THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

WITH INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

BY

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BOOKS I.—V.

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PREFACE.

In the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the *Politics* in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a *nova impressio correctior* was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the *impressio* of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.
Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the Politics as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society and Journal of Philology by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-
ant of the references to the recently discovered Constitution of Athens. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman’s, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of Quaestiones Aristotelicae I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven Quaestiones are combined, as Quaestiones criticae collectae, although the last word collectae forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of Home Life of the Greeks, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors’ initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel’s recent work on that subject reached me.
The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

Trinity College, Cambridge,
Oct. 15, 1894.
ON REFERENCES TO THE POLITICAL BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS, SECTIONS, PAGES.

The text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight books in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ E Z H 0 according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ Η 0 Δ Z E). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldine and other early printed editions, any more than in the MSS. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus, the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of chapters here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the left hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the Index Aristotelicus to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolini), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanius (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner’s “vulgo.” In this new complete arrangement Book I. makes eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The sections into which Bekker’s chapters are divided, are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker’s pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott’s Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the Politiee by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with a prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the right side of the page are these, introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Gotting
ON REFERENCES TO THE POLITICS.

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879): Grote in his history always cites the Politics by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the chapter, page, column, and line of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the Politics occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the Index Aristotelicus 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the left hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded: (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, not of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the right hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus: (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι κρῆ προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the Index Aristotelicus would be Πβ§, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections: or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879; but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. 51 § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, 1 f.
# CONTENTS.

## INTRODUCTION.

- I. Manuscripts and editions .................................................. 1
- II. Compilation and history .................................................. 11
- III. General estimate .......................................................... 19
- IV. Economic—Slavery and Wealth .......................................... 23
- V. Review of predecessors .................................................... 32
- VI. Leading Principles ........................................................ 37
- VII. Monarchy and the best state ......................................... 44
- VIII. Pathology of the existing Constitutions ........................... 56
- IX. Date and connexion with Ethics ....................................... 66
- X. Recent criticism of the text.
  - Comparative worth of manuscripts .................................... 71
  - Dislocations and double recensions ................................... 78

## ANALYSIS

- ................................................................. 98
  Symbols and Abbreviations ............................................ 136

## TEXT AND COMMENTARY.

### Book I.

- Excursus I. Epimenides .................................................. 138
- Excursus II. On i. c. 6 .................................................... 204
- Excursus III. The relation of \( \chiρ\eta\mu\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\iota \) to \( \sigma\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\sigma\iota \) ........... 209
- Note on i. 13. 12 .................................................................. 211
- Note on i. 2. 13. 1753 a 30—4 ........................................... 213

### Book II.

- Note on Arcadia .............................................................. 316
- Excursus I. The matriarchate .............................................. 326
- Excursus II. Hippodamia .................................................... 331
- Note on the Cretan ............................................................ 334
- Excursus III. Sparta and Crete .......................................... 338
- Excursus IV. Carthage ......................................................... 340
- Excursus V. Solon ............................................................... 350
- Excursus VI. Thales .......................................................... 351
### CONTENTS

**Book III.**
- Excursus I. Classification of Constitutions 354
- Excursus II. Pittacus 447
- Excursus III. The Vatican fragments 451
- Note on the basis of the text 454

**Book IV (VII).**
- Excursus I. On ἐξωτερικὴς λόγος 469
- Note on IV (VII). 11. 6, 13 30 b 26 561
- Excursus II. The age of superannuation 566

**Book V (VIII).**
- Excursus I. Aristotle’s scheme of education 569
- Excursus II. The Compositions of Olympus 619
- Excursus III. Ethos or character 621
- Excursus IV. Ancient Greek Music 622
- Excursus V. Suggestions on the text 624
- Note on κάθαρσις 638

**Addenda**
- 659
CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2: for M. read Isaac
P. 18, note 7, line 4: for politieuw read politieuw.
P. 26, line 14: for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans p. 43, n. 373)
P. 69, note 2, line 3: for νομον read νομον
   1b. line 4: for politieuw read politieuw
P. 82, line 2: for diáplan read diáplan (cp. below p. 312)
P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17: for μάλιστα δ' τοις κατά φέους
   read μάλιστα δε κατά φέους
   1b. commentary, right column, last line: for eisicheic read coesichec
P. 146, critical notes, line 3: after 28 insert ἥν
P. 147, text, 1253 a 3: omit ἐκατ.
   1b. critical notes, line 6: transpose
   φ omitted by Π² Bk
   to precede ἐκατ Μ³
   That is, the φ omitted by Π² Bk is in 1253 a 3 before ἀνθρώπου. Strike read
   ἀνθρώπου: cp. Addenda p. 663
P. 150, crit. notes, line 5: for Quaeest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read Quaeest. crit. coll.
   (Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff
   1b. line 8: dele Αξ.
P. 151, crit. notes, line 8: after Quaeest. Cr. III. 5 ff., IV. 5 ff. insert Quaeest. crit.
   coll. p. 336 ff
P. 153, crit. notes, line 4: after Quaeest. Cr. III. 7 ff. insert Quaeest. crit. coll. p. 339 f
P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin: for (p. read (p. 6)
P. 157, text, 1254 a 27: for ἀδ and read ἀδ
   1b. crit. notes, line 3: for Dittographia read Dittography
   crit. notes, line 9: after ἀδ read ΠΠ Bk.¹ Susen.¹-²
P. 160, text, 1254 b 14: omit καλ
P. 161, crit. notes, line 1: after 18 insert λεκτετ
P. 176, crit. notes, line 9: after Quaeest. Cr. III. 3 ff. insert Quaeest. crit. coll. p. 332 f
P. 178, comm. left column, line 9: for διερωθήτων read διερώθηται
P. 180, crit. notes, line 3: for ὑπ read ὑπ
P. 182, text, 1257 a 38: for καλ δέ read καλ δέ
P. 183, comm. left col. line 8: for 5 read see
   1b. line 9: for μετατάδειπνων read μετατάδειπνων
P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below: after selling insert and
CORRIGENDA.

P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: after citizens insert a comma
P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: for [kal] read kal
P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: remove 9 from line 30 to line 31
   Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: for μέρος read μέρος
P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: remove 10 from line 35 to line 36
P. 209, To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. I. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672
P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: for καὶ έτ read καὶ ετ
P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: for III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 § 2,

iv (VII). 8 § 4,
P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: for Bk. read Bk.¹
P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: for ἔξει, πᾶσι read ἔξει πᾶσι,
P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: for i. 126 read 1. 141 § 3
P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: for 1. 9, 9 read 1. 7, 2, 1255 b 24 f
P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: for προσεδρεύοντες read προσεδρεύοντοσ
P. 265, text, 1267 a 11: for δόναυτο read βοιλαυτο
P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: for II. § 9 read c. 11 § 9
P. 279, crit. notes, last line: after Ephesus insert op. c. fol. 186b p. 610, 16 ft.
ed. Hayduck
P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: for evidences read evidence
P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: for δει νομίζεων ειναι read ειναι δει νομίζεων
P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: read διαφέτεια
P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: for 8 § 6 read 7 § 6
P. 297, comm. left col. line 19: for p. 9 read p. 20
P. 300, comm. left col. last line: for Ottfried read Ottrfried
P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: for πολεμίων read πόλεων
P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: for δυνατῶν read δυνατῶν
   Ib. crit. notes, line 7: after Schneider || add δυνατῶν II Susem.¹²
P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: for τι read τι
   Ib. text, 1272 b 23: for τοσαύθ' ἡμῶν εἰρήσθω read εἰρήσθω τοσαύθ' ἡμῶν
P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (bis, line 4 and line 18): for ἀπορίαν read εὑρόριαν
   Ib. crit. notes, line 3: for 6 εὑρόριαν PII²Ar. read
6 εὑρόριαν ΓΜ²Ald. Bk. Susem.¹²
P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: dele (12)
P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: dele Aristeides
P. 326, line 9: for IV. 130 read IV. 180
P. 331, heading, line 13: for Η. 7. 1 read Η. 8. 1
P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: for βολαίαν read βδλαιάι
P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: dele (2)
P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: for φαυλῶν read ἐφαμέν
   Ib. text, 1276 a 10: read δημοκρατία (τότε γάρ
P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: dele * *
   and read συμφερόντοι; εἰπερ οὖν
The parenthesis extends from 1276 a 10 (τότε γάρ to 1276 a 13 συμφερόντοι)
   Ib. text, 1276 a 14: for καὶ read [καὶ]
   Ib. text, 1276 a 15: omit <ον>
   Ib. text, 1276 a 16: for τυραννίδος. read τυραννίδος;
   Ib. crit. notes, line 3: after 14 read [καὶ] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)
   Ib. crit. notes, line 4: dele incorrect
   Ib. crit. notes, line 5: after Hayduck add Susem.¹²
COEIGENDA.

P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: for τὴν read [τὴν]

CXLIII. 1891, p. 444
P. 365, text, 1276 b 30: for δοσιπ read δος
P. 370, comm. left col. last line: for διαντατ read διανται
P. 380, text, 1278 b 8: for καλ ει read καν ει
P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: after (corrector) add a semicolon
P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: for vii(v) read viii(v)
P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: with change of punctuation read έτσιν (έδοξε γάρ, δικαιών)
P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: transpare failon to proceed έξωντα and read έξωντι έξωντα γε τά συμβαλοντα τάδη περί την ψυχήν αλλα μη ρημαν.
P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: for αρχευν read αρχευ
   Ib. line 23: for έτυδυμα read έτυδυμα
   Ib. line 26: for δ read δ
P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευδέντας read πιστευδέντας
   Ib. crit. notes, line 10: after right insert a comma and read πιστευδέντας Π fr.

Bk. 1 Susem. 12
P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: for συ read συ
P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: after turn out insert anyhow, i.e. "
P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: for πιστευδέντας read πιστευδέντας
P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: for dittographia read dittography
P. 464, line 44: for 24 read 23
P. 467, line 5 ff.: dele the sentence. Again, one might have imagined...πολιτεία.
Not so.
P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: for καί read [καί]
P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: for τρέτι read [τρέτι]
   Ib. crit. notes, line 2: for υπάρχοντα read υπάρχοντα
P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: for of δε read αδε
P. 524, text, 1330 b 30: for τόλμη τοιείρ read μη τοιείρ τόλμη
P. 539, text, 1332 a 13: οριζει καί before ἀναγγείλατε
P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: for 1184 read 1154
P. 535, text, 1333 b 31: for τότων τών τότων read πάντων τών τότων
P. 537, text, 1334 a 26: transpare διηγήσατα το προκει και τότο τὸ μέρος
   Ib. comm. right col. line 17: for correlation read correlative
P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f.: for viii(v). § 10, 7 § 2 read viii(v). 1 § 10, 7 § 4
P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: for ἀνίκην read ἀνίκη
P. 545, head line: for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40
P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: for τῆςκεν ἐγγίσκαται read ἐγγίσκαται τῆςκεν
P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: for χρόνον ψάμμισιν read ψάμμισιν χρόνον
P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: for θεα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν θεα

Not so.
INTRODUCTION.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF THE POLITICS.

Aristotle’s Politics has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P* and P* (Bekker’s P*), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Aretinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274, by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex which we will call Γ; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date. This translation, primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P* and one at Milan M*, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Aretinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Aretinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

1 Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1429 at the request of Palla Strozzi; see the evidence for this in Oncken Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1870. 8vo) vol. 1. p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, Aristotelis Politicorum libri sexti cum recentioribus translationibus Gulielmi de Moerbeke (Leipzig 1872. 8vo) p. XV.
3 Thomas Aquinas twice quotes it in the Summa contra Gentiles, writing probably A.D. 1261—1265. Tr.]
4 The best manuscript of this ‘Old Translation’ expressly states it. See Susemihl op. cit. XXXIV. See also below p. 49 n. 3, p. 71 ff.
5 On the date see Susemihl op. cit. 810.
6 With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides Π the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M* = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund:

P* = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p*, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.). corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P* was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P* the two families are blended, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P, the principal manuscript of this second family; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P*; so also of Aretinus’ translation and especially of P3; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

---

1 On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato’s Republic is quoted in a gloss on viii (v.) 12. 8, which in all probability (see note 4) proceeds from this archetype: on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncial (particularly iii. 14 §§ 12, 13 οὐσίων and οὐσίων for θυσίων and θυσίων). Now uncial writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susenohl op. c. xiv f., xlvii f.

2 Ordinis superioris.

3 Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

4 For the same glosses which in P* can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P3, and a similar origin may be proved for others in P2 in another way. On the other hand P2 has few glosses in common with P3, and the number in P3 is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susenohl op. c. viii f., xviii f.
Aristotle's *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Arctinus and in a different way by C'. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class: II.

P² = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's P²; last collated by Susenmühl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink: these are indicated hereafter by (corr.¹), (corr.²), (corr.³) and p⁴ respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.'). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P⁴ = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P², especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P² than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P⁴, like P², was last collated by Susenmühl.

II. Worse class: II.

1. First group.

P¹ = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susenmühl.

P¹ = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthelemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and E. Rohde.

M^b = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for i. c. i—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

U^b = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for ii. cc. 1—7; iii. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; vi (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; viii (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for i. cc. 1—4.

L^s = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinæ) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U^b, collated by Patzig for i. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books i. ii. and v (viii). from Stahr and Schneider.

C^c denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Aretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

2. Second group.

C^t = Florentinus Castiglionensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4; ii. 1—2 § 3; vi (iv). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q^b = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for i. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books ii. iii. vi (iv).

R^b = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thettalos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books vii (vi), viii (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q^b, particularly to the corrections of Q^b in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S^b = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q^b, to which it bears an extraordinary resem-
Manuscripts.

blance; collated by Bekker for Books 1, iv (vii), v (viii), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. 1, and for single passages elsewhere.

TV = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. v (viii), then again by Hinck for Bk. 1, i—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to Vb than to Qb, Rb, Sb.

Vb = Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thetatalos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. iv (vii), vi (iv), viii (v), by Hinck for Bk. 1, i—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. 1. i—4) are in striking agreement with C
t.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to U1 L8, than to the second.

Wb = Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. viii (vi), by Hinck for Bk. 1. i—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. 1. i—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by P = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall1. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

1 Nor is P4 now quoted under II2 II3 or II5 in the critical notes of this edition.
manuscript now contains only Bk. viii (v). from c. 6 § 9 onwards, Bk. vii (vi). Bk. iv (vii). and Bk. v (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl 1.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides Π M⁵ P¹-²-³-⁴ Ar., are:

for I. 1—4: P⁵ C Q M⁵ B⁷ Q⁷ R⁵ S⁵ T⁵ U⁵ V⁵ W⁵ L⁵ Ald. for VI (iv). 1: C² Q⁶ V⁶.

I. 4—6 § 8: Q M⁵ S⁵ T⁵. for VI (iv). 2—3 § 7: Q⁶ V⁶.

II. 1, 2: C² Q⁶ T⁵ U⁵. for VI (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 4: Q⁶ U⁵ V⁵.

II. 3—7 § 21: Q⁶ T⁵ U⁵. for VI (iv). 4 § 4—7 § I: Q⁶ V⁵.

II. 8—III. 2 § 3: Q⁶ T⁵. for VI (iv). 6 § 2—8 § 6: Q⁶ U⁵ V⁵.

III. 2 § 3: Q⁶ T⁵ U⁵. for VI (iv). 8 § 6—16 § 8 (end): Q⁶ V⁵.

III. 2 § 3—14 § 1: Q⁶ T⁵. for VII (vi): P⁴ R⁵ W⁵.

III. 14 §§ 2—10: Q⁶ T⁵ U⁵. for VIII (v): 1—3 § 5: R⁶ V⁵.

III. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end): Q⁶ T⁵. for VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10: R⁵ U⁵ V⁵.

IV (vii): P⁵ S⁵ V⁵. for VIII (v). 4 § 11—6 § 8: R⁵ V⁵.

V (viii): P⁵ S⁵ T⁵. for VIII (v). 6 § 9—12 § 18 (end): P⁵ R⁵ V⁵.

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthélemy St Hilaire.

Π denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,

Π¹ that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including Π,

Π² that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding P⁵,

Π³ that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (i.e. all the mss. known except Π M⁵ P¹ P² P³ P⁵), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas.¹-²-³ denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

¹ For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl l. c. pp. V—XXVIII.
though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Götting's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P² ¹ ² ³ ⁴ and of a few leaves of M², which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P¹ ² ³ M² and almost completely P⁴ ⁵, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P⁴ (Bekker's I⁴) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the textus receptus. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II, the consensus of the mss. of the first family, viz. I, M², P¹: failing that, upon P² ³. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (Ed. eth. ii. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch τετάρτου μεγαλού, etc.

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

Sepulveda. Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.
Camot. The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.
Vettori (Victorius). First edition of the Politics; Florence, 1552. 4; a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori¹, Vettori².
Camerarius. Politiorum et Economicorum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.
Zwinger. Edition of the Politics; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

¹ Further particulars in Suschil's larger edition as quoted above, p. 814 ff. References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Montecatino. Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the Politics; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. i), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider’s edition, II. p. v.
Scaliger. See Scaligeriana published by Oncken in Eos 1. 1864. 410 ff.
Helmstadt. In Politics; Leipzig, 1865. 8.
Göttling. Edition of the Politics; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist. (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. De loco quodam Arist. (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings Opusc. acad. ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
A. Stahr. Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
Lindau. German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
Bojesen. *Bidrag til Fortællingen om Aristoteles’ Boger om Staten*; Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Sorøer Programmes).

Nickes. *De Aristotelis Politicorum libris*; Bonn, 1831. 8 (Degree dissertation).


Rassow. Short Gymnasium-Programmes: *Observationes criticæ in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik*; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristotelicae*, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik*, Weimar, 1862. 4.


Schnitzer. *Zu Arist. Pol.,* an article in *Ev.*, i. 1864. 409—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osiander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1836. 10.


Büchenshütz. An article on i. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcvi. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.


Madvig. *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos;* Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.


Bücheler. In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my *Quaestiones criticae;* Greifswald, 1867. 4.


Vahlen. *Aristotelische Aufsätze II;* Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in *Philol. Anzeiger v.* 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn. XXI.,* 1870. 828—830.


Trieber. In communications with me by letter.


Diebitsch. Degree diss., *De rerum conexu in Arist. libro de re pub.;* Breslau, 1875. 8.

Heitland. Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.; Cambridge, 1876. 8.


Bender. *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen;* Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.

Freudenthal. In communications with me by letter.


Postgate. *Notes on the text and matter of the Politics;* Cambridge, 1877. 8.

Von Kirchmann. *German translation with notes;* Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).

Tegge. In oral communications to me.


II. The Compilation and Subsequent History of the Treatise.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the Poetics he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, ἐφημα δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔκκλησιμένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely On Poets. Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, "histories" of plants and animals. But not the Poetics, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up "our Aristotle," to use Grote's phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle's own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle's master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the Phaedrus. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master's

1 [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper On the composition of Aristotle's Politics in Verhandlungen der xxxv. Philosophen-Versammlung, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1870), and from the Introduction to the Poetics (Greek and German), edited by Susnagh (Leipzig, 1874, ed. 2) 1-6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, Phil. u. Griechen III ii chap. 4, 126—138, which should be compared.] See also Jahrbücher f. Phil. 1871, 122—134, Revisian's Jahrbuch xvii. 1870, 254; and Zeller On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching in Hermes xli. 1879, 94—96.

2 276 d 1 εἴρηκεν τις ἐκκλησιμένος διδάσκαλος ἀμφοτέρως, et το Μήδος γέγονεν πάντας, καὶ παντὶς ὁ Μήδος ἐξαντλάται, 278 a ἄλλοι γέγονεν πολλοὶ διδάγοντες, ἐπιστρέφοντες εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσαγωγὴν γεγονοῦσιν.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

dearth Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physica* in his possession. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics* and, that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physica* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*; the latter part of *Politics* iv (vii). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as *politeia akroasis*, while *physika akroasis* is still the title borne by the *Physica* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at


3 Alexander, *Schol. in Arist.* 158 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and Simplicius ib. 509 a 6: see Zeller ii 71.

4 Staatslehre des Arist. i. 60 (1).

5 Diog. Laert. v. 24.

6 See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Susemihl *Jahrb. für Phil.* ciii. 1871. 122—124.
first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be either that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakable, as when we compare the Posterior with the Prior Analytics, or the third book of the Psychology with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle. If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopaedia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

1 As in the Metaphysics, K cc. 1—7 = B.F.E.; A cc. 1—5; M cc. 4. 5 = A c. 9.
2 In the Physics, Bk. VII, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, are other instances only less striking than those named.
3 So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastus' library contains a gross exaggeration; see now Burn's Jahrbuch. IX. 338; XVI. 243 f.
arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, and in some measure in the Poetics; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the Physics in the latter part of Bk. XI (K) of the Metaphysics and in part of what is now Bk. v (Δ) of the same work.

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the Politics, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand. There is only one transition from Metaph. VI (Ε) to VII (Ζ) see Bonitz II 294-]

4 That the work in its present shape is as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of Krohn Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften I 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polenaar Tirocinia critica in Aristotelis Politica (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the Poetics, 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastos and other Peripatetics, or, as Polenaar thinks, by additions of their own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Krohn's, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Krohn does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the Politics, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. II, in which only "isolated pillars" of Aristotle's structure have been left
passage of any length, iv (vii). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil 1. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work 2. Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated; and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable; see below p. 33 n. 4. The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos. Plut. Frissoed.: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on iii. 14.9 (674). In the principal part of Bk. iv (vii) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Nisaulph (Anon. Alcrath. 5:78 later) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. v (viii) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. vi (iv), of which c. 15 together with vii (vi). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. viii (v) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos. Plut. caper: comp. nn. on iii. 14. 9 (674) and vii (vii). 9 (1720)5. There are some resemblances to the Arapogastica of Isocrates; see on iii. 3 § 5. § 9. 6 § 10. § 11. 11 § 19. iv (vii). 4 § 5. vi (iv). 9 § 7. vii (vii). 5 § 10. viii (v). 1 § 2. Yet Spengel's assertion "tothen Isocrates Arapogasticum in summum Aristotelis verum, tam multi sunt loci, qui cadam tradunt" (Aristotelicae Studia III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as approved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in Philol. Anzeiger v. 1893. 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. v (vii) is that ἐπαινεται, ἐπαινεται are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings.—ἐπαινεται only in the Problems, ἐπαινεται only in the dialogue On Philosophy,—whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

1 But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see note on iv (vii). 1 § 6. § 13. Another well-written chapter is vi (iv). 11, and this even Krohn regards as part of "the well preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even here to forget out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Sussebdl. cit. p. 679. 2 To start from the internal connection of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polumar lose all valid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard mere disconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Sussebdl. cit. p. 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly remarks that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their exclusive the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reknowing glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

same topic; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous lacunae of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether. The right order has often been disturbed. The two grossest instances are that Books vii and viii should come before Bk. iv, and Bk. vi before Bk. v (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us). No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient. For to all appearance

II. 8 § 1 (δρ...βουλόμενος), 10 §§ 3, 4,
12 §§ 6—14:
III. 17 §§ 3, 4;
IV (vii). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9:
V (viii). 7 §§ 13, 14;
VI (iv). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19.
VIII (vi). 2 § 7 (ἐρ...βανοβλικα), 2 § 9—
3 § 6:

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 § 15; III.
14 § 15, 15 §§ 11; VI (iv). 7 § 5, 14 § 5.
On vI (iv). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65
n. (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master.

As to the doubts recently cast upon IV
(vii). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (vii).
13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and n. on IV (vii). 13 § 8 (881).

Besides the end of Bk. III and the beginning of IV (vii) see II. 7 §§ 10—13
=7 §§ 18—21, III. 15 §§ 7—10 = 10 §§ 10
—13; IV (vii). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2;
VIII (v). 1 § 1; 7 § 11; 10 § 24 = 10 § 25.

See particularly 1. 8 § 3; 10 § 1, 12
§ 1; 11. 2 § 6. 5 § 2, 11 § 5;
III. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, 6, 16 § 2;
IV (vii). 11 §§ 2, 13 §§ 11, 14 § 7;
V (viii). 7 § 15;
VI (iv). 8 § 7, 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;
VII (vi). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;
VIII (v). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 25, 12 § 11,
§ 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: "necem aristoteliam quasi stellis
illustrare sagnet". Gottling sneeringly
writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. LII.

[On these transpositions see pp. 78
—95.]

The one transposition was first made
by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his
French translation, not published until
long afterwards (Paris 1489): and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Flo-
rence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scaino
da Salo Quinque Quaestiones ad octo libros de republica (Rome 1577), Conring, Bar-
thélemy St Hilaire, Spengel Ueber die
Politik Transactions of the Munich Acad.
V. I ff. Arist. Studien II. 44 ff. (Munich
1865), Nickes De Arist. Politicorum libris
(Bonn 1851), Brandis in his history Griech.
Röm. Philos. II ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and
by others. It has been disputed without
success, amongst others by Woltmann in
the Rheinisches Museum (New Series) 1.
1842. 321—354, Forchhammer in Philo-
logus XVI. 1861. 50—68, Bendixen in Phi-
logenig XIII. 1858. 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff.,
XVI. 408 ff. and in Der alte Staat des
Aristoteles (Hamburg 1863. 4to), by
Krohn op. c. 30, and Diebitsch De rerum
consci Arist. libris de re publica (Bres-
lau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly
assumed by Conring; the first who ac-
tually made it and tried to demonstrate
it was St Hilaire. He was followed by
Spengel and even by Woltmann, but was
opposed not merely by Bendixen, For-
chhammer, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even
by Hildenbrand Geschichte und System
der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie I (Leip-
zig 1860) 371 ff., and by Zeller op. cit. II
ii 672 f. n. (2), although they have ac-
cepted the first transposition, Hildenbrand
under certain conditions and Zeller unre-
reservedly. See below p. 58 n. 2.

[On these transpositions see pp. 78
—95.]
even the epitome in Stobaeus presents the traditional arrangement; and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Aristo.

1 Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said, the text of the Politics has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a Politics in the Alexandrian library attributed to some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos; consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laerte and in the Anonymus of Menage. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippos of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian Politics; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise. And it is

highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—101 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippos and Apellikon of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal, while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—for except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero. It is true he did not use it directly and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty, and it is in

(VII). 1. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 27; and End. Eth. II. 1. 1319 a 33 with Pol. IV (VII). 8. 5, 1328 a 35.

1 See Strabo L.C., Plutarch L.C.

2 Polenar op. cit. p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

3 De fin. v. 4, 11, ad Quint. fratr. III. 5. 1, De leg. III. 6, 14, De rep. I. c. 25 (comp. Pol. III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 f., 1. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. Pol. III. 1 § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2). c. 27 (cp. Pol. III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. Pol. VI. 1 (iv. cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (op. c. 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation ad Quint. fr.

4 See Zeller op. c. II ii 151 n. (6).

5 So Zeller L.C. Whether the author of the Magna Moralia in I. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with Politics (VII). 13, 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

6 Cp. ad Att. IV. 4 b § 1, 8 a § 2, ad Qu. fr. II. 4 § 2, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single work of the Politics of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work 2.

III. General Estimate.

At the time when the Politics was first made known to medieval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood 5, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it "the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science" 6. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature 7. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations increases the improbability of Krahn's assertion mentioned p. 15 n. above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that Pol. III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastus. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

1 See above p. 1.

5 That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain: "Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote," 454 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition vi iv. 41 & 83. [Von Hartling in K. Mus. xxxix. 1884. 446-457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus died 1280.]

6 On this subject generally see Osler, "L. O. 1. 64, 65. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oreime: cp. Roscher in the Zeitschr. f. d. Staatswissenschaft xix. 1863, 205 ff.

7 Zeller op. cit. 754 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in Hellenica (Oxford, 1870) ch. 3-18. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Holland's translation of Arist. De Gen. 1. III. 19 (1871) p. 13 (London 1877, 9). "Indeed, when we come to analyze his method we find three inaccessible elements, really scientific inquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally submit fortis altera veritas, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant Aristotele 417 ff.

8 Zeller op. cit. 757, 708.

2-2
of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own\(^1\) and Plato's\(^2\) cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers\(^3\).

The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

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1 I. 3. 4 with n. (31), I. 6 §§ 1—5

2 Laws 1. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cp. on the latter passage n. on II. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildbrand op. cit. 395 n. (2).

evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the Republic and the Laws; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them'. Further, the Laws proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the Republic of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

1 I may refer to the notes on
I. 13. 16 (127) IV (VII). 6. 5 (774).
II. 6. 5 (158) IV (VII). 12. 2 (859).
II. 5. 15 (160) IV (VII). 15. 10 (926).
II. 6. 10 (208) IV (VIII). 16. 12 (944).
II. 7. 6 (236 B) IV (VIII). 16. 15 (946).
II. 9. 23 (312) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025).
also to Throuet Léves sur Aristote 100 ff. (Paris 1866. 8). Van der Keist Platon et Aristote 452 ff. (Brussels 1876. 8).
Reference may be permitted to the notes on the following passages:
Bk. I. 2 § 2 n. (21); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8 (54); 9 § 18 (93); 10 § 4. 5 (98); 11 § 6 (103); 13 § 12 (131); 14 § 16 (147).
Bk. II. 5 § 11. 1 (153); 5 § 16 (167); 8 § 17 (168); 19—24 (172); 5 § 192; 6 § 6 (201); 6 § 9 (266 b) (327).
6 § 15 (315); 8 § 24 (373) (274); 18 § 25 (277); 9 § 2 (279); 9 § 8 (283) (284).
9 § 11 (292 b); 9 § 13 (207); 9 § 20 (210).
9 § 25 (326); 9 § 27 (328); 9 § 21 (341).
9 § 34 (341).
Bk. III. 3 § 9 (477); 4 § 10 (498).
7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 11 (641).
Bk. IV (VII). 6 § 5 (774); 7 § 8 (781).
10 § 13 (818); 12 § 2 (829); 12 § 3 (868).
12 § 8 (869) (907); 14 § 13 (907) (934).
(908); 18 § 10 (931); 10 § 10 (937).
13 § 3 (944); 16 § 14 (948); 16 § 16 (950).
16 § 17 (951); 17 § 10 (952); 17 § 5 (957).
Bk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1000); 4 § 7 (1014).
4 § 9 (1015) (1014); 7 § 2 (1020).
6 § 2 (1024); 6 § 9 (1027); 7 § 2 (1026).
Bk. VI IV. 1 § 1 (1114).
Bk. VI (VI). 1 § 1 (1140).
Bk. VIII (VI). 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10 (1724) (1725); 11 § 11 (1727).
(1729); 12 § 8 (1753); 13 § 9 (1754).
the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting. Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

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1 I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff Aus Kythäthen 47–54 (Berlin 1880. 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

2 Comp. on 1. 2. 4 note (11), 1. 2. 6 n. (19b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, op. c. 110–113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

3 See the notes on 1. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).
CONTRAST TO PLATO.

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former under the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular. By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premises, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

IV. ECONOMIC (OIKONOMIKH)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH.

The opening chapters, Bk. i. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important that man, and

See the notes on I. i § 3, 3 § 4, 7 § 1, 2.
See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 § 14—16 and note on II. 2. 3 (131).
On this and the following sections comp. Susemihl, op. cit. On the composition of the Politics 17—19.
Mommseu's account in the History of Greece, i cc. 3. p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877. 8), may be compared.

* Van der Rest, op. i. 372. That form of thus proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (op. cit. ii. 29 f.) maintains, is undeniable; yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 29) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, known, is either exalted above humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own spontaneous act\(^1\), quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them\(^2\).

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (οἰκονομική 1. cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4 ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes\(^3\), Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age\(^4\); and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time\(^5\). Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as when Aristotle wrote it.

\(^1\) Hildenbrand op. cit. 393 f., Oncken op. cit. 11. 18 f. Comp. n. on 1. 2. 15 (28 b).

\(^2\) Poet. c. 4 §§ 1—6.

\(^3\) See on 1. 5 § 9 n. (46). 6 § 8 (54).

\(^4\) Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Senecæ's remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Lecky History of Rationalism 11. 258 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847. 4) and Oncken op. cit. 11. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that servitude was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, e.g. that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the coolie traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. H. W. J.]

\(^5\) So Hildenbrand rightly thinks op. c. 405.
difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect: that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite'. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved'. 'The thought that slavery is incompatible with 'the dignity of man' has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet 'the thought of the universality of man's dignity'*. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave's soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature's freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery'. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs'. Yet in all fairness it ought to

1 See on 1. 4 § 2, 5 § 8, 9 n. (45). 6 § 3, § 8 n. (55), § 9 n. (56), § 10 n. (57).
Compare also the notes on 1. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.
2 Heldenbrand 19, 78, 404 f.
3 Comp. the notes on 1. 5 § 9 (86), and 6 § 3 (52).
4 See the notes on 1. 4 § 8 (44) and 5 § 9 (42).
be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar fallacies. Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him.

The more general discussions on production and property which follow the investigation into slavery, i. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner', but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (i. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole.

1 Oncken op. cit. ii. 73 f.
2 Oncken op. cit. ii. 38.
3 On this subject see some remarks of Lang, op. c. 60, and Bradley op. c. 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on i. 5, 10 (47) and iii. 5, 7 (511).
4 [Both are included under ἀρματιστική. The Greek κτησις and the German 'Erf- werk' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, Soph. 219 c, d, opposes κτήτικη to ποιητική, classing all the 'arts' under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth. Tr.]
5 As Teichmüller asserts Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudämonie 148 (St Petersburg 1859. 8).
6 Zeller op. c. ii 693.
7 See on i. 12. 1 n. (107).
However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. 'The axiom that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures of the earth, we also hold to be true'; and the proposition, which Aristotle is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man’s relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing: in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsmen who wander without a home; nor does he bring it into in separable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture. Agriculture moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades, and the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsmen, the hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and with even less trouble than they do; thus the notion of individual labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background 'in Aristotle’s view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a further natural species of production standing on the same footing with the former species.' Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

1. *op. cit. II. 75-114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.
3. *See IV (VII). 9. 3. 4 o'te *βδάντον βίον *μητ' ἀγαπάωσε δι’ ἧς ταρακεφαλαία
4. *Add the ἔγγραφα χρόν. 5. ἔγγραφα χρόν.
plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated, but the whole discussion is evidence 'how acutely Aristotle has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in 'the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited 'with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here 'accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of 'the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so 'exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to 'add.' Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

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1 See on 1. 8. 7 n. (71) and 1. 9. 8 n. (82).
2 Van der Rest op. c. p. 382.
him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature' in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself, but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations, gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it. The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual. Of industry as

1 See on 1. 9. 8 u. (87).
2 See on 1. 9. 8 u. (84).
3 But see on the other hand the note on 1. 9. 11 (87).
4 Cps. on 1. 9. 11 u. (88).
5 Comp. the notes on 1. 9. III (92), 18 (91).
understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than 'of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, 'that 'second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the 'forces of nature'. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible 'to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aris-totle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, 'is not a producer at all, but 'consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the 'true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to 'overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her 'smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aris-totle took of money it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age, he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that 'the free community of antiquity 'was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on 'the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is here (I. 11 §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a know ledge of the market. Consequently 'the separation which Aristotle has 'made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly 'maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, 'for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a 'field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound 'remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while 'speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

1 Cp. n. on 1. 9. 18 (93). Lang op. c. 59. [See however Cunning-ham Christian Opinion on Usury pp. 26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]
2 Cp. nn. on 1. 10 §§ 4, 5.
3 Comp. Lecky op. c. 11. 277—289,
essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the πολιτικός who controls the finances of a state as well as the oisινήωρος who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedures in both cases are completely similar': 1. 8 13—15, 10 1—3. This agrees the decided irony with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with 'perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life 'and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a 'circle of several families (1. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when 'intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in 'a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of 'each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenableness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly 'manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (ἀρετή) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue, as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays.  

1 Strangely misunderstood by Ockeen l.c. II. 113, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states used such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.

2 On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on 1. 13, 6 in (112).

3 Van der Rest a.p. c. 378. Comp. also n.n. on 1. 13 17 (114 b) and on 11—12 (130—131).

4 See the n.n. on 1. 13, 12.
V. The Review of Preceding Theories and Approved Constitutions.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, iii. 15 § 2, vi (iv). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable¹ that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phales, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses² of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's Republican ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human nature and of political and domestic life.' Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well-meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism⁴ have disclosed very little that will

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¹ If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1130); also Hildbrand op. c. 351 ff., Zeller op. c. 11 ii 677.
³ Zeller op. c. 11 ii 697 f.
⁴ The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto (Halle 1868. 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pinzer De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit (Leipzig 1822. 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.
stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's Laws. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phæleas, 7 § 6 f. Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the Laws disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character. The refutation of

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1 See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), 3 (146), 4 (147), 6 (150) (152): 6 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), 16 (167), 20—23 (173), 35 (183), 27 (184).

2 See on II. 5 § 17 (168), 19 (170), 24 (179), 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187), 189; also on 22 (177), 6 § 19 (193).


4 Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest op. cit. 108 ff., 121 f., 222 f., 348 ff.; but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5, 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

5 See on II. 5. 8.

6 See on II. 5 § 7 n. (168), § 16 n. (169), § 8 n. (176 b). How Van der Rest op. cit. 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

7 It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Böckler, Pauly-Wissowa, quaest. Consider. Plat. et Arist., disquisition. ut commendat: Heising, 1834, N. Orges Comparativae Plato Petronius aut Aristoteles liberum de republica (Berlin 1843). 8. Priem, Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansichten vom Staat in der Klasse, Mon. xiii. 1858, 1—48, 209—247, Rassow, Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat der Aristoteles (Weimar 1866). 4—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the Republic, or, being Left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the Laws and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 5 (197), 16 (200), 14 (213); 7 § 3 (241), 10 (136 b): 9 § 3 (284): IV. (131) 16 § 15.

8 See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (193), 15 (190), § 5 (192) (193), 6 (201), 7
Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance.

We may admit then with Oncken that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view; and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it. However much to the purpose the

(204), § 9 (206 b), § 10 (208), § 13 (210), § 14 (212), § 15 (213–215), § 18 (220), § 19 (225–227).

1 See nn. on II. § 5 (192), § 10 (208), §§ 12, 13 (209) (210), 7 § 5 (234).

2 See nn. II. 5 § 15 (105 b), 7 § 8 (238).

3 op. c. 1. 191 f.

4 See the Excursus II on Hippodamos at the end of Bk. II.

5 See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.
objections which he brings against Hippodamos, with regard to his division of the civic body; they are defective from the jurist's point of view; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (iii. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as ipso facto disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions: indeed apart from it we should know next to

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1 Compare the notes on ii. 8 § 2 (25), § 9 (26), § 24 (276) : but on the other hand ii. 8 1 12 n. 1268.
2 See the notes on ii. 8 § 5 (258), § 15 (268).
3 Trieb Ot Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfasungsgeschichte 99 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavours to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. Here I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. 12 f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert "Studien zur altpart.

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8) Constitutions of Crete, Carthage, and Sparta, 1871. 8" endeavours to show that on the contrary Ephoros made use of the Politia of Aristotle. Frick in the Jahrb. für Philol. 1872 p. 657 made reply to to that Ephoros work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said 345: for all that follows was added by Demophilos, the son of Ephoros, probably after his father's death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his Politia as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Müller, Fragen. Hist. Gr. ii p. 111. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Müller on the authority of Meier, Rose Aristot. pandegraphus p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the Helots did not appear until the period between the years 318 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz Die vorherigen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig 1865. 8) p. 245 sq., Aristot. fragm. (p. 243 in the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true au-

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4 See with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible : see the notes on ii. 9 § 17 (312); 10 § 1, 2 (342, 354). § 5 (359) : VII. 9). 10 (1493), 7 9 (1592), 11 12 (1571), and compare Rose op. cit. 298, 492. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephoros was Aristotle's only authority.
nothing of the Carthaginian constitution: moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own patterns were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master. On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and Spartan constitutions as they are described in the works of Ephoros, and that too in spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Triebner op. cit. p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement? Why should not a part of the mistsichs discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and banefulness? And the procedure which Triebner commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on 11.9.35 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Triebner and others - that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times - particularly credible; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Fülleborn, in a note to Garve's translation 11. p. 242 says most sensibly: 'Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history .... and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind.' But should not this consideration be extended to other cases? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right? See the notes on 11.9.5(299), §15 (300), §15 (303).

1 Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself 11.9.§34 (cp. note). See further the notes on 11.9.9§5 (283), §11(295 b), §20(318), §23 (324), §26 (330), §27 (335), §31 (341).
Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialistic elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle’s model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato’s.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon’s as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book 1.

VI. The Leading Propositions of Political Science.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle’s own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeliness to Plato which was before remarked 2, our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former 3 and much shorter portion, iii. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others 4. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation 5 upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cce. 1.

1 See further the notes on H. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).
3 Hildbrand, op. cit. 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II: the “latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive ‘solution of the problem’—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I— whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organisation for the common weal.”
4 III. 1 § 9 a. (450 b). 3 §§ 1, 2 a. (456). 5 §§ 5—7 c. (208).
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

2: the essential identity of a state c. 3: the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 0—13, is, firstly, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτείαι). As we are told in Bk. I, the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ὁρθαί πολιτείαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβάσεις) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολιτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider secondly a series of difficult problems (ἄπορως). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13.¹ From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

¹ The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

(A) First main division: cc. 1—5
   (α) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
   (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
   (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.

(B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
   (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
   (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀποτελεῖ) : cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8
   (α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
   (β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11
   (γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.
Whether the property of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (ἀρχηγοι) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (εἰθωράς). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author’s essential independence of Plato¹, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles, he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

¹ Spengel Uber Arist. Pol. 15 n. 19, Henkel, op. cit. 80, n. 15, Oncken op. c. ii 165 l. 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the concept of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato “nothing thing was so certain as that the demos ‘meant the sovereignty of folly, and the ‘rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom’ dom itself.” But how can Condorcet conceive of Aristotle’s own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange expediency.

² For this reason Oncken’s assertion E. c. 172, that the exposition given 11 14, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles’ time, is not correct.

³ Whether Trendelenburg in Natur-
external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion¹, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses: but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist;' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force². He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders³; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit 'of the true statesman who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

¹ Demosth. Fals. leg. 135: ὃς ὁ μὲν δὴ-μός ἐστιν ὀσταλωτότατος πράγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀνυδελτώτατον, ὅσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεύμα ἀκατάστατον, ὃς ἠν τῆς κυνοίμενος.
² Oncken op. c. II. 168.
³ Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. vi. 39. 1; also Pericles ib. II. 40, Otanes in Herod. III. 80 s. fin.
the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the
body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence
can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected
through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical
point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can
be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3)
which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the
public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a
truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of
the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more dis-
putable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each
individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees
further than all the intelligence of the experts1. Plato is of quite
another opinion (Latas III. 700 E ff.)2, and ‘nothing is easier than by
resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of
mere cyphers; but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the
poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in
order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with
which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be
matched.’ Spengel3 is undoubtedly right: these chapters (III. cc. 9—
13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere
in the work, doctrines ‘which deserve to be written in letters of gold.’

This section ends with the remark (III. 11. 20) that all this does not
as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that
those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In
other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its
complete form that of the degenerate varieties4, is not yet decided. We

1 See however the note on III. 11 § 2
(566 b), 15 § 8 (647).
2 Yet on the other hand see Spenn. 194.
3 Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. Memor. III. 7 in the
case of the popular assembly (Vettori).
4 Oncken II. 165 f. ‘What,’ he rightly adds, ‘would have become of the Ger-
man drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with
the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolas down to the romantic school?’ It is
however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this ‘positive’ popular
sovereignty to the ‘active’ sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-
government of the Demo by the Demos’ was also taken by Aristotle, ‘when he rec-
ognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aris-
tocracy’ (Oncken II. 169, 239 f.). For

(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as
standing on an equality with the other
two forms of government, vii (iv). 8, 14
and 12 no greater rights are granted to
the people in a Polity than in an ariboc-
cracy or a moderate democracy, vii (iv).
14 § 10, 14. And when Oncken made
the assertion (II. 174) that Aristotle in-
vocably subordinated to the law the popu-
lar desire the wisdom and virtue of ev-
even the best individual citizens, he most
surely have forgotten the substance of
III. c. 14, c. 17 §§ 5—8.
5 Art. Stud. III. 13, p. 54 (646).
6 In general the result of the preceding
statements is that Democracy is prefer-
able to Oligarchy, and the latter predi-
able to a Tyranny; but whether and how
far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank
before an unrestrained democracy has not
yet been decided.
naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion peri βασιλείας, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13, there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in 13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context. On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands, might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed above would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

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1 In his translation vol. i. p. 296 n. 79. Cp. my note on III. 13. 12 (599).
2 In the note to his translation, p. 172.
3 Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ἄρθρων πολιτειῶν μὲν εἶναι ταύτην 1. c. βασιλείαν (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there mentioned. But surely it is enough that in 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the best constitution and the corrupt forms.
4 Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.
5 As Conring saw.
6 P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 2.
follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only¹. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13. In its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—Are the best 'laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens, or of the majority?'—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at 11 § 20; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete². There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally³.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundance noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (11 § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, 11 § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification⁴. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable⁵, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted.

¹ See the note on III. 11. 8 (509).  
² πότεν μὲν τὰ προσχώμενα παραφθέγματα, βελτιώμενοι τις ἢ διαφορὰ ποιοῦντο, τριγμοῖ τινας καὶ πλείους; III. 13 § 12. Compare ὁ αὐτὸς μεστὸς τις ἔργος δει εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις έλεημονικοῖς εἰσαχθεῖν, οὐδέν τοις οὖν πλείον τοις τε φανερόν δει τε ἐγγύς τοις τούτοις ἐνεκηκαί τούτω μόνον, 11 § 20.  
³ See Thurot's excellent and convincing analysis Etudes 47 ff., from which Susenius should not have expressed partial dissent in Philologus XXIX. 14—15 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 11. 13 (1990). Compare also Susenius Comm. der Aristotel. Pol. 22 ff. (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be reckoned) and in part Spengel Arist. Stud. III. 24, 47 ff.  
⁴ See again the note on III. 11. 13.  
⁵ Cp. the note on III. 11. 1.  
⁶ See on III. 13. 13 n. (509).
in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (Πολιτεία)\(^1\); as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy\(^2\).

VII. Monarchy and the Best State.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. iii cc. 14—17, the second Bkk. iv and v. (in the old order vii, viii), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle’s conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective: but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle’s time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

1 See the note last quoted.
2 See VI (iv), 2, 3 with nn. (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.
produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phoenician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting point of all subsequent development

In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind

It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in Polity (Πολιτεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

1 Spengel Arist. Stud. 11. 57: "Ban-

2 lida is to Aristotle a historical tradition

3 rather than a form with any further ca-

4 pacity for life in the mental development of

5 his own nation; and like all Greek

6 philosophers and political writers he

7 rarely notices any other. Thus he is
careful to set forth in various forms the
difficulties involved in the practicality

8 and proper limits of this government.

9 Our astonishment at this defective

10 method of treatment, which first surprised

11 Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel

12 put the question Lib. Arist. Pol. 16—

13 Did Aristotle conceive the theory of

14 monarchy to be complete with the dis-

15 cussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings
govern, their inner life, their influence

16 on the people is quite lost sight of. This

17 must be answered in the affirmative with

18 one exception, to be afterwards men-

19 tioned p. 46, for which we can easily

20 assume. The ideal king, the preemin-

21 ently best man, can have no instructions given

22 him (15 13 in 14, c. 17 3 5).

23 And therefore far from any idea that

24 true popular liberty thives best under

25 widely limited monarchy.

26 See the note on 110. 13 14 (602); 12 25 (65)

27 2. And therefore far from any idea that

28 true popular liberty thives best under

29 widely limited monarchy.

2 See Henkel p. 75 45. 6. 53; also

38 vii (v), 10 3 9. 10 with w. (1090).
than to base it exclusively upon personal merits, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions. This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (πολις) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (ἔθνος), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (vii). 7. 3; that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

1 See the n. on III. 13. 9; also VI (iv).
2 2, VIII (v). I § 11 with n. (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 n. (1708).
3 Henkel op. c. 86.
4 So Hegel Gesch. d. Phil. II. 401, Hildenbrand op. c. 426. Recently Oncken (op. c. I. 16 f., 188 f., II. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the Politics. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrik Litt. Centrallbl. 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel op. c. 89 n. (19), 97n. (26); Bradley op. c. 179, 238 f.; Susemihl in the Jahrb. f. Philol. c. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursian's philol. Jahresber. III. (1874—5). 376 f.; or to the notes on III. 13 §§ 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 §§ 15 (633); 17 § 5 (678); VI (iv). II § 19 (1303). The last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partizan, made by Bernays Phokion, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz Antigonos von Karystos 182f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Bursian's Jahresber. XXX. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug Demosthenes as a political thinker (Studien aus dem klassischen Alterthum I. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (Deutsche Litteraturzeitung 1882, col. 1081 f.) has already somewhat modified his position: see Jahresber. I. c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (vii). 2. 11 (cp. the note) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.
5 Cp. the note there (782).
of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Polities*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle’s notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that which we of ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development. He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, the mightiest lever in this process. Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on. Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period; that the same development of mental culture, of social and military organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of development through which the political world of Hellas passed. The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle’s design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III. c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

1 Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.
2 Cp. the notes on III. 14 §§ 12 (627), 15 §§ 11, §§ 13 (662), §§ 13 (663).
3 Henkel pp. c. 94. But certainly this description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken’s remarks.
4 Henkel pp. c. 96 f.
form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists must first determine what is the best life'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other. And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, iv (vii). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows, as in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim.

1 In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book iv (vii).
3 See the notes on iv (vii). 1 § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.
4 See the notes on iv (vii). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (725), § 16 (729); 3 § 3, § 6 (741), § 8 (743), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.
5 iv (vii). 15 §§ 8—10, v (viii). c. 3, c. 5 § 4 with nn. (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14. Cp. the notes on iv (vii). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921): v (viii). 2 § 1 (977); also on c. 3 §§ 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1032), and Excursus i upon Bk. v (viii).
6 See the passages quoted by Zeller ii 614. n. 1.
7 Cp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. v (viii).
is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution; yet by the end of Bk. v (viii), it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided. We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. ii, but also in Bk. iii. Thus in the latter we learn how this, or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy*. And Aristotle's many previous intimations*

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1 See the notes on iv (vii). 1 \ 10 (790); 2 56 (717); 3 7 (776), 8—10. 2 C, the note on v (viii), 7: 1 (1081). Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: *residuum sumo emptor in grave nondum insert. Of older scholars Courting is particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hildebrand (pp. 449 f.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency does not exist or is of any rate unimportant. So too Zeller op. cit. ii ii. 676 F. 736 C. Compare further Spengel *Ueber die Pol. des Aris. 8 full.

2 See III. 1 56 9. 10 6. (440, 441) 1 4 4. 5 6. (471); 6. (449) on 4 16; 5 8 3. 3 8. (504); 5 8. (509); 7 3 89. (436); 5 7; 11 6. 9. 11 (209) 1 1 9. 9. 8. (193); 1 11. 11. 2 11 (209) 1 4 4. 25. 13 1 4 6. 9. 10 16 3 11 17 1 2. 1. 17 the notes.

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction. Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned IV (vii). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, v (viii). 7. 3 ff. On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, IV (vii). 15. 9, v (viii). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from "which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

IV (vii). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14; 16 § 12; 17 § 12—cp. 17 § 5 § 7: v (viii). 3 § 10—cp. 7 § 31; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note on v (viii). 2 § 2 (979). On 11. 6 § 14, 111. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

¹ See IV (vii). 14 § 8 foll. n. (903), 15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted on n. 46 n. 5.
² See v (viii). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. v (viii).
³ See v (viii). 5 §§ 4—7 with nn. (1024-5-7); § 15 foll. nn. (1044, 1045);
⁴ See the Excursuses I, III, IV at the end of Bk. v (viii).
⁵ Zeller op. c. II ii 737 should be corrected by this.
⁶ See the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics pp. 8 ff., 15, 64 f.
'scientific education was intended to follow' 1. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (viii). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (viii). 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction; but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (viii). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato 2, intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course 3, and this would furnish the solution of the riddle 4. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (vii). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory; in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties 5. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman 6; if moreover scientific activity

1 Zeller pp. 6, 11 ff. 7, 17 n. 4.
3 No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the omission at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.
4 This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections p. 604 ff.
5 418 ff. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a rarity which must not be expected; he never says a word in the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much; see Exc. i at the end of Bl. v (vii).
6 See the note on iv (vii). 5 § 74 (13).
7 See ut. 4. 4 with the note on ii (408), § 5 (171). § 19 (400) (c. 8). 18 § 11

4—2
is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, II. 5. 25 1.

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised i. 13. 15 (cp. ii. 9 §§ 5, 6) 2, is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education 3, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (vii). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (παιδονομοι), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent 4. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasia for the young, IV (vii). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pauson with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (viii). 5. 21 5. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring 6; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (e.g. ταυμβοι) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

1 IV (vii). 7 §§ 1—3, 9 § 3 n. (808); 13 §§ 9, 10; 14 §§ 7, 8; V (viii). 1 §§ 1, 2 n. (974); VI (iv) 7 § 2.
2 See the note on II. 5. 25 (182); Nic. Eth. vi. 7. 7 (vi. § 1144 b 14 ff.) Metaph. 1. 1. 11 ff. (981 a 12 ff.).
3 See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285).
4 Nic. Eth. x. 9. 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the Politics; but the same thought forms the basis of the remarks in IV (vii). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 8, 9, as Zeller op. c. ii ii 739 n. 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. nn. on IV (vii). 12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (963).
6 See the notes on IV (vii). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 16, § 12; V (viii). 5 § 21.
7 See on IV (vii). 16. 12.
parties of adults are to be countenanced, iv (vii). 17. 12. Inspectors for the women (γυναικοκόμοι) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, vi (iv). 15. 13. vii (vii). 8. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy*. We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; 11. 6. 10 ff., iv (vii). 16. § 15, § 17.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, iv (vii). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato’s Laws*, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, iv (vii). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination*. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised iv (vii). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt συνβίωσις; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage†; also the consideration of the question postponed in ii. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed*. But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, ii. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration*. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent*

1 Zeller, op. cit. ii 730 n. 4 assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.
2 See the notes there.
3 The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on iv (vii). 16. 15.
4 See the notes there; also ii. 7. 5 with n. (136).
5 Cps. the notes on ii. 6. 15. iv (vii). 10. 11.
6 Cps. the note on iv (vii). 3. 12.
7 Cps. the notes there.
8 Cps. n. on ii. 12. 11 (308).
9 Cps. the note there. (370).
10 Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.
Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five but yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates. Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability. Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour, and in respect of a public education from their seventh year, all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves. But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests.

Aristotle was the only ancient philosopher whose works were known to all the ancient world. His works may be divided into four main classes: Physics, Ethics, Politics, and Poetics. The first three are the subject of the present work; the fourth is only briefly referred to. These works are in themselves, and in the mind of the ancient world, the most important and unique contributions of the ancient world. The works of the ancient world are divided into the three classes of literature, philosophy, and science. The works of the ancient world are divided into the three classes of literature, philosophy, and science.
hilitation which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts. The soil is to be cultivated by men who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free.

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, iv (vii). 6. 1 ff., as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, iv (vii). 9. 7. "The messes (οἱ θέματα) are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta, at once common meals and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guards' houses inside the city wall. All boards of officials have their messes, each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the rangers and field-patrols in the country. The rule of a common mess 'table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate.' In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed, with their twenty-first year, they are also per-

1 Even vocal and instrumental virtuosi in music are classed with manual labourers. Schomann, (vii). 548. 201 (vii). 6. 1 ff., 44, 161; 6. 1 comp., etc. 1 at the end of Hec. v (viii). 9. 1 4. v (vii). 9 8. 10. 13 2 [Culture-state]: one which exists to promote the higher civilization. [See p. 48. Th.]
3 Cp. n6v06 on iv (vii). 6.
mitted to attend drinking-parties and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in ii. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, iii. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in iv (vii). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark viii (v). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, iv (vii). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the Laws, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

VIII. The Pathology of the Existing Constitutions.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. iv. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

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1 IV (vii). 17. 11.
2 V (viii). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. n. on IV (vii). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to V (viii). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious; see n. (1113).
3 IV (vii). 17. 11.
4 Cp. n. on ii. 6. 14.
5 Cp. n. on iii. 3. 6.
6 Cp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. ii.
description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (ὅσι ηλικία) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (ταῖς πλειοτάταις πόλεσι); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (ἐν τοῖς ἰδιωτικύποροι), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while these fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies\(^1\), Polity (Πολιτεία), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny\(^3\). The problems to be solved are as follows: to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it: and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word; just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the “discussions on Aristocracy” (ἐν ταῖς περὶ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 \(\frac{1}{1} - 19\), which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly\(^4\) be by

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2. See note on VI (IV). 1 (1116).
3. See the note on VI (IV). 3 (1118).
4. See note on VI (IV). 3 (1118). 120. 20.
Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (Πολιτεία) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents Πολιτεία in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 121: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v; while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text². If it is right

1 See the note there, (1315).
2 Hildenbrand op. c. p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in VI (IV), cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book v of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book vi. Zeller on the other hand op. c. 11 ii 675 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books iv and v of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles; in the (old) Book vi he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the Jahrb. f. Philol. Cl. 1870. 343—346, 349 ff. why
it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliar to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, vii (vii). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion. Two of the others, vii (vii). 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds. But the fourth, vii (vii). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past: an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. vi (iv) and the first seven chapters of Bk. vii (vii)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. vii (vii), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of different constitutions, vii (vii). 1. 3 ff. Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. vii (vii) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in vi (iv). c. 16: but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there vi (iv). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, vi (iv). 15 § 22. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution; the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on vi (iv). 2 § 5 (1144), 8 6 (1144).

1 See the note there (1424).

2 Only in the latter passage the δτ which follows must be changed into δτ, or else the whole of the following clause ἀρχαῖα δέ τε ἄθροισιν. Διώκησις εξυπηρετημένη

3 See the note there, and Spengel Uber die Politik p. 36 f.

4 In that case the change of δτ into δτ, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

5 See the note on vi (iv). 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, pp. 70. 353, thinks those seven chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

6 E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on alegophoo, the laws, in an aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1463) at the end of Bk. vii (vii).

7 Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on vi (iv). 15. 1 (1441).

8 Oncken 1. a. complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Altic
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

proposed this book, VII (vi), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book VIII (v) it will be sufficient to refer to the Analysis; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the Commentary. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman. In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, VIII (v). II. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (τυραννίς) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in III. 5. 9 ff., IV (vii). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook ἀμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἶ τι λοιπὸν, οὐ χέρων ἐπισκέπτεσθαι in the announcement of the contents VII (vi). 1. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words καὶ τὸν οἰκείον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρίτον άποδίδουσι πρὸς ἑκάστην, but in reverse order. That the whole book is 'a regular medley of motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never stood in the same original connexion' is therefore (see p. 59 n. 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on VIII (vi). 1. 2 (1370 b).

[1] [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]


[3] In Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen 12 ff (St Petersburg 1859, 8). Compare the review by Susemihl Jahrb. f. Philol. CIII. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.

in various ways depend upon them: vi (iv). 4 § 20—22. 6 § 1—3, 12 § 2; vii (vi). 4 § 1—3. 8—14; cp. iii. 12 § 7 f.; iv (vii). cc. 8, 9; vi (iv). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own; they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller 1 himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (πόλις) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (iii. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (iii c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see vi (iv). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (iii. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated vi (iv). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

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1 L. 3, 14 ff.
2 See the note on vi (iv). 7. 4 (13. 5).
in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored. In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence, while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; Aristotle's conception of Oligarchy is the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, in (iv). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in vii (v). 7 §§ 5—9, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, vi (iv). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in vii (vi). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

1 See note there, and on viii (v). 7. 6 (1599).
2 See note on iii. 7. 3 (536).
3 See note on iii. 7. 4 (538).
4 So Nic. Eth. 1. 13. 3, 1102 a 10 f., x. 9. 13, 1180 a 29 ff.
5 vi (iv). 7 § 4. 11, viii (v). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In ii. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.
6 It is a strange misconception of Oncken's op. c. ii. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in vi (iv). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.
7 See the notes on vi (iv). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238); vii (vi). 27 (1402); viii (v). 7. 6 (1599).
amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments. It is surprising how Teichmuiller could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmuiller himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts), and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

1 Comp. Quicken. 66. c. 11. 253, who however is not altogether right: he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a democracy from a polity.

2 See n. on II. 10. 1.

3 See n. on VI. 4. 11. 11 (172).
their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class; but Aristotle is the first thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here. He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, Πολιτεία. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance.

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship vi (iv). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, vi (14). 15 § 19 f, is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, vi (iv). 14 § 10, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

1 See n. on vi (iv). 11. 9.
2 Oncken op. c. II. p. 225.
3 Oncken op. c. II. 227, 228.
4 See the note on vi (iv). 15. 21 (1371).
5 See n. on vi (iv). 9. 5 (1255).
thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Polities. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work?* Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, vi (iv) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Polities in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle, and there is all the more reason to hold, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his Polity is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15, 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in vii (vi). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like Polity.* This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction vii (vi). 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; viii (v). 8, 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken* has well said: "Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate the poor for the service of watching over them."

1 The practical proposals in vi (iv). 14 § 11—13, which Krohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.
2 As Oncken thinks, op. cit. II. 239.
3 Nor can it be inferred from the following words in vi (iv). 13, § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (159b) ; and on 6 § 2 (159d).
4 With Oncken, op. cit. II. p. 210, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in 6 § 100 (p. 41).
5 op. cit. II. 250, 256.
the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even
an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian
spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings
it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at-
tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the
heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the
national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle
watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling
like an all-powerful monarch; few there are whose observation traces
the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the
idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed,
described Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever
did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only
homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment
escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom-
age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take
as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand-
ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no
healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state.

IX. Date of the Work and its Assumed Connexion with the
Nicomachean Ethics.

There are notices in the Politics of the Sacred War, viii. (v). 4. 7;
as of something in the past; of Phalaecus' expedition to Crete, which
took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)9, as a recent event,
περιτον τόλμησις ενικώδες διαβέβηκεν είς τήν νύσσαν, ii. 10. 16: lastly, of
the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), viii. (v). 10. 168, without any
intimation that it had but very lately happened." On the other hand
the passage ii. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 3335.
The Politics as a whole must have been written later than the Nicoma-
chean Ethics, which is quoted six times, ii. 2 § 4; iii. 9 § 3, 12 § 1;
iv (vii). 13 §§ 5, 7; vi (iv). ii. 36, and earlier than the Poetics which is
announced as to follow in v (viii). 7. 37.

1 In his Constitution of Athens in the
Πολιτεία: see above, p. 35 n. 3.
2 Diod. xvi. 62.
3 Cp. the note there (1673).
4 Zeller op. cit. ii 154 n. (4).
5 See the note there (375).
6 See nn. on these passages.
7 Cp. the Introduction to my edition of
the Poetics, p. 11 f. Heitz' objection (in
Die verlorenen Schriften 99 ff.) there
mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the
meantime been answered in detail by
Vahlen Sitzungsb. der Wiener Akad.
LXVII. 1874. 293—298: he has made it
tolerably certain that the chapter on
καθαρσίς in question, which is now lost,
It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the Ethics, and yet that work itself calls the theory developed in it not Ethics but Politics, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the Poetics and Rhetoric. For the intermediate expression of the Rhetoric (1. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 f.), τὰ ἡγηματία πολιτεία, is here our guide, by making Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense appear as parts of Politics in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the Magna Moralia at the commencement of his work, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the Ethics that a full realisation of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.
To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct. Yet this view is undoubtedly very far. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows*: “Since then "previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their "enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take "this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitu-"tion generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as "possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review "whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; "next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is "which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and "from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when "this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a "comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the "best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and "what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its "kind). Let us begin then with our discussion.”

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark*¹: “there is no coher-"ence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the "*Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out.” The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-"matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end: nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unimimpeded virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

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¹ So recently by Nickes for example.
² *Nic. Eth. X. 9 §§ 22, 23 1181 b 12 f. paralipóontων oýn tōn protérov ane-"preúntov tó peri tēs nomokēsias, autōn επισκέψεων mállovs βελτίων ἕως, καὶ ὅλου ὅ peri politeias, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἥ peri tā anērphōna philosophia tēleiothē. πρῶτων mēn oýn eti kata méros ejhriasa kalou ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων περαθομεν ἐπελευ̂ν, elta ek tōn synnymemwn politeion theorhē̂sa tā poia swzēi kai φθείρει tāς πόλεις kai tā poiā ekástas tōn politeion, kai diá tīnas alías ai méν kalōs ai de toûn" ναντόν politeion και ἑωραθέντων γάρ τούτων tā x an mállon svvísoumen kai poia politeia áριστη, kai poiē̂s ekástat tachθēn, kai tis ἐνομος kai ἑθεία χρωμένη. Λέγομεν oýn ἀρξάμενοι.
³ In his translation of the *Politics* 1. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.
to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book, making what is contained in Bk. viii (v) come next, and then developing the contents of iv (vii), v (viii), and lastly of vi (iv), and vii (vi). What must be understood by a ‘comparison of constitutions’ we see clearly from x 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation; here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this ‘comparison’.

That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue, and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down “the theory of the constitution generally”? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words καὶ θέλει ἡ πολιτεία contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from καὶ ποιεῖ πολιτεία φύσιν onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover “method in his madness.”

That in spite of their close connexion¹ the Ethics and the Politics are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

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¹ For the interpretation which Nickes, l. i. pp. 86, 87, parts upon the concluding words, ’’Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing “a commencement dealing with other matters,”’ is not calculated to inspire confidence.

² τῶν ἐυθύνων (οὗ ὁ σημείωσις διδόει ἑαυτῷ τῷ προσελέρχοντα διδάξαντι τις εὐθυνον) τίνι ἢ δικείμενον τῷ ἱλίου, and τῶν κληρῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν αὐτῶν τοιαυτῶν, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no further.

³ This disposal of the unhappy attempt of Nickes l. i. 28 ff. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the author attempts he is on the whole successful.

⁴ As Zeller observes ap. n. 11 i. 104 l. 66 ff.
introduction to the politics.

is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. iv (vii). from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else', the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' ἑτέρας σχολῆς, has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the Prior or Pure and Posterior or Applied Analytics, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller and Walter have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality: but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant. Yet practical insight (πράξινος), without which there is no moral virtue, can be materially promoted by Ethics, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

1 See above, p. 15 n. 1.
2 Cp. the note there (709).
3 Cp. Zeller op. cit. 11 ii 104 f. n. 1, 182, 607 n. 3: Oncken op. c. 1. 164 ff.
4 op. c. 11 ii 176—185.
5 Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft 537—554 (Jena 1874, 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.
7 Nic. Eth. 1. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. 1. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; 11. 1. i 1103 a 14 ff.; 11. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9 — X. 10 (Bekk.): cp. Pol. IV (vii). 13. 11 ff., Nic. Eth. 11. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a 26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; 11. c. 9. Comp. also Walter op. c. 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter 11. 7.
8 Cp. nn. in 1. 5. 9 (45), 1. 13. 6 (112).
9 Nic. Eth. 1. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., 1. 3. 7 1095 a 10 f., 1. 4. 6 1105 b 4—13, 11. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter op. c. 157, 400 ff.
10 As Zeller thinks, op. c. 11. ii 608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the Nic. Eth. adduced by Zeller, Vit. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Kassow.
CONNE\ION WITH THE ETHICS.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of πολιτικός consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle iii. 1. 1; vi (iv). c. 1; vii (vi). 5. 1; iv (vii). 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory iii. 8. 1 (cp. vi [iv]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur.

[X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above, has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation De praeditiis emendandi Aristotelis Politiica. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Sussehili, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was something deplorable. He renders περί τῶν ἀυτοφημίαις περί ςτλ, de pronunciatis de optima civitate; πρὸς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων αριθ ἄλλον; εὐπρεπῶς πρασφερρί; εὐπρεπῶς πρασφερρί πρωθί εἰς; evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as τὰ ἡροί τὰ περιμάχητα bona quae circa res bellufas. But mere ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in ii. 12. 8, he made Ὀλυμπιάσων an accusative after τῶν νικητῶν qui vésc Olimpiasém; at any rate he gives supér texit for

1 Comp. utn. on iii. 8. 1 (542); iii. 13. 13 (601); vi (iv). 15. 4 (1550); see also iii. 7 2 [1-3.

2 Here Prof. Sussehili's own Intro- duction ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible. Tr.

3 Sussehili however in the large critical edition (1872) p. xxxiii f. had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsistencies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1579, cp. 1 p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.


5 Busse, ed. cit. p. 56 L. Spence permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

6 p. 9. The best is, gives Olimpiasém.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

ἀνὰ δόματα in v (viii). 3. 9—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ autem in ἐστι γὰρ II. 9. 18, ἵσως γὰρ IV (vii). I. 17. I. 3, δὲ γὰρ v (viii). I. 2²; γὰρ igitur, III. 7. 5; δὲ enim I. 2. 1; οὖν enim I. 8. 6, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ...δὲ et...ciam, καὶ τον et guidem. Sometimes he omits particles (μὲν, γὰρ, δὲ, οὐτε); sometimes, c. g. II. 5. 9 δικαίως et iuste, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 φράτωρα φυλέτην fratruelim aut contribulum, etc.⁴ He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ διὸ ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἔνα et ambos fieri unum ex duobus existentibus; IV (vii). 3. 8 κυρίως καὶ et dominos (i. e. και κυρίους)⁵. His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἁριστοκρατικη, ὀλιγαρχικη by the nouns aristocratia, oligarchia⁶.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v). 6. 3 ἐν θω (for ἐνθα) in theo, which he took for a proper name; III. II. 3 κρύπ (for κρύνουσι, so M⁷) Kries; II. 9. 30 φιλίτα (so M⁸) amicabilia; v (viii). I § 4 M⁹ αὐτ ἰπσομ (he has read the compendium αὐτὸν); 6 § 9 M⁹ ὁ αὐτός (for ἀὐλός) id ἰπσω. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the Politics. Take for instance VIII (v). I. 3: P¹ gives ἄνθεσις ἐ. τι δόης, with space for one letter; M⁸ has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading ἕτι; not so William; from the immediately preceding ἐκ τοῦ ἵσως ὄτιον ὄντας he derives inaequales in quocunque existentes. Similarly with natura for δύναμισ in IV (vii). II. 4 (from the adjoining φῶνων), alia quidem esse eadem for τὸ πᾶσι μετὲναι VI (iv). 4. 25 (from the following τὰλλα μὲν ἐναι ταυτά): see also III. 16 § 5 universale borrowed from c. I 5 § 4 τὸ καθόλον, IV (vii). I § 4 quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant, IV (vii). II § I si ad votum oportet adipsici positionem borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρη ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν; etc.⁸ Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M⁸ though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (vii). 14. 22 Π had the same hiatus as M⁸ has now, through the homoeoteleuton σπουδαζειν, σχολ-άζειν: William does what he can

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⁴ Busse pp. 15—20.
DEFECTS OF THE OLD TRANSLATION. 73

to conceal this by translating ἐνεκέω τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης gratum ordini et pacis, as if he had read τάξεως. In vi (iv). 4. II M* gives τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἡ instead of τῶν ἀδυνάτων η; so too Γ, for William renders minus quam to make sense. Similarly v (viii). 6. II M* has ἂπαντησις for ἂπαντον; William sequedabant; which must be his attempt to make sense out of ἂπαντον1.

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in ii. 9. 20 διημαργηθεὶς αὐτῶς ἡμιρρήματοι καὶ τοις βασιλείς regere populum et ipsis (he read αὐτοῖς) sedebant regem, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see vii (vi). 7 § 5 προσκείται απομείνα άρρητος, 8 § 1 δοξηθαι dividere etc.; and for the converse ii. 7 § 6 δείξῃ ostendatur, 8 § 5 γράψῃ scribatur, viii (v). 8. 9 τορώληθαι comprehendarunt, etc.2. Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. i. 5. 8 ἕπερ τοὺς εἰρήνης si quidem et dietis <creditar>, ii. 9. 5 κατημέναις peri οἶκος (so M* for peroikoi) possidentibus <praedia> òποια domus, etc.3 Yet additions may be due to glosses, like vii. fuscium proelio, (2) ἀπαντήθη μίχης νοσον in the margin of P*, etc.4 Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: i. 9. 1 οὔτε πόρρω ἡεῖνην ποιει λουγε <resita>; ii. 8. 13 οὐ καλὸς δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς κράτους ἔχει νόμον, τὸ κράτων ἅξιον καὶ non bene autem necro de indicio habet lex indulgere dignissius, though here one might suppose he had ἥ κράτων ἅξιον before him: ii. 11 § 14 ἔκαστον ἀποτελεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν unus quodque perficer ab eisdem': c. 11 § 15 τοῦ πλατεῖαν, αἰτε τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπερνοντες ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων inditando sempere aliquaque populii partem emittentes super urbem, suggested perhaps by παντοῦ εἰπο- rouch in vii (vi). 5. 9: iii. 3 § 2 ἐπερ αὖν δημοκρατοῦσιν τί quidem <creditar> in democratum versus fuerant quaedam: 13 § 2 οἶκα habetur: iv (vii). 16. 1. 4 πρὸς θεῶν ἀφοθορπεῖν τῶν εἰληξάτων τίνι περὶ τῆς γενεᾶς τιμήν ad desum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt cum quia de generatione hourem (as if tais εἰληξάτων were read)5.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π* e. c. Π Γ M*) than P*, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

1 pp. 22—23: Γ may have had ἂπαντησις, but this is less probable.
3 pp. 32.
4 pp. 34—43.
5 pp. 32—45.
M, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family.

These conclusions however are by no means warranted. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P or of M. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P only: once in conjunction with P only: 3 times with P (or its corrections) only; once with Aretinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing. Whereas the correct reading is due to P alone 11 times, to P in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P margin, P) 5 times; and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Aretinus could have offered, ut quisquam hic illic offerre, ut propensus facile fias ad credendum hos in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti-quiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina "esse haustos."

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Susemihl's large critical edition (1872) p. XIII: "mirum autem est in eis verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis col-" dicibus omissa hic liber (P) cum paucis "aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, "eum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum "hac assentire aut alias eiusmod sensus "voce quam illos hic illic offerre, ut "propensus facile fias ad credendum hos "in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti-quiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina "esse haustos."

With what follows compare Susemihl Politica tertium edita (1882) Preface pp. VIII—XIII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P M</th>
<th>William</th>
<th>P5 (margin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>παραθυμενη</td>
<td>subintrans</td>
<td>υπεισόδουσα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>παραμυλή</td>
<td>praeratricatio</td>
<td>παράβασις</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>το μικρον δαπάνημα</td>
<td>parvae expendae</td>
<td>αι μικρα δαπάναι</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αναιρετ</td>
<td>consumunt</td>
<td>δαπάνωσι</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from v (viii). 8. 2—a passage where the second family P5 exhibits an hiatus—

1 pp. 45—47.
2 In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48) 35 κατά, 1256 a 8 ουστά-

seis, b 38 πληθεί, 1230 b 9 τηι Ταραντι-

νων ἄρχην, 15 τηις αὐτῆς ἄρχης, 1321 a 12 ὁπλιτικήν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγός ὑπὸ (or ἐγγί-

ζων?), 1311 a 6 χριμάτων: ΓP 1328 a 5 παρά, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγεν, 1340 a 16 δηλον ὑπερ δέ, 1321 b 29 τα omissa, 1322 b 36 προεσυνόνας (?), 1306 b 39 και omitted: ΓP 1259 b 28 δέ; Γp 1256 a 16 παρά, 1272 a 39 και oντ: ΓP (corrector) 1278 b 22 παρ': ΓAr. 1289 b 38 πολέ-

μους; ΓPAr. 1336 a 5 δέ: ΓPb 1303 b 31 τά: Γ Aldine P (corrector) 1332 a 33 τά: Γ Ar. P (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 σώ-

ματος: ΓP 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς διως M P, διως ce).

4 Γ alone gives 1258 b 40 Ἀρχηγία-

1260 a 4 ἄρχωνων καὶ, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὑ-

ης, 1266 b 2 δ' ἡθ, 1271 a 20 καὶ, 1276 a 33 εἴθος ἥν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1332 a 42 ἐνα δέ, 1336 a 34

5 Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 οἰκο-

νόμος, 1262 b 32 τοὺς φίλακας, 1274 b 20 (αποτίνευν or αποτίνεων?), 1280 a 29 τα-

λάντων may be mentioned.
easily make for themselves. In 4, or perhaps 5, places Pº has alone preserved the right reading; it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M* or to P* alone. From Pº and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for Pº, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts.

Further it must be noticed that while M* T are often found alone supporting a variant against P*, M* P* are less frequently (the number of such cases being about 1/4) alone in agreement against T, and it is very seldom indeed that P* T alone support any reading against M*. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that T and M* go back to one common archetype, and P* to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P* Pº); only the immediate ancestor of M* had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with P* or the authorities from which it is derived. The genuine readings of the family Hº will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M* T), sometimes in the other (of Pº and of the corrections in Pº P*); and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.

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1 Pº alone 1519 a 13 θανατησθαι, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr.), b 4 τέκτονες corr. (2 eulogiai), 1286 b 17 μετέφασαν (perhaps Γ also), 1287 b 38 θανατήσαν, 1328 a 5 θανάτους, 1335 b 20 γερο-μονας, 1338 b 4 πατέρως (corr.), 1340 b 30 ταύτων, 1390 b 24 έφιμορον, 1391 a 35 τό παλαιότέρον (7); Pº Ατ. 1263 b 4 τό, 1280 b 19 εφιμορον; P* (corr.) Ατ. 1245 a 37 εφιμορον, 1290 a 14 πατέρως, 1304 (margin) T* (later hand) 1284 a 37 εφιμορον. Of these θανάτους, ταύτων, το παλαιότερον, εφιμορον are of slight weight.

2 P* 1235 a 25 και ουδεμίας άλλας καθαρίας, 1270 b 38 καθαρίας, 1318 a 29 αλλά καθαρίας Ατ. (corr.), 1339 a 24 εφιμορον; perhaps 1238 b 21 εφορον.)

3 1267 b 25 το Lº U (corr.) 1274 b 20 εφορον Lº: 1275 b 29 το Lº. Ablative and Mº (1st hand): 1311 a 31 (margin) Pº Ατ. 1315 a 38 ένοικ. Lº: 1317 a 12 το Ατ. 1319 b 59 το πετράτο R².

4 For proof of this see (beside the criti-
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Few of the readings common to Ms P or of those common to Γ Ms have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or Ms, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13. 15 ταύτας γὰρ δὲ διώκειν for αὐτάς γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of Π): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P διακόπτονσι is a trifle nearer right than Ms διακονοῦσι Will. ministrant'.

All existing manuscripts of the Politics, when compared even with those of the Ethics, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ Ms, other things being equal, in preference to P sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of Π, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P against Γ Ms. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects Π is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in Π: in such cases it is seldom Π that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is Π that is mutilated. Yet as a general rule Π should be followed in preference to Π.

Coming now to Busse's view about P, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (viii). 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

P Ms William P5
πρὸς ἀκριβείαν ad perfectionem πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
ἐφημέναι dictis ῥηθεῖσαι
§ 6 ἐνεκεν gratia χάριν (Bekk.)
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ipsius quidem enim αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
φίλων amicorum τῶν φίλων
C. 3 § 1 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἑδή de musica autem περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 3 τέλος finaliter τελευταῖον
ὅτι δὲι ποιοῦντας quod facientes oportet τὶ ποιοῦντας δὲι(Bekk.)

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

cal notes) Susemihl's Third edition (1882) Preface pp. x, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.
1 Quoted by Busse p. 45.
2 The manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics show an equally perplexing discrepancy between KbMb and LbOb in some parts of the treatise, KbOb and LbMb in others.
3 Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327a 34, 1329a 17, 18, 1334a 37, 1336a 34, b 18, 1330a 10, 1307b 321. Susemihl op. c. viii.
the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P*: 1330 a 32 χρή for δι prow. c. c.; 1333 b 2 δε καί τα χρήσματα for καί τα χρήσματα δε (P omit δε); 1335 b 23 παντεσπήναικα for τικοντιανά; 1336 b 5 γάρ τοι for τοι γάρ, 1339 a 16 χάριν for άκμα, 1340 a 8 δήλον for φανέρον; 1341 a 6 ἀργών for πόσων; 1309 a 18 οὔ for μή. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P* and M* against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 λεπτομένως M* P* δησιεντες William, 1318 b 31 τηματών τῶν μειονων από omitted by Μ* P* translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 μὲν τοις M* P*, Ald., τοις μὲν P*; 1332 b 1 μεταβάλλων M* P* metαβάλλων Π*; 1334 b 2 τοις untranslated by Will., τοις P*; 1335 a 16 τοις c. c. τοις M* P*; 1337 a 18 Βέλτων M* P* Π* Ar., βέλτωτων c. c. optimus Will.; 1319 b 24 καί τα P* and in the margin of P*, κατὰ c. c. in Will.; 27 τοι πρότερον Π* P* and the corrector of P*, τοι πρότερον Π*; 1322 a 22 τοις εἰρημένοις M* and P* (1st hand), τοις εἰρημένοις c. c. dicto Will.; 1306 a 22 ἐγχειρίσμους ετετεί, εγχειρίσμου M*, εγχειρίσμουν P* manus inceptor Will.; 1313 b 2 φθόνινα τοις P* R*, φθονώματα τοις c. c. supracite Will.; 1316 a 32 τοις c. c. τοις V* Ar., in Γ Μ* a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 δεί διαικωνύμης καί πολλῆς συφραστής τοις ἄραμα δοκούται πράτειν καί πάντων τῶν μακροβιομένων ἀπολυόντας c. c., indigent testitutia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written ἀπολύοντες; but P* has δεότατοι......ολ' ἄραμα δοκούται......ἀπολύοντες. Or again, 1311 b 7 δι' το εἰς τὰ οὕτω αἰσχρῶς (αισχρῶς M* P* αἰσχρῶς Π*); προτέρον quod aliqui monardarium in corpora versandum fecerint would have suggested αἰσχρῶς, not αἰσχρῶς which is what we find in P*. So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt ἁπλόν of 1321 a 12, William's armamentum would have suggested ἁπλότητα or ἁπλότητα, not ἁπλότητα which is the reading of P*. Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading ἀφειμένοι seems to have come down in P* as well as in P; it is at least unlikely that William's corrector suggested it. Even in viii (v) 8, 2, the passage which Burbe thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that παρακολουθεῖν should supersede ἑκπαιδεύεται1.

1 Consensus cursitum.
2 Bekker, who took 1 of the second or warm family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P* in some cases even, e.g. 1416 b 18, 1437 b 16 f. 34 f., where M* have a better reading. See p. 76.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the Politics, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention\(^1\), is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books\(^2\), but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(i) Bk. I. II §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. I., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασίων ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τίχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λαβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικῶταται δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείονται χρήσεις, ἀγεννόταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδέι ἀρετῆς, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τὸ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστικὴ could not be excluded from the ἐργασίαι of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικῶταται κτλ, are, περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἐξηταί καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμων μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστικῆς, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν be transposed to follow ἀρετῆς.

The argument too runs on better to the next sentence ἐτεί δὲ ἐστὶν 

\(^{1}\) As may be done by passing over the parts printed in Clarendon type and reading the duplicates of the same passages in their transposed place; where they stand in ordinary type between thick brackets thus < >.

\(^{2}\) See above p. 16 n 4.

\(^{3}\) Susemihl Quaestiones Criticae i p. 9 (Greifswald 1867. 4).
(2) Bk. i. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot, "that "after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does "not say one word of the ἄρετη διανοητικῆς which properly belong to it, "while speaking three times, ll. 15, 17, 20, of ἄρετη ἄρετη in the same "sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who com- "mands ought to have ἃθροικὴ ἄρετη] in perfection, he says that the work "belongs to him who directs it and that reason (λόγος) is a directing "faculty: this reflection evidently applies to the ἄρετη διανοητικῆς of το "λόγον ἄρετα, elsewhere called φρόνιμος, III. 4. 17, and not to the ἃθροικὴ "ἄρετη of the ἄλογον." He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, "ἄρετα τούτων... ἄρετα to follow ἐπιβαλλει αὐτός: to omit ἃθροικὴ in line 20, "and change ἃθροικὴ to διανοητικὴ in l. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ἃθροικὴ he retained.) Now there is "no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνιμος inseparably involves ἃθροικὴ ἄρετη, Nic. Eth. vi. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. ib. 12 § 6, ἐπι το "ἐργαν ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνιμον καὶ τὴν ἃθροικὴν ἄρετην): so l. 20 "ἄρετη may stand. The dianoetic virtue, in its perfection, seems to "reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the "present passage, ὁ δοῦλος ὀυκ ἐχει τὸ βουλευτικὸν, and Pol. iii. 4. "17, 18, ἢ δὲ φρόνιμος ἀρχόντων ὡς ἄρετη μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ὀσκεί ἀνάγ- "καιν ἐνα κοινῇ καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχόντων δὲ γε ἐν "ἐστιν ἄρετη φρόνιμος, ἄλλα δέ τις ἀληθής with the notes.

(3) II. 4. 4, ζώσε δὲ μᾶλλον... τοῖς νεωτερίσεις. "It is singular that "Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to "prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family "affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers "more obedient" (Thurot). He therefore suggests that II. 4. 4 should "follow κοινωνίας in II. 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, "1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that οὐσίας φιλὰ must result from the "Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show ἀριστοτελὴν ἀνάγκη τοῦ ἐναίσχους ἄρχοντων τοῖς ἀριστοτελῆς τῶν "φιλῶν τοῖς τοῦτος τοῖς γίνεται τῶν φιλῶν. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion τοῖς τούτοις to "be extraneous to the main political subject of the Republ. Moreover

1 Etudes sur Aristote 18. 19.— Comp. "also Susemihl Quaeoct. Crit. vi. 9—11.
3 Susemihl Comment. Crit. ii p. 15.
in line 37 he exchanges the construction with περὶ for a new one οἷς...πεπλήρωκε. The clause καὶ περὶ παπεδέας...φυλάκων should come amongst the subjects (περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν) on which Socrates in the Republic has touched, and therefore in § 1 after κτῆσεως 1364 b 301.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, αἱ μὲν ἱδωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν. Giphanius (Van Giffen)2 comparing c. 12 § 1, ἐνοικὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ ωντινονοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἱδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον...ἐνοίκι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοῖ, proposed to omit φιλοσόφων καὶ. Spengel3 simply transposed these words before ἱδωτῶν.

(6) II. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas’ scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὖ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάπητον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶς κτήσεως ἀνισον, ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τάς οὐσίας ἵσας εἶναι τοῖς πολιτέας πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἄλληλοις, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὖδὲν ὡς εἰσεῖν, καὶ γὰρ ἄν οἱ χαρίεντες

1 Compare Victorius Comm. p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adiungit autem in extremo disputasse etiam illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc cnim coniungi debet cum ἰσ τοις κτήσεως ἀνισον, bus ad materiam eorum librorum indicandam, non cum inferioribus ut quidam falsa putarunt.


It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices, must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: for if so, the legislators would naturally be the richest and most skilful, and the public business would be carried on in a manner calculated to give more pleasure than profit to the rich and grateful citizens.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προείτο τήν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ο νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἁρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τής σχολής. “If he was forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made provision for poor men in office.” Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: “at all events he should not have allowed these “high offices to be virtually put up for sale.”

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύεται συμφέρον, καλείται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγος. ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ πλείουσι ένδέχεται, πλείουσι δ' ἡγή χαλέπων ἡκριβώσθαι πρὸς πάσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τήν πολεμικήν: αὕτη γὰρ εἰ πλῆθει γίνεται: διόπερ κατὰ τάσιν τήν πολιτειῶν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχοντιν αὕτης οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα. Spengel first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγος, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἡγή χαλέπων) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot supposed a lacuna to precede, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἁρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ μη τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀρίστους>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 τοῦ τοῦτον πλῆθος εἰ ὃ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικῶν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικῶν before πλῆθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγος refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία.

Schmidt lately found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει εὐλόγος, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχοντιν αὕτης οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλῆν τοῦτο...νόμους. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows: Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

1 Susemihl Jahrb. f. Ph. xcvi. 1866. P. 333.
2 Über die Politik p. 23 n. 24.
3 Etudes sur Aristote p. 42, 43.
5 Susemihl Quaest. Crit. iii. p. 16.
6 Etudes sur Aristote 47—51.
or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on aristocracy). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), i.e. somewhere between ἀρετήν (§ 12, end) and εἴ δέ τίς εἶσαι, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13.

(i) III. 13. 22. The sentence ἢτο τούτο...τώτῳ ἐρᾶτε, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to διαρθροῦν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited ἢτο τούτο...τώτῳ ἐρᾶτε, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after διαρθροῦν, at the end of the general reflections. Bernays however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἢν τίς ἐρᾶτε.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, πάτρισόν ποτε ἢν συμφέρα κάριν ἢν πάτρισὸν ἢν συμφέρα, a succession of ἀποράει and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows*: (a) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 5—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀπορία, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14.

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1 Susennih in Philol. xxix. 1870 pp. 113—114.
2 Études sur Aristote 51—53.
3 In his Thématisation, p. 241.
4 For a fuller account see the Analyse, p. 113 f.
and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words κατὰ τὴν έαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 δοκεῖ δὲ τις...§ 4 πάντων, relates to a different ἀπορία altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος)?

Here the limit of ἀπορία ἡ distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, ἀλλὰ μὴν...ὁμοίως, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν as far as κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in § 9 must belong to the first ἀπορία (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) ἀλλὰ μὴν...§ 5 τῶν κειμένων could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow καλλιον and precede δὲ μὲν τούτων; the remainder (δ) 16 § 5 ὡ μὲν ὃν τὸν νόμον...§ 9 κατὰ τὸ ἔθος might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between πάντων and ἀλλ’ ἴσως. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (ε) §§ 9, 10 from ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον as far as συμφράδιονες, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after ὃ ἄδικος and before εἰ ὁ. To this same ἀπορία further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν to the end δὲν ὁμοίως; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.
Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson. “It may be that the two chapters belong "almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being "combined they should be still further resolved.”

(i) 15 §§ 2, 3 το μὲν οὖν...ἐνώπιος = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ἐρωτήματος.

(ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχή...πάντας corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἀρχὴν...κατὰ τὸ ἔδος = §§ 10, 11 εἰτέ δὲ καὶ...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

(iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ ἐστὶ corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλὰ ὅτι...διὰ ὅψιν and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ...μὴ.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

οὔτε ἰόδιον...συμφράδιον. "Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second."

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν σὺν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλεῶς. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἥξει δ' ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 ὅ βασιλεῶς. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα...τῶν κειμένων "interrupts the argument of the context: "it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 "and may be read after τῶν ἀνυματῶν ἑστὶν 1287 b 23" (in § 11).

Spengel proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος to follow κάλλιον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὴν, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. A, where the recurrence of a word (υὐλογισμὸς in Rhet. 1, 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ἥγετεν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws.

(13) IV (vii). 1 §§ II, I2 = c. 2 §§ I, 2

ἔχομενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενοι καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἁρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττοντων καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντων; οὔτε δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτε ἀνδρὸς πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπὸν ἑστίν εἰπεῖν. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ πάντες γὰρ ἀν ὀμολογή- σεως εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν

2 Arist. Stud. III. 26 (78), f.
3 ἀλλ' ἵσων ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦτον βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκάστα κάλλιον. The reply is: ἀλλὰ μὴν δέοι γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὃ νόμος, οὔτ' ἀνδρωτος ἀν δύνασθαι γνωρίζειν. Objection: ἀλλ' ἐπιτίθεται παραδείγματος ὃ νόμος ἐφάπαξ τα λαύτα τῇ δικαιωσάτε γνώμην κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἤτι δ' ἐπανορθισθεῖσα δίδως, ὃ τι ἄν δοξῇ πειραμένοις ἀμε- νον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ὃ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.
Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed\(^1\). If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of c. 1. Sussemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12.\(^2\)

\(^1\) *Über die Politik*, pp. 45, 48.

1) IV (vii). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen)\(^3\) calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, έπει τό γε καλόν έν πλήθει και μεγέθει ευθείᾳ γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow ευσύνοπτος: in this way § 9 έν λεχθαί ερων would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words έπει...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θείας γάρ...τό πάν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koraes omitted διό: it is a smaller change, with Boëcker\(^4\), to transpose έπει...γίνεσθαι to follow αναγκαίον in § 9.

\(^3\) *Giphanius*, pp. 91 f.

(15) IV (vii). 8. 2 ένθα έπει τραφη τοιτό έστω επεί χαίρει πλήθος ετ' ἄλλα τι τῶν τομώσων ἐστίν. Bojesen\(^5\) saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 έσται ταῖς πόλεσιν αναγκαίοιν ύπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of εν τι κοινώ καὶ τοιτό των κοινωνίων ἄλλοις κοινωνίασ, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

\(^5\) *Giphanius*, pp. 91 f.

(16) IV (vii). 8 §§ 3, 4 έταν δ' έτ'...κυσίως ἐσται. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτιών at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινωνίων of § 2.\(^6\)

\(^6\) *Susemihl Comment*. Crtr. V. p. 12.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

(17) iv (vii) cc. 13—15. Wilson¹ regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "In each the same question is proposed, what is "happiness or the chief good? (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost "the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with "15 §§ 6, 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...Ηχθαί)." These transitional passages stand as follows:

... <τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν, φανερὸν ἵκ τοῦτων' πώς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τούτο δὴ θεωρητέον, τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ έθους καὶ λόγου δει. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινάς εἶναι χρή, τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἡ τοῖς έθεσιν.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τοῦτων δὲ ποίους...ἐθεσι in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

¹ Journal of Phil. x. pp. 84, 85.
to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of c. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13; see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in iii. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in iii. c. 6; in i. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in i. c. 4 are but amplified and supported 1.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason 2. Hence Böckler 3 proposed to transpose ἀλλάρια...ἀλλήλως to follow βαλτων at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to λόγος and ὀθη; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for "the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and "habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would "never do by nature or by habit."

(18) IV (vii). 16 §§ 4, 5 σχίδων δὲ πάντα...τότε. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 πληθών ἔτι ἁμορφώ. If this be done, (1) § 6 ἔτοι δ' ὁ τῶν νεών κτλ. will directly explain § 4 ἔτοι δ' ἔθεν ἔρξαριαν...βούλησιν; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37 (2) respectively 4.

(19) IV (vii). 17 § 6 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...διαταγμάτων. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 ἀνακομιοῦν; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss τὸν ἐγγένεον ἔλεγκτον. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then ἐνακτάσεων ὅη will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred 5.

(20) IV (vii). 17 § 12 τῶν μὲν οὖν ὃς ἐπισκόποι...ἀρχότοι. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after διαστάσεως (ὅς ἐπισκόπου) in § 14 6.

(21) V (viii). 4 § 7. The clause δὲ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ὅρων κρίνει, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν...αὐταγωνιστικός γιὰ τής πανδοκά τῆς ἐκκοι.

3 *Susemilh Quarterly* part. viii. 9. 16.
5 *Susemilh El.*
πρότερον δ' οὖν ἔχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δὴ.

(22) v (viii). v § 17 ἐτι δὲ ἄκροιμενοι τῶν μουθέσων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρίς τῶν μουθῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἑτὶ, should give a second reason ὅτι γνώμεθα ποιοὶ τίνες τὰ ἴθη διὰ τῆς μονοσικῆς, the first being the 'enthusiasm' inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: 'enthusiastic' strains inspire 'enthusiasm': and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that "rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, "short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the "soul undergoes a change." But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully pouring out morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: "because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody," i.e. a purely instrumental performance.

(23) v (viii). v § 25 καὶ τίς έοικε συγγενεὰ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς μουθοῖς * * εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασι τῶν σοφῶν οὐ μέν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἶ δ' ἔχεν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, i.e. after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον § 24.

(24) vi (iv). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds for believing that this portion of Bk. vi (iv) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεία πλείως καὶ δι' ἦν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρήμενων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγομεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρήμενην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskilfully added by the compiler, seems probable from the

1 Susemihl ib. p. 411, Q. C. iv. 20, also Böcker independently op. c. p. 18.
2 Susemihl Philologus XXV. 1867. 411 — 413, Q. C. iv. 20, Spengel Arist. Stud. 44. 45.
3 op. c. p. 18.
4 Susemihl in Rhein. Mus. XXI. 1866. 554—560.
DISLOCATIONS.

fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 διότι ἐπὶ τούτῳ κ.λ. is never
redeemed; instead of this the main
again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact corre-
spondences adduced by Wilson in

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλέονς πολείταις

ομολογόμενα γὰρ τῆς ἐν μέρισι

şi, τοῖς συνεχείς ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι
tοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ
tῶν εὑρόν τοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀπώρον τὸ

στὸν δ' ἀγοραίον, τὸν δὲ

τρίτων δὲ τὰ ἀγοραῖον, κτλ.

οὕτω κτλ.....φανερῶν ὅτι τὸν

οὐκ ἐκδιδάσκειν άπαντῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἄνα
tοὺς πόλεως μέρους. * * * οἷς ὁκινεῖ
tοῖς εἰσὶν εὐπόρους. δύον δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκα
cόν κτλ

.....άναγκαιον καὶ μετέχεισι
eἶναι τοὺς αἰτητὰς τῶν πολείτων.

ωσπερ κινέται εἶναι διαφόρων ἀνα

τοῦ πλείους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολείταις, εἶδος διαφο-

ἐν ἀναγκαῖον ἄναρχων καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν

ἐναγκαῖον ἄναρχων ἄναρχων καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν

ἀναγκαίον ἄρα πολείταις εἶναι το-

τοῖς ἀπώροις καὶ τοῖς διαφόροις
tῶν μαρίων. 3 § 6.
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. iv (vii), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. "iv (vii) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβώτες τὴν εἰρημένην: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.


The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διὸ of which it could be the effect. Thurot would find a place for it after προσόδων ὀνόμα, but he has to admit that ἔξειναί σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἔξειναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατίκον after ἔξεινα: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

1 "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. iv (vii)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.
2 Etudes sur Aristote 60, 6
3 Bemerkungen pp. 13, 14.
DISLOCATION

has been laid down the clause διό...μετέχεται comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert οὗ after σχολάζειν.

(26) vi (iv). c. 12. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, ἑτέρα καὶ τὰς ἀκολουθεῖς τῷ πρώτῳ αἰτητῷ: what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κράτος whether their preponderance comes from τὸ πολέμου or τὸ ποιήμα, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, ὅπου μὲν ὄντων ὑπερέχει...τωτῷ; (2) when an oligarchy, would suit better in the remainder of § 3, ὅπου δὲ τῷ τῶν κυρίων...πλῆθους; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, ὅπου δὲ τῷ τῶν μέτων...μέτως. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words δὲ δὲ ἀκι τῶν τομοθέτων...τῶν κυρίων τῶν τοιοῦτων, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, τῆς κοινωνίας κτλ. Moreover from 12 § 6, ἐνῷ ἐν ἅμα συναγωγῇ right on to the end of c. 13, τῷ ἀρχηγῷ, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry τῆς τῶν αἰτητῶν. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12.

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry τῆς τῶν αἰτητῶν is broken off abruptly at ὁ μέτως in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. vii (vi). 1. 5, καὶ τῶν λαοτῶν πολιτεία τῆς συναγωγῆς, ἐφημα πρῶτερον—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, δὲ δὲ...τοιοῦτως, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, δὲ...τοιοῦτως + 12 § 6, 13 §§ 1—6, ἐνῷ ὁ ἐν ἅμα συναγωγῇ...ἐν τῶν μέτων in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between ὁ μὲν ὄν τρόπος τῆς μικρῆς οὔτως and τοῦ δὲ ὀφθαλμοῖς, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, δὲ δὲ τῶν πολιτείων...ἀρχηγῶν, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after ἔλως.

(27) viii (v). 1 § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διό καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διὰ διώκεται ἀνεντὶ προς γάρ...ἰσιν, ὅτι ἐν...
INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ὑπτον κτλ, and in § 10 another ἐτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τὶ κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτε δὲ κτλ, where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτε δὲ οὐδὲ...ἡ τὴν μοναρχίαν is in § 11 between politieῖαν and πανταχύν'.

Wilson discover a parallel version of I §§ 2—7, δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον...στάσεων εἰσιν, in I §§ 11—16 πανταχοῦ γὰρ...τῶν τοιοῦτον πολιτείων. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

δεὶ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηται πολιτείαι πάντων μεν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἵσον, τούτου δ' ἁμαρτανότων, ἑσπέρ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ὁτιοῦν ὅντας οἰσθαίατα ἀπλῶς ἱσοὺς εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἑλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἵσοι εἶναι νομίζοσιν), ὀλυγαρχία δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν τι ὅντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' ὀντίαν γὰρ ἀνίσοι ὅντες ἀπλῶς ἀνίσοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

Further "the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated "in a shorter form" in 2 §§ 2, 3: "there is here then perhaps another "re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book "and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3." Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. iii; at I § 2, § i3, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with 1 §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if 1 §§ 11—16 is another recension of 1 §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, στασιάζοντι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλυγαρχίαις...ίσοι ὅντες,

1 Susemihl Quaest. Crit. v. p. 10.
2 Journal of Philology x. 84.
should precede 1 § 11, παραχωρέω γαρ κτλ. At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 31.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γένεσις προξ. οργανωτικσ, have for their subject the cases where στάσεις has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μεταβαλλοντες δὲ καί...πρὸς πολλοὶς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δὲ οἵκερεν τῷ παρα το διάλογον, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This section may be κατὰ τὸ ποιόν ορ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 5—12, μεταβαλλοντες δὲ καί...πρὸς πολλοὶς (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow διαμετείχας at the end of 3 § 8*.

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—15, ὅμοιοντων δὲ ἀληθείας...η ἱσόδιον. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμον ἡ διάφορα, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated. 1

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy*, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucretius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskilfully with Aristotle's materials. 2 In proportion as this is

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1 Susenmihl Politica text. ed. p. xxiv; Böckert ed. cit. 37.
2 Böckert ed. cit. 40, 41.
3 Susenmihl Quaest. Crit. v. 12, 13.
4 "Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shown not only that the passage cannot be placed in its old position, but that it must be placed in its new." Pontigon Notes p. 24.
5 "Hoc est aequissimum: quam Aristotelii omnes has particularissimae itaque in altera Politicorum recensione sine uberus tractaret sine continentis expetiendis ordinis interea stilis proprietate, in marginis hic illic dubitate postera aequant, qui scilicet ille libros, rius munere, quod neque ille sed utrumque. The phrase in commune profusa in hanc, quae habet die tristis, locum confudere. quae in terrene remissa manifeste hanc redeprehendit." Böckert ed. cit. 28, 33. There was no place for annotations in an ancient book; but such notes are in the above line, e.g. (41) (42) (43), (45) (47) (49)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the marginal of Weidmann Translation p. 125 n. 1.
admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotle correxi quas editores eius antiquos: certe cur ab eo ipso in "libris celerrime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, inco- "hatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem "esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam."

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the Politics carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies. The most important change introduced is to make Bk. i. cc. 8—11, περὶ χρηματιστικῆς, precede the discussion περὶ δεοστότου καὶ δοῦλου, thus inserting them in i. c. 3 § 3 between χρηματιστικῆς and πράσων ἕτε. That the topics of Bk. i. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. i. in the following order: c. i, c. 2 §§ 1—6 παιδάς: then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

η δ᾽ ἐκ πλειώνων κομψῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἤδη. γνομένη μὲν σὺν τοῦ ζην ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν 
<ἔχει τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν>. [η δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστὶ.] οἶνον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστον, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. διὸ πάσα πόλις φύσει ἐστὶν, εἰπὲ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνία. τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐκείνων. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34.

Then follows 2 § 7 δῶ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

3 Even Krohn Zur Kritik 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the oikeiων συναγωγῆ.
4 aiř <a> for ἄτι.
What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, i.e., §§ 9, 10 & 11, etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., etc,
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good: 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the Politicus of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state: 1 §§ 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life: 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy: 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong: 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual: 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes: 2 §§ 15, 16.

A. Of the Family in general.

There being three fundamental constitutents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (i) of master and slave, (ii) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (iii) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (χρηματιστική); the relation of this subject to that of the family (οικονομία) is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.

I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5.

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(i) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(8) The view quoted in the Introduction from Plato's Politics that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 3, 4.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.

(τεῦχος κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

[No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense.]
(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth 
(χρηματιστική) to a theory of the family or economic science 
(οικονομική): cc. 8—10.

(1) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν...).

(γ) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(δ) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the natural species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(ε) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(δ) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artizans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(β) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(γ) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to
the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been

III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations: also in the relation of master and slave: cc. 12, 13.

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children: c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to imitate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free: 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it: that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(a) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9:

(b) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not of themselves, but in relation to another: 13 § 11 (ἐντὸν ἀλλ' ἄνω).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists: It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of training slaves: 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity: 13 §§ 15, 16.
A. Critical Part.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. 1 §§ 1, 2.

II. Criticism of the ideal polities: 1 § 3—8 § 25.

a. Plato's Ideal State in the Republic: 1 § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(b) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word "all". Plato's view would not be correct if "all" meant "all collectively", but only if "all" meant "each individual":—a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.
(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest kinds of relations: 4 § 3—6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when that general love of particular affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a suitable attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better fitted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4.

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties; and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischief pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (αλλά μὴ...), § 10.

(ii) Arguments against community of property: 5 §§ 1—13.

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 2. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to μικρον and τεσσαρες, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. For preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (ζωγραφοευγης), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality: 5 §§ 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair: he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(γ) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the definitiveness of the end which they subserv, as pointed out above under (6). But so far as political unity within our limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.
But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: 5 §§ 17.

Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 §§ 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory: 5 §§ 18—24.

The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: 5 § 24 (ἀτοστον δὲ καὶ...).

To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato’s part requires it: 5 §§ 25, 26.

Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: 5 §§ 27, 28.


Comparison of the Republic with the Laws; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: 6 §§ 1—5.

Criticism of the state in the Laws: 6 §§ 6—22.

It would require far too large a territory: 6 §§ 6, 7.

It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: 6 §§ 7, 8.

Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully: 6 §§ 8, 9.

There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: 6 §§ 10—13.

We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: 6 § 14.

It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: 6 § 15.

The division of each citizen’s real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: 6 § 15 (καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοτέλων...).

The constitution proposed in the Laws is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, 1. e. a Polity (πολιτεία) technically so called. But

this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme: 6 §§ 16, 17.

Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: 6 § 18.

The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato’s: 6 §§ 19—21.

The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: 6 § 22.
c. **Phaleas' scheme of polity**: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10; helds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 5, 9. If 10–11: 7 §§ 18–20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 §§ 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether untouched: 7 §§ 14–17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 21, 22.

d. **Hippodamos' scheme of polity**: c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 §§ 1.]

(b) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 §§ 2.

(ii) Division into artisans, farmers, soldiers, 8 §§ 2.

(iii) Division of the land: a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 §§ 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurors must record their verdicts, § 4.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 §§ 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 §§ 7 (συμφωνεῖν τὸνδ...)—§ 10.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: 8 § 10 (ἐκ τοῦ γεωργοῦ...).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurors should vote, § 5, any better: 8 §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, 8 §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: 8 §§ 23—25.

III. CRITICISM OF THE BEST AMONGST ACTUALLY EXISTING POLITIES: cc. 9—12.

(a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: 9 § 1.

(β) The defects of the Spartan polity: 9 §§ 2—36.

(i) Social defects: 9 §§ 2—19.

(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: 9 §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: 9 §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dowery, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: 9 §§ 14—19.

(ii) Political defects: 9 §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephoralty, 9 §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, 9 §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, 9 §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: 9 §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (παύλοι), 9 § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, 9 § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, 9 § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, 9 § 36.
(b) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(b) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—10.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the olearch is worse managed than the ephorality: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischief similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephorality, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(g) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6.

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7.

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mixed up to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10. 11 § 12, §§ 10—12.

(d) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(e) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(b) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 5, 6.

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 1—8, upon Solon’s constitution.
The Politics

[IV. Appendix.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: 12 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philolaos, 12 § 8,

(c) Charondas, 12 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phales, 12 § 11,

(e) Plato, 12 § 12,

(f) Draco, 12 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,

(h) Andromadas, 12 § 14.]

B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

B. III. cc. 1—13.

First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question 'What is a state?' and this introduces the further question 'What is a citizen?': 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (δικασταί), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: 1 § 2—2 § 5.
The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

γ. Is the excellence (ἀρέτή) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

[(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.]

(b) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, i.e., his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first known properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their highest sense jointiy identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (ἀρετεῖς) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or diastatic excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artisans or laborers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 3.

Second group of principles. Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 23.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 4 § 2—7 § 5.
(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (δίκαιον) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (τὸ κυρίῳ δίκαιον, τὸ κατ’ ἄρετήν): c. 9.

(β) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (οἱ ἐπιεικεῖσι), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (ἐὰς ὁ σεπουδαῖος), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, 11 §§ 1—5: but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the
citizens should entrust the details of state business: II §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, II §§ 10—13; and reply to the objection, II §§ 13, 14.

(iv) Second objection, II §§ 15, 16: how disposed of; II §§ 16—17.

(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the true sovereign: the unrestricted plenary power of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: II §§ 19—21.

(7) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: II. 13.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (capacity and virtue) to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with influence: c. 12. Politics where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification, even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper. True Aristocracy

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases. —That which determines (1) and (2), or something similar, is best.

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state not only establish its right when this body is large enough manumitted to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government assert in succession and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

1 Bernays supposed cc. 12, 13 to be another version of no. 9—14; see p. 42.]
II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:

B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).


MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (διαφοράς).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (ράδιον... —§ 15.

(a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.

(β) Despotic monarchy amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

(γ) Ἀλεξισμαφητεία or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

(δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.

Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

(e) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—16.

(α) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man: 15 § 3—§ 5 (πάσαν): 16 § 5 (ὁ μὲν οὖν)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

15 § 5 (ἄλλα ίσως...κάλλιον): 16 § 4 (ἄλλα μὴν δόσα...)—§ 5: 15 § 6:
15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ...)—§ 10=16 § 10 (εἰσι δὲ)—§ 13:
15 § 10 (εἰ δὲ)—§ 13 (δημοκρατίαν).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (ἄλλα ίσως...)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (εἰσι δὲ)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves ipso facto allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.
III. c. 14—IV. c. 1.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 13.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 15 §§ 15.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (διοικητικοί).

(γ) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 15 (ἐχει δέ ἀρματοπάλα).—16 § 2 (βασιλεία).
   (i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 14 §§ 14—16.
   (ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(ε) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals; whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (διότι δὲ τίτων)—§ 4.

(ζ) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.
   (a) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (δοματορεία) or a normal republican government (πολιτεία); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.
   (β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen, yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 17 §§ 13—15): 17 § 1.

(η) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.


Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—5.

(a) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—4. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12 = 3 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

[(β) A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 §§ 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant’s life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.]

OUTLINE OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION:
B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

(a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(B) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(C) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(D) The position of the city, 5 § 3 (τὸς δὲ πόλεως...)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea: 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3; 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artizans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-
ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (δοῦλοι καὶ ἐρπλοιοὶ) of non-Hellenic descent: cc. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation: they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 [§ 1—9].]

(b) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (κατὰ ἐπιτύχησιν) — 11 § 14.

(a) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9:
(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9:
(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10:
(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (μὸνοι θεωρῆσιν), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (ἐρπλοιοὶ) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 §§ 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.
(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.
(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.
(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.
(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess. 12 § 1.
(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (ὑπαρχὸς Δημοκρίτης) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(3) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (incomplete).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is an essential to the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.
(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (φόροις), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7 (left incomplete).


Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.

The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of V (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(b) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(i) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(ii) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (ἐντ)—§ 21 (ἀνθρώπων).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (τὴν τε...δουλεύειν).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.
(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preeminence; all the others ought however to be practiced, since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to possess in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtues. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a concluded military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans: even capacity in war, which in all they strive to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of rational goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (<5νεν...>)—end of B. v (viii).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction; yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity: c. 16.

(1) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.


(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 3.

(b) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, §§ 3.

(7) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (<...μακαμαίνεται>). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(8) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7; and (e) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female sensuality; also (f) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 6—8, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37(i) for men and 18 for women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(3) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 15, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 24.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants: procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 §§ 15.
(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: \(16 \S\S 16, 17\).

(7) Penalty for adultery: \(16 \S 17 (\text{for}...)—\S 18\).

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, \(17 \S\S 1—14\).

(1) In infancy, \(\S\S 1—3\), \(\S 6\), \(\S 4\).

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, \(\S 4 (\text{for} \ 3\text{rd} \ \text{of}...)—\S 7\). With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: \(\S 7—\S 14, \S 13, \S 14, \S 12\).

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: \(\S 14 (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)\).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: \(\S 15, 16, \S (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)\).

(1) General introductory remarks. Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: \(\S 15, 16, \S (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)\).

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: \(\S 1, 2\).

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: \(\S 3, 4\).

(4) The right educational course: \(\S (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)\). cc. 2—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: \(\S 1—3\).

(6) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: \(\S 2, 3\).

(8) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: \(\S 3—6\).

(7) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: \(\S 1\).

(8) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure; but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, \(\S 2—\S 11 (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)\); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: \(\S 11 (\text{for} \ \text{the} \ \text{age} \ \text{of}...)—\S 12\).
(ii) Athletic exercises (γυμναστικά): cc. 3 § 15—4 § 9.

(a) As was stated above, IV (vii). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises: 3 § 15.

(b) But two errors should be avoided: the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done; the other, the Spartan practice of breaking them by excessive exertions: 4 §§ 1—7.

γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training: 4 §§ 2; (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 9.

(iii) Music: cc. 5—7.

(a) Statement of the question: Should music serve for passive recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely aesthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification? 4 § 1—4 (ἐρμηνεύω).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician (μουσικός): 5 § 4 (ὅτι μὲν οὖν)—§ 8.

γ) Answer to the first question: Music can and should subserve each of these three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also more recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disregarded, as we supposed above (§ 4): yet it is only subordinate. 5 §§ 9—15; and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young: 5 §§ 16—25.

(3) From this follows the answer to the second question:

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians: 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves: §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, 4, as follows:

(a) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes: 6 §§ 6 (παραγόμενος).—§ 8.

(b) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young: 6 §§ 9—16.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (άμφωναί) and rhythms:

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homeopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed: 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing: also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young: 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.

B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS: B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

Introductory remarks: B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity: 1 §§ 1—7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight: 1 § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions: 1 §§ 9—11.

iv. The department of constitutional theory which remains for treatment defined: 2 § 1. Order of merit of the degenerate forms of government: 2 §§ 2, 3.
The arrangement to be followed in the succeeding exposition: 2 §§ 4—6.

The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions: VI (IV). c. 3—VIII (V).

i Enumeration of all possible constitutions: VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(1) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.]
(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 § § 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 § § 7—19.

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 § § 20—6 § 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (Aristocracy).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § § 22 ( démocrates)—§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (dansarela): § § 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: § § 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (a) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (b) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity: c. 7—9 § § 5, 12 § § 4, 12 § § 6—13 § 6, 9 § § 6—10, 13 § § 7—11.

(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 §§ 4, 12 §§ 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.

(c) Genesis and organization of Polity: 9 §§ 1—5, 12 §§ 4, 12 §§ 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 13 § 6. (iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a great mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in accordance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of
ILLUSORY DEVICES. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar countermeasures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 12 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10.

(v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (πολεμευν)

(vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9.

(vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

ii THE BEST CONSTITUTION ON THE AVERAGE (ἀδιστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι): c. 11.

(i) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (πολεμευν).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (καὶ σφόντα)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(ii) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.
III. What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (τίς πολιτεία τίς καὶ ποιῶν ποιοίς συμφέρει;): 12 §§ 1—3, 4 (ἀρχαῖα) § 5.

(a) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.
(b) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 §§ 3.
(c) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 §§ 3 (ἐπίσης...,) (c) to Polity, 12 §§ 4
(d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (μείζοναι), § 5.

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

IV. The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII [VI].

(a) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV). cc. 14—16.

(b) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(c) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(i) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(ii) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10:

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (ἀρχαῖα);
(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (τὸ δὲ τοῦτο) —§ 9;
(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;
(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 12.

(c) Measures by which at all events to secure that the desires passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most common Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a compromise the reverse of that usual in Politics: 14 §§ 11—16.

(d) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: 6. 14.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, XI §§ 1, 2.
(b) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e., ministers or authorities of the state: 15 §§ 2 (ἀρχαῖα) —§ 4.
(γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.

(δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (...) and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (καὶ ποιεῖν ...)

(e) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.

(i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.

(ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.

(iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.

(η) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.

(i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.

(ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (C) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.

(θ) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.

(d) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.

(β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.

(γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (οἱ ἱκανοὶ): how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.

(δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.

(ε) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: vii (vi) cc. 1—7.

(a) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.
(b) The species of Democracy: 

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various combinations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: 1 §§ 5—10.

(b) The principles of Democracy enumerated: 2 §§ 1—4.

(c) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 3 §§ 5—8.

[(d) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendations of a penalistic form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy; 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(e) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(f) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(g) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (τῆς τε ἐξ ἐλαχίστης) — 5 §§ 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 6 §§ 13—16.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: e. g.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 6 §§ 1, 3.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 6 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 2, 4.

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(b) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum: 6 §§ 9—11.

(c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 5.

(b) of the several intermediate species, 6 §§ 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 4—5.

(d) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 §§ 1—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army. 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 4—7.
(iii) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (incomplete).

(a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.
(b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (a) of the markets (ἀγορανύμιοι), § 3; (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (ἀστυνύμιοι) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (ἀγρόνυμοι, ἀλωροι); (δ) financial officers (ἀποθέκται, ταμιαί), § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (μνήμονες, ἐπιστάται), § 7. (ζ) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (η) Military officers (στρατηγοὶ, πολέμαρχοι, ναόπορχοι, κτλ), §§ 13—15. (θ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (εὐθυνοι, λογοσταί, ἐξετασται), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (πράξουναι, βουλη), § 17. (κ) Officers to superintend public worship (ἱερεῖς κτλ), §§ 18—20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.

v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).


(a) Statement of the whole question: I § 1.

(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: I §§ 2—7.

(c) Two species of revolution, I §§ 8—II:

(a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—II: whether
   (i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply
   (ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or
   (iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.

(β) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.

(d) Special application of the remarks in I §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 § I4, I § II (παραθαύμω...)—§ I5.

(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, I § 16.
The causes of decay inherent in all politics in common: cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry: the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, is not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections: § 3 (ἐν τούτοις...οὕλεοι).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution: 2 §§ 4—6.


(β) Consideration of them in detail: 3 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—13, 3 §§ 9—14.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8; 4 §§ 8—10: and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (ἐνα τῷ ἐναλλακτικῷ), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (α) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13:

(ν) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—2.

(c) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 13, 14:

(a) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.
The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) The causes of decay, cc. 5—7.

(a) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (κυριάρχει...προτάσει) 1.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(b) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5 2.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (κυριάρχει...)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(b) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

1 Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3).

2 If § 5, καὶ ἐν 'Εφεσσαῖς...πολεῖαι, be genuine we must add: "In the same way a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."
(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public moneys, then embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private tyranny owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotic character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11.

[6] Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled in war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual dismises of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.

(c) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(/) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another : 6 § 18.

(c) In Mixed Aristocracies and Polities: c. 7 §§ 1—12.

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4.

(1) especially when the large body excluded considers themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 3, 4;

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 5;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 6;

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to assume supreme power, 7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Polities consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 9, 10. Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place; but to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—14.

(D) Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken to summary.

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

1 Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.
(ii) **The safeguards: cc. 8, 9.**

(A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

(B) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Polities and Mixed Aristocracies special care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in vi (iv), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Polities and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14:

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14:

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.
VIII. cc. 8—10

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, may even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 9 § 4.2.

(8) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and bodily worth and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification stands in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification is a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(9) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(n) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which inevitably leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—8 (Diason).

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (μετατοπίζεις)§ 16.


(i) The causes of decay: c. 10.

(A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (δισχορέω).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Arachne, but Tyranny (τραγεδία) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(β) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(γ) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(δ) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 §§ 11—13 (δισχορέω).

(B) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general: 10 §§ 13—28.

(α) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 15, 16.

(β) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(γ) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the master; in others the assailing desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(δ) These points of view presented in detail: 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20.

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 201.
(c) Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.

(a) Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (1) under a royal or aristocratical, or (ii) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or

(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38, or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(ii) The safeguards: c. 11, c. 12 §§ 1—6.

(A) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(b) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(i) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6, and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;
draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10, and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10.

(8) by suspecting his own friends, most of all, 11 § 16.

(9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 17.

(10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13.

(11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 §§ 15.

(12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 16, 16.

Or (6) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poises as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

Careful management of the state funds, avoiding lavish grants to assassins, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented, no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offenses against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always lessen distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising elements, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to annihilate in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who compose that party, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet praise so rest his rule upon the poor where they are the strangers, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.
ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(b) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (δ ἀποδοτί—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition from Tyranny or into the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.
(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Arbitrariness at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under certain limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 18, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained. 12 § 18. (This is almost entirely wanting.)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. The third main division of the work on the nature of Legislation is entirely wanting.
Symbols and Abbreviations.

Γ = codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit vetustatranslatio latina Guilelmi de Moerbeka.

M = cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.
P1(corr.) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
p1 = correctiones palli diores et luteolae.

II1 = the agreement of ΓMSP1 in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

P2 = cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.
P2(corr.) = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
P2(corr.2) = correctiones nigriores.
P2(corr.3) = correctiones palli diores et luteolae.
p2 = correctiones rubrae.

P3 = cod. Parisinus 2026.
Sb = cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.
P4 = cod. Parisinus 2025.
Tb = cod. Urbinas 46.
P5 = cod. Parisinus 1858.
Ub = cod. Marcianus Ven. append. iv, 3.
Vb = cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.
Q = cod. Marcianus Venetus 200.
Wb = cod. Reginensis 125.
Mb = cod. Marcianus Venetus 213.
Cb = cod. Camerarii deperditus.
Qb = cod. Laurentianus 81, 5.
Ab = cod. Arctini deperditus.
Kb = cod. Laurentianus 81, 6.
Ad = editio princeps Aldina.

II2 = the agreement of Ald. and all existing mss. except M₆P₅P₄ in a reading.
II₃ = """""""""""" exception M₆P₄P₃P₆ in a reading.
II = codex archetypus deperditus superstitum librorum et Aldinae.

Bas.¹ = Basel ed. of 1531.
Bas.² = Basel ed. of 1539.
Bas.³ = Basel ed. of 1550.
Bk.¹ = the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.
Bk.² = the Politics reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).
Susem.¹ = Susemihl's critical edition, 1872.
Susem.² = his edition of 1879.
Susem.³ = his ed. in Bibliotheca Teubneriana, 1882.
Susem.⁴ = the present work.

Note that P₄,⁶(corr.) = the corrector of P₄ and the corrector of P₆; but P₂ and P₄(corr.) = the first hand of P₂ and the corrector of P₄.
[δρχων] Bernays = Bernays proposes to omit δρχων from the text.
<καὶ οἰκονομικῷ> Rassow = Rassow proposes to insert καὶ οἰκονομικῷ in the text.
? Susem. = Susemihl conjectures; but Γ (?) = Γ may have had the reading in question.
εστὶν * * denotes a lacuna; that after εστὶν some word, or words, has been lost.

The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over: where they occur in the mss. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ
Bekker 410.
p. 1252 a

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περὶ οἰκονομιάς, cc. 3—13 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα γάρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκίων). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. 1, are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (ἀπορίας) started for discussion; (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολιτικός and οἰκονομικός, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις ἐξ ὡν σύγκειται, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσὶν φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλευθεροὶ, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, cc. 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστική to Economic, πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ κλ., cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artizan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἐστιν ἀρετὴ τις δοῦλοι παρὰ τὰς ὁρμανκάς, 13 § 2 ff. See further the Analysis and Introd., pp. 23—31.

1 The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end: § 1. The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organization, as is evident when it is analysed into its simplest elements: §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 i πόλιν] A 'city,' but at the same time a sovereign 'state,' κοινωνία—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. ἀλλακτικά, commercial transactions, exchange Nic. Eth. v. 5. 9; ταύτην τὴν κ. = τὴν γαμοῦν ὁμιλῶν, the marriage union Pol. iv(vii). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (i) the voluntary combination, association, or cooperation of free men with each other in objects in which they have common interests (τότου, συνμ., συμμαχία κοινωνεῖς), or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσεως μὴ ἐφημέρου ἔνεκεν: τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων χάριν). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that ἡ πολιτικὴ κ., 'civil society' = the community, τὸ κοινόν (e.g. II. 3. 1 compared with II. 2. 2, iv[vii]. 14. 1). See further on I. 2 § 12, § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ] seeming good, which may not really be the agent's true interest, although he thinks so, cp. iv[vii]. 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated Nic. Eth. iii. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20, the solution being ὅ που ἐκαστὸς κρίνει ὁρϑός καὶ ἐν ἐπάκοσι τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι are often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖν = μιθαίον to be thought, φαίνεσθαι = εἰδεῖν to appear, of an object present to sense; hence ὅ δοκοῖ = subjective opinion, τά φαίνομεν = objective facts. Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v.

4 πᾶσα μὲν...μάλιστα δὲ] The clause with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπιτῆδε: 'while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίλεται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.' 5 κυριωτάτου] Cr. iii. 12. 1 and note Susem. (1) Aristotle's proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-
περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλωσμένη πόλις τῇ καὶ ἡ καυνονία ἡ πολιτική.

§ 2 οὕσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικοὶ καὶ βασιλικοὶ καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ δεσποτικοί [ἐναι] τῶν αυτῶν, οὐ καλῶς λέγονται (πλῆθες γὰρ ἀπὸ καὶ διαφέρουσα νομίζετε διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐβεβαιωθέντων δεσποτών, οὐκ ἀν μὲν δικιάν, δεσπότην, ἀν δὲ πλείους καὶ πλείους, ἀν δὲ ἀρχόν, πολιτικὸν ἡ βασιλικὸν, ἡς ἀναδείκνυσαν συν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρῶν πόλεων καὶ πολιτικοῦ δὲ καὶ βασιλικοῦ, ὅτι μὲν αὐτῶν ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικὸν ἦν ἀκ. 15 ἐπὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τυπικῆς κατὰ μέρης ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενοι, πολιτικῶν ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἐλεγοῦν:

9 ὡς ἢ οἷον omitted by Π (added after τῶν by a later hand in Μ) § 14 φθόνων Μ (1st hand), φθιστήρι Μ (corrector), φθιστήρι F45 Q Q1 S5 Τα U V W W* L² Althan § 15 τοῦ is omitted by Π Βκ § 16 (Ἀρχαῖον καὶ Ἀρχόμενον) in Bezaeus (cp. 10. 17. 7) needlessly

τική to be the ‘art’ concerned with ἡ καυνονία ἡ πόλις, is given by Νε. Ἐθ. 11. 2 §§ 5—7; cp. τὰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ὡσπερ εἰς ἐν τοῖς, μεζον γε καὶ τελείωτοι τῆς τῆς τῶν πόλεων, τῶν καὶ θείων υἱῶν καὶ τῶν τῶν ἐνθεοῦσιν, ὡς τον τινίν. ἐνθεοῦσιν, ὡς more precisely described in the case of the ‘city’ as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ καθῆκον συμφέρον.

ἡ παοῦς…παίσας περιέχουσα] ἴδον, 11. 2 § 7, where is explained, from Νε. Ἐθ. Β. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the inferior as ἀρχαι (ἐραι) of itself.

§ 2 8 οὕσοι μὲν κτλ] Plato Politeia 28 β Ἔκε. 11. 3 cp. c. 3 §§ 1—3, 11. 3 § 4, 11. 2 § 11 ἄρα τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἐκμελεῖ τὰ πλῆθων ἐνεπεσμένης τῆς τῶν κακῶν. Neo. [2] πολιτικοῖς] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-possessed according to Greek ideals: so 8 §§ 13, 11 §§ 13, 11. 7. 1 πολιτικός ἡ γενειακή καὶ δικαίωσις, cp. Νε. Ἐθ. Ν. 9. 18 οὐσιστικό. Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that διὰ θυγατρῶν π. should know psychology, Ν. 1. 1. 3 § 3—7, legislation, and other sciences; hence joined with αἰσθητική, a theoretical statesman, student of politics. IV (VII). 4. 3, VI (VII) 3. 1. 3, VIII (IV) 9. 9. 9 ἐπίθει κτλ] They assume that a king differs from ἀρχή, a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. ἐπίθει numbers: 8 §§ 15, Ῥετ. 1. 4, 10 (ἐπίθει Ψίματος the strength of the defensive inclosure, cp. Κολοσσ. ο. ζ. ἦν ἐβεβαιωθέντων τὰ κατὰ καθήκον.

10 φθόνων] or ὡς ἢ οἷον οἰκονομία; in kind: ἔνας οἰκονομίας to be essentially different, because division into persons takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἄρα τῶν ἑαυτῶν] Χαράκτης ἀρχαῖον ἀρχαῖον, and similar before ἀρχαῖον, but now οἰκονομίας (οἰκονομίας) would be more as well as in the latter case, and so on § 14, while other ἑαυτῶν or ἑαυτῶν may be understood to follow here as on line 13.

12 τοῦ εἶδος κτλ] Wherefore the state so composed is often compared, Th. 1. 1, where cp. = νομικόν. (3 b)

Plato Politeia, 25 αὐτός οὖν ἡ γενειακὴ καὶ δικαίωσις τὸν ἀρχηγὸν ἐν πάση πόλει ἀρχηγὸν; Ν. 22 ἔνας ἐν καθῆκον, ἄρα τοῖς ἑναρχήσισι, καὶ ἀρχηγότερον, ἀρχηγότερον ἀρχηγότερον; Δικαίωσις τὸν ἀρχηγόν ἀρχηγόν. Δικαίωσις ἀρχηγόν ἀρχηγόν, ἀρχηγόν ἀρχηγόν, ἀρχηγόν ἀρχηγόν, ἀρχηγόν ἀρχηγόν.
§ 3 δήλου δ' ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἔπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν υφηγημένην μέθοδον, ὀσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκῃ διαιρεῖν (ταύτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ πλανῶς), οὕτω καὶ τόλμην εἰς ἄν ὑπάγει ταῖς σκοποῦντες ὑφόμενα καὶ περὶ τοῦτων μᾶλλον, τι τε διαιφροσύνη ἄλληλως, καὶ εἰ τε τεχνικῶν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπόθεσεων.

§ 2 εἰ δὲ τες ἐὰν ἀρχὴς τὰ πρῶτα ἑκάστας φυσικὰς βλέπειν οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τοῦτοις, καλλιτεύονται ἄν ὑπὸ τοῦ § 2 θεωρῆσειν. ἀνάγκῃ δὴ πρῶτον συνυπάρχειν τοὺς ἀνεύρουσας προτον υπὸ τοῦ πρώτου συναναλογεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνεύρουσας.
I. 2. 3] 1252 a 17—1252 b 2

άλληλων μη δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θηλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρετος τῆς (του)
γενέσεως ἑνεκέν (καὶ τούτο ὑπὸ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν
καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις γέφων καὶ φυσικῶν φυσικῶν τῷ σφετερίῳ)
οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλπείν ἐτερον), ἄρρεν δὲ καὶ
ἀρχέμενον φύσει διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυναμένων τῷ
διανοια τροποῦν ἄρρεν φύσει καὶ δεσποτεῖν (φύσει), τὸ δὲ
dυναμένου ταύτα τῷ σώματι τοιαύτην ἄρχεμενον φύσιν καὶ
§ 3 δοῦλουν διὰ δεσποτή καὶ δοῦλον ταύτα τυμφάρει), φύσει μὲν
οἷον διώρισα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσιν
tοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτέτοι τὴν Δελφικὴν μῦθαιν τε


οἷον ἐκ προαιρέσεως not by design, or of deliberate purpose, ἢ γὰρ προαιρέσεως μετὰ λέγων καὶ λογισμοῦ: instinctively.

αρχέμενον κτλ] "governor and governed by nature" clearly "master and slave" not as i § 2 'political ruler and subject.'


δι' τὴν σωτηρίαν "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the "slave by birth" on Aristotle's view is explained § 45 6—10, as Fullenborn has correctly observed: in the case of the master it should be remembered that without slaves in his household he can procure at best but a poor and uncertain subsistence: see § 5 n. (15), 4 § 1—4. Susenm. (6)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. § 8 8—10, 11 § 8 n. (10). Susenm. (6 b)

33 ταύτα — ἀ τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν φύσει.
νυχώς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν' οὕτω γὰρ ἀν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα (1) 4 τῶν ὄργανων ἐκατόστων, μη πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνι δουλείον' § 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει 5 τὸ ἀφ' αὐτάτος καὶ ἐκτιτορασίους ὑπὸ τὸν Ἰβύς καὶ τὸν κέινα τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχει.

in append. prov. i. 94 (tom. i. p. 393 of the Corpus Paroemographiæ, Gotting. 1830) Δελφική μάραγια: ἐπὶ τῶν φιλόκερδῶν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαμβάνων προαιρουμένων, παράσοι οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μὲ τι τῶν ἑρείων ἐλαμβάνον, τὸ δεινοτέρθης μαχαίρας (? for the use of the knife) ἐπιράττοντο. Athenaeus iv. 74 p. 173: 'Ἀχαίοι δ' ὁ Ἐρημεύς ἐν Ἀλκμαιῳ πυη σατυρικῷ καρυκουσίοις καλεῖ τοὺς Δελφοὺς διὰ τοῦτων. Καρυκουσίους προσβλέπει καὶ ἑπταμετρούσι γράφει ἐπὶ ἀμιγαμείρων αὐτᾶτο καὶ εἰκαρκεόνοι, εἰς ταῦτα δὲ ἀποβλέπον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἔρημος ἧλλ' ἀλλ' ὁ Δελφῶν πλεῖστα ἄκοντων | Φοίβη μαχαίρας | καὶ προδόδοσι τοὺς σους προςόπους. It was from Thomas Aquinas ad locum that Oresme derived the explanation cited above. See Von Hertling Rhein. Mfus. XXXIX. p. 447. Mr W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to "a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar Nem. viii. 42."

3 ἐν πρὸς ἐν' There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows De Part. Anim. iv. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται χρήσθαι δυνά ἐπὶ δῦν τῆς ἐργα καὶ μη ἐποδίευξι πρὸς ἑτέρους, ὥστε ἐν ἀκχωριστό ἐπίτευξιν ῥαλχα-κοιτικὴ πρὸς ἐνεύθεις ῥαλχα-κοιτικὴν ἀλλ' ὅπου μη ἐνδέχεται, καταχρητίζω τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἐργά. Susem. (9) See De Anima ii. 8. 10, 420 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices ii. 11. 13, vii. (15. 6. 15.

4 μη πολλοῖς ἔργοις κτλ] "if restricted in use to a single function." Fülleborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. Susem. (10)

§ 4 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις κτλ] 'Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in barbaria they are not, because all—men and women—are slaves' (Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν δούλων Plato Laws 805 E. Fülleborn (11. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense indeed Congreve seriously takes the words, supplying τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τὰς σετίς τοῖς ἀλλοις τός ἀρσεν καὶ τοῖς ἀστατοῖς.) "Fülleborn's objections arise from his having been misled by the omission mentioned above, in n. (10), and so having misunderstood the real sense of the passage. Aristotle's meaning is this: because the barbarian nations are slaves by nature, the men are not capable of respecting the freedom of the female sex in the women, and of according to them the position which by nature belongs to the woman in relation to the man; but treat them as slaves. And hence necessarily arises the perversion of nature, that in the marriage relation you have 'one slave ruling despoticly over another.

To the same cause, the servile character of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics (1. 6. 8 n.), Aristotle attributes the fact that they themselves are ruled by their kings as slaves; or in other words that the form under which the state exists amongst them is despotism, iii. 14. 6 n., which in reality cannot be considered to constitute a state at all, a state consisting of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1, 111. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. vii.(iv). 4 § 11, a passage which is probably not genuine. Such a despotism is only an abnormally expanded family: ('non civitas erit sed magna familia;' Grotius De iure bellii ac pacis iii. 8. 2). It is a species of that which Aristotle denotes by ἔθνος, i.e. a mere aggregate of men of the same race, a tribe population or nationality, as contrasted with πόλεις, a city-state: § 6; ii. 1 § 3; iii. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15; iv.(v). 4 § 11; viii.(v). 10 § 8 with nn.; Nic. Eth. 1. 2. 8, 1004 b 10; Rhet. 1. 5. 5 1360 b 31: cp. Schlosser i. 278. [Cp. ἔθνος = federation in Polybios and Dionysios, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues: δι' ἐθνικῶς χρείας 'for federal purposes' Diod. xviii. 13. 13.] See further n. (13) 8 § 6, 6 §§ 4—6 with nn. (47), (54), (56): 7 § 5, 8 § 12; iv.(vii). 2 § 15, 14 § 21 with nn." Susem. (11)
6. ταξιν. ανέτοιον δέ ὑπὲ τὸ φύσει ἀρχαὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γινομένῳ ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δουλης καὶ δουλου. ὤς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ

5. ός ταυτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δουλων δεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τάτα tio δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρῶτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσιόδος ἄλος πρώτη
ioin μὲν πρῶτην γεγονον τε θεῦ τ' ἄραμν.

ο γὰρ βοῦς ἀντι' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἑστιν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνετέσσεριν κοινωνίαν εστὶν
φύσεω ῥόκων ἑστιν, οὔτε ὥς Χαρίωνας καλεῖ ἀρμοστέων. Ἡ τε

15 μενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁμοκάτους ἐμ' ἐκ πλεονῦ οἰκίων αὐτικοῖς

9 ὅς before tauto Γ, omitted by M.1] 3, 1, 1774 (corr.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 1337 and Comm. 1. 871. ὁμοκάτους Riddleway (also Shilleto in unpublished Antiochana 108) menides επίρρη οὐ πληθυνοῖς, εὐτε ὁμοκάτους. 8 Naite von Wattenwyl (1891).

8 Euripides Iphigenia in Aul6 1400 Nauck. The words following are alle oį βαρβάρους, μὴ τε, Ἐλληνως τὸ μᾶς γὰρ δουλον, αι δ' ἐλευθέρου. SUBSEM. (12)

9 ὃς ταυτό κτλ] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not contested until a late period and then by but few: 3 § 4 n. (31). This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority; it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on 1. 5 § 10. That slaves are not-Hellenes is assumed quite as an understood thing in many. Meemor. 11. 7, 6, Democrit. xxi (e. M.6)-

48. See however m. (64) on 1. 7 § 5. SUBSEM. (13)

§ 5 τι πρῶτη] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—arises primarily the family. For the sense, πρῶτης καὶ ἀναγενεστὲρων οἰκία πολλά μας. Ἡθορ., viii. 13. 7. The three stages, εἶναι στάτοι, are given by Plato Laws 1. 626 c. 6. Ἡσιόδος] Works and Days 406. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, whereas δ' ἐν γαμοτις, ζησι καὶ βουλεύει ημερα. SUBSEM. (14)

12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κτλ] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. § 5 ff.

κτλ. (146). If with both these passages we compare § 10—3, 1. 5 § 10, it is evident that Vasta's decisions be to τέκνεα 1. 5, 12, which Grohmann omits pp. 1. 5. 7, 9, is quite to the sense and spirit of Aristotle: all in free pastures, &c., liquid instrument gnosis, voces et semivocales et metrum, voces in qui sunt semivocales in quot non bivere, metra in quot sunt plurera. 11. Schiller. SUBSEM. (15)

15 ἡ μὲν οὖν κτλ] ὅπως ὁπως, and η to repeating after the quotation from Herodotus the clause: 9 ὅς ταυτό κτλ. To this view φύσεωι in the style of ancient Greek thought the society which, in the order of nature, had access to most everything under the heavens: wherefore the one who attains to Charon's end of a piece of land in the place of fire, resembles the Greek. The union of a number of families was formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence in the family, where in Aristotle expressions are in a day; in Democritus hex. 1. 7, περιοχής, &c., "being acquainted with less transient customs." 14 Xanthes] 11. 14. 4. (4161). XVIII. 14. 16, 16. 16, 4. 1. 6, 16. 1. 6, 5. 16. 11. 4, 92. See. (34)

Ἐπιπερίτεις. See. Evangel. 1. 3 the end of this book. p. 122. (16)

13 Aρακάνθων] The reading is doubtful. 10. (17) The om. of the latter word give disadvantage. 12. If Aroucius is reading from a collection of stoics (Xanthes)
ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and διόκατόνως, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For διόκατόνως of the inferior MSS. is usually taken to be a compound with κάπη a trough, crib; hence any feeding-place; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in arsi could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Götting, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the families of the Cretans 'mess-mates,' because the συστία were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of διόκατόνως Dittenberger urges that 'it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read διόκατόνως) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But διόκατόνως = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.' Yet διόκατόνως should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of 'hearts' meaning homes or families*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. Transactions Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading διόκατόνως (with a), Doric for διόκατόνως (κύτος) = with a common plot of ground. SUSEM. (17) "'The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. Θαλέως i. 11. 12: κύτος is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (σιτις): cp. Π. 5. 2 (γαστόν και καρπός). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original οίκια: (2) οίκος = joint family of Hindu or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (κύτος) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine "(Early Law 237—255): after that, "(3) the οίκος breaks up into separate οίκιαι forming the κώμη (= the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (όμογελάκτες") (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye La propriété primitive cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn Aryan Household 176—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan Patriarchal Theory c. 8: also Caillebot Droit de succession p. 34 ff., Jannet Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte (Paris 1880) p. 88.

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household.

Stu. (188)

18 ὄμογελάκτας] According to Philochorus Fras. 91—94 and Fras. 119 in Harkness and Suidas (α. 277. γεγένηται, ὄμογελάκτης, ὄργανος) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένος who were afterwards called γεγένηται = kin, clansmen, were originally called ὄμογελάκτης = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider Allenda II. 471). Pollux vi. 37, viii. 9 οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους ἐκατοντάκου γεγένηται καὶ ὄμογελάκτης, γένος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεύρετος, ἀλλὰ δὲ τοῦ σαφῶν ωἴμα προσφαρευμένα. Stu. (19).

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κόσμος and the γένος is apparently indicated III. 9 13, 14 where we have the παῖδες defined as (α) οὗ τοῦ ἐν τῷ κοσμῷ καὶ ταῖς ἀδελφαῖς καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, and (β) οὐ γεγένη καὶ κόσμῳ κοσμῶν." (Heitland 1808 8).

Even then no place in the development is found for φαρίαν, φελινι, or Aristotle's "associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals." Nn. Elish. viii. 9, 5; cp. Ped. iii. 9, 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to σικακαριστή, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ὄμογελάκτης, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παῖδες τε καὶ παῖδων ταῖς be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the case in which it was customarily applied to the clansmen (γεγενηται). For descent has long been reckoned through males in Athens, indeed Diakarchos (Fr. 9 Muller) appears to denote by κάρτα what is usually called the γένος; and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine Early Law p. 272 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant "thieves of kin by descent through females only." On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the logodaed, it has been with good reason inferred that the system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, Megarian ep. c. 179—197, ep. L. H. Morgan Ancient Society 2. 5. c. 117—134. "If ὄμογελάκτης = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that the membership in the γένος depended on close having had the same mother's name (Iskandy). If so, we may similarly interpret ἑτοιμασία and ὀργανός as originally from a time when ruling from the same mother's stock and from the same mother's blood, constituted a larger society the natural idea of kinship? See Eec. ii. 6 in the.

Another meaning proposed is "those who offer the same meal," from a comparison of Sanskrit apparatus, "countrymen = those who offer the same food, the same water (i.e. 'from kin,' 'common kin' respectively) (Heinze ep. 17411. 110 for this there is no evidence.

Σχοῖνοι are mentioned from the village and country as the "men of their own household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household.

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Or the word may have first meant "thieves of kin by descent through females only." On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the logodaed, it has been with good reason inferred that the system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, Megarian ep. c. 179—197, ep. L. H. Morgan Ancient Society 2. 5. c. 117—134. "If ὄμογελάκτης = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that the membership in the γένος depended on close having had the same mother's name (Iskandy). If so, we may similarly interpret ἑτοιμασία and ὀργανός as originally from a time when ruling from the same mother's stock and from the same mother's blood, constituted a larger society the natural idea of kinship? See Eec. ii. 6 in the.

Another meaning proposed is "those who offer the same meal," from a comparison of Sanskrit apparatus, "countrymen = those who offer the same food, the same water (i.e. 'from kin,' 'common kin' respectively) (Heinze ep. 17411. 110 for this there is no evidence.

Σχοῖνοι are mentioned from the village and country as the "men of their own household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household.
§ 7 ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστίν ὅ λέγει (p. 3) "Ομηρος, παῖδων ἦδ' ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὗτοι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς 25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οὐ δὲ τὸ ἄρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύσαντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐάυτοις ἀφομοιοῦσιν οὐ ἄνθρωποι, οὖτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλευρῶν κοιμών κοινωνία τέλειος πόλεις ἤδη, πάσης ἐκουσα πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκειας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γνωμένη μὲν 30 οὖν τοῦ ξὺν ἔνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ ξὺν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει

21 ai is omitted by M8PI, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 σποράδες γάρ καὶ οὗτοι <ἀγγεγείτον> Schmidt edits, σποράδες γάρ καὶ οὗτοι [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and 26 ὥσπερ γάρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἦ δ' ἐκ Μ8 PI Q8 R8 b S8 T8 Vw W8 Aldine Bk., ἦ δ' ἐκ Μ8 L8 || ἦ δ'...1253 a i βελτίστων transposed by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδας. See his arrangement and alterations Introd. p. 96 || 29 γενόμενη Schneider || 30 οὖν is wanting in M8 PI, but cp. iv (vii). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀπ. ἦ 'Wherefore likewise the colonies' [i.e. the villages] 'because of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύσανται. So § 11 ὡστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).


24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον With the adverbial use comp. Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 7 καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἄκουν.


See still stronger statements about the popular religion in ᾽Μερθ. xiiil (L). 8 §§ 19–21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 ἦ δ' ἐκ πλευρῶν κτλ] Cp. ii. 2 § 8 with note and references, also ii. on III. 3 §§ 3, 4 § 10 (554). SUSEM. (20 b)

"The union of several village-communities forms, when complete, an actual city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to promote a higher life." See Grote History ii. 341–344 on city-state (villages; on this deduction of the state generally A.C. Bradley Hellenica 197–199, who observes 194 n. that "freedom", though not in a mere negative sense, best answers to αὐτάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of man's nature, external or spiritual, unsatisfied. In N. E. i. 7, 7 τὸ αὐτάρκειας ὢν μονολόγιον αἱρετῶν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μη-δενίας ἔνδοθα, the sole condition of a life that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp. N.E. x. 6. 2 ὡδεῖον ἔνδοθα...ἀλλά αὐτάρκεις. 29 ff. Compare c. 4 § 1; ii. 2 § 8; iii. 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff., 9 §§ 5, 6, 11–14, esp. ἢ γενών καὶ κοιμών κοινωνία ἀξιόν τελεια καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάρμου>. τούτο δ' ἐστιν, νῦν φαμέν, τὸ ξὺν ἐυνοιμαν καὶ καλῶς τῶν καλῶν ἀρα πράξεων <χάρμων> θετένον εἰναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὖ τοῦ συγχρ.; further iii. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; iv. (vii). 4 §§ 11–14, 5 §§ 1, 8 § 4; 8 §§ 8, 9, 9 §§ 1, 2; vii (iv). 4 §§ 9–11; vii (vi). 8 §§ 3. These passages would prove (even if it were not self-evident) that the perfected and beautified life, made complete self-sufficing and satisfying, is one with the life of happiness or well-being (ἐυδαιμονία): cp. n. (284) on ii. 9 § 5. SUSEM. (21)

The implication of εὐ ξυν and αὐτάρκεια which disposes of Schmidt's athesthes of the clauses where the latter conception comes in (fahrh. f. Phil. cxxiv. 188a. 804, cp. Introd. 97 n.) may also be studied in Nic. Eth. i. 7 §§ 6–8. In De anima ii. 8. 10, 420 b 19–22, τὸ εὖ is opposed to ἄναγκαιον, to ἐξ ἄναγκης in De part. animal. iii. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κτλ] Two proofs that the 'city' is natural. (1) It is the outcome and realization, the final cause, of the previous societies: they are natural, so also is the 'city. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;
but to be self-sufficient is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippasus and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antithenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller Socrates and Socratics p. 332—5.
The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the Gorgias, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in Republic B. 11, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbes, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τῶν | Physics 1. 1. 8
193a30 f. φύσει in first sense = ὑπὸ μετα
potence; in second sense = ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὰν λογόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνεῖν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσεῖν: 1. 2 § 8, 194a 38 f. ἡ δὲ φύσις τῶν καὶ τὸ ὀφέκα. Εἰ γὰρ εὐνοεῖν τὴν καρδιῶς συνής ἔσται τι λαχανίων, τῶν τόλμω τὸ καὶ τὸ ὀφέκα.

33 ὅπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι.

32 [ἡ δὲ... ἐστὶν] Schmidt 33 [ὅπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι] πρὸς μετα
telesetheias, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν ἐναι ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου ἐπτόνου οἰκίας. ἐτὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ καὶ τὸ τέλος βελτι
στοὺν ἡ δυνάμεις [καὶ] τέλος καὶ βελτιστωτον. ἐκ τούτων ἄνθρωπός
νέρον ὅτι τῶν φύσεων ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρωπος φύσιν τολμ
τικών κέρατον ἔχει ἐστί, καὶ ὁ ἀπόλλει διὰ φύσεως καὶ ὡν ἔδω πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἐκ τούτων φύσεων καὶ ὡν ἔδω πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, 32 [ἡ δὲ... ἐστὶν] Schmidt 33 [ὅπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι] πρὸς μετα
off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as 'clanless lawless heartless', for he, not the ἄπολις, but οὐ τοῦ Ὀμηρον λοιδορθείς, is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious)—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon" (Jackson).

§ 10.7 άξια άνθρωποι. From an epigram of Agathias (Anthol. Pal. ix. 492, esp. 20—28) Göttling De loco quinam Aris. (Jena 1848) showed that άξια nearly resembles the 'blot' of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (Academy Jan. 8, 1876) take άξια to mean a 'rover', i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathias' epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation from Iliad ix. 63, 64, where ἔκεινος οὗ πόλεμον ἐρατον ἐπιδίδωμι ὀκρώσεισι is the subject of which ἄφθορος ἀθέματος ἀνέστιοι are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw (Arist. Studien iii. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless heartless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or 'rover' is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer's πόλεμον ἐπιθυμησεις ἐπιδίδυμι who is a φύτεις τοιόντος, i.e. an ἄπολις φύσεως, in whom to the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἄπολις is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the άξια (Jackson). SuSem. (24) (25) δοτι here, like δη, "that." διότι δε πολιτικον] De hist. anim. 1. 1. 12: πολιτικα δ' έστι θεα ὤν η τι και κοινων γινεται πάντων το έργον, δηευ ποτα πατει αγελαία. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). SuSem. (24b) 9 For parallel passages consult Zeller ii 114-24 n. (3); for Aristotle's teleology, ib. 422—438, 488—497.

§ 11. On the physiological distinction between φώνη mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see De hist. anim. iv. 9. 536 a 20, b 8 ff., Prohl. x. 39, 395 a 7 ff., Pet. 20 § 2, 1450 b 22 ff. στοιχεῖον—φώνη ἀδιάρρεος, ὁν πάντα δε ἄλλ' ε' γ' πέρικε συνετή
§ 11 apocryphal (§§ 385 U* and 1st hand L.*) IPP. bk. = every. § 12 καλον afofal. Susen. (26) = and therefore also (for the purpose of signifying justice). § 12 16 πρόσ when compared with. § 12 10 aγάθον καλ καλον aλοθαναί moral perception. N. Eth. II. 9. 8: IV. 5. 13, ὑπὸ τον aλοθαναί καλον ὑπίσκ. not to mention passages in bk. viii. in §§ 4 of each. § 14 δια τοὐτον κ. § 14 a general objective genitive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 13 κ. τόπος, "fellowship in goodly and iustice." The "city" is regarded as a moral or religious, society, church and state in one. § 14 καλ πρότερον δι τή φύσι. It is not in order of time γενεσί, which are N. Eth. VIII. 12. 7, quoted on § 3 above, sets the direct contrary, but in order of thought and of real existence φύσιν, κατά φύσιν, τῷ εἴδον, τῷ χωρίσ. the state is prior to the family and to the individual. On this distinction see Maps. 3. 8 § 3 3. 7. 996) a 15 16 18. 10. 8. 10 13. 3. 1. η ἐνέργεια τοῦ τέρατος τοῦ διανοιγμὸς (the realized and actual proceeds the possible) κατά γενεσί καὶ κατά τοῦ καὶ κατά τοῦ γένος αὐτῶν τῷ εἴδον καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τέρατος ὑπὸ τοῦ τέρατος τῷ εἴδον. γάρ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ εἰμι, τῷ χωρίσ. N. Eth. VIII. 7. 12, 261 a 14 what is in process of development appears imperfect, but in φανερῶς τῷ γενεσί, ἐκλείπει καὶ ἐκλείπει, δια τή πρόσ τις ἡ πράξις τους ἀνθρώπους τὴν, τοῦ μόνου οὐκοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἄδικου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων aλοθαναίς ἕχεσιν ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. § 19 καὶ πρότερον δε. τή φύσι τόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἐκαστος ἔκαστος. § 19 ἐστιν το γένος πρότερον ἀναγκαίων ἐναι τοῦ μέρους, ἕνα ὑπὸ τοῦ ρομαντοῦ γέγονε τοῦ δόλου οὐκ ἕσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χειρ. εἰ μέν ἐρν-
nύμως, ώσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην διαφθαρέσα γάρ ἐσται (1) τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἐργῷ ὀρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε 24 μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέων τὰ αυτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ’ ὁμώ-
§ 14 νυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ ψύζει [καὶ] πρότερον ἢ ἔκα-
στος, δήλω’ εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἐκαστος χωρισθεῖς, ὁμοίως
tois ἄλλοις μέρεσι εξεί πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὦ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι
cοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενοι δὲ αὐτάρκειας οὐδὲν μέρος
29 πόλεως, ὡστε ἢ θηριὸν ἢ θέος.

§ 15 ψύζει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὄρμη ἐν πάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινων-
αν ὅ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστοις ἁγαθῶν αἰτίως. ὡσπερ γάρ

22 λέγοι Βκ. 2 and Susem. 1 following P² and perhaps Γ || ἀλλὰ διαφθαρέσα
Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθίνην, ἀλλὰ (διαφθαρέσα γάρ) ἐσται τοιαύτη πάντα: hardly right || <οὐκ> ἐσται Rud. Scholl (Comm. de legg. xii. tabb. Bonn 1865, p. 43) which is not improbable: unless we are to bracket the words διαφθαρέσα γάρ ἐσται τοιαύτη. But see Comm. and Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. || 23 <ἡ> τοιαύτης ὡστε οὐκαρ ψύζει [καὶ] τοιαύτης if Jackson || δὲ] γάρ Γ apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ. κτλ || 25 καὶ omitted before φύσει in Πλ and Paris. 963 || καὶ omitted before πρῶτον by P² Ar. || πρότερα Γ p6 Q M T b U b
V b L, πρότερα P 4, πρότερον Q 5 R b S b || 28 μηδὲν Π² Bk. μηδένος Γ Ar. || οὐδὲν Π² Bk. οὐδὲ M ² P 1 || 31 πρῶτων P 4 b, Q M T b R b S b T b U b V b L 1

accepted: διαφθαρέσα must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῦ ἐργοῦ ἑστηρεμένη καὶ τὴν δυνάμεως: “in such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function and in its capacity to execute that function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name”.

But the parallel passages De gen. anim. I. 19. 7 726 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γάρ ἢ χεῖρ οὐδ’ ἀλλ’ τῶν μορίων ὄντως ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἢ ἁλλής τινὸς δυνάμεως ἢ χεῦρι οὐδὲ μόροι οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μόνων ὁμώνυμων: Π. 1. 42, 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γάρ ἐστι πρῶτον μὴ ἔχων ψυχῆς, οὐδὲ σάρξ, ἀλλὰ φησιν ὁμώνυμος λειτυργεῖται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρῶτον τὸ δὲ σάρξ, ὡσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγκενεῖ λίθους τὸ δὲ σάρξ, ὡσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγκενεῖ λίθους; De anima I. 1. 9. 412 b 18 ff. ὁμολογοῦσας ἢ ἀπολειπόοις οὐκ ἐστιν ὁφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμώνυμως, καθάπερ οὐχ ἐστιν καθότι ἢ γεγραμμένοι: Meteorm. IV. 12. 3, 390 a 10 ff. ἀπαντῶ δ’ ἐστιν ὄραμα ἐργῶς: τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ ἄνω ἐργὸν ἀλήθες ἐστιν ἐκάστα, ὅπως ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁφθαλμός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμώνυμως, οὐκ οὗ τεθεῖς ἢ οὐ λίθους lead to the conclusion that διαφθαρέσα is subject and τοιαύτη is predicate. If so, and if τοιαύτη = a true hand, the sense requires the insertion of the negative of the hand, although we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα δὲ: “for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function.” ὁμώνυ-
μος οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις εξεί κτλ ‘will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part’: i.e., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be υστερον not πρῶτον.

29 ἢ θηριὸν ἢ θέος Σο. § 9 ἡ προειρήματα ἢ ἀνθρώπος. Ἰ. Επ. v. 9. 17 with Jackson’s note, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐπιτροπή (τῶν ἀπὸ τὰς ἀγαθὰς) οὐκ ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ’ οὐδὲν μόροιν ὁφθαλ-
mον, τοῖς ἀνάτομοι κακοί, σοὶ that the sphere of particular justice is restricted to human society: gen. VII. 1. 2 ωστε οὐδὲ θηριὸν ἐστίν κακία οὐδ’ ἀρετή, αὕτως οὐδὲ θεοὶ.

§ 15 2 δὲ πρῶτος κτλ] Gen. Intro. 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300) Susem (28 b) ωστε χάρι κτλ] “Both the grammar and the sense of τελεοθέν and χωρισθέν
nówou kai díkis appear strange, and 26 χωρασθείς is used in a different connexion" (Jackson). Spengel (and lately Ridgeway) would make the participles masculine. But the concord is not too harsh: "at fortress, ut sepius, libriore constructione utitur Aristoteles" (Susem.). For the thought, Plato Lese τῆς ε., περί τῆς ὑποδομῆς τῆς πολιτείας πάντων, cf. τῆς ὑποδομῆς τῆς πολιτείας πάντων (cf. (Jackson). Most editors make it causal or instrumental. "But (1) what can 'weapons for practical wisdom and virtue' mean? Hardly weapons for the exercise, but rather such as serve for the attainment, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὑπάλληλον shows that the former are meant. (2) It is essential to the thought that we should learn whence man, of all creatures, gets these dangerous double-edged weapons, so eminently adapted for purposes mutually opposed (two-edged), for good and for evil. Whereas they are for good needs not to be stated Aristotle's teleological standpoint implies it."

III. 10. 3 αξιόματα τῆς τέχνης προτεινομένης. Susem. (22 c).

Jackson keeping the law always is δίκαιον τόλμην (which he holds to be a hypothetical explanation of δίκαιον τόλμην, rightly placed but in a Greek sentence) would translate: "you judge belongs to a state", etc. can be found only in a state. "But on the accidental feature of law—which is the determination of what is just—being a regulation of the political community. Cf. Acts 5. 29 f., etc.

C. 3. Upon δικαιοσύνη, it is here that the law gives its usual and general application. Roughly speaking, the rest of the sixth tract of (3) jurisdiction in cc. 1, 4, (4) constitution in cc. 3, 4, (5) and (6).

C. 4. The household word judgment implies a law. This household word judgment implies a law. A man is born with weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserv.) wisdom and virtue; weapons which are, however, especially liable to abuse (Montecatino): φρουροίς the data of reference (Jackson). Most editors make it causal or instrumental. "But (1) what can 'weapons for practical wisdom and virtue' mean? Hardly weapons for the exercise, but rather such as serve for the attainment, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὑπάλληλον shows that the former are meant. (2) It is essential to the thought that we should learn whence man, of all creatures, gets these dangerous double-edged weapons, so eminently adapted for purposes mutually opposed (two-edged), for good and for evil. Whereas they are for good needs not to be stated Aristotle's teleological standpoint implies it.


37 ὡς δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικοῦ κτῆι
152 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 3.

§§ 5, 6, beasts to man, female to male, § 7, so it is better (i.e. § 11 advantageous and just) that a man whose function is bodily service, who is a mere adjunct of another, should be subject to his superior in excellence of soul, §§ 8, 9. Nature design to mark this distinction upon the bodies of the two, but does not always succeed: §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult Intro'd. pp. 24—26, the excellent dissertation of L. Schiller Die Lehre des Aris. von der Sklaverei (Erlangen 1847). Hildenbrand op.c. 395—406, Öncenk. 11. 29—74, Becker and Hermann Charikles III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 356—373. Susem. c. 3 § 1 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίαι δὲ κτλ) In his lax manner Aristotle means "the parts of Economic" or household-management "correspond to those of which the household consists". This at least gives better sense than to read οἰκίας: see 12 § 1.

The οἰκίας μέρος, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three ‘pairs’ of relationships, συζυγεῖαι (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνία). 4. ἔτει δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλ. κτλ] by the method noticed 1 § 3 n. 8 § 1 n., III. 1. 2 n. (434). Susem. (29) § 3 πρῶτα] The ἀυθνήτα of 1 § 3. § 2 9 γαμφίκη = ‘conjugal’, πατρικὴ = ‘paternal’ relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ἡ γαμφίκη ὀμβλα, the marriage union, IV(VII). 16 § 1 = simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἄνδρικη, Götting παισικὴ (sic) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin maritalis. Strictly πατρικὸς = hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14. 6: but in Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8. VIII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for ‘paternal’.
meros tis oikonomias] (aneu gar toun anagkaion adunaton (II)
25 kai xin kai ev xin). Ossteron de tais orismenaias technai
anagkaion ein uparxh tis oikeias orygias, ei mellei
§ 2 apotelesmheis th ei erugon, [oanw kai tis oikonomikoi] twn
oragian tis mne afich tis eimypicha (oin to kubern-

vnti) ou mene oiaf aftpicha tis eimypicha' ou gar
30 uprptetai en orugian eidei tais technai estin), oanw kai
<to> oikonomikos to kthmha orugian eidos 4u4u esti, kai ei

25 kai ev xin wanting in GM and P1 (first hand, added in the margin) || de
Hence [de] Susem.1-2. || 26 melou Koraces and perhaps P || 27 to oikonomikoi
thwn oikonomikwn P2-3-6. Q M9 Qp R5 Sb Tb Uw Wv L9 Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C
and the rst hand in Vb (the dative in Vb by a later hand); [oanw kai to oikonomikoi]
and 30 oanw kai <to> oikonomikos > Rassow Susem. Thurot once proposed to omit
30 oanw kai and transpose 27 oanw kai....30 estin to follow 31 esti || 31 [h...
...32 esti, kai] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the 'natural' part concerns oikonomikai, and
that only indirectly. My defence of the
words, Rhein. Mus. xx. 510, is exposed to objections not then foreseen: it would
seem this is an Aristotelian inter-

SUSEM (32)
24 anw gar ktl] Cp. 2 § 8 n. (21). Mere life, bare existence, xin, is of course
the immediate end of the household and of household management: good life or
well-being, ev xin, is the end which the
state has in view: but indirectly the state and its end is the end of the household
2 §§ 2—9. Consequently we find that side of
oikonomia, which is directed towards
securing the fitness of those belonging to
the household, and so towards the perfect-
ing of life, ranked above the use
and preservation of property, or the side
which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 n.
SUSEM (33)
25 tais orismenaias technai= the arts which form distinct professions: 'as the
craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must
be provided with suitable tools &c.' Bern-

Nays. In any case the phrase means 'the
arts' properly so called; immediately
below they are termed productive or creative
(poiene, poiitika oruug a § 4 with n.) as

contrasted with the merely practical
activities to which Economic and the art
of life belong. According to Aristotle these
productive arts are to be subdivided into
(1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or
fine arts'.

In the sphere of prac-
tice the end lies in the activities them-
selves, energeiai: in the sphere of the
arts, in certain definite special products,
eruga, distinct from the activities which
produce them: Nic. Eth. I. 1, 2, 1094 a
3 f., diafora de tis phainetai tov telon
'tis mne gar elan energeiai, tis de par'
avtas eruga tis, I. 1. 5 1094 a 16 diaferei
'de oudean tis energeias autaiv eina na
the telon tov praxetis ou para taunai allo tis, kath-

per epo tis lexeisoum epistimovn, 11. 4.
1105 a 26, VI. 2 5 1139 b 2, II. 5, 3
1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this
distinction Schlosser prefers to explain
orismenaias the, as arts restricted
to definite distinctive ends. But can this
be expressed by the one word orismenaias?
Fulbeorn wavers between this explana-
tion and his own, which makes oror. te.x=
definite special arts || the one all-em-

bracing art of life. But conduct or the
art of life—even if we include in it the
perfecting of life—embraces at the most
only the practical activities; and from
what has been said it follows that the
technical or productive activities, poiins, would
be excluded from it. Cp. also vi
(vii). 3, 3 n. SUSEM (34)
§ 2 30 en oruugon eidei= is classed
with, ranked under the head of, im-
plements: cp. tais en thlas eidei arxas
Meta. I. 3-3. 983 b 7, the material sort of
causes; en morion eidei De Cado I. 1. 7
268 a 5. The same idiom frequently
where eidos and the genitive are almost a
paraphrase for the thing in question: tis
muon xheis malkovn eidos h politeias Pol. III
15, 2, cp. vi (iv). 6, 9 xalgarxias eidos.
31 to kthma oruugon ktl] 3the
chattel is an instrument to aid him in
living." But it is not true now that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's property is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further 1. 4. 4. 35. 6. 10. 6. Suskm. (35)

33 ὅργανον πρὸ ὁργάνων] an implement superior to other implements; see 7 § 1 and De part. animal. iv. 10. 21 668 τὴν ἴδιον (sc. ἢ φιλοκ) ὅστε ὁργάνον πρὸ ὁργάνων. For this relation δοκεῖ = ἐφύσχων ὁργανόν, ὁργανόν ἐφύσχω δοκεῖ Eaton cites N. Eth. VIII. 11. 6

§ 3 35 Δανδάλον] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato Mem. 67 D, Suidas s. v. Δανδάλον τοιχώμα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusion of life and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato l.c. See Brunn History of the Greek Artists I. 14. 23. Suskm. (36)

36 ὅ ποιμνίς] Homer Hes. v 271. 376 ὅποιον ὁ ποιμνίς ἀλλότριον ἀλλότριον ἄγετα. Suskm. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lyttelton's Creasing Ray.

§ 4 1254 a 1 ποιητικά for productive (of fresh utilities entailed in material objects), τεκμερία for actions merely for use, i.e. as we use from § 3 the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy consumption is either production or reproduction, and the distinction of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producer's or the consumers' point of view. Mill, c. 3, Sidgwick Principles, c. 12. 7. 2.

On the distinction here made between τεκμερία and ποιητικά see p. 142 and Zeller op. c. 119 ff. 172 ff. 553 ff. Consult also the special treatise of Ed. Muller History of the sciences in art in Ges. 24. 104 ff., 254 ff., Toma

Müller justly remarks, op. c. 119 f. 552 ff. that from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at the unskilled labour as one added that some sort of manual labour for productive i.e. non-commercial utility is denied. The point is maintained in view of the fact that in the real and industry of Homer the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the
μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἐπερών τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (II) αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθήτους καὶ τῆς κλήνης ἡ χρῆσις μόνον. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εὗδει καὶ ἡ πράξεις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ἀντὶ ἐχειν διαφορὰν. ὅ δὲ βίος πράξεις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστίν; διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξειν. 

τὸ δὲ κτήμα λέγεται ὁσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον, τὸ τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου ὁμολογοῦ δὲ καὶ τὸ κτήμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκεῖνου δ' οὐκ ἐστιν' ὅ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δούλου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλὼς ἐκεῖνου. 

τῖς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τῖς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἄλλ' ἄλλου ἀνθρώπου ἄν, ὡστε φύσει δοῦλος ἐστιν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστιν ἀνθρώπος, ὅς ἂν κτήμα ἐδοῦν. 

5 δ' wanting in M and perhaps also in Γ, hence [δ'] Susem. || 6 καὶ δέονται II P2-3. C4 Wb Ar. Ald., δέονται δ' P4-6. Q M b Q b R b T b U b V b T b L t Bk. || 10 ἀπλῶς Γ and P3 (but ἐρυθρέα [sic] ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄλους mg, P3, i.e. a marginal note in dark yellow ink), ἀπλῶς ὀλὼς M4 P1, ὀλὼς all other sources Bk. Susem.1-2. || The clause 15 ὅ...16 ἐστίν is noticed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Metaphys. p. 15, 6 ed. Bonitz || 15 ὁν III Paris. 963 Alex. (apparently) and P4 (corrector in margin), δὲ P2-6. Q M b Q b R b T b U b V b W b L b Ar. Ald. Bk. and the 1st hand in P4 C4: no doubt also in P3 (an erasure here), γρ. δὲ p1 in margin, ἐστίν a later hand in C4 || 16 ἀλλ' ὀδῇ P14-6. Wb L b Ald., ἀλλ' οὐδὲν M4 || ἡ Γ M4 || δοῦλος ἐστιν or δοῦλος ἢ Γ apparently, δοῦλος ὁ M4 C4 and P1-2-3. Q M b (1st hand), ἀνθρώπος ὁν δοῦλος ὁν P4, ἀνθρω- 

production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle." Susem. (37) 

§ 5 κτήμα...μόριον] Eaton compares Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἐως ἂν ἢ πτιλόκαι καὶ χωρισθῆ, ὡστε μέρος αὐτοῦ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as parts of oneself. 

10 ἀπλῶς ἄλλου] "belongs absolutely to another. 

To express relation to and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with ἐναῖ, as here and Pl. Rep. IV, 433 b toαία ὅτα ἐναί του, or (2) ἐναῖ with the genitive, as in Metaiph. 1, 2. 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and Rhet. 1, 9. 27 ἐνευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἐγὼν. 

12 ὅ δὲ...ολὼς ἐκεῖνου] Eth. End. VII, 9. 2. 1241 b 19 οὐ γὰρ δ' ἐστιν (sc. δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος), ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός...τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὑστερ μόριον καὶ ὀργανον ἀφαιρετον, τὸ δ' ὀργανον ὑστερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος. 

§ 6 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because 'the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it περίκειται καὶ πάσχειν'; Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 2. 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἐτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, Pol. IV (VII). 1. 12 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν, also IV (VII). 4. 10; Plato Parm. 134 ἐν τῷ δύναμιν ἔχει  ἐν ἔχει, Rep. IX, 588 B τὸ τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δικαια πράττειν  ἐν ἐκάστορον ἔχει δύναμιν. 

15 ὅ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτλ] Conversely in Metaph. I. 2. 19 982 b 25 we have a definition of the free man ἀνθρώπος, φαιμὲν, ἐνευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐναῖ καὶ μὴ ἄλλον (L. Schiller). Susem. (38).
5 λος ἐστιν], κτήμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικῶν καὶ χωριστῶν] τὸτέραπ (II)
§ 2 ἐκ τῶν γυμνῶν καταμαθῶν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχει καὶ ἀρχηγεῖ
οῦ μόνον τῶν ἁναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὑπὸ.
καὶ εὗθυς ἐκ γενετῆς ἐνια διεστρέκτη τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖον
τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖον. καὶ εἰδὴ πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχηγεῖον καὶ
25 ἁρχομένους ἐστὶν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἄρχη ἡ τῶν βελτίων)
§ 3 ἁρχομένους, οἶνον ἀνθρωπον ή θερίουν τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελείσθαι
ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίων βελτίων ἐργον ὅποιον δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει
tὸ δ' ἄρχεται, ἐστὶ το τούτων ἐργον σοί γὰρ ἐκ ἀληθείας
τος οὐ παθήσεις RQ Sb Tp Ub Vb Wb L A. Ar. Al. Bl. et al. with the before these words, corr. ἐν τῷ τίμου τό εἰς ὄργανον πρακτικῶν καὶ χωριστῶν ἀλλὰ ἀλλού ὅποιо, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτήμα 'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in ὕπερ τοῦ 
ένιαι συμφερόντων
§ 1 17 χωριστῶν] Hereby opposed to μόνον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 1,3 (Shilleto).
Thus the definition of οὐκ ὄργανον ἀνθρωπον πρακτικῶν καὶ χωριστῶν, ἀλλὰ ἀλλού οὐκ, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτήμα 'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in ὕπερ τοῦ τίμου τοῦ εἰς ὄργανον πρακτικῶν καὶ χωριστῶν
§ 1 20 τὸ λόγῳ...καὶ τῶν γυμνῶν] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικὰ in διαλεκτικῆς γρηγορίας as opposed (4) to ἀνελεκτικὰς ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς, (5) to φιλοσοφικὰς γρηγορίας οἰ ἐπιστολοποιήσ: W segmentation 11. 354, Zeller Plut. II 1171 n. 3. Lacton rightly compares IV (VII). 1 6.
§ 2 23 τῶν συμφερόντων] Under the limitation laid down IV. 6, 6, 14 (2).
§ 25 καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων κτλ] This passage is referred to IV (VII). 3, 2, see the note, cp. IV (VII). 14 19 τῷ γὰρ διάτερον ἀρχεῖον 
διὰ τὸ ἀνθρωπον βυθισθὲν καὶ μᾶλλον μετὰ ἀρχηγοῦ. St. Al. (28 b2)
§ 3 25 το τούτων ἐργον] This discussion per se them, the work which they exclusively perform in these relations of government and governed but in the mere exercise of command and burden of obedience. See Plato Cyp. 1. 14 at τοῦ ἐργοῦ τοῦ τούτων ἐργον ἡ ὄλλη 
προκαταλαμβάνει τοῦ ἄρχει τοῦ τούτων ἐργοῦ 
δοσα γάρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition, not so much as a particular and separate one, viz. in the particular explanation of it κατὰ τὸ ποτήριον ἐργον. St. Al. (22 b9)
The sentence is in parenthesis in 1. 1, 3, where see. In IV. 24 (1) we note that the initial parts, whether the whole of the first or part of whole, is such a part of whole, in so many cases every a principal or ruling part and the whole, in so many cases every distinct which is radical. Thus the whole order of slaves forms, as in 9. 2, the parenthesis, a it 20 and hold good of lying things.
The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). SUSEM. (38 c) It is not probable that ἕκ with genitive = a partitive genitive (Bonitz Ind. Ar. 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise Peri phront., 836 a 39, to ὁ φυτὸν ὅικ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν στερομένων ψυχῆς, and 828 b 27. It would be an improvement, but hardly correct, to render ‘taking the whole of this is preeminently true of living things’. 32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι κτλ] αἰτεῖ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιστοῦ ἐστίν ἕνεκε, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν IV (vii). 14. 10.

33 ἀρχή, ὁ οἷον ἁρμονία\] ‘Even in things without life there is a species of domination, in music for instance’: each musical ‘mode’ being ruled by its key-note, ἡ μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord*). Compare Probl. xix. § 33 920 a 21 ἡ γὰρ μέση καὶ ἡ γεμών: § 36 920 b 9 τὸ ὁρμούσαι ἐστὶν ἀπάσας sc. ταῖς χορδαῖς, δὴ τὸ ἐξεύρει πρὸς τὴν μέσην: § 44 922 a 23 ἐπείδη τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν ἀκρῶν τοῦ μόνον ἀρχῆς τίς ἐστίν ...27 φθόγγοι ὧν ἡ μέση καλουμένη μόνη ἀρχή ἐστι θατέρον τετραχώρου. On the technical sense of ἁρμονία = ἔδω διαπασῶν see Exc. iii. on Bk. v (viii). Another political simile from the ‘modes’ Eth. Enul. vii. 9. 4: ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρμοσίων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, inas-

* The term ‘dominant’ for the fifth above the key-note in a modern scale is quite different.

much as some are ὀρθοί, others παρεκβάλλον. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἁρμονία as qualifying ἀρχή=dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or sub-ordination of parts. Cr. De Anima 1. 4. 1 τὴν ἁρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σῶθεν ἐναντίον ἔλαιν. This would be the sense of συνμορφωνία, rather than of ἁρμονία, in music: Probl. xix. 38 921 a 2.

Ἐξωτερικοπετάρας ἐστὶν σκέψεως ‘would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject’. Obviously the simple meaning here as in ἔξω πράξεις IV (vii). 3. 8: not to be pressed (as by Thurot Études 219 f., Ueberweg Hist. of Phil. Eng. tr. 1. 143) to signify ‘those parts of Aristotle’s strictly scientific works which are “dialectical” i.e. controversial, rather than “apodeictical” i.e. purely scientific.’

34 τὸ δὲ [ᾧ ϕῶν κτλ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἁρμόσων by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δὲ δὲ σκοπεῖν ... ἔχειν in such a way that even the first member (ὡς) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second division into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δεύτερον, τρίτον to correspond with πρῶτον, in place of them we find τάλιν and ἔτι δὲ in § 7. SUSEM. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle’s meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 ὡς γὰρ ἑκατόν ἐστι τῆς γενεσίας τελευτήσῃς ταύτην φαινέ τὴν φύσιν ένεικ ἑκάστον. Cr. N. Eth. ix. 9. 8, Cic. Tusc. 1 § 32 (Eaton).
crasing φαίλως καὶ just afterwards; μορφήρως, due to a mistaken correction against over μοχθήρως, may have displaced φαίλως, as Schmidt once suggested; now he suspects μοχθήρως ἡ: [ἡ μοχθήρως ἡ] 

1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φάσιν wanting in Μ' and Π' (in hand), but added in the margin by P1 | P33 have peri for παρὰ 6 [καὶ διαλειψάν] οίκες, perhaps rightly.
Now in the Politics we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the *αἰσθητικόν* or *δρεικτικόν* (cp. De Anima III. 7). 2 oux etepon to dreikton kai feuktikwn, ou'ti allhlon ouste to aisthetikon allo to einai allo) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or perceptive side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, *τηδοσία*. Cp. I. 13. 6 n., Nic. Eth. 1. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10 f.; VI. 12 § 6. SUSEM. (40)

§ 7 10 ταλιν...13 ετι δε] See on § 4 a 34 above. *οὐσιωτάτος* Here again, in man's relation to the animals we see the same thing: clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruler and ruled and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. SUSEM. (41, 42)

Cp. 2 § 2 διά την σωτηρίαν (Congreve).

Πλωτοποιεῖται 264 λ. δώρηστο το ἄφον τῷ τιμίῳ καὶ ἄγρῳ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσα τυλισθεῖσα· ημεία προσέρχεται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχουσαι ἄγρα. A division which Aristotle censures as unsubtle. De part. animal. 1. 3. 13 § 643 b 3, πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπέων, ὡς ἡμεία, καὶ ἄγρα τυλιγόμενοι δέστα.

§ 8 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπω καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἔρωτος· τὰ 12 11 μὲν γὰρ ἥμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τῇν φύσιν, τούτως δὲ πᾶσι βελτίων ἀρχεται υπ' ἀνθρώπου τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-τηρίας οὗτος. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θήλυ φύει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χείρον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.

5 τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ τρόπου ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐτι πάντων ἀνθρώ-πων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστάθην ὅσον ψυχή σώματος 13 καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων

13 ἢστι Ar. (?) est igitur, Susem.3 (a misprint)  || 14 Πκ. omit καλ  || 16 διε-στάτας τοσοῦτον Μς, διεστάτα τοσοῦτον Π1  || ψυχῆς σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπων θηρίων? Thurot, more correctly; but perhaps an improvement upon Aristotle himself  || 17 δὲ wanting in Μς Π1-3. Qb Tb Ar. Ald. and Π2 (1st hand, supplied by corr.2)]

14 κρείττον...χείρον] Elsewhere to τὸ θηλυ is declared to be ὑπὲρ ἄρρεν πεπ-ρωμένον, or ἄναηπρια. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex: Keph. V. 455 E ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄθθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρός, Latas vi. 781 B ὄσω ἡ θήλεια ἡμῶν φύσιν ἐπὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρον τῆς τῶν ἀρέτων, Timaeus 42 λ. B: τὸ κρείττον τοιοῦτον ἐλγέ γένος...ἀνήρ, 90 E f.

15 ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 ἄσοι...17 θηρίον] Cp. Πρ. 11. 5 κατὰ τὸ διαφέροντον ἐνίος τοῦ θηρίου, ὡς ἐποι ἐπείτε; Ηow is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle's own psychology? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is at most but a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyments, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition ἀνθρωποθ-δωλία" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli Aris-
toteles Παρασκευικ 69). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, iv(vii). 17 § 7; § 9; also v(viii). 6 § 8, iv(viii). 15 § 5 with the notes: Nic. Eth. 1. 5 § 3; III. 10 § 8, 11 § 3; iv. 5 § 6; and the further references under άνθρωποι ὑπάρχοντες Bonati Ind. AR. 54 b 30 f. SUSEM. (43)


20 τοῖς ἐπημένοις τῷ σώματι, τῷ πάθητι καὶ τῷ θηράτῳ θελεί (Congreve).

§ 9 21 διό και ἄλλοι ιστόν] As a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum huic alterius qui maius existat esse, Cic. De Rep. III. § 27 (Congreve). SUSEM. (44)

22 δόσων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἱκεν In c. 13 § 4 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (ἀνθρωποσθεῖα) is described to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children (see note), for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the more suggestions of the instants and passions of sense; Nic. Eth. i. 3. 6, 111. 11. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here resorting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see a. on § 6), the appetitive soul, in iv (vii). 14 § 3, cp. Nic. Eth. i. 13 § 6 etc.; namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by practical reason. As the power in question is to Aristotle amongst the most remarkable peculiarities of the practical reason—see n. (49) on § 5—this cannot with accuracy be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (what we may if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part in which is excluded the possession of practical reason. At the most there can only be an approximation to the slave here described. See further on c. 11 § 15

23 Λάχανον II. &c. Bk. Schneider Spengel, perhaps rightly [παραγωγής] Bonati [ἄλλα] Spengel αἰσθάνεσθαι is Schneider
28 Moreover the service afforded by the slave is not very far removed from that of domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (note the dative) towards the necessities of life.” Comp. Plato Polit. 280 b: slaves and domesticated animals as species of the same genus peri χων κτήσιν των ἡμέρων πλήρω δοῦλων: also c. 2 § 5 above n. (18): and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (46)

§ 10 27 Βουλεται] Nature designs, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).

113 § 10 27 Βουλεται] Nature designs, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).

32 χρείαν] “including services in war as well as in peace.”

16. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental worth is necessarily and naturally presented in a harmonious external form; and in the very beauty of the race, of which he was thoroughly conscious, Aristotle finds direct proof of its superiority to the barbarians. What a complete justification this for the slavery of the black and coloured races! Zeller op. c. ii 691 n. (2). See on 1. 2 § 4 n. (13).

Lang however from another point of view justly remarks op. c. Essays 60: “we must remember no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves.” SUSEM. (47)

6 There is then one species of slavery, which is natural. But there is another species, conventional slavery: § 1. The justice of the convention which allows prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves is unconditionally challenged by none (A) and defended by others (B): § 2. The reason why there are these conflicting views, and why nevertheless they have a common ground, is the implication of virtue and superior force. The issue turns on what constitutes right and justice: § 3. Weakness of the one view (A), which implies a denial of the right of superior virtue to rule: § 4. Others (C), again, argue that all slavery, so far as it is legal, is just: but the war might be unjust, and they would refuse to apply their principle consistently to effect Greeks: § 5. This refusal leads them back to the former doctrine: § 6. Illustration from the conception of necessity: § 7. Men are marked off for true freedom and true nobility by virtue (apart from it): § 8. Reconciliation: §§ 6, 10.

See Excursus ii.; Hampke in Philologus xxiv. 1866. 171—175, who compares IV (VI). 3 §§ 12—18; in the Transactions of Cenib. Philol. Sect. ii. 1883. Jackson pp. 111—116. Postgate pp. 119—123. Ridgeway pp. 125—130; and Susmihl in Hermes xix. (84). 376—378. The chapter reminds us of J. Ehr., i. c. 8—11, in so far as Aristotle is testing his theoretical conclusions by a companion with various received opinions. § 1. 1255 a 1 ff. "It is thus plain that in certain cases there are natural freemen and natural slaves, for the latter of whom the estate of slavery is both advantageous and just. And yet it is easy to see that those who maintain the opposite" (vis. of the doctrine of natural slavery against Ridgeway 139). § 10, to a certain extent, argue correctly: For the term slavery and slave are used in two senses. <Besides the natural> there is that the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered of war are declared the property of their conquerors."

6 γαρ νόμος 'φανείρ: X. καταμαθάτων Cypr. vili. 73. τον γάρ τινα τον τελευτηταν πολέμου, διοικητήν θραύσατο τον τελευτηταν εἰς την προσωπικήν τοῦτον τούτον. See also上有。 It is well known that ancient and modern purely conventional and semi-ancient tradition were called slaves by the Greeks, and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws: viii. 1 ff. § 4. By convention and not convention, for the Conventions of nature and the Written Laws of nature are one and the same: vii. 6, 7. Yet these "written laws" are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a distinct natural giver: see on 25. v 12 ff. 11. 14. Sim. (48), Co. Comm. 149 ff. 2 7. This interpretative help is by many unnecessarily accepted. For the commonsense, of course, of an ancient people, "slavery among the ancients was at first an associated, not an independent, conquest of the spirit of human nature. When men were subjugated, frequently they killed their prisoners. Later still of Aristotle in Pol. ii. 744. γραμματεύοντος τέχνην. "The punishment was laid against our predecessors, who had proposed or needed an emancipation, or popular liberation, in a case which concerned power or liberty, in force at the time and not previously
repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. (A decree (ψήφισμα) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the Boule previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the Boule on the same subject which it could contravene) (Meier and Schömann Attischer Process 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. SUSEM. (49)

9 ὡς δεινὸν κτλ. “on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues.” The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῖς μὲν εὐνόῳ δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι and § 3, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπότης, where see note. SUSEM. (49 b) Note the genitive after ἀρχόμενον, “subject of the coercer”.

11 “This then is their view: others again take the former view” (ἐκέινως): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ ἐκέινως repeats the φασὶν of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (Λ) the opponents (τοῖς μὲν), and by (Β) the defenders of conventional slavery (τοῖς δὲ): the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (c) the τῶς of line 22.

§ 3 12 “The reason of the conflict” between (Λ) and (Β) “and what” at the same time “makes the (two opposed) views overlap.” The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (Λ) and (Β) stand sharply opposed (cp. τὸ διαστάτων χωρίς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force. Bernays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51)

13 λόγοις, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as “the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them,” thus nearly = views or reasonings (Postgate op. c. 121, 123 n.), “platforms” (Heitland), theories.

πολλάκις, as in 1. 9, 15, vii (iv), 10, 2, vii (vi). 1. 3; see Heitland’s examination of these passages Notes 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson op. c. 114 n. Bonitz Index s.v. compares τεμαχισμένοι and explains that from the sense “to alternate” it comes to be applied ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque cohaerant. “Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion” (Susem.). Oncken took it of ‘arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments,’ Heitland and Jackson of ‘propositions overlapping’; but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the λόγοι of (Α) and (Β)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which overlap: because the “slaveries which (Α) pronounces unjust, (Β) pronounces just.” (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. 11. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινὰ κτλ. “in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort.” These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that βία carries with it ἀρέτη: this is the common ground where the two opposing parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.
I. 6. 4]

1255 a. 9—1255 a. 20.

15 ἐστιν αἱ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ύπεροχῇ ἄγαθον τινὲς, ὡστε δικαιο

μὴ ἀνεύ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦν

§ 4 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (οὐδ' ἄρα τοῖς μὲν εὐθέων

dοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὕτω τὸ ἅπαθος

tὸ τῆς κρείττονα ἄρχειν) ἐπεὶ διαστάται τὴν χώραν τούτην τῆς λαοῦ·

17 εὐφρατεῖν Λαμπίν, wrongly: <εἰσ' = εἰσί; > Scholastic.

14 χορήγησις means, resources: η ἐκ-

τοῦ χ. favourable external circumstances, external goods Nic. Eth. x. § 4; so of the individual Pol. iv.(vii). 13 § 3. In a wider sense, anything with which the state requires to be furnished, even population, territory iv.(vii). 4 § 3. 4.

13—16 δηλοῦν [S. H.] Fulkeborn remarks with truth that the qualifications necessary here (amounting in all to tēres paribas) really make the whole theory futile, because ‘other things’ in this connexion are so seldom ‘equal’. Bodily qualities, superior numbers and weapons, all sorts of external circumstances often largely contribute to victory. Conquest is no valid proof of the higher excellence of the conqueror: besides, the one kind of mental capacity which has contributed to his victory is no guarantee that he also possesses the other which qualifies him for wise government, above all for the exercise of despotical rule over a conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle would be borne out by a belief in the moral government of the world: in the main, success attends upon the most capable nations. Sueton. 50.

15 ἡστε δοκεῖν κτλ. "hence it seems that force to coerce is never independent of virtue, but that the dispute turns on the nature of right and justice."

§ 14 17 f. ("For this reason some take the mutual goodwill of governors and governed ‘to constitute right, others stand on the naked right of the stronger to rule.’) The parenthesis is due to Ridge-

way; Heitland say that ‘this remark breaks the course of the argument’ (p. 14). The grounds for the view of (10), which had not been stated above 11 1, 3, are now given by διὰ τοῦ.

τοὺς μὲν] Clearly again the unqualified opponents of slavery. Sueton. 50 b.

Jackson, 115 n., first proved that one meaning of εὐφρατεῖν is ‘loyalty: the will-

* [And no less by the scientific decree of the survival of the fittest.]
§ 5 ού δει το βέλτιον κατ' ἁρετὴν ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν. Ὅλως (II)
δ' αὐτεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οὖνται, δικαίως τινός (ὅ γὰρ νόμος
δικαιὸν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαιαν,
άμα δὲ οὐ φασίν. τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-
25 καίαν εἰναι τῶν πολεμῶν, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-
μῶς ἀν φαίν τις δοῦλον εἰναι εἰ δὲ μὴ, συμβιβάσεται τοὺς (p. 9).

§ 6 συμβεβ' πραθήναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλουται δι
λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-
30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἥττουσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὄπερ εἰ
ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐναρμονεῖ τινας φαίνει τοὺς μὲν
§ 7 πανταχοῦ δούλους τους δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 19

24 εἰμι δ' Ὅλως ΠΠ Ῥθ. ΤΤ Ὡ (γρ. ἄμα π¹ in the margin), ἀπλῶς apparently Ar. ||
27 καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ἀγαθὸν Schmidt || 28 αὐτοῦ Montecatino and perhaps P³. Over this word P³ has the gloss τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατηθέντας which M² has in the text after ληφθέντας || 32 πανταχοῦ] εἰς ἀρχῆς ΠΠ, γρ. ἀπαν-
tαχοῦ p³ in the margin
departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 τοῦτον τῶν λόγων
as a singular of one view and hence infers that ἄτεροι λόγοι denotes one view also;
M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'.

ὡς οὔ δει, epexegetic of λόγοι, 'the view namely that...'. But Jackson fol-
lowing Heinsius makes it depend on πεπαθον: 'plausibility to shew that it
is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule'. Why does Aristotle expose the
weakness of (A)? He admits εὐθεία as the principle regulating the relations of
citizens in the normal πολιτεία, but as between master and slave it is not to
supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take Ὅλως with ἀντεχόμενοι.
"Others again simply holding fast to
something just and right as they suppose
(for whatever is legal is just) admit the
justice of slavery in accordance with the
laws of war, but in the same breath
withdraw the admission. For not only
may the war have had an unjust origin,
but further no one would call him, who
is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave.
Else it will follow that men who are
held to be of the noblest birth are
slaves or come of servile ancestry, if
they" [or their ancestors] "happen to
have been taken prisoners and sold":—
as Plato was by Dionysios. The view of
(Ὁ), 22 τρέχει, is substantially the common
opinion in Greece, with its latent incon-
sistencies. Ὅλως was taken by Hampke
= 'embracing both the former views'.
 Ridgeway οὗ εὐθείας (p. c. 130) objects that 'if
Aristotle was enunciating another theory
here, he would have used ἐτὶ δὲ'. It
will be found upon comparison of De
Anima 1. 5 §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and Meteor.
i. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that Ὅλως
and ἐτὶ δὲ are used in parallel clauses
to introduce distinct objections, the order
of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διόπερ κτλ] "Hence they refuse to
call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to bar-
barians": αὐτοὺς used absolutely for αὐ-
tοὺς < τοὺς Ἐλλήνας > which comes to
the same thing as 33 αὐτοὺς. Eaton com-
pares the noble conduct of Callicratidas,
 Xen. Hell. 1. 6, 14.

30 οὖδὲν ἄλλο κτλ] In making this
qualification they are really on their way
to the principle of natural slavery laid
down by us at the first: they are compelled
to admit that in certain cases there is a
distinction between two classes, the one
who are everywhere, the others who are
nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the
intermediate view of (ἐ) to its right sense
Aristotle has no need to refute at length
the extreme views of (A) and (b).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ] Nic. Eth. v. 7, 1, 1134 b 19, τὸ μὲν φάσει <δίκαιον> ἀκίνητον
cαὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν (Con-
greve). τόν αὐτοῦ κτλ] Cr. iii. 13, 2 ἡ εὐ-
γένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οἶκοι τίμιος. Susem.(52)
33 asto αυτός Π3 Ρ4 Plut., αυτός Ρ3 Ρ4 Τ8 and 1st hand of Ρ3 (omitted by some) παρ αυτός Μ3 Plut. and perhaps Ρ4 | 35 read omitted in Ρ4 Ρ5 Ρ4 Τ8 Αld and Ρ4 (1st hand), Ar. leaves και κατα τους untransliterated | 36 read before Ι is omitted by Bk. | έλευθερα for 'Ελευθερα Π4 | 37 έγερεσις Ar., έγερσις Π3, έγερσις Π4 Ρ4-8. Ald. Plut. ά γόνου Ρ3 Ρ4 Τ8, έγερσις Ρ3 Τ8. | 38 ανδράκων Μ3-8 Ald. Plut. and Ρ3 (a later hand) | 39 omitted Π3 Ar. Plut. Bk., alibi II

35 ως δν τα] "which implies the existence of an absolute, as well as a relative, nobility and freedom".

36 On the tragic poet Theocles of Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of Aristotle who is rather fond of quoting from him, see Susen's note (104) on Poetics 11 § 1, Bernhardt Greek Literature, ii b p. 64 f., Welcker Die griech. Trag. iii. 1069 ff. [Also Cope Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philos. 111. 360 f., Int. to Rhetoric 53 f., note on Rhet. ii. 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in Nauck's Frag. Graec. frag. iii. Schem. 53.

§ 8 39 άτυχή] From vii.iv. 8-9, viii(v). 1. 7 (cp. iii. 13, 3, Rhet. i. 8, 5) we learn that true nobility is a combination of wealth with high excellence hereditary in a family, διπλα και τελείως ἀφικόντα.

How far this third or intermediate view of slavery and the limits within which it is justified as natural agrees with that of Aristotle himself, is more clearly seen from the discussion in iv (viii), 7 § 1-3, where see note (780, 781). The question is, to what extent are we to attribute the higher endowments and 'virtue' which distinguish the Greeks and the slave from other races and make the latter their slave born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Hellenic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before iii. 14. 6, διακρίνεται τα καπετανία των 'Ελλήνων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τον 'Αριστοτέλην τοῦ τοπολογεῖν. The other references are i. 1. 5 = 5. 8 f., 5. 8 f., 6. 8 f., 5. 4 f. | 36 § 11: Χλ. 17. 11. 10, 9 | 8 (14) 71 with the notes.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows, in the main, the indications of Aristotle Plato in like manner considers the enslavement of Hellenics by barbarians: Ecg. v. 469 f. = 471 f. 11. Ideas which Plato only supposes, Ev. viii. 349 = 350 C. Polit. 299 a. Aristotle works out systematically: see an. 1. 3. 3-4 (46) and the note there: instead. p. 48 b. 24 Lescher Art. M. 11. 715 f. [Exact to Plato.

Π 4. 428 f., Scholi. 54

14.1. 3 on άτυχήν. See above p. 110.

Another translation Ev. iii. 11. 2, 6. 5. 8, 5. 4 f. = 5. 4 f. 5. 3 f. = 5. 11. 7 v. viii, viii. 8, 5. 7 (780, 781). The question is, to what extent are we to attribute the higher endowments and 'virtue' which distinguish the Greeks and the slave from other races and make the latter their slave born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Hellenic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before iii. 14. 6, διακρίνεται τα καπετανία των 'Ελλήνων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τον 'Αριστοτέλην τοῦ τοπολογεῖν. The other references are i. 1. 5 = 5. 8 f., 5. 8 f., 6. 8 f., 5. 4 f. | 36 § 11: Χλ. 17. 11. 10, 9 | 8 (14) 71 with the notes.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows, in the main, the indications of Aristotle Plato in like manner considers the enslavement of Hellenics by barbarians: Ecg. v. 469 f. = 471 f. 11. Ideas which Plato only supposes, Ev. viii. 349 = 350 C. Polit. 299 a. Aristotle works out systematically: see an. 1. 3. 3-4 (46) and the note there: instead. p. 48 b. 24 Lescher Art. M. 11. 715 f. [Exact to Plato.

Π 4. 428 f., Scholi. 54

14.1. 3 on άτυχήν. See above p. 110.
θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίων, ούτω καὶ ἕξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἤ δὲ φύσις βουλεταὶ μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλακίς μὲντοι οὐ δύναται. 

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν ὡς ἔχει τινα λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ 20 ὁ συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τῷ δεσπότει καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δή το ἄρχεσθαι τῷ δέ ἀρχεῖν, ἡν περίκασιν ἄρχην ἄρχειν, ὥστε 

§ 10 καὶ δεσπότει, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀνυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖς (τὸ 10 γαρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ δáveis καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὁ δέ δουλος μέρος τι του δεσπότου, οἷον ἐμφυτον, τι του σώματος κεχωρισμένον δέ μέρος; διὸ καὶ συμφέρον 21 ἐστι τι καὶ φιλία δουλῷ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἄλληλους τοῖς

1255 b 2 γενέσθαι Μ 

§ 9 

§ 10 

§ 10 συμβαίνει...ἐλευθέρων. Φülleborn remarks with truth that this admission quite invalidates all practical application of Aristotle's theory. It is even possible for a Greek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic, to be a natural freedman: c. &\, c. Hermæs, Aristotle's friend and the uncle of his wife, who had actually been a slave: see on 11. 7. 17. Hence the non-Hellene may even prove to be the natural master of the Hellene. 

SUSEM. (56)

§ 9 5 οὐκ εἰσίν

§ 10 δὲ δόγμα κατά] So above 5 § 10 συμβαίνει...ἐλευθέρων. Fülleborn remarks with truth that this admission quite invalidates all practical application of Aristotle's theory. It is even possible for a Greek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic, to be a natural freedman: c. &\, c. Hermæs, Aristotle's friend and the uncle of his wife, who had actually been a slave: see on 11. 7. 17. Hence the non-Hellene may even prove to be the natural master of the Hellene. 

SUSEM. (56)

§ 9 5 οὐκ εἰσίν] Fortuitously we can check the text (see Crit. Notes) by the directly opposed statement with which c. 6 opens, by § 6, § 10, and the next words, line 6, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ "in certain cases there is a clearly marked distinction of this sort, where namely..."

§ 9 τὸ δὲ κακῶς] sc. ἀρείν. 

§ 10 τὸ γάρ αὐτὸ κατά] See 1 § 3 n. (7). 

11 ὁ δὲ δούλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ

μέρος] This is said of property (κτήμα) generally and of the child Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. 

SUSEM. (57) See however Jackson's note ad loc.

12 διὸ...13 πρὸς ἄλληλους] In Nic. Eth. viii. 11 §§ 6, 7, 116i a 32 ff, it is said that there can be no friendship between master and slave qui slave: ἐν οἷς γάρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἐστιν τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἄρχοντι, ὡσεὶ φίλας: οὐδὲ γάρ δίκαιον. The relation is like that of a craftsman to his tools, of soul to body, of master to slave, ὀφελεῖται μὲν γάρ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων (cp. τὸ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τοῦ text), φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστιν...ὡς δὲ δουλὸς ἐμφυτὸς ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἀνυμφόρως δουλὸς. οὐ μὲν οὗ δουλῶς, οὐκ εἶστιν φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὐ δ' ἀνθρώπος: δοκεῖ γάρ εἶναι τοῖς δικαίοις παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς τάτα τῶν δυνάμεων κοινωφέσθαι, καὶ συνθετικα, καὶ φιλία δὴ, καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπως. 

Zeller ii ii 693 f, following Ritter, rightly calls this an inconsistency which does the philosopher honour. The author of the
Eudemonian Ethics, vii. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff., withdraws the concession: since there is the same relation between soul and body, craftsman and tools, master and slave, in these cases there is no association (koinonía) possible. "οὐ γὰρ δὲ σπουδάζων ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἐν τῷ τὰς τοῦ εὐδοκίας τὰ δύο τοῦ ἐνδιαφέρει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεῖον ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ἡμνήσισι καὶ τῷ διαφέρειν ἔργῳ πρὸς τὸν ἐνδιαφέρον τὸν ἐν τῷ διάφορῳ ἐστὶν (the good of the one is not separable from the good of the other, the good of both is the good of that one of the two for whose sake the other exists). τὸ τὲ γὰρ σωμάτων ἐστίν ἄργαν φύσις τῷ συνάπτον μόνον καὶ ἀναφερόντας. That even a slave is a man is emphasized in another fragment of Philoctemon, besides the one quoted on § 34, viz. 'Επανομένων 28: καὶ διοίκοι τὰς τινῶς σύνταξες, ὑπὸ διαφέρουσας, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀνδρακόλαις συνάφοις, ἀν δὲ ἀναφερόντας. Cfr. Becker Chari kler III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. Tr. p. 357. Consult further Pol. iv (vii). 8 § 1-4 n. (801); i. 2. 3 n. (7); III. 6. 6. SEM. (57 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's Euripides, Pref. to vol. i. pp. xiii f. with ref. there given, esp. Hel. 728, Melanippe fr. 506 (§ 15), Phædrus fr. 823 (828): úmaph Oneken II. 33 ff. 

c. 7. Διατομαία then, or rule over slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1. Nor does the relation of διατομαία depend upon science: § 2. In what sense there may be a science of the duties (1) of slaves (2) of householders (the latter quite distinct from ἡ κατάλειψις, sc. δούλων): § 3-5. § 17. τοὺς] Plato. See on § 14 n. (x). SEM. (58).

"It is plain that here and in 1. 1 Aristotle is thinking of Plat. Polit. 258 E sqq. esp. 259 b. It is however a mistake to attribute the doctrine, without qualification, to Plato, what at 258 b introduces a long and elaborate myth with the express intention of warning us, that though the shepherd-king of the Homeric period exercised all regal powers indiscriminately, this state of things ended with the Satrapism. See by all means 274 εώς γ. From this point to the end of the dialogue the Ethics of Aristotle engaged in discriminating the relations of a host of rivals. Clearly the doctrine in question is at variance with the whole tenor of the Republic. May we not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2. 11, Euthyph. 11b, to Socrates?" (Jackson).

19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ 10 διάφορον. Compare iv (vii). 8 § 4 (6. § 33). 11 n. 6 (4); 12. 3 n. (7); III. 10 § 2. 17. 14 n. (1121) 14 b. 4; 11. 6. On the other hand see iiii. 3. 4 n. (471), SEM. (52 b).

22 A similar distinction is found in Xen. Mem. iv. 1. 4. 1 (διάφορον καὶ διὰ διάφορον) and 1. 2. 2 (ἐν διάφορον, ἐν διάφορον). Jackson refers to Pol. iv. 286 (285 7-). § 19. See his notes.

2 31 σὺν λόγῳ ὑπὸ συνάπτον" As is inserted in the passage of the first text: cp. c. 1 1 2 (95). 3 + διάφορον τῷ τούτῳ διάφορον": but more than latter at most excludes the former. As was shown in 1. 1 2 c. 1 1 2, Plato is very far from denying the fact that he is asserting the other. He then, however, regards the more capacious as the universal rule, but for that very reason misses the perfect test of all, of whatever kind, it is he above all who in the most exact have knowledge, in so to speak, the phenomena, but not on the Socratic provocation.
excellence (ἀρετή) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the Ethics he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller op. c. ii ii 627 f. SUSEM. (59, 60)

κατά = in virtue of, as in καθό. The term ‘master’ is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα κτλ. The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the emnobling refinement and perfecting of existence. SUSEM. (61)

29 A verse of the Pankratias, a comedy by Aristotle’s younger contemporary Philemon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (διασώφη) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

(170) POLÍTİKΩN A. 7. [I. 7. 2]

ομοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δουλὸς καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος; ἐπιστήμην δὲ ἄν (11) εἰς καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικῇ μὲν οίαν περ ὁ ἐν 24 Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευσεν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνον τις μισθὸν § 3 εὐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακοινῆματα τοὺς παιδας), εἰς δὲ ἄν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον τοῦτον μᾶθαις, οἶνον ὑφοποιητικὴ καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαύτα γένη τῆς διακοινίας. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἑτέρα ἑτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

29 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

§ 4 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι εἰσὶ δεσποτικὴ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἑστὶν ἡ χρηστικὴ δουλικὴ. ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτάσθαι τοὺς δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δοῦλοις. ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμην οὐδὲν μέγα ἐξουσία οὐδὲ 34 σεμνῶν ἢ γὰρ τῶν δοῦλων ἐπιστασθαι δεὶ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ § 5 ταῦτα ἐπιστασθαι ἐπιπτάττειν. διὸ ὧν οὖς ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοῦς κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτῃ τῆς τιμῆς, αὐτοὶ 23 ἐν ταῖς Μη P1 SUSEM.1—wrongly, see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1362, ἐν [ταῖς]

SUSEM.2 || 24 ἐπαίδευσεν Π2 Bk. || 26 τούτων Π3 Bk. || ὑφοποιηκή Π2-3 Q S B Tb Ald. Bk. ὑφοποιηκή Π4, ὑφοποιηκὴ Αρ. || 27 ἑτέρα] ἔργα Q S Tb Ald. and 1st hand in Πο-4. (ἐρ. ἑτέρα in the margin of Π4, the right reading is inserted in Π3 by a later hand, but subsequently erased)


8  

perι μεν ουν δοϋλον καί δεσπότην τούτων διωρίζωμεν τοις τρόποις οἷων δει 
πασις κτήσεως καί χρηματιστικῆς ὑπερ-

38 [ή] Susem., η Schmitzer wrongly: 3[μάλα] or 3[τις αἰκία] Susem. | 4 [ή 
Susem.]

37 [ή δὲ κτλ] With κτητικὴ supply δούλων. But it may be inferred from c. 
8 § 12, δοκι καὶ ταρξιμονιά φέοει κτητική πω 
κατα. τι η γαρ χρηματιστική μέσοι επών, η δὲ 
χρημάτωσι προτε τὰ τὰ τῆρλα καί τῶν ἀνθρώ 
πολος αὐτῶν αὐτῆς δρόμοις μη δέλτον, τα 
that under the one genus 'offensive war' Aris 

3. 171  

τριπλος τας θηρίας τροτοτε φίλει δοιλα 

κατα. τις θηρίας χρηματιστικῆς) 

If this be so, he knows nothing of an 

art of 'man-hunting': and the words at 

the end, 38 η χρηματιστική, must be an 

interpolatio. 

Cf. further 1. 2 § 4 n. (11, 6 

§ 8 ηπι. (54, 56), ιV (VII). 2 § 15 ν. 

δι πάνων περιστατικά διοκόλεοι, διὰ 

τῶν δεσποτῶν, ὦτεροι οὐδὲ χρηματικ 

ἐπι 

θυων ἔνα χρηματικόν ἀπὸ τῶν δεσπ 

οτῶν. (757, 778): ιV (VII). 14 § 21, where one object of 

military training is τὸ δεσποτέων τῶν δο 


κατα. τις θηρίας χρηματιστικῆς, 

Susem. (65).

This view, that θηρίας is a species 

of πολεμική, Jackson cannot accept. 

On the contrary, from 8 § 12 (just quoted) he 

infers that to Aristotle (as to Plato Σημ. 

222 b, Law 823 b) πολεμική is a species of 

θηρίας: see his note on that passage. 

He translates here, " the art of acquiring 

slaves, that is, the just art of acquiring 

slaves, is distinct from both of those 

from δουλεία and δεσποτεία, "being a 

species of the art of war or the art of 

hunting."

cc. 8—11 περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ 

χρηματιστικῆς.

c. 8 In what relation does χρηματι 

στικὴ stand to θηρίας? Is it (1) the 

same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3) 

a subsidiary science? It is not the same, 

for it serves a different purpose, accom 

modation: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or 

not is disputed, and must be decided for 

each of the various species of χρηματιστικῆς (specifica); 1 ).

Review of the various natural state of 


The natural art of production (σφόδρον), 

which has for its object the accomplishment 

of natural wealth within the state, is a 

branch of Economics §§ 3—13.

For this section of the work consult 

Laud. Schneider Das staatswirtschaftlichen 

Leben Leven und (The theory of Politi 

cal Economy in the Aristotelean, p. 1. 

Deseri Kreas, 1883, p. 11 New York, 

1875; Glaser De Aristotelica et 

Berc und (Rigdenburg, 1879, 4 with 

Benelux's review in Philosophiska 

xvi, 42,123: Hamburger Encyclopa 

dia, p. 1. Lyceum, 1877) Scheler 

Zu Aristoteles' Politik in 4. 1. 1890, 

405—416: Susem, on 4. 11. 8—11 

in Röhr, Men, XX. 1882, 53—567: 

Kuhsrenscheff Zu Aristoteles' Politik im 

4. 9—11 im J. für Philos. XCV. 1892, 

477—484, 717 and Susem (80).

There can be little doubt that Aris 

totle wrote with especial reference to 

Plato: 4. 16 477—478: 11. a. 600 

918 a—920 C (B. VII, 2. 943. 

408 a—409 B, 318 494 A, 226 B 11, 

219 43 b, 11). 37 4—392 c, etc.

1 16 15 3 : χρηματιστική is fully applied 

(1) to the whole art of acquisition, 

than completely identical with σφόδρον. 

In this sense the term was introduced by 

4. 1160 a 4, and this form is still used 

out § 9, and in §§ 10. In a same 

sense it is used (1) for the acquiring 

exchange, see above § 9. The limit 

of the term is ambiguous, (a) not for 

us, that is, the language in general 

again at § 9. In the sense, therefore 

spreitung, "sparer science," 

—especially to be understood as 

universally. Again in 9 § 11 in a 

used (2) for that part of the art of 

acquisition which, as we shall see, was 

directed solely to the personal wealth 

indirectly connected with the state. 

Plato (1) yields "economic science,"
1250 a 5 [7] ὑπηρετικῶν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικῶν Bender, certainly not right. That Μο omission ἡ is quite unimportant || 6 κερχηδοτικῶν P²−4. Q S²−T² Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P³, κερχηδοτικῶν P³ (1st hand) || 9 ἔρων Γ P¹ Susem¹−². || 10 χαλκὸς Γ P¹ Susem¹−², χαλκὸς M² || 11 τῇ ὑικονομῇ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ Sylburg for ὑικονομικῇ (ἡ ὑικονομική) of P³ and Bk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ] perib M² P³ S² T²

(2) = ἡ μῆ ἀναγκαία of c. q § 18; and (1) the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. Susem. (69) 2 κατὰ τὸν ύπηρετικὸν τρόπον] "in accordance with the procedure adopted," namely, that from part to whole. See i § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29): III. i § 2 n. (434). Susem. (66) ἐπιτρέπω...[ἡ] "since the slave is, as we saw, included under the head of property," being defined as κτῆμα, a chattel. 5 καὶ εἰ ὑπηρ. κτᾶ] The more precise way in which this third possibility is expressed is to anticipate a decision in its favour (Hampke). However when the decision comes to be made, 10 § 1 — 3, it only has a preference given it; it is not exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks. That the question, in which of the two senses χρηματιστικῆς is auxiliary to Economic, is never taken up is most surprising. We can only conjecture the answer from passing hints: see on 10 § 2. Susem. (67) 7 ἡ μὲν ὄργανα...[ἡ] δὲ τὴν ἔργαν] The one provides tools to work with, the other raw material to work up (Oncken). Susem. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato Politieis 287 C, ὡς τὲν υμαντὴν τρόπον, ἐπείτερο καὶ ὁ διό- (III) λος τῆς κτῆσεως μέρος τι ἢ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορρήσειν ἄν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ ὑικονομικῇ ἔστω 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ υπηρετικὴ, καὶ εἰ υπηρετική, πότερον ὣς ἡ κερχηδοτική τῇ υφαντικῇ ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικῇ τῇ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτους ὑπηρετούσι, ἀλλὰ ἢ μὲν ὑπερ-§ 2 γανὰ παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὑλὴν λέγω δὲ ὑλὴν τὸ ὑποκεί-μενον, ἢ όυ τι ἀποτελείται ἔργον, οἶον ύφαντη μὲν ἔρια 10 ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ δὲ χαλκοῦ). ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἷς ἡ αὐτή τῇ ὑικονομικῇ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ, δὴν λογίζεται (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρύσασθαι) τίς γὰρ ἐσται ἢ χρησομενή τοις κατὰ τὴν ὁικῖαν παρὰ τῇ ὑικο-μικῇ ἕως τοῦ πότερον μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἔτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμ-
15 el γάρ] εἴπερ Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen. (Passage p. 1866 c. 40) has shown that el γάρ can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen's version after 16 εταί must be a full stop. But perhaps διαμαρτυρήσων. el γάρ: eti τενκ. ** with the punctuation of previous edid., is right. 16 έταί: έτοι: είτε περίεργα: Darm. 17 * * * ζολόν Conring Suppl. ‘The lacuna began with δι or διαδείπτερον Hymenaeu Substitution. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, ed hic. and Adelung, ** μηνιά Carne, χρηματιστική Π Π Ατ. Lk. 19 [καὶ εἰπότα] = Seitenz. ed eti? Stahr 22 πεποίηκας after διαφέρεται Μ P 15 23 τεινόνται μπε Μ 16

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes el γάρ to mean "ifnamely" as in Alkídamos. De genp. 11, 12. άρα σε εἰρήνη ήμαι ἄλλην τιπ τεινόνται μελέτη λέγων: el γάρ οi τοις δηλωμοι διαφέρεται... διαπίται καὶ φθάνων τάς των ακοπτωτών γράμμα εμπελάς, and Arist. Khet. III. 17. 11 el γάρ Ἀριστέα λέγων Πηνέλα εκείνης, εἶναι Λιάκη, εἰνα τῶν θεών, εμφαίοι καὶ καὶ διάβασ, ή (μα. ή) τα καὶ τά παρά τοι σκόπως ἄτιν. Elsewhere γάρ appears redundant, or rather, no apotélosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: Nic. Eth. VIII. 8. 6 οἱ χρησιμοὶ δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ προκειμένοι: Evr. γάρ (now long namely as) αὑτός Παῦλος οὗτ' διαφέρεις ἄλληλοι: έν τούτω γάρ Khet. II. 15. 10. ή γάρ Pl. vi. (IV). 8. 6, δε μεν Khet. VIII (v). I. 8. “See however Spiegel Aris. Rent. u. Vahlen neuste Bearbei- tungen p. 13 ff.” (Sussemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in Khet. I. § 3 (and Pl. vii. 7 § 21) are γάρ, χρησμὸς κτήσεις, έτε καὶ πρότερός καὶ κρυπτατίτωρ καὶ διάπελασ: also ρυμελαματισμὸν πρότερον which, according to c. 6. 9, below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like διάπερον which correspondingly to this, cr. Proct. I. 3 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (if the expression is again exact, and) έπει τά τρόφιμα εὑρείναι must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessary of life—clothing, tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls 'instruments for life and wellbeing,' including especially of directly produced as produced by industry without recent in exchange. If so. Exchange is the sphere. That is supported by the actual use of the word in a wider sense than food, for economic economy; "substance, 1. 10. 11. 6. These passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of economizing which, because desire to procure the requisite substances, usually belong to economic sciences, but this does not affect the present purpose.

Or, (1) if all that is meant is that production and appropriation, of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "secondly" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the products of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the right explanation, I propose the text descriptive case on § 17 + 18 this is not rare. 3084. 1280.

πρῶτον is dependent, (επει) τά τρόφιμα. 15. open to the Λέξεις Παραθηκής 4. 5. That the way in which animals support themselves contains the mode of life in more fully detailed Arist. 1. 13. 477 b 17 ff., 480 a 11 ff., Titus 11. 11, the 1. 4 ff. and the proof to be given in detail in VIII. chs. 9-11. Under superscripts are included animals who had no動作.
roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than ἴσσοφάγοι = herbivorous. In Hist. animal. σάρκοφαγος ‘carnivorous’ is chiefly used: ζύοφάγος hardly ever.

§ 5 26 ῥαστώνας facilities: “to enable them to get at their food and capture it.” By τοῦτων understand ἵθα primarily, though καρπὸς would be included. Bernays reads κατὰ for καί: “to give them facilities for the capture of their food.”

§§ 6—8 Smith Wealth of nations Intro. Chap., Mill Pol. Econ. 1. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lovnest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, Hist. anim. 1. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. n. above on 5 § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotus describes, iv. 186, would represent these νομάδες. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory νομαῖοι of Hellenic democracies, VII (VI). 4. 11.

32 “The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land.”

§ 7 36 λιποτείας It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. i. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful υἱὸν ἐχοντος τοῦ αἰσχρον τοῦτον τοῦ ἕργου φέροντος δι' τα καὶ δίδαξι μᾶλλον, cp. Hom. Od. III. 73, IX. 252 : and even later it was usual amongst the Locrions and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. i. 5, ii. 32, iv. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see Introd. 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (i. 47 n.) adduces as a parallel. See Introd. 27 f. Susem. (71)
14 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τῇ τοῦ καλομένου γάρ (III)
§ 11 λακτός φύσιν. ὡστε ὰμοιός δῆλον, ὦτι καί [γενομένους] οἷς-7
tέν τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐνεκεν ἐναὶ καί τὰ ἄλλα ζώα τῶν ἄνθρωπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἄλλα
taula γε πλεῦστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλας βοσκεῖς ἐνεκεν, ἦν§
12 καὶ ἐσθῆκας καὶ ἄλλα ὀργάνα γίνεται εἰς αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ
φύσις μηδὲν μῆτε ἀτέλες ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαίον
tῶν ἄνθρωπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
23 διὸ καὶ ἥ πολεμική φύσει κτητική πώς ἐσται (ἢ γὰρ θη:-

νομένους Ρι (1st hand), ἄλλος γενομένους Ρ’ (corr.1 in the margin), γενομένους
(=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the Ethics II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένους] Bernays,
[δῆλον ὦτι καί γενομένους] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in ΠΙ is another τὰ ἄλλα (τάλλα
Π’), a repetition of the preceding: παν (sic) Π’ (1st hand), τὰ πάντα Π’ (corrector)
|| 20 γίνεται Μ’Π || γοῦν C o n r i n g Susem.3, which suits the sense but is against
Aristotle’s usage, γάρ; Susem., ὄν W Π Ar. Bk. Bernays || 23 [διὸ...24 αὐτῆς] and
23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμική also 24 [ἢ δὲ...26 πολέμου καὶ πρωτον] Schmidt, who trans-
poses the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θηρευτικῆς. See Qu. Cr. III. 5 ff.
(tὰ ἐναώα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (tὰ ἀναώα) breed worms. The difference
between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a parent
and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg: but if the whole of the young
animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also
Hist. anim. 1. 5. 3 480 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (κύμα) is called an egg when one
part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young
animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the
whole of the germ by its organization and growth: cp. ἵδ. ν. 19. 2 550 b 28 ff.
ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκολήκων οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τινὸς γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, ἡπερ ἐκ τῶν φῶν, ἀλλ’
ὅλον αὐξάνεται καὶ διαρθρόημεν γίνεται τὸ ὄνο, and De gener. anim. III. 2. 4
752 a 27 f. οὐκ ἡπερ οὐκ γεγονεὶς αὐτὰ δι’ αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ φάδ’) λαμβάνει τὴν αἰσθήσεις.
It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present
passage of worms is in reality only true of
eggs. All that the former receive
from the parent worm is that capacity for
perfect self-development which is wanting
in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 n. (96).
Susem. (73)
14 τοῦ καλομένου γάλακτος φύσιν=
the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ
ἄερος, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις=air, heat respec-
tively; see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 838 a 8 ff. with
the examples 837 b 42 ff.
§ 11 15 γενομένους “after they are
born.” The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12
is common to all the Socritics and was
probably derived from Socrates himself:
Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 5 ff.
§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἥ πολεμικὴ κτῆτικὴ
This does not directly follow from the
foregoing. Some intermediate thought has
been supplied: < it must further be as-
sumed that amongst men themselves the
less perfect are formed for the service of the
more perfect >. Cp. also n. (70) on
§ 3. Susem. (74)
“There are at least four ways of taking
this passage. (1) Vettori Gphi public
Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἥ
both refer to πολεμικῆ. (2) Lambin,
Schnitzer, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμικῆ,
ἕτερην to θερευτικῆ. This is plainly absurd:
for if θερευτικῆ can be used against men
as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος
πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as
πολεμικῆς. (3) Garve, followed by
Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητικῆ,
and ἥ to θερευτικῆ. There are three
objections to this: (a) It proves too
much; for if we deduce the right to make
war from the right to hunt, why should
not captives be eaten?—a notion which
Aristotle (7) IV (vii). 2. 15 expressly repu-
diates with abhorrence. (b) Wars of
defence or to regain liberty can hardly be called hunting; the notion of hostility is the wider. (7) The clause *αὕτη δικαιοποιεῖ* assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is not therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders: *quod ut alios bello claudit parum ratio a natura quidammodo profinisset, making ἐπιθέτος an epithet of κείμενος and μέρος πολέμων κείμενος; he also refers ἀνθρωπος to ἄνθρωπος. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing ὅσον after κείμενος and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in ἄνθρωπος so combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive.*

**Suum. Quaest. Crit.** iii. p. 6 f. Then translate: 'hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)' viz. of natural warfare, and  

κείμενος, § 7, is αἵτοροι ἐργασία. "It" i.e. war "has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—αἵτοι κείμενοι, ἐν ἄνθρωποι—is supported by Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to πολέμων. He translates: 'natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (1) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is ἄνθρωποι proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a branch of war which has a natural justification.' He adds: 'The translator then is

\[\text{ἀνθρωπος προτέρων πολέμων} \]

From 7 § 1 it would appear that πολέμων is still further divided. See Plin. Nat. Hist. iii. 203, 223. This includes captives, deportations, and requires under the general head of πολέμων, which is one of the two branches of πολέμου.

24 φωτείν δικαιοποιεῖ* Commend the reflex. *give given. *[10x] 6. 7. *Strick (119.)

13 27 εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος *See K. C. 

In c. iii. 1, p. 510. *Strick (119.)

28 With the changes proposed by Malby and Ramsay one could almost translate: "one species of acquisition...in a branch of slave society, whose task it is to furnish a store of slaves necessary for life and useful for civil or domestic society, slaves which ought therefore to be at hand in the household or to be procured by the hand by his science (Ramsay)—Colum (Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays)." Though change is, of itself gained from the sense of "come", in so far as "coming" in sense is required not very clear, see by Strick. Jackson, for his part, argues with Bernays, interpreting as we find ancient, though capable of being misunderstood (here perhaps anticipated by coming to agree on the same point.)
translates "in so far as Economic must
either find ready to hand, or itself provide
that there may be found ready to hand, necessary
of life and utilities which are capable of being stored for
the common use of state or family."

True wealth is for use: ὅλως δὲ τὸ
πλούσιον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσαι μᾶλλον ὡς ἐν
tῷ κέκτησαι: καί γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν τῶν
τοιοῦτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλοῦτος Κειμ. 1. 5. 7.

32 αὐτάρκεια — the amount of such
property absolutely necessary to secure independence
of all external aid.

οὐκ ἄπειρος See 9 §§ 13, 14. The
notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in
Epicurus apud Diog. Laert. X. 144: ὁ
τὸς φόρους πλοῦτος καὶ ὁρατά καὶ ἐπι-
ριστῶς ἐστί, ὅ τὸς κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπει-
ρον ἐμπίστευτα. The earlier political eco-
nomists believed in a possible "glut of capital": Mill
P. E. 1. § 3. Σέλων] Frug. 13, 71 Bergk. SUSEM.

35 οὖδεν γὰρ κτῆ] See again
Ex. iii. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b)
c. 9. The other species of κτήσις, viz.
χρηματιστικά, the art of money-making,
of money: §§ 7—11. Distinction between
natural κτήσις and this χρηματιστικά: §§ 12—15. Cause of the confusion between
them: §§ 16—18.

30 in other words, means and appliances for life, and
for the life of wellbeing and perfection
as the end of the household and of the state. But cp. Ex. iii. SUSEM. (77)
The definition of wealth as "instruments" (given also 4 § 2) is commended
by J. S. Mill Political Economy 1. 10 as
adding distinctness and reality to the
common view. His definitions are "any
product both useful and susceptible of
accumulation"—with which comp. 1256b
29—and "all useful or agreeable things
which possess exchange value." Mill
too restricts the term to material wealth.

38 τοῖς οἰκονόμοις κτῆ] See again
Ex. iii. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b)
§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια — the amount of such
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1256 b 29—1257 a 16

Politics

καθ’ αυτό οικεία
καθ’ αυτό δια οικεία
κατά συμβεβηκές

υπόδειξη
μεταβλητική
σταθμός
τὰ ὑπόδημα

Front Euchar.
call autò
καθ’ αὐτὸν
καθ’ αὐτὸν
καθ’ αὐτὸν

End Eth.
call autò
καθ’ αὐτὸν
καθ’ αὐτὸν
καθ’ αὐτὸν
καθ’ αὐτὸν

(Jackson).

9 υπόδειξη = wearing, ἡ μεταβλητική = the use in exchange. The shoe when used as an article of exchange preserves its proper nature, it is still to be worn by somebody; although as it is not made to exchange this use in ὁποία isia.

§ 3 καὶ γὰρ... 13 υπόδημα] This is true. The question is always how much money or food the shoe as such, and not the leather used in making it, is worth: the labour has to be paid for as well as the materials (material). Cf. on § 9 [13] and below, 13. See n. 790 13 ὑπόδημα = a shoe.

4 14 ὑπόδημα = a shoe.

End Eth.

All things have a use in exchange. We now speak of the two natures of a thing, value in use and value in exchange. 13 ἀπόλα-πία τὰ μὲν περὶ τίνες ἄλλες ὀρθώς, derived on the first instance from a natural origin [whatever it may afterwards become].

12—2
17 [ἡ καὶ...19 ἀλλαγήν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς τις φύσει χρηματιστικής Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς metaβλητικῆς Bernays || 20 [τοῦτο...οἰκία] Schmidt || ἐστιν] ἦν Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in ΠῚ and Ar., it is supplied by μ in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes || ἔτερον || ἔτερον ἡπόρουν Schmidt, ἐστέροντο Koraes, ἐστέροι ἐτέρων Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἔτερων <ἐτέρων ἡπόρουν>? Susen. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδέντο || Ῥακες added ἦν || 24 καὶ is wanting in Π. [καὶ] Susen., καὶ <ὑπὲρ> Schmidt and Bernays (perhaps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 ff. Michael of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. 7. 76 refers to this passage

17 ἡ καὶ δὴλον...καπηλικῆ] Barter is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes on to show. Money is an artificial means of facilitating this, not of natural origin but only due to custom and convention, see §§ 8—11 μ. (82, 83): though when applied within due limits it is not contrary to nature. The whole explanation would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly observes, had Aristotle definitely stated what he means by 'trade' (καπηλικῆ = huckstering, retail trade): viz. that it is a buying and exchanging "not for one's own wants, but in order to sell again". As it is, this is left to be inferred from the context. Susen. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ κτλ.] "For the necessity of exchange is confined, as we saw, to the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants." Cp. τοσαφῆς = only so much 13 § 12.

§ 5 21 ἄλλ' ἡδη] but not until the society extended. Since trade is introduced at a later stage it is not 'natural'. Possibly directed against Plato's primitive state, the ἄλθησιν, ὑγιής, ὑών πόλις, Κερ. Π. 371 Α—Δ; ἄγορα δὲ ἧμῶν καὶ νόμισμα ἐμβαθοῦν τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενητ. σταυ. 20 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. κτλ.] Bernays thought the addition of a word for "lacked" unnecessary, 'because this idea is implied in κεχωραμένοι'. If so, as κεχωρ. <ἐτέρων> ἐτέρων = separated (or divided) one from this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ. πολλῶν should mean 'separated from many things'. But as Bernays gives 'division of possessions', i.e. separate property 'was introduced for many things' he must intend κεχωραμένοι πολλῶν to stand for 'living in divided possession of', or in respect of, many things': a sense hardly possible in any case and quite inconceivable if the participle has a different construction with ἐτέρων. Susen. Postgate would govern πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων by ἐκοινώνουν, supposing πολλῶν to be opposed to πάντων (as πείλαστων is, Π. 5. 27), and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary division of the joint-household into two: "again when the original household split into two, each half continued to hold in common a large part of the stock, viz. all that the other half left it".

23 κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις] Comp. 2 § 5 n. (18). Susen. (80)
All things which are to be exchanged must be somehow commensurable; and for this purpose money has been introduced, which serves as a sort of medium, for it measures all things. For how many pairs of shoes are equivalent, to a given house? The standard or common measure is in reality desired; but hence is conventionally represented by money which gets its name (rhoKOUN - commensurability) because it is not by nature, but by convention (deosiat), and that it is in permanent change and desiccates as it passes (wos no longer current). It we do not require a thing now, money obtain the guarantee of a future exchange, to the price if we require the thing at some other time. And although the value of money has occasionally changed, yet it tends to be more constant than that of any other thing. All other commodities should therefore have a price set on them, that no exchange may always be possible.

**Συστ. (53)**

6. & των χρημάτων αὐτῶν αὐτός οὖσας. Aristotle thinks this is not implied by the nature of money, since certain things are not considered as a medium of exchange, and the following mention stones with marks impressed upon them (-olds). - I. (578). V. (156). E. (150), B. (565).

**Συστ. (82)**

35. διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγάς κτλ]. On the origin of money compare Lk. Ed. N. 8 3 10—16 (11.3 3 a 19 ff.), of which the substance is as follows.
38 καὶ Μ⁴ Π² Βκ. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἑπιβαλλόντων Μ⁴ Π² Βκ.
1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P²-3. Q S Tb Ald. Βκ. and P⁴ (1st hand) || γενόμενον ? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || ποιητικήν [γὰρ] Schmidt, who transposes ποιητικήν...8 χρημάτων to follow 10 καπηλικήν || γὰρ] δ’ Berneys, inserting γὰρ after the next following καὶ, thus: χρημάτων’ ποιητική δ’ εἶναι τοῦ πλοῦτο• καὶ <γὰρ> χρημάτων’ καὶ γάρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι omitted by Π¹ || τοῦ omitted by Μ⁴, bracketed by Koraes; ὄντως? Susem. || 8 Giphanius proposed to omit γὰρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὰ || πολλάκις after τίθεαι Μ⁴ Π¹ || 9 διὰ τὸ] διὰ ? Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τὴν, καὶ <εἶναι> ? Susem.; Schütz rejects καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν (οἱ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν) καὶ || 11 νόμῳ Lambin, perhaps rightly: yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 στῆρως] “Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato Comicus Poës. 3 χαλέπως δὲν οἰκή-σαμεν ἐν Βυζαντίοις ὧν σιδαρέως τοῖς νομίσμασιν ἤρθονται. These coins were commonly called οἱ σιδαρέοι, cp. Aristoph. Clouds 249. εἰ τι τοιούτων ἐτέρων] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyrus.” (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner Types of Gk. Coins p. 4 ff., Head Coinage of Lydia p. 11.

τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κτλ] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato l c. ἐν Λακεδαι-μονοι σιδήρῳ σταθὼ νομίζοντας. Cp. Xen. De Rep. Laced. 7, 51; Plutarch Lys. 17 (ἀβελεσκο, spits), Lyc. 9; Polybius vi. 49; and H. Stein On the Spartan iron money in Jahrb. f. Philol. LXXXIX. 1894.

332 ff. Susem. (85) § 9 1257 b i Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγ. ἀλλαγῆς with προσθέτως rather than with ἐγένετο, “as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities not μεταβαλλόμενον <τὸ νόμισμα>, “will produce the largest profit.”

§ 10 καὶ γὰρ...10 καπηλικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith Wealth of Nations B. iv. Cp. Mill Pol. Econ. pp. 1—4. Even in Rhet. i. 5. 7 νομίσματος πλῆθος is only one of many ‘elements’ of wealth.

§ 11 νόμος παντάπασι] An allu-
Sisson to the derivation of νόμος = money, currency, from νόμος = convention, current custom: see n. (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμως, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato Erg. l. c. 5. n. (85) (Schneider). Susem. (86) 12 κατά μεταταξινω κτλ] Although Aristotle himself, § 12, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is 00δέ φόρει, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see n. (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. Susem. (87)

With this comp. N. E. ν. 5. 11. 10 ἡμῶν μετατάξει καὶ τοιοῦτο ἀρχὲς τῆς, 14 πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν ἐκ τῶν μετατάξων τὸ αὐτὸ ὦ γὰρ δὲ ἔνων δεῖ τὸν δικαίως μιᾶς μὲν ἐκ μέλλειν, μᾶλλον.

14 κατοι κτλ] "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore, when in fulfilment of his insatiate prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16 Mīdav] This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenus and restored him to Dionysus, who in return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid Metamorph. 11. 30-145. Aristot. must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if his food had been converted into drink or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. Susem. (88)

12 17 διὰ τρισί οὐκτίννιν κτλ] A possible reference to previous sentence, or second, 10 w. (1). Susem. (88 b) 19 ιδία καὶ ἡ χρ. Golden of goods for other, χρ. (καὶ) τρισίν. 21 διὰ χρηματός μετατάξην "exchange of commodities: the natural exchanges, i.e. the currency, is intrinsically connected with money, for it limits exchange: it is more than the goods with money, every citizen, every merchant, every agent in exchange, knows the value of the goods, and also the value of the money, representatives of the different words of the line from which, (Latin). Susem. (89)
25 ὡστεπερ γαρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστὶ καὶ (III ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρόν (ὅτι μάλιστα γαρ ἐκεῖνο βούλουται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπει- ρόν (πέρας γαρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις, οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς
29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
§ 14 πλούτως καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δὲ οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρη- ματιστικῆς] ἐστὶ πέρας· οὐ γαρ τούτῳ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐργον, διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γνωμένων ὀρῶ<μέν> συμβαίνων τούναντινόν πάντες
34 γαρ εἰς ἀπειρόν αὐξῶσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. § 15 αὐτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλαττεὶ γαρ ἡ χρησις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected εἰς: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ…31 ἐργον suspected as an inter- polation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικὴ P4 (corr.), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts δ καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Gurlitt recommend ταυτὸ instead of τούτο; [ο] Bojesen Thürot Schütz, ἀν Bernays, ὁ δ<ση> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οὐ γαρ ……ἐργον once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας. This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φύσα> ? Susem. || διὰ <τι δὲ> τῇ μὲν * * φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ὀρῶμεν Sylburg, ὁρῶ ΓΠ Αρ. || 34 νόμισμα, αὐτιον * * διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἀπει- ρόν: medicine is without end in respect of health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.
27 τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος = means to the end.
28 πέρας…πάσαις] "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that; and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour; that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (Introdo. p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturiry of many of his conclusions in this
9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further iv (vii). 1 § 5 n. (695), n. (700). Susem. (90) ||

§ 14 30 If οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l.39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the house- holder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.
31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρηματιστικὴ ποιεῖν as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schütz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.
34 εἰς ἀπειρόν] Cp. [Xen.] De Vesti- gal. 4 §§ 6, 7: ἀργυρόν δὲ οὐδὲς πω ὀντὸν τοῦτο ἐκήθατο ὡσε μὴ ἐτι προσδείσθαι.
oi χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are en- gaged in traffic.
35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικῆ is the cause of this mistake. § 15 ἐπαλλάττει] See on 1. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικῆ overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.
Here two φρονεῖσα επαλλαγτοι because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'.

39 διασταλοῦσιν κτλ] "'pursue through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely'; ουν. οὐκέτακτα 'their substance or capital in money, Bonitz s. a. Better thus taken as a paraphrase of κλημα, for which idiom see Waitz Oxyg. i. 283 and cp., ἢ τοῦ δῶμας οὐδά 693 b 6. 

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: ταύτη διαστάθευκα τοῖς διασταλεῖς κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αὕτω δὲ κτλ.] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer,' says Fullarton, 'when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the smoothing of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. Schleg. (91)

1238 a ἡ οἰσίν] lovisa Syllburg (but see on 1257 b 23) | δοσιν... ἐπισελαλοντα noticed by Eustath. on the Iliad p. 625, 36 | ἐπισελαλονία (perhaps rightly)
§ 17 ἐτερον εἴδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτ’ ἐλήξωσεν. ἐν ὑπερ- (II) ἐ<ν> ἐπιστέφει τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ἔκτοσιν κἀν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύναται πορίζειν, δὲ ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τούτο πειρώναι, ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς § 18 καὶ λατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δὲ ύγιειναν, οὐ δὲ πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικὰς, ως τούτο τέλος ὑπὲρ τὸ τέλος ἀπαντάντα δεόν ἀπαντάν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς, καὶ δὲ αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἐφμεῖν αὐτῆς, ἐξηγήσατο, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἤ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν, οὐχ ὡσπερ αὐτῆς ἀπειρὸς ἀλλὰ ἔχονσα ἀρον’ δήλου δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορομένου εἰς ἀρχὴν, πάτερον τοῦ

12 ὑγιειν M P 1 || 15 [τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας] Schmidt || μῆς is transposed by Hampke and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαία—wol wrongly || 16 [καὶ περὶ...19 ὄρον] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thurot || 18 ἤ Schneider (perhaps rightly, unless we prefer to omit ἤ.....τροφήν) || αὐτὴ Welldon || 19 Bender considers the whole of c. 10 δήλων...8 ἐστὶν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (95) || Schmidt transposes 19 δήλων...38 ἔτοιν to follow 1256 b 30 οἰκίας

§ 17 8 καὶ μὴ κτλ.] “And if they cannot procure this” (ἀπολαυστικὴν ὑπερβολήν) “by mere accumulation they attempt it by some other supposed cause, perverting each of their faculties to attain it.”

§ 18 13 πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικ.] Compare Plato Rep. i. 342 D: the true ἱατρὸς no χρηματιστής, and 346 C, D: η μοσαρτική accompanies the other arts to provide remuneration.

14 ἀπαντάν—meet in, conspire, tend to: references ad.


§§ 16—18 In the several points Aristotle is quite right, but in reality all this makes against him. For it shows that the fault lies with the men and not with the ‘arts’. If men misuse not medicine merely, but moral virtues like courage, as a means to their own avarice and craving for pleasure; if they can follow agriculture, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same spirit; why are commerce trade and banking to be unceremoniously rejected merely because they can serve such men as a still reader and more successful means to the satisfaction of their desires? Why should it be culpable in any one to carry on such pursuits merely to gain a living by them? (Glaser). It is true that if there were no stock exchange there could be no speculation in stocks, and then no one would be tempted to such excessive indulgence in it as is certainly liable at times to endanger the morality of whole nations [as e.g. at the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But without the shadow no light; civilization is impossible without luxury. ‘In spite of many great evils which money has brought into the world it is to this invention alone that we owe the fact that ninetieths of mankind are now no longer forced to serve that fortunate minority, the owners of real property. Think of the time when money was still scarce in Europe; the land then belonged almost exclusively to the clergy and the nobility. Money alone introduced a new species of commodity of inexhaustible ownership, which stands open to all to acquire’ (Slosser). “Aristotle forgets, too, that, even before money was invented, people might find no limit to wealth-seeking. The ἀνυπολέσιον of Odysseus, Od. xiv. 96, went beyond the limit of his consumption, and its aim was, not nurture, but power, as he could make
grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks” (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising. Namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole householder (οἰκονόμος); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (Intro, pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: “when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow” (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (hainasias), as intellectually and morally degrading; see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequentially, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see iv. viii. 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. iii on Ili. 1. and Plato Laws vii. 860 d—e all paid labour, see n. (102), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

20 \{[καὶ πολιτικός] Schmidt | od, <άλλα εἰς ὑπηρ. αὐτήν, ἵνα ἐπιστηθην ὡς ἀναγκαία χρήματα ποιεῖν> or something similar? See also (see Contra.) od. " Removed by Schneider; if taken here, it must be repeated in 35, and so Bender 23 <eit> ἐπιστηθην? Schneider, ὡς οὐκ ἔτεκεν, line wrongly.
24 θάλατταν ἂν ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δέι ταῦτα διαθέτει—(III

§ 2 ναὶ προσήκει τῶν οἰκονόμων. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ύφαντικῆς ἔρια πούῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνώναι δὲ τὸ ποίον χρηστον καὶ ἐπιτίθειν ἡ φαύλων καὶ ἀνεπιτίθεινος, καὶ γὰρ τοις ἀπορθήσειν ἂν τις, διὰ τὶ ἢ μὲν χρηματιστική μόριον τῆς 29 οἰκονομίας, ἡ δὲ ἑαυτῆς οὗ μόριον καὶ αὐτοῖς δὲ τὸ ὑγιανέν τούς

§ 3 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὡσπέρ ζῆν ἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστί μεν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχηγοῦ καὶ περὶ ὑγιανέας ἢδειν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἐστὶ μεν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῆς υπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον, δει 35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γὰρ ἐστὶν ῥοφήν τῷ

24 ταῦτα ἄντιν Glaser (wrongly), πάντα ἢ Oncken, τάλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὗτος ὁνόμασι Schmid 29 δεῖτε ὑγιανέας M8 P1, δεῖτε P4 || 32 ὑγιανέας Alc. ὑγιανέας M8 P1.2-3-4. || τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ] τῆς ἑαυτῆς P6 Q L8 and P4 (1st hand—γρ. τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ in the margin), while in S8 T8 V8 ἄλλα…οὔ is omitted || ἢδειν <ἦστιν> and 33 οἰκονόμου <ἦστιν> Welldon || 33 τῶν omitted by P4.6. Q L8 || χρημάτων] χρηματιστικῆς P4 and ηρ. P4 (in the margin), χρηματιστικοῦ P6 L8, χρηματιστικῶ Q || 34 After τῆς P4.6 C8 Q L8 Ar. (probably also M8 U8) insert κέρδος || 35 ταῦτα Bender for τῶν, cp. n. on l. 21

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, postea (Bonitz): answering τοῦτο μὲν. “And then it is the householder’s duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ὡς δει).”

§ 2 25 οὐ γὰρ κτλ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστική is related to οἰκονομίαν as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed 8 § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστική provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature’s stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessary of life are certainly called elsewhere, 8 § 15, 4 § 1—4, the instruments (βραχα) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (ἐκ δὲ βλος πράξεις, οὐ ποιήσῃν), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστική, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is c. 10 required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indefensible, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSEM, (95) 28 ἀπορθήσειν ἂν] χρηματιστική (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 3 34 μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γὰρ κτλ] It was explained in n. (73) on 8 § 11 that on Aristotle’s own theory it is impossible to see how far
this is intended to apply to the animals which according to him are produced from worms. Susen. (96) 36 Παντι γαρ κτλ] "for every animal has for its sustenance the remainder of the matter out of which it grows." Hence the animal and vegetable world is nature's reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 α της δέ μεταβολικής φυ\-γομένης] Attested in equally general terms by Plato Laws XI. 918 D: compare Andoc. I. 137, Diog. Laert. I. 104. An Athenian would find capital for mercantile concerns, but he considered it on the whole disreputable to engage in them personally (Becker Char. II. 134 ed. 2, Eng. Tr. p. 281). Susen. (97) 3 δέ αλλήλων] If nearer, the profit made from mutual exchange. But more likely masculine, derived from men defrauding and overreaching one another; the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection to trade altogether.

μουσείαν] Demost. XXXVII 46. Paut.-tacementum § 51: μουσεία, φιλοσ. Αθηναῖοι οἰκεῖται δαρειοφοίταν. Susen. (97 b) η βολομοστατική] obel weighing, petty usury; Ὑγίας νὰ λέπει. Ζ. Ἀθ. ι. 148 p. 147 explaining the law τὸ δύτιμον στάτικον εἶναι ἐν ἀρχαῖον δὲ βουλεύο. ὁ δαρειοφός τό παρασκευασμένον τοῦτο ἐστιν κατὰ τὰ ἱσταταὶ ἀλλὰ τὸν πρῶτον παρασχεθεὶν. Αρ. also Aristoph. Clouds 1140, Antiph. Nem. frag. 1, Meineke 92 in Athen. 1. 108 C (Cop.). The insolvency of the principal lent was the main cause of a high rate of interest. Thus upon bottomly the average rate charged was 20 per cent., which would go to cover insurance. [Xen. Eryth. 9. 9. On house-rents the return was only 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of a paper medium of the nature of bills of exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contributed to the same result. Rückert's Beiträge zur Erneuerung der.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 10.  

190

 obsession тα τακτόμενα τούς γεννώσων αὐτὰ ἑστίν, ὃ δὲ (II) τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίματος. ὡστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἑστίν.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γυνῶσιν διαρκίαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ ἐπὶ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἄνωγκαλαν. ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περί τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειροῦ εἰναι, ποία λυσιτελόστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον 14 ἔστων κτήσεις ποιά τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ § τῶν λοιπῶν ξύφων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειροῦ εἰναι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε τοῦτων τίνα λυσιτελόστατα, καὶ ποία ἐν πολλὸς τόποις.

7 ἐκ is omitted by Π2 Bk. and P4 (1st hand), perhaps rightly: it is added by P4 (corrector) || 10 δὲ [γὰρ Π Αρ., perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλεύθερον ? Jackson || 12 δὲ] δὴ Λαμβίν, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by Π2 Bk. || κτήματα] κτήνη Bernays

τιτρώσκοντες καὶ τού πατρὸς εγκύνους τόκους πολλαπλασισμοί κομιδόμενοι πολὺν τῶν κη-
φόρα καὶ πτωχῶν ἐμποίουσι τῇ πόλει. Still earlier in Aristoph. Thesmoph. 846, ἠδεια
γοῦν εἰ τόκου, τεκόσα τοῦτον τόκον" (Ridgeway). Cp. also Plato Rep. VI. 107 A, Politic. 276 A.

With 3—8 διὰ τὸ κτλ comp. Plato Laos v. 742 C, VIII. 842 B. Every one will agree with Fülleborn that this proof is sophis-
tical. But Stahr rightly observes: 'it was not until capital itself attained its complete development, that is, only in recent times, that the justification and reasonable necessity of interest became clear. The history of capital recounts the gigantic efforts that had to be made, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, in order to its formation. From the point of view of universal history the high rate of interest in ancient times has perhaps been a favourable means to that end; yet its immediate effect, in conjunction with a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was to excite repulsion in men with moral natures and this led them decisively to condemn interest altogether, as Plato did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole theory of exchange the following shape: 'he first includes under the term Exchange (αὐθή) all buying and selling barter. Next he subdivides this genus into two species, the one good and praise-
worthy, the other not so. The former belongs to Economic. It exchanges the surplus stock of the household for commodi-
dities which the household needs; or if this surplus stock be sold for money it is with no intention of making a profit, but only to purchase other necessities with the proceeds. The other species is distin-
guished by the intention of making a profit, and this exchange with a view to gain is χρηματιστική in the narrower sense or trading proper. It is again subdivided into two branches: the one includes all traffic in commodities whether in ex-
change for other commodities or for money, the other is traffic in money alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle regards this last as wholly detestable: the former as less bad, but still bad enough' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (98)

c. 11 Production viewed on the prac-

§ 10 χρήσιν = practical application, as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its limitations solely in the nature of the case generally; but in practice the nature of the particular locality where we live, and therefore the climate, the character of the soil, &c, determine whether we are chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-
rearing, to mining or commerce by sea, whether there can be preserves of fish and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or of cattle must be procured, and so on (Schütz). SUSEM. (99)

11 For ἐλεύθερον (ἰ ἀναγκαῖος, strictly limited, cp. Metaph. 1. 2 § 11 982 b 27 : αὐτή (First Philosophy) μόνη ἐλεύθερα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, and § 14 983 a 10, ἀνα-
γκαῖοτερα μὲν οὖν πάσαι αὐτής.
11. Garp in Allevs eithenei xÝfrois, tis pet rei mepoqia. (10) 
19. TOU rj oot, kai tov óllon kwpón tov polòtov o potòtov, id' 
29. óswon ònto tóv xhónoí Bovndéias. Tis mév sèn oikeiostotis xýrois 
21. xatistovís taútta mória kai právta, tis dé xetaxpkhtovk 
mégiston mév xutória (kai taútta méra tria, evdouvria 
fortogia xarástatov: diadére de toúton étéra étéra tò 
tá mév ásfaléstera einaí, tā dé pleioi xorízo to xáto 
4. karpian), deúteron dé to kisiomós, tríton dé xisxária (taúto- 
26. tis dé o mév tov Baúnavsou tekhhn, h de taw upéxh 
kti dé sozmati múnoi xhrotimov) tríton de eilwv xhromat 
ýtistovk vàx tauta kai tis právtes (êceu xarp và tis 
katá fúsin tî méros kai tis xetaxpkhtovk), ósa và tâ 
26. tekrwv] tekrivwv Vermehren, perhaps rightly 27. tekrwv] tàxatov III and 
P1 (corrector), állois tríton P1 in the margin 29. àvoi a Berenays

§ 2 17. eithenei—thrive, have abundant 
offspring: see Verrall Trans. of Camb. 
Phil. Soc. xii. p. 165.

18. òdòi and here (when we come to this) 
we find two kinds: agriculture proper and 
fruit-growing. The technical terms per-
haps of Apollodorus, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in 
particular of the vine would be included 
under òpofoskófenv; see Stcts Histo-
Works and Days (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f.
Susem. (100)

§ 3 23. fortogia— inland trade. Su-
semm. This is the view of the com-
mentators generally, but Cope disputes it.
He remarks: 'fortogia and its deriva-
tives fortogíov, fortogíov, fortogíov, 
fortogíov, seem to be always applied 
to commerce carried on by sea, whether 
aves or plóia be expressed or not (the 
sense of ' porter' given in the lex. 
seem not necessary in any of the pass. 
24.3). For this reason, and because 
commerce by land at Athens and in 
Greece generally was so utterly insigni-
ficant in comparison that it might well be 
overlooked without notice, I rather think 
that Ari. means by xéaxpoia keri 
and letting out ships for trade, and by 
fortogia commerce proper, the transport 
of goods on board of them, perhaps in-
cluding also land transport. On this 
view Xenophon's distinction De Res. 
L. ed. 7. o nèv xexóv, ó de xéaxpoia, ó 
de xéaxpov, would correspond to Ar-

isostov's here.'

parástatov (virtually = xetaxpkhtov, xap-
derei xeraxks, but xetaxpkhtov, because in their 
comuniation.)

23. ásfaléstera For definition of 
ἀσφαλέστερα in this connexion, see Bess. 62, 1. 7. to éxalei a kal wuo rhêma 10. eic apó 
ασφαλέστερα πολλον πολλον (literally). 

xetaxpkhtov genet. addition to the 
principal (p. 101); see also § 11.

25. xisxária kek Cq. § 6 below.
In any case the distinction is unnecessary.

The occupations distinguished in § 6 as 
technéteras, which are not included 
manual labour nor service the wise 
here entitled to: see no. (p. 17). More 
over in vii. (vii) 2. 2. where another 
expression, év xéaxpoia, are said to be 
describing and defining. The term has quite a 
peculiar meaning, see no. (p. 221).

§ 4 26. By xéaxpov and xéaxpoia 
above xéaxpoia Cope understands the 
Xéaxpov in a general division of the popu-
lace: farm labourers, peasants, etc.

29. dén kek is in some assurance to 
den xéaxpoia. 'All the service of property 
derived from land and much of its trade 
products as are employed by the pro-
ducer himself,' i.e. the class of xéax-
pov, xéaxpoia. Even if there 
is a split, we come to xéaxpoia 
(a colon after 15= xéaxpoia), on the 
assumption that a single xéaxpoia is 
a belonging to the translation of these 
and για 'directed to the land'.
30 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γυνομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, (p. 12) § 5 οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική, αὐτὴ δὲ πολλά ἢδη περιελήφθη γένες, πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τῶν ἑκ γῆς μεταλλευμένων ἔστιν. περὶ ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν καθόλου μὲν εὑρήτα ὁ θείῳ τὸν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖται χρήσιμόν μὲν § 6 πρὸς τὰς ἔργασις, φορτικών δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατριβεῖν. εἰς δὲ τέχνηκοτάται μὲν τῶν ἐργασίων ὧνοπο ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δὲ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λαβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικόταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σῶματος πλείωσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννε- 31 ὑλοτομίᾳ ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas and Susem, 1, but wrongly || 33 περὶ... 35 ἐνδιατριβέω Susem. transposes to follow 39 ἄρετῆς; see Introd. p. 78 || δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk., omitted by Ar. || 35 εἰσὶ... 39 ἄρετῆς was first seen by Montecatino to be out of place, it was erroneously transposed by Piccart to precede 27 τρίτων δὲ || 36 P[al-] Q Ald. Sb Tα Bk. insert τῆς before τύχης || 38 ἀγεννεταται Μ[α] P[14]. Q Ald., perhaps rightly.

30 ἀκάρπων] Compare Rhet. i. 5. 7: κάρπωμα δὲ λέγοι ἀφ’ ὠν αἱ πρόσοδοι (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ περιεληφθείση γεωργία. § 5 32 γένε, ἑθος interchanged: cp. § 8 § 2 ἕθερον ἑθος with § 3 ἕθερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὑπὸ ἐλάχιστον τύχης] "where chance has least play": where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman's hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. Walter op. c. 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (552) on III. 9. 8, also v(viii). 2. 5 with n. (981). Susem. (102).

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐπιήχει, ἡ δ’ ἀπειρία τύχην, Melanph. i. 1, 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 ἀνανεώταται κτα] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4 § 12, 5 § 4, § 6; iv(vii). 9 § 3, 14 § 7; v(viii). 2 § 5, § 6, § 6, § 6 §§ 3—6, § 16, 7 § 7; vii(vi). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes; Plato Laws v. 741 e, 743 D f., cp. vii. 831 c f., 846 D f.; Xenoph. Oec. 4 § 2 f., cp. 6 § 6, 10 § 10—show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the servile (cp. n. 43) and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large (see further Herod. ii. 167). 'Servile' occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are 'artistic' (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the "sedentary" crafts, τέχναι εὐδαίμονες Eud. Eth. i. 4, 2, 1250 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage; v(viii). 2. 4 n. (980). Similarly we read in Plato Rep. vi. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and mars the soul; Xen. l. c. says that it hurts men's bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (καθῆσθαι) coupled up indoors (σκιασθεοῦσα), or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace; and Pseudo-Plato Érast. 137 B that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent κυπτάντα ὑπ’ (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: 'he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property', Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ii 142 (Eng. tr. Socrates and Socratics p. 170 n. 1). Compare Xen. Men. iii. 1. 10. With the definition of servile employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6b) and c. 5 § 7 ff. Susem. (103).

For λοβοῦνται see v(viii). 41: i the workmen themselves 'spoil' or 'deprave' their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.
39 σταταί δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεί αἴρεται.
33 < περὶ ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἀρκεταί
34 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖται χρήσιμον μᾶς πρὸς
37 <τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατριβῆν> ἀποκρ. 3, εἰτέ ἔστι θείως
40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἶχον Χαριτίδος τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
43 Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεγραμμάς καὶ ψῆφης καὶ
πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι περὶ ἄλλων, ταύτα μὲν
ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτο ὧτρ ἐπιμελεῖς ἐτί δὲ καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον
4 σποράδην, δὲ ἄδει ἐπιτετυχήσων ἐμοὶ χρηματιζομένῳ.
5 δὲ συλλέγειν, πάντα γὰρ ωφέλιμα ταύτ ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶν
τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἶχον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλήσιον
τούτω γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικὸν, ὁλλ' ἐκάθεν
μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
9 ὑν. ὀνειδίζοντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πειναῖς ὡς ἀυτοφανῆς
10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὐσίας, κατανοήσαντα βασιν αὐτὸν θαλαμό
φοράν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἰστρολογίας, ἔτι χρημάτων δυντι
εὐπορίσαντα χρημάτων ὁλίγων ἀρραβώνων διαδεσάµατο τῶν
ἐλαυνουργεῖ τὸν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χήρ πάντων, ἐλέγου
μισθοφόρους ἀχτ' οὐδένος ἐπιβάλλοντος: ἐπειδὴ δ' ὃ καὶρὸς
5 ἢκε, πολλῶν χρηματιών ἅμα καὶ ἐξαφέρεται, ἐκμεταλλεύετα

40 χάρης (χάρετι Μ') δὴ Π Αρ. Bk. Bernays
1259 a 6 οἶνον....18 σπουδαζούντων seems to have been used by Herwegen
of Rhodes as quoted by Dilog. Laert. I. 26
13 Ἀλαυνούργεως Π. Αινεκ. Ἀλαυνούργεως Π. Συσσεμ. 1-2, Ἀλαυνόργεως Π', Ἀλαυνούργεως Μ' Q (7), Π', Ἀλαυνούργεως 13
Ald. Bk. Bernays, Ἀλαυνοῦργεως Λ'

39 ὅπου ... αἴρεται] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily
excellence "is least needed." No doubt
leaving money on interest is particularly
meant, 10 § 4. Such business he includes
under the "service occupations." Syssim.
(104)

§ 7 30 περὶ τούτων] With the
transposition this apply to 34 τά
κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσαι, exact particu-
larly in detail. 1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ
Also mentioned by Varro R. K. 1. 1. 8, and
several times in Pliny's Natural His-
tory. Syssim. (105)

3 διὰ τῶν ἐπιμελῶν - a whoever is interested
in the subject. We are referred to
written works in Klot. 1. 4. 13, 1500 a 30.

§ 8 6 τὸ Θάλεω] Ακ. Π. Λ. 97.vi. 1. 5
1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller 1.
168 ff. [Eng. tr. Pre-Scotian 1. p. 311 ff.]
194

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α. 11.

[1. 11. 9]

ἐν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέγαντα ἐπιδείκει ἢ

οὗτοι ἐνιαοῦσιον. Ἡθολή μὲν οὖν λέγεται τούτων ἡ
tὸν τρόπον ἐπιδείκει ποιήσαι τῆς σοφίας ἐστὶ δ’, ὡστε
tοις εἴτενε, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἦν τὰς
dίνηται μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διό καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἐσια
tούτον ποιοῦνται τῶν πόρων, ἣταν ἀπορρωσὶ χρηματῶν μονο-

§ 11 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ἁμών ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ τις τεθέντοις
tοι' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπριάσμα τάντα τῶν σίδηρον ἐκ
tῶν σιδηρεῖν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἄφικοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-

ρίων οἱ ἐμποροὶ, ἐπόλει μόνον, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβο-

λῇ τῆς τιμῆς. ἀλλὰ ἄμως ἐπὶ τοὺς πεντήκοντα ταλάντων

§ 12 ἐπέλαβεν έκατόν, τούτων μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθήμενος τὰ 8
mὲν χρήματα ἐκεῖνα ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μεντὸι γε έτὶ

30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὕτω ἄφικοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ

πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
tαυτῶν ἔστων (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενόσθαι

§ 13 μονοπωλίαν) χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζει ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι-

τικοῖς. πωλίας γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων

35 πόρων, ὡστε πολίκα, μᾶλλον δὲ, διόπερ τινές καὶ πολι-

tεύουνται τῶν πολυτευμένων ταύτα μόνον.

12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δὲ-

σποτική, περὶ ἢ ἐιρήνη τοῦ πρότερου, ἐν δὲ πατρική, τρίτῳ δὲ

16 συλλέγαντος P4 Ald., συλλέγαντες Sb Tb || 25 ἐμπορῶν P2-3, πορῶν M* ||

28 τοῦτο Sb Bk. || ὁ omitted by M* P1 || 30 αὐτῶν II Bk. || 31 ὄραμα] εὑρήμα

Cameras, θεώρημα ? Koraes || ὶθλη καὶ τοῦτο Susem.12·, Thāli et hicie Williams, per

perhaps rightly || 37 μέρη omitted by II2 (added by a later hand in Sb) || 38 [περὶ

...πρότερον] Schmidt

§ 10 21 ἢναί] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampperts are instances given by Ps.

Aristotle Oeconom. 11. 18 134a 33 b 33. 4 § 4

134b 25, 8 1347 a 32.

§ 11 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα] "on" or

or "in addition to his capital of fifty talents he received a hundred more": he

made a profit of 100 talents on his original fifty. The preposition has the same

force in τόκοι εἰπτριτοι Ῥήθ. III. 10. 7, and the analogous fractions.

§ 12 28 Undoubtedly Dionysios the elder who is mentioned III. 15. 16 ν.

Susem. (106)

31 ὄραμα] 'discovery': cp. Dem. adv. Med. § 60 533, 25, οὐδές πῶς τοῦτο

elde τὸ πλεονέκτημα 'had an eye to this advantage' (Postgate). Also Plato Phaedr.

267 A ἔλευθον ὑμῖν τιμήτηρα.

§ 13 35 διώστερ κτλ] See Exc. III.

and Introd. p. 31 n. (1). Susem. (106 b)

Possibly an allusion to Eubulos.

c. 12 The remaining branches of Eco-

nomics: the relations of the head of the

household (1) to his wife, (2) to his children.

§ 1 31 ἐπέλθ[η] v. c. 3 §§ 1, 2. Susem.

(107) Comp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. 9 διὸ μᾶλλον

πρὸς γυναῖκα ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἡ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ

κτῆματα: τότα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς
díkaios with Jackson’s note, "in Pol. III.

§ 7 however οἰκονομική as an epithet of

ἄρχη is used to include all three rela-

tions." Justice between man and wife is

really ἀνώμωρον, 3 § 2.

39 γαμική ** καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τέκνων. ἐς Ἰουλίου (90) παῖς μεν ἁμφοῖν, οὗ τὸν αὐτὸν ὡς πρότον τῆς ἁρχῆς. ὡς γὰρ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων ἀντικείμενος, τὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἀρχειν φύσει τοῦ θέλειν ἁγιομονεικότερον, τή μῆπος συνεκτικὴ παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ προσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ μεθρ. τέρων καὶ ἄτελον, ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἁρχαῖς τοῦτο 5 πλείστατας μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τὸ ἀρχιμέτρειον (ἐξ ἤπως γαρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μορφήν), ἦραν δὲ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἁρχηγὸν τὸ δὲ ἁρχηγαί, ἤπειρα διαφορὰ εἶναι καὶ σχέσιμα καὶ λόγοι καὶ τιμαίς, ὧσπερ καὶ Ἀμασία ἡπερ

39 γαμική ** καὶ γὰρ Conring; Bernays by altering ἄρχηγον Ἰουλίου, At. by translating ἄρχηγον, ignore the lacuna: τῶν ἀρχηγῶν, a Paris ms. 1514; See the Comm. 1259 b 2 που] ἐν ΠΓ (emended by p1)
Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly, he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. 

SUSEM. (110 b) c. 13. Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household; §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.


§ 1 18 ‘τοινυν traducendo ad novam cognitionem inservit’ Bonitz Ind. Ar. quoting Physics I. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3, 9. Perhaps it only resumes a thought previously expressed, ‘then’, ‘accordingly’: see n. (107 b). Bernays gives ‘It is clear beforehand then.’ SUSEM.

20 Here πλούτος = ἀρετή κτήσεως, but in § 15 it is πλήθος ὄργανων.

21 μᾶλλον ἢ δύναμιν Cr. n. (33) on 4 § 1 καὶ καὶ καὶ εἶπ. SUSEM. (111)

§ 2 25 τὸν ἀλλόν ἐξευθέ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγων ἀπότομον θεοί. Works and Days 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz op. c. 50 f.
tauton esti to zetousmenon kai peri thymiasin kai taudeun. 10
30 poteera kai tauston eisin aretai, kai dei tis thymiasin saphron
eina kai oundeiasin kai dikaiasin, kai pai, esti kai odhn.
§ 4 lassostos kai sophron, o ou; [kai] katholou h tauti deutere
ptenon peri arxomemon fisai kai arxountos, poteos o authe
arethi h etera. eis metan eis amforterous metaxh katho-
35 kaqathias, dia ti ton mev arxhein deai ou ton de arxhe
ekathapax; (oude gar to mallein kai h tauti idiou te diafo-
rein) to mallein kai h tauti idiou: eis de ton mev dei ton de em

thetaumaston. eite gar o arxhein mev estai sophron kai et
41 kious, pois arxei kalods; eito o arxomenos, poi arxei

seeti kalods; akolastos gar an kai deilas idioun tourg

5i prospokontos. fanevnon tois wti anagkei mev metaxh
amforterous aretis, tauhtis dei estin diaforos, ostepo kai tis

6 fisai arxountos kai arxomenos. kai tautos othei

phiroteTai: peri tis phuchin ev tauhtis gar esti fisai to mev
arxein o arxomenos, oui eteina famen estai arethi, oine
tou logon kai e

7 exounto kai tou ulogon. dhlon tois ouw esti
tou autou trupou.

30 sophrona after 31 eisai II Bk. 31 esti before eisai omitted by II

kai before katholou omitted by I M

1260 a 4 arxountos kai omitted by II Ar. Bk. p. 3 in the

margin, gynhetai < rad > Schatz; yet gynhetai may also be read precisely 4 mev

eina famen M B 1, mev famen eisai IV (correction)

§§ 3 1 paises... sophron] Compare Nis. Eth. 111. 13. § 119 a 33: we apply

the term deiasias to the faults of children so far as they bear a certain resemblance
to the vice of intemperance (deiasias).

SUSEM. (111 b)

§ 4 37 eidei diaforos] see on 1 2.

§ 5 1260 a 3 osteper kai . arxomenon] the diaforal eidei, as explained 5 2 ii.

§ 6 4 gynhetai "this is indicated (or, given in outline) in the case of

the soul. The particular gynhetai [1 4] seems evidence that the verb is used pass-

ively (Bonitz Ind. Aris); but Schatz' suggestion < rad > gives the middle a fair

sense: "to this result the relations which exist in the soul at once lead." SUSEM.

6 ev tirparan, 7 aleiyou] and we say that a different kind of excellence belongs
to the one and to the other of these, I mean to the rational and irrational parts of

the soul." Namely intellectual or dialectic virtue (aerxins diaforos) to the

rational soul; moral virtue (which deris.
excellence of character requires, temper-
ance, etc.) to the irrational appetite soul; Zeller II 6 161. 4 11. The human

the virtues are discussed in I 15 of the

Nis. Eth. and the latest detailed instance

gation of this subject. Wallerat, 4 69-

37, gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of various,
thecentric, objective, and practical in the

enemies among men (o, and has its par-
color, dialectic virtue, or it may be ver-
ture. Practical wisdom is taken as a

result), if not the only one, at all
events the most indispensable and im-
potent virtue of the practical sense

(Wallerat; 4 69-37) see on 1 6 2

II 10, 11; 15; I 6 13-15; II 15 38.

To dialectic: moral virtue belongs to man in the earnest sense, namely as pre-

serving in mind the ways of life and

knowledge of all unquestionable knowl-

edge which must be presumed for every religion and
for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest: (ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysics; and (iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Waller are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as diacritical 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in Kunstlehre des Aris. (Aristotle's Theory of Art) p. 62 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a diacritical excellence, though it can lead to one, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. 7, 1140 b 21 f.

For the 'excellences of character' cp. § 6 n. (40): in regard to temperance in particular ii. § 6 n. (206 b), § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 16 n. (491), iv (vii). 1 § 4 n. (693). Susem. (112)

7 τούτων] See on § 1. 'But' or 'now it is clear' (Bonitz).

§ 7 8 ff. 'Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

1 Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher Wallass of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this is so Walter's conception of them, p. 512, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In Nic. Eth. i. 13. 20 σύνεσις, apprehension,—see Pol. iii. 4 §§ 16, 17 nn. (457, 8), vi (v). 4. 14 n. (1186)—is added as a diacritical virtue along with σοφία and ἀρχή. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood, for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and here this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues: we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work.'

Bernays defending the order of the ms. translates from 14 ὅρωσις as follows: "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues: all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason i.e. that which makes the ruler a ruler "is supreme master"; if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue. "Those again who obey need severely so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work." This however does not meet Thurbo's objections, Études 16 ff. "The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest intellectual virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest moral virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the moral virtue of the irrational part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the intellectual virtue of the rational part. Indeed the words which Bernays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the diacritical virtue." Cp. Hermes xix. pp. 588—592, Quaest. Crit. vi. p. 9 f. Susem.

§ 8 ὅρωσις] See 12 § 1, ό τόν αὐτόν τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Susem. (113)
1260 a 8—1260 a 22

I. 13. 9

have ever so small a share of any nameable intellectual virtue in the department of practical, such virtue consists merely in the fact that one alone understands his master's commands and knows how to execute them better, more quickly, and more aptly than another. See also 1110. 15 ἐκαστον] 4 τινως ἐν ἀποστ. ἱδια τινί ἀνεφέρετο, 'so far as he is independent on them.' Impersonal, e.g. οἱ ἄνθρωποι. But see also 4. 4. 421 b 34. ἀνασκόπησις. "This is seen where the slave is independent of the master." Compare also 3. 4. 4. 528. 1110. 15 ἐκαστον ἱδια τινι ἀνεφέρετο, 'to understand his master's commands.' "That the moral virtue of each of the above classes is peculiar to itself. Bernard translates as if he had before the words intended.

22 Σωκράτης. The historical Socra
tetes cannot be restored with anything as A. Result. a. 16. 11. 1. 15 (King, loc. cip. 6). The hero here doubtless Aristarchus has in view the Peri
tical Socra
tes, among other pas

14 ὑμνοῖς... 16 ἐργον Θυρατος. See also n. 115.}
μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἢ δ' ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ (V) § 10 περὶ τᾶς ἄλλας. δὴλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπὶ- 25 σκοπούσιν—καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγουσιν ἐξαπατώσων ἐαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιοῦ- των· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινοι λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαιρεθμοῦντες τὰς ἄρες—§ 11 τὰς, ὡστερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διὸ δὲι, ὡστερ ὁ ποιητής εἶρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων—

9 γυναικὸς κόσμον ἢ σιγὴ φέρει, ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἔτει δὲ παῖς ἀτελῆς, δὴλον ὅτι

24 καὶ, which Ar. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἢ τὸ Π1 P4-6 Lb. Wb Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar., τὸ P²-3 Sb Tb || τοιοῦτον ἢ τῶν τοιοῦτοιν Με P1 || 31 ὅ before παῖς omitted by Π1

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon l. c., Plato (Rep. v. 452 ε f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the Laws) in the public menses: see Π 1 § 1 n. (153), § 5 § 5 n. (195), § 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (Π. 1 § 3 f., § 7 f.) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on Π. 2 § 9, Zeller op. c. Π. 1 775 [Eng. tr. Plato n. 481], Sussemlil Πlat. Phil. Π. 1 168—170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations in the difference in temperament between the two sexes in Hist. Anim. ix. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 608 a 21 ff.: τὰ ὥθελα μακακώτερα καὶ κακουρέγετα καὶ ἦττον ἀπλά καὶ προπετάτερα καὶ περὶ τῆν τῶν τέκνων τροφήν φροντιστικότερα... ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δύσθυ- μον μᾶλλον τὸ ὥθελον τῶν ἄρεσει καὶ δόσθει, καὶ ἀπαιδεύτω την καὶ ψευδότερον, εὐπα- τητέρων δὲ καὶ μηνιμοικώτερον, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀργυρύτωτερον κτλ. Πρ. De gener. anim. Π. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller Πι η 688 with n. (116). SUSEM. (116)

23 ἢ μὲν ἀρχικὴ κτλ] Πρ. Π. 3 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495): also Π. 1 § 7 n. (42 b), 12 §§ 1, 2. Π. 1 See on the other side n. (120) on Π. 1 13 § 11. SUSEM. (117)

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] "in detail".

25 The same protest in Nείκ. Εἰθ. Π. 1 7 § 1, Περ. 3 §§ 3—4.

26 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν] Plato Rep. Π. 4. 444 ε ὅγεια τις καὶ εὐεξία ψυχής: Gorg. 506 b

27 οἱ ἐξηρ. κτλ] As Gorgias does in Plato's Meno 71 b f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle is here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the Meno insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the Ethics Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to Π. 2. 2. SUSEM. (118)

§ 11 28 ὅ ποιητής] Sophocles Ajax 293. See further n. (117). SUSEM. (119) 31 ἦτει δὲ κτλ] "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator." The slave's moral excellence is re-stricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (Νείκ. Εἰθ. Π. 9, 10, 11. 2. 5 ff.); on this see Π. 17. 3. 5 n. (875): but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely ὑπηρετική, as Aristotle inexacty puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8—11 compare Poetics 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Sussemlil's edition. SUSEM. (120)
to the proofs of his argument. In his treatise "On the Nature of Virtue," Aristotle discusses the concept of virtue in a comprehensive manner, emphasizing its importance in shaping human character. He argues that virtue is not merely an external behavior but a deeply internal quality that influences one's actions and decisions. Aristotle distinguishes between different forms of virtue, such as political virtue and personal virtue, and explores how they can be cultivated through education and practice.

Aristotle's ideas on virtue have had a profound impact on subsequent philosophical thought, influencing not only moral philosophy but also areas such as politics, ethics, and social theory. His work continues to be studied and debated, with scholars examining his views on topics ranging from the nature of happiness to the role of education in developing virtuous citizens.

In conclusion, Aristotle's treatise on virtue provides a rich and nuanced exploration of the concept, offering insights that remain relevant to contemporary discussions on ethics and morality.
make δ the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.' Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει De caelo 1, § 10, 277 a 5 ðovn γάρ ἡ ἐτέρα [γραμμή] ἐπιβάλλει τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἐκείνης τοσοῦτον, where ἐπιβάλλει contrasts with ἀπόδοξε. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπαλλάττει?" In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αὐτῷ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἄρετῆς by itself also strange? (See Critical Notes). If something like δοῦλων or τῆς ταυτίσης has been lost, αὐτῷ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect 'he shares in ser vile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave's.' SUSEM. (123)

Plato Laws 777 E, τὴν δὲ οἰκέτου πρόσφα- την χρὴ σχεδον ἐπίταξε πᾶσαν γυναῖκαν. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on § 12. SUSEM. (124)

Plato's view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Eliot.

Because the slave, albeit unable to deliberate rationally himself, yet, as an adult, understands better than the child the rational admonitions conveyed to him by others (FüllEborn II. 184). Compare n. (120) on § 11 above, and n. (45) on § 9. SUSEM. (125)

§ 15 8 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον] Compare the close of c. 7.
II. 13. 16] 1260 b 1—1260 b 24


11 τὸ τοῦ καλὸς αἰ. ὁμολογοῦν (Cingham). τῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὁμολογοῦν> διώκεται, how the right intercourse ought to be followed: cp. τὸ δὲ κακόν <ἀρχευόμεν καὶ τῶν> ἀρχευόμεν πότε ἀρχευόμεν. 6 § 10.

12 ἐν τούς...πολιτείας] This discussion means the scheme of the best state more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come down to us in B. iv(vii) and vi(viii), this point was never reached, nor the question of the proper training and education of the women. Cp. Introd. p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. Summ. (126).

15 ἀναγκαίον] Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (13).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ.] Cp. ὑπη. viii. 4. 1, viii(v). 9. 11 κ., and Nic. Eth. v. 2. 11, τὸ δὲ ποιηστικὸ τὸ ἄριστο τῶν νομιμῶν δια νομοκεντρικῶς τὸ παθητικὸ τὴν πρὸς τὸ καθαρὸ κτλ., with Jackson's notes. The all important term πολιτεία will be fully explained in B. iii (1 § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c.). It will be found to be a much wider term than 'constitution' or 'form of government' (πόλεως ἁρχής), as indeed the English word 'polity' is still. See ὑπῆρ. vii. 3, ἐπέρ ὁ ἀρχηγὸς κτλ., and n. (45) in ii. 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς...ἀντι, is an important means towards the excellence of the city. literally "makes a difference with regard to..." So iv(vii). 14. 7, πέρι τοῦ τοιούτου διαφέρειν καὶ πράξαι.

16. 18 αἱ μὲν Παρθένες] Cp. ὑπ. i. 9 3. 6 κ. (253), Plato Laws 754 a, ἀν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός εἰσιν, ἐν ἄνθρωπον, ἀν τὸ πείνα τῆς πράξεως. Summ. (137).

20 οἰκονομόροι, substitution, the title given Ἀριστοτελεία to any element at least as well as of cures of, see ii. 3. 14, 15. (viii). 14. 3. 4.

41 αἴσθης κτλ.] 'Let us dismiss the present discussion as complete, and study an epic subject from a fresh starting point. And first let us review those theorists who have put forward a solution for the best form of polity.' With τοιούτου κτλ. cp. τοιούτῳ τοιούτῳ Ἀρκέας, ili. 6. 5.
EXCURSUS I.

EPIMENIDES I. 2 § 5.

The most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. i. 109—115 (cp. Suidas s. v.), whilst of modern writers Heinrich Epimenides of Crete (Leipzig 1801. 8), Hück Kretai III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess De Epimenide Crete (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time pp. 12—14 (in Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly received the requisite religious sanction. In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. ii. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Ulrichs On the Rhetra of Lycurgus in the Rhein. Mus. vi. 1848. 217—230, Duncker History of Antiquity vi. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer De ephoris Lacedaemoniiis pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta) p. 185, Frick De ephoris Spartanis p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato Laws 1642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. i. III—two epics, Κοινῷτων καὶ Κοινοβάντων

1 If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see n. on II. 9. 23), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

2 Triebel (Forschungen Berlin 1871. 8) Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-
EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—8 3.

The recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in n. (51) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the Philologus xxxvi. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of ἐστιν, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 ἀν γενι... 19 ἀπεκέφαλον form a parenthesis, and hence that the ἐνει following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserves to be so, while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The conventional law in question consists in the universal agreement that persons captured
in war are the slaves of their conquerors (ἐν ὃ τὰ κατὰ τὸ δεικτα ρατούμενα τῶν κρατοῦτων εἶναι φασίν). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule. This then is their view (11 οὕτως): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, ἐκεῖνος, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 δύστανται χωρίς) and in conflict (ἀρματισμένοις), yet they have a common point of contact (ἐπαλλάττοντοι), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written ποιεῖ δὲ in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (ἀρετή) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴν τυγχάνουσα χορηγία καὶ βιαζόμεθα δύναται μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐστὶν δὲ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθῶν τινῶν); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (χορηγία). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (ὡστε διὸ ἡ ἀρετή ἐν τῇ βιαῖ). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον ἐν τῷ ἀρματισμένῳ). Just for this reason (διὰ τοῦτο) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: i.e. in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish “normal politics” from “degenerate forms” (παρεκβάσεις). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

1 Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ὑπεροχῆ ἀγαθῶν τινῶς are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle’s explanation of their common statement μὴ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τῆν βιαί. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ἀγαθῶν τινῶς as the cause but not the matter of the partial agreement between (A) and (B); and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously διόταναι and ἐπαλλάττοντοι, (4) to the sense given to ἀπεραί οὐκοπώς, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about τοῦ δικαίου.]
position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the rule right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his cause in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), ἀτερον λόγον, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result: that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters; that the ἀτερον ἔστων γε χαρις τουτων των λόγων oτηται ἐπὶ ἄριστων, διὸν ἑνώντας αὑτόν ἄτερον λόγον, ὁς σοὶ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρτεν εἰς ἀποστίως. Pius once correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written ἄριστον λόγον for ἀτερον λόγον.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (ἄλως to be taken with ἀτερχόμενον) adheres to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Helleses conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see Isocrates p. 25). SUSEMIIH.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1235 a 7–26: i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just]. While Aristotle declares that in practice some slavery is just, some slavery unjust. In 1253 a 13–21 he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own."

6 Now the λόγον of (A) and (B)
   i. All slavery is unjust
   ii. All slavery is just

1 [Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered in (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]
EXCURSUS II.

ἐπαλλάττουσιν: i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττουσιν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as ἀρέτη with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἄγαθος of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βλα, there there is ἀρέτη, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βλα is always accompanied by ἀρέτη, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βλα is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon ‘loyalty’, i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βλα is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle ‘might is right’.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διεστώσαν χωρίς and no longer ἐπαλλάττουσιν, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἀτέροι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὅσο δεί τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρέτην ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν1.

He adds in a note: “In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἵσχυρὸν and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἵσχυρὸν and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἵσχυρὸν or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἵσχυρὸν or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοὺς λόγους and τῶν λόγων to be ‘the theories of (A) and (B)’, ἀτέροι λόγοι to be ‘the theory adverse to (A’s) theory and the theory adverse to (B’s) theory’, i.e. ‘the theories of (B) and (A)’.” He agrees with Heitland (Notes p. 11) that ἐπαλλάττειν means primarily to ‘overlap’, whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: “But when may propositions be said to ‘overlap’? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) All X is Y might be said to overlap Some X is Y, and (2) Some X is Y and Some X is not Y might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττειν marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that All X is Y could not be said to ἐπαλλάττειν Some X is Y. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττειν understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis.

1 Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of § 4 (especially ἐπέλ, ἀτέρος, ὡς οὐ δεῖ as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρέτην to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against ‘the modified doctrine.’ SESEM.
in diapntanw χωρίς, I take επαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase diapntanw χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of εκπροφέρω in s. 1, and b. 17. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for επαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another."

Bernays’ rendering of 6, 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in s. 25f., is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of same good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all other elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, which proclaims slavery; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule, then the view which impinges the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just merely because the law sanctions it; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

**EXCURSUS III.**

**THE RELATION OF χρηματιστική TO οικονομική | I. 5. 2.**

ὅτι μὲν οὖν όν ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἡ χρηματιστική, δηλατούμεν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ἔδος, ἔχει διαφημίσθησιν. The most obvious reason is to understand ἐτέρῳ ἔδοι as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὀντομετική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hamps—see s. (67) on i. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to οἰκονομική, and consequently in c. 8 5 13 would set matters right by adding μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not theory said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', οἰκονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Huchternscheffl rely on the perceived and
of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is really a part of οἰκονομική, but that the 'natural' part of indirect χρηματιστική, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to οἰκονομική. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of χρηματιστική, with which the householder is concerned, is related to οἰκονομική; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of οἰκονομική, in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that οἰκονομική has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, χρηματιστική with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of χρηματιστική most closely allied to οἰκονομική cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 n. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that ἔτερον εἶδος denotes something which is not connected with οἰκονομική either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it; the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and μέρος is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus χρηματιστική has three meanings, (1) = κτητική, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8: and, in a narrower sense, (2) = μεταβαλτική or καταλλακτική, ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαία, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. n. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly μεταβαλτική or μεταβολική as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under οἰκονομική and

1 If Büchsenschütz had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.
that which is alien to it: but sometimes it is found in the largest occupation of retail trade proper, mercator, as in ἱ 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 5. Tiedemann has some good remarks on the rant of a strict terminology in Aristeot Arist. Forschungen 11, 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether χρηματιστής is a part of oikonomos, is, at first, a perversely way of raising the question. For oikonomos, conversely, has a wider field than oikonomos: even the financiers of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a χρηματιστής (Π. 12—14; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is in no consideration as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of χρηματιστής. Cf. the notes on §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. Susem. (69)

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NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) or 5 § 7 and 15 § 16 may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls τὸ δικαιοσύνης, he would be without reason altogether; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, τὸ σοφιστικὸν, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression ἄριστως ἐπιμέλητα τὸ δικαιοσύνης, 11 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolical and interpreted in the light of this other, and itself hyperbolical, statement εὐσκόρπος λέγει τοπικά λέγει αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπου ἄλλον μη ἐπιμέλητα ἄριστως 5 § 9: reason is present in the slave only, as to speak, as a δίσιμος, not as a ἐγείρε; and Aristotle avails himself of the

1. Staatslehre 11. 81: "It is just like putting the question: Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species? For that χρηματιστής has the wider generality and that oikonomos is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of oikonomos to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite "(1) "procedure, we can only with difficulty suppose that χρηματιστής is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth; that oikonomos teaches us to apply to the main-
hyperbole μη ἐχεῖν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the Poetics, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἡθη) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἃν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ ήθην γένοιτ’ ἀν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων αἵθεις τραγῳδίαι εἰσίν καὶ ὄλως πισταὶ πολλοὶ τουύτοι. 

Comp. Hermes xix. 1884, p. 592. Susem. Plato too, Rep. iv. 441 A, says λογισμὸν ὤν ἔνοι μὲν ἐμοίην δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὐγε ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.


ἀναρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμονύμως, ὅσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην: διαφθαρείσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γάρ) τῷ ἔργῳ ὀρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὅπερ μηκετί τοιαύτα ἐντα οὐ λεκτόν τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἄλλ’ ὁμονύμα. The words of n. (28) p. 150 “if τοιαύτη = a true hand” will admit of further elucidation. Scholl, who maintains this to be the meaning of τοιαύτη, ‘talis qualis esse debit vera manus’ (Susem. Quaest. Crit. iv. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τουύτος in De part. animal. i. i §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθειός έχει τὴν αὐτήν τοῦ σχῆματος μορφήν, ἄλλ’ ὀμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος. ἔτι δ’ αδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα <τῆ> ὡπωσοῦ διακειμένη, οἷον χαλκῆν ἢ ἄγγλινην, πλην ὁμονύμως, ὅσπερ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἰατρῶν. οὐ γὰρ δυνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, ὅσπερ οὐδ’ αὐλοὶ λιθίνοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ’ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἰατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτους οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἐτί τῶν τουύτων έστι, λεγὼ δ’ οίῳ ὁδηλαμάς, χεῖρ (where Scholl has himself added τῆν). The citation is the more apposite because Scholl takes διαφθαρείσα χεῖρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χεῖρ, ‘manus corporis extincti, ἀναρουμένου τοῦ ὅλου, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellandā.’

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Scholl contends, διαφθαρείσα is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφθαρείσα means ‘a dead man’s hand,’ may not τοιαύτη mean simply ‘homonymous,’ a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἔσται τοιαύτη is parallel to οὐ λεκτόν τὰ αὐτὰ ἄλλ’ ὁμονύμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576) : “posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est.”
Book 11 is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, *Metaphysics of Psychology*, etc. Here cc. 1—8 deal with Political Thinkers, cc. 9—12 with Existing Constitutions. See *Intrud.* p. 32.

*Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors:* § 1.

*First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's *Republic*?* § 1 1260 b 27 προαρατεῖα This is evidence (as against Gotthelf *Proleg.* p. xviii) and others that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state; see Spengel *Ueber die Politik* p. 311, and compare *Hist.* (VII). § 3 4.

κοινωνίας τής πολ. *This takes us back to I 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, πολιτεία, was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in I 1.* § 29 κατ' ευχήν] For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); IV (VII). § 1 1 3 5 § 10 1 15 1 11 1 19 1 19 111 1 111 1 with some *Syst.* (124).

In Plato's *Repub.* there is a scheme, e.g., *Leg.* 476 b, etc., in which the various 7 c k of citizens are divided into three orders, or classes, with certain differences. So in *Dem.* 17 c 53—5 = κατακαταρχήν, an Eucharistic scheme, into three parts, and 13 1 5 a 11 1 5 εἰς τό οὖν τοῦ συναρτήσεως οὐσίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργων in a participle, and what is a noble art, worthy of 17 c 7. This is consistent with the past, something necessary, indispensable, etc., in *Dem.* 11 c 371 b 10 1 15 1 15 1 11 1 11 1 19 1 19 1 1 111 1 111 1 1 111 1 with some *Syst.* (124).

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defectiveness of all schemes hitherto framed that we have undertaken this investigation.

34 σοφίζεσθαι = affect wisdom, show one's cleverness, whence σωφάστης. Elsewhere in the treatise simply 'to devise,' 5 § 19, VI (vii), 13, vii (vi), 14, 19.

36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι] Shilleto compares Thuc. vi. 40, Plato Soph. 264 b, Tim. 48 c, Laws x. 892 d, for this sense 'to take up.'

§ 2 37 ἥπερ πέφυκεν] The natural beginning, seeing that every state is a form of association, κοινωνία, 1. 1. 1 (Eaton). SUSEN. (129).

38 ἡτοι πάντας πάντων κτλ] The same alternatives are given IV (vii). 8 § 8 – 9 § 2.

41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not universally true. Mere contiguity of residence is not enough to constitute citizenship: III. 1 § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea of territory in the germ.

§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκήσεσθαι] Eaton proposes a reflexive sense, 'direct itself aright,' comparing Thuc. vi. 18 τὴν πόλιν τριφυλεῖσθαι αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν and other instances.

6 ἔκειν' Rep. IV 423 e f. v. 449 c— 466 d. This passage and v (viii). 7. 9 justify the inference that Ὅρωμάτις with the article v (vii). 7. 9, means throughout ὁ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Ἐ. Socrates, the character in the Platonic dialogue, in keeping with Aristotle's cautious manner of referring controversially to contemporary thought. Not directly named, as a rule, Plato lurks under Socrates (cp. wn. 116, 199), as under τνές, τιν ὅν πρότερον, and the like. See Campbell's apt remarks on similar reticence in Plato, Intro. to Theaetetus p. xxxiv, ed. 2.

cc. 2 — 5 An Examination of Plato's Republic.

c. 2 Communism would not secure Plato's end, which is the utmost possible unity. Excessive unification subverts the city, reducing it to a family or an individual: §§ 1, 2. The elements of the city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-
tissed from an offensive and defensive alliance (συμμαχία) and a race or tribe (τέμπος): § 3. It is this which makes recti-

cally the political safeguard, § 4, allowing the citizens to become alternately rulers and subjects, although a permanent governing body would be better, §§ 5, 6; allowing also a change of functions among the offici-
s, § 7. Further, the greater independence (αυτοδουλεία) secured in the city essen-
tially depends upon a degree of unity lower than that of the family, § 8.

See Grote's Plato c. 35, 3. pp. 160—

242, Oncken i. 171—193 and various monographs quoted in the Interpr. p. 32 n. 4. p. 33 n. 7. The main defects of this criticism are at once apparent; Zeller, Platonic Studies p. 203, 240, has rightly traced them to an excessive striving after logical clearness; a tendency to reduce the Platonic utterance to a number of precise dogmatic propositions and to test the independent validity of each empirically, without regard to its inner connexion with the whole system of idealism. Hence it comes about that the spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly ever adequately appreciated, while now and then there is a captious, almost ped-
dant, disposition to get at external results and to fasten on details with but little insight into their true relative im-
portance. "Several objections urged by

him turn more upon the Platonic lan-
guage than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and if judged by Plato from his own point of view would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections" (Grote). This is the sober fact, and serves to account for the pianist charges of injustice, sophistry, and mak-

s sometimes brought against Aristoteles.
The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. *Suseum.* (131)

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the *République,* the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.

24 *όυ γὰρ ἡξὶ ὁμοιῶν*] Apparently contradicted by *Suseum.* § 4, 16 § 2, vii(iv). 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὁμοιῶν (Eaton). The present statement is repeated *Suseum.* 4. 5 where *uniformity* of moral excellence is disclaimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by *N. Eth.* v. 5. 9, *οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἱστρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλὰ ἐκ ἰστρῶν καὶ γεωρ-γοῦ, καὶ ὄλος ἐτερῶν καὶ οὐκ ἰσομή. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὲι ἱσασθήραι. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed *Pol.* iv(vii) cc. 8, 9. See on 1. 7: § 1 r. (58 b).

*συμμαχία* A confederation is a different thing from a state: see *Suseum.* 3 § 5, 9 § 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The
separate autonomous states, the Laconian- 
omontains and their allies, for example, 
are homogeneous.

27. το μὲν answered by 29 ἐκ ἑν ὑπ'. The 
one (the alliance for war) will be of ad-
vanntage from its mere size however 
much alike in kind, just as it will be of 
advantage if a weight shall pull more 
than another: i.e. like a heavier weight 
which turns the scale. The more mem-
bers the stronger the alliance.

27. διοίσει κατα 
"Upon something similar", the character of the constit-
ents, whether heterogeneous (so as to allow of 
reciprocity) or homogeneous, "will de-
pend the difference also between a city and a 
race, provided the race does not live with its 
population separated over a 
number of villages, but like the Arc-
dians." Not observing the parenthesis 
and taking εἰς τῷ ὑπερ τοῦ 
κατα, the editors have 
figurative of τῷ ὑπερ τοῦ 
κατα, the editors have 
referred this remark to the process of 
συνεπικράτειας, the change from village 
life by which a Greek ἐφέρα was consolidated 
into one city. But (1) the Arcadians 
must surely be cited as an example of a 
race and not (as they would be upon 
that view) of a city: (2) this is not a distin-
iction between ἐφέρα and παῖκται universal-
ly, but between one ἐφέρα and another. 

(1) Should we then expect ἐφέραν, or 
ὅμως ἐφέρα or something equivalent: and 
the exact force of the future and of ἐφέρα 
(meaning not ἐφέρα) would be omitted. 

(2) In that case Arcadians means sim-
ply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegesta-
mites, Mantinians and others might equally 
claim to belong to the Arcadian league 
(τῶν Ἀρκαδῶν). Hence Dittenberger to 

27 ἄρα εἰς τῷ 
"Aρκαδοί τῆς προσκομίας, εἰς τῇ ἐφέρα" 
το οὖν ἐν ὑπ'. (βοσκεῖν γὰρ χάρις ἢ 
συνεπικράτεια τίθε-

cen), ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ σταθήσαι πλεῖον ἡλίκια (Ἴσαιας 22 ή ὑπ'. 
τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὥσπερ μὲν κατὰ κόμην ἢ ὡς ἐγγὺς 
σμένου τοῖς πλῆθοι, ἄλλα οὖν 'Αρκαδοίς' ἐξ ἡπ. ἐκ ἑν ὑπ'.

4 γενόθει, εἰδεῖ διαφέρει. διὸπερ τὸ ἦν τῷ ἐπιτεθείματι 

26 τῷ (τῆς 14). τῆς Π4. Κ1. Τάπ. Τ. Υ. 17 ἄρα 
'Αρκαδοί τῆς προσκομίας, εἰς τῷ ἐφέρα 1261 a. 3, but wrongly. 28 καὶ πόλις] τοῖς ὑπ'. ? Sunnem. 29 ἄλλα'] τᾶς 
'Αρκαδοίς * * Conring, ἢ ὡς <τῷ> Ἡρπεί; but see Dittenberger sp. p. 1119. and the Comm. below 30 γενόθει? Sunnem. 31 ἄρα <τῷ> διαφέρει διαφέρει (prob.
ably right), εἰδεῖ διαφέρει Μ'"
tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

"As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in Nic. Eth. v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who renders, the one service, the other tymē καὶ γέφας Nic. Eth. v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of αντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, 'reciprocal proportion', to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the Ethics p. 88 ff. In Nic. Eth. v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is αντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἴσοτητα, i.e. 'reciprocal proportion' as opposed to the 'retaliation' of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλεις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between αντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, i.e. κατ’ ἴσοτητα λόγων, and αντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἴσοτητα, i.e. κατ’ ἴσοτητα ἀπόλως, τὸ ἴσον τὸ αντιπεπονθὸς is the equivalent of αντιπεπονθὸς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in Nic. Eth. ix 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἀπόλως δίκαιον is τὸ κατ’ ἴσον κατὰ νῦν (vii) 1, 1301 b 37, at vii(vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δικαίως is said to consist in τὸ ἴσον ἐχει κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἄλλα μὴ κατ’ ἴσον, τὸ κατ’ ἴσον in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἴσον. See my notes on Nic. Eth. v 3 § 7."

"Jackson.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, Ethics i. p. 51 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the Ethics are a development and improvement of those in the Politics. The common source may be Plato's Δίος κράτις, the true πολειτικὸν δίκαιον, of Latus, vi 757 b, c: τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζον πλέον τῷ δ’ ἐλάττονι συμβεβηκέναι νεκρεῖ, μέτρα διδομένα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκάθερον, καὶ θ’ καὶ τιμᾶς μείζοις μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν δὲ μείζους κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς ὕδικοις Nic. Eth. v. 5, 6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ αντιπεπονθὸς is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal proportion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible: it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (N. E. viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further 1. 2, 16, III. 10, 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—

I. 7. 1 n. (58 b), IV(vii). 8. 4 (597), vii(vi). 11. 8 (1293); III. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, 1 § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also III. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4—7 διαπερ τὸ ἴσον...ἀρχάς are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of dissimilar members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (ἀνάρτοπεια) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eubulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From
32 ἢμαὶ ἄλλα[P in the margin | 34 τὰς | M 181. | 34 [and A, probably right) | 35 μετὰ[άλοι [M 181. | 18 | 36, 37 after 18, [M 181. | 37, 47 C. | U8 Ald. Bk. and a later hand in 18 omitted by the tail hand in 18] | 37, 38 | and Bernay, who omitting with Korai 28 which follows humanly removes all traces of the lacuna after ἔκδικος recovered by Courting and Schneider (v.g. καὶ δὲ ἐκδίκως ἐκεῖνος τὸν κ. τ. τ. η. η. 32 τὸν; | <νῦν] ἡν ἑπεξεργάζεται equal to some thing similar Thesid. 4 | 3 § 3: 4 § 4: 5 § 11, 14, 15: | 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it may easily be seen that this does not affect the soundness of his reasoning which, as even the language shows, is directed more especially against Republic v 461, where Plato is showing how the abolition of family life would be the means of making all the citizens of his ideal state fed as the members of a single family (cp. n. 140) or even of a single man (καὶ ἐστὶ δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐκλύθησθαι ἔχει, ἄλλως 31 πολλά ἐπαναρέγεται). In this, not, as Aristotle right, to prescribe for the state the end of representing so far as possible an individual man? Aristotle’s argument is that unity when applied to the state is an analogical term, and that Plato’s use of it subverts the very ground of the analogy (Katon). Comp. also Oncken i. 175 f. | 181. 133 (133) | 31 τοῦτο τὸ ἄνεγερθεῖν. There must needs be reciprocity even amongst free and equal citizens, as in the ideal state. | ἡμαὶ γὰρ ... δυνατόν] All cannot rule at once: the only possible alternatives are (a) a perpetual ruling body, ἀνθρώπων (cp. 1. 13 § 4) τῶν συνεπτυχίων ἄνεγερθείν: (b) alternation or rotation of functions, μεταβαλλόμενοι, ἄνεγερθείν ἄνθρωποι κατό ἀρέων (cp. 1. 1 § 2, III 6 § 9). | Comp. iv(viii). 14 § 1, 2 where this argument occurs. 5 § 35 ἡπειράντως [apparently redundant after συμμετέχοντες, δὲ to τῆς}] 4 ὁ συμμετέχοντα ἡμεῖς τὰ πάντα ναυτικον χρῆσται, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τίποτε τῶν τούτων ὅστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὀτεπερὶ ἢ δὲ εἰ μεταβαλλόμενοι ὁι σκυτεῖσι καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μή ἢ αἱ αὐτοὶ σεαυτοῖς καὶ τέκτονες ἢσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐβέλτον ὁυτόν ἐχει καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἡ τινος λοιπον την πολιτικήν, ἄγκολο ὁς τοὺς αὐστάντες διὶ βέλτιον τούριθον, εἰ δυνατόν ἐν οἷς ἢ μὴ δυνατόν ἐκ τῆς τροποῦσκαν τοῦ ἐνεπερδυμένοις, καὶ τέκτονες ἢσαν.  

II. 2. 6] 1261 a 31—1261 b 39. 219
is or is not a source of individual advantage. τοῦτο τὸ ἐκεῖνον = this yielding of the retiring magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office; μεμείσαι is the counterpart or re- flexion of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

1261 b 1 ἀμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον κτλ. Compare iii. 10 §§ 2—4 with n. (672), iv(vii), 3 §§ 5, 6 n. (740); further n. (58 b) on i. 7, 1, n. (133) and (797) on iv(vii). 8. SUSEM. (134 b)

2 τοῦτο δι] This δι with the demonstrative resumes the with the relative 39 ἐν ὦς δὲ: so iv(vii). 9 § 5, ἔ...ταύτη δέ. The two recensions of the text here widely diverge; see the Critical Notes. Bekker's text is nearly that of P2; ἐν τούτοις δὲ μεμείσαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἱσοὺς ἐκέκω ὁμοίως τοὺς ἐκ ἀρχής. Thur. Etudes pp. 22—24 has shown the usual modes of interpreting this text to be unsatisfactory. The infinitive may indeed be governed by βεβλησον, and εἰσέχαι (or ἀρέσκει) may be understood with τοὺς ἐκ ἀρχῆς: but whether ἐκέκω be taken as subject or object of μεμείσαι the result is equally futile. If object, the sentence means 'where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality'! If subject, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is 'imitated' by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural inequality.

§ 7 5 ἀπὸ πάντας ἀν ἄλλοις γενόμενοι as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενό- μενος δ' ἄλλος in Nic. Eth. ix. 4. 4. άρχοντον] gen. abs. "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον = 3 ἐν μέρει.

7 τυντον] That is, Plato: see esp. Rep. v 462 b. Cp. n. (133). SUSEM. (135) Also 464 b μέγιστον γε πόλει αὐτῷ ὠμολογήσαμεν ἄ γὰθον. 8 καὶ...(φανερῶν ὃτι...is the construction.

9 καίτοι...σωτῆς ἐκαστον] οὐκ ἀνάβει. "Cp. iii. 10. 2 οὐκ γ' ἐρήμη...φθείρετο τὸ ἑξον αὐτὴν with n. (561 b)." SUSEM. (135 b)

"What is this 'unity' which seems to Plato so beneficial, to Aristotle so..."
mischiefous? It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the άδεια of Nic. Eth. 1. 8, 1667 a 22, as appears from c. § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic πόλις. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization'. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the πόλις, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior κοινωνία which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior κοινωνία—i.e. example, οίκια, σχολοι, συστά- τα, φιλαθεία, φιλοσοφία, εφετερο- στατικά Nic. Eth. viii. 9 § 4 f., 1160 a 9, q.v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior κοινωνία, which μορίοι ήσσαρι τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας Nic. Eth. viii. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior κοινωνία to the suprene κοινωνία. He thinks, in fact, that the πόλις is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticism arises directly from the theory of the πόλις which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of φιλία in all its forms, which has led him to devote it two out of the ten books of the Nic. Eth.**

Jackson.

§ 8 το ένοον is infinitive, the ende-
to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the Republic would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (3 §§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato’s avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (esprit de corps) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τούτο = τό μιαν από μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms mine and not-mine.

18 κατά τόν λόγον] with απόδεικνυόμαι, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of mine and not-mine: εάν πάντες...μή ἐμὸν is explanatory of λόγον. For κατά = by, cp. Metaph. Θ, 8 § 14. κατά τό δή τούτον τόν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι...1050 b 3.

19 ο Σωκράτης] In Plato’s Republic v. 462 c: εν ήτινα δή τότε πλείστοι εἵπε τό αὐτό κατά ταύτα τότο λέγουσι τό ἐμόν καί τό οἶκ ἐμὸν, αὐτὴ ἄριστα διοικεῖται. SUSEM. (137)

§ 2 20. ‘All’ has two senses, (1) each individual, pro se quisque; (2) the whole body collectively. If ‘all’ is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means (‘proposes to do’).

24. οὐκ” “circumstances”: the joys and sorrows of life. Rep. 462 E. οὐν δ’ οὖχ οὕτως] But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term ‘all’. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say ‘mine’ in this sense.

26. πάντες ![Image](image.png) “are discussed] Another instance in III. II. 2. Also VII. IV. 26 where the distinction is skillfully worked in: μοναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κυρίοι εἰσέχων οὖχ ὡς ἐκαστὸς ἀλλὰ πάντες.

§ 3 28 τό γὰρ πάντες κτλ] The terms ‘all’, and ‘both’, and ‘odd’ and ‘even’ by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια] See § 27: τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ ἄρτιον) ἑνδέχεται τῷ ὄχρῳ ἐπάρχειν τῶν δὲ μερῶν µηδὲτέραν, De Soph. E. 4 § 7, 166 a 33: παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάρκειαν ὃτι τὸ πέντε ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, το (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two
30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλαγρομένοι διὰ τοῦτο τὸ πάντα τας τῷ αὐτῷ λέγειν ὦδὲ μὲν καλῶς, ἀλλ' οἷς ῥωστάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπονομηκόν ἔνδο όν ὑπονοικίων). πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἑτέρου ἔχω βλέπον το λέγομενον. ἡ κακτα γὰρ ἐπιμελεία τυχεῖν τὸ ἀληθεύον κοινών τῶν γὰρ ἱδίων μᾶλλον φρονιστήσεως, τὰς ὑπ' ἀναφερέ 
35 ἦπτων, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ἑτέρῳ φροντίζοντος ἀληθεύον ἄλλον, οὕσπερ ἐν ταῖς ὁμοιό-
τικαῖς διακοινίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες μὲν ἐν τῇ χάρου ἐπιτελοῦν.

πρὸς δὲ τούτους εὐλ]  "In the last place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property owned by the greatest number means too much attention. For men are not much about their private matters, and less in the public concern." The real and attention of individual owners are interested, and filled by division of ownership, so with the men who are a "common preserve" of the Government. "

35 ἢ ὅσον ἐκατον ἐπιβάλλει ἕνοικοι to three, odd and even' (Eaton). SUSEM (138)

Walford and Pontacke would take περιττα καὶ ἀρχα to be predicates of πάντες and ἀληθεύον. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of ἀληθεύον, 2 + 3, and of περιττα. As ἀ-

περιττα = sum of two things, so περιττα - an odd sum total, ἀρχα = an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits De Sept. EL. 30 § 2, ἕνη β, οὗ δέτοι τῷ πασφα-

περιττα, unless the confusion of two things as distinct a ὅροι and ἄρχα is said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικοῖς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider); in Aristotle's phrase they admit of ἱσθένσι and διαισθαί, illicit cumbination and disjunction. See De Sept. El. 4 § 6 166 a 21, 6 § 168 a 36, 20 i 177 a 33. 30 § 7 181 b 20: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀδιόν καὶ τὸ ἐκατον παλαι παλαιών, the words, 'both' and 'all' have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare viii. 3. 3: παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἐν ἀδιόν ἐν' αὐτών, ὡσπερ δ συμφιλιστά μοίη; εἶ ἐκατοσ ἀκριβώς, καὶ πάντα (illict συμφιλιστά). SUSEM. (139).

31 ἄλλον μὲν] οὐ καὶ ἐκατος; ἄλλοι καὶ colletively.

32 οὐδὲν ὑμονοικιον] Since democrats may quarrel, although παλαι παλαὶ, οὗ ὡσπερ ἐκατος δὲ they are superior to the state. The individual, whose unity is Plato's main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say "mine".


and (is) three, odd and even' (Eaton). SUSEM (138)
birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardian alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See n. (133). SUSEM. (140)

38 χιλιοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by Rep. iv 423 λ. ‘Now each of Plato’s citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is his son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.’

39 οὐχ ὡς ἐκάστον] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 α) ἔπει οὕτως κτλ] Almost word for word from Rep. v 463 ε, παρὼν ἀρα πόλεως μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῷ ξυμφωνήσων ἔνως τινος ἣ̃ e ἦ̃ ἡ̃ κακῶς πράπτωντος, ὁ̃

νυσθή ἠλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὐ̃ πράπτετε ὑ̃ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all have with one accord use the expression ‘it is well with mine’ or ‘it is ill with mine.’ Hence translate: ‘As [or if ἐπει be retained, ‘Further] each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term ‘my son’ to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says ‘my son’ or ‘so and so’s;’ and this ‘so and so’s applies equally to all of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists.’ To take ἐμὸς = my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by οὐ̃ς in the preceding line, 6 τέκνων, 14 υἱῶν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χιλιοι νιόν (b 38) it is the elder generation, the ‘fathers’, that are meant by τῶν χιλιῶν ἢ δυσῶν κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 δισικλιῶν καὶ μιρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὐ̃ς corresponds ὁπόστοι ... ὁ, as τῶν τῶν τρόπων τοῦ δεῖνος; mine or A’s or B’s, and so on through all the thousand. When a ‘father’ uses the term ‘my son’ in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other ‘fathers’.

2 ἐμὸς] Editors compare Soph. Antig. 565, ἀλλ’ θ’ φοι μένοι μὴ λέγε. 3 οἶνον = I mean.
7 [εκαστον...8 μυρίων] Schmidt (transposed as above) 4 μελος Simon Boiota, perhaps rightly: yet the instances in which μελος in Aristotle stands without any have not been sufficiently explained; μελος with a common after the word of before) το αύτο Βερνάγιος προσαγωγος Beinais, perhaps rightly: yet the plural may be intentional although the participle goes with εκαστον. 8 και ἡ Συσσανιναν. 9 τὸ ἀντίστοιο Schmidt; τὸν αὐτὸν Μμ. 204. 14 Αδηλφός κατ' Μμ. 206-207. Άδηλφός τοῦ αὐτοῦ τον καταλέγαν. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 μιλείαν Simon Boiota; τον κατάλογον Simon Boiota.

5 καὶ τοῦτο κτά] 'And even this he says dubiously, for it is never certain who of the citizens actually had a son or whose son, if born, was reared.' At first sight this seems to make against Aristotle; for if less than the thousand had sons, the fractional interest of each elder citizen, or 'father,' in the younger generation is increased. But then his chance of being childless is proportionately increased.

6 "And yet it is better in this fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 elder citizens to use the term 'mine' (of any one), all calling him by the same name" viz. son 'or as it is used under the present system' with the addition of different names, as nephew, cousin, &c.?

7 εκαστον...8 μυρίων] Of course only those citizens are meant whose age enables them to call a boy 'son' and not 'brother' or 'grandson.' Here το αύτον. SUSEM. (141) With αὔτό μὲν εκλόγεια may be mentally supplied ἀλληλούσχοις τάς θάρσεως (Thurul). 8 δισμυχίων] Is this genitive after εκαστον, as above? If it is more forcible if taken after το αὔτο = the same relative? Each calls him 'mine,' (which will result in) the whole body (plural) calling one person the same relative of some 2,000 people (T. L. Heath). A different construction of 6 is proposed by Ionitz; viz. to take εκαστον as the object, instead of the subject, of λέγει, and to make δισμυχίων the genitive after το αὔτο δόμων, which is a correction for μιλείας: 'is it better in this sense to call each (of the younger generation) 'mine,' using the same names (i.e. son) for 2,000 or 10,000?' In the same essay (Hermes XVI pp. 192-194) Ionitz defends the vit. regarding ταύτ 'in' on the ground that a new objection, No. 2, is there introduced. The last, No. 3 (194-196) is recent. Ἀριστοτέλη κατά τὴν ἀποτίμησιν which the term 'son father' suffers. 'The multitude of fathers, when each of the younger men has, in proportion and favor to the losing of, which a son otherwise receives from a father.' In the passage which follows (1 τρίτον αὐτόν 14 τον) the latter is viewed from the opposite side. The name 'son' loses all value, in each one who men it shares the problematical relationship as an indubitably large number. With all deference to authority in weighty, it may be doubted if the two sides are opposed at all events in a 1) (species 2) with the point of view in the advantage of the younger generation no less than in a (Ἀριστοτέλης. Comp. Simonida. Com. Cons. V. P. 163.) 7 8 9 10 μελος κτά] 'For one and the same process is called by some men his own son, by another his own brother, or even (they say) according to some other kinship either by several relatives or by some connection, and allows himself in the first instance of one to his kin, and furthermore by another his dearest, his kinsman. For it is better for a citizen to have common essence than to have species a son.' There is in present a kind of community for relations to each other to outsiders according to some other kinship either by several relatives or by some connection, and allows himself in the first instance of one to his kin, and furthermore by another his dearest, his kinsman. For it is better for a citizen to have common essence than to have species a son.' 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10 prosagoreuei ton avtoin, & &' aneptioin, & kat' allhn tin (I. syngyneian, & prois a'imatos & kat' oikeiotitha kai kheia avtoi praton & ton avtoi, prois & te toutous eteros frataora, 

§ 8 ton viou. 

ou & mou & all' oudde diafugwein diastatov to & mou tiwes is &

15 upolambanovn eauton adelphous te kai paiadai kai paterai 

cali & meteras' kata & gar tas omoiosthtas, aig gynontai tois 
teknow pros tois gennishantas, anagkaiotou lambanovn peri

§ 9 allhnlos tas pitseis, opere fasi & kai sambainewv tinis ton 
tas tis ghis periodous pragramatenevnon: einai gar tis

20 ton anw Lievoun kouvas tas gynaikas, ta metoi gynomeva 
tekna diaireisthai kata tas omoiosthtas. eisai de tines 

kai gynaikes kai allon xwron, oion ippoi kai bois, aig 
sfodora pefikasai omoia apoandhvn ta tekna tois gouve-

4 svn, opsper & en Farpaihlo klytheisa Diakalal ippos. 

eti de 14

25 kai tas toiautetai dyscheriai ou radion euabsthnai tois 
tautht kataskevnousi tihn koinwnian, oion aikias kai founous 

[akousious tois de] ekousious kai maxhas kai loiodorias. ou

12 avtoi—avtoi Bk., avtoi—avtoi G II || ? Susem. || eteros Lindau, 
eteron G II Ar. Bk., eteron Bernays, etairoin Spengel || 13 <&> filateln Bas,3 Bk., 
aut contribuion William || etairoin <&> fratetna <&> filateln Schmidt || 27 
[akousious tois de] Bender, akousious [tous de ekousious] Congreve; tous de ekousious omitted by D2, which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted kai maxhas

(558); vi(iv). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); vii(vi). 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); viii(v). 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1564), 8 § 19 (1636).” SUSEM. (141)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect 

17 lambanewn tas pisiteis] derive their convictions; so in iv(vi). 1. 6. 

§ 9 19 tas tis ghis peridous] Books of travel round the world, as in Rhet. 1. 

4.13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), Meteor. 1. 13, 13, II. 5. 14. Such books 

were also called periplois kai periprigmais.

Usually pragmatetewoan takes peri; but once, Rhet. 1. 

2. 5, it has peri. In Pol. 

iv(vii). 14. 8 we have toutw d' eli ti ro-

moxtet pragmatetovn, atopw.

20 tis ton avno Lievoun] See Exc. 1. to B. II p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for 

these customs. Comp. also 1. 2. 4 u. 

(11) and u. (116). SUSEM. (142)

24 opsper...ippos] The same remark in 
Hist. Anim. vii. 6. 8, 586 a 12 (Scheiider). Further compare De Compar. 
Anim. iv. 3. 1, 767 b 5: o mou eikous tois 
gouvevin hen tripon tonia teras eivai par-
ekbevthe gar h fiosis en toutois ek tis 
gunon tripon tonia (Eaton). SUSEM. (143)

Dukala here probably means "docile": Xenophon Cyneget. 7 § 4; Memorab. iv. 

4. 5: fai de tines kai ippoin kai bous 
tod boulomewn dikaisou periephhaini panta 
mesata elina tois didakhtovn (Jackson).

c. 4 § 1 25 tas toiauta] the following.

27 [akousious tois de] ekousious] Can it be said that a divine law forbids 
involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c, but permits it in other 
cases? On the contrary, responsibility 
causes for involuntary acts; nothing but 
egligence is then punishable; nor can we 
talk of such acts being allowed. But
intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender).

SUSEM. (144)

28 οὐδὲν διίνον] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken). SUSEM. (145)

32 λύσεως = expiations. Editors compare Κερ. Π 304 θ:  ὃι ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαροὶ ἀδίκημαν διὰ θείων καὶ πατϊας [ἡδονάς] εἶμι μὲν ἐπὶ ἴδιον εἶμι δὲ καὶ τελευτάσθαι, ὅτι δὴ μὴν καλέων: Eur. Or. 510 φῶνον φῶνο λύσαι, εὐγεμένως λύσαι. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age.

Grote, Hist. 1. 34, compares Thuc. 1. 126 — 128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κτλ.] "All the editors assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηθέρων, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γυναῖκάστων εἴδεχεται μηθέρων γένεσιν λύσαι, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made.' He ought however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made.' Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μηθέρων, <οὐδὲν διίνον>."

JACKSON.

SUSEM. 3, 2, 3 οὐδενικιν δε κτλ.] "Ερ. ΠΠ. 403 A, Β: οὐδὲν ἄρα προσωπικόν παραλείπει οὔτε ἐγγένετο ἀνθρώπισιν τῇ ἀνθρώπισιν, οἱ προσωπικοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ γλῶσσα (ο. ή περὶ τῷ ἀκροβάτῳ) οὔτε ἐγγένετο τῷ αὐτῆς ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπειρότατον ήταν ἐρωτεύεται τῇ καὶ ἐρώτησεν...οὕτω δέ, οὐ δοκεῖ, παραλείποντο εἰς τῷ ἐλεγέσθαι τῇ πολλῷ σειτίνη καὶ καὶ ἐκείναι καὶ αὐτοῦςδιώτερον."
35 εἶναι omitted by M* and P1 (1st hand, supplied by p1) || 40 έωσε...b 3 νευτερίζειν Thuot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κοινωνίας, Susem. to follow 1262 b 24 τολμητόμουσαν, Introd. 79 || δε ΓΠ Βκ, δη Σusem.; the alteration stands or falls with the transposition

1262 b 4 Συμβαίνειν Ρ4Τb U6 and Qb (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 ουτως omitted by M*P1 || 7 τε omitted by M*P1, quidem William, but nothing can be inferred from this with regard to Γ

35 δις πατρι....ἀπρεπόστατον] But the words ὡσπερ ύποκεισθην, Ρp III. 403 b, do not bear this implication. Plato permits to the ὀδήσεως only such familiarities as would be unimpeachable as between father and son.
36 καλ το ἐραν μόνον (ἀπρεπόστατον ἐστὶ) according to Greek ideas. Such power lay in a ‘little word’ to extinguish the fiercest passions, Laws VIII 838 b.
37 δι’ ἀλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμιαν] True there is no other reason assigned, but there may well be irony under the terms ἁμονία and ἀπειρωκαλία (see the quotation n. 146): especially when viewed in connexion with the noble conception of Socrates’ moral character and the language of gallantry at the same time put into his lips by Plato. See Appendix 1 to Dr. Thompson’s Phaedrus, esp. pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-figure and etheralize gross passion was pitched in too exalted a strain of romanticism. Plato himself renounced it afterwards. His matter-of-fact discourse simply ignores it.

§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a later marginal note by the author.

§ 5 1262 b 3 δις δη Comp. 1. 6. 5 n. “Such a law must bring about the very opposite to that which ought to be the result of well-framed laws and to that which was Socrates’ own reason (c. 2. § 1) for thinking that the institutions regarding women and children ought to be thus ordered.”

This criticism seems unfair. Such private friendships and affections as Aristotle is thinking of do not, according to Plato, promote concord in the state generally, but rather divert men’s attention from the whole community into private channels, and by creating private interests tend to selfishness and disunion. So the Spartan love of domesticity is censured; Rep. VIII 548 A, B.
Ifet...
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 4. [Π. 4. 8

20 τῶν τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς νιός ἢ νιόν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς § 9 ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γὰρ ἐστίν ἢ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κῆδεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φίλες, τὸ τε ἱδον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν ὃν 24 οὐδέτερον οἶον τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὖτῳ πολιτευμοῖν. <ἐοικε

§ 9 a 41 <ἡ> μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρῆσιμον τὸ κοινός εἶναι τάς γυν.

b 1 ναίκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἢ τοῖς φιλάξιν; ἦπτον γὰρ ἐστιν φιλία

2 <κοινών οὖν τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶναι

3 <τοῖς ἀρχομένους πρῶς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτέρειζ.> ἀλλὰ

§ 9 25 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ

20 τούτων δὲ ἡ φροντὶς καὶ [ונ] Spengel: τούτων <διαφεροῦσα>, διαφροντίζειν

Camerarius: τούτων <διαφεροῦσαν or διαφαρητίαν, ὡς> διαφροντίζειν ? Schneider:
tούτων δια<πρε>ων, φροντίζειν Madvig: τούτων, <ὁ> διαφροντίζειν Kornes in

the text, but the absolute accus. is also possible without ὡς || ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἀναγκαίων

Bender (no comma before διαφροντίζειν) || 21 ιδον T2.3 Qb Tb Ald. Bk. ||

ὡς after 22 ἀδελφοῖς Ridgeway || 25 γενόμενα Susem., γενόμενα II Bekk., γενόμενα

? Götting

The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This

seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern oikeiōtησα by διαφροντίζειν; so that either ἢ πατέρα κκή is the subject of
diaφροντίζεις, as Congreve and Susemihl think, or as Ridgeway Transactions II. 132 proposes ἢ πατέρα κκή is to be regarded

as epegegetic of the wider term oikeiōtησa. He translates: 'so the result is

that in such a constitution as Plato's least of all is it necessary to have regard for

the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 πατέρα ὡς νιόν κκή] "that one citizen should care for another as father for

son, or son for father, or as one brother for another." Ridgeway apjty

compares viii(v). 11. 21 ταύτων ὡς κοινών ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδιῶν, Metaph. m. § 6, 1079 b

34 τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the con-

struction see Critical Notes.

§ 9 23 τό ἀγαπητόν has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique; =μένον

(Eaton, quoting Odyssey 11. 365 μόνον ὡς ἀγαπητός): and (2) much desired,
dearly prized, precious. SUSEM.

See Cope's note on Rhet. 1. 7. 41: καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν (μείζων ἀγαθόν ἢτοι), καὶ τῶς

μὲν μάνον τὸς δὲ μετ' ἀλλῶν, where it must have the second meaning, as unicus in

Catullus 64. 215.

§ 4 1262 a 40 γεωργοῖς] Here as often the farmers stand for the entire

third class of citizens in Plato's ideal

state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πλῆθος of § 5

18, all who are neither ἀρχωτες nor ἐπίκουροι; properly including (§ 9) τεριτ-

ται and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See § 5 20, where

all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle's fears: see § 5 §

19, 20, 22.

41 χρήσιμων] Comp. viii(v). 11. 15

(Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole

passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—9 are essentially a repetition, with

certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3

§§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them.

Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must

be content to set down to the occasional negligence of Aristotle's style this reite-

ration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred

before. Comp. n. (164) on 5 § 14.

SUSEM. (149)

1262 b 2 τοιούτους = ἦπτον φιλόκους: cp. 1. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether
disclaim such a policy; see Rep. 416-7, 463 B. See n. on § 5 20, 1264 a 27.

§ 9 25 περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν] In Plato's ideal state, as children of the Guardians

grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely

the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,
who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received among the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See Repub. III 415 b, iv 423 c. Super. (150)

27. 

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, Kep. v 423 c, Tim. 19 A (καὶ ὅποιοι ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων διαδόσεως τέκνων, ἢ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὸ σώματα τόπο, καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πατρὸς τεταρτάνσεως), and that other regulation about exposure Kep. v 460 c (τά ἐκ τῶν ἑρείδων, καὶ ὃν τις ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνώνυμος γίνεται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀνώνυμως κατακρατεῖται).

28. 

But what harm could this knowledge do to the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, those adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. Super. (152)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and disunion would follow the recognition of the facts.

29. τίσι τίνας διδάσκειν; This clause depends on γνώσκειν.

10. 

παῖδα γενέσθαι. III 6-9. III 6. 311. 74. 14. τοῖς παῖσιν, παντὶς ἐπὶ τοῖς. 14-24. Obviously Aristotle accepts with horror (as we should) from these practices against blood relations. But there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote attributes to him, that unless the chief will fail upon the產業 (Great family creditors) of the members without religious ceremony.

24. ἔστω ἐλέασθαι, etc. They might be reared on these goods, as they could be if they used these means of calculation.

C. 3. (Olsch. i. of communicated property.) III 1-9. See super. (151)

12. 

This issue is not discussed on either page, for the conclusion adopted II 24 20 establishes the fact (and indeed of these children trees as their applicants at the head, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, repub. 5; 13-14. Plato we perceive that even the second application does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third. Moreover, it is devoted to a part of the territory and as Plato had extended it to the children. In Plato's Crito Plato the Guardians forbid the possession of goods and save much of money altogether and as in this way
39 ἡ μὴ κοινὴ after εἶναι M*Pl. In Γ δὲ was perhaps repeated before εἶναι || [πότερον—40 χρήσει]? Schmidt and then a colon after νεομοδηθημένων

1263 a 1 [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] Susem. || 2 πᾶσας Γ Susem.1-2 Freudenthal (perhaps rightly), πᾶσας M* || πᾶσι <τὰς κτήσεις ἡ τὰς χρήσεις ἡ> τὰς or πᾶσι <<τὰς χρήσεις ἡ> τὰς κτήσεις ἡ> τὰς Spengel, ** τὰς Susem.1-2 || τε] γε Koraes Oncken Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσις κοινῆς εἶναι βέλτιστον ἡ τὰς κτήσεις Koraes Oncken || 3 καὶ] ἡ Schlosser Koraes Oncken, κατὰ Bernays || χρήσις <ἡ μονὰς τὰς κτήσεις ἡ τὰς χρήσεις> Freudenthal, χρήσεις <ἡ> τὰς κτήσεις μόνον ἡ τὰς χρήσεις> Busse, χρήσεις <ἡ> Heinsius Hampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See Rep. 3416 c, 4149, v 464 c, and comp. Zeller's Plato p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. n. (196) and 13. 9 n. (116). Thus, as Oncken 1. 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical fiat, while Aristotle B. i c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between them that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families; whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term without settled and independent housekeeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see Introd. p. 27. Susem. (153)

39 πολιτείαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτεύεσθαι. The phrase recurs vii(iv). 1. 4. We find καθʼ ἃς πολιτεύοντα, 11. 7; 11 the accusative in 1. 11. 13 ταῦτα πολιτεύεσθαι, and in τὰ πρὸς αὐτόν 11. 7. 14, is not quite similar.

§ 2 40 χωρὶς σκέφτασθαι ἀπο] separately from independently of. Comp. Plato Phaedo 98 c διαφωνᾶς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, "to separate them." This is the sense of ἀπό in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διερμηνέουν τοῦ διότι as Aristotle puts it. Compare πόροι ἂρ' ἡμῶν Problems xiv. 10, 917 b 14, and Nic. Eth. ix. 8. 1 οὐδὲν ἂρ' ἐαυτοῦ πάττει, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἐκείνα χωρὶς = the families are separate.

2 κτήσις:] (χρήσις; ownership, fee-simple] usufruct, income returned.

3 οἶνον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. "I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as
public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill *Pol. Et.‘* ii. c. i calls thoroughly going Communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier.

γιπάδα, plots of ground, farmsteads, like ἀκρόπτερον, emphasizing the site of the property.

4 ἔνα] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum VII(VI). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and ἐργα, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose custom Aristotel paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his Νόμος or Νόμιμα βαρβάρων; cp. IV(VII). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most appropriate references are from Diodorus v. 44 of the Vaccaeans, a Celtiberian tribe: v. 9, of the exiled Cnidian and Rhodians who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari): v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Needham in Strabo xv. 1. 65 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain σωφρίνα.

7 τῶν] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glarus) and amongst the village communities (demes) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar’s account of the Suevi (Bell. Gall. VI. 29). Strabo viii. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatae, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Dio. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: *Memoirs Scottish Geographer* pp. 84. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Landถee’s *President Property* : see pp. 106, 124 f. (of the English trans. by Maitland). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. They will hold lands in common: the bands of such Aztec “groups” could not be divided. They constructed pueblos, or houses, and lived in large household compounds of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred foreraters together; and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household i.e. something analogous to ovremia: L. H. Morgan *Anc. Society* pp. 187, 190 B. 411—112.

8 κωνδυ] χαρά Ἡαμπκε
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑργοῖς μὴ γνωμένων ἵσων ἀλλ’ ἀνίσων ἀναγκαίων (II) ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνον-

14 τας] πολλά, ὅλγα δὲ πονοῦται τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσιν, § 4 πλεῖω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζήτη καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν-

3 θροπικῶν πάντων χαλεπῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων, δηλοῦσι δ’ αἱ τῶν συνυποδήμων κοινωνίαι σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφέρομεν εἴ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-

κρούοντες ἀλλήλους. ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν θεραπότων τούτων μάλιστα (π-

20 προσκρούομεν οίς πλείστα προσχρόμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακοινίας

§ 5 τάς ἐγκυκλίους.) τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταῦτα τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχέρειας. ὡν δὲ νῦν τρόπουν ἐχει] [καὶ] ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσε καὶ τάξει νόμων ὁρθῶν, οὐ μι-

κρὸν ἄν διενέγκαι. ἔχει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἄμφοτέρων ἀγαθὸν. Λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἄμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-

12 ἀλλ’ ἀνίσων omitted by P 2,3 Q b Tb U b Ar. Ald. Bk. and P 4 (1st hand; added in the margin) || 13 [ἡ λαμβάνοντας] Congreve, μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνοντας omitted by U b Ald. || 18 διαφέρουσιν Koraes | προσκρούουσι] for προσκρούοντες Congreve || 20 χρώμεθα P 1 || 22 νῦν after τρόπον ἐχει M a P 1 || 23 καὶ after ἐχει omitted by P 1 || ἔθεσε P 2 Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖν governs τῶν ἀνθρω-

πικῶν πάντων; “to share in all relations of human life, especially such as affect property.”

17 συναποδήμων] N. Eth. VIII. 9

§§ 4, 5; συμπερεύοντα γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ συμ-

περεύοντι, καὶ προξενεύοντι τῷ εἰς τὸν βλον. 18 διαφερόμενοι ... προσκρούοντες] Par-

ticipal construction with ellipse of copula, as perhaps in I. 5. 9 αἰσθανόμενα. τῶν ἐν ποι] things near at hand, im-

mediately before us : Herod. III. 79: ἐκτεινον τῶν μάγων πάντα τινά τὸν ἐν ποι ἄνθρωμον.

προσκρούοντες] Comp. N. Eth. IX. 4

§ 1, τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες = friends who have broken with each other.


§ 5 22 ἀλλὰς τοιαύτας] Aristotle never urges (1) that communism will diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2) that it will relax the checks on an increase of population. The Hellenic idea of the omnipotence of the state precluded these objections. The conclusion at which he arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill Pol. Ec. ib. p. 128: “We must compare communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country.”

ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κτλ] δν τρόπον νῦν ἐχει with the epexegetic ἐπικοσμηθέν κτλ is the subject of διενέγκα: “the order of things at present existing if improved by good manners and the enactment of wise laws would be far superior”: ἔθεσε, somewhat wider than morality, see § 15; ways, habits, instincts.

“This is in reality not so much proved as stated; still it is not laid down simply on the strength of § 4. Oncken I. 184 goes decidedly too far in saying the attacks on community of property lack all precision and point, and that the doctrine is not refuted on its own merits like the community of families. He fails to notice what is pointed out by Zeller Platonic Studies p. 289 that the words of § 6—‘all will thrive better under a system of private property because then each one labours assiduously for his own advantage’—apply to property exactly the same argument which was used with most effect to refute on its own grounds community of wives and children and was for that reason twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n. (149).” Susem. (156)
1263 a 12—1263 a 36.

[...] the main he may state most of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go beyond them. It is also partly observed by Ock. a 18, that in general whatever, as was the case in Greece, the Romans are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling castes in a whole stand in a certain commensurate relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further iv. (163).

SUS. (156 b)

34 olov kal in Ladevouutsxv ou] Xenophon De Pêr. LXX. 6 iii 11 iv relates to the man in the same sense, but as to slaves and locals, and not as horses, with the more palpable intention that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he may a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully answerable. As in dogs, he was more definitely restrained than homage to the change. Those who require the dogs, invite their owners to go hunting: while he, if he has not the horse, refuses them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about plantations growing in the fields, which he does say is that after a meal in the morning people left the remains of the food they had prepared in more substantial eating, retained while hunting and in case of hard work, of if they had no provisions with them. Hence the mode of their more cheerful and take what they require leaving the rest behind and replacing the meat. SUS. (156 b)

- 26 For (πλως) in general, almost like ἀπλως, comp. lll. 9. 4, viii(v). 1 § 3. 1 § 13 where it is opposed to κατά τα ἅπαν here to παν. § 27 The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction: the article implies those grounds of complaint specified above. Each will set about his own task, e.g. the cultivation of land.

39 δι' ἀρετῆς κατά] Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, in all that relates to use friends go shares in property.

"Comp. iv(vii). 10. 9 with n. (831). Giphanias observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely introduced here because Plato (Kêp. iv 424 A) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misapplies it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted the former, restores it to its original sense. See Zeller's Pre-Socratics i. p. 345 n. 2, Eng. tr. 2nd SUS. (156 b)"
§ 8 δενθὼς ἐφοδίων, <τοὺς> εν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. (φανερὸν) τοῖνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἵδιας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τούτου ἐργον ἱδιον ἐστὶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἱδίουν ἀμύθητον ὄσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἱδιον τ. μ. γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτόν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν τούτῳ φυσικόν.

§ 9 τὸ δὲ φιλαυτὸν εἶναι φύγεται δικαίως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τούτῳ τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δει φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιοῦτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταῖροις ἢ ἱδίοιστον ὃ γίνεται τῆς κτήσεως ἱδίαις ὦσης.

§ 10 κτήσεως ἱδίαις ὦσης. ταῦτα τε ἐν ἐλπίδεις εὑρίσκειν, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸν περὶ τὰς ἴμνακας

37 ἐφοδίων] pro viaticis William || <τοὺς> or <πασι τοὺς> before κατὰ Sauppe, before ἐν Susen., <τοὺς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, ἤσχρ. f. d. ὥστε G. xcv. 1874. p. 487, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς Oncken, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς Bernays, <ταμελίοις> ἐν or <ταμελίοις> ἐν v. Leutsch, ἐν τοῖς ἄγραις Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραιν] θήραιn Bücheler, perhaps rightly

1263 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by Π 3 το ἐπίκεν by Qb Tb Ub and P 2 (1st hand; added by corr. 2) 4 καὶ τὸ P 1 Ar., καὶ τὸν ΓΜ P 3 3 4 Qb Tb Ub, τὸν Ald. || φιλοχρήματον <τοῦ> ἐφιλτιμον 3 Koraeas, accepted by Bernays || 5 ἐκαστος P 3 4 Qb Tb Ub Ald. and P 2 (1st hand; emended by corr. 2) 6 ἐτέρως Π 1 Susem. 1 2 7 οὐ after ὅδι omitted by Π 2 9 τὸ ἐπὶ μὲν omitted by Π 1, τῷ Bernays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc. οὐ τῇ ἡρσέν ποιεῖν κοινὰς. ἀπὸδε ἄρτεν.

νομοθέτου ἐργον] Undoubtedly Aristotelian hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296).

Herein he agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or underestimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). SUSEM. (160)

40 ἐτι δὲ κτλ. "Again, even to the pleasure we feel, that it makes no call that a thing our own is unreasonably great." An expression like οὐχὶν ὅσον, ἤθικαν ὅσον, nimum quantum.

41 μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ or μὴ τοτε with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended; ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. "It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose."

§ 9 1263 b 2 οὐκ ἐστὶν δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8. 1, 1168 a 28, Rhét. i. ii. 26, 1371 b 18; also Plato Latos v 731 D (Eaton). Congreve quotes Nic. Eth. ix. 4. 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους... ἐφευκέν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλληνεθάνειν. SUSEM. (161)

3 καθάπερ κτλ. "just as the love of money means to love it more than is right": Pl. Rep. i 347 B τὸ φιλάργυρον εἶναι δειδος λέγεται (Vettori). Comp. also Nic. Eth. iv. 4. 4, φέρουν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπαύωντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, φέγγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ. ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ πρὸς τούτου νομίζων εὑρίσκειν, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸν περὶ τὰς ἴμνακας

8 αναρρόθησιν ἄργα "destroy the functions." Even Zeller Phil. d. Gr. ii ii p. 597, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato's commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence
in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic ‘community of wives’ being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true: but then neither is this the point of Aristotle’s objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato’s state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, σωφροσύνη. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual’s moral freedom. Further, see n. (103 b). SUSEM. (162).

10 [ἐργον καλὸν] Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a ‘moral action’ (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τὰ καλά ἔκεισα, with that peculiar implication of ‘nobleness’ which runs through the Nic. Ethic.

12 πράξεως ἡλευθερίων] for which private property, e.g., money, is required. Comp. Nic. Eth. x. 8, 4 τὸ μὲν ἢλευθερόν δεῖ τοῦ χρήματος πρὸς τὸ πράξεως τὰ ἡλευθερία; id. § 7. Can we assign acts of liberality to the gods? τίνι δὲ δίκαιον; ἄτε τίνι εἶ, καὶ τί δικαιοῦν ἐν θανάτῳ;

13 ἐν τῇ γὰρ κρίσει... 14 [ἐργον ἐστὶ] for the use of one’s possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero’s iussi virtutis, Acad. post. 1. 38 is analogous to ἔργον in this sense.

12 [ἐφίλου ψυχᾶς] This is the leading question, though it may fairly be supposed that commission would not core all these sins.
23 αἰτίων δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν §14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ὦσιν ὁρθὴν. δεὶ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶς μιᾶς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ὦ πάντη. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὕστερον ὦσιν ἄντων ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πόλεως εἶναι χείρων πόλεως, ὡσπερ καὶ ἕν τις τῆς τριήμερος ποίησε ὁμοφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν ῥυμῶν βάσιν μιᾶν.

25 τοὺς] τῶν P4 Qu Ub Ald.  || 32 πάντως p1 P2 Bk.  || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλεις to follow ἔσται μὲν || 34 ἔσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem1,2, edit William

25 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτλ] “Since we see just those people who are joint owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have their estates separate.” Are these the συνατό-δομοι of § 4? Or is the reference to commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κτλ] The cases of quarrels seen to arise out of partnerships are few, it is true; but then we compare them with the large number of those who have separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀδύνατος] Compare Grote III. pp. 217—222. “This supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance. Plato’s project contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated: the reasons offered to prove it impossible are principally founded upon the very sentiment adverted to. The truly forcible objection is the sentiment itself.” Plato impugns it and declares it to be inapplicable to his guardians: amongst whom as he conceives, a totally different sentiment of obligation would grow up. Similarly “if Sparta had never been actually established and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable.”

30 παρακρούσεως] “fallacy” as in De Soph. El. 17 § 3, 175 b 1, Demosth. c. Timocr. § 194, 760 27 φανακίσμον καὶ παρακρούσεως ἔνεκα.

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ] the incorrectness of his first principle: see § 2. Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who from Aristotle’s own admissions v(viii). 1. 4, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς πόλεως μόρον γὰρ ἐκατός τῆς πόλεως, and 1. 4, 5 τὸ τε γὰρ μόρον ὦ μόρον ἄλλου ἐστὶν μόρον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόλυτον ἄλλου, argues that “the broad principle is common to him with Plato,” though “each has his own way of applying it.”

General Objections to the scheme of Plato’s Republic: §§14—28.

§ 14 Here too it would have been as well to state that these remarks are nothing new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although as new points arise out of them (see Analysis p. 104) there is much greater justification than there was in the case of c. 3 §§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8 : cp. n. (149). Susem. (164)

33 προϊσα] advancing (to a certain degree of unity), “if its unity be carried far” explained by γνωριμία μιὰ μᾶλλον in 2 § 2.

34 ὁσπερ καὶ κτλ] “as if one were to turn the concord of parts into unison, or the rhythm into a single step.” See Probl. XIX. § 3, 921 a 2, συμφωνία κράσις ἐστὶ λόγων ἑχοντων ἐναντίων πρὸς ἀλλα.

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices singing one part with the instruments playing another: cp. Probl. XIX. 39,
The text appears to be a page from a document discussing music and terminology. It includes references to historical music and philosophical concepts, such as the use of terms like "philosophia" and "societas" in relation to music. The text is written in Greek and Latin, with a mix of modern and classical references. The page is discussing the succession of voices or instruments in music, and mentions the importance of understanding the historical context of musical notation and theory.
extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II. ii. 792. Comp. Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Philol. vol. ciii. 1871, p. 135 ff.; iv.(vii). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (828). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle’s advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Socrates. Comp. Zeller’s Plato p. 483 f. Susem. (187)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Hermann The historical elements of Plato’s ideal of a state, in Gesam. Abhandl. vii. 140; “Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece: he has but applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination.” It is at least obvious that the Spartan αγωνι is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote iii. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan Ancient Society p. 417 conjectures that the system of relations propounded in Rep. v 401 b, Tim. 18 c, δ was derived from “traditions not known to us”: and Curtius (History of Greece 1 p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society Rep. iv were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):— two features of the scheme which bear in a high degree the stamp of originality. § 17 § 10 [οις] “actually in process of formation.” The plural is used as well as the singular ἐργο with or without the article, in prose or poetry.

§ 18 εἰς συστάσια] See n. (166). That Plato too intended this, was shown in n. (153) on § 1. From the expression here and in § 15 we might be led to believe that this was not the case. Comp. § 19 n. (179), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184): § 3 n. (187), § 5 n. (195). Susem. (168) φατρίας] The form φατρία (as in Aeschines ii § 147), not φατρία, is supported by the Corpus Insr. Att. ii. No. 509, 1. 1 with Köhler’s remark; Philippi Contributions to a history of the Athenian citizenship (Bertrige u. s. w. Berlin 1870) p. 177 n. 55, 62; Bürmann Three Studies in Attic Law in Jahrb. f. Philol. Suppl. ix. p. 615. At the same time φο is often written in the cursive mss. with a small hook to φ, so that φ and φο can hardly be distinguished with certainty from one another. In such a case therefore it may be advisable to depart from the one safe principle of following the oldest manuscript authority and to retain the only rational form φο even against the codices. Comp. § 3 § 6 n. (141). Susem. (169)

7 αὐτών Ald., αὐτὴν Thom., αὐτός Böcker, aū Bernays, ἀττά Jackson, αὐτίκα Welldon || 8 φατρίας M* P2-3 Qb T* Ald. Susem. 3-3, φατρίας P1 || 9 οὗτος after ἄλλο M* P1 || 10 καὶ νῦν τῶνν Triebër
"The argument in 8. 18-20 is not at all obvious..."
§ 20 23 ἐκείνοις—τόσο ἄλλως πολίταις, the citizens of the third class. πολλάς, the citizens of the third class. τά τοιαύτα] family life and separate possessions.

24 τίς ὁ πρῶτος τῆς κοινωνίας] What will be the means of uniting them? How will they associate as fellow-citizens with the two upper classes, who have such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ κτλ] This is the very reproach which Plato levels at the existing polities: ἐκάστα αὐτών πόλεις εἰσι πᾶμ-πολλαί, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πόλείς...δύν μὲν γὰρ κάν ὑπὸ τινὰς ἢ πολεία ἄλληλης, ἢ μὲν πεντήν, ἢ δὲ πλουσίων Κερ. IV 422 E; and VIII 551 D (Eaton). Συσεμ. (173).

26 οὗν φρονοῦσι] Κερ. III 415 D, E; IV 419 ἀλλ' ἀπεχώροι, φαίνει δὲ, ὡσπερ ἐπικουροὶ μοισθοῦν εἰς τὴν πόλιν φαινεῖται καθότατα οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρονοῦντες. Συσεμ. (174).

27 πολιτάς is predicate: "his citizens are the farmers and the artisans, &c." As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger and more generous conception of the purpose of political institutions than any we find elsewhere in Greece, even in Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the people as not members of the common-wealth, IV (VII). 9. 3. Plato not only treats them as integral parts of the state, but in a sense makes them the ultimate object of his solicitude. It is for them that he sacrifices the private pleasure of the guardians, and compels his philosophic rulers to descend into the cave. Both rulers and guardians are truly public servants, whose duty it is to protect and benefit their fellows, Rep. 403 B.


καὶ τούτοις] just as much to the citizens of Callipolis (το. δὲν δὲν ὑπάρχει τούτων ἀστασιάστων οὖν); for by l. 27 the farmers, artisans &c. who make up the third class, are citizens.


"Laws concerning city-police and market-police." Dionysius says that the Roman aediles (VI. 96) σχεδόν ἐνίκαιον ποιεῖτος κατὰ τὸ πλείον τοῦ παρ' Ἑλληνικὸν ἀγορανομικόν.

32 Take μόνον with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This objection proceeds from an acute apprehension that in outward aspect the ideal state would not greatly differ from an ordinary Greek city, in spite of its standing army, half Amazons, and its government of experienced military officers distinguished as savants, who (like the Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in India) are at another stage of development, and belong intellectually and morally to a wholly different world from the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίους...φέροντας] Hypo- precisely the connexion is to be understood was explained in n. (153) on § 8. Practically the result is much as Aristotle represents it, and this is certainly managed differently in his own pattern state.

Πλ. Κερ. v 464 C pará τῶν ἄλλων τρόφῳ λαμβάνονται μεθάν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινὴ πάντως ἀνάλ- σκευ, IV 416 D, E: τὸ δ' ἐπίτηδεα, δόθ' δέονται ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου σώφρων.
... 

35 πινεστίας Π' 3θ
36 καὶ διδάσκων ή καὶ ταῦταν Πινεστίας Π' 3θ
37 καὶ περισσέως Schneider, μενεικ ή καὶ ταῦταν Πινεστίας Π' 3θ
38 Scaliger ὑπεντείχε Πινεστίας Π' 3θ.

1264 b 3 καὶ... γυμνῆς. These words in Π' came before 2 ἄπειρον (go uncertain his in the margin): Syburg and BK bracket them; Schneider and Kornesius ungroup them to precede 2 τί οἰκομούσης, Kornes reading 1 et 2 for 1776. These lines discovered the lacuna.

καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ταξιμένουσι παρά τῶν ἄλλων

... 

33 χαλέπους κτλ) trebleaces and full of arrogence.

34 το τάρπ' ἐνώσις πινεστίας] See § 2 b. (180), SUSEM. (178)
35 δούλλας] Ridgeway Transactions p. 141 thinks the word means "the serf populations of states like Argos and Crete, called τέταρται at Argos, and ἀσκομάτως in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 24 where the word is used of the Helots, καὶ ἀσκομάτως ἐκεῖστιν. So also by Plato, Lecos 756 b of the Marianids.

§ 23 εἰτ ἀναγκαία κτλ] We are recalled to § 18; the question, ποι ὡς τόδε διαφέρειν, is the tenure of property amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether it is equally necessary here" = as in the case of the Guardians, to have communism "or not, has certainly not been determined, as matters stand," ταύτα συμφωνεῖν τοῖς αἰτίας. 37 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνωσίων] "No about the following points: what constitution and education and code of laws are to force in the case of the citizens at large."

40 διορθοῦντας πρὸς τὸ συμμετέχον. The construction is as in τῆς ἱλικίας. 44 εἰς τὸν θυρίσμαν] διακ. τ. 451 b. SUSEM. (451) τοιούτως τὸν τραπεζοῦν, ταῦτα should be by a parenthesis from the three animals that... In 180, it is in 181. 451 εἰκόνας τούτων... 1321 a 4, εἰκόνας τούτων. 47 ποιητὴν τῶν μεταφράσκων ὑπεντείχε...
9. *άξιωμα* = dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, *άξιωσις*, and that of others, *άξιομα*.

10. *θυμωδεδέοι...άνδρασί*] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φύλακες = ἐπίκουροι) from whom the first class (ἄρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (διαλεκτική). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical after life, in serving in higher commands, they are length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see *Rep.* vii 536 d ff., comp. n. (970) on iv(vii). 17. 15 and Zeller’s *Plato* p. 480 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on iii. 1 § 10 n. (440). 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), iv(vii). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. i to B. iv(viii).

As Eaton remarks, *θυμωδεδέοι* = ‘men of spirit’ is Plato’s own term (Rep. ii 375 b, 376 c) for his caste of warriors: comp. iii. 16 § 1 n. (641), iv(vii) 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). *Susem.* (182)

§ 26 ὅτι δὲ ἄναγκ. *κατά* “Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato’s myth does not answer its purpose, as it does not recognize the promotion of ἐπικούρων to be φύλακες.” *Jackson.*


ἐνδούς γν. directly they are born, at the moment of birth: ἐνδοῦ is time is not a good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the Republic: the objection of Adeimantus at the opening of B. iv that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419—421 c.

15. ἐτέ δὲ...17 *νομοθέτην* Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 b, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τούτῳ βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅτεν ἐν τῇ ημίν ἐνθὸς ἐστὶ διαφέρωντος εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἀλλ’ ἡ πόλις: but Aristotle has not attended to another passage v 465 d—466 b, where this thread is taken up (μεν δὲ γὰρ οὖν ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἐνθῷ ὧν ἐν τῷ ημίν ἐνθῷ ἐπέπλεξεν, ὅτι τοῦ φύλακας ἡ ἐυδαιμονία σείς ἐπίστροφον) and to the later discussion ix 680—692 b, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato’s ultimate decision is the very opposite: that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians can attain to perfect happiness (466 d θύγοντι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὧν οὖν ὁ Ὀλυμπιακός ἔσωκε, μακαριστέρον). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (179), § 24 (179): and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). 

Moreover in iv(viii). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εὐδαιμονία δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος.
II. G.

18. μὴ τάσην ἢ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Βοήσειν. τὸν τοῦτον μερῶν 21007 τοῖν ἐχθρῶν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν τὰ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀντειμεῖ τῷ ἄρτι ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρα, τὰ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδελφοῖς, ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο εὐδαιμόνευ, οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐ γε τεχνήται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν Εὐδαιμονίας.

ὁ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ᾧ ἡ Σωκράτης ἑφη, τοιαῦτα III τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τοῦτον οὐκ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἔσχεν εἴδον δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν νόμων ἔχει τοὺς διευθυνόμενον γράφεντα, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἑνώθη πολιτείας ἐπικέφασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον, καὶ γιὰ ο ἡ τὴν πολιτολαία περὶ ὧν πίπτον μικρῶν διορικεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης, πέρι τέ τινα ποιμένα, καὶ γιὰ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποιαν τινα δει γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάξιων: καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν τάξεων (διαμειτεῖ δὲ εἰς οὐλο μέρη ὑπ'
32 πλήθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (προπολεμοῦν μέρος) τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσι τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὡσπέρ δὲι κεκτησάθαι καὶ τοῦτος καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διάρκειν ὡς Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας οἴεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἔξωθεν λόγους πεπλήρωκε.

39 λόγοι after πεπλήρωκε Susem.1-2 following William’s translation: it is omitted by M. P. Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of eis compare IV(vii). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμούν] Plato’s word Rep. IV 423 ἀ.

τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 182 Susem. (186). Supply ἐστίν. “The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of these latter.” He quite correctly takes the ἄρχοντες to be a committee chosen out of the ἐπίκουροι: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coopted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the λογιστικὰν and the other two parts which make up τὸ ἔλεγχον: but in the state the wide distinction is between ἄρχοντες and ἐπίκουροι together, i.e. φύλακες in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and ὁ ἄλλος πολῖται on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 u. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at § 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer; à fortiori it prohibits the artisan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller Plato p. 470 f. Susem. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διάρκειν] Yet see Rep. v 468 ἀ.

αλλὰ τὰς μὲν κτλ] Consult the note following. Susem. (188)


39 τοῖς ἔξωθεν κτλ] But in the Republic Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 ἑ — 466 ὄ, of the regulation of property relations III 415 ἐ — 417 ὃ, of education II 376 ἑ — III 412 ὄ, VI 502 ἐ — VII 535 ἑ, X 595 ἁ — 608 ὄ, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 ἐ — 376 ἑ, III 412 ἐ — IV 445 ἑ, V 466 ἐ — VI 502 ἑ, VII 535 ἐ — V 541 ἑ (comp. II 376 ἑ — III 412 ὄ, VI 502 ἐ — VII 541 ἑ), of the women’s share in the duties of the guardians v 449 ἑ — 457 ὃ, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul X 608 ἐ — 621 ὃ nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the Republic? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? Susem. (189)

“In answering the question What is
the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? It is convenient to distinguish the subject of the conversation from the subject of the work. Thus in the case of the Republic, though the thesis on δικαίωσις δίκαιος is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the καλότες, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis on δικαίωσις δίκαιος which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in point of its originality, both for the reader and for Plato himself (περὶ τοῦ κεφαλαίου Ποιημάτων 17 c), special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way relevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce. [Jackson. § 4. 1565 α 1 πον δε νόμων κτλ]

40 τὸν λόγον untranslatable by William, Λτ. [τὸς λόγον] Seneca, &c. but it is uncertain and it is better to follow II, as I once think, or else with ΛΠΙ in our Kéros.

ally works it round to the other policy once more. Aristotle's conclusions are many states, no average policy. Cp. 1629 and χ. 8. 1. 4.

7 When he wrote the Republic Plato looked upon the pattern communities described as by no means impracticable. He declares that as humanity introduction might be expected without difficulty under a definite condition, which thought not indeed new, one of frequent occurrence, was yet by his means impossibly: v. 471 ff., 475 c, χ. 67 ff., any 596—602 c. In the Republic community knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the first and the existing constitutions. But in the Laws he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the Republic (though he still holds it to be the best in an impracticable ideal: v. 719 a, χ. 710 b. 847 b, 1 τ. 1053 c. v 875 a 6. 876 b. 4 c). For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitution, not without expressing the apprehension that if the states were made to call this into life much or it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual result would be only a pattern state of the third order: χ. 719 a 6. 821 b 5 a. But here was the possibility that was making it, though only by a limited extent, is made dependent on a number, very similar though not exactly the same as the condition which is indispensable for the realization of the state planned in the Republic; namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (opposed with an indication for philosophy), though of good dispositions and so to say raised, or furnished with a noble background, v. 720 a 8. 831 B. Cp. Zeller, Βροτ. 16 a, 710 b. 1626 a, 831 b. 835 a 50. Il. 395 a 5. 1331 a. 12. The ill. 411 a. The Greater sizes of the Laws is in Aristotle seems to have rightly supplanted this relation between the first or all
events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken op. c. 1. 201, that the state of the Laws is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the Laws to frame something intermediate to that of the Republic and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the Republic so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained." SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4. Ἐξό γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ]
But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle's ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the Republic as does that of the Laws? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (238); § 2 (279), § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (305); 11 § 10 (393): IV(vii). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), Introd. p. 22 n. (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the Laws: see on IV(vii). 17 § 1 n. (950), § 15 (970): V(viii). 4 §§ 7—9, nn. True, Plato's divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the Laws, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable

indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV[vii]). 10 §§ 9—11, see also nn. on IV. 5 § 1, 6 § 15: and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, § 5 nn. He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (Introd. 34, 56, IV(vii). 16 § 15 f. nn.); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the Republic (see on IV. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 140), had in the Laws abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: n. (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle's ideal state stands even nearer than that of the Laws to the state depicted in the Republic, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV[vii]. 16 §§ 1—10, nn. 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato's, and ethically regarded a modern view (Exc. I. to B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself. SUSEM. (192)

§ 5 ταυτά ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφισέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις καὶ γὰρ παρεδότων τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐργῶν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-
II. 6. 6]

1265 a 4—1265 a 13.

240.

χρηστοὺς ἥν, καὶ περὶ συσσίτιων ὀφαστῶν πλῆθὺν ἐν ταῖς εἰπον, φησὶν εἰς ὥσπερ τὸν ὀπλα κεκτημένοι, ταῦταν δὲ πεντακισίλιον.

τὸ μὲν οὖν περίπτων ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κορυφῶν καὶ τὸ κατοφοίνον καὶ [τὸ] ἐγγύτερον, καὶ λοις δὲ πάντα ἓσως χαλέπον, ἔπει καὶ τὸν εἰρημένον πλήθυν

9 καὶ before γνωρίω omitted by Π

is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: Lote vii. However a certain survival of the philosophic rules of the Republic is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called ‘nocturnal assembly.’ It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by computation, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavoureth thereby to give public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See Lote 1 632 C, xii 961 D ff., 961 A ff. Cp. n. (1770) on iv(vii), 17 § 15. Sus. (193)

καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων κτλ] Lote v 744 E, vii 806 D—807 D, viii 843 D, 846 D, xi 519 D ff. Sus. (194)

ἀναγκαίον—necessary for support, cp. III. 5. 3, iv(vii), 10. 7 where the antithesis is to τὰ εἰς εὐγνωμονία καὶ συγχρονία.

8 καὶ περὶ συσσίτιων ὀφαστῶν] Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, § 17 n. (168), § 24 n. (179), that even in the ideal state of the Republic Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. Sus. (195)

πλῆθὺν ἐν ταὐτῇ κτλ.] As a matter of fact mess common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the Republic, as was stated in n. (143) on 1 17; but in the changed sphere of the state the Lote he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to maintain it in the later scheme: vi 729 ff., vii 806 ff., cp. viii 843 ff. For this compare 1 12 § 9 n. 1 1011. 7 7 1 n. (1231 b). Sus. (190)

9 χαλέπων] Xotev, iv 751 A, where however this number is given as only the minimum, δὲ ἄλλων δήμων καὶ τὰν ἀνθρώπους. Sus. (197) Yet Grose (Plato, ii. p. 326 n, b.) observes that the understanding of Aristotle himself on this point is one material evidence that this was intended by Plato. Comp. Polit. 286 ff. for the possible number of the rulers.


6 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Now all the observers of Socrates display genuine acuteness, originality, research, yet are out of the common, extraordinary, cp. Metaph. 1. 2. 15; simple, supposing, subtle, in vi(vii), 4. 12 suppose many more λεξίς ἀπὸ ἀποκρίσεως. Both better taken of the time, if than with the same million of the style. (Thus Goughin Commentary on Polit. ii. 5 gives for αἰσχρόν τοσοῦτον παραλαλόματα, γνώμιον ἔργα.)

τοῦ Σωκράτους] Aristotle then presumably takes the Athenian stranger in the Lote to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The loss should neither be considered as personal, enlightened Athens. See Sus. (198) 1 211 n. (197). The of the Lote p. 948 b. Sus. (199) Yet all the same the stranger, τὸ o—e., apparently means especially for the propounded of "Socrates" in the Republic.

11 ἐκαλέσας δὲ τῶν] cp. ἀποκρίσεως to be right: "but to be right on all points may well be a hard task," προεῖπε τῷ καθορίσται. Hence however needless χαλέπων, too much to ask.

13 τὸν έξ ἀνθρώπων] The construction changes, he begins still Socrates were to follow.
14 δέσει τοὺς τοιούτους after 15 ἀπεράντων Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γρ′, περὶ M3 Π2 Βκ. and Π1 (1st hand) || τοιούτων Welldon || 18 μήδεν] μὴ M3 Π1, omitted by Qb || 19 τε omitted by Π1, τε τῆν by M4 || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before ei by Π1 and in the margin of Π4, adopted by Susem.1-2: a doubtful case, the words would then bear the sense of μάλιστα μὲν. Schmidt inserts them after προσθείναι (μὲν answered by δὲ 28)

14 Βαβυλωνίας [Cp. Π. 3. 5 n. (492).] Susem. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλῆθος] unlimited in size.

εἰς ἢς κτλ] But how does this calculation agree with that made about Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare nn. (306), (311). Even granting that the present is the more correct statement, how much smaller must we imagine the number of citizens to be in Aristotle's own ideal state according to the data given ΙV(vii). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser). Suppose these data reduce the number by one half, one half the same objection would still apply to Aristotle. On the other hand it is interesting to observe how near his penetrating intellect comes to a discovery of the fact, that the idle-ness which belonged as a right to a privileged minority of freeborn landholders was really the fundamental evil of the Hellenic state. Confined however to the circle of opinions current in his own age and nation, the philosopher turns back when on the very threshold of the truth: and follows Plato in adopting this fundamental evil as an inalienable primary good for his own model state. Susem. (201)

§ 7 17 δὲ μὲν οὖν...μηδὲν μὲντοι ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme on ‘favourable supposition, yet not so as to be impracticable."' Cp. Λαύς V 742 E : τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐτὸν ἀν δοξάτο οὕτως βουλήσας, sc. διὰ διακοσμών.

ὑπότιθεται κατ’ εὐθύνη] A reference to the expression used by Plato Λαύς IV 709 D εὐθύνει δύναται...καὶ νομοθετής, Kεριή. VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ἦμᾶς εὐκρᾶς εἰρηκότα, ἀλλὰ χαλέπτα μὲν, δυνατὰ δὲ πη, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἢ εύρητα; cp. VI 524 a—c ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἐλέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλέπτα δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατα γε. On his part however Aristotle also appropriates the expression: see the references in n. (128) on I § 1, esp. δὲ διὰ πολλὰ προσπότεται καθαύρωσι εὐδοκόμως, εἶναι μέντοι μήδεν τοιῶν ἀδύνατον ΙV(vii). 4 §§ 2 n. (750). Susem. (202)

18 λέγεται δ’ ὡς δὲ κτλ] This is not expressly to be found anywhere in the Λαύς, but Aristotle had a perfect right to infer it from IV 704—709 and V 747 D. Susem. (203)

20 ἐτὶ δὲ καλὸς κτλ] But this even Plato himself has by no means overlooked; see Λαύς V 737 C ὅγκος δὲ πλῆθος ἰκάνος νόμος ἄλλως ἀριθμὸν γέγοντο ἀν λεχθείση ἡ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν πλατείον κωμείων πόλεις (Schlosser). Aristotle brings the same objection against Phaleas, 7 § 14 ff. (Eaton). Compare n. (210) on 6 § 13. Susem. (204)

Cp. ΙV(vii). 2. 18 τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστιν ἐδείκτην, ἐξετε χιλιάδες γειτονίστα, τοίᾳ πρὸς πολούς ἀσκητηρίῳ. 21 εἰ δὲ κτλ] See Ταξιβ. f. Phil. xciii. 1866. p. 329. The sense is clear from the parenthesis: ‘if the state is to be independent and secure against aggression.’ Editors who retained the ms. πολίτικων extorted much the same sense out of it, explaining it to mean simply a "national" life, the life of a πόλις; or a "social" life, a life of activity, πρακτική. Thus Victorius: a moribus aliarum civitatum non penitus abhorrere quae fines etiam imperii proferre conantur. Shilleto
wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. Protag. 322 πολιτικήν τέχνην ἣν μέρος πολιτικοῦ, absolutely political and having therefore as one ingredient πολεμικὸν." The expression recurs IV(vii). 2 § 3, 3 ¶ 5, 6 (a probably spurious passage) and 6 § 7, whereas see Critical notes. 23 ἀ χρήσιμα κτλ.] Cp. vii(vii), c. 7 §§ 1—3 (Eaton). SUPER. (205) ¶ 8 24 εἰ δὲ τῆς μὴ τοιούτον κτλ] "But if any one refuse to approve of a life such as this" i.e. which is "for the state at large any more than for the individual." Whether war is the end of the state is a question debated iv(viii). 14 § 13 f., 15 §§ 1—6. Plate in the LXX 1 628 C, vii 803, viii 829 A, holds that it is not.

28 τὸ πλήθος really belongs to the dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it might not be better to define otherwise, by a clearer definition, the amount of property which one man may hold." It is characteristic of the writer to require analysis and precise definition, to σφάζοντας δικαιοσύνην. 29 τοσούτην γὰρ εἶναι φησι] Ixxo V 737 D γιὰ ὑπὸ μὲν εἰρήνη πάντων συνεχίσται δεν ἔκαθη τῆς πόλεως πολεμικὸ ὁ μὲν προσέχει. With what follows compare 7 § 44 (337 b). SUPER. (206) ¶ 31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this (latter) is too vague (cp. παν ἐπὶ Βάκχ. § 9) since men may live wretchedly and at the same time wretchedly I." literally, in hardships and distress.
σωφρόνως καὶ ἑλευθερίως (χωρίς γὰρ ἐκατέργῳ τῷ μὲν τῷ τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιτόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ’
35 εἰσὶν [ἐξει] ἀρεται περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐταί, οἷον οὐσία πρᾶσω [μὲν] ἡ ἀνδρείως χρήσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἑλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ τὰς ἐξεις αναγκαῖον εἶναι
§ 10 περὶ αὐτὴν ταύτας. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἱδάζοντα τὸ β' περὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἀφεὶ
40 ὃς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀδόρστον ὡς ἱκανὸς ἄν ὀμαλισθησομένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλήθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσῶν γενομένων,
§ 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν
νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὀπτοσονοῦν πλήθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαίρετων οὐσίων ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα-
5 ράζγυγας μηδὲν ἔχειν, εάν τε ἑλάττουσι οὐσὶ τὸ πλήθος εάν τε

33 ἐκείργῳ Koraes, ἐκάτερον Γ ΠΙ Αρ. Βκ. || τῷ τὸ ΠΠ Αρ. Βκ. || τῷ τῷ ΠΠ2 Αρ. Βκ. καὶ ΜΠ (1στ. ἱδαν.) || 34 τῷ τῷ ΠΠ2 Αρ. Βκ. καὶ τῷ τῷ ΠΠ2 ΟΒ Αρ. Αλδ. Βκ. || ἐπιπόνωσ] laboriosae vivere William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence τὴν Susem. 1-2 erroneously || 35 [ἐξεις] Susem. || ἀρεται] alperai written by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss upon ἐξεις χρῆσαι ἔξιν ΠΙ. Apparently William translated from the following order: αὐτάι αἱ ἐξεῖς εἰσίν ἀρεται περὶ τὴν ἔξιν τῆς οὐσίας, Ar. from the following: αὐταί οἱ ἀρεται εἰσίν ἔξεις περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by ΓΙΠ2 Βκ. || 37 ἔξεις Susem. 2, χρῆσεις Γ ΠΠ Αρ. Βκ., αἱρέσεις Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀναγκαίως αὐτάς εἰναι ταύτας, not happily || εἰναι after 38 αὐτήν ΠΠ2 Βκ. || 40 ἀνομαλίας θεσσαλομένην Madvig for ἀν ὀμαλισθησομένην
1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις]. Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷον τε ἣ δὲ τοῦτ’ οὐχ’ || 4 παρἀζγυγας Γ ΜΠ καὶ ΠΠ (1στ. ἱδαν.), and the scribe restored this after ΠΠ had emended it to παράζγυγας

33 χωρίς] if the two be separated.
34 τὸ ἐπιπόνωσ (ἡν’).
35 ἀρεται...αὐταί] These are the only virtues that have to do with the use of property. οἶνον = I mean.
§ 10 38 ἱδάζοντα] Lasso v 7.40 b—
741. A. SUSEM. (207 b)
"Tis strange that while equalizing their properties he should not regulate the numbers of his citizens."
39 ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖναι καλ’] This too is very inexacty expressed. All that Plato in the Lasso intends, indeed all that he is able to effect, is to keep the number of citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly 5040 elder men, as many younger men, with twice that number of women. All beyond that number must, as he expressly prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the normal family: only when there is childlessness or death does it become necessary that there should be other children in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser). As it stands at present, the polemic does not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the means proposed by Plato to avoid an excess of the prescribed number to be impracticable or impossible to realize he should have proved his point, as he easily might have done. SUSEM. (208)
§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ’ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς = ἀκριβῆστερον: "whereas that requires to be fixed with a great deal more nicety in the supposed case than at present." Cp. 7 § 18 οὐκ ἔχων τι. 4 παρἀζγυγας] the cadets; like παρη-
2 πλείουσ. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ ὑπολάβει τιν ἀ μὲν ἄριθμοι τινῶς μὲν πλείουσ ως κανένας τότε ὑπολάβεται πρὸς τοῖς τύχης, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ συμβαίνῃ τελευτῶν τινας τῶν γεννήθηκτων, καὶ τῶν τῶν ἀλλών ἀτεκνίας. τὸ δὲ ἀφείσθαι, καθαρόν ἐστι τὰ ἐάν εἴναι πόλεσιν, πεῖνας ἀναγκαῖοι αἰτίων γενόμεθα τῶν πολέων, ὡς ἐν πενίᾳ στάσιν ἐμποίει καὶ κακοπαθείς. Θεοῦργος μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὁν ἀναπαθής τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τῷ πάθει, τῷ πάθει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεποντοῖ τοῖς κλήροις ποικίλης κατὰ μέρος 4 γεότε ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατοικίστατοι τοιαύτατοι ἐστιν ἄλλα μὲν τοῖς πῶς ἄν οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἡχεῖν, λειτουργοῦσαν ἀλλοπαίδαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περι τῶν ἀρχαίων.

11 ἄλλως γ vacp, πλείουσαν τρίτην ἱστ. Βκ. (καὶ ἄν τε μετέχειν) 12. 15 [ὁ μέρος 17 ὅπερ] Schmidt 14 καὶ κατὰ Βερνάκα. 15 τῶν τομῆς λαβών Σμήνουν ΙΔ. Βκ., ἄν τε ἤχουν τρίτην 17. 15 εἰς μᾶλλον ἰσίων ΙΙΙ. Βκ.

οροὶ ἥσσος, supernumeraries outside the traces, the elder brother being the yokehorse, ὄνομα ἥσσος.

§ 12 6 Take μᾶλλον with τὰς ὀδοι. 7 ἀφείς ἄριθμοι τινῶς] Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Exc. II 10 B. II. SUSEM. (209).

Grote III. 228—231: Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognize the common element in the positive and probabilistic checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, Laws v 740 c—e, cp. Grote III. p. 239 n. (g). Perhaps that Aristotle deprecates is the "laister fair", ἀφείσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δὲ ἀφείσθαι κτλ] Aristotelian? repeats this 7 § 5. SUSEM. (209 b)

11 δὲ πενία κτλ] See Laws v 744 d.; also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy Ἀρχ. VIII. 555 d—557 Α.

Φίλιππος ὁ Κορίνθιος] Nothing is known of any such ancient lawyer of Corinth. He is supposed to be the better known Phileon of Argos, about whom see VIII(y). 10. 6. Yet he is called a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar, Olympia, XIII. 20, τῶν μὲν ἀλοίπων, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ ἄγαθον Κορίνθιον εἶναι ἀρχίσατε καὶ στράβον. This is one of the serious difficulties in this chapter mentioned, Jansen, p. 23 n. 4. 14 (4). There is always the heroic remedy: see Critical Notes and M. Schmidt in J.G.C. F. Phil. Hist. 1892, p. 573.

16 εἰ δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] A decided ly unhistorical assumption, as may be seen in the note on § 10. Aristolete] repeats this objection against Phileon, 2 § 4, comp. n. (104) on § 7. SUSEM. (209).

14 17 ὅπερ] (vii) 10. 13. 11. 9, and end p. 14. 5, 6, 7, etc. The latter passage is one of what seems to be thinking. To prevent any inference in the further number of the citizens, Aristotle sanctions the promising of children. For instance, p. 45 n. 204, 214.)

15 ἀλλοπαίδαι κτλ] Jansen, 7 234 in the συνεργάζομαι for συνεργάζεσθαι, but closer than the word, ἄν, τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποκλίνει τοις, τὸν ἐναντίον κατά τὰς αὐτικὰς ἀντίκας τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τὰς κοινὰς συναρμολογομένας διαφέρειν κατά λόγον. As a matter of fact the objection of Aristotle is altogether mistaken. In the Laws Plato has done exactly what Aristotle has been required to do. The potential for all the citizens of the model state is the same, whatever the ground of which he appeals them to conform to the polis which having
are better fitted for the warp and which for the wool, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. SUSEM. (212)

It is the professed object of the 

Epi-

nomis to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle's silence respecting it: Zeller Plato p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

20 στημόνιον...κρόκης] Zeller Pla-

tonic Studies p. 107 took these terms in the Laws to refer to the appointment of magistrates and of the laws for them. But in Pl. Politicus 283 B, 309 B, the brave and energetic natures are the warp and the gentle and weaker natures the woof.

21 δεί] Taking up the preceding δεί of line 20.

§ 15 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes.

22 μέχρι πενταπλασίας] Here and 7 § 4, Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato's meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in Laws v 744 E (cf. vi 775 E ff.) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The recurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSEM. (213)

(213)

23 δια τί τούτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κτλ.] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state: see iv (vii). 10 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (214)

25 δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα] One homestead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: Laws v 745 E, vi 775 E ff., cp. viii 848. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar iv (vii). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. iv (vii), he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt's suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSEM. (215)

(215)

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two οἰκήσεις Laws 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, οἰκό-

πεδα, οἶκας: Aristotle recommends two κλῆροι, not two οἰκήσεις or regular establishments." (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-
27 ἔστω ἡ μεταβολή σκλήρω. Even supposing that, in contradistinction to him, Aristotle really intended to provide only one of the two estates with a dwelling-house, how can he have believed that to farm two estates in separate localities would thus be made easier than if they had dwellings upon them? Is it not clear that the opposite will hold good? Nay more, what ideas are we to form of two such detached properties, one near the town and one in the country, unless there are farm-buildings and a house upon the latter? If this be so, the above supposition is a priori impossible. Even Plato does not arrange that the country house shall be a regular establishment in the sense of being always inhabited, but the son who inherits succeeds to it as soon as he is grown up and married, and so sets up the second establishment there (Laws vi 775 ε. 6). In Aristotle’s best state such an appropriation of the second dwelling-house is certainly excluded, because there, where the heir marries, he succeeds his superannuated father as citizen and consequently as proprietor of both the family properties (see note and Ex. Addenda on in. VII. 16 § 10, 1335 a 32–34); but that is the sole point in which Aristotle diverges from Plato in this matter. To what purpose he would destine this second house can only be conjectured: it may be to lodge the superannuated father, perhaps with the lands belonging to it as a sort of retiring pension. In any case the inconsistency, as Aristotle’s text has come down to us, is unquestionable. 

Sokem. 16 διελθὼν χωρίς... separate homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις] The entire arrangement of the constitution tends neither to oligarchy nor to democracy but to an intermediate known as Polity. Plato’s citizens are the heavy armed men (Laws vi 775 ε. 4, ἑπίκεντρα ἐστί τῶν σύνταξιων ἅπαντα τῶν ἐν τῇ μητρίᾳ τῶν τῶν Αριστοτέλους τῶν τοπίων ταῦτα ἔχοντες καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἑλπίζουσιν τοὺς τοπίοις...). This is the criterion of a ‘Polity’.

28 τολιτταῖον] Compare VII. 1. 14 § 4 with the notes and references there given. Sokem. [216]

29 ὡς καυστατὴν έτῇ] as the most universally adopted he calls αὐτός τάς μάρτυρων τάς τοπίων τούτων τῆς τῶν ἐν τῇ μητρίᾳ τοίνυν τῶν τῶν Αριστοτέλους τῶν τοπίων ταῦτα ἔχοντες καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἑλπίζουσιν τοὺς τοπίοις...). This is the criterion of a ‘Polity’.

31 πρῶτην] ἀνίκητον, ἀνόητον. See 3 αὐτός τάς μάρτυρων. Comp. 6, 1, 32.

32 Plato’s arrangement ἢ ἡ Τῆς implies this.

33 ἀριστεραποτεύτης] i.e. a constitution which, like the Sparta, has the character of an Aristocracy in a greater extent than Polity. The term was at first explained: true Aristocracy coincides with Aristotle’s best constitution, but to a transferred and aggregated sense this name is given by such constitutions as combine an aristocratic with an oligarchical and democratic element, like Carthage, or only with democratic elements, like Sparta (the e. 1335 a 34–35); Further consult Athenaeus i. 10 B. On the and the notes to VII. 10 § 3 (1139), § 1 (1142). Further consult Athenaeus i. 10 B. On the and the notes to VII. 10 § 3 (1139), § 1 (1142). Further consult Athenaeus i. 10 B. On the and the notes to VII. 10 § 3 (1139), § 1 (1142). See also § 3 (1139), § 1 (1142).
mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to tyrannis, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, \textit{Laws} XII 962 E, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice: \textit{οἱ δὲ σοφοί...} and others) to \textit{τὰ τῶν εὐπατρῶν τετυμημένων...}
\textit{δὲ τὰ λαῖα αὐτοῖς δὲ βλέπειν; presumably his predecessors were to some extent the same who are here noticed. Compare further Excur-

\textit{sus I to Bk. III. Susem. (219)}

\textit{Isocrates Lacedaemonios μάλιστα δημο-
kratouμενοι τυχάνως dicit Arcopag. 61 (Spengel).}

\textit{§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ} \textit{Laws} III 693 D f. 

\textit{Isocrates Lacedaemonios μάλιστα δημο-
kratouμενοι τυχάνως dicit Arcopag. 61 (Spengel).}
pronounced democracy and republic to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls Oligarchy and republic the two worst forms of government, see on vii(iv). 11 § 21 n. (1305): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the Laws it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with 

\[ \text{republic: } \text{III } 661 \text{ b} 11 - 701 \text{ E}, \text{ IV } 710 \text{ E}, \text{ 712 } \text{ e} 1 \text{ f. ; kingdom or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the Laws, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and republic. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if it were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the Laws a combination of oligarchic with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constitutions of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (σεξέρεια): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 8 (19), § 14 (312), § 21 (259); Sussemlfl Plut Phal. ii. 624 -631, Translation of the Laws p. 98o; also Zeller Plato p. 635 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this the state of the Laws without a certain monarchical head; far in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (Studien 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remarks (§ 7, 1, 209): taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us." The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the Laws, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 ·μακάρες, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them;* in the sense in which Aristotle himself (§ 14) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy. § 17, and the head of each of the 10 •μακάρες, though there were twice of them, and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken morally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the σχεδίασις, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. Aristotle (229).

4 βλητιον ον κτλ.] That is, in the particular case here given [666 a 132], they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy, or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and sceptics of the Lecceanonian constitution proposed in § 17 are doubtless intended. If it were true (166 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one consisting

* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible to a central assembly, and all the councillors which he has attached to the assembly to, is general.
pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made: for any three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than these two. Susem. (222)

\[ \gamma \gamma \alpha \rho \varepsilon \\pi \lambda e \iota \omega n \ \kappa \tau \lambda \cdot \] 'This statement made thus universally is not in keeping with the philosopher's thought. He does not blame Plato for not combining elements enough, but because he would construct a polity out of the two corrupt elements' (Riese). On Aristotle's own principles a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, must be better than one of oligarchy, democracy, and τυραννίς. As was shown in the last note, the preceding sentence, rightly understood, is a simple deduction from what has been laid down above, and needs no additional reason, least of all one which erroneously extends it beyond the limits of this right interpretation and lays it down as universally true. The chapter contains difficulties enough, but this is beyond the limits of all that we dare attribute to Aristotle himself: surely this illogical generalization is interpolated. We shall however be obliged to go some way further than this, I think. For even one who, like myself, either rejects or mistrusts Schmidt's other atheeses in this chapter will nevertheless be unable to deny that the entire passages §§ 16—18, 1265 b 29 el μεν...1266 a δ ἰδιωκρατικά, and § 22, 1266 a 22 ὡς...25 σκέψεις, do most violently interrupt the connexion and leave the impression that they are non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is strengthened by the strange statements noticed in nn. (219, 220). Susem. (222)

\[ \varepsilon \chi ω ν τα \ . \] & en tois νόμοις πολιτεία μοναρχικών οὐδέν. See n. (220).

7 ἐγκλινεῖν = to betray a tendency towards, as in viii(v). 7. 7.

§ 19 § τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἰρέτων κλη-ρωτοῖς] "For selection by lot from a body elected previously by vote belongs to both." i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy]. This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (ἀγοραβῶμαι and ἀστυνόμοι), and of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίαι ἀδιόθεται): Laxos vi 755 B—E, 763 D—E. Susem. (223)


9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ] Laxos vi 764 A: ἐνω δὲ εἰσ ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ἔξολον ὅ βασιλεύωντος, ἐπάναγκες δὴ ἐστι τῷ τῆς διεθνοῦς καὶ πρῶτος τιμώματι, δέκα δραχμαῖς ἤμισων, ἐὰν μὴ παρὼν ἐξετάσθη ὅ τι ἔσολον, τρίτη δὲ τιμή- ματι καὶ τετάρτη μὲ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἄγιοις ἀφείσθω. Susem. (224)

10 θέρειν is suffragium ferre, to vote: to vote for certain candidates for office.

καὶ θέρειν ἄρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίαι ἀδιόθεται) Laxos vi 765 c, and of the council vi 756 B—E: but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20. Susem. (225)

11 τοὺς δὲ ἀφείσθαι] Not however at the election of ἀγοραβῶμοι and ἀστυνόμοι, Laxos 764 A: χειροτονηθὲν δὲ πᾶς πάντα...δὲ μὴ δέθων, ἐὰν εἰσαγεθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀστυνόμουσα. Susem. (226)

τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cr. τοῦτο δὲ μεμειται, 2 § 5.

12 καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους κτλ] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (νομοθέταις) no such regulation is found: Laxos vi 753 B, 766 A f.; nor for the supreme board of control (ἐκθέντοι) xi 945 E f.; nor again for the military officers (στρατηγοί, ὑπάρχοι, φίλαρχοι, ταξιαρχοί) 755 B ff. And as
regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a minority, namely the ἀστυπόλεμοι, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (ἄδραμοι) must be elected from the third or the second class.

SUSEM. (227)

13 τὰς μεγίστας ἡκτραχ. τίμημα is a property qualification, census. See Laws 744 b–e.

§ 20 14 τῆς τῆς ἑολῆς αἴρεσις

Thus described in Laws 756 b–e: 'The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (ἐρότεν μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἀπέτατα φέρειν ἐν ἀνάγγγεις, ἢ τρισάμισθαι τὸν μη πείθομεν τῇ δόξῃ ἡμών). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (τῇ δ' ὑποταλαί πέρειν ἐν τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ τοῦτο καθόπετο τῇ πρώτῃ); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (τῇ τρίτῃ δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων δέ ρεχρείς μὲν ἐκ τῶν βολὸμενων, ἐπανάγγες δὲ ἐναι τοῖς τῶν τριῶν τιμημάτων); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (τῇ τέταρτῃ δ' ὑποταλαί πέρειν ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων κατὰ τοῦτο καθόπετο τῇ πρώτῃ); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced first, by election, in the of each class and next, by sortition, to go from each class. The passage continued: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names ruled down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose on them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny; these are to form the council for the year.' (Dr Jowett's translation).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, Plato thi., 364 n. 9. (b) Stallman, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but Dr Jowett in the fifth day, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (150 + 150 + 150 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct: the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election: there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sealing in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (ἐπεξετῆς δ' ἐκ πλῆθους, τοιχον μὲν καταργημένων, ταυτάρατα δὲ ψηφίσας τῇ ἑκάτερῳ κατά τοῦτο καθόπετο τῇ πρώτῃ); the voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as the most by them selected from each class (ὑποταλαί). Plato appears to assume that more than that member will be nominated on each of the first four days.

ἀνεφόραμεν μὲν εἰκάς Fice are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally if we be like men from the second, and next from the third, now that it is not compulsory on all to vote.

17—2
but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and in (elected candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21 10 εἰτ ἐκ τῶν κτλ.] More accurately stated, there is first an election of 180 candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: secondly, a selection of one half of these, 90 from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. Vide supra. SUSEM. (228)

20 ἐσονται δῆ κτλ.] Thus those who belong to the highest classes and who are superior men will be a majority (of the voters); because through the absence of compulsion some citizens of the popular party will abstain from the election.

21 βελτίων] i.e. men who take a higher interest in political life. So far, then, even this oligarchical regulation contains an aristocratic element. SUSEM. (229)

§ 22 24 τῶν ὑστέρων...σκέψις] VI (IV). c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, 11. SUSEM. (230)

25 ἐπιβάλλη=devolves (upon us): see
30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as το τρόπον to be spurious and of late origin, but see Int. p. 33 n. 4 and Comm. nn. (213, 219) 31 αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ άνθρώπων αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν, τῶν δὲ τῶν καθεστηκημένων καὶ καθ’ ας πολιτεύονται τίνι εγγύτεροι, εὑρίσκεις γαρ οὕτω τὴν τηρεταί τούτων αμφοτέρων, οὑτε τῷ τῆς τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀλλος 35 κεκαυνότομης, οὑτε περὶ τὰ συστήματα τῶν γυναικῶν.

§ 2 ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχοντα μᾶλλον, δοκεὶ γαρ τισὶ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετάχθαι καλῶς περὶ γαρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι βασικά τὰς στασίας παρ’ 39 τας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τούτ’ εἰσήγη τε πρὸτον.

on 1. 13. 13 and reff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortyanin inscription lately found, οὕτως τῶν ἐπίβαλλαν, the next of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cp. λεκτος κατὰ τῶν ἐπιβαλλοντα λόγων De gen. ass. 1. 2. 1. 716 α 32: and Pol. VI (v. 4). 13 § 7 τῶν ἐπιβαλλαν.

26 τὸ ἐκ αἰρέσεως αἰρέσεως] it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.’ This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of νομοφύλακες. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control. SuMM. (291) 37 συντίκαι This apparently pertains something like the wire-pullers and caucus of our day. Comp. viii (v. 3). 9.

c. 7 Examination of the polity proposed by Phalæas. See Athens p. 145. § 1 31 For the antithesis comp. 1. 7. 5 πολιτεύοντας ἐς φιλοσόφων, 11. 11. 1 οὐκ ἐκκρίβνωσαν πράγμα τῶν πολιτείων ὡς ἀντιπαρών, ἀλλὰ διείστη καταδείχθην ἐπὶ τοῦ βίος: Pl. T. τ. 49 ε ἐς δὲ τῶν συ- φαστῶν γένος φιλοσοφία μὴ ἀνελθείν διὰ φιλοσοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτείας.

34 τούτων ἀρμ.] that of the Ῥωμαίων and that of the Λατίνων. 35 συστήματα τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with υ. (196): also 81 (193) on 6 § 2 and (116) on 1. 13. 9. SuMM. (231 b) 36 τῶν ἀναγκαίων] the necessary considerations of every day life as opposed to its luxuries or amenities: practical requirements | fanciful theories.

27 μέγιστον τετάχθαι] The sentence is inverted: with τετάχθαι θέλεται το περί τας φιλοσοφίας; the intensive clause so formed, τὰ πρό προστίκαι is subject of ἄριστον πρότον. ‘Some hold the right regulation of the tenure of property to be of the utmost importance. There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye Primitive Property, Face xvi—xxvii, esp. chaps. 140, 145 a. 235.

35 διὸ Φαλέας πρῶτος. From 2. 1 (comp. p. 142 a. 11) it is clear that Phalæas was younger than Hippandros. But if Phalæas is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato had published rules of his. This conjecture finds support at the apparent meagreness of his proposal, its lack of all finished conclusion as com
§ 3 ἡδικὸν γὰρ δεῖν ἵσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τούτῳ δὲ κατοικιζόμεναι μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπῶς φέτο ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ ηδικοκοιμομένας ἑργοδότερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' ἂν ὀμαλισθῆναι τοῖς προϊαῖς τοὺς μὲν πλούσιους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν.

§ 4. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος 6 φέτο, δεῖν ἐὰν, πλειόν δὲ τού πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλάχιστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔξουσιαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθάπερ εἰρήται καὶ πρότερον.

§ 5. δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ λαβώμενοι τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὁ λαὸς 10 θανεῖ νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάκτοντας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν εἶναι γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος τῶν τέκνων ἀρίθμος, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐγ γ νόμον λύσθαι, καὶ χω-

1266 b 2 δὲ ἡδικὴ ἡ, δὲ Π' II, δὲ Μ' Αρ. || 3 τὰς omitted by Μ' Π', [τὰς] Susem. 1 perhaps rightly || § [Π]Λάτων...8 πρότερον] ? Susem. The brackets are necessary if Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 ἐὰν omitted by Π', [ἴσα] Susem. 1, but see Dittenberger op. cit. p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Bender || 12 τὸν τε νόμον Bas., τὸν γενόμενον Μ' U 2

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. num. 255, 256 on 8 §§ 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phæas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artisans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böck Staatshaushaltung der Ath. I. p. 65 and Roscher Thukydides p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel Studien p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 390, and thence to Chalcedon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 27, Theopompos Frag. 65 in Athenaeus XII 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phæas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great hindrances to this hypothesis. Susem. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθὺς should be taken with the participle. 2 τάχιστα The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4. 6 ἐὰν = laisser faire. 8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 n. (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. Susem. (233)

§ 5 9 δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ κτλ] This remark was made before, 6 §§ 10—13, cp. n. (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. Susem. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρῃ exceed, rise above. 'If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.' 12 ἀνάγκη...Ἀνέσθαι] Schlösser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phæas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phæas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. Susem. (235)
Χαριλε — quite apart from the violation of the law, it is a defect that many citizens should decline from wealth to poverty. Comp. § 2, χαριλε ἢκτ. 13 φαλον κτλ] Comp. 6 § 13, n. and τρι(κι). 16 § 15, n. (οὐκ). SEEKEM. (236) 14 ἐργον to be taken as b 2 ἐργον-διστερον 'it is hard for such people not to encourage sedition.' In τρι. 15, 3 also ἔργον κτλ — it is improbable in the same way as μᾶλα 'with difficulty' comes to mean 'hardly ever.'

§§ 6, 7. The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognized (1) by Solon's legislation, (2) by laws which for a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Leuci which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Leuci, where the disuse of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy. Yet the size of properties needs regulation, if, when equalized, they are not to be over-large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Phileas at Thbes), τρι(κι). 7, 9 (θυρί). SEE KEEVER op. cit. pp. 161—165 Eng. trans., A. Lang Essay xiii, esp. p. 89; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom.' An early equal distribution (Maine's Village Communities p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early Lawgivers of Greece. Long after them Phileas, and Plato in

the Lawes, 744 b, desire a return to the old usage.

διότι μὲν... ὀμαλότης] At this point then Aristotle's own socialism begins to come out more clearly than before. See note on § 7 (16); § 16 (160a); § 6 (10—14 (206—211), and § 7 (134b). Further comp. n. (192a) and Isocrates, p. 33. SEEKEM. (236 b) 17 Like the law of Olymios prohibiting mortgage, τρι(κι). 4, 9, Solon's mortgage, or relief measure, restored mortgaged lands to their proprietors. τῆς...τοῦτοι χαριλετερον] τὸ πάντως ἀναιδεύτως ἀνθελθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. His graduated assessment must also have tended somewhat to equality. But in addition to this Schleimann, Antiquities p. 130 Eng. tr., and Curtius, Hist. i. 37 Eng. tr., represent Solon as enacting a special law, that there should be a maximum limit to the acquisition of landed property: Crete (Hist. i. 37) thinks no such inference borne out by the present passage. ταρ' ἄλλαν] It is not known where.

19 ἐν Δοκρέωι] Presumably the Ephespius Locrus, where Zaleucus was legislator, c. 13 § 6.

§ 7 21 καὶ τερ' Δικαια] Comp. τρι(κι). 4, 9 τοῦ γὰρ τερ' ἀνδρόν ἀνακλάζων ἐν πλήθω ἐνθαρρύνω κατώτερον κατατάσσων μὲν τοις πληθείς εἰτέκνηται τῶν πλείων ἐμεῖναι μετὰ τοῦτον κατάγων μετὰ τοῦτον κατάγων. But then there may be equality of possessions and
yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small.


28 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστόν] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; iv(vii). 5 § 1, with the notes: also vi(iv). 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in n. (207). Susem. (257 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phæleas must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessaries of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally, (c) for higher gratifications. Phæleas can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τούτο δ' οὐκ ἐστι κτάλ. Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (296) and Exc. II on Bk. ii p. 333. Susem. (238)


40 This opposition of οἱ χαρίλεντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in Níc. Eth. 1.5 §§ 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικῷ, in Pòl. vii(vi). 5. 10 with νοῦν ἔχοντες.

1267 a 1 εἶναι σε. αἱ κτήσεις. 2 Homer Íiad ix. 319. Susem. (239) The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.
§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in Ehei. 1. 13. 17 ἄκινητος δὲ τούτο ἀθάναται αὐτός ἀνθέοις ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἀναγκαίᾳ ἢ ἐν ὑποκρύπτῃ ἢ εἰς ἀδιάλυμον, where see Copes' note.

§ 12 8 τοῦτο ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίαν ἐπιθυμίαν. Ποὺς ὁ ποιεῖται ἤ τὸ ποιήσεις, ἢ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἀναγκαίᾳ, ἢ ἐν ὑποκρύπτῃ, ἢ εἰς ἀδιάλυμον. One could hardly have supposed that this last was a fruitful source of crime.

The crime is greater because the excuse is less; it is not δία τὰ ἀνάγκαια. Hence the higher privilege given to those who punish it.

§ 14 19 δὲ δὲ κτλ. The same criticism as was passed on the Láus, 6 § 7. That the constitution must necessarily have reference to the maintenance of the military force follows directly from the assumption of the military régime which Plato and Aristotle make without reserve.


§ 15 24 πλῆθος sc. τῆς κτήσεως. ὅν = ὅστε τούτων; as ἐκ ἃς, § 9.

25 οἱ πληθυσμοὶ = οἱ πελάτες, Rhet. 1. 5. 17 where see Cope’s note.

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less. 'The example may be filled up thus, ἀλλ' οὕτως πολεμεῖν λειτουργεῖν ἢ χαρὰ ἄχρον διήγεται τὸ χωρίον, λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτο τῆς διαπάνης ἐδέξας γὰρ ὅτι τούτον λαβὼν ἐκκλησίας ἢδον τὸν Ἀρτανία ταύτα δ' εἰ- πὼν ἐπίσκεψεν τὸν Ἀυτοφραδατήν σύνυνοι γενομένου πανσά-

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τὰς οὐσίας ἵσας εἶναι τῶν πολίτας πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (II)
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγας οὐδὲν ὡς εἴπειν, καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ

40 χαριντες ἀγανακτοί εἰς ἄντι [ἄν] ὡς οὐκ ἰσων ὑποπτες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ
§ 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἑπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δὲ
1267 b ἡ ποινὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκα-
νον διώβολα μόνον, ὅταν δὲ ᾗ ἡ τούτῳ, ἢ πάτρων, ἢι δένοι-
ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἐὼς εἰς ἄπειρον ἑλθονσ. ἂπειρος γὰρ ἡ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσες, ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
§ 20 ξόσιν. τῶν οὐν τοιοῦτον ἁρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμά-
6 λιξειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον παρασκεύ-
ζειν ὡστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὡστε μὴ
δύνασθαι τούτῳ δὲ ἐστίν, ἂν ἢπτους τε ὁσί καὶ μὴ ἀδικώ-
§ 21 τα. || οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἱσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρηκέν.
περὶ το ἡγὸ τῆς γῆς κτήσιν ισαζεί μόνον, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δοῦλων

38 ἵσας after εἶναι Π2 Bk., perhaps Γ; possibly right || 40 ἂν Π2 Bk., omitted by Π1

1267 b 5 ἁρχή is corrupt: ἁρχη Scaliger, ἁρχη Schneider, ἁρχηγη M. Vermehren,
δλετη? Madvig probably right, <ἀπαλλαγῆς> or <ιατρελας> ἁρχη Schmidt; ἀρκει
Koraes, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls στασιάζοναι of § 10.
39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ] a 16 ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικράς ἀδικίας κτλ.
καὶ γὰρ ἂν κτλ] "For even then (ἐὰν ἰσαὶ αἱ κτήσεις, § 10) the higher classes
would be discontented, as they lay claim
to something more than an equal share,
and hence are often found aggressive and
factions."
40 οὐκ ἰσων] ἀλλα πλεῖονος: on the
the ground that they desire something more
than an equal share, something propor-
tionately greater. Comp. ΙΙΙ. 13. 13 and
Thuc. VIII. 89. 4 πάντες γὰρ αὐτημέρων
δειοῦσιν ὡς ὁποια ἱσαί άλλα καὶ πολὸ πρό-
tος αὐτὸς ἱκανος εἶναι. In Thuc. I. 132
§ 2 μὴ ἰσοὶ superior.
§ 19 1267 b 2 διώβολα] This refers
to the so-called θεωρίκον, a grant of pub-
lic money to provide for shows or public
amusements introduced at Athens after
Pericles' time. In the first instance at
those festivals only which at play were
exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price
of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was
paid from the state-chest to the lessee of
the theatre for every citizen present.
(Every one who went to the theatre re-
ceived a counter which he gave up on
going in; the lessee collected from the
state the two obols for every counter; but
he had to pay a rent out of his receipts
and to keep the theatre in repair. See
Benndorf Beiträge in Zeitschrift f. d. öst.
Gymn. xxvi. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subse-
quently the poorer citizens received the
like dole for all the other festivals, and
these outings swallowed up no small
part of the revenues. See Böckh Public
Econ. of Athens p. 217 Eng. tr., Schö-
tr. An Attic obol = 1 3d. of our money,
a little more than five farthings, or 11
German Pfennige; Hultsch Greek and
Roman Metrology p. 172. Susem. (245)
4 ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ] Comp.
a 5 ὡς χαίρως καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν
§ 20 ὡς τοὺς μὲν...πλεονεκτεῖν.
Substantially the same remedy as in § 12
τρίτων δὲ εἰ τίνες...ἀκος.
§ 21 The argument from inconsis-
tency is pressed from opposite sides here
and in § 15. Phaeas must have meant
to include personal property, § 3.
10 ἐστί δὲ καὶ δοῦλων κτλ] Comp.
Rhet. I. 5. 7 πλαύτον δὲ μερή νομίζομεν μα-
τος πλῆθος, γῆς χωρίων κτήσεα, ἐτί δὲ
ἐπιπλων κτήσεα καὶ βωσκημάτων καὶ
ἀν γραφίδων, where Cope explains ἐπι-
πλα as "moveables" opposed to fixtures,
such as houses and land. Hence furni-
ture, even if of bronze, Xen. Oecon. ix. 6,
Thuc. Iii. 68.
269

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι = public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημοσιον = λατρεία): also καταγωγή and others, Plato Gorg. 455 b with Dr Thompson's note, Polit. civ. 259 a.


§ 23 17 ἐν Ἠπποδάμῳ κτλ. "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phales could catch the thought that the handicrafts throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, that only the artisans who worked for the community were to be public slaves": Esch. Staatst. 1. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnos. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τοις τά καΰδι εργαζόμενοι to mean 'those who do common work for the whole community'; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas' proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2 = 395/4 was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. "Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnos allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνοι καὶ παρακάτω νόμος ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοντα παρακλήτῳ τῇ Βελοπόντῃ: VI. II. 111. 16" (J. G. Schroeder). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnos see further III. 16 § 1. VIII (Ⅵ). 10. 4; 7 sq. SUSEM. (249)

Bernays renders: 'But if (this proposal is to be tried), state slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnos and at Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens.'

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 304 f.

1 22 Ἠπποδάμος. See Exon. II 10 B. 11 344 f. Also K. F. Horsman De Hippodamos Miletus (Marburg 1910). SUSEM. (249)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hellenbrand pp. 56-51, Oudem L. 213-218, Henkel 181 f. 165. See also

23 περεά (not παρεά as Susem. gave) P2-3.4 Qb Tb (? Ub) || 26 κόμπος] κόσωμο

πολυτελείς Π. Ar. Bk. Bernays and yp. p. in the margin, καλλιτευκτικό Bender, κόσωμ Ridgeway, κοσμήσει Welldon || τότε omitted by Tb Sepulveda’s codices Bender Ridgeway Welldon, etn’ Bernays || 28 λόγος P2-3 T, απουδάω Wb L Ar. Ald. || 32 μें omitted by M Qb || 33 τα L and Ub (corr.), τό M Π2.3-3.4 Qb Tb Ald. and Ub (1st hand) || <καί> την Schmidt

23 κατέτευμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar Pyth. 5. 84 εὐθύτομον κατέθεη...σκυρωταν ὄδον.

25 ζήν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

The following words εὐθύτομον must be taken with πλῆθοι according to the reading of Π1 adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσωμ, the reading of Π2 (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. Supp. 246 for κοσσωμ, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλιτευκτικό or κοσμησει, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

τριχών τι πληθεί καὶ κόμπος] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hesippos, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, was on this account nicknamed Κραβθιδος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μην φθειρεθ' ήμιν κωμάδι, Aristoph. Knights 580. See Becker Charicles II. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (251) 26 εὐτελον] of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγος] a man of learning, as in IV(71), 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωρολόγος.

§ 2 30 την πολιν] Oncken 1. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle’s criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 διήρει δ’ εἰς τρία μέρη κτλ.] So too Aristotle IV (717). cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on 11. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)
χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἵεράν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δ’ ἱδίαν θεῶν. (V)
35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱερὰν, ἅφ’ ὑπ’
δ’ οἱ προτοπολεοῦντες βιωσοῦντι, κυρινῇ, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν
4 ἱδίαν. φητο δ’ εἰδή καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τριά μόνον, περὶ
δ’ ἄν γὰρ ἂν δίκαι καὶ νόμον, τριὰ ταῦτ’ εἶναι τῶν ἄριστον,
ὑπὲρ βλάπτην θάνατον: ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν
40 ὁ κύριον, εἰ δ’ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καθὸς κεκρí-
σαν δοκοῦσας δίκας· τούτῳ δὲ κατεσκευάζει ἐκ τοῦ ἡμώ
ροτῶν αἱρετῶν. τάς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστήριοις οὐδὲν
ψηφοφορίας φητο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκατον πε-
ναίκοιν, ἐν φ’ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικαζό τιπλῶς [τὴν δίκην]. εἰ

35 ἵεράν Πα ὄμηρα Ι.α., καὶ P3 (1st hand, emended by corr.) 37 δὲ καὶ εἰδή: Γ
apparently, possibly right 40 δὲν Π3

1268 a 2 φητο omitted by Wb; 3 α严格按照 the margin 3 emended
διδάχθη P1ă and 1st hand of P3 (emended by corr.) τῷ δίκην omitted by Π1

35 ἁπ’ ἄν δ’ κτλ!] Here there is just a
term of Plato’s ideal state, when we
consider that the soldiers answer to
the second order, and the artisans and far-
ers together to the third order of citi-
zens in the Republic. However even when
viewed in this light the differences be-
tween the two schemes are as great as the
resemblances. But the state proposed in
the Laws may be described as hardly
anything more than an improved working
out of Phaleas’ ideal. Comp. L. Stein
ep. c. p. 163 f. Sussem. (205)

§ 4 37 φητο κτλ| See Exc. II. to
B. 11 p. 333 f. Sussem. (205 b)

ἔφαμ and βλάπτην answer to crimes
against the person and against property.
Not necessarily however; for ἔφαμ implies
insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings
or honour, whether accompanied by vio-
est or not. Whereas βλάπτην implies
loss or damage sustained, whether to per-
on or property. See Klot. i. 12. 26, II.
2. 5 with Cope’s excellent comments.

39 ἐνομοθέται δι…] This idea of a
court of appeal is further evidence that
Hippodamus had a fine sense for juris-
prudence. It is appropriated by Plato
also Læstv vi 767 c—84. XII 926 c f.
(Oncken). Cρ. also Exc. II. Sussem. (206)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.
§ 5 1268 a 4 οὗ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In
the Athenian courts the voting was secret:
each jurymen (διασέργη) received two
ballots, one for condemnation, the other
for acquittal; and there were two votes,
one of copper, into which the ballots con-
taining the verdict was thrown, the other
of wood, into which the other, unused
ballots were thrown. The ballots for
voting were either differently coloured
stones or small metal balls, or even dif-
ferently coloured beads or shells. At
what time the one or other of these were
used is not known. Stones were cer-
tainly the most common; a black stone
served for condemnation, a white one for
acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a
hole in it served for the former purpose,
a whole one served for the latter purpose.
Equality of votes was counted as acquittal.
(Meier and Schönmann Aristoteles Pro-
em 770 ff.) Sussem. (257).

Aristotle himself in his authority for the
voting in Athenae see Frag. 1547 a 5—41 of the Berlin ed.

3 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκατον κτλ.] Nearly
the same arrangement was actually intro-
duced amongst the Romans: a fact which
shows how clearly this proposal testifies
to a legal mind of great originality. At
Rome the voting was by tablets in the
manner here proposed, leaving it to the
indiges to affirm not simply condemnation
(Ι) or acquittal (Α), but also a ver-
dict of “not proven” (Νο, now Squeat). That
Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is in yet quite un-
able to realise to himself the proper mean-
ing of the proposal is a further proof of
its originality. (L. Stein.) Comp. a.
§ 6 ήτωσ ούτως κτλ.] "just as if this law had not been made before elsewhere."

So K. F. Hermann De Hippodamo p. 44, who is defended by Dittenberger (Gött. gel. Anthrop. 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel. It is true that ωσ with the participle might equally mean (1) because in fact, as in Pl. Phædr. 245 ε ὡσ ταύτη σύνθες φύσεως, or (2) because as he thought (ὡσ οὐκ ἀνάλογον 5 § 6); but νύν is not decisive in favour of (1), see n. (259).

οὕτω, not μητῶ; cp. Lyssias 14 § 10 ἐτάλισαν αναβίαται, ὡσ οὐκ ἐξεσάμοινον τῇ πόλει δικήν λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ὡστε τοῦ ἰδίου ἄλλ' οὐ τῆς ἡμέρας αὐτοῦ μέλον: Xen. Cyr. V. 1, 13 ὡσ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κλέπτειν, άτια τὸν κλέπτωντα. The clause is virtually oblique, and the negative is reproduced unchanged.

10 ἡταί δι... νύν] Here as often νῦν = as things are, "under the existing system," not simply = now, as Spengel explains it. Unless one follows Spengel in an untenable alteration of the text, the drift of the passage can only be a censure upon Hippodamos, which is even in this form quite intelligible, though it would certainly have been more clearly expressed as follows: "whereas a law like this was already at the time in force at Athens."

We cannot however prove the date of this Athenian regulation (on which Wilmovitz Aus Kyldathen p. 26 may also be consulted), but the present passage would seem to make it earlier than the treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite possible that Aristotle's censure is unfair; for who is to inform us that in its author's intention the scheme of Hippodamos was restricted to new proposals, never before realized? Cp. Hermann op. c. 43 f. SUSEM. (259) Cp. for νῦν § 5, c. 1 § 3, 3 § 6, 5 § 11, 17, 6 § 11 οὖς ὑμίως τότε (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ νῦν (as things actually are), Kret. 1. 1 § 4, 1354 α 19 καθάπερ ἐν ἑνίας γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων, § 7 τοῖς δ' ἀρχοντας κτλ.] All officials (perhaps even the priests) were consequently to be appointed by popular election and not by lot; comp. Excursus II p. 322. SUSEM. (260) 12 ἀγιον...πόλεως] It would seem that Hippodamos did not state whether all three classes were eligible (Oncken). See however n. (262). SUSEM. (261) 13 τοῖς δ' αἰρέθεντας] the magistrates elected to have the charge of state matters and of the affairs of foreigners and minors in the city.
8 διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἴ τε γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας τάστικας, οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὀπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνίται ούτε τίνες οὔτε τὸ ὀπλα, ὡστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δουλοί τῶν τὰ ὀπλα κεκτημένων.

9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὀπλα ἔχοντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πολιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ως εἰσεῖν, μη μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οὖν τε φιλικῶς (ἐχεῖν τὸ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὀπλα γε κεκτημένους ἀμφότερον τῶν μερῶν: τούτο δ' οὖ ῥᾴδιον

10 μὴ πολλοὺς ὄντας' εἰ δὲ τούτ' ἐσται, τί δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίοις εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἄρχοντων καταστάσεως; ἐτε οἱ γεωργοὶ τὸ χρήσιμον τῇ πόλει: τεχνίται μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πάσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλεις τεχνιώτερόν καὶ δύναναι διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεισιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης: οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζονται μὲν τοῖς τὰ ὀπλα κεκτημένους τῆς τροφῆς εὐλόγοις ἢ ήσαν τί τῆς τοιούτου μέρος, νῦν δ' οἶδαι ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταῦτῃ οἶδα γεωρ- 11 γήσουσιν. ἐτε δὲ τὴν κοινὴν, ἢ' ἢ δὲ προπολεμοῦσις ἔσοι; ἡ ἐν τῷ τροφῆς, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ με- 17 οί omitted by Μ' Π', [cf] Susen. 1 25 καὶ omitted by Π' Ar. Ek. 26 γν omitted by Μ' Π'. [yr] Susen. 1 2 34 ἤπι] ἤπιοι Π'. 1 2 γεωργήσεων Ar. Morel 33, 314.
χιμον έτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης' εἰ (V)
δ' έτερος τινες ἐσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἱδία γεωργοῦντον καὶ τῶν
μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὐτό ἐσται τῷτο τῆς τόλεως, οὐδὲ-
§ 12 νός μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτριον τῆς πολιτείας' ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ
tis τούς αὐτοὺς θήσει τούς τε τὴν ἱδίαν καὶ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆ-
γεωργοῦντας, τὸ τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἐσται τῶν καρτῶν εὗ ἀν
έκαστος γεωργῆσει δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἐνεκέν ὦν εὐθὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κληρῶν αὐτοῦ τε τῆς τροφῆν
λήψοιται καὶ τοὺς μαχίμους παρέξουσιν; ταύτα δὴ πάντα πολ-
λην ἔχει ταραχήν.

οὐ καλῶς δ' οὖν' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως

§ 13

5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἄξιον διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς
γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν δικαστῶν διαίτηταν. τοῦτο γὰρ
ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείονιν εὐδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γὰρ
ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐντινών τούτων τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργεῖν Μ.Σ.Π1 || έτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Π Μ., a similar gloss τούτων
έτερον εἶναι p2 in the margin || 39 αὖ ὅπιν Π3 || τοῦτο after τῆς πόλεως Μ.Σ.Π1 ||
42 Spengel thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἄποτο, for which δυσπόριστον
seems to him to be required by the sense.

1268 b 1 γεωργῆσαι Π Βκ., ministrabit William, habeant ministrare Ar.,
doubtless on mere conjecture; hence erroneously ύσωργήσεις Vettori Susem.1-2 and others ||
δύο οἰκίας can hardly be sound, δύον οἰκίας Ar. Camerarius, <εἰς> δύο οἰκίας
Bernays, δύο [οἰκίας] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad),
<δίκης> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susem.2; there is some corruption || 5 τὸ κρίνειν
ἀξίου Π Βκ., ὁ κρίνειν ἁξίων Susem.1-4 wrongly from the translations of William and
Ar. || διαιροῦσα Π2-3 Qb Tb Ald. Βκ., διαιροῦσα Lc || δίκης Π1 Ar., κρίσεως Π2
Βκ. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γὰρ Ar., ζ' Γ Β Βκ. || 7 καὶ <μὴ>
πλεῖον; Koraes || 9 καὶ omitted by Π Μ6 || τοῦτο τῶν p1 Π2-3-4 Qb Tb Βκ.,
tούτων Wb Lc Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται κτλ] Comp. n. (201) on 6 § 6.
§ 12 42 τὸ τε πλῆθος ἄπορον κτλ] “the amount of produce will be
inadequate for the maintenance of two
establishments.” This again is a mere
assertion which ought to have been
proved. Susem. (265)

1268 b 1 γεωργῆσαι οἰκίας] See
Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend
the text as meaning to maintain two house-
holds by agriculture on the analogy of οἰ-
kίας οἰκεῖν.

§ 13 4. ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law
about passing sentence.

§ 15 4. τὸ κρίνειν ἁξίου κτλ] “the require-
ment that a verdict shall be returned
upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδι-
κάζει τὸ δὲ μὴ. § 5) when the charge in
the indictment is simple, whereby the
juror is turned into an arbitrator.” ἁξίου
is infinitive.

6 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] This is practic-
able in arbitration even (καὶ) where there
are several arbitrators, for they con-
fer with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλεῖον] At Athens a single
public arbitrator decided each case, but if
private arbitrators were chosen by the
parties to the dispute themselves, a body
of 3 or 4 might well have been more
common. Susem. (266)

§ 19 ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect
then the practice in the Greek courts of
justice was just the reverse of that in
ours. Susem. (267)
II. 8. 16]

1268 a 37—1268 b 23.

13 μὴν after Π and perhaps Γ 13 κρίνει Βκ. 7, κρίνει Π Π Αρ. Βκ. 1 15 δή] δέ Π 16 add] add Π Μ. and Π 1st hand, corrected in the margin 17 δ᾽ omitted by Π 17 γεγονασαν δικαιωσαι Σουσιμ. 3, perhaps rightly 21 ΔΛΛ...ματ omitted by Μ 24 δέ omitted by Π Μ. and Π 1st hand, added by corr. 4 [διά] Σουσιμ. 4, wrongly 13 γεγονασαν Μ 13

13 μὴν after Π and perhaps Γ 13 κρίνει Βκ. 7, κρίνει Π Π Αρ. Βκ. 1 15 δή] δέ Π 16 add] add Π Μ. and Π 1st hand, corrected in the margin 17 δ᾽ omitted by Π 17 γεγονασαν δικαιωσαι Σουσιμ. 3, perhaps rightly 21 ΔΛΛ...ματ omitted by Μ 24 δέ omitted by Π Μ. and Π 1st hand, added by corr. 4 [διά] Σουσιμ. 4, wrongly 13 γεγονασαν Μ 13

14 12 δικαιομενοι may be either litigant. If the participle is παραδίκη, it denotes the defendant; if μισθό, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

15 8 μὴν γάρ...15 τετταρας] "For he (the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the juror will decide for ten—or whatever the larger sum may be—this which is claimed by the former and the smaller sum which is awarded by the latter—while another (juror) will award five, and yet another, four." (Bernays). This seems slightly better than to understand παραδίκη, διακρισία, τετταρας, tetrachia of sums awarded by different jurymen (diecasts).

15 μεταμοιρισται will estimate damages according to a graduated scale. Comp. Demosth. adv. Lep. 494, 4 ή δει ταύτα μεταμοιρισθαι τά των δασμάτων. 16 16 τις οὖν ὁ τρόπος In what way then are the votes to be counted, i.e. sorted? διαλογία—collecting and arranging: disputatio, Pro Pomone 14.

19 οὖν τὰ πάντα...δικαίωσεν] "If the indictment has been framed (not constitutionally but) absolutely with justice." (It has also been proposed to put a colon before δικαίωσεν: "and justly too; for etc."). If the suit be for 10 minae, sequellum means that the defendant does not owe 10 minae, it says nothing about bailiwick for a smaller sum.

21 ηδή when we turn to the judge who condemns while not believing the twenty minae to be owing, it is more true that he commits perjury. Comp. vit. (V). 8, 6 ἀρχὴ δικαστάν Ἰπποδίκου (C). 13—15 1 L. Stes. 15, 13 ἐκεῖνος rights calls this whole criticism a misapprehension. If the judges, or jurors, are forbidden to converse with one another, it is certainly impossible for them to find μισθόν in context. It is more even possible for all to reach the same result without consultation, and still more likely that only to this way can some one of them clear his conscience. And if, after the fact of a peremptory indecisiveness has been established, the jurors cannot agree upon the amount, then a conditional verdict is the only one possible, and in that case certainly there can be no real decision except by way of compromise. Thus this objection makes for Hippodamia, raises it against him (Ovidius). And lastly how is it possible that the "majority of legislatures" were right in excluding consultation amongst the jurors? At the rate our modern legislation just as of old has pronounced them to be wrong. Cf. also in 12 (35) on ὁ δικαίωσεν. [Brock]

16 13 οὖν ἐφέστη] the proposed
Γαρ συνοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεως, ἂν τίχρα, πολιτείας. ἔντιπτε δ’ εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἐτέραν ἀπορούσι
γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ
§ 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν τις ἄλλους βελτίων. διότερ
οὐ γὰρ τῶν ταχὺ συνχωρεῖν, εἰπέρ μὴ συμφέρει
§ 18 εἰς ἄλλην περί αὐτοῦ διαστελλασθαι βελτίων. ἔχει γάρ,
ἄστερ εἰπομεν, ἀποροιαν, καὶ δοξόειν ἂν βελτίων είναι τὸ
στίχον. ἔτι γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τούτο συνενήσχεον;
§ 19 τὴν ἀναγκαίαν όμοιος ἔχειν. σμηοεῖν δ’ ἂν γεγονέναι φαίνει
τις ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν τοὺς γάρ ἄρχαιον νόμους λιναν

27 τὸ <μή> Ὡν Λ' Ald. || 30 γάρ Spengeλ, δ’ Π Βk. || 32 μικρὰ Π²
Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious
to the ear,—a curious confusion of me-
taphors.

24 ἔχει γάρ κτλ] for it leads to false
accusation and possibly to changes in the
constitution (see n. on line 30 below).
Informers would always claim to reveal
facts highly useful to the state, as did the
Roman delators. ἢ τίχρα = should it so
happen; and so εἴ τίχρα, τυγχάνον, εἴ τίχρα.

25 ἄλλο πρόβλημα[—another question.
ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες] Can this have been
written in works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16—25 Is it expedient to alter
the laws of a country in order to introduce
improvements?

With this interesting discussion com-
pare Rhet. 1. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengeλ); also
Plato Polit. 294 Α—302.

28 τοὺς πατρίους νόμους] 'The an-
cestral laws' would include much that is
unwritten: customs, institutions, those
traditional practices of the society which
serve as a basis (οὐν ἐφεσάμετα) to the
written code, Plato Laws 111 680 Δ οὐδὲ
γάρ γράμματο ἔστι πῶ, ἄλλο εἴθει καὶ τῶν
λεγόμενος πατρίους νόμους ἐποίησεν τοῖς.
Compar. Laws VII 793 B—D; see n. (48)
on 1. 6, 1, and 11. 5 § 5, § 15.

§ 17 29. τὸ λεξιθεῖν = the proposal
of Hippodamos.

εἴτερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν] "in case it
turns out to be inexpedient": i.e. if on
the wider question we decide against
change.

30 ἔνδεχεται γάρ κτλ] "Some may
propose the repeal of the laws or the
constitution as a public benefit." When
thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμοι =
the code of positive law. The revolution
of the Four Hundred, it will be remem-
ered, was effected by the suspension, in
legal form, of the γράφη παράνομων, the
great safeguard against the subversion of
the Athenian constitution.

32 διαστελλασθαι= enter into detail.
It is used in Topics v. 3, 8, 131 b 15, 17,
as synonymous with διορίσθαι. Cp.
Pl. República 7 vii 535 b τοία δὴ διαστέλεις;

§ 18 33 βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖν] This
view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34 ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III.
15, 4, n. (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§
7, 8; IV(vii). 2 § 13 n. (726); 13 § 2
n. (872); 111. 6 § 7 n. (531). SUSEM.

(270)

36 μᾶν...37 πολιτικὴν] It is A-
ristotle's invariable practice to rank Politi-
cics with the "arts and faculties": e.g.
VI(iv). 1 §§ 1—3, Nic. Eth. 1. c. 1.

§§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of
inquiry. We could wish he had noted
down a few more of these antiquated
usages.
40 ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοῦς. ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τι γὰρ τι Ἐλ.,
§ 20 λήμνες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐσωνύμιον παρ' ἄλληλον, ὥστε τι
λοιπά τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔστι ποιοὶ νομίμοι, εὐθὺς πάμπας ἔστιν,
οὗν ἐν Κύμη περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμοι ἐστὶν, ἀν πλήθος
40 ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τι γὰρ Π.12, ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τι γὰρ Π.1, ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τι γὰρ Π.4, ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τι γὰρ Π.6, ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τίς γὰρ Π.7. Ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τίς γὰρ Π.8, Ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τίς γὰρ Π.9, Ἐσιδηροφορῶντο τίς γὰρ Π.10. Κορακος, ἐσιδηροφορῶν τις τῷς Σουσ.1 misced by William's version; see Dittenberger op. c. p. 1371
1369 a 1 κόμη Ι.Μ.'

41 τὰς γυναῖκας ἐσωινότο. The suitor purchased the daughter of her father by means of presents (κόμη): see Schollm. Greek Antiquities 1. 52 [Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider compares marriage by syncepho among the Romans. Sus. (270 b).

There is a valuable note on the κόμη or bride-price in the English translation of the Odyssey by Butcher and Lang. "The κόμη in Homer are invariably gifts made by the wooers to the father or kinsmen of the bride, that is, the bride-price, the δάνυμα of the dwellers on the Volga...The father of the bride was thus said δανυμάτωθα διόγατα (Od. 11. 53), to accept certain κόμη as the price for his daughter,—what is called 'coming to terms about the marriage' in Head xiii. 381 (δόρα...συναγεία...άμφη γάμφ.). As a rule the woman would go to the highest bidder, but in the case of a favoured wooer it seems to have been not unusual either to remit the price and give the bride ἀνάδεουν (cp. Agamemnon's offer to Achilles, II. ix. 141), or to return a portion of the κόμη after marriage (Od. 1. 178, 11. 119, 119), as is still the custom among the Karakas in New California." Homer also mentions gifts from the wooers to the bride, and μεσία, gifts from the bride's father to his daughter: but ἐφάρη, the later word for dowry, does not occur. Even in Findar θέρα is used in the sense of ἐφάρη: Pyth. 3. 94. (Eaton compares Tac. Germ. 18; but that is the 'Morninggale,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1369 a 1 οἶνον ἐν Κύμη. This forcibly recalls compurgation, the established legal usage in ancient times in England and amongst other Teutonic peoples. That the oath might be employed on behalf of the suitor is sufficiently attested, although cases where it is taken on behalf of the suitor are usually mentioned. The Greek custom is confirmed by the inscription of Goryles, column 11, lines 36–44. The law has prescribed certain fines, the price to be paid for the ransom of an accused person charged with adultery and in the power of his captors. But he may plead that he was (wrongfully) seized by force cp. [Demosth. c. Nicomach. 66 1067], to δία μοι ἐξαπατέσθαι ἡμᾶς μετέκριν. If so, the captor must support his charge by compurgators, whose number depends on the amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Five are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200 staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is a full citizen. (b) Two are necessary if the aggrieved husband is a ἀνέντρος, i.e. free but not a full citizen; while (γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf (οἰκον), the serf's lord (τέχνης) and one other compurgator must appear. The fine for (γ) is 5 sta. for (δ) 10 to 20 staters. The Creon text of the law reads thus: αἱ δὲ τετερατιβριδίας [i.e. τὸν ἐφάρη συναγείαν], ἀνέντρος τοις τετερατιβριδίαις [τοὺς τετερατιβριδίας] καὶ τὰς πλῆθος τετερατι βριδίας, ἀνέντρος τοῖς τετερατι βριδίαις [τοῖς τετερατιβριδίαις] ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐφάρη τοῦ τετερατι βριδίας, ἀνέντρος τοῖς τετερατι βριδίαις [τοῖς τετερατιβριδίαις]. And if he shall plead that (the captive) overmastered him, the captor shall swear— in the case of the 50 staters or more, himself with four others, each imprecating on himself to the case of a clasper man, himself with two others: in the case of a master-thief, his lord with one other—(an oath that he took him in adultery and overmastered him not. See Liddelmg on Diccu Hsot. and Goryles, pp. 101–107; and Mr H. J. Kolb. The seven Tables of Goryles in the


6 ὄμοιος Π1 Αρ. || 7 το omitted in Π2 || 8 εἶν Π Αρ. || 11 γραφεῖναι Π2 Βκ.

Late Quarterly Review 11. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of δολοφονοῦν.

§ 21 5 ἤτε γηγενεῖς ἥσαν! It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, 

§ 22 9 ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark Politicus 274 B f.; ἀκτὸν δὲ ἄθηθεν ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφθικοὶ γεγονότες διεηρτάζουσιν ἣν ἄθυμα (sc. τῶν θρησκῶν), καὶ ἦτο ἄθηθοι καὶ ἀθενοὶ κατὰ τῶν πρῶτων ἥσαν χρόνοι...ἐκ τῶν πάνω τῶν νόμων φαύλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἑατέον ἐνεπι ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων recurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3.

§ 23 10 "So, too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing." § 23 A sound argument, quite in Ben-tham's spirit.


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were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archemachos Fr. 1, from Atheneaeus VI. 264 A: "Bouwov tōn tēn 'Aρακαν κατοικησάντων oi μή ἀπέραντες εἰς τὴν Βουκικώνα, ἀλλὰ ἐμφυλιοφρήσαντες παρέδωκαν ἐαυτούς τοῖς Θετταλοῖς δουλεῖν καὶ ὀμολογίας, ἐφ' ωδὲ ἐξάζοιν ἀυτόν τοῦ τῆς χώρας, οὕτω ἀπεκτένων, ἀυτοὺ δὲ τῆς χώρας ἔργαζόμενος τας συντάξεις ὑποδοῦντος· οὐν οὖν ο ierr οι κατὰ τας ὁμολογίας καταμείναντες καὶ παραδόντες ἐαυτοῦ ἐκλήθησαν τότε μνεσάτα, νών δὲ πενεσάτα· and Theopompos Fr. 134 in Ath. VI. 265 B, C: "Δακεδαμίονα καὶ Θετταλοῖς θυμοσεῖσθαι κατασκευασάμενος τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ὀικουτών πρόσερχε τῆς χώρας, ἦ ἐκείνων νῦν ἔχοντοι, οὶ μὲν Ἀλήτων, Θετταλοῖς δὲ Περδαμίδων καὶ Μαγνητῶν καὶ προσγρηγοροῦντο τὸν κατα- δουλευθέντας οἱ μὲν εἰλωταὶ οἱ δὲ πενεσάτα· On the similar relation between the Mariandynians and the people of Heraclia see n. (777) on IV(vii). 6 § 8. SUSEM. (280) Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mariandynians Latos VI 776 C, D.

38 ἑφεδρεύοντες] always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 ἄδ ἄρὰ το ἀνθρο Δακεδαμίονος πρὸς τὸν εἰλωτὰς τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθεστήκει.
II. 9. 5] 1269 a 31—1269 b 13. 281

§ 3 tois átvxhμαι διατελοῦσιν: perί δε τούς Κρήτας σωπθείν
40 πτω τοιούτον συμβεβήκεν. αἰτίον δ’ ἴσως τό τις γεγονόσαι
[1269 b πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἄλλας, μηδεμίαν εἶναι στρα-
μαχον τοῖς αφισταμένοις διό τι μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐτάς εἰς
κεκτημέναις περιοχαίς, τοίς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γεγονόσαι ἐχθροί
πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργείωι καὶ Μεσσηνίαι καὶ Ἀρκεδιαί: η ἐπεί καὶ
toῖς Θεσσαλοίς κατ’ ἀρχὰς αφιστάντο διά τι τὸ πολέμειν ἐτείς
toῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Περαιβοῖς καὶ
§ 4 Μάραμ. οὐκε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδέν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς
ἐπιμελείας ἐργοὺς εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτούς ὀμολογεῖ
τρόπων’ ἀνίμηνοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζοι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιῶσιν
10 εαυτοὺς τῶν κυρίων, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ἱάτρεις ἐπιβουλεῦσιν
καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <δ’> οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκοι τόν ἐξεύρητον
§ 5 τρόπον, οἷς τούτο συμβαίνει περί τῆς εἰλικρείας. ἐτείς δὲ ἡ
περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας ἁνεσίας καὶ πρὸς τίν προαιρεσίν τῆς πο-

1269 b 3 περὶ οἰκεῖς M' and apparently Γ (præedia circa dominus Williams) δ’ ἀφιστάντο Bas. 3 in the margin 6 περαιβοῖς Π. Bk. Suew. γ’ Διερβέρ (perhaps rightly) 10 κακοπαθῶς P' (1st hand, perhaps rightly), θ. κακοπαθῶς χωρίς corr. 1 of Π' in the margin 11 <δ’> οὖν οὐ κακοπαθῶς Suew., in Π' Π. Bk. 12 ἐτείς...1270 a 8 πάλον] Plut. ὸδ. 14 quotes similar statement from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles p. 30 rightly judges, from his Δακεδαμιῶν Ἡλετεία

§ 3 30 αἰτίων δ’ [ἰσως] It might be thought that one very material reason was the much freer and less oppressed position which, according to Aristotle’s own evidence § 5 § 19 n. (171), the Cretans granted to their dependants (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n. (355); § 5 (357); § 8 (364), § 16 (374).

SUEW. (281)

1269 b 3 περὶ οἰκεῖς See c. 10 § 3 and Exe. 111.

5 tois Θεσσαλοῖς] datēse in eissemi. ἀφισταντο sc. οι νεκταρα.

§ 4 7 τῷ γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας κτλ] “the task of attending to this; how, namely, we ought to associate with them”—the sentence τῶν δε...τρόπων being dependent on the noun ἐπιμελεία, just as in IV(vii). 16. 1 πέτε χρῆ κατεισχαί τῷ σώμα-

λαί is dependent on ἐπιμελητέων. We may render: “It would seem too that apart from everything else there is the irksome task of seeing that we do not, as we ought: for when allowed their freedom, they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their landlords; if treated harshly, they plot revenge and cherish hatred.”

14 δῆλον κτλ] The truth of this remark no one will wish to question. But does Aristotle really know of a remedy? He hopes to get over the difficulty in his own “best state,” by taking men of non-Hellenic race to all the soil, slaves or serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent freemen of different nations but only of the gentler races: IV(vii). 12 13, 14. n. (840) : cp. IV(vii). § 8 (813), and n. (364) with Exe. 111. Supposing all this could be so fortunately arranged, would it have been any real remedy? SUEW. (282)

The women of Sparta: [10 1—12].

§ 5 13 τῷ περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας ἁνεσίας So Plato speaks Laws 1 617 C διὰ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ ἰμόν ἱερῶ καὶ Παρθενίων ἀφθινώς τοῖς ἑαυτῷ ἀποθανοῦσιν. Παρθενίων (τῆς) ἐξήρθη γένεσι 2 Στρατοπεδευτὴν

ἐφι (Keth.); SUEW. (283)

πρὸς τὴν προαιρέσιν τῆς πολιτείας] “judged by the intentions of the constitution, the second point of view for criticism as mentioned in § 7. The other, the standard of the best constitutions, is here
called the Wellbeing or Happiness (εὐδαι-
μονία) of the state (Congreve). This then, and not εὐνομία, is the right
reading. For the best constitution is pre-
cisely that which most contributes to the
‘best life’ or Happiness. See i § 1 n.
(128): 1. 2 § 8 n. (21); and especially III.
18 § 1 n. (683), IV(VII). 1 § 1 (685), § 2
(687), § 11: 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 f.
(806), 13 § 3. SUSEM. (284)

15 οἰκίας μέρος So I. 3 § 1, 4 § 1, 13 § 15.
καὶ πόλιν...νομίζειν] “one must regard
the state as nearly divided into two.”
But the construction is not plain: is it
έγγυς "οδοιav ) τον διχα διήρησατι? This
would be supported by vi(iv). 6. 11,
viii(v). 1. 16, where έγγυς is almost an
adjective. Or it might also be νομίζειν
dιήρησατι έγγυς τον διχα <διήρησατι>.
16 From Euclid Elem. I. 10, I. 9,
III. 30 it is seen that διχα διαρείων=to
Elem. v. 4. 8 with Jackson’s note.
17 ὡστε ἐν ὦςαις κτλ] From this it is
seen, as indeed before from I. 13 § 16
πp. (126) (127), that Aristotle intended
to introduce into his ideal state a public
education and training for women, although
this education was certainly not to be
common to boys and girls. Cp. Introd.
pp. 49, 52 (2). In the Latus vi 781 b
Plato had expressed himself still more
forcibly: οὐ γάρ ἡμας μόνον ἐστιν, ὦς
δόξειν ἂν, τὸ περὶ τᾶς γυναικᾶς ἀκομαθητῆς
περιορίσθωπε, διὸ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῶν φύσιν
ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄγριον χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων,
τουσοιών διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλεῖον ἢ διπλασίαν
ἐστιν. Aristotle however says quite
the same thing Klie. 1. 5. 6 1361 a 10 ff., ὥσος
γάρ τά κατά γυναικὰς φαύλα ὅσον Λακε
δαιμονίας, σχέδον κατά τὸ ἡμῶν οὐκ εὐδα-
μονιόν (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM. (285)
§ 6 20 καρτερίκην] of hardy endur-
ance.
22 ἔξημελήκεν] has disregarded his
aim. This picture of luxurious living is
indirectly confirmed by Plato Rep. viii.
548 A, B; ἐπιθυμηταὶ δὲ γε χρημάτων ὁι
τοιαῦτα ἄτε κεκτημένοι ταμεία καὶ οἰκεῖοις
θησαυροῖς, καὶ ἀν περιβάλλον οἰκησίων ἀτε-
χείσις νεωτᾶτα ἰδίας, ἐν αὐτοὶ ἀναλυσοντες
γινεῖτι πολλὰ ἀπαράπτοτα: cp. 550 D.
§ 7 23 ὡστε ἀναγκατον] Wealth
must needs be in esteem, because the
unbridled luxury of women is a very
costly business. SUSEM. (286)
26 Κελτῶν] See Note on the Celtæ
at the end of B. ii. SUSEM. (287)
\[8 \text{ tētimēkai tīn ἑρᾶς τῶν ἄρρενων συνονθιαίν.} \]

\[8 \text{ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συνεξῆς τῷ Ἀρείῳ πρῶς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἢ ἐλπὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑρᾶς ἄρρενων ὁμιλᾶς.} \]

\[30 \text{ ἢ πρῶς τὴν ἑρᾶς ἀνακινοῦν κατακαύχωμαι τοῖς.} \]

\[30 \text{ ἡ νομικὴ ὑπό τῶν ἑρᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς αρχῆς αὐτῶν.} \]

\[28 \text{ πρῶτος Μ.}\]

\[28 \text{ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος} \]

Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and customs, are direct inventions of individuals, who consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and thoughts. 

Cp. also v(viii). 6 § 13 n. 1078. 

Süsem. (288) 

30 κατακαύχωμαι easily captivated, with ἐν ὑπ. v(viii). 7. 4, with ἐν ὁπίσ. ἐκθ. X. 9. 3; with πρῶς: one might say "easily allured to." 

31 διό παρὰ κτλ] Schomann Antiquities of Greece p. 268 Eng. tr. is certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that the prevailing condition of things with us in this regard would have appeared to an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (γυνακοπαρτα), although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly answer the question proposed by J. G. Schneider (see n. 295 b) and by Oncken: whether true womanliness can have thrived under so rough a treatment of the marriage relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public tables, slept in a tent, and only paid sudden visits to his wife: where consequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common duty and mutual improvement, where parental duty was removed and the natural field for the wife's activity abolished. If in the latter respect Aristotle aimed the cause of the evil in his retention of common messes for the men and his excessive public education prove, does this justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly correct? In reference to the first question, if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to hand over one's wife to another, if Schomann himself thinks, cp. § 267, a Spartan woman, to whom proposals were made by another man, hardly felt herself insulted by them but referred the lawsuit to her husband, then (as Füllbrehn and Schomann after him have remarked) the breach of the Spartans, that adultery was never heard of amongst these, does not amount to much: adultery here only means an intrigue with another man without the husband's permission. The further breach of the Spartan women, that they were in an especial degree good housewives (Schomann cp. §. p. 268), must accordingly be reduced to its proper dimensions. Plato however supposes (Laws vii 804 F L.) that though the Spartan women did not weave and spin, occupations which they left to their female slaves, they yet led an active life, since they had nearly half the responsibility for the management of the household and the education of the children. Certainly there is some exaggeration in the charges of licency and more of passion brought against them, and these must be moderated from the above points of view: but it is quite as certain that they are not all pure inventions. Oncken refers his readers to the treatises given by him Hellenica and Athenica i. 81. Cp. Introd. p. 39 n. 10. (1) Struve (200) 

32 εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν] during their supremacy. 

Cp. § 10 n. (991) viii15: § 13 εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν Ἀλκάδης Δημήτριος. § 14 εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν Ἀλκάδης καὶ Ἀλκαδάνης τῆς Ἄλκες τῆς νησίωτικῆς, during the reign of Lois.
35 ἐπερ Π Βκ.; ἐπερ Syllburg Susem.¹ misled by William's version nisi ad bellum || 36 τοῦ] τοῦ Spengel

1270 a 1 τῆς οἰκείας (οἰκία; Ἱ Ἄρ.) omitted by M* and P¹ (1st hand), added by p¹ in the margin || 4 προφοδοσποιμένων Bk. Susem.¹ by a misprint (corrected by Bender)

§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλιῶν See 5 § 4 n. and 1, 7 § 2. Susem.(291)

§ 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς] 'at the time of the Theban invasion, under Epameinondas 369 B.C. Susem. (292)

38 χρήσιμοι κτλ] "For they were of no use, any more than the women in other cities, but they caused more confusion than the enemy." It is significant that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon (Hellen. vi. 5 28 αἰ μὲν γυναῖκες ὠδὰ τῶν κατόν ὁρόδον ἄνεχοντο, ἀπε οὐδέπετο ἰδούσα τολμοῦσι) and Plutarch (Ages. 31 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ὀδυαμένων ἥραχαζον, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφράσαν ὁπόν πρὸς τὴν κραγην καὶ τὸ πιό τῶν πολεμιῶν) speak much more strongly on this point. Oncken observes quite rightly, that this was the first opportunity the Spartan women had for putting into practice the brave speeches they had been making for centuries; they might at least have displayed a quiet bearing, even if they were not to be taken at their word. Susem.(293)

Bernays renders: 'although the women in other cities are of use' [on such occasions]. But is it so? The Septem of Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, Latus 806 B.

§ 11 1270 a 1 ἐξο γὰρ κτλ] According to Plutarch Lycurg. 1, in his account of the constitution of Sparta Aristotel placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-

ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C. (J. G. Schneider). See this passage among the Fragments 490, 1558 a 13; Rose=485 in Rose Aristot. pseudep.76 Müller. Further compare especially Gilbert Studien 72 ff. 158 ff. Susem. (294)

The passage is as follows: αἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἰφίτῳ συνικαλάται καὶ συνδιδαχαί τὴν Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκεχειρίαν ἑγόμενοι αὐτῶν, ὃν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμηρίων προφητῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίασ διάκονον ἐφ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτων τοῦ ἄκουσάν διαδεδέχθεται καταγεγραμένων. E. Curtius, History Eng. tr. 1. p. 191, adopts this date. Even so, there would be a grave chronological difficulty if these Arcadian wars be supposed to precede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the main fact Aristotle is correct. A long period of camp-life, of war in which the Spartans lived perpetually in the field, must have preceded the complete establishment of the system and the institutions which are referred to the Lycurgan legislation*. Such a period we find in the tedious and difficult conquest of Laconia by its Dorian invaders.

4 προφοδοσποιμένων] Note the double formation of perfect.

¹ I entirely agree with Wilamowitz Homerische Untersuchungen, Berlin 1884, p. 267 ff., that Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the supposed Lycurgan legislation never had an existence; and I also regard the account which he gives of the real state of things as altogether correct. Susem.
5 psevdoiméνous διὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν βιων (πολλά τιρί ἡχῶν (17)
μέρη τῆς ἄρετης), τάς δὲ γυναικάς φασὶ μὲν ἄρειν ἐπεχειρ-
ρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὥς ἐς αὐτόκροουν.
§ 12 ἀποστήμα τί πάλιν. αἰτία: μὲν οὖν ἐδειν αἰτία τῶν γεγο-
νόνων, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀλλ' ἠμα-
τι 10 οὐ τούτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δὲ συγγραφέων ἤχι ἢ μὴ ἢχι.
§ 13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς: τά δὲ περὶ τῶν τρι-

7 ἄρα ἢδ' ἦδον; 

5 πολλά γάρ ἢχει μέρη κτλ] Σρ. 

Plato Law 1. 630 ε σοκ ὡς πρὸς ἄρετης τι-

μέρος καὶ ταύτα τὸ φαινότατον ἔδειξεν [ὁ Ἀ-

κυήργον] βλέπον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τάσσεν ἄρε-

τήν: Θυσ. τ. 84. 3 πολεμοῖο τε καὶ εἰσόδουι διὰ τὸ εύουσαν γυναικεῖαν: ν. 66, 4. (Eaton). 

Susem. (294 b)

6 φασὶ] ἀσίτωσιν, ἄρα, ὃς ἂν ἂν μὴν ἠμελημένοι ὀρθῶς ἀρειντὴν μεθείναι... ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως γίνοι ήμιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαβραιτῶν μᾶλλον καὶ ἤτικοπτῶν ἐφικ, τὸ θῆλα, διὰ τὸ ἀνατίθεν, σοκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο εἰς ἀρτοῖ τοῦ νομοθέτων ἄνθιστο-

τον ἐν ὀρθωθῇ. Τhis Plutarch must have been

forgotten, when (Lysag. 14) he attacks Aris-

totle alone on account of this same remark and

tries to refute him. The facts which he ad-

dudes with this object prove simply nothing: but directly afterwards (c. 15) he gives a detailed account of the Spartan 

custom of lending wives, and this does not make the assertion, which he appeals to, very credible: viz. ταύτα δὲ συνεντραχνοὶ φωναξ καὶ πολιτικῶς ἡττο-

νόμος ἄτακτο ὡς τῇ διάτοτο ἡγο-

μένην γεγέναις περὶ τὰς κραίδες ἐκχείρθατ. ἔστω δὲθ' ἐπιπλέον εἶναι τῷ 

μικρίτα χαρ' ἄνθιοι. Even he does not venture to deny the subsequent laxity of the women at Sparta. (J. G. 

Schneider.) Susem. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of the events which happened and there-

fore clearly of this mistake: but the ques-

tion before us is not who is, or is not, excusable; but whether as a matter of 

fact (a legislator) is right or wrong.

9 ἀλλ' ἠματι... ἔστι 

This Aristotel-

not is not unaware that the author of a code or a constitution is by no means 

able to proceed simply at his own good pleasure, but is tied down to the given 

circumstances: cp. § 23 n. (134), 12 § 6 (409): v. (11), 12 § 4 (116), c. 6 (114), 

§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 (108) v. (94). It is only in case these circumstances are 

highly favourable that he considers his own best constitution possible. But this 

is still a long way off the knowledge that 

a nation's constitution and code of laws 

are in general the product primarily of its 

individuality and history, and only 

secondary of the legislature's wisdom or 

unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle mean 

forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of 

his own examination in that 'the 

never purposes to account for the 

constitution by the circumstances under which it 

arose, or to fault the necessities which 

confronted the legislator. Instead of this 

Lycurgus, who led behind him an actual 

state, is treated like Plato who con- 

structed an imaginary state. Aristotle's 

criticism neither is nor claims to be his 

torical criticism in our sense of the term, 

which is more concerned to explain the 

conception of the facts than to second 

praise or blame. He is at once 

in pointing out the defects of this poli-

tical structure as the admirer of its ex- 

cellents had been in earlier times and 

continued to be later on. Nor could it 

have been otherwise; for neither by nor 

they had the requisite historical data for 

appreciating the personal responsibility of 

Lycurgus. Nor have we even now, assum-

ing that we still retain our belief in the 

existence of such a person as Lycon-

gu. Moreover in spite of his recogni-

tion of the force of circumstances Aristotel- 

shares with Plato (and all the political 

theories of Greece) the belief in the im-

potence of positive legislation, that 

moughty historical development, which are 

not of today or yesterday could be simply 

swung out of the world by a command 

of prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus 

responsible for things the which we 

legis
lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the effects could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him' (Oncken). Cp. also n. (82) on 1. 9 § 8: n. (238) on 11. 7 § 8; Exc. 11 on Bk. 11; n. (339) on § 30 below; (466) on III. 3 § 9; (552) on III. 9 § 8: II. 5 § 8 n. (160): IV(vii). 14 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law,' (cp. n. 480 on 1. 6, 1 and Exc. 11 to Bk. 11), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see n. (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: 1. 2 § 15, ἀρρητός συντόνως, n. (28 b): or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ἀνθρωπολογικός πρότως, n. (285).

"In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism" (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see nn. 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.

§ 13 15 μετὰ γὰρ κτῆσιν] Possibly we should alter γὰρ into ἰδέα, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last n.), which is referred to in § 13, see n. (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ κτῆσιν served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γὰρ of the text is an inconsistency. SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κτῆσιν] Cp. viii(v). 7 § 10 εἰς ἀκάκεδαιμον εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἐξονται n. (1603). SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus. The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitaeus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given
away or freely disposed of by will; Plu-
tarch Agis 4, cp. Schumann Antiquities
of Greece p. 316 Eng. tr. As far as he
knew, this had never been prohibited.
Should we expect later writers to be
really informed? Or would it not be
as well to consider the said story in
the great lumb-room of historical fable
which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to
us so richly furnished? See further the
next note. Susen. (299)

έποιησεν οὐ καλὸν] Aristotle implies
that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited,
by a declaration of illegality and a pen-
talty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the
purchase of a new one. When translated
into our mode of thought and expression
this means that the force of usage and
custom was against the practice; it was
held dishonourable to sell. With this
agrees the omission of Sparta, § 6, from
the list of states where alienation or en-
largement of the inherited estate was
prohibited by law' (Oncken). as one
means of restoring, in a certain sense,
equality of possessions; comp. n. (327).
(This decisive circumstance was quite
overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a
fair inference that Aristotle was also un-
aware of any equal division of property
amongst the Spartans, whether by Ly-
curges or any one else, with the design
that this equality should be perpetual?
(This least is the only point here in ques-
tion with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since
such a division amongst those who are
actual citizens was also his own ideal,
iv. (VII), 10 | 9—12 n. (844) | cp. sp. on
II. 6 | 5 (192), § 15 (314)—would be
not have expressly appealed to the autho-
ritv of Lycurgus in support of it, and
expressly commended him for this ex-
cellent design? Would he not also have
expressly blamed him, no less than Plato
or Philebus | 6 | 10 II. (208—211), 7 | 1
(234)—for having neglected, to a still
greater extent than these treatises, to
take the appropriate means for bringing
this about; nay more, for having taken
as good as no means whatever? The yth
fragment of the Thity of the Lycur-
ganians attributed by Heerckckens
(Müller Frag. sect. Gr. ii. 311) undeni-
ably goes back to the Aristocratic
work On the Spartan constitution, see a.
(360) om 10 | 6. But this by no means
proves that these extracts must be wholly
free from foreign additions, or that the
δαντικα μαξείς δε επιστολα is not one
c. 172 II. attempts in vain to show
that it is impossible that Aristotle
should avoid this limitation in the present
passage. Far, if he had known it, it is
obvious how much it must have been
weakened and again aggravated the blame
he has here expressed. For whatever we
may make of the ancient portion (δα-
νικα μαξείς) it would tend to a
stronger case on the part of the legisla-
tor to preserve the family estates if the sale
of this portion were absolutely forbidden
by law and declared null and void, at
the same time that it would be so much
the stronger inconsistency if cases this
property was to be freely disposed of by
will or given away. Besides Gilbert's
whole method of explaining this dispen-
sion has already been treated, last cor-
cently, refuted by Frick in J. Phil.
CV. 1873. 665. Susen. (300)

22 διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλαίπειν] Trans-
lated into our language this means: in
each age after Lycurgus usage and customs
were often sealed by approved free gift
or by testamentary dispositions of land.
Susen. (201)

VIII. 9 | 500. 6. 16B. Susen. (301 b)

15 τῶν πεντα μέρων τα δύο] two
sixths.

τῶν τ' ἐκκαλ[μεν]οίν ετά] why the num-
er of heroes in Sparta was undoubtedly
larger Aristocles considers it superfluous to show, because it is readily
understood that in the many long wars
an unusually large number of men fai
25 καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸκας διδόναι μεγάλας: καὶ τοί βέλτιον ἢ (VI) μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. * * νῦν δ᾿ ἔξεστι (p. 47) δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτι ἐν βουλήτῃ· κἀν ἁποθανή μὴ διαθέμενος, ὅν ἀν καταλήκῃ κληρονόμοι, οὗτοι ὃ ἂν
§ 16 θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμενης τῆς χώρας χιλίων ἵπ-
30 πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμιρίους, οὐδὲ
χίλιων τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12
dήλων ὃτα φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς εἴχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τὰξιν ταύτην
μιᾶς γὰρ πληγῆς ὑπνήγειε οὐχ ὑπνήγειε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἀπώλετο
§ 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλγανθρώπιν. λέγουσι δ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτε-

(Bender). Aristotle’s statement concerning
the great wealth of Spartan women
is confirmed by Plutarch’s from a yet
later time: Agis 4. 7 ἤν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακω-
νικῶν πλεόντων ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὸ πλέωνω.
(J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (302)
The Spartan name for them is ἐπιπρά-
μονες, ἐπιπαραμίτινες.

25 καὶ τοί βέλτιον] Here again later authors are
apparently better informed of the
facts than Aristotle. We are told
that dowries had actually been prohibited,
and that down to the time of Lysander none
were ever given; see Schömann Antiq-
uitics of Greece p. 265 Eng. tr. SUSEM.
(303)

26 νῦν δ᾿ ἔξεστι κτλ] It is obvious that this sentence forms no antithesis
to the preceding and thus νῦν δ᾿ δεῖ gives no
sense. All however is right if one ima-
gines something like the following to have
fallen out before νῦν δ᾿ :<‘ And besides
it would have been necessary to prescribe
who had the right and obligation of
marrying heiresses,> whereas at present
every father can marry his daughter to
any one he pleases, and if he die without
a will his heir at law bestows her upon
whom he pleases.’ SUSEM. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means ‘heir’;
here it must mean the person entitled
to the rights of the deceased, the next male
relation of full age, or, if there were
more than one such, the eldest of them.
SUSEM. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king
by Herod. vi. 57: δικαίως δὲ τούτου βασι-
λίας...παραγέω τε παρθένου πέρα, ἐν τῷ
κυνάται ἔχων, ἢν μὴ περὶ δὲ πατήρ αὐτήν
ἐγγυήσατο.

§ 16 29 δυναμενης] Of course Aristotle
makes this calculation, as Oncken
remarks, with regard to the total
population of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non-
Spartan descent. In any case it is rather
too high an estimate, as this total popula-
tion amounted to only 400,000 at the
most: see Schömann Antiquities of
Greece p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other
hand the reading, or rather conjecture,
τραχάλους would not merely give a
number far too small, but also one out of
all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry.
SUSEM. (306)

30 οὐδὲ χαλών] ‘In the time of Agis
π. 241 (Plat. Agis c. 5) the Spartans
were but 700, and only 100 retained their
family allotments’ (Eaton). SUSEM. (307)

33 μᾶν γὰρ πληγῆν] The battle of
Lencstra. Cp. further § 34 n. (345),
iv(vii). 14 § 21 n. (916) ; v(viii). 4 § 4,
§ 7 n. (1008). SUSEM. (308)

οὐχ ὑπηνύγετο] The negative to be
taken closely with the verb: under one
Knights 1377 δεξίωσ δικαίωσ ἀπέθανε, Plato
Phil. 23 λιμφρώνοι δικαίωσ ἀπετυχεί τῶν
νικητῶν : and below Pol. vi(vii). 4. 30
οὐ πολιτεῖα.

34 διὰ τὴν ὀλγανθρώπιν] Here
again of course only Sparta proper are meant, not Provincials (Horlocus) and Helots. According to Xenophon, Helis, vi. 4, 15, 1000 Lakedaemonians fell at Lustra, including 400 out of the 700 Spartiates who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, De Repl. Iat. 1, 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states. (J. G. Schneider).

SUEM. (309) § 17 34 ληγόμενε δ' ὡς κτλ. It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, ix. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Thesemmen the Elder and his brother Hegias Βεοτολοι δ' τάκτων ἀνθρώπων ἐγκαίνιον Σπαρτήν ιερών τοιαύτης μονάς. (Congreve.) Cpr. also n. (314). (Plutarch Infall. Iat. 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycurgian discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τής ἀρχαίας διαταγμένη μονάς, which they were not permitted to sell. Cpr. n. 300.) Ephoros however, as Tricler shows, had the following story, Fgr. 18 found in Strabo viii. 364. The first king, Eurycles, and Froklakes had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorised the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship, at that time the πείρατοι were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Tricler and Suscimbil once supposed; but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephoros. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Agiadae and Talthybiadae; see Schumann p. 103, 208, 215 f., 249 Eng. tr.; Colbee p. 17, 57 ff., 149 f. From in Thucyd. Iat. xv. 1872, p. 612 f. It might again he said that Herodotus unadvisedly has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the acharphoi, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such acharphoi were not confined in the times of the earlier kings even Lycurgus, Grypos, Klesandria, for example, belonged to their number, see Schumann p. 200. Eng. tr. Kedgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the Acharphoi, i.e. Helots emancipated for these services in war, and in their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of Acharphoi is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schumann p. 105. Eng. tr., Comp. I. 147, 1320 and epip. Interd. p. 138 f. (310).

35 σωτ' οὐ γίνεσθαι, and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were as war for a long time. The indicative should have been used in such cases— οὐ γίνεσθαι, etc. This word is used by Aristoph. Thesm. v. 40 EV-9 χειρονομήσεται διδασκαλεῖς. The same use of the word is made by Demosth. Πολεμικ. 166, 167, 331 with Shallot's Appendix. 48 καὶ φασιν εἰναι κτλ. Truthfully here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demosthenes in Lysim. 104, 344 remarks them at about 8,000 (Ulpian). SUEM. (311)

37 σωτ' εἰσὶν ἀληθῶς εἰς μήν Αττικής himself then deduces οὖν SUEM. (312) 48 βέλτιον 38 τῆς πολιάς. It is better to fill the gap with some by means of an equal division of property, than by the admission of aliens.

18 30 τευχαίαν τειχών τήν διορθώσαν is an obstacle to a reconstruction of these cycle of Sparta, this by equalisation of property, see I. 2 436.
construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 προδάγει Spengel || τῶν πολτάς omitted by M*P || 8 αυτή Ar., omitted by ΓΜ Welldon || 9 παντός Sauppe (Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannium p. 94 f.), pάντες ΓΠ Ar. Bk.

4 ἀφροῦρον not liable to military service, ἐμφροῦρον: φροῦρα is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon Hellic. II. 4. 29 ἐξάγει φροῦραν, so IV. 7. 2, v. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φροῦραν φαίνει = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Βραδία φροῦραν ἐξων.

τέτταρας] Aelian Var. Hist. vi. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso Sparta i. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the re-mission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see n. (321) on § 21. SUSEM. (314)

§ 19 4 καίτω φανερόν κτλ] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the ἄδακες (see n. 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Oncken). SUSEM. (315)

The Ephorality §§ 19—24. Amongst other monographs see A. Schäfer De ephoris commentatio (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein The development of the Ephorality (Jahresber. des Gymn. in Konitz, 1879), Ulrichs in Rhét. Mus. vi. 1847, p. 221, G. Dum Entstehung und Entwicklung des spartanischen Ephorats (Innsbruck 1878).

8 αὐτῇ in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δήμου Thirlwall (iv. 377) supposed the ἄδημοι to include the ὄρο-
οδρα πένθης εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀτορίαν ὡςιν ἔσχον. (VI)
20 εἰς ὁπλάας ἐνεποτήρησε μὲν καὶ πρὸτερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἂν ἦν τῶν ἄρχουν τινος Ἀρδρίου διαφθοράς τις ἀργυρίων τινῶν, ἂς ἐκφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἂν ἦν τῶν πολέμων ἀπολέσασι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχήν ἔχειν λίγαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύπους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ἰσακείζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ἀντε καὶ ταύτης συνεπιλατρεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας.
21 κρατίας συνεβαίνει. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ὑσυχαίς γὰρ ὁ δήμος διὰ τὸ μετέχει τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὡστ’ εἶτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἶτε διὰ τὴν τοῦτον τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτοντες, συμφεροῦτος ἔχει τῶν πρώτων.

10 ὁ νῦν; Schneidler 11 'Ἀρχιλαός Αι., ἀρχιλαός εἰς Πελ. 1, ἀρχιλαός Π[this hand, emended by a later hand], ἀρχιλαός Π' in the margin. 317.3, 12 Κ. F. Herrmann. The opposite view is taken by Schomann Antiquitates p. 145
Eng. tr. See Buck 'The Laconians and their allies' I. p. 21 sq. (Leipzig, 1878).
For παράς. not παράς, see § 22, 12. 10 ἀρχεῖον—magnificatae, board: see § 21, 10. 10 ἀρχεῖον τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖων.

Δύναι] See below 10 § 12 n. (370 b) and Thuc. 1. 131. 3 ὥστε (Πανακιανί) πιστεύειν ἥρμασιν διαλέγειν τὴν διαβολήν (Eaton); also Kehl. III. 18. 6, 149 a 31 ff.; the Laconian Ephor called to account for his conduct says ι. μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) ἥρμασιν λαβόντες ταῦτα ἐποιήσαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν, ἀλλὰ ἀποφυγα (Gottling).
SUSEM. (316) ἡσαυ] were often. 'Why this tense? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were no or not?' (Con雜gre). It is imperfect in § 14 ν. 16 ἡσαυ, § 30 ἡσαυεῖον, συνεβαίνει. 20 11 εἰς τοὺς Ἀρδρίους] what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ ὁ ἀριστοκράτης recently, compare VIII (v). 10 § 31 καὶ ποὺ τῶν πολεμίων, n. (169). SUSEM. (317) 14 καὶ ἰσοτύπους Σφ. Histo Liv. 1. 712 b καὶ γὰρ τερατεύεται δὲ καὶ προσπάθεια (ἐν ἰσοτύπους) μετατυπώσει τοιαύτης; τοιαύτης; τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ ἐκδότης γεγονοι. See n. 6 § 17 n. (319). SUSEM. (318) διηθαγωγεῖν to conclude, flatter as individual like a demagogue, in VIII (v). 6 § 6. 10 § 31. But, as Crocker remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. SUSEM. (319) If these sorts be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in II 16, 19, 21. The kings themselves were compelled to shun the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.
"This seems to me impossible in this context. If their power be right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously expressed. For I cannot agree with those who think that Oncker's objection is sufficiently removed by n. 6 § 17, 176 b 22. From χαριτορικον εἰς τοὺς ἐφόρους αὑτὸ τὸ εἰς τὰς ἐφόρους αὐτὸν τὸν ἐφόρον." SUSEM. 16 εἰς ἀριστοκρατίας. See n. 16 n. (315) on III. 7 § 1. SUSEM. (328) 21 17 συνεχεῖς the keynotes of the constitution.

10 ἀρχεῖον ἢν μεταχείρησεν. Not ἀρχεῖον in this case but, see Aristotle's view, VIII (v), 11 § 3. Theophrastus. See n. (314) on III. 9 b. SUSEM. (321) ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτον ἀριστοκράτης. Aristotle is not guarantee, then, that many great or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislature's intention: esp. 14 § 8. (408). SUSEM. (321 b) in συμπέπτοντες Σφ. δείκτες restoratae n. 12 n. [9].

19—2
22 ταύτα Π¹, ταύτα ΓΠ⁴, τὴν αὐθὴν ο ἢ [ταύτα] Σχενέρ, <κατὰ> ταύτα Βερν- 


The order (which Stahr, and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is διε τά τά μέρη (subject) τῆς πόλεως βούλευσαν τήν πολιτείαν τῆς μ. τ. (object of βούλευσαν) εἶναι και διαμένειν. If a constitution is to be preserved, all classes in the state must desire its existence and continuance. Hence we are led to Bernays' or Schneider's correction.

23 οὖτως ἔχουσιν = λοίκονται τήν πολιτείαν οικείοιν (Congreve). Comp. 10 § 10, of the βίος.

24 καλοί καθαροί] This expression in Aristotle—see e.g. vi(iv). 8 § 3 ff.—always denotes the more educated and capable men; and this meaning in the present passage is confirmed by the addition ἄθλων γὰρ ἢ ἀρχῆ γὰρ ἑστιν, which Trieber hardly has sufficient grounds for regarding as an interpolation. Hence Unger in Philol. Anziger v. 1873, p. 370 has rightly protested against the completely mistaken assertion of Gilbert op. c. 151 ff., and Frick De ephoris Spartanis 28 f. 7, who prefer to understand by it the nobles. From passages like 11 §§ 3, 4 and vii(iv). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who reads without preconceived opinion will see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows nothing of an election of Senators at Sparta, for which only certain families were eligible (as was the case in Crete c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary nobility within the pale of those pure Spartans who had the right to take part in the popular assembly. Nor can the opposite of this be inferred from vii(iv). 9 § 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of election may very well have been such that in practice members of certain families were successful time after time: see viii(v). 6 § 21 n. (1586). SUSEM. (322) ッドου γὰρ κτλ] To be a member of this body is a reward of special excellence, or at least it should be: see below § 25, Demosth. xx. Adv. Leptin. § 107 εκεῖ μὲν γάρ ἐστι (at Lacedaemon) τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλων τῆς πολιτείας κυρίω γενόντα μετὰ τῶν ὁμολόγων: Plut. Lyc. 26. SUSEM. (323) 26 καθαροτάτα γὰρ συν ἢ ἐφορεῖα ἐξ ἀπάντων. Cp. 10 § 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, n. (370). SUSEM. (323 b) § 23 28 παύδαρωδῆς κτλ] Here Aristotle calls the whole method of electing the Ephors childish, yet he says of the election to the senate § 27, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παύδαρωδῆς, it is childish as to the means of ascertaining the results. Consequently the mode of election was probably not the same for the two offices. Plato again describes it in the case of the ephors as approximating to a nomination by lot Laws III 692 A, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως. This points to auspices (Urlich Rhein. Mus. N. S. vi. 1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to determine whether electors were chosen by the people and then, after observing certain signs, they appointed the new ephors, as Urlich thinks: or whether, according to Schömann's conjecture p. 240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons were nominated by the people, and the five selected from them in accordance with certain auspices. SUSEM. (324)

Schneider had suggested that as in the election of the Senators (see n. 333)
the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (t. 281 f.) adopts this view. Götting (p. 468) assumes that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

κρίσεως μεγάλανόν. The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits, especially in all actions arising from contracts: see III. 1 § 10 τῶν συμβαλλόντων <διάσεως> διά λόγα τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλας ἀλλατι σύν (144-4). Schömann εφ. c. 237, 246, 250 f.Eng.r. Susem. (325).

30 κατὰ γράμματα. There were no written laws in Sparta: Schömann εφ. c. 251 Eng.tr. Susem. (326).

30 μὲ γράμματα ἀλλὰ ἀκριτά. Comp. μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀλλὰ εὐσεβεῖς, τοι. 11. § 23 31 σύν ὀρθολογουμένην] inconsistent with (the design of) the polity.

32 εὐνόμην λαϊν. The ephors had a separate seal of authority to themselves, Schömann εφ. c. 245 Eng.tr. and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things, to provide a far more elaborate ἀνακάρματος than the ordinary soup, the ‘black broth’ of Sparta (J. G. Schneider). Susem. (327).

34 ἀλλὰ λαβήθει ἐξήνων]. Cp. εφ. 316 μ. (436-7), Τ.VIII. 15 § 6 μ. (1577). These amongst the Spartan ephors, too, the much-venerated institutions of annona lead its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avoid even be explicable? Stein. (358).

§ 25—26 The Senate as Elders.

35 εἰςκεκυρευμένα. If only honest men, sufficiently trained in military excellence, entered the senate. No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution, but frequently it was not carried out: see Φύλ. 314. Susem. (339).

39 κρίσεως μεγάλανόν. The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. 1 § 10 μ. (144), 111V. 9 § 9. Λέγεται εἶναι εἰςδαφάνειαν καί ἀνακάρματα ἐπί τοῦ πόλεως. Susem. (328 b).

40 κατὰ γὰρ, καὶ] in conformity with this principle. Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: Περιτ. εφ. 9 § 8 μ. (116-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. By his state of the Laws he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magistracy after the age of 70 or over 70 years of age: Λαξ. VI. 533 a f. Compare also Eth. 16. 14: 4 ἄλλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τῆς ἐσχάλτους Παρθ. 61. 134 εἰςδαφάνειαν
πολιτικῶν B. 9.

1271 a γῆρας: τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτων πεπαιδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν (VI) νομοθέτην αὐτοῦ ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸις ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ § 26 ἁσφαλέως. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδρωδοκόμωναι καὶ κατα- χαρίζομενοι πολλά τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοιμηκότες τῆς ἁρ- 5 χῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι: νῦν δὲ εἰσών. δόξειε δὲ ἂν ἢ τῶν ἑφόρων ἄρχη πάσαι εὐ- θύνεις τὰς ἀρχὰς: τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἑφορείᾳ μέγα λαὸν τὸ δῶ- ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τούτων λέγομεν διδύμα δεῖ τῶς εὐθύ- § 27 νασ. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἢν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατά

1271 a 3 δὲ] γὰρ Σπενγελ || 5 ἀνυπευθύνους Συλβοργ, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ ἢν αἵρεσιν ποιοῦνται...κρίσιν or rather κατά τὴν...γερόντων ἦ τε κρίσις Bender, much too violently

tις σώματι συναίσθενται καὶ αἱ φρένες· γγράφο- κουτὶ δὲ συγγράφοκοι καὶ ἐστὶς πρόγματα πάντων ἀπαμβηλύνοτα, Livy vi. 23 cum corporibus vigere et deflorescere animos, Lucret. iii. 445 pariter cum corpore et una crescere sentimus paralleterque sensere mentem 1 (Eaton). Susem. (330)

1271 a 1 δὲ answers b 37 ἐπειδὲς μὲν, the intermediate words from καὶ τὸν being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3; 4 τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ...ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ κτλ.

ὡςτέ...Ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are trained in such a way that even the legis- lator cannot trust them.' Camerarius long since asked how Aristotle came to this conclusion. Presumably from the fact he mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that every senator (as well as all the other officials and even the two kings) was placed under the control of the Ephors.

Susem. (311)

§ 26 3 φαίνονται δὲ κτλ] Cr. c. i 1
§ 4 μεγάλα βαλτάτουν καὶ θβλαιψαν ἤδη n. (384). Susem. (311 b)

5 δόξειε δ' ᾧ κτλ] It might be held (cp. 8 § 18) that the board of Ephors controls all the officials. But this is too vart a trust to commit to the Ephorality and it is not in this sense that we assert the necessity for responsible control.

8 τὸν τρόπον οὐ τούτων] Because the superintendence and control exercised by the Ephors was far too unlimited and violent (J. G. Schneider). See above § 20 n. (318). Susem. (332)

§ 27 9 κατὰ τῇ κρίσιν κτλ] "The proceedings are described by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 26) in the following manner. After the assembling of the 'people,' i.e. of all the Spartiates who possessed the right of voting, some men selected for the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring building from which no view was afforded of the place of meeting, though the voices of the assembled crowd could easily be heard. Then the candidates for the vacant office passed silently one by one through the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while the people, according to the various degrees of favour with which they regarded them, made their feelings known by correspondingly loud or feeble acclamations. The party confined in the building, to whom the order in which the candi- dates appeared by lot was unknown, observed on which occasion the acclama- tion was loudest, and the candidate who was thus greeted was regarded as the popular choice......Aristotle's judgment upon these proceedings is quite intelligible in an age in which the man- ners of the people had long degenerated from their ancient purity and simplicity. For obviously there was nothing easier than to turn the whole election into a mere fraudulent farce, and to determine the result beforehand" Schömann p. 231 f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions that arise is, how the committee which decided on the loudness of the acclama- tions was itself appointed:—and on this point we have no information (Oncken). Besides, this mode of election is only a peculiar survival of the primitive election of chiefs by acclamation in a rude an- tiquity, retained in a time for which it had long since ceased to be adapted. In general the votes of the Spartans in the popular assembly continued to be taken ἑνεκα νοικ, by acclamation, βοσ: and only in case of a doubt as to the decision did an actual division of the

10 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτίσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schlosser and Füllborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the proposers might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δὲ γὰρ κτλ] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination. Zeller Plato p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 n. SUSEM. (335) Add Rep. 347 b ff., 517 b, 519 c.

28 13 νῦν δὲ ὅπερ κτλ] But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (τιθενταῖοι αὑτῶν, a personal canvass). See Xen. De Rep. Leg. IV. 3.

16 τῶν γὰρ ἀκακομάτων τῶν ἐκουσών] Here the term ἀκακομάτων is used in a sense different from that of ἀκακόματα, i.e. the ignorant, etc., who are not to be elected to any important office. Aristotelian passage Ἀπ. ἔκτ. 3. 3 (336).

17 τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει κτλ] Here Lycurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato: § 9: ἐπιτιθεμένος μὲν ἃς ζητέθηκαν ἡ αὐτοκρατορία ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος ἤτακα, ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντικῷ τούτῳ ἀμελείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἔπειτα ἐπιθέσει τῷ ἀρχοντικῷ τούτῳ ἀμελείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὴ ἐπιτιθεμένος μὲν ἃς ζητέθηκαν ἡ αὐτοκρατορία ἀμελείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. SUSEM. (337)

29 10 ἄλλος ἄλλοις μέταν [311 a. 14-17. SUSEM. (338)]

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν μάλλον ὁ κύριος ἐνεπηκόμισεν: an elective municipality.
§ 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς (VI) οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς, δήλου ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὃς οὐκ ὤσιν ἴκανῶς ἀγαθοῦς ὀνδράσιν διότερ εξέπτευτον
25 συμπροσβεβήτας τοὺς ἔχθρους, καὶ σοφιάν ἐνομίζω τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλέας. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ 31 συνστίτα τὰ καλοῦμενα φιδίτα νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστή-
§ 31 σαντι πρῶτω. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνο-
δον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ' παρὰ δὲ τῶν Δάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ
30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίοις ὄντων καὶ τούτο τὸ ἀνά-
25 ἐφόρος Götting || 27 φιλίτα Π (emended by corr. of P)

§ 30 22 ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25; 17 § 5 n. (675): VI(Iv). 2 § 1 ff. 
30 nn. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. § 8 (521), 13 § 9 (595); 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditory descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare 11 §§ 3, 4 nn. (381—3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (1. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism: and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta in the Jahrb. f. Philol. xcvii. 1868. i—9; A. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann op. c. 208, 225 f., 541—4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. Susem. (339)

30 λεῖς προσκαλῆ ὡρώστε δε τι πιει ἐκα-
τος πάντως συφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. Τεν ἐξίμβουλα were given to Agis, Thuc. v. 63.

25 συμπροσβεβήτας] A less forcible word, like συναποδημώντας, might have been expected.

26 τὸ στασιάζειν Grote II. p. 464. Schneider compares Plut. Agis c. 12, τῶν γὰρ τὸ ἄρχεσιν (the Ephors) ἱσχει εἰς ἀδιάφορος τῶν βασιλέων τὸ τὰ βελτιώναι λέγοντι προστιθέμενοι τὴν ψήφον, ὡς ἄτερος ἐργῇ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον.
The public messes: §§ 31, 32.

§ 31 27 φιδίτα] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. Lyg. 12 guess wildly. Perhaps σέδο to sit; if indeed φιδίτα is the true form and φιδίτης = [ἐ]φι-ἐβ-
30 τις (?), see n. on 1272 a 22. Clearly ἀν-
δρέα was the older Doric name, and συνστίτα is only an Attic term.

28 ἔδει γὰρ κτλ] Cp. io §§ 7, 8 nn. (363, 365); IV(vii). 10 § 10 (834). Plato's criticism, Latois viii 847 E, is precisely the same: τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τον ἐκ τῆς χάρας ἐγγύς τῆς τοῦ Κριτικοῦ νόμων ἔουσαν ὀρθότης ἀν τῆς γνομονής κατὰ τρόπον γέργονθαι κτλ. 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινὸ) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth' (Oncken): or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schö-
30 mann op. c. p. 291 Eng. tr. Susem. (341)

For σύνοδον = πρόσοδον the lexx. quote Herod. 1. 64 χρυσάτων σύνοδοι = contributions. But here the singular (σύ-
νοδον) and the entire phrase ἀπὸ κοινοῦ (sumptu publico) εἶναι, favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. VII(vi). 4 §§ 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς συνόδου ταύτης = τῆς ἐκκλη-
σίας. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν = contribute.
The military spirit | 34. 35.

34 1371 a 1 Πλατών ἐν τοῖς ἱππα... | 1 672 ὁ ἀλλόκοτος σπουδάζειν εἰς την παράδοσιν. | 2 605 ὁ ἀλλόκοτος σπουδάζειν εἰς την παράδοσιν. Ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ δικαίου λαλεῖται μετά τοῦ ἱππατοῦν δικαίου... Εἰπον γὰρ τὸν λαόν τοῦτον ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου λαλεῖται... ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ δικαίου λαλεῖται μετά τοῦ ἱππατοῦν δικαίου...
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἁρετῆς ὡς πᾶσα συνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, (VI),
τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-
γαροῦν ἐσφάζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦστε, ἀπώλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
5 ἓπει ἐπιστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἥσικηκέναι μηδὲ-
§ 35 μιᾶν ἀσκησιν ἔτερων κυριῶτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τοῦτον δὲ
ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τα-
γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃα δὲ ἁρετῆς μᾶλλον ἡ κακίας, καὶ
tούτῳ μὲν καλός, ὅτι μὲντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἁρετῆς
§ 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλός. φαίνοντο δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
11 κουμά χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κουμῷ
τῆς πολέως ἐστίν οὐδὲν πολεμοῦσι μεγάλους ἀναγκαζόμενοι
πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσι τε κακοῖς διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπα-
tιατῶν εἶναι τῆς πλειστῆς γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλῶν

1271 b 3 αὐτὴν Μαίρας || χρησίμη <μιὸν> ? Susem. || 5 ἥσικηκέναι] ad virtutem exercitari William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἁρετῆν wrongly
inserted by Susem.1–2 || 6 τοῦτο Π1, τοῦτο Π4 Qb Ar., Π2 (1st hand, altered by corr.1),
and perhaps also Γ || 7 μὲν omitted by Γ Μ, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.1 ||
γίνεσθαι after τάγαθα Μαίρας || 12 ἀναγκαζόμενοι Π2–3 Ald.

οὔτε πρὸς μίαν...οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταῦταν; § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the
notes. Susem. (344)

4 ἐσφάζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ.] Repeated in substance IV(vii). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐξελέγχεται νῦν, § 22 τῶν γὰρ βαθὺν ἀνάσαν, ὡσπερ ὁ σιδηρὸς, εἰρήνης ἀγωνεῖς. αἰτήσει δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παλέοντας δόσασθαι
σχολάζειν, 15 §§ 5, 6: ν(viii). 4 § 4 τοῦς Δάκωνας έσμεν...νῦν...καὶ τοῖς γυμνι-
κοῖς ἀγώνας καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειψόμενοι ἐτέρων: where references will be found in the
notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution,
in the Ποιησεῖα; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch
30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the
author: the passage begins ἃντων τῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ἀρχεσθαι μὲν βέβαια, ἀρχεῖν
dὲ οὐκ ἠπόστατον Δακαδαιμόνιοι. Susem. (345)

ἀρέσται—after they had won their empire, when they had become a sov-
reign people. § 35 § τὰ περιμάχεια] i.e. external
goods: cp. Nic. Eth. ix. § 8, 1168 b 14 ff. οἱ μὲν οὖν...φελάντοι καλοῦσιν τοὺς
ἐαυτοῦ ἀπανεύρουστα τὸ πλέον ἐν χρήματι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἱδανοῖς τῶν σωματικῶν...
ἐπινόδακας [οἱ πολλοὶ] περὶ αὐτά ὡς ἀριστά δύντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχεια ἑστὶν: § 9

1169 a 20 f. προσέσται [ὁ σπουδαῖος] καὶ
χρήματα καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δόλος τὰ περιμάχῃα ἁγάθα, περιποιούμενοι ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλὸν.
Susem. (346)

9 τοῦτο μὲν καλός] They are right in
thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the
goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(vii). 1 § 3 n. (697), 1 § 6 nn. (927—8)," Susem. (346 b)

ὅτι μᾶκτα ταῦτα κτλ.] See above § 34,
n. (328) and again IV(vii). 15 § 6 nn. Susem. (347)

The finances: §§ 36, 37.

§ 36 12 ἀναγκαζόμενοι] if they are
compelled.

14 τὴν πλειστὴν γῆν] Only the
smaller part of the land belonged to the
Provincials (περιοκών). Susem. (348)

οὐκ ἐξετάζομεν...ἐσφοράς] Even at
the commencement of the Peloponnesian
War Thucydides (1. 80. 4) makes the
Spartan king Archidamos say: πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τοῦτον (sc. χρυσοῦ) ἑλέπτομεν
also what Pericles says (1. 141. 3) αὐτο-
γοι οἱ Δακαδαιμόνιοι καὶ οὔτε ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων οὔτε ἐν κοίνῳ χρήματα ἑστὶν αὐτῶς.
Susem. (349)
II. 10. 1

§ 37 τοὺς δ’ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτως

As early as the first quarter of the sixth century B.C. Alcaeus (Fr. 50) quotes the saying of Aristocles, a Spartan, "money makes the man," in full force at Sparta: οἵ γὰρ δήσταρεν Ἀριστοκλῆς βασιλεύς οὖν ἀκαίρας ἐν Σπάρτῃ λέγων ἐκείνης φράσις ἔστη, πίνακας δ’ οὗτος πλεον έλεόν οὖν τιμᾶτον. Amongst well-known instances of peculation or corruption Eaton quotes Lestychides, Plutarchus, Antiochus, Kleandridas, Gyllippos, Lyander: to which he adds Plutarch’s own admission, Lycurgus, 30: "Athena δὲ βασιλεύσεις εὐφρονία τιμῶν εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην καὶ μετα τοῦ κυβερνήτου πλωτείαν καὶ πλεον έλοις πρὸς ἤγει διά Λατερίαν, δι’ αὐτὸν δὲ ἀκαίρας ἐν κυβερνήταις ἐπιτρέπει τῷ πατρίδαις φιλοχρημάτις καὶ τροφῆς. Besides the corruption of the ephebus, § 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (333 b), 11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have spoken confidently of that of the kings and admirals. There was a well-known oracle, ὁ φιλοχρημάτα Σέπτσαν Ἀδελχίδα, διὰ δὲ ὅσπις, quoted in Aristotle’s Polity of Laconian Frgs. 501. 1539 b 28 (= Aristot. pseudepi. 496 τοίς in Müller’s Fr. hist. Gr. ii. p. 131), and even Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it. Fr. 3. See further Xenophon, De Kyrr. Leg. 14. 3 and the statement in Ps.-Plato Alc. 1. 132 § 6 quoted by Eatont: χρήμαν καὶ ἀργυρόν οἷον ἔσταν ἐν πέντε Ἑλληνες δίκαιοι ἐκ Σακελαδαίων ἐφικ. This may very well be an exaggeration: the writer of the dialogue is however generally well informed on historical matters, see Cicert Menon. N. S. ii. 11874. 369 ff. Compare with this the instances of great wealth possessed by Spartans, some of which have been collected by Grote Greece δ’ 331 f., Gilbert op. c. 154 f. If the Sparta-
tiates, with the exception of the kings, ever were prohibited from possessing gold and silver—a statement which H. Stein in the dissertation quoted to a. (86) on 1. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—it was at a very early time that the prohibition was removed. For gold and silver money were first coined by Phidian king of Argos (whose age is, I admit, very variously estimated, 760 or 650 B.C.) and even down to the time of Creesus gold and silver were scarce in Greece; see a. (160) on VIII (V). 10 § 8 and Hulse Public Economy i. p. 6 f. Eng. ii. H. Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce this supposed prohibition to the fact, that gold and silver money remained unknown for a longer time in the isolated valley of the Euxine than in the trading districts on the coast, and that the Spartans retained their old iron money in use for a long time, but in bar, and afterwards as a sort of exchange (see Schumann op. c. p. 177 Eng. 6) and employed it even later along with gold and silver money for internal trade. See however Tucker op. c. 117. SEEL. [500]

15 τε] δὲ Ἡ 16 γὰρ omitted by P 32 δὲ] τε Μ 1 P.; quidem Wil.
liam, γε Ἡ?

§ 37 τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβεβηκέ τε τοῦναίτων τὸν νομοθέτη τοῦ συμ- (VII) 16 φέροντος τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἄχρηστα, τοὺς δ’ ιδιώτας φιλοχρημάτων.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας πολιτείας ἢ τοσοῦ-

τον εἰρήσθω (ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστω ἡ μάλιστ’ ἢ τῇ ἐπιτιμ-

δο σείει) ἢ δὲ Κρήτης πολιτεία πάρεσσες μὲν ἔστι ταύτην, VII ἕχε ἢ δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χείρον, τὸ δὲ πλείων ἢττον γλαφυ-

ρῶς. καὶ γὰρ οὐκε οἷοί καὶ λέγεται δε τὰ πλείοτα μεμιρήθη̄

τὴν Κρήτης πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακώνων τὸ δὲ πλείωτα

15 τε] δὲ Η 16 γὰρ omitted by P 4 (M 1 P.); quidem Wil. liam, γε Ἡ?
§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττοι διήρθησαν τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VI)
25 τῶν Λυκοῦργου, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ
βασιλέως καταλυτών ἀπεδήμησει, τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-
τρίψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγενείαν ἄποι-
κοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ
29 πρὸς τὴν ἀποκλίαν ἔλθοντες τὴν τάξεως τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-
§ 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν

25 ἐπιτροπεῖα I P¹ and 1st hand of M² P² (in P², altered by a later hand) || τῶν
Χαρίλλου P¹ || Χαρίλλου Bas.¹, see Comm. || 26 τότε omitted by Π¹ Ar., [τότε]
Susem.¹ || 27 περὶ περὶ τὴν Π² Bk. || 28 Λύκτιοι κρῆτες Π¹, ἄλλως Λύκτιοι p¹ in
the margin || 30 [διὸ……..40 Κάμικοι] Susem. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι]
Spengel

24 διαβρῶν = quasi per membra et art-
us distinguere et certum in ordinem redi-
gere (Bonitz): to articulate, elaborate
(Welldon).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τῶν Δ.] Ephoros
l.c. (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus,
as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous
child of his brother Polydektes, for certain
reasons which are stated went to Crete and
did not return until Charilaos himself
had assumed the government. Compare
Plutarch Lycurg. cc. 2—5; Triber op. c.
p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel Die Quellen in
Plutarches Lykurgos 22 ff. (Marburg
1870.) Susem. (352)

25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos
in VIII(v). 12 § 12 (see n.): probably we
should restore it here, or else read Cha-
rillos there. Susem. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ’…κατοικοῦσιν ["And
the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos
had found the system of the laws estab-
lished at that time amongst the inhabit-
ants." In just the same way Ephoros (l.c.
481) replies to those who claim a Lacedae-
monian descent for the Cretan institutions
on the ground that the Lyttians were a
colony from Sparta and that colonists
generally preserve the usages of the
mother state. He urges that many colo-
nies did not do this and that many
Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta,
yet had the same institutions as the
Spartan colonies in Crete. On these con-
siderations of Aristotle and Ephoros,
then, the Lycurgan institutions at Sparta,
so far from being genuinely Spartan,
were not even of Dorian origin, but had
belonged in the first instance to the pre-
Dorian population of Crete; unless in-
deed even these earliest inhabitants of
Crete are to be regarded as Dorians (as
they are by Ottfried Müller The Dorians

I. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has
been refuted by Triber p. 81 ff. In
opposition to the view of Ephoros and
Aristotle, which is in itself improbable,
he has sought to maintain the truth of
that combated by Ephoros, that Spartan
institutions actually passed over into
Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare
n. (356) on § 4. Polybios moreover IV. 54.
6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the read-
ning there also) as the oldest of the Cretan
towns and likewise as a colony of Laced-
aemon. Triber has shown conclusively
p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there
never really existed any specially 'Dorian'
political or social principles, such as are
presumed to have found their highest and
completest embodiment in Sparta. Su-
sem. (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention
merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants
of the pre-Dorian population, if after all
the Spartan and other Dorian settlers
had accepted the same institutions? Ar-
stotle cannot have contradicted himself
in such a manner as this, or have written
such nonsense. It is much more likely
that some learned Peripatetic added this
in order to tack on the following remarks
about Minos, his maritime power, and
his death. He did not however perceive
that they are not at all appropriate to this
connexion, and that to speak of Crete as
favourably situated for maritime supreme-
cy over the Hellenes agrees but ill
with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16:
where the remoteness of the island is
said to have shut it off from external
complications and from foreign dominion.
Susem. (355)

Grote II. 484 n. 2 has another way
out of the difficulty. He takes the word
as in Thuc. i. 17, "the neighbouring
31 auton tropou χρωται αυτοις, ως κατασκευισαντος Μίνω (vii) πρωτου την ταξιν των νομων, δοκει δε η εθις και προε την αρχην την 'Ελληνικην περικεναι και κεισθαι καλων (p. 10) παση γαρ οπικειαι την θαλασση, σχεδιων των 'Ελλων
35 ιδρυμων περι την θαλασσαν παντων οπικειαι γαρ τη μην της Πελοποννησου μικρων, τη δε της 'Ασιας του περι Τριτων
§ 4 τοπου και Ροδου. διο και την της θαλασσης αρχην κατα
σχει ο Μινως, και τας νησους των μεν εχεροσατο των
§ 10 τησεν οικει περι Καμικου.
§ 5 οπικειαι δε αναλογων η Κρητικη ταξις προς την Λακωνικην. γε-3
1772 α ωροθει τε γαρ τοις μεν ειλωτες τοις δε Κρητικην οι περιοικα,
32 [την.... νομων] Stahr
33 παση.....35 παντων noticed by Theodoros
35 τη μεν τηι] τη μεν Γ Μ α | 36 μεκρων] διλογι before τη Ηπειρωνη/ν Π "
τηι.....37 δε omitted by Qb Tα and Pβ (1st hand, added in the margin by a later
30 ρηθοι Π' Ar. Ι. 40 Καμικου Βασιν, Κα-
31 μικου ταινι in margin, perhaps rightly, καμικου Γ Μ Ρ1-34 Αλδ., καμικων Π', καμικων
Qb Tα, Camerinam Albertus Magnus and Ar.
1772 α 1 α ωροθει τε omitted by Μ'Ed

states'" The words of Ephoros in Strabo x. p. 737 are: τοις δε Κρηταις δι-
γωρησας (sc. των νομων) κακωτισθων των
πολειμων και μάλιστα των Κωνοιων, των
πολεμιων μενοι δε τεινα των νομων
παρα Λεκτια και Γρόιακοι και Άλαιοι
ται πολιχνων μελοι η ταρ ελεοτοι, και
dη και τα Λεκτιων νομα πουσιαθα μαρ-
tωρα των τα Λακωνικων προετοσε επι-
παινοιντας άπολογεις γαρ θεται φαιλάτεν τα
τη μπροστιας ένθη εκει άλλων υπερθει εισα
τοις προσθετεν ειαντον ει τοις προσθετεν
πολιτε-
34 οπικειαι = commands the whole

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete
lost its fleet and maritime supremacy.
Cp. Thuc. I. 4: Ephoros Epist. 64 (Müller 1. 150) και γαρ εκαστοι τρι-
terος τοις Κρηταιοι...δε δε επιθυβηκανει τα
κατοικη.

§ 46 οι αναλογων Λακωνικην

36 Trierer p. 86 ff. shows that, although the points of difference as well as of resem-
blance are not brought out factually enough, yet in the main the whole com-
parison is just. He tries to make it probable that from its quite peculiar char-
acter the similarity can only be explained by a real transference from Sparta to
Crete. Oncken on the other hand, 11,

377. finds a reason both for the resen-
blance and the limitations to it in the
one point which Aristotle has not men-
tioned, the fact that in Sparta so in
Crete a dominant race of the same
Dorian descent broke in from a foreign
land upon an old political order, overthrew
it by violence, and then directed their
whole energies to the task of maintaining
themselves uncontaminated and unassess-
able at the head of their new settlement.

Pultilus vi. 45, 46 goes still further and
even denies that there were any resem-
blances at all between the two politicos.

SOREN. (356)

He insists [1] on the absence of any
legal restriction on the possession of land
or money, and [2] on the annual tenure
of offices (as contrasted with the life-long
tenure of Spartan kings and Germenial)
and the democratic characters of the Greek
governments. Undoubtedly as we ap-
proach Roman times the power of the
exarch-powers, Hock iii. pp. 64—
97, who supplies has seen in speaking
this tendency, that a democratic revolution
had subverted the government of Ar-
"tolia since.

5 1377 α 1 α ωροθει
καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφότεροις ἐστὶν, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ (VII) Δάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἤ καὶ § 6 δὴλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἢ τάξεως. οἱ
5 μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐξουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τοὺς ἀμφότεροι ἢ κατέλησαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
§ 7 τοῖς κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἐξουσια ἐκκλησιὰς δὲ μετέχοντες, κυρία δ' οὐδένος ἐστὶν ἄλλη ἡ συνεπιφύλασσαι τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἐξουσίοις καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρήσιν ἢ τοῖς
Δάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Δακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκαστὸς εἰσφέρεται) [15] τε τατεσαμένων, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινώτερος:

3 φιδίτια ΠΜσ and Ρ1 (1st hand, apparently altered by Ρ1) || ἀνδρεία Μ*, ἀν-δρεία Ρ1 Bk., ἀλλὸς ἀνδρείᾳ Ρ1 in the margin || 8 βουλήν "a gloss under which lurks a Cretan name" Spengel || πρῶτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Ar., perhaps rightly || 11 ἄλλη Ρ1 and Π2 (1st hand, emended by corr.1)

3 ἀνδρεία—meals of men: or more precisely, clubs or companies of men who messed together: see n. (378) on 11 § 3. SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες] The same remark is found in Ephoros l.c. 483, with the object of proving the same conclusion. Comp. also Phl. Lycurg. c. 12. But that Ephoros repeats this argument three times, is a very inexact statement of Trieber, p. 100: for at p. 486 the expression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσίτιοι τὰ καλός ἀνδρεία and p. 483 εἰς τὰ συσσίτια ἄγουσι τὰ ἀνδρεία. SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of Sparta was the constitution of every independent Cretan town. We learn from the inscriptions that little places like Hierapytna, Priaius (Praesus), Saxos, Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλή, and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f. SUSEM. (360)

§ 7 το ἐκκλησίας ἢ κτῇ] Cr. II §§ 5, 6 with Exc. IV. Although the simple verb ἐπιφύλαξεν does not mean "to vote," but "to put to the vote," yet so far as I know συνεπιφύλαξεν is everywhere found in the sense of "vote

approvingly," i.e. "confirm by a vote," auctores hicri: Polyb. xxii. 13. 1, Plutarch De Garrulitate 511 f. Here it can have no other meaning. The only doubt is whether we should take it literally (1) that the popular assembly was bound to ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had the right, without proper debate and without amendment, simply to confirm or reject the proposal previously decided by others. That question will be discussed in n. (380). SUSEM. (362)

Aesch. De Fals. Leg. 35 has the middle voice in the same sense. Compare καταστήσων with both meanings (1) to be very silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In the Gortynian inscription the assembly in the market-place and the stone from which the speaker addressed the people are twice mentioned x. 34, ἀμφαιθαί ἐκ τοῦ ἀγοραν καταβελεκτὸν τὸν πολιτεύοντα ἀπὸ τὸ λαὸν, ὁ ἀπαγορεύονται, i.e. ἀναφαίνεται [he must adopt] ἐκ τοῦ ἀγοραν καταβελεκτὸν (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ (cp. Soph. O. Col. 196) ὁ ἀπαγορεύονται, adoption shall be in the market-place, when the citizens are assembled, from the stone where they make speeches: and again xi. 16.

16 εἰρήται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31. Cr. n. (341). SUSEM. (363)
κοινοτέρας] ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 § 31, in a more public fashion.

18 εἰς τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public domain." Zittelmann pp. 139, 140 conjectures that the citizens had the right of pastures on this domain-land. By the law of inheritance in the Gortynian inscription, certain of the cattle with the house in the town pass to the sons as priscipium; but the daughters have a share of the land which is cultivated by klasmai.


SUSEM. (364)

§ 8 10 τέκται καὶ μέρος] Partly on this model, partly on that of Hippodamos (§ 3 n.), is based the division of the land in Aristotle's ideal state, τῆν (VII). 10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the temples, (2) of the ἄνεμινα, (3) of private individuals, (4) and (2) together forming the public land. In the state of the Latins there is no public land, although Plato mentions the Cretan institution in with approval, τῆν 847 e quoted in n. (341) or 9 § 31. SUSEM. (365)

20 ἦστ' εἰ κοινὸ κτλ.] If we understand this as e.g. Schömann does, τὸν 307 con. tr., that the mess-hands maintained the members of the family, wives daughters younger boys and slaves, who had their meals at home, then the whole of Oncken's proof (11. 389), that καὶ γαρ εἰς καὶ παιδαὶ καὶ ἄλλοι is a spurious addition, falls to the ground. Such slight inaccuracies of expression, due to excessive brevity, are no uncommon thing in Aristotle. The sense might be made clearer by a slight insertion thus: "one part is set apart for the worship of the gods and for the state expenditure, the other for the public messes— and the entire title of the households of the citizens—, so that all, men and women, children, are kept at the public cost."

Schumann rightly remarks that this explains why an Aegyptian state had to be paid for each slave: see Exc. ii. p. 337. Oncken however gives a different explanation (11. 387), he makes each of the subject population 17) contribute an Aegyptian state, SUSEM. (366)

§ 9 22 διλογοτινάιας] Our only authority for a Cretan delites, Heracleides Ponticus, and the writers quoted by Athen. tv. 142 f. Diondias and Pomponius, do not enable us to verify this statement; Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old practices of sitting at tables; Cretan quorum nemo gustavit exceptum eum quem, Ceere

πρὸς τὴν διεξαγωγήν κτλ.] See Schömann p. 304 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (367)

Also Zittelmann Das Recht von Gortyn p. 101 and the inscription itself i. 1, 8, 9.

25 εἴτε κατὰ τοῦ διαγ. κτλ.] Since Aristotle thought it so important for his own ideal state to maintain uniformity in the number of citizens (see c. § 12 ff., 7 § 51 tv. (11. 388)), and in not too much about the means of securing that end, it would
have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, *Nic. Eth.* vii. 5. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, *p. 389 ff.,* tries to prove that § 9, as far as καὶρὸς, is interpolated, are wholly untenable: and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here; we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. *Susem.* (369) 32 διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀκροβύτητα κτλ. See c. 9 § 22 n. (323 b). *Susem.* (370) 34 ἐκ τινός γενών. Called στρατός in the Gortynian inscription V 5 ο᾽ οἰ αἰθαλεσταρτος εκοσμων οι σων κυλωι = when it was the turn of the ‘troop’ of the Ae­thallians to assume office and Kylos was κύριος ἐπτύχων. Comp. Hesych. στράτος (εἰς) = αἱ τάξεις τοῦ πλῆθους. Similarly in the oath of Dreros, Cauer Delect. inscrip. 38, ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰθαλεως κοσμόμουτων τῶν σων κυλα. 35 κεκοσμημένων] like ὁ ἀρέσας, ὁ βα­σιλεύονς, the aorist being more usual. *11* 38 μὴ κατά γραμματα] without written rules to guide them. *Cr.* 9 § 23. *12* See *11* § 4. 40 λήμματος. They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles’ brio to the ephor Klean-
41 γ') ί' apparently Ar., γάρ Susem.1 wrongly, enim William, whence nothing is to be inferred about Γ.

1272 b 1 διαφηρέστων Γ' M and perhaps Ar., διαφηρέστων 14 (1st hand) δέ Congreve, rightly, I think 6 πάντα πάντα P9 (1st hand), πάντα P10 (corr.) 8 of αύ Koraes, δόταν Γ' II Ar. Schneider Bk. 9 τῶν διαφήρων (not here but before νη καθάσας) Π2 Ar. Bk. and π1 in margin: so transposed, διαφήρων - τοις or even better <τοις> τῶν διαφήρων? Schneider Heimsoth transposes added... 12 ἀλλὰ ἀλλάζομεν before 9 καὶ δῆλον κτλ. 11 γάρ Susem. following Bernays' translation, δέ Γ' II Ar. Bk. Susem.1 διαλαμβάνοντες] suspected by Benus (1std. Arist. 183 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem., id est lambarant Schneider, needlessly if we alter μοναρχίαν into ἀναρχίαν ἀναρχίαν Bernays, μοναρχίαν Γ' II Ar. Bk. Susem.1

dridas, Plut. Per. 22c. Hence the office is not such a prize as to excite the cupidity of the commoners.

41 τοῖς ἐφόροις] Cp. 9 § 19 n. (316).

Susem. (370 b)

1272 b 1 τῶν διαφηρέστων goes with πάντως: at a distance from anyone who is likely to corrupt them.

§ 13 δυναστεική] A δυναστεία is the worst and most extreme form of oligarchy, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of government: vii(iv). 5 § 3 δόταν καὶ αὕτη παραπλέος καὶ ἀγαθή μή ἢ δῶματι ἄλλη αὐτῶν n. (1115); 6 § 11 n. (1128); 14 § 7—9 (1447); vii(v). 7 § 3 n. (1328), 12 nn. (1331): vii(vi). 7 § 3 n. (1447); vii(v). 7 § 3 n. (1509); 6 § 11, 12 nn. (1586, 9), 7 § 12, 13 n. (1605); 8 § 7 n. (1613), § 11 n. (1617).

Susem. (371)

Thebes at the time of the Persian war is an instance: Thuc. 111. 63, 3.

5 μεταφ., ἀπολείφων τῆς ἀρχῆς] to resign office before their term (of a year) expires. The verb is ἀπολείψαμεν in the Gotthian inscription εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀπολείψαμεν; or (7) § 2 (after) δέ ἀπολείψαμεν.

§ 14 8 το τῆς ἀκομής the fact of the suspension of the office of Kármas, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cp. Thuc. 1. 48 καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνοῦ ἀπολείψαμεν, ἦν οὐκόν αὐτὸς διαλέγομεν; 11. 43 καὶ ἔδωκαν, ἦν ἐκ τῶν διαφηρετῶν αὐτὴν εἰς θεσσαλίαν (Strabo). 11 ἀν μὴ κτλ] Oncken (11. 351) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Kármas. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartan and Cretan senates, and between the Ephoria and Kármas, it is in all the essential features of the authority of these offices. It is clear in the summation that, as in Sparta, 11. 10, 14, 15, so in Crete, the Senate had critical jurisdiction over the most serious matters, and the Kármas appeared, like the Ephoria, as aaraxes in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no pronounced there is often no judge. Thuc. 1. 37. 11: διαλαμβάνοντες — by having persons
§ 15 χίλιαν ξοικαν και στασισάτω και μάχεσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τοῖς διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τῶν χρόνων μηκέτι πόλεις εἰναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύσει θαί τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p. 306) ἔστι δὲ ἐπικυλήνων οὕτως ἐξούσα πόλις * * τοῖς Βουλομένωις ἐπιτίθεσα καὶ δυναμένοις. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἰρηται, σφίζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων ἐξηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω § 16 πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοικὸν μὲν τοῖς Κρητησ, οἱ δὲ εἰλατε ἀφίσταιται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ κοινωνοῦντι τοῖς Κρήτεσ, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβεβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε πανερατὸν τῶν ἀσθενεῖν τῶν ἑκεί νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαῦθ′ ἣμιν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-
II. 11. 3] 1272 b 12—1272 b 33, 307

11 τείας: πολιτευεσθαι δὲ δοκούσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιου καλώς καὶ VIII
25 πολλά περίττως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ᾽ ένια παρα- πλησίως τοῖς Λάκωνως. αὐταὶ γερ ἀπολιτευτεὶ τρέις ἄλλοις τε σύνεγγυς πὼς εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρουσιν, ὑ ἡ Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τοῦτον ἢ τῶν 20 Καρχηδονίου. καὶ πολλαὶ τῶν τεταγμένων ἦχε παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς

§ 2 καλῶς σημειοῦ ἐτο πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τῶν ἐμοιο ἐκόσιον διαμένειν εν ἡ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ στα- σιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἶπεν, γεγενηθαί μήτε τύραννον.

§ 3 ἦχε δὲ παραπλησία τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὴ μὲν συμ- 24 καὶ καρχηδόνῃς after καλὼς Μπ’. 18 ὡς δὲ ἔστεκεν Καρχηδόνιον μετὰ Μπ’. [8] Susen, 2, 13 30 συμεῖο τι; Σουσεν, <εφ.> συντεταγμένη Schneider, τι τεταγμένη ἡ Bergk (Comm. crit. spec. vii. Marburg 1850, one or other seems necessary; heu instituteis Ae.; τάλακε for πολείκαις Bender 31 διὰ τὸν Spenel, έχοντα Π’Βκ. omitted by Μπ’, untransl. by Ατ.; τοῦτον Bergk, έχειν Hanpke, έκοι νος W. Wagner (De Plauti Attul. Bonn 1864 p. 37). all before Spenel;
<έχ.> έντα τις <έχ.> οὐναι Σαυππε, έχοντα <έχ.> Bender following Lücken’s translation populum rerum compromet. έν omitted by Μπ’, crossed out by p²

C. 11 The constitution of Carthage.


§ 1 24 πολιτευεσθαι δι κτλ] “are thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution, (b) with many features of unequal relative excellence, and (c) some which most nearly resemble the Spartan constitution.” Of these three points Aristotle adopts two, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 3, and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the further discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently that he also accepted the second point. Herodot. III. 24, and Julian, Or. i. p. 14 (Spanh.), also point to a similarity between the Carthaginian and Spartan constitutions which they declare to be the best actually established. Polybius vi. 51 ff. and Cicero De Rep. ii. 23 § 41 ff. compare them both with one another and with the Roman constitution, while Eratosthenes (in Strabo i. p. 66) praises the admirable character of the Carthaginian and Roman constitutions. Susen. (377)

The existing struggle with Dionysius for Sicily must have called attention to the government of Carthage, see note on 1273 a 36 (Wyse).

§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is thoroughly <well> organized when the popular element is attached to the system of its own free will.

31 διαμένων, like μεθέω τοί; 16, be abide by, remain loyal to, a government.

32 μῆτε τύραννον] This anastomia seems true. For the efforts of Hannos (about B.C. 314) to make himself tyrant, mentioned by Aristotle himself VIII(v.), 7 § 4, met with no success, see n. (1297); while the attempt of Hasdrubal was not until after Aristotle’s time, B.C. 308. That also ended at last unsuccessfully; see the same note. Lastly there was one Macrinius between 550 and 550 B.C., who having been banished because he had been defeated in Sardinia procured his return by favor of arms. He then summoned the popular assembly, justified his conduct before it, and had ten senators put to death, but made no change in the existing constitution. However he fell under suspicion of aiming at tyrannical power, in consequence, and as a punishment for his former violent proceedings, he was executed. Justin. XVIII. 7, so that this instance does not contradict Aristotle’s statement. With regard to VIII(v.), 12 § 13 see n. (1371). Susen. (377 b)

§ 3 "The points of analogy to the Spartan polity are the common metals of the clubs like the palaestra at Sparta, and
the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit).” See Excursus IV. pp. 340—347. Susem. (378-9-81-2)


§ 4. 38 “And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity,” like the Heracleid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartanææ is obscure. See Hdt. v. 72, Curtius History 1. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann Antiquities pp. 208, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr.

39 [míte kαθ’ αὐτό κτλ] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. Susem. (383) eì tì διαφέρον [See the Critical Notes. The sense required is “and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority.”

40 [kαθ’ ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly “elected rather than hereditary”: Cope more cautiously “according to age.” But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

[μεγάλων γάρ κύριοι κτλ] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b). But the conditional praise here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. Susem. (384)

41 [εὐτελείας = cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in Ῥήτ. Π. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 [tα μὲν οὖν πλείστα κτλ] “Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences” sc. from the best type “are common to all the constitutions mentioned.” And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). Susem. (388)
3 parakbáseis < τάς τής ἀρίστης τάξεως > or something similar Susen.) cp. 9 II. Fulleborn first suspected a defect 4 ὑπόθεσιν < ἑκαναύσιν > Bernays; cp. alio 9 § 1 | 5 πολιτείας < τοῦ καρποφορίου > | 6 πολιτείας < τοῦ Καρποφόρου > | 7 πολιτείας < τοῦ Καρποφόρου > Thurot, who discovered the lacuna 8ἐκλείψεις 10, ἐκλείψεις Μ' (corr.) 9 ὑπόθεσιν Morel Bk. Bernays | 10 ὑπόθεσιν Morel Bk. Bernays. In Π' ἡ ἀριστοκρατία is, apparently by the scribe himself | 11 τοῖς καὶ Σusem., καὶ τοῖς II βκ., καὶ τοῖς Bernays | 12 ἐπιφώνουσι II' (emended by corr.) | 13 ὑπόθεσιν προς τοῖς Βκ., ὑπόθεσιν II' (emended by corr.) 14 | 15 τά δῆματα | 16 τὰ δήματα Μ'., τά ὀλίγα Π' (1st hand, corrected by p1), τάξεις Γ'

4 With τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιμετραθέντων ἀν. and take πρὸς when judged by.

5 τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιμετραθέντων κτλ. The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μὲν μὲν ἐν τῷ κατὰ ἡ μή καλῶς πρός τὴν ἀριστήν κενομοθέτησαι τάξειν, ἐτέρα δὲ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ἑκαναύσιν τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῦ πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an aristocracy; i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy; more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see VI.(IV). 3 | 4 n. (1141); 7 | 6 n. (1235), and cp. VIII(V). 7 | 4 n. (1197), 12 | 12 n. (1772), 14 n. (1780): or else at any rate as a polity (πολιτεία) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental assumption (ὑπόθεσις) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. 9 τοῦ ἀρνητικοῦ μεγάλου ἀν. | 11 μεγάλα ἀνείπη στρατιά, VI.(IV). 8 | 7 δὲ αὐτήν καὶ ἡ (536) on III. 7 | 3. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for these must stand highest; hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchical principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristocracy departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of oligarchy and Democracy; hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see VIII(V) 9.

6 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. "For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed": otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice."

8 παντεία. 20 both: vtor. the Senators on the one side, the Senators on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: παντεία is here treated as a kind of justice. Such a definition, however, would be incorrect. Comp. Ancl. Polit. 1. 41 b 21 ἢ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ μαζί τινος καὶ μαζί τινος (Westc. also VI.(IV) 4 | 3. See also Exc. 17, 4 Simon, p. 347. STIM. 383.

Add Ancl. Polit. 1. 27 | 9, 44 b 26. Meditations. 11. 4 | 1, 559 b 11, 11. 3 | 8.
χροσ, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς (VI) 12 ἐσφερομένωι ἀντεπείν ἐξεστίν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολι-

382 b 17, and De Anima III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen).

§ 6 ii ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly ; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy: see on 6 § 16 n. (218) and Exc. i to B. III. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, vii(vi). 4. 4 n. (1415), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution vi(iv). 14. 4 f.: at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held vi(iv). 6. 1, the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, vii(vi). 4. 4; or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, vii(iv). 14. 4 n. (1322). And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. Susem. (388)

12 ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις κτλ] In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors were allowed to take part in the debate; other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schomann Antiquities p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to listen to the resolutions of the government without really having the final decision in its own hands, and 10 § 7 (cp. n. 362) that it had in those states no greater powers entrusted to it than to ratify the decrees of the Cosmi, or the kings, and the senators, all this certainly looks at first sight as if the assembly had not the right to reject these decrees, and indeed many have so understood it [e.g. Höck Kreta III. 59 f., Ridgeway op. c. p. 134]. But that these expressions should not be thus pressed is shown by the simple consideration that if the assembly had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to convok it in case the Shofetes and the senate were agreed; whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing, it must be conceded to Oncken (i. p. 279 f.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch Lycurg. 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhetra) by the kings Theopompos and Polydoros (αὐτὰς, αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς ἀποκατάφερα ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ τής δικαίου ἁγίας οὔτε ἀρχηγεῖς διὰ τοῦτο ἢτοι ἔπειτα ἄριστον, τοῖς γενόμενοι παρὰ τὸ ἐξήλθον ἢτοι τοῖς παρακτίους ἐπάνω τε ἕκτεντα καὶ μεταποιοῦντα τὴν γνώμην παρὰ τὸ ἐξήλθον, i.e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. Susem. (389)
§ 7 teiwos ouc estin' to de tis pentafrakias kurias ouias polllas kai megaloiv evf ai'tovn ai'retas eina, kai tin tin evstaton
taustas arieisbhai tinin megistis arxhyn, eti de taustas
pleona archev chrionov ton ton alloan (kai gar exelilenostes
arxhousai kai mellontes) olymarchikon, to de amiswun kai
mu klerisias aristokratikov theton, kai eti to toiothov ente-
ron, kai to tin dikes epo toinov archeon diexousbhai par-
soas, kai mu allass up alloan, kathaper ev lakaidamorof
parakbainwe de tis aristokratias eti tis ton karxhodon
vion moliasa pro tin olymarchian katina bin diairiai kai
sundokei tios pollon' ou gar monon arystiinedh alla kai
ploutinidh ouioutai dein arieisbhai tis arxhousai; adunaton
9 gar ton aporouta kalw archein kai skholazein. eiteper ou
mein arieisbhai ploutinidh olymarchikon to de kar' arse-
tin arystokratikon, autne tis an eiz taini trity, kath h-
per synetaktai [kai] ton karxhodonov ton peri tin pro-
liteian airowntai gair eis duo tausta blankoutes, kai me-
30loista tais megistas, tous te basileis kai tous stratigous.
10 dein de nomizein amirtima nomodieto tin parakbasin eina

16 xlmw M', xleqov P*4 Q*4 T*4 Abk. Bk. Susem. P* (later hand), xleqevi P* (10th
hand) 17 melonoi? Sylburg wrongly
to tais P*4 and p' in the margin, ton P*4 T*4
18 kai et... etpov Kluge thinks, interpolated or out of place 19 to
kata Korace (ep. 111. 1. 10), tov II Ar. Bk., tov <ai'atov> - Venturi: tov arxhlon tioum
P*4 Ab. 20 kathaper ev lakedamorof Bender thinks not genuine 18 [erat
Susem, untranslated by Ar., kal synetaktai Congreve transposing, cal - synetak-
ryve - or something similar Thurot

§ 7 13 tais pentafrakias See Exc. iv. p. 348f. Susem. (300)
19 upo twn arxheon Aristotle says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. iv. He
regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratic pro-
vided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to
them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified
for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of
justice are more appendages to different offices of state. Further cp. III. 11 10, 10
11 tais deis diaferesin sweta meras...tia autin
tai tairis kal ton Karxhodon: tiow gai
dixaiei epistres tois devoun nnu. (413, 4):
aile n. (325) on 9 23 above, p. 248
and Inotev, p. 54 n. 3. Susem. (301)
20 kathaper ev lakedamorof On the
jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors
at Sparta, see nnu. (315, 339 b) on 9 23.
23, 25; on that of the kings Scholmous
p. 379 Eng. tr.; on that of the other
magistrates ep. 7, 250h. Susem. (301 b)
8 23 alla kal ploutinidh! Yet
apart from the ideal state... see 8000
on IV(vii). 15 9 tairis ev tairis -
Aristotle himself approves of Solon's
moderate course in this respect 19 II 6.
6: III. 11 8. Susem. (302)
9 30 ton stratigonom See Exc.
iv. p. 349f. Susem. (303 b)
10 31 dein ed nomizein ev kal See 9
2 n. (379 b) compare IV(vii) 5, 25.
10 9 n. 14 Heil If Aristotle demands
the legislator that he is to free the magis-
trates from all matches about their sup-
port, this can only be done by paying
them. And yet in 7 above he had him-
self declared it a better regulation to
combine such others with payments.
(Fullerwern). See however Exc. IV(p. 379 b).
Susem. (303)
τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. εὖ ἄρχη γὰρ τοῦθ᾽ ὅραν ἐστὶν τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολάζειν
καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐδιωκτέντες. βέλτιον δ' εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τῇ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἑπεισιών
οὐδὲν ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελείοθαί τῇ σχολῆς. ☼

32 ταῖδ' Βκ.2, a misprint probably || 33 βέλτιστον Π2-3
1273 b 6, 7 βέλτιον.....σχολῆς transposed by Susem., Introd. p. 81 f. ||
6 εὔφοριον Π1Π2 Α. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly

39 δ' τι Π2, δ'τι Μα1-4 Ald. Βk. and perhaps Ρ3 || γάρ Α. δ' ΓΠ (for which Π2 in
Susem.1 is a misprint) Βk. || 40 πολείτων Γ Μα
1273 b 1 τε.....τών τι' εἶναι βεβαιοὶ ἀριστοκρατικῶν Π2 Βk. || 2 δ'] γάρ Σπεγγλ ||
τοῖς ὅνομένοις Πτ' (1st hand, corrected by p1 in the margin), [τοῖς ὅνομένοις] Susem.1-2, τούς ὅνομένοις Ραμαος || 3 μὲν is rightly omitted by Π2 Βk. ||
4 ἦν ἃν Π Μα || 5 ἄρατ' ἄρχεοι Σπεγγλ, ἀρισταρχεῖαι ΓΠ Βk.

35 εἰ δὲ...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς] "But even supposing that means must be taken into account, in order to secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can devote their whole time to their duties, "it is a grave defect that the highest offices, like that of Shofete or general, should be purchasable." Here he takes
up the condition postulated and justified above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτισθέν κτλ.
36 τὸ τὰς μεγάλας ἤντας κτλ.] The same thing is said by Polybios vi. 56. 4 (Schlosser). Susem. (394) Mr Wyse refers to Plato Κρ. 544 Β ὅν ὅνται βασι-
λείαι and such like intermediate polities are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ τοὺς βασιλάδους).

41 τούτοις = τῶν εὑρίσκω. In c. 5 § 15, 7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative weakness of direct enactments and go-
vernment interference. But public opinion can be legitimately educated and influenced, and this is τὸ παῖδευσάμα πρὸς τὰς πολείτιας. See VIII(v), 9 §§ 11-15.

1273 b 1 ἢδηςθαι κτλ.] "Nor is it strange that the purchasers of place should be accustomed to make a profit out of it, when it has cost them dear." The article with the participle need not be suspected; the sense is "buying office as they do." Cp. c. 8 § 10 ὃ ἐνεργῷ πορίζωντες ὅπως ὅπως they supply, whereas ὃ ἐνεργῇs would be "supplying, as they do" = as they supply (Tyrrell).

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ B. 11.
Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic examples of shoemaker and flute player: cp. c. 3 § 3 n., Pl. Lecr. 11, 374 C.

12. πολιτικότερον] more to the advantage (or, in the interest) of the state, which is in this way better administered (καλλίων οίτιν έκαστόν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολιτικῶν).

13. Κοινοτέρον τῷ γάρ] sc. εήσει. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικότερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικότερον. On this paragraph consult further vii.[iv].

15. τοι τῶν αὐτῶν] Each of the inevitable task incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath).

16. οἰκία ὑπὸ τοῦ στεφάνου] The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Picart). Semel. (397)


The subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa may be classified as follows: (1) the so-called Liby-Phoenicians, i.e. the old Phoenician settlements and colonies recently founded by Carthage: colonized towns, partly dry only inhabited by a mixed Phoenician and Libyan population, which had to pay a fixed tribute and furnish contingent. Uica alone escaped a similar fate, and had its independence and its walls preserved to it from the twin feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors. (2) The agricultural villages of native Libyans who had been transformed from free farmers into serfs; they had to pay a fourth part of the produce of the soil as land tax (tithonos) i.e. 75 of 100 if they were subjected to a regular system of recruiting. (3) The so-called pastoral tribes (savages) who had to pay tribute and to furnish contingent. In the towns of the Carthaginian state preserved by Sallustian writers (1) are called ἄθροι, "towns," and the villages occupied by (2) are called τάσση, "towns," of subjects [McCulloch 81]
20 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γὰρ ἑώται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν (VI πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀποτασιά-
§ 16 στοὺς εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δὲ, ἢν ἄτυχια γένηται 
tις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ φάρ-
μακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἴσυνίας.

(12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρη-
26 τικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αὔπερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι, 
12 τούτον ἔχει τοῦ τρόπον τῶν δὲ ἀποφηματοποιοῦν 
λιτείας ένιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ 
ἀντιωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τῶν βίων, περὶ 
30 ὅν εἰ τὰς ἀξίολογον, εὑρήται σχέδου περὶ πάντων, ένιοί δὲ 
νομοθέται γεγονὼν, οὐ μὲν ταῖσ οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οὐ 
καὶ τῶν ὅθεν ἔτη, πολιτεύεται αὐτού καὶ τούτον οὐ μὲν 
ἐγένοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων, οὐ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ 
Λυκοργος καὶ Σόλωνς οὔτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-
§ 2 στηρισαί. 

25 περὶ...1274 b 26 ὁ (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188b. 
Götting pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. iii. (399, 423, 427) 
|| κρήτης Μαρτίου || 26 αὔπερ εἰ(περ)7 Susem. (I may have omitted περ., i.e. William) || 27 τι Here omitted in Π, hence [?1] Susem.1.2 || 32 νόμων inserted after μὲν 
by Π, Βk. || 33 νόμων |μόνον Π, Βk. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην Π, Βk.

55. 4. It is the latter which are here 
meant (ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). We are not to 
understand the passage, with Heeren (p. 42) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation 
of new colonies; but of appointments 
like that of governor and assessor of 
taxes which gave the holders the opportu-
nity of enriching themselves at the ex-
 pense of their subjects. (See Kluge p. 
192 ff., who however incorrectly assumes 
that such officers were sent to Liby-
Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.) 
It was in accordance with the principles 
of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to 
give these appointments to decayed 
nobles (as might be inferred from 
Mommsen's account Π, p. 17 Eng. tr.), 
but according to Aristotle's explicit state-
mont to plebeians, or citizens who did not 
belong to the ruling houses. SUSEM. 
(398)

§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἴσυνίας "No 
spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e. 
no means of terminating civic strife. 
Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51 
on the second Punic War.

The Solonian Constitution: §§ 
1—6.

For the historical bearings of this pas-
sage consult especially Grote cc. 11, 31; 
tr. and Athenian Constitutional History 
translated by Bosanquet (Oxford 1878); 
Also Case Materials for the History of 
Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1874); 
Oncken Athen und Hellas pp. 161—173, 
Staatslehre 11, 410 ff.

§ 1 28 οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν κτλ] see 
1. 7. 5, 11. 7. 1. Here legislation is ap-
parently a branch of practical politics; 
cf. μ. Π, Π. πολιτικός, 1. 1. 2.

33 νόμων, οἵ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας] This 
distinction, which is quite in place here, 
induced the author of the suspected pas-
sage, §§ 6—14, to believe that in 
Aristotle's opinion a list of mere legislators 
was a further requisite. Whereas in fact 
Aristotle intends with these words to 
dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such 
list drawn up by Aristotle the interpo-
lator supplied the supposed want on his 
own account. SUSEM. (399)

§ 2 36 ἐνιοὶ μὲν οὐκοῦν] Introd. p. 20
II. 12. 3] 1273 b 20—1274 a 2. 315

τε γάρ καταλύσαι λιαν ἀκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν (IX) δήμον παύσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσας τῷ πατρίῳ, μήξαντά καλώς τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι γάρ τιν τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρέας πάνω βουλήν ὁλογραφικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρέτως ἀριστερὰς στοχαστικῶς, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικὸν. διότι τὰ Σολωνίκα ἑκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχουσα πρότερον οὗ καταλύσαι, τῇ τα βουλήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δήμον καταστήσαι,

37 γάρ omitted by M 19

41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια Π. Αρ. Πλ., but see § 4, where Schneider restored the pluralis καταλύσας τὰ δικαστήρια ἀνοικεῖ δὲ τοί. resit.

n. 1. The context shows that these eu-

logists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed
corporation, and not of Democracy, as
Oncken strangely maintains. Such a com-

bination of oligarchical and aristocratical

elements they found in the "old-

fashioned" Solonian democracy; in other

words, not merely a moderate Democracy,

but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least

a kind of Polity. SUNEM. (400)

41 Dies Uber die Berliner Fragmente der Αληθαρων πολεοδο (Berlin 1885), p. 35, refers to Isocr. Aesp. 16, Antid. 232, 312, for expressions of the current notion that Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; ὁ Σολων ὁ παλαιὸς ὁ πείδος τῆς πόλεως. 37 λιαν ἀκρατον Too unqualified.

38 τῆς πατρίως] The old-fashioned, as distinguished from the modern, democracy (§ 3, 3); Comp. §§ 3, 4; VIII (IV). 6 § 5; 14 §§ 7, 11, 12; VIII (VII). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3; VIII (VII). 5 §§ 10, 11 (μεταφάλλος δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίως δημοκρατίαν ἐπὶ τὴν κωμοτηρίαν) with the references in the notes. Comp. also VIII (VII). 7 § 7 n. "modern oligarchies": III. 6 § 9 n. (3.32).

Aristotle quite accepts the distinction, cp. §§ 5, 6; III. 11, 8; VII (IV). 11. 19 n. (1.203). For he has no objection to raise against these panegyrista of Solon, except that they referred even the aristocratical and oligarchical elements of the combination to Solon, whereas in fact only the democratic accession was his doing. With the following sentences compare Schol.-mann The Solonion Hellenic and Ethical comp d'État, an article in the J. Phil. X. 1866. 585—594, and R. Scholl De synagogy Atell. p. 10 ff. (Jena 1876). SUNEM. (400 b)

42 "Inter eós qui Solonem laudant, ni faller, lascravit in Aeneographe intel-

ligit: uia emin loquitur, ut Soloni et al-

quae ἀρχαῖς et βουλήδια tribuat, ut nihil

αὐτὸς δὲ δικαστήριον" (Spengel).

39 "by a happy blending of (other

elements) in the polity." 39—41 Parallel to the account given, probably by the same writer, of the Spartan polity 6 §§ 17.

4 On this battle-ground of contending opinions there are at least three issues. (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting the views of the panegyrista of Solon [Gratte, Franklel], or is he converting them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Scholzmann Att. Const. Itat. p. 37 Eng. tr.]? (b) What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See Eng. p. 330 ff.] (c) Is the statement it contains historically true? [Gratte, Curtius reject it. Thirlwall, Scholzmann accept it.]

41 Coue] Scholzmann, Frankel Die attischen Geschichtschreiber, 62 L. (Jena 1877). 80, and others lay too much stress on this word base—"cause", here and below, § 5 l. 13. Aristotle often speaks in a qualifying manner about things of which, in reality, he has not the slightest doubt. Thus base l. 15, comes very close to πιστὰ πέρα, the force of which, as often in other writers besides Aristotle, is to express not as much what is merely apparent and probable, as what is obvious, what has come to light. SUNEM. (401)

See above 1. 6, VIII (V). 3 §§ 9, 9; II. "The words express Aristotle's own opinion, because (1) the construction requires it (from atop γνωρίζεται, etc.), (2) the source requires it; some thought that Solon established a revised constitution, Aristotle contends that he only added a new element, the Democracy (Case)."

1274 a 1 τῆς τε βουλῆς What powers

Aristotle might assign to the council of the Areopago which Solon issued existing and left unaltered, it is not easy to see from this. SUNEM. (402)
Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν σημ. Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon's panegyrists in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts the historical statement of Solon's critics, but attacks the censure which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n. (396), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτωμάτων] accidentally, “in the course of events” (Susemihi). ναυαρχία = the supremacy at sea, like ναυρεσία; not found elsewhere in this sense.

13 ἐφορονημαιτεν] acquired overweening confidence in themselves, became aware of their importance. Eaton compares V (viii). 6. 11 μετά τὰ Μηδικά

1 This is strangely overlooked by Oncken II. 440 n. (1). As against Schömann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes Solon as having introduced the appointment of the Heliaea by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these censorious critics the formula used is the singular, τὰ δικαστήρια, which had given some show to the meaning which Schömann has refuted: see Exc. v. This defence then is fatal to Oncken's position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (ii. 494) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Heliaea. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon's critics and admires in thinking that it was he who made the Heliaea, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.

316 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β. 12. [II. 12. 3

τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινές τῶν
§ 4 αὐτῶν· λύσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων, κληροτόν οἶν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ’ ἐσχύσεν, ὡσπερ τυράννῳ τὸ δῆμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν τῶν δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλήν Ἢφιλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
§ 5 μισοθέρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν τρόπων ἐκαστος τῶν δημαγογῶν προφῆγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν τῶν δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνον γενέσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτωμάτος (τῆς ναυαρχίας) γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἰτίων γενόμενος ἐφροσύνη.

1274 a 4 θάτερα Kornae, βαθέραν Π. I SUSEM. in the text, βαθερον Π IV Ar. Bk. || 5 ἔχων Π II Bk. || 7 μετέστησαν Tegee, κατέστησαν ΓΠ II Ar. Bk. SUSEM. || 8 ἐκόλουσε Γ Λαρ., ἐκόλουσε Qb || [καὶ ΠΕΡΙΚΛῆΣ] Sauppe, probably rightly, τὰ... 9 ΠΕΡΙΚΛῆΣ omitted by Γ M*
14 ἀντὶ πολιτιστικῶν Γ ΠΑ. 
15 ἦς ὁ δήμος κόσμον ΜΠ ΠΙ Σουσέμ. 
16 ἢποξειδεύς [Σπύρο], παρόμοιος Σουσέμ. 
17 τῶν ἐπισκόπων καὶ θυγατέρων καὶ τῶν περιτόμων τοῦ τέλους.

This is why in a fragment of his Polity of Athens Aristotle mentionedThemistocles’s proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (seePolyaeu. Στρ. 1. 30 § 6): Diels ζ. p. 34.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle’s sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to democracy: the Moderates (Ἱπποκλῆς) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydicus (ὁ Μηθυσκόλος), Nicias, and Theramenes (Πραγμ. 369. Πλ. Νε. 4), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon.

15 τῶν Σαλών ψήφοι. But above, § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schömann remarks. Either before Solon’s time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon’s edicts, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

Sume. (411)

17 καὶ εὐθυνέας [By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office, the magistrates could be brought before a popular court, or perhaps even before the popular assembly, and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cp. Εἰς τὰ πολ.; further ΙΙ. ι. ι. § 8 n. (569). ο. v). § 19 n. (569), 4 3 (1310). § 6 (1325), 10 (1331); n. on 16 § 2; and Σεβμ. ο. v. I 4 (1472). Sume. (412)

"With this statement of the ζυγωματικά of democracy, compare the summary of the characteristics of true ορασία which Herodoton III. 26 pass into the mouth of Otanes: τὰς ορασίας τοὺς ἐκεῖνος ἑταίρας τούτους ορασίας ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἀντικείμενα ἐξίσους ἀντικείμενα" (Jackson).

μηδὲ γὰρ δούλοι ἐν εἰσὶν καὶ πολίτες] Here again is a substantial contribution to Aristotle’s own views on the requirements of a good constitution.

Sume. (413)

§ 6 18 τῶν δ’ ἀρχαί] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the common en-joyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.

19 ἀντὶ τῶν πολλων κτλ.] On these four Solomon clauses see Schömann Aristot. § 410, 4. 19 110, 4. But for the Παπίπτειν of this section see the next, §§ 6 16—7 13.

Sume. (414)

The order of the clauses is not correct even if we point the words more orderly.
22 [κομβοθετά...b 26 ἄντρομον] ὁ δὲ ἡταρτὸν τὸ θητικὸν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετήν. (ΙΧ
ιομοβεταὶ δὲ ἐγένεντο Ζάλευκος τε Δοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπίζε-5
φυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναίς τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολιταῖς καὶ
ta ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκυδικαίς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ
§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρώναι δὲ [[καὶ]] τινες καὶ συνάγετε ὡς Ὄνομακρί-
tου μὲν γενομένου πρῶτον δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-
σθήναι δ' αὐτῶν ἐν Κρήτῃ Δοκροῦν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικῆν τούτον δέ γενεσθαι Θάλητα ἐτάριον,
Θάλητος δ' ἀκρατείαν Λυκορύγην καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζάλευκον
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγοντι ἀσκεπτότερον τῶν
χρόνων ἔχουσε· ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόδαος ὁ Κορινθιοὶ 6

or, with Spengel, transpose them to go with ἔννοιαν. Cp. H. Landwehr in Philo-
logus Suppl.-Band v. 1885, pp. 118 ff.
21 Comp. Julius Pollux viii. 130 o1
dὲ τὸ θητικὸν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχῆς ἦχον.
Many of the arguments with which Götting Comm. p. 345 f., impugned the genuineness of the whole chapter were answered by Nickes De Aristotelis politi-
corum libris p. 55 ff., and Spengel, Über die Politik p. 11 note, Artis. Studiim it. p. 18 f. Götting was followed by Böck and Bernays Grs. Abb. 1. 172. The case must depend mainly on the language.
22 Δοκροίς τοῖς ἐπίζευφροις] i.e. the Locrarians living on the promontory Zephy-
rion in Lower Italy. The laws of Zaleukos about (?) 664 b.c. are said to have been the first which were committed to writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng., τρ,
Antiq. inr. publ. 89 n. (8). Susem. (415)
25 Χαρώνδος] Mentioned i. 2 § 5 n. (10), vii(v. 11 § 15 n., 13 § 10. Susem.
(416) On his laws see Diod. xii. 15.
24 τοῖς Χαλκυδικαίς πόλεσι] i.e. the colonies which Chalaes in Euboea
planted in those countries: see E. Curti-
tius Hist. i. 436 ff. Eng. tr. Susem. (417)
§ 7 25 πειρώναι δὲ τινες Ephekos
Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch Lyewc. 4,
Tribe of c. 67, 72, 101. Susem. (418)
The construction after συνάγει, ὡς
and genitive absolute in the one clause balanced by an accusative with infinitive
in the other, is awkward; but it can be nearly paralleled from Plato Philebus
16 C: τὴν φίλην παρέδοσαν ὡς εἶναι εὐν.
μον.. ἀνωτών, πέρας δὲ ἐκ ἑξῶν τῶν. δεῖν
καὶ ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε αὐτοῦ γίνεται ὡς,
mήτε ἡμῖν παράγειν.
28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean
"for the purpose" κατὰ θεάν ἤκεδον, or
"in connexion with," almost "prac-
tising his mantic art."
Θάλητρ] See Exc. vi. p. 352 f. Suse-
sem. (419)
29 To the arguments advanced
against the genuineness of this portion of the chapter may be added one derived from the fact that here we have Θάλητος
as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητρα
of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic
gen. Θάλητρ 1259 a 7, the Doric Ἀρχίθτον
1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation from Auleas 111. 14 § 10. Plato on the other
hand regularly changes quotations from other dialects into Attic; cp. Gorg. 485 E,
505 E, with Dr. Thompson's note '(Ridge-
way op. c. p. 135).
30 ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν κτλ.] This critic-
ism is very just. Susem. (419 b)
The same date circa Ol. 29 or 664 b.c.
is the best attested for Thaletas, who
comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes
fourth, in this succession, with Lýceu-
gus between them whom the latest estimate
only brings down to 776!

§ 9 40 ἀπόπτως = 'even from far' may be used for visible, as here, or invisible; but the former in late writers.

§ 10 1174 b 4 φησιναν μὲν οὖν κτλ] The interpolator here explains why he has related the history of Philoctetes a such length, namely to make clear how this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if he really considered such a detailed explanation necessary, when its necessity or even utility is not further disprovable, then he ought at any rate a forti eti to have shown how a Corinthian stranger came to give laws to the Thebans. [REDEM. (421) 4 Θετικοῦς] laws of adoption. The Cretan term for adoption, we now learn, was άφησεν, αφησομενον.

καὶ τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἑαυτομενον] Athen. Lit. Hist. ii. 7 relates that at Thbes it was forbidden under penalty of death to expose a child, but in case of pressing poverty the father might bring his child in its swaddling clothes to the magistrates, who then sold it by a regular contract to the lowest bidder (τῷ ἐποτέῳ ἄγανι), whom it had to serve like a slave when grown up, in return for its maintenance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Scholander, there is here a survival of the old laws which tended to promote the original family estate unaltered by means of adoption. Hardly so, for the punished child is brought as a kind of slave. On the further constitutional history of Thebes see Exc. i. 1 to B. VII 105v. [SUEM. (422) 11 7 ἔτοσκεφτο] as, παραδόθησθαι (Stobaeus says ἐμπαραθέθαι) preclusion her property. [Recent quote P. Zanci xi. 957 ἐ. (Dean), 1129 5.
§ 12. 10 of the ymovy omitted by P^3-Ar., perhaps rightly. || 9 φιλολαυος P^3-Ar. and 1st hand of P^2-3 (corrected by corr.^) || ἄνομαλωσις Bk., ἄνομαλωσις II, ὀμαλότης Spengel, ὀμαλότης Chandler || 12 τήν......13 ἀσχησον Vettori first observed the harsh construction; either ἤ......ἀσχησον or <ο̣̄ περί> before τήν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 13 γίνεται P^2-3-Qb-Tb || 14 τούτο P^2-3-Qb-Tb Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τήν M^8 (1st hand)

§ 12. 9 ψαλέον δ' ἵδιον κτλ] Even Fülléborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. note (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamos he has said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (εἴηται σχεδόν περί πάνων): also that in § 1 f. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 399), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Götting, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. SUSEM. (423)

ἀνομαλώσις] equalization: Rhet. III. 11. 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνομαλισθαί ('read ἀνομαλισθήσαται; Λ', our almost unique authority, has ἀνω μᾶλλον εἶναι: SUSEM.) τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολῳ διέχοις ταύτῳ, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ διώκαις τὸ ἵδιον. See Cope's note. Not a fresh equalization, but a breaking up of the present distribution to restore equality; so ἀνάμειν, ἀναθάμοσα, ἀναδιώκας ψήφους.

10 ἤ πε τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ] Cp. 6 § 2 n. (153); 6 § 5 n. (106). SUSEM. (424)

11 ἐτί δ' ὁ περὶ τήν μέθην κτλ] Laws I 637 ff., 643 ff., II 664—672, 673 d ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for adding it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp. n. (423) just above. SUSEM. (425)

12 καὶ τήν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κτλ] Laws VII 794 D—795 S. SUSEM. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram verborum factit, durior: videbatur enim vel eodem casu, quo prima duo protulit, dicere debuisse καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησις vel plene logi hoc pacto: καὶ ὁ περὶ τήν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκήσεων (Vettori). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SUSEM.

§ 13. 15 πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχοῖν κτλ] From n. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Charondas Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which
were made for an ideal state. But this does not mean matters because, as Draco was not the author of a constitution, there is a marked antithesis between them of quite another kind. Steph. (427)


18 On Pittacus see III. 14. 10 with Exe. II. on B. III. Steph. (429)

νόμον δημιουργός has been objected to; but Nickes cites ἄρετη δή, IV, vii. 9. 7.

20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους κτλ. [Cp. Rhet. II. 25, 7, 1401 b. 11 hρησας οὖν αἰσχον καὶ παρέστη καὶ τὸν αἰσχόν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀνθρώπου. Steph. (428)

§ 14 24 Χαλκίδας τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης. The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalcidice, which derived its name from its colonization by Chalea in Ithaca. This took place before the settlement of the western colonies of Chalea, noted in § 6 i. p. (4.7). See E. Curtius 1. 410 f. Eng. tr. Steph. (430)

25 Laws of Chares, the respective heirship are mentioned by Diodorus xiv. 18.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see n. 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a συμμαχία, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of ἔθνος, however, conceived as analogous to a συμμαχία, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words ὅταν µὴ κατὰ κόμμα ύσιν κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκάδες: II. 2. 3.

It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the συμμαχία, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see n. 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic πόλεις."

Dittenberger in Gött. gel. Anz. 1874, p. 1382. Susem. (132)

To Dittenberger's explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (i) that there is a reference to some συνοικισμός of Arcadians, and that the πόλεις is distinguished from ἔθνος = the unorganized race. Then if it be granted that ὅταν µὴ ύσιν = διὰ τὸ µὴ ἔιναι οτ πῶ µὴ ἔιναι, the words will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus µὴ κατὰ
κόιμας κεχορισμένοι will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the συμμαχία must consist in the isolated independence of the villages: the ἰδέας "Arcadia" being composed εἴ των ἐμπολων, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegen and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralizations and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note ad loc., it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle may have interposed at this point the remark that as the polis differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but not from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (Notes p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race is the polis; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (ii) to understand by ἰδέας the organized race or tribe, as something distinct from the polis, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows:1 Xenoph. Hell. vi. 5. 6 τῶν δὲ τενταόν ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν Καλλίσων καὶ Πρίσσων στεφθεὶς ἐπὶ τα συμμαχήσει τε πάντων ἀρκαδικῶν, καὶ ὁ τὲ νεκρὸν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τούτω εὑροῦν εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἐπὶ τίνι ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίας ταῦτα ἰδέας εἴη, ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων νόμοις ἀρχήσας εἰτ. vi. 5. 12 ὁ δὲ Ἀγαμέμνων τοις τετραλλοτοῖς πολίται τριακοσίων ἐκ τῶν Ἐυξίδων καὶ εὐρώπων τοῖς ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ ῥηξείς ἐν κοινῷ, εἰτ. τοῖς ἀρκαδικοῖς ὑμῶν ἐκεῖ ἀνακάλυψε τὴν πολιτείαν ἐκ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἀρχῶν ἐκεῖ ἀνακάλυψε τὴν πολιτείαν. Xenoph. Hell. vii. 4. 12 καὶ τὰς μυριάδας τὸν Ἡλίαν Ἀλκιβία, τὸν μὲν πολιτικὸν ἀνακάλυψε ἤματα, ἐκ τῆς τυχίνας.

1 With what follows compare Freeman Federal Governments pp. 197—198,
NOTE ON ARCADIA,

suntelóvnta éς τo 'Arkaidikón: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτήφωτο, ἔλεγον [οἱ Μαντινεῖς]
ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἦ τῶν Μαντινεών πόλεις ἐγγύς ή μὴν παρέξει τις τὸ κοινὸν τῶν 'Arkáδων ὁπότεον τοῖς προσκαλαύτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ 'Επαμεινώνδας ἐλογίζετο ἀφίσιν ὑπάρχει...'Αρκάδων τοὺς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντας. ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι Τεγεάται καὶ Μεγαλόπολιται καὶ Ἀσκεάται καὶ Παλλαντίες, καὶ εἰ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικραὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ ταῦτας οἰκείων ἤναγκαζότω.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινὸν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (μέτοι), a federal army (ἐπάρτητοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. Hell. VII. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν 'Arkáδων, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammentes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. XV. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis.1

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κόμας κεχωρισμένοι. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the unorganized race, which lives κατὰ κόμας τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the southwest of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

1 Plut. Philop. 13; Paus. VIII. 27. 7; Freeman p. 626 n. 4.
NOTE ON ARCADIUS.

is it that (a) the league embraced Tegae, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraclea, πύλεως which were not absorbed in Megalopolis: while (b) most of the townships or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are unmistakably called πύλεως, not κώμαι, in respect of their previous existence. It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new league that these places became κώμαι: previously they had been πύλεως. Note is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing the πύλεως (1) from a συμμερία or federation of states (Μεγαλόπολις) and (2) from a federal state (Bundesstaat), and if Arcadia is the illustration of (2) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partisan might hold no doubt that the opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe and the πύλεως, ex hypothesi all-important, disappears.

(iii) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: 'when the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, but lives scattered and without political organization.'

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a πύλεως or an ἐθνος. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victoria and Camerarius apparently consider them abduced as exemplifying the πύλεως, implying that distribution of the population over villages or ἐθνος (κατά κώμαι) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how any tribe in region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

1 Plutarch. viii. 27 = J, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: πύλεως ἐτοιμάσε ὅπως...παράδειγμα φέρεται κλήτων ἐπίθεσιν ἐπίθεσιν αἱ Δεσπόται. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term πύλεως which is often interchanged with κώμαι: cf. Thuc, ii. 15 κατὰ πύλεως φιλοκρατίαν, but Bernay's x. 35 στρατηγὸν καὶ κατὰ πύλεως κώμας (both of Attica before Thucydides).

2 ibid. viii. 27: 7, τῶν κατευθυνόμενον πολεαίναι ἀληθῶς ἐτέρωσιν ὅπως...τὰς ἐκτοικίας Μεγαλόπολιτος κώμας, Τόρεως, Δικταίας, ὁπότεν τὴν πρὸς Οὐρανίον. Μηθύριας, Τεύκτης, Καλάνται, Ἐλευθερίας: 12 = Μεθύριαι τῶν ἄνοιξιν ἀληθῶς εὐθυμήγοι καὶ κώμαι δὲ καὶ τὰ Μεγαλοπολιτάκτες ἄνοιξιν εὐθυμήγοι (νπάξιον τοῦ λαθοῦς). The scholiast, however, from the name Μεθύριας, states that this adds a new tribe, the Μεθύριαι. This Jackson has supplied this omission.
'Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.' From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotos (iv. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (Δωσίες) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela 1. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Göttingl): Nicolaus Damascenus, Frag. iiii. in Stob. Flor. xxlii. 41 (Müller Frag. hist. Graec. iiii. p. 458), of the Liburnians (Eaton). Diodoros iii. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglodytæ of the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (iv. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view 'in order that they might all be brothers;' ὅπερ καίγεντοι τε ἀλλήλων ἔσω καὶ οἰκίαι ἔόντες πάντες μῆτε φθώνῳ μήτ' ἐχθεὶ χρεώνται εἰς ἀλλήλους. The case of the Massagætæ, cited by Congreve, Herod. i. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, i. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. i, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrhænæ by Theopompos Frag. 222 in Athen. xii. 517 D, E, Müller Frag. hist. gr. i. 315, and of the Scythian Galaktophagi by Nicolaus Damascenus Frag. 123 in Stob. Flor. v. 73, Müller Frag. h. gr. iii. 460.

1 Διβόρωι κοινάς τὰς γυναίκας ἔχουσι· καὶ τὰ παιδιὰ τοῖς γένοις μέχρι τῶν πέντε, εἰτα τῷ ἰκτίῳ συνενέγκοντες ἀπατᾶν τὰ παιδιὰ τὰς ὀμοιότητας πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰδαύξοις καὶ ἐκάστῳ τὸ ὄμοιον ἀποδύδοσαι παρὰ.

2 Ἐσύπομος δ' ἐν τῇ μ' τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ νόμων εἰσίν φησι παρὰ τῶν Τυρρηνῶν κοινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναίκας· ταῦτα δ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σφόδρα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ γυμνασθαι πολλάκις καὶ μετ' ἄνδρῶν, ἐνώσετε δ' καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀντίλοις...τρέψαν δ' τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς πάντα τὰ γυναίκα παιδία οὐκ ἐδότας ὑπὸ του πατέρος ἐκατοκοῦ. ἐξού δ' καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦ αὐτῶν τρόπου τῶν θεραπευόντων κτλ.

The description seems to owe much to Plato's republic.

3 εἰς δ' καὶ δικαίωταυς, κοινὰ ἔχοντες τὰ τε κτήματα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας, οἵτινες μὲν προσβεβέρεροι αὐτῶν πατέρας ὀμοιάζοντες, τοὺς δ' νομέως παῖδας, τοὺς δ' ἤλικας ἀδελφοῖς. [This is the system of nomenclature (in use in Hawaii and Rotuma and other islands of the Pacific), classifying and not describing the person addressed, which Morgan calls Malayam. See Ancient Society pp. 401—423. If there is anything fabulous in the account of Nicolaus it must be sought in his further statements παρὰ τοῦτοι οὐδὲ εἰς οὕτω φθονοῦν, ὡς φαίνετο, οὕτω μετοικοίμην ἱστορίησα διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινοτήτα καὶ δικαιούμεναν. μάχεσθαι δ' οὐχ ἤτοι αὐτῶν οὐ γυναῖκες ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ συμπολεμουόντων αὐτοῖς οἶκον ἄρη.]
It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken, p. 179-181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the Ethics shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, Nic. Eth. viii. 12, 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union; and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

'Further, §3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions one blood, one stock, and the like. Again, §5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, op. c. ti. ii. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply or impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals—and to use Zeller's apt expression (Plato p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

1 διὰ ταύτης δὲ καὶ τὸ γενέσθων εἴη
does καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ τῷ φίλῳ. εἰπ' ἃ
dὲ καὶ δὴ ἀρετής, καὶ ἐπικεφαλεῖ τίνος εἰς τῇ
gamma ἐνεργείᾳ ἰσχύ. καὶ ἐπικεφαλεῖ τίνος ἐνεργείᾳ.
primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to develope out of the family a higher unity. That these considerations do not recur in the Politics, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his own premisses. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose. 7

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's conceptions, understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approximately the modern or monogamous family. From the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost universal. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory untenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the family is a πολλάκις λεγόμενον, and what he assumes to be its simple and primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests. Beginning with the Auseans, Troglodytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus, nearly all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself. The phrase εἶναι κοινὸς τὰς γυναῖκας is not likely to have been literally true, or to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases. Few tribes are so

1 It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice happily married.
2 Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus, and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the Politics.
3 But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.
4 B. ii. of the Laws is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.
6 That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much Aristotle collected in Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments are of little value.
7 What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller information we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.
backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object)1. It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thoive, and Messene, in the use of μητρίς for 'motherland' by Cretons and Messenians2. Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race)3 and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain, Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side4. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager5. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman gentes7. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father's side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy8.

1 Called a totem in North America and a klobong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The apparasus was the totem of an Attic γόνατος, Hist. Theol. IV. 6. 14. 3.2. 7 Th锄bns καὶ ταύριν τάραν κατ'εαυτή μητρότοιον ασφαλέον, μητρότοιον σεβασμόν, ἀλλὰ οἰκειότητα καὶ τιμήν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the Partlyly Review Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870. 4 Plato Rep. 18. 575 b. PASSEIn. iv. 26 313. 5 3 Herod. i. 173. Nicolatoe Damoeci. Frag. Hist. Gr. in. 111. 461 (Müller) Λέκιον τὰτ γαρ αὐτάκεια μᾶλλον ἐκ τούτο δομῇ τούτῃ καὶ καλωταίς μητριθέντω τάς τε ἀλλήλην καὶ τρισάρκης λιτότητω, ὃ τούτο καὶ ἑαυτής τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν σχηματισμόν, διὲ τοῦ πάντων. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glauce, Hem. i. v. 150 ff.: the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

6 Strabo III. 4. 18. p. 165 τοῦ τάραται τοῖς ἄλλοις δομήθηται ταῖς γερανίν τιμίας, τοῦ τάραται ἐλεγοντο κατ'αὐτής τοῦ ταύρου τοῦ πρότερος γαρ τὰ ταύρινα ἐλεγοντο κατ'αὐτής, τοῦ ταύρου καὶ τοῦ ταύρου γερανίν. Γεύεται γαρ τοῦ γερανικείατορ. The esvade among the same people, ibid. 117 p. 164 ταύριναται τοῦτος δομήθηται, ἢ τοῦτος ἀνθρώπου αὐτίκα παρά ταύριναται. From Herod. ii. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were supposed amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

7 VarroRESP Augartin. De civ. Dii xvi. 91: cr. Justin 15. 8, Samias 31. 410. For the Locrians, Polyb. xiii. 17, καί διὰ τῶν τραγώνων ἢδη τὰν ἀνήθηκε καὶ τὴν γερανίν, ὁπισθεν ἁπλων ἢδη τῶν ἀνήθηκεν, cr. Aristotles spea Polib. xiii. 6, 1960 6 8 ff. καὶ τε δορίας τῆς τούτων ἢδη τῆς τούτων τῆς τούτων γερανίν ἢδη καὶ τῆς τούτων γερανίν ἢδη τῆς τούτων γερανίν ἢδη τῆς τούτων γερανίν ἢδη τῆς τούτων γερανίν. 8 Hem. I. d. ii. 661 ff. (Theopolemos). Xvil. 95 cr. xix. 49 (Lykaos). Hypogeum Feb. 729. 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence so the ban narrated in Homer Iliad iv. 566 ff. 9 Plutarch Quis. Rom. 69. 5 p. 285 s u ἢ παρακολούθησαν ἐπεξεργάζοντας ἤθους ἐπεξεργάζοντας ἤθους ἐπεξεργάζοντας ἤθους ἐπεξεργάζοντας 515. 69. 8 8 ff. καὶ ἢ διὰ τῆς ἔτης γερανίν αὐτὶ γερανίν.
The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the ‘stocks’ (γένος) and ‘brotherhoods’ (φαρστρίας) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see n. 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved 1. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epi- menides, όμοσίττου and όμόκατου or όμόκατων? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this v. i. The όμογάλκτες (i. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a γένος (for όμογάλκτες = γεννηται, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother’s milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive family (οἶκος: i. 2 § 5) may have been known as ‘sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.’ This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning ‘those who eat together’ (coediche), and ‘those who have a common residence’ (teadhloch) 2. There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in όμογάστριον and ἀδελφός, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier φράτωρ, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek φράτωρ continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association 3.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Polyb. xii. 6 παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πάτρων ἕν καὶ σύννηθες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλέον ἀδελφοὶ δύναται, καὶ τέκνα τῶντων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παθᾶσαι ἵκανον ἐκδώθαι γυναίκα τινς τῶν φίλων καὶ σύννηθες. 1 The form of capture a marriage ceremony at Sparta, Herod. vi. 65; Plut. Lyg. 15, Xen. Rep. Lac. i § 5. In Crete, Ephoros apud Strab. x. p. 432 D. The Ionian etiquette (one consequence of capture), Herod. i. 146. 2 Studies in Ancient History p. 123: Lang Essays p. 97 n. 3 This explanation seems the most
Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind: he has to admit that γὰρσι, γὰρκακία fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κακοπάθοι διαλήκται and διαλογοι, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth, he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.}

EXCURSUS II.

HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS: II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV (vii). 11 § 6 n. (§50), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ἡ Ἱπποδαμίου διαγορά; Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 11, Andoc. i. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.c., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 426 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent


4 οὔτε ἡ τέχνη τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπέρριψεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔμειναι ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπισελήνως. [A very cautious statement.]
of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (περὶ εὐδαιμονίας) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (περὶ πολιτείας) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the Florilegium of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle: and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle’s statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. ‘It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs’ (§§ 2, 7, 9 nn. 253, 261, 262), ‘to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property’ (§ 4 s. f. n. 255 b) ‘and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice’ (§ 5). ‘It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state’ (§ 7 n. 260 b), ‘to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal’ (§ 4 n. 256), ‘whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. Oecon. 4 § 3) leads its partizans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. De Rep. Lac. 13 § 5, Plut. Pel. 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.’

It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycophron (111. 9. 8 n. 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to
HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS.

attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere security of mutual rights' in Lyrophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lyrophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does, with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (H. 6 § 10 ff. cp. rm. 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Iiasocrates, the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff.

1 Staatslehre i. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.
Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 ff.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1. SUSEM. (250)

**Note on the Celtae: II. 9. 7.**

On the Kelts see also IV(vii). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and *Nic. Eth. III. 7, 7, 1115 b 26 ff.* where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celtorum amoribus puerrorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 a' (J. G. Schneider). See also Ammian. Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fülléborn). Plato *Laws* I 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. *Hell. VII. i. 20.* There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian *Anab.* I. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle *Meteor.* I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea *Nic. Eth. III. 7, 7,* his pupil Eudemos III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros *Fr.* 44 (see Nicol. Dam. *Fr.* 104, Aelian. *V. H. XII.* 23): Strabo (vii. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff *Deutsche Alterthums-kunde* I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same
EXCURSUS III.

THE Ephors and the Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλομέναις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἑφοροὶ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα ἔσθιν. Η. Ι. Ι. 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle’s authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see n. 540 or 9 § 30 (Triebel). Compare n. (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers: all they do is to observe the con-
manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the ἔφοροι are 'overseers', the κώσμοι are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephoros (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and Κώσμοι. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle could not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoros. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called Πολιτείας which we have under the name of Heracleides1 of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's Πολιτείας, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his Cretan Polity. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoros the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSEM. (360)

The Cretan περίοικοι.

φόρων οὖς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι: II. 10. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan περίοικοι (see n. 355) with the Spartan περίοικοι, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. n. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (Frag. 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus vi. 263 E f., that there were three dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the Mnoitae, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the Aphanioi, and (3) the περίοικοι, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects." Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. xv. 695 F (in Bergk Poet. lyr. Gr. no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybris boasts that the Mnoitae call him their lord. Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. vi. 263 E, describes the Aphanioi as

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1 Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.
2 τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλειαν οἱ Κρῆτες καλοῦσιν μνοῖς, τὴν δὲ ἵδαι αφαμίστασ, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπὲρ κόανυς.
3 Spear and sword are my great treasure and my godly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.
'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae'\(^1\); and earlier still Ephoros (frag. 32 a, in Athen. v. 263 f) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called these slaves Clarotae. It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called ἀγαμία, as well as ἀλαμία, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land; see Schömann Antiquities p. 308 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan Helots either (a) both the clarotae and mnoitae; or (b) the mnoitae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term ἐπισίου in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the word φέπωμεν φέπωμεν to ἐπισίου would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (\textit{Pr.} 1) in Athen. iv 143 A, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage\(^3\) I interpret so that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these contributions amongst the various mess-associations; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see \textit{n.} 366 on § 8 \textit{e.vtr.}, Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his ἐπισίου the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if φέπωμεν φέπωμεν ἐπισίου can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessaries of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

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\(^1\) ακαμία ἢ νὰ Κρήτες τοῖς μὲν κατὰ τοὺς εἰκτὰς γνωστάτας, ἀφανίσατε τοὺς κατά γάρ τοὺς εἰκτὰς γενόμενοι ἡ ἡκτίς ἡ εἰκτὸς πάθεις ἐν τῷ κλαρόται καὶ κλαρόται.

\(^2\) Ἀριστοτέλης Κρήτες κληόνα τοῖς διαλέοντι ἡ τοῦ γνωστοῦ πρὸ ἢν εἰκτὸς ἀκαμίας.

\(^3\) Ι致命: ἐπισίου τὸ τῶν ἐπισίους κατά τοὺς ἐπισίους κατὰ τῆς διαθήκης τῆς ἐπισίους, ἐν τῷ τῆς ἐπισίους κατά τής ἐπισίους [ἡ] διάταξιν.
common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before φόρων is unavoidable, whether we supply <ἀπὸ μαριόν τῶν>, or in agreement with Dosiadas <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν> φόρων.

The term περιόικοι is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the freer position which these peasants occupied (cp. II. § 19 n. 171, 9 § 3 n. 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cretan Dorians in the cities made use of purchased slaves: Schömann p. 298 Eng. tr. In IV(VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. nn. 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9. 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by δοῦλοι and by περιόικοι: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term περιόικοι by 'villeins' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cretan περιόικοι are, whereas the Helots are δοῦλοι pure and simple. The former might very well get the name περιόικοι, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schömann suggests p. 229 E. tr. And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian περιόικοι, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cretan περιόικοι a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cretan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority. We recognise the περιόικοι of whom Aristotle speaks in the Foukées of the code, and the περιόικοι = ύπήκουοι of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the αφέταιροι of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (πολίται) and from purchased slaves: of the μνοίται the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

1 [Blackstone himself compares un-emancipated villeins with the helots, Commentaries B. II. c. 6 vol. II. p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders δοῦλοι by Leibeigene, περιόικοι by Hintersassen. The Gortynian οἰκέες, though a specially privileged class of villeins, are nevertheless called δοῦλοι: vid. infra.]

2 But when Schömann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once"; for the term occurs three times, viz. 10 § 5, § 8, § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 [also in c. 9 § 3]. It is only in c. 5 § 19 that Aristotle calls them δοῦλοι. Höck (Keleta III. p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of: and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II. 381 f. 387 ff. may be taken to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

3 The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the American Journal of Archaeology I. pp. 324—350, II. 24—45.

4 Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's περιόικοι are not the περιόικοι of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the κλαρώται: i.e. those who in the code are called Foukées." Zitelmann in Das Recht von Gortyn p. 63 n. 56.

5 We find oἰκέες for oἰκέται in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias X. 19, οἰκέται καὶ δοῦλαι (Bücheler). Comp. Kallistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

6 The ἐνδοδίαι δοῦλα or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II. 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (χρυσώνητος): Zitelmann ib. p. 64.
distinction of πολιτικός, ἀφένταρος, Φοκίς. answering to that of διάκριτος, περιοχής, ἡλιοτρόπος at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Hock, Crote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an ἑταρία; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain castle (τὰ καταστάσεις), Code IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (ὁμοθέσια), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (Εὔπορα) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the Φοκίς who tilled it. To these Φοκίς he stood in the capacity of πιστος, 'lord' or πατρων. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The ἀφένταρος was also a freeman like the πολιτικός, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any ἑταρία, he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a Φοκίς (100 stater, 10 stater, 5 drachmai = 2½ stater, Code II. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the serv and the freeman is 1 : 2 and 1 : 5, Zittelmann p. 102 n. 8.

The Φοκίς were not free men: Φοκίς and ἄλλοι are used indifferently in the code, and the terms ἀφεντάρων and Εὔπορον do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villenage or servitude, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses; they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled Εὔπορος. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villein possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the servus, if indeed it be not that of the client, as Rome.
EXCURSUS IV.


τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἐταυρίων.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patri-cians, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek φυλαὶ and the three ancient Roman tribus, the latter to the Greek φρατρίαι and the 30 Roman curiae (see below on γερουσία, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or 'gentes' that are here called ἐταυρίαι, 'mess-associations'.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the φυλαὶ in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the ωβαὶ, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schö- man Antiquities of Greece I. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called συσσίτια: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables 'in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence' (ib. p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the ἀνδρεῖα in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. 'In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20, 6, 29: c. 9, 12, 23: 1 Kings i. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the συσσίτια of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festive occasions by the curiales in their places of assembly or curiae.' It is also to be remembered that ἐταυρία was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lyctians, διήρηται δ' οἷς πολίται πάντες καθ' ἐταυρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ τάντας ἀνδρεία (Frag. 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; 'probably guilds under oligarchical management' (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the συσσίτια at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchi-cal clubs were certainly called ἐταυρίαι in Greece (cp. n. 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake.
of having compared a Spartan public institution with the arrangements of merely private associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The circuli and convivia at Carthage are further mentioned by Livy xxxiv. 68 § 5; their "meetings" (συνέλευσις) also in Theodoros Meropitas Hypomn. c. 104 § 1 (cited by Kluge p. 215); but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. *Suidem.* (378)

η τῶν ἐκατόν καὶ τετάρτων ἀρχιν.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 16 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?) to these were added the highest magistrates, the two Shofetes [see below Βαρκλεί] and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin XIX. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen out of the number of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: desin cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esse omnique qui aegerent simul et indicarent, centum ex numero senatorum indices deligebant, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigebant, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legisque respicerent. Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the Senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals but beyond doubt the Shofetes [kings] and Gerusiatrics [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless
cruelty,' comp. Diod. xx. 10. 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (ibid.) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate1: see below γερουσία and n. (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (XXXIII. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6, tum temporis consulem: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: iudicum ordo Carthagine ca tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis offendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat. horum in tam impotenti regno...praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihil habuit, nam...quia ex quaestura in iudices, potestissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subdactumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicium, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam

1 In Diod. xiv. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 193, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: ἣς ἄναγγεισεν ἐν τῷ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ, καὶ σύγκλητος is therefore the same as γερουσία, the smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called σύγκλητος by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of γερουσία for the small council and σύγκλητος for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (n. 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called σύγκλητος.
corum, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulis annis indices legentur, neve quis biamium continuum judex esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephoracy. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 15 n. 325); and so civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who make that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis.

To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest offices in the state (μεγίστη αξιόλ, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 η γαρ αξιολ ευπλα του μεγίστου αξιόλ). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (διέτει αν η του εφίπα τευχην αξιόλ τε τευχην τας δραχα), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred.

Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials; that we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it; and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. (379).

οι βασιλείς

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title sholetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two sholetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos above (Hannibal 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy XXX. 7. 5. Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius v. 11, Nep. L c., cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6); and Polybios also vi. 31. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of sholetes at Gaules.
(XXXVIII. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidæ, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election ‘of a king’ (Zonaras Ann. VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. xx. 10. 1 n. 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. xiii. 80. 2) 1. It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad 2. It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (to § 6)—see the parallel passages given in n. (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were dissolved. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin xxii. 7. 7, Diod. xiii. 43. 5, xiv. 54. 53, xv. 15. 2, xx. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyæn. i. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

1 It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet De Rép. Laced. speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).
2 Only the incorrect statement of Zonares l.c. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.
3 Comp. Òro's. iv. 6. The words κατά νόμον added to the title of King in these passages of Diodorus (κατά νόμους τότε βασιλεύωντα and βασιλέα κατὰ νόμον) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king βασιλεύονσα κατὰ γένος, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in Diog. Laert. iii. 82. τὸς δὲ βασιλέας ἢ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἢ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστὶν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι, κατὰ νόμον πολιτικὴ γὰρ ἔστιν. ἢ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.
still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the
Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be
assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office; (2) in
any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office;
although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,
whose members were also called "judges" or shofetes (see above, also Cato
as cited by Festus s. v. munus), but no doubt, with some distinguishing
addition—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that
board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in
the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held
meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them di-
sected the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 5; Livy XXX. 7. 5,
46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings
Prætor: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l.c. expressly
distinguishes the Prætor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is,
it is true, in the last degree confused, we find that the term Prætor is only
used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal (c. 195
and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution
of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the
dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 tum temporis consulum, Zonar. IX. 14 s. f.
κυριάρχης τῶν Καρθάγινων αρχηγών). According to Cicero's statement, De
Rep. II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily
suppose with Heeren that the shofete were elected for life: but this is dis-
proved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7); and not merely
Zonara, VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l.c. definitely states
that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle
has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the
senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any
rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed
a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: triginta
senorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad
plenum senatum regendum vis. It may be conjectured that one of these
twenty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above).
And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the
authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate,
because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see
above). Such a larger council is usually called στράτευμα, even by Aristotle
II. 1. 10 (cp. n. 442), and although the terms γεωργία, στράτευμα, and συνα

3 Prætor factus est, postquam rex
perat cum secondo et viceversa. Heer-
ren p. 138, as proposed to alter rex into
but that here also rex denotes the
shofete and that the alteration is there-
1 fere unnecessary is shown, apart from all
other reasons, by the very next words: at enunt Roman Consules at Carthagin
spontaneously sound but tepis. concludere.
δριμον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms γερουσια and συγκλητος X. 18. 1 δυο μεν...των εκ της γερουσιας, πινετε και δεκα των εκ της συγκλητου and XXXVI. 2. 6 τριακοσιων ωμηρου...των πινε των εκ της συγκλητου και της γερουσιας. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusists [senators] from whom probably, see Polyb. I. 21. 6, the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), 'to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors' (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see 11 § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators (Valer. Max. IX. 5. 4 ext.

1 As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misinterpreted, viz. Diod. xiv. 47. 2 (see p. 342 n. 1) and xx. 59. 1 μετα δε ταυτα της γερουσιας εν Καρχεισι διε τους πολεον [καλως] έδωκε τοις συνεδροις τρια στρατισε...ηπεμφαι. The συνεδροι are the members of the γερουσια itself: the transaction takes place in the γερουσια alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senate combined. The word συνεδροι is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

2 Duncker (Hist. of Antiquity II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators exclusive of the kings.

3 See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

4 Whether it was so "regularly", a Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

5 For the senators Mommsen (Ii. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Forty although it may certainly be quite tr...
THE CARTHAGINIAN DEMOS


The deputies of the senate (σύνεδρον) with the army formed part of the general's council of war, Polyb. iii. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, cum πάντες οἱ πρεσβυσταῖς Καρθαγινίνων μὲ πρῶτοι καὶ πασί πάντες Καρθαγινίνων οἱ αρτατεσσερεῖς μετ' αὐτῶν, Polyb. vii. 9 1, 4. Movers, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the πρεσβυσταῖς; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. iii. 340, 360). Susem. (382)

ο δῆμος.

'The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not: if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions,' at Sparta and in Crete; § 5, 6.

Klüge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly; that this was not the case may be seen from Livy xxii. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, xxiii. c. 12 ff. However the senate and the shofetes might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. vi. 51, 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (τῶν εἰλαίτων δύναται εἰ ταῖς δισεβαίνεις παρὰ μὲν Καρθαγινίνας δῆμος ἐντὸς μετελθεῖν, παρὰ δὲ Ρωμαίον καὶ τοῖς εἰλαίτων εἰχεν ἐν αὐτοῖς). And yet even this very war was decreed by the shofetes and the senate alone, Polyb. iii. 33, Livy xxii. 1ff. Susem. (387)

That the latter are also called "senators" being elected, as a matter of fact, from the (smaller and larger) senate.
This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. n. 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards entered the council of the Hundred, but only that they elected that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shofetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy xxviii. 37. 2), and the censor (praefectus morum: Nep. Hamilc. 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by principibus quibusdam et magistratibus mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—vectigalia publica partim neglegentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant, xxxiii. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (11 § 7 s. f., III. 1 § 11 cp. nn. 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shofetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (i) the Boards of Five and (ii) the Council
of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose, and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two shophetes or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year: at any rate it appears to follow from Livy's account (see above n. 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above; unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. SUSEM. (390)

οι στρατηγοι.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above n. 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above n. 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian 'kings', exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 340) takes it to mean that the Shophetes were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals. The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 71, Cato cited in Gellius x. 24. 7, Frontin, Strateg. II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 2. The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of shophete and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 36. 2, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly; yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

1 There is no ground for assuming with Klagc, p. 93 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once shophetes and generals, or that the Hundred in previous times held both offices in conjunction eleven times.

2 At least I take this to be the most probable view.
senate: see Diod. xiii. 43. 5 (κατέστησαν; cp. above n. 381), xx. 10. 1 (ἡ γερουσία...στρατηγοὺς...ἀπείδειξε). But it may be conjectured that the election required to be confirmed by the popular assembly. At least when Hannibal was elected by the army the Senate was not satisfied with an approval of the act on its own part, but invited the popular assembly to confirm it, Polyb. iii. 13. 4; and such a confirmation may have been requisite for the appointment of the senators and showtes, in case it did not entirely rest with the popular assembly to elect them (see above n. 382). Susem. (392 b).

EXCURSUS V.

THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3.

ἐσεὶ δὲ Σόλων...τὸν δῆμον καταστύσας, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Helaea, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure. It is another matter when Fränkel The Attic δικαστήρια p. 63 f. infers from iii. 11. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Helaea to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon’s legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. iii. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotele is saying

1 This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.
2 The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOLON.

precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Frankel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Frankel's explanation be consistently applied to VII (14 § 5, § 6, § 10 (see nn. 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity: that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not obscure, but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon's fault but by the course of events; though Frankel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian Heliaea consisted, as Frankel very ably proves (pp. 1—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., op. pp. 21—51) not only this Heliaea as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another lexica, as

1 Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (448 f.), Attica has the wider sense of "tribals" generally, and not the later, narrower sense of "tribals" of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge; Willkat, "De Kyralen," p. 881, shows that the word has not even the former sense in that place but means "punishments."
EXCURSUS VI.

THALETAS: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeonian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukos cited in Plutarch De Music. 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 B), which were called Paeans and Hyporchemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Heracleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. De Music. 9. 1134 C, Schol. on Pind. Pyth. II. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeonian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephoros, Lycurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lycurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Pratinas fr. 8 in Plut. De Music. 42. 1146 C, Plut. Philos. cum principibus 5 p. 779 A, Aelian. Var. Hist. xii. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation: see Wilamowitz op. c. pp. 87—94.

1 Fränkel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliaca possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

2 And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

3 E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.

a representation of the popular assembly. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy. All this however does not exclude the possibility that on Aristotle's view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state: indeed on the analogy of vi(iV), 14, 6 (n. 1325) there is a certain probability even, that by his remarks in ii. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings. SUSEM. (408).
underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. 1 to B. 1): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Fορρων). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paemas and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sombios, frag. 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 c, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopædia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knossian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrius of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. i. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger De Thaleta poeta Essen 1851. 4, Hock Kreta iii. 339 ff., Bernhardy History of Greek Literature 3 ed. i p. 373, Christ Mater. p. 415 ff., also E. Curtius History of Greece 1 p. 182 Eng. trans. Sum. (419)
1274 b 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς
28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρήμενας, ἐστὶ τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-
32 § 1 τοῦ τὸν περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ
ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτὲ
ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, οὐ μὲν φάσκοντες
35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πράξιν, οὐ δ' οὗ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τὸν
νομοθέτου πάσαν ὅραμεν ὁποῖαν ἐπαντεύοντο πόλιν,
ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούσων ἐστὶ τάξις τις.

In the notes to this book fr. denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by
Heylbut in Rhein. Mus. XLII. 1887. p. 102 ff. See Exc. III. p. 454. As a rule it is
without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν... 28 τοῦτον, was by all previous
editors appended to B. 11 || 28 εἰρήμενας Koraes; cp. II. 1. 1, but see Dittenberger
op. c. 1366 f. || τοῦτον * Thurt.; τῷ < δὲ > ? Susem. This δὲ is all that we
require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some ulterior cause is uncertain,
see Introd. p. 14 n. 3 || 32 καί before τίς ἐκάστη omitted in Γ Αρ., perhaps rightly ||
38 ἢ τε; Susem. || ἐστὶν (ἐστιν P1) after τάξις τις M P

B. III includes two parts: a statement
of General Principles, cc. 1—13, followed
by a review of Monarchy, cc. 14—18,
the first of the forms of government exa-
mined in detail. See Analysis p. 108 ff.,
Introd. 37 ff. The former part is the
most valuable exposition of Aristotle's
positive political theory to be found in the
whole work. Comp. Oncken pp. 117
—174.

cc. 1, 2. The definition of constitution
to be obtained by reference to a city and
citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence,
§ 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights,
§ 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in
executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition
applies to a varying extent in dif-
f erent states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a
rough mode of defining citizens by descent
1 § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic
rights by persons not entitled to them: 2
§§ 3—5.

Mr. A. C. Bradley has some valuable
remarks on Aristotle's conception of
citizenship in Hellenica pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίαι] Constitution
"proper," i.e. those actually in force
or 'valid' in existing states as opposed
to schemes on paper. So κυρίως with
ἐπίστασθαι, to know properly or unconf-
ditionally, is opposed like ἀπλας to ἐ
ποθέσεως,
35 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν] "that it is
not the state which has done this or the
but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. II
62 § 4 (Eaton) and η. (455) on c. 3 §
below. Susem. (432)
36 πολ. καί τοῦ νομ.] See above e
1. 1. 2, II. 12. 1.
38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering
of the inhabitants." The character of this
organization is explained 6 § 1 πολε
τάξις τῶν τῶν ἀλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλισ-
τῆς κυρίας πάντων, η. (522). Comp.
1. Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts (Jebb).

41 τι πλῆθος "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, Isaak εις ανισότητα (Eust.), § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447). SUBSE. (433).

434 1 ὡστε τίνα κτλ.] Schlosser’s censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, 1. 1 § 3.; n. (4); 3 § 1 (30); 8 § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at 1. 2 § 11" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define πόλις by reference to πολιτικός; on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state." (Schlosser 1. 218.) To say this is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 17 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. completing 1. 3. 8 n. (21), adequate for the end of the state. And just this is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering in this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Hence he is certainly right; the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See note (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUBSE. (434).

435 3 ὅ τοὺς ποιητοὺς] "honorary citizens" (Suseilh). But probably cases like those of § 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Dein. c. Neocr. 1575, 1576, τὸ γάρ τινα ποιητήν: 7 οὐ τῶν ὁριῶν ποι.] "Domestic does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, πάντα πολιτική κίνησις, with e. (1351) on the other, 9 § 10 n. (444). SUBSE. (434 b). 8 εὐθὺς οἱ τῶν δικαιῶν] "not the advantages of common jurisprudence, in the sense of the capacity to bring, defend a civil action." Therefore 10 τοῦτο] these civil rights, must enter into legislation, τούτο άπό συμβάλλειν "the parting is a commercial treaty. More fully explained below § 6, 7 (Schlosser 254). 1520. Sub. (433).
The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states; such perhaps as μὴ ἐξιπολῖθος ἐπὶ ἀπειρακτῆται, έλέους, Pseud-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] De Halounes §§ 9—13, Pollux viii. 63, 88; Harpocration s. v. and Aris. Frags. 380, 1541 b 1: whence some infer that αἱ ἐμπνεύσεις πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπνεύσας δικαίως of Thuc. 1. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh Pubb. Econ. of Athens pp. 40, 493 Eng. tr. and Groce c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope's note on Rhet. 1. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in Amer. Journal of Phil. 1880. 1. pp. 3—11.


§ 5 13 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθάπερ καὶ παίδας κτλ] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but on with a qualification. SUSEM. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν ἀτέλεις] Cp. § 5 § 2, n. (505). SUSEM. (437 b) Add i. 13. 7—20 ἕγκλημα διδορθώσεως δεομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by a added qualification, as citizen under age. }
...1.8

11^1270

237. MI

...
358 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 1. [III. 1. 8

διαφέρει τῷ ἑίδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ

δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχώμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὔδ' ἐστίν, ὥς

§ 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινὸν, ἡ γλώσσας. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας οἴρωμεν

εἶδε διαφερόντας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ύστερας τὰς δὲ

1275 ἐπὶ προτέρας σύσας τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημέναις καὶ παρεκβεβηκιάς

ἀναγκαίον ύστερα εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτητῶν (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκιάς πῶς λέγομεν, ύστερον ἔσται φανερόν), ὥστε καὶ

4 τὸν πολίτην ἔτερον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολι-

§ 10 τελαίναι. διότι ὁ λεχθεῖς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μᾶλιστ' ἐστὶ

πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδεχεται μὲν, οὐ μὲν ἀναγ-

37 οὐδ' ἐπιτίθει Madvig, οὔδ' ἐστιν ΠΠ Άρ. Βk., οὐδεστίν τιν. || [§ τοιαῦτα] Bas. 9

πολιτείαν, consequently, the πολίτης as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὀμίσθωμα. Here however πολίτης is probably παρώμυμον, like ἄγαθὸν in Nic. Eth. 1. 6 §§ 8—12, also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller Plato p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In Ind. Ar. ὑπόκειμεν is explained (1) res singulae quae continentur notionis aliquae universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio referetur et quibus suspensa est: e.g. Μελ. Α. 2, 4, 982 a 23, ὅ 

τὴν καθόλου ἑπιστήην ἑχον οἶδα πως 

πάντα τὰ ὑπόκειμα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πραγμάτων (ὑπὶ πολίτου) ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑπό-

κείμενα (singulae πολιτεία ad quas refer-

τιν τοῦ πολίτην notio) διαφέρει.

35—38 "See Categ. 1. i f.: things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὁμίσθωμα λέγεται ὃν ὄνομα μόνον κοινὸν, ὅ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον ὅτε ἐπιστῆ). Things are said to be synonymous or equivocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp. Waitz ad loc., Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. ὀμίσθωμα [Grote Hist. Antiq. 1. 8. ]; also I. 21, 13 above n. (28)." SUSEM. (438 b) Hence ob-

viously πράξειμα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. De Interp. c. 7 § 1, 17 a 38, ἐπεὶ 

δ' ἐστι τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ 

dὲ καθ' ἑκάστων. Any general notion, however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'something,' if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ύστερας. προτέρας Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence; the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See I. 2. 13 n. (27). SUSEM. (439)

1275 b 1 ἡμαρτημέναις Plato's word Rep. V 449 Α, VIII 544 Α. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong, perverse': cp. 6 § 11, VIII(v), 1, 5, N.Ε. IV. 9. 35, VIII. 10. 4. In VIII(v), 1, 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἀποκεντημένον=deser-

rate.

3. ύστερον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). SUSEM. (439 β)

§ 10 5 ὁ λεχθεῖς The citizen as thus defined, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία κτα. But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 nn. (598, 599): IV(vii). 9 §§ 7—9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3—5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4—6 n. SUSEM. (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which
would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." SEME. (441)

8 συγκλήτων] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in I. A. to B. 11 p. 34, 4 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. SEME. (442)

κατά μέρος] not "in turn" but "by sections.

κατά τάς δίκας... κατά μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two 'definite magistracies', the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened (συγκλήτων) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judicature into a special government department. SEME. (443)


τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Rhet. 1. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to ομολογία which are court." διὰ τὸ ταὐτά καίτως εἰσίν μια πρώτη γένιν.

§ 11 κατά Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in u. (443) we shall discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and H. 11. 7. κατά τάς δίκας κατά μέρος δικαιοσύνης, τάς κατά μέρος ἐν Λακεδαιμονί (ἐπ. Πλ. τυ. π. 34, 4 f. and un. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards is distinguished from that of deiavtai annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 43. 6. 314. SEME. (444)

15 ὧ κατά τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀριστερὰς] "the officer defined by his tenure at the office" (of judge or magistrate). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 11, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between ἀριστερὰς and δυσκόλη on the one hand, Helika,ιδίας, andΑριστοκράτους on the other.) SEME. (445)

§ 12 ἐν ἀρχής βουλευτικής καὶ κριτικής
20 τῆς τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ικανον
2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειάν ἄρης, ὡς ἄπλος εἰπεῖν: ὁρίζονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν πολιτικὴν τῶν ἐξ ἀμφότερον πολιτῶν καὶ μηθατέρου μονον, ὅνων πατρὸς ἡ μητρός, οἳ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ἔντοσιν, ὅνων ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πέλεως.
25 οὗτο δὲ ὀρισκομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροοῦσι τινες τῶν §2 τρίτον ἐκείνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολιτικὴς. Τοιχίας μὲν ὅν ὁ Λεωντύνω, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δὲ εἰρονευόμενοι, ἐφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀμποποιῶν πεποιη-

κήσα "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (ἀδραστὸς ἀρχηγός). SUSEM. (446)

ἐδή is simply untranslatable: without going further, without anything more being necessary, 21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ὡς “a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. n. (21), Π. 2. 8 η (136) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)
c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: νόμον ἐγέραν μὸνον Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυνεὶ Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας. 25 πολιτικῶς Like our word 'popular,' or popularis in Cic. De fin. IV. § 24, V. § 12: i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation παίχως, pingui Minerva.

§ 26 Τοιχίας The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to 1. 13. 10 (cp. n. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leon- tini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics: Alikdamas (n. 31), Polos, Likynnios, Protarchos and Lycophron (μην. 297, 552) were their most eminent names. See Foss De Gorgia Leoninto (Halle 1848), Frei in the Rhein. Mus. VII. 1850. 527 ff., VIII. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller Pre-Socratics vol. II. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass Die attische Beredsamkeit (Attic Oratory) I. p. 44, III. 2. 333 ff. Susemil Gorgias and Attic prose in Jahrb., f. Phil. CXV. 1877. pp. 793—799, De vitis Tisias etc. (Greiff- wald 1884) p. xx ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' Sitzungber. der Berliner Akad. 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSEM. (448) Also Cope in Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil. III. 65—80.

The following passage, Π. 25—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in Transactions of the Camb. Philo-

logical Soc. vol. II pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (Journal of Philology X V. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaens by Lycophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon Hellen. II. 3. 4.

27 εἰρονευόμενοι: ironically, though the word could have the meaning "jesting." But we are told Rhet. Π. 11, 17, 1408 b 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρονείας ὕπερ Γρηγίας ἔφει, that Gorgias used to be ironic in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 ἐφη καθάπερ ὅλμους κτλ: "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magis-

trates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of ὅλμους, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. Π. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or

'Burgomaster,' and as this was so in parts of Thessaly (see Schumam. Acti. 16, 16, p. 87 n. 10, Antiquités de Greece p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been at Larisa: while (2) at the same time in Attica, and the common language generally, it was the term for workmen or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The jest, when cited in this context, raises a presumption that the magistrates of Larisa bore this same title at the foundation of the city and had full powers to make citizens of whom they pleased; yet who in the world would spoil such a joke or pun by inquiring whether this was historically true? (But the jest would lose all its point if όρνατον be taken, as Ockoen suggests, to mean the founders, not the magistrates, of Larisa. For every town has its founders, and not merely Larisa and certain towns like it: nor does the word here mean unless some more precise phrase be added.) Further comp. viii(1), 6 6 n. (1853), 10 8 n. (1854), viii(11), 4 16 n. (1858). Susen [450] Cp. Thuc. 1. 46 ἐκαίνισενος.

So iain για τινας λαρισοποιοι

"For (the wild) some of them are Larissians," i.e., hardware manufacturers. Why should Gorgias interpret his own joke? It is far more likely that this is a play by some one who did not read that Aesop goes with Larissians above, or perhaps believed that Larissa, Λαρίσσα, meant "a kettle" on the analogy of τέμπας, προτέρας. In Arist. Pol. vi. 205, the Larissians engraunted as Aesop, Aesop is an adjective, and this makes against its supposed use as a substantive, and therefore against the translation of Camerarius (Ridgeway).

3 30 ἀπολεῖν] a simple question, added perfunctorily.

τοιλίου για εφολείτων [έσον καὶ δουλούς μετοικοίς] "not be admitted into the tribes many resident aliens of foreign and servile extraction" (Ridgeway). It is well known that Cicero abolished the four ancient tribes.
39 καὶ Βκ.², καὶ ΓΠ Αγρ. Βκ.¹, προσαπορθείεν <ἄν> έγόττίλιν, τις <ἄν> Σπεγνελ
τοῦτον Ἡλ Λ', Τουτό Μ* (1st hand), τοῦτον ΓΠθ.¹²-3.4 Ἡλ ΤθΜ² (corr).
176α τῆς γένεθη πολίχνις ἑποίμην πρὸς τὴν εἰρήμην πρότερον ἀμφί-
σβήτησιν.

Congreve supports the reading of Bekker² and Thirlwall (π. 74) by a com-
parison of τυπ. (vii. 4) § 6 δοῦλων ἀρμάθων πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ἐνω, § 14 ἐνω καὶ μετοίκω
vacu. This is nullified by Aristoph. Ἀθ. 5ο-8. Ἠ. 347 εἶ ποῦ δικίδιον ἐπί 
κατὰ ἐνω μετοίκου, Ἐκα. 297 μετοίκου καὶ ἐνω. That δοῦλοι may be 
used in freedmen is capable of abundant 
point: Athenaeus vi. 93, 267 b, c diαφέρειν δὲ φησὶ Χριστίππος δοῦλον ἐκέ-
τεν μέγαν ἵππον ἐν β' Περὶ ὄνομαίς, διά τοὺς ἀπελευθέρων μὲν δοῦλοι ἔτι 
icetaton, σχήματος ἐκάθεν μή τῆς κτήσεως ἀρχαῖων: ἦσαν συγκρίνεται. § 64 δοῦλο
καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων ἐστιν (of a citizen): Isaacus νί λδη 49, ὅταν ὄνομαν ἄρχαν ὄνομα δοῦλη
(of a freedwoman): Harpocration s.v. μετοίκων, κηρ. Βοεκχ. Πολ. Εκονομ
2 χ. τ. (the freedmen paid this)

The proceeding of Cleisthenes was not more violent than that of Euphrón 

af Σίκυόν: Χεν. Ἑλ. νη. 3. 8 ὅθεν νοῦν μὲν οἱ μόνοι ἐλευθεροὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίται ἐποίει: and the two commonest sources of 
an artian population are cited side by side, Ἰνηκα c. 5 § 3 παρέ ἐνοι ἃν

dοῦλον τῷ βασιλείῳ ἢ ἐνεργ. There is no authority for δοῦλους μετοίκων and 

if any change were needed Niebuhr's would be the simplest. See also Grote 
v. 17ον. 1. Σχομάνν Constitutional History p. 69 f. Ἐν. τρ.
§ 5 176α καὶ τοῦτον] Even those who have received the franchise in con-
sequence of a revolution. Σουεμ. (452)
§ 7 πρότερον] § 3 ν. (432). Σουεμ. (453)
c. 3 The identity of the state depends 
not upon its territory but upon its 
constitutions.

§ 2 π. ἐνοι] Possibly writers who 
advocated repudiation are meant: In-
tr. p. 20 ν. 1. Σουεμ. (454)
11 διαλέγεται = discharge, pay in full.
 newSize (οὐ οὐ τῆς πόλεως κτλ.] “on the ground that it was a loan to the tyrant and not 
to the state.” This question was really 
raised in b.c. 403, when after the expul-

sion of the thirty, the Athenian state 
debated whether it was obliged to repay a 
loan of 100 talents borrowed by them 
from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f., 
Isocr. νη. 68 f. (Vettori). The 
converse case, viz. that the credit of a service 
rendered by the expelled tyrants was 
claimed by the state, arose, when the 
Corinthians after the expulsion of the 
Cypselidae demanded that the offers 
dedicated by this family at Delphi and 
Pisa should be inscribed with the name 
of the town, and the acts of their 
may thus be regarded as acts of the state.
The Delphians admitted the claim, the Eleusians rejected it: see Plut., De Reicl. Deuc. 13, 400 e (Schlosser). Comp. further n. (432) on 1 § 1. Suprem. (455). Brightman (p. 171) cites the case of the United States and the lands issued by the abortive Confederate government.

Comp. Them. iii. 81 ἀνδραίων... Ἀλίπη (Alexa) χρηστῶν ἀρσίου ἄλλην τῶν ἀλβώντων (τῶν ἀνατέκνων Schd.).

13 ἀνδρώτων] "for some forms of the state rest upon superior force and are not made public by expediency." This is the second time that Aristotle refers beforehand to the doctrine of 'derogate' forms of government, more precisely laid down in c. 6: see above nn. (439 b, 440). Suprem. (456).

14 ὁμοφόρον. "The laws of the state are thus supplied: - But democracy also is a government of this sort." Suprem. (457).

15 [ηπητικός] Aristotle has in view the measure which the Greeks called ἀνατέκνον, σπηλαίον (v. 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town was destroyed by its conquerors and the inhabitants were driven to seek new homes in the neighbourhood in a number of unwalled villages and hamlets, as was done to Mantinea, by the Spartans m. 395 n.c. This was an antecedent measure: for the custom of living together in a walled town was usually favorable to democracy. The opposite and democratical procedure, the union of several country places, hitherto unwalled, in a single town was ἀνατέκνον; and directly after the battle of Lacedaemon this was done by the Mantinians who rebuild their city B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse to the foundation of a common capital of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See Curtius Hist. iv. pp. 202, 417 f. Eng. iv. Subhominum Astyp. p. 171 Eng. iv. Op. 350 b, 1. 2. 8 n. (430). Suprem. (459).

17 καὶ ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραγμάτων] In this form the problem must be regarded as easier to solve, for the variety of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates a solution.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ. 3.

23 πολλαχῶς λεγομένης] As in Greek there is only the one word πόλις for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in n. (459) it might well be asked, whether the state of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the city. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word πόλις, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (Introtd. p. 22), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of πόλις, πολιτικός, by 'city' 'civil' rather than 'state,' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. vii. 77. 7 ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τείχη όποδ ναις; Soph. Oed. Ἐκχ. 56 ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστιν οὔτε πόργος οὔτε ναῦς ἐρημος ἄνδρων τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων ἑσω; Thea. Hist. 1. 84 quid? vos pulcher-rinam hanc urbem dominus et tectis et congru gestu lapidum stare creditis? SUSEM. (461)


28 ξυν περιγραφῇ] has a circumference of a nation; i.e. encircles a nation rather than a state.

29 μᾶλλον ἑθνους] Comp. n. (11) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (463)

ης γε φασιν ιαλωκιας] The capture by Cyrus is meant: Herod. 1. 178, 191. Nothing is there said however of an interval of three days, but we are told that when the extremities of the town were captured the Babylonians who lived in the centre had not yet discovered that it was taken. See also ii. 6. 6 n. (200). SUSEM. (462)


§ 7 1276 b 2 Κοινωνία πολιτών πολιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this, translating "For if the state is a kind of community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a community possessed by citizens in a constitution," and adlibing the MS. text of 9 § 14 as another instance of the double genitive with κοινωνία. If any change is to be made at all, we should omit πολιτῶν, which, though grammatically unobjectionable, is superfluous and somewhat obscures the sense. Usually κοινωνία πολιτῶν or κοινωνία itself has been made the subject of the second sentence, and κοινωνία πολιτείας or κοινωνία is its predicate, "and fellowship of the citizens is fellowship in a constitution" or "constitute in a constitution." SUPP.

§ 8 7 εἰδος ήπερ τῆς συνθέσεως] "If the kind of combination be different," i.e., if the elements be differently combined.

8 ἄρροιαν] See Exe. iv on B. v(viii). SUPP. (465). In these two modes the notes (φάλλου) are the same: but the Dorian mode is from E to e, and b natural is μέθη or key-note; while the Phrygian mode is from D to d and a is μέθη. Comp. Dio Chrysost. B 211, p. 21 ἄρροια Δηχεῖται καὶ Φρέγατο ἀλλή καὶ Διήν."
not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see vi(vii), 1 § 1 f. n. (173), vii(v). 9 § 11 (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, vi(v). 5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from iv(vii). c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (109).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see min. 82, 206, 339) left too much out of sight, may utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people; and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. vii § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. Susem. (466) 13 e i d i k a i o n . . . 

But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when the state changes to another constitution is a different question.' The point is not resumed in the sequel.

'This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question.' Susem. (467) 4, 5 Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen? See Anal. p. 109, and Thurot Etudes pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the Republic, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. viii. ix. Aristotle admits it in some cases (§ 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (§ 8), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with N. E. v. 2. 11: o  v r k a i o w  t a v t o w  a  d o l i t f a g a l l  

... The fragment from the English is used for the Greek. Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to
in. 4. 3) 1276 b 10.—1276 b 32. 367

πότερον την αυτήν ἄρετὴν ἀνέδροι ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολιτὸν στόχον (11) δαίων θετέω, ἢ μὴ τὴν αυτήν ἀλλὰ μὲν εἰ τις τούτω τις χείνει δι' ἐλπισιῶν, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τέτορ τοις πρῶτον ἀγαθόν. ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰ τε τῶν κοινωνίας ἁστίν, οὐτω καὶ τοῦ πολίτην φαμεν. τῶν ὁ πλωτὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἁμοιοί· ὅμοιοι οὗτοι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἶναι, ὁ ὁ κυβερνήτης, ὁ δ' πηρρεύς, ὁ δ' ἀλλήλα τις ἐχαρετισμῇ εἰσάχθηκεν δήλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβεστάτου ἐκατοστού λόγος ἑδύνεται τῆς ἁρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐφαρμόσει πάσιν. ἢ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἐργαν ἐστιν ἀυτῶν πάντων τούτων γὰρ ἐκάστος ὑφέτεται τῶν πλωτηρίων. ὁμοίως τοινκαὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίτερ ἀναμοιλινός οὗτοι, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἐργόν ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστιν ἡ πολειτεία διότερ τὴν ἁρετὴν ἀναγκαίον ἐνιαί τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολειτείαν. εἰπτερ οὖν ἐστιν πλείον πολειτείας εἰδή, δήλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδείξεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μιαν ἁρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε-
33 tov δ' ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtuous and fitness of the man (ἀρετή) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετή of the woman as separate and belonging to a separate species: see 4 §§ 15—18 (491, 492); 1. 13 §§ 9—11, 19. 14b, 117, 119. Susem. (470).

§ 4 36 ἐπελείθεν τι οἵ περὶ τῶν στρατ. are separately found: while vili(v), 10. I. ἐπελείθεν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας εξ ὧν θείη-πεσα is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαποροῦντας; "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state."

"But the sense seems to require that ἐπελείθεν τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον should mean here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρὰ might be necessary="starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'." Susem.

§ 5 37 εἰ γαρ ἀδύνατον] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike."

But how does this agree with the passages quoted in n. (133) on 11. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18§ 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοὺς πρῶτος λόγοι) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4—6§ 1; see n. (684) on 18§ 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, 4§ 5, the arguments ἰδρο and κοιν had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18§ 1 refers us back, may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4*, or in the lacuna at c. 13§ 6 (see Introd. p. 43 ff. 599). But at c. 6†§ 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13§ 6 is too near to 18§ 1 to be meant by the words ἐν τοῖς πρῶτος λόγοις. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction; see § 6 n. (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); 5§ 1 (501). But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18§ 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18§ 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently iv(vii), 9§ 3, 13§§ 9, 16, 14§ 8: vi(vi). 7. 2 (nun. 684, 808 and Introd. p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men: and this alone is reasoned out logically (see n. 458). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not...

* Not directly after 4§ 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4 from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemihl in Compos. der arist. Pol. p. 24 f. n. (24).
The members of the Assembly had no intention of permitting civil offices to be held by the members of the Assembly, or of allowing the members of the Assembly to retain the office of public officers. Consequently, it was assumed that the most virtuous citizens, who were the highest and most perfectly educated, would be naturally the best and most qualified to hold these offices.

It may therefore be inferred that Aristotle was of the opinion that the Assembly had no intention of permitting civil offices to be held by the members of the Assembly, or of allowing the members of the Assembly to retain the office of public officers. Consequently, it was assumed that the most virtuous citizens, who were the highest and most perfectly educated, would be naturally the best and most qualified to hold these offices.

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In the Assembly, the virtue of the politician was considered to be the key criterion for choosing the best citizens to hold public offices. Therefore, it was assumed that the most virtuous citizens, who were the highest and most perfectly educated, would be naturally the best and most qualified to hold these offices.

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In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in n. (501) on 111. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of 111. 2. 3: comp. n. (133). SUSEM. (473)

§ 7 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐστι τινὸς κτλ.
"Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?"

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμος, ἀγαθὸς refers to moral virtue (cp. n. 40). Just in the same way at 11 § 2 we have ἀρέτης καὶ φρόνιμοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ in combination; where ἀρέτη is 'virtue' simply, ἂ. e. moral virtue. Cp. n. (565) and n. (703) on IV(VII). 1. 10. On the relation of φρόνιμος (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see nn. (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with nn. (493, 497, 498). SUSEM. (474)


§ 8 17 Ἀναγκαστικοὶ, ὑποβαθμίζονται. Whether these were authors, is doubtful. SUSEM. (476) Mr Wyse finds the reference in Ps.-Plato First Alc. 121 d ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Ἐὐφρατης] In the Aenid, Frag. 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV(VII). 14-1, n. (891). SUSEM. (477)

19 τὰ κοινὰ δ' παίδευσαν γενοβάτω] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἰ δὴ ἢ ἀρέτη κτλ.] Far more just is Aristotle's admission VIII(V). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ πολεμεῖ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (Thurot). Cp. n. (1630). SUSEM. (478)

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολιτῶν] 'but in a
kai dia tovti isow; 'Iados wv ephi peiwv one wv tov tereuws, au (1) ouk epi斯塔menos idnwths elnai.

Alla miw epiainetai ge to dunamei ophxwv kai arxhswai, kai politov doxwmou h amytia elnai to dunamei kai arxhswai kai arxhswai kalw.

On this whole paragraph cp. [Susem. ed. coll. p. 387 f. 17 ov] &;? Susem. 29 eotai, [o]w Schlesier, [o]n Karesa, [o]n Cherew, el [o]n Screeew, el [o]n Susem. Yet eotai may be right, if the lacuna after 32 amphoteras is much larger than the mere loss of toto euv skopwv or something equivalent; or if Welldon's conjecture below is right.

On the whole paragraph cp. [Susem. ed. coll. p. 387 f. 17 ov] &;? Susem. 29 eotai, [o]w Schlesier, [o]n Karesa, [o]n Cherew, el [o]n Screeew, el [o]n Susem. Yet eotai may be right, if the lacuna after 32 amphoteras is much larger than the mere loss of toto euv skopwv or something equivalent; or if Welldon's conjecture below is right.


specific citizen.' The gloss fairly gives the sense.

'21 'Iados' The famous tyrant of Therae in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius Hist. iv. pp. 443-451 E. tr. and Krafft's Art. 'Jason of Therae' in Pauly's Realencyclopadie. Grotting recalls saying another thing of his cited by Aristotle Hist. i. 1. 31. 1773 a 25, that he must do something in order to have the power to do much right. Susem. (479)

if] Not phos, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

'turh deiwos ewos'] "he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject." Eaton compares the saying of Astyages to Harpagus, and of Procrater to Lecythus to Herodot. i. 29. vi. 67 and what is related of Therae. iv. 147; and Aeschyl. Pers. 926, but all these cases are not essentially different. Susem. (480) Even Grote caught napping here, for he represents soean as saying that he felt hunger until he became despot (iii. p. 36 n.)

§ 10 25 Alla mwn = 17 kalai] Eaton compares Phil. Latoeiv. 1. 643 E. tov pwe dotev et Kalai tes, tonwos taisthupheta te kai amytia ton arxhswv; amphotera. Susem. (481)

27 ei ouw... 29 ouw = 27 ou epi amphotera amyteta] "If we then lay down that the excellence of a good man is that of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is that of both," ruling and being ruled, "they cannot both be equally praiseworthy." It is the virtue of the good man which alone is one and perfect, § 34 tov dotev daimon daimou katv daimon daimou einaiv tov thelas. Of civic virtue this is true only in so far as it denotes the excellence of rule (there declared to be the excellence of the citizen), but not in so far as it is the excellence displayed in due obedience. This latter then is a subordinate excellence. Susem. (482)

11 Welldon, reading 29 eotai ouw... 30 eotai amphotera kai = 29 eotai... 30 eotai kai, translates "Since these seems that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both [rulers and subjects] and other cases where they ought [each] to learn only one." But this strain of 29 eotai - not both the same.
σταθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, * * κάντευθεν ἄν κατίδοι τις. (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ δησποτική ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τὰ λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ’ οὐκ ἂναγκαῖον, § 12 ἀλλὰ χρήσθαι μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδίδες. λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δίωσθαι καὶ υπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς πράξεις. δοῦλου δὲ εἰδὴ πλείω λέγομεν αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ἂν δὲ μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χρηστῆς· οὕτω δ’ εἰσίν, ὡσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τούνομα αὐτῶν, οἱ ξύντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, εὖ οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνήτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ’ ἐνίοις, οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημοφύλειοι τὸ παλαιὸν ἄρχον, πρὶν § 13 δήμον ογνέσθαι τὸν ἐσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐργά τὰν ἀρχο- μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἄγαθον] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ 5 τὸν πολιτήν [τὸν ἄγαθον] μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατέθεν Μ', τοιούτευθεν ΠΓΓ κ. Αρ. Βκ. Βενάμια—ειλικρινώς μια μονομερή ομιλία, ουδὲ τὴν κατάφορον ἀπέλευσεν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ εἰδήσει τῆς λακονίτου. ἐν τῇ καταφορᾷ τῆς κατάφορον ἀπέλευσεν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ εἰδήσει τῆς λακονίτου. Μ', τοιούτευθεν ΠΓΓ κ. Αρ. Βκ. Βενάμια—ειλικρινώς μια μονομερή ομιλία, ουδὲ τὴν κατάφορον ἀπέλευσεν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ εἰδήσει τῆς λακονίτου. Μ', τοιούτευθεν ΠΓΓ κ. Αρ. Βκ. Βενάμια—ειλικρινώς μια μονομερή ομιλία, ουδὲ τὴν κατάφορον ἀπέλευσεν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ εἰδήσει τῆς λακονίτου.
III. 4, 16]

1277 a 32—1277 b 10.

δεσπότην τοτέ δε οὐδολον. ἀλλ' ἐστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἦν ἀρχὴν τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γέμει καὶ τῶν ἐλεωθέρων. ταὐτήν γαρ λέγουμεν εἰναι τὸν πολιτικὴν ἀρχην, ἦν δεὶ τῶν ἀρχηγῶν ἀρχήμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἰππαρχεῖν ἰππαρχηθῆναι, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθήναι καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λυχναράσαντα, ὡς λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς. οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἄρξαι μη ἀρχηθέντα. τοῦτον δὲ ἄρση μὲν ἑτέρα, δεὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἄρχαθ' ἐπίστασαι καὶ δύνασαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχὴν σαι, καὶ αὐτή ἄρση πολιτοῦ, τὸ τῆς τῶν ἐλεωθέρων ἀρχής ἐπίστασαι ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἄνδρος δὴ ἄγαθῳ ἀμφω.

7 < καί τε; Suec. 10 καὶ before στρατηγηθῆναι Suec. 11 διὸ < καί> P2 Q 1 T 10 lk.

for his private use] the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

8 ὁμοίων τῷ γέμει - his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ is in accord with the commonest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 Ιο ἰππαρχεῖν κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten ῥαξίων, one from each φυλή (see n. 413), and perhaps themselves called φύλαι. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ραξίαρχος. Each such ῥαξίων was divided into λέγοι or companies, as we should call them, and their commandants were called λέγαρχοι. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἰππαρχοι, and under them were ten ἱππαρχοι, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοὶ, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten ῥαξίων: but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive political-military officers. Violently it was at the same time that the ῥαξίαρχοι were created, to assume that had been earlier the functions of the τοποφόροι: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might try on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Salmenon Fragmenta p. 430 f. 432, 434 f.


12 λέγαρχος κτλ] Comp. viii.viiii. 14 f. n. (898) B. This saying is attributed to Salomon by Apollodoros in Dion. Lecr. 1. 60, Stob. For. XIX. 24 (Eustath), but hardly on good evidence. Suec. 490

§ 16 καὶ ἄνδρος δὴ κτλ] both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thucydides objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end; only here, according to Aristotle's view, the value of the citizen who is governed is as much in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself as the course of his exposition; but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 1301) represents the specific differences between the lower virtue of the warrior and the higher virtue of the man, 1. 15 317, 9, 16, 198 (114 b. 115; 141) as so as to imply that the latter is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. w. (476). Suec. 491.
καὶ εἶ ἐτερον εἰδός σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαίοσύνης ἀρχικής (καὶ [γάρ], ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἄν εἶ θοῦς ἀρετῆ, οἶον δικαίοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἰ θήνῃ σοι καθ' ἀ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὡσπέρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυν. § 17 ναικὸς ἐτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι δειλὸς αἵρη, εἰ οὔτως ἀνδρείος εἰν ὡσπέρ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὔτως κοσμία εἰν ὡσπέρ ὁ ἀγαθός, εἰπὲ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός: τοῦ 25 μὲν γὰρ κτάσαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν): ἡ δὲ φρόνιμος ἀρχοντὸς ἰδίως ἀρετῆς μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἐσοικεν

18 [γάρ] Göttingl, τῆς; Susem., γὰρ <ἀρχοντὸς καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Götting, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἄρχοψ and a colon after 17 ἀρχικής || 19 τοῦ θοῦς ἀρέτη] Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on 1. § 6 n. (40), § 9 (45), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115): III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). Susem. (493)
eἰδή ἔξονα κτλ] "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). Susem. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling <and in being ruled>. For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the free-man who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἀρχοντὸς καὶ ἄρχωμεν>), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antitheses maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρίνως II. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία = 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant. 23 οὔτω κοσμία] "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on 1. 13. 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. Susem. (495)

24 οἰκονομία εὖρα] It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. 1. cc. 8—10: see Exc. III. to B. 1. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. Mem. II. 7. 12—14, Ωἰκον. 7." (Eaton.) Susem. (496)

25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις] By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (45), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115): III. 4. 7 nn. (474—5). Comp. Nic. Εἰθ. v. 10. 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σῶνης κρατικὴ μόρον; also n. (498): V. 4—14 n. (1186), and Rhet. 11. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἄρχων τὸ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV(vii). 9. § n. (810). Susem. (497)
§ 18 ilarity of right opinion' here denotes more precisely the capacity of rightly apprehending the order given in order to execute it aright, for which the person who executes it is often obliged to discover the ways and means either wholly or in part for himself. 'Right opinion' of this sort does not by any means correspond, as Katen thinks, with that to which Plato applies the term, simply because the φύσις to which Plato often opposes it (as in Laws t. 632 e) coincides with philosophical knowledge. Hence Plato would not concede to right opinion, as Aristotelc does. See further t. 13. 7 n. (115). SUSM. (498)

...The comparison is taken from Plato Kep. x. 601 b. Cp. 11. 14 n. (374). SUSM. (499)

c. 5 § 1 33 περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν κτλ. "It is an erroneous assumption to think, as Thurat and others do, that this is an altogether different question from the one discussed in the last chapter. These opening words at once prove that Aristotle looks upon the discussion of c. 5 as most closely connected with the chapter preceding. There it was decided that the virtue of the citizen in republican states consists in his being qualified both to rule and to be ruled; but in fact a restriction was needed in those cases where full participation in civic rights is granted to the lowest classes of the people, who live by manual labour, the mechanics and day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that owing partly to their want of leisure, partly to their degrading occupation, they cannot raise themselves to a higher level of virtue: and that therefore they are just as unqualified to rule as they are unable to claim, in the full sense of the word, the title of σωφρόνες, i.e., virtuous and capable men. To avoid this restriction is the main object of c. 5, and goes more dimly into details, t. 4—7, respecting the position of this class (Ramsay Rennckmgton p. 10 f.). SUSM. (500)

§ 34 ὁσ ἀληθῶς γὰρ, "whether he really is a citizen who has the right to share in office or whether the working men also ought to rank as citizens"; as was indeed the case at Athens. πότερον πολιτικὸν. It is true that Aristotle ought not to have raised the question in this form after defining the position of the citizen given in t. 2: c. comp. t. 6 a. (174). But in the following discussion he has taken care that no material disadvantage results from this formal defect. SUSM. (501)

οὔτων τις ἦν. SUSM. (502)

§ 29 τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἄρτῃ γὰρ τῆς τολματοφύλαι, including τὰς ἀρχαῖα, to command as well as to obey.
§ 2 τόος ἐκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἤ δια γε τοῦτον (ΠΙΙ)

1278 a τοῦ λόγου οὐδέν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ
doúloi τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ’ οἱ ἀπελευθεροι. τούτο 2
γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὥν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἰη
pόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ’ οἱ παίδες ὁσαύτως πολίται καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖς, ἀλλ’
oi μὲν ἀπλῶς οὐ δ’ ε’ ὑπόθεσον: πολίται μὲν γὰρ εἰσον,
§ 3 ἀλλ’ ἀπελεύθεροι. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοις παρ’ ἐνιόος
ην δούλου το βάναυσον ἡ ξενικόν, διότερ οἱ πολλοὶ τινοῦ
tοι καὶ νῦν ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολι
tην. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολιτής, ἀλλὰ πολιτῶν ἐρετὴν ἦν εἰπ’ομεν

10 λεκτέων οὐ παντός, οὐδ’ εὐθυερῶν μόνον, ἀλλ’ οὗτοι τῶν ἐρ-
§ 4 γονι εἰσον ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἄναγκαιων. τῶν δ’ ἐναγκαίων οἱ μὲν 3

39 οὔτε...οὔτε Spengel
1278 a 5 ἐκ προσθέσεως Casaubon || 9
πολιτήν * * Oncken, wrongly || 11 δ’ [ἀναγκαίων] Susen.3, δὲ μὴ ἀφειμένων?

Congreve, δ’ αὐτοῦνρχν Schmidt, δὲ <μὴ ἀφειμένων τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply

dὲ <μὴ?> Susen., δ’ ἀλλων Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended

(τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

39 ἐκάστος] each native artizan.

"What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he
need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still
retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as
under Solon's constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. Susen. (502)

§ 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves
nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners).
The indispensable elements of a state (ὅν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἰη πόλις) need
not be all citizens.

1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ κτλ] This reason

is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves
cannot come into the question: while the
freedmen were regarded (and with
good reason) as a special class of the
resident aliens: see Schömann p. 351 of
Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself con-
siders them, if the reading is correct,
c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the
term, in accordance with its etymology
μέτοικος denotes only a permanent resi-
dent in a town of which he is not a
citizen, though he is a citizen somewhere
else [cp. Eur. Hel. 892]; and this condi-
tion is not fulfilled in the case of the freed-
men" (Dittenberger). Susen. (503)

2 τούτῳ γὰρ ἀληθές, κτλ] "For this
is quite true that not all who are indis-
pensable to the city ought to be classed as
citizens." A very important point for
our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see

iv(vii). 8 § 1 ff. n. (755). Susen. (504)

4 ὡσαύτως καὶ] equally with. See

on II. 8. 21 ὑμοίοις καὶ.

5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults,
are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the
others, viz. children, only in a qualified
sense; i.e. on the supposition that they
grow up.

6 ἀλλ’ ἀπελεύθεροι] "but under age." See

c. I § 4 n. (437 b). Susen. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some
places were slaves or foreigners. But
see Herod. II. 167, where contempt for
handicrafts is said to be common to Εὐρ-
arians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians,
and to have been 'learnt' from them by the
Greeks.

8 ἤ δὲ βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. iv(vii).

9 § 3; § 7, n. (809). Susen. (506)

9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολιτής] "But if

the artizan too is a citizen, then the virtue
of the citizen, as defined by us, must not
be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor
even to the free man as such, but to those
only who are released from menial func-
tions" [including free artizans].

§ 4 11 τῶν δ’ [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ]
Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as
neuter (in support of this use see II. 9 § 2
τὴν τῶν ἄναγκαιων σχολή, and I. 7, 3,
11. 6. 5): 'in respect of compulsory work
12 κοινος Πτ. Βκ. 14 φαίνει untranslated by At., suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture δε φαινεται φαίνει in the margin of Bas., and by Schnei-

der. Bernays, "at the first glance": but can it mean this? Στάιν? Susem. 14 φαινεται would be less alteration, but hardly right: το δεφαινεται or το γαρ φαινεται Schmidt 24 [oι] Schneider

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those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers: οι τα κοινα εργαζομενοι οι; 23.
13 δι κοινος Καπβρ. 1. 11 § 13: δε μεν δουλει κοινωνει ρωμει δε πιουντεροποιοι οι γαρ βαθανους τεχνιτες φαινομενην τε 
κει εχει δουλακαν, μεν δι; (122); 1. 11 § 6 m. (103), III. 1 § 11 m. (466).
Susen. (507)

13. θητες = θείηθρον δια πεινας ετε ροι 
γερον διπλασιοντες Polliκα ηπ. 52.

φαινον δεντεδενν "In what position the artisans stand becomes clear upon slight reflection from the following consideration"; viz. that a variety of &ctif-

"must also be several species of citizens." Sec c. 1 § 8-11. Susen. (508)

18 οιον δε τις λεγον ημ καλη] Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that 
this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate sec m. 110 της c. 1 § 10, although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (526). § 4 n. (528). c. 13 § 8 n. (537).

Susen. (509)

10 ου γαρ ολον την See again n. (104).

Susen. (510)

If we grant Aristotle’s premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a busy, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A.C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that “if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good” Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

19 τασπεριμαι = μαρπεριμαι property qualifications. Comp. ψαριν in § 2 μαρπεριμαι μεταφ.

7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the govern-
ment until he had retired ten years from the market place.
§ 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἑτῶν μη ἄπε- (III)

26 σχηματῶν τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσεφέλεται καὶ τῶν ἐξῶν ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐν τοις δημοκρατίαις πολιτῆς ἐστιν, τῶν αὐτῶν.

25 τῶν τῶν Qb Th and P2 (1st hand, emended by corr.) || 26 ἀρετῆς ΓΜ* || 27 προσεφέλεται καὶ προσεφέλει τώρα? Riese. See my critical edition for other emendations, of which τῶν ἐξῶν (for τῶν ἐξῶν) P4 is the oldest.

25 ἐν Θήβαις δὲ] Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle commends this regulation vii(vi). 7 § 4, n. (1490), and justly too, as Schlesser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be flooded with alien or upstart elements. Further compare viii(v). 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, Rhet. 1. 7. 32, 1305 a 19: but his Politics nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations invariably incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the rough labour of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur). Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (βάναυσοι) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, Hellen. p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral βάναυση which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aris- totle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state iv(vii). 14 § 7; cp. v(viii). 2 § 6 m. (982 a—3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the βάναυσοι. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of persons in trade, not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which βάναυση is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSEM. (511)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς] Hence ἀγορᾶς βίος iv(vii). 9 § 3; δῆμος vii(vii). 3 § 2, ἀγορᾶς πλῆθος 4 §§ 10, 21 (Eaton).

27 προσεφέλεται] drops in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demothenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins. ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSEM. (512)
31 tovōcēs [dead] ταρ' Bernays (without parentheses) 32: ἔπη τους τινάς των συνόπτων ἐπικεκρυμμένων έστιν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοπτῶν κοινῶν ἐστιν.

32 tovōx δοθο: Under this name were included not only those children whose mother was not a citizen, but also the children of a citizen mother if she were not lawfully married to the father. The latter were always accounted citizens at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle is only thinking of the former. See Scholman pp. 336-8 Eng. tr. SUSELM. (513) § 8: "But as the admission of such persons to the franchise is due to the debt of citizens of legitimate birth, as population increases they gradually part off from the roll of citizens, first, the children of slave fathers or slave mothers."

33 τοὺς ἐκ δοῦλου.... δουλής] See preceding notes. SUSELM. (514) ἕτα τοὺς ἄπο γυναικῶν] This remark has been rightly adduced to show that at Athens even in those times in which the bastard children of citizen fathers became citizens in their turn (ἐν 546) the children of a citizen mother by a father who was not a citizen were not reckoned citizens. The child followed the status of the father in both cases, although the former case was restricted to the period in question. See Philippus Contributions to a history of Athenian citizenship p. 64, Scholman p. 338 Eng. tr. (where the reference in n. 6, incorrectly given, is to the present passage). Compare τοὺς τοῦτον τινάς τους νόμους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οἴ (III) 30 μὴν ἄλλα ἔπη τα ἐνδειγμάτων τῶν γυναικῶν ποιοῦνται πολιτάς τοὺς τοιούτους (διά γὰρ ὀλοκληρωτικάν ὀστό χρώται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦσίτοι δὴ ὕγιλον κατὰ μικρῶν παραρασσόν- τας τοὺς ἐκ δουλω τοῦ πρώτον ἢ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἄπο γυναικῶν.

34 τέλος δὲ μονοι τοὺς ἄλοι ὀστῶν πολιτάς ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν
35 οὖν εἰδή πλείον πολίτου, φανερῶν ἐκ τοιούτου, καὶ ὡτι λέγεται μέλε- στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὦστερ καὶ Ὕμηρος ἐποίησεν
ως τό τοιούτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοπτῶν κοι-
1278 b 1 <ἀρετήν> Schneider Susem. following Ar., <ἐτέραν> <ἀρετήν> Spengel, less probably, <θετέων> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine || 2 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων omitted by Π1 (added in the margin of Π2), [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Susem.1 || 3 <πόσ ἡ αὐτή καὶ πῶς ἔτερα, καὶ> δι' ὁδόν ἄλλον Π2 (corr.) || 4 κάκεινης Π2 (corr.1), κάκεινης Γ Μ3 Π2 fr. Ar. Bk 1 Π1 (1st hand) and corr.1 of Π1 (κάκεινης changed to κακείνης and again written over η) || 5 Π2 omitted by Π2 fr. Bk. || η... 5 κύριοι omitted in Q5 T5 Ar. Ald. and P5+ (1st hand: added in the margin, but in Π3 again erased) || 6 καὶ εἰ Π2 fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M5)

"joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an αὐτοκίνητον: and he quotes in support of this view VIII(v). 3 §§ 11, 12, διὰ δούλον ἴνα συνοικίων ἐκδίδοντο ἡ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασάμενοι ὁμοίοι...ἐν Θεοφίλου ἕνας ἡνίκας. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the συνοικίων are really μέτοικοι.

§ 10 1278 b 3 ὅτι τῶν μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτός] that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 n. (471).

Sus. (519)

τυνός δ' ἐτέρος] The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the deprived forms of government; viz. (1) the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (δυναστεία), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master's rule (ἀρχὴ διεστικτίκη) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. Sus. (520)

κάκεινης δ' οὐ πᾶς] "And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over, the public administration."

5. ἢ καθ' ἀυτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων] This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminently best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. Sus. (521)

c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ? Compare A. C. Bradley Hellenica, pp. 222—230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία = an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. 

"Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν τὴν πόλιν ὑπὸ ὑπάρχοντας τάξεις τις; VI(IV). 1 § 10 τάξεις ταῖς πόλεως ἡ περὶ τάς ἀρχας, τίνα τρόπον γενε- μηνται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τί τὸ κῦρον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν: 3 § 5 with notes." Sus. (522)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express πολιτεία, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 s. fin.) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one
constitution may be superior to another'" (Bradley).

This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 ἡ πολιτείας] 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. 'This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (54); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (εὐστρατός).

So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (666) on c. 4 § 9 and c. 12 § 5 n. (52)." SUSM. (533)

πολιτείας δὲ τινήν ἡ πολιτεία] 'the constitution or the ruling class'; an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. 'The 'constitution' varies with the 'government' or governing class.' § 2 14 φαμίν δὴ κτλ.] Accordingly we say that in these cases 'a democracy and an oligarchy' 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases."

15 ὑποθετῶν δὴ] 'We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.'

"See n. (530) on § 7." SUSM. (534)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον λόγον] In Book 1 c. 2 § 9 ff. SUSM. (525)

For the prepos. in 'ἐπ' c. 18 § 1, cf. τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις (Footnote).

23 καθ' δὲν ἐκπάλλει μέρος ἑκατόν] 'to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life.' οὕτως καθ' ἐκπάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in τι. 6 § 32, οὕτως ἐκπάλλει + στιχ. and τ. 13 § 13 (where however see note).
25 κουνή πάση και χωρίς· συνέχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζήν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἵσως γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζήν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς
§ 5 κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλη λίαν. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅ χαρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλυκῶμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὥς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐμερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύττητος φυσικῶς.

5 όλλα μὴν καὶ τῆς ἁρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ρή- διον διελέιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διο-
§ 6 ριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία, καίτερ ὄντος καὶ ἀλληθείαν τὸ τε φύσει δοῦλο καὶ τὸ
35 φύσει δεσποτή ταυτοῦ συμβέβηκός, οὕτως ἁρχεῖ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέροντος, οὐδὲν ἢπτον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου
7 τοῦ δούλου σφέζειαν τήν δεσποτείαν) ἢ δὲ τέκνουν ἁρχὴ καὶ

4 χωρίς <ἐκάστω> Spengel || 26 καὶ συνέχονται....κοινωνίαν follow 27 μόριον in Π Αρ. Βk. Bernays and Π< (corrector) the order of the text in Π fr. || 28 ὑπερβάλλει Π<1-4>, ὑπερβάλλη Π<2-3> Q<6> Β<9 fr. || δ'] γὰρ οὗτος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὸ τε φύσει δοῦλο καὶ τὸ

§ 4 25 χωρίς to each separate individual.

25 συνέχουσι τήν π. κοινωνίαν] Comp. Plato Politicus 301 E f. || [Isos γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι κτλ] Comp. Nic. Eth. IX. 9, 1170 a 25, εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζήν ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ; X. 4. 10. 1175 a 16, ἢ δ' ἵσων τελείω πᾶσεν ἡγεῖσαι καὶ τὸ διῆν, οὐ ὀφεῖσθαι...πάτερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζήν αἰρομεθα διὰ τὸ ζήν τὴν ἡδονὴν, ἄφεσθαι. συνεξείσθαι μὲν γὰρ ταύτα φαίνεται (Eaton). SUSEM. (527)

27 κατὰ τὸ ζήν in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 κατὰ τὸν βίον.

ἐν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man’s true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5 31 τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους] Bonitz: the usual modes, Ind. Ar. 424 b 43: i.e. the modes (usually) stated [cp. κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον τῶν εἰσβολῶν λέγεσθαι

Meta. 1. 9 § 11]. But what we require is ‘all the possible modes,’ and so Bernays ‘the modes in question.’ This is supported by τὸ λεγόμενον 1. 1 § 3, τὰ λεγόμενα ὀργανίζεται § 4 § 4. The modes of government in question=the modes of governing men. But even so we rather expect τῆς λεγομένης ἁρχῆς τοῦ τρόπου: see Critical Notes and Jahrb. f. Philol. CXIX. 1884, p. 271 n. (23).

33 διελείν] distinguish. Comp. 11. 2 § 1 n. ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς]. See Excursus 1. to B. iv(vii). SUSEM. (527 b)

διοριζομέθα] not necessarily of accurate distinction.

§ 6 33 ἢ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία See 1. 2. 3 n. (7), 1. 6 §§ 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side 1. 4. 5. SUSEM. (528)
35 ὅψις ἁρχῆς] Nevertheless the slave-owner’s rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) ‘to the interest of the slave.’

36 οὐδὲν ἢπτον = μᾶλλον, predominately.

37 φθειρομένου = while the slave is becoming useless, spoil.

§ 7 39 καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης] This

40 ἢτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστίν ἢ <εἰ> κοινῶς ἄμφοισι, (IV) καθ' αὐτό μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὡς ὅρμημα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ κάν αὐτῶν εἰς. οὔτε γὰρ κοινῶς τῶν παιδοτριβῆς ἐν τῶν γυμναζόμενων ἐστὶν εἰσι καὶ αὐτῶν, ὡσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης εἰς ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων· ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτριβὴς ὁ κυβερνήτης σκοτεὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὡσπερ δὲ τούτων εἰς γένεσιν καὶ αὐτῶς, κατὰ συμβεβηκός μετέχει τῆς ὑφελείας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτηρία, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζόμενων εἰς γίνεσται παιδοτριβῆς ὁμ. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἄρχις, ὅταν ἢ κατ᾽ ἱσότητα τῶν πολιτικῶν συνεστείχηκαν καὶ

addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian; for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ὅπως ἐκεῖνος οἰκονομῇ and ἀποστάσει free from suspicion. For the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand ἀποστάσει in a narrower and more special sense 'emphatically' (as Congreve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the free members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves 1. 13 § 1. 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether ὁικονομῇ and ἀποστάσει can be so opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by i. 1. 2. SUSEM. (529).

40 ἢτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν] Comp. τὰ ὀφθαλμῶν δίκαιον N. E. v. 6. 9 and Jackson's n. But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the 'end' of the state mentioned, as rather recalled to our memory, in 3. 3—9. The highest possible life, εἰς τὸν. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in 3. 5—6, ὡς ὁ πολεμικός λέγει, had to be prefixed to this passage. SUSEM. (530).

41 καθ' αὐτῷ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός διὰ] essentially incidentally. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. Pl. Polit. 217 εἰ ἤδη τὰς εἰς τέχνας ἑστίν. 6. 9. 9 Did κατά] 'Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, their claim is to hold office in turn.' ὡς ὁ πολεμικός λέγει, καὶ εἰς ὑπότεινες τοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς καὶ ὑποτεινέτος καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς καὶ ὑποτείνετος καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς καὶ ὑποτείνετος, supplied from τινῇστα.
Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Polities, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." Susem. (532)

10. The prôteron men katai] "In early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after his: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterrupted; one might suppose that those of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11. Leitourgein] of the onerous task of the magistrate e.g. in old Athens: munus publicum dum gerit, commodo civium inservit cum damuo etiam familiariis.

12. And 12 autou] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. II. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where dia to tin phain men eisain patran rechehos to tin pefrke eis the text here) and 1. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of politikos, even if his essential identity with basileus be assumed.

13. Oi toin el... to airxas] Comp. Isocr. VII. (Panegyricus) 24, 25: autia de' et tov mi perimeraxhinoi eisai to airxas, oti mebaxhikoi hian evragazhavai kai fiedexhavai, kai mi... ek tov dymosioi to sfetrep autovn dioikein, alla' ek tov ekastov uparchvntov, ei toto dehseie, tois kouvs eparkesai. Oiutos de' apteixovn sforhov tov nai polvou, woste xaleptwteron hii evkeivn tois kouvs eirein tois boulouvoues arxhein hii tiv nai tois mhdv deumvov, ou gar eimiavon alla leitourgyian evmiou eivai tin tov kouvs evmipleian. Susem. (532 b)

14. Ti autn] This is to dikaiov and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society; c. 12 § 1.

15. Orbal] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the Politicus Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 B tiis odh de' tov omv, thal xaleptwteron hii evkeivn tois kouvs, kai tov dikaiov, kai tov dikaiov, kai tov dikaiov.

16. Kateto to aplwv dikaiov] As opposed to ti kai ti kai to dikaiov.

17. Tov sfetereon explained by tov arxhivn to oifov autwn: a usage common in Thucydides, e.g. IV. 114, VIII. 46.

18. Parkebashies] perversions; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb parkebashies is both intrans. and trans. to violate, e.g. VII (V), 10. 5. The noun = error in Metaph. XIV (N). 2 § 13, 1089 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62, 13, and so Nic. Eth. 1. 5. 1.
28 διανεμ. δ. τον πόλεμον ἀρχ. — But how, a Platonic might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?

32 τῶν μετέχοντας = τῆς πολεως. — They may still be indispensable elements, c. 3 § 2 καὶ ἀντικείμενος τῷ συμφέροντι.

33 μοναρχ. — A neutral word, convenient as including the two species βασιλεία καὶ τριάρχεια, Μέντλος, 503 b. 1. — In no single case of all the ἀρχαί is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 η διά τοῦ τόου ἄριστουν ἀρχ. — Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term, but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, ως (580b) ἀρχ. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy; and he uses the word widely in this sense alone. 

11. 25
Yet §

(SUSEM. n.)

SUSEM. §

Se

Ty

omitted '

€...3

(1133), -
The (Eaton). , -


37 <πολεμικοὺς> πλήθος Zeller (Griech. Phil. II. ii. 714 n. 1) || The transposition of b 3 καὶ μετέχουσι...4 ὑπαλληλοὶ to follow a 39 πολιτείᾳ by Schmidt (see Introd. 82) || 39 <οὐκ> εὐλόγως? Spengel who first saw that the text was unsound; * * συμβαίνει Thurat, afterwards accepted by Spengel || μὲν omitted by fr.

(655), 17 § 6 (680), vii(iv). 2 § 1 (1133), 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—10 (1245), 13 § 10 (1356); vii(vi). 2 § 7 (1492). Other references in n. (471) on III. 4. 5. SUSEM. (536). In Ῥήτ. 1. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτείᾳ] a constitutional government, a polity: a republic of the middle classes (so far as any Greek city can be so called). In this work without any other distinctive name, like the English Commonwealth; but in Ν. Ε. viii. 10 called τιμοκρατία: see Exc. 1.

§ 4 1279 b. 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὑπάλληλα] "Here it is the possessors of arms that share in the government": more precisely, the heavy-armed; i.e. those who are in a position to equip themselves at their own cost with heavy armour and (as Zeller remarks II ii 748 n. 7) to undergo the gymnastic training requisite for this species of military service, to which time and leisure and also a certain material prosperity were essential. Accordingly this involves a moderate property qualification. Comp. Exc. 1. to B. I. i; 11. 6. 16 with n. (216), vii(iv). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268); vii(vi). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point of view the Four Hundred at Athens restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens, Thuc. vii(vii). 97. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (537) From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens was a Polity in this sense, and again from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγως ) (παραλόγως, almost εἰκόνως, with good reason. See p. 82.

40 πλείους δ’ ἡδί...πολεμικὴν] But when we come to the case of a larger number, it is hard for them to be perfectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλὰ but on the contrary) at the most they can be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 3 διότερ...3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν] The military character of Polity is also emphasized by the author of the interpolated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the nature of this form of government itself, as Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely any cogent reason can be found for making this such an inseparable and essential feature. He may have dimly perceived that the description of Polity as a mere blending of democracy and oligarchy without the addition of aristocratical elements,—as distinguished from those spurious aristocracies which, like Carthage, combine in themselves these three elements, vii(vi). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 §§ 9 (ep. II. 11. 5 n. 386)—by no means agrees with the recognition of Polity as one of the three normal constitutions, as defined by him; but that on the contrary (as was remarked Introd. p. 63) if this recognition is to remain valid, some account must be taken of merit also even in a Polity, and it must be presumed that a certain amount of excellence is spread generally amongst the citizens. And in accordance with the view here expressed about military excellence this may have induced him to transfer the warlike spirit of the Spartan system not so much to the other mixed aristocracies as to the remaining constitutions, which are most akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some measure to overlap the chasm; for indeed he cites Sparta vii(iv). 9 § 6 f. n. (1262), as an example of a successful blending of democracy and oligarchy in Polity, though this involves him in inconsistency. At the same time by this
immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already observed found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For then in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely politics but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding τυποκογια in Plato’s Republic (Excursus i.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, vi(iv). S § 1, 7, n. (1239). Comp. Zeller ti ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 § 2, 3. Cp. n. (343). Simm. (538).

§ 6 η μέν γάρ τυπανις] Earlier still Thucydides, 1.17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. Simm. (539).

7 η δ’ οὔλιγ... γάρ απόρων] Here then the numerical standard completely disappears. See Hsc. (234, 238): as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See n. (244). Simm. (540). c. 8 § 1 11 δει δει τι: οὐτίν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the Politics, except Book viii(iv), has no other subject. Simm. (541).


Further see vi(iv). to 1, viii(iii).-1, 12. Here old/other branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in ti. 1 § 2 (a nearer parallel in Ne. Eth., 1.1 11, 13 11, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in Ne. Ethik this is the supreme end of theory: η γε γένοιτο ἄλλα συμφέρει, γὰρ ἱνά τὸ συμφέρει και αὐτῷ συμφέρει, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτὰ γενέσθαι. μη γάρ παραρέει τι κατὰλησθέν] “not to overlook or omit anything.” Cf. De Part. Anim. 1. 3 § 6, 645 a 5, where ἀποβλεπτόντα is di diakonóreitai ἀπὸ διακονοὺς μετὰ τυποκογιάς.

2 16 διάστασική κτ] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.

1279 a 36—1279 b 17. 387 (V)

ο αὐτὴς οἱ κιστημένων τὸ ὕπλα. παρεκβάδεσθι δὲ τῶν εἰρήνης μέν των τυραννις μὲν βασιλείας, ὁλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. η μὲν γὰρ τυραννις ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, η δ’ ὁλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸν εὐπαρόντα, η δ’ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς κοινὰς λυσιτελοῦν αὐτῶν.

8 δει δε μικρὸ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰτεν τὸς ἐκάστη τοῦ των τῶν πολιτείων ἐστιν’ καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τιαὶ ἀπορίας, τὸ δὲ περί ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μονὸν ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστι τὸ μὴ παραρέει τινες τα καταλλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἐκαστον ἀλήθειαν.

2 ἐστὶ δε τυραννις μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρηται, διεστατικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὁλιγαρχία δ’ ὑπ’ ἄσι κυρίων. 1279 b 6 δὲν possibly G. Ηίσιθ William [13 ἐκαστον (οι ἐκαστον) μὴδε;] Koras [μὴ] μὴδε;? Schneider, perhaps rightly if 13 τι, which is not in Π Λκ., should be omitted. 16 δὲ δὴ οὐ; ἐνδεικτική? Syllburg
rion τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V).

§ 3 πρῶτη δ’ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστὶν, εἰ γὰρ εἰεὶ οἱ πλείους οὕτε εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἡ κύριοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμόλοις δὲ πάλιν καὶ εἰ ποὺ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττουσι μὲν εἰναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ’ οὕτως κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ’ ὀλγοῦν κύριοι πλῆθος, ὁλογραφιὰ εἶναι φασίν οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δοξέων.

§ 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν <ε’> τις συν-θεῖς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὁλωντήτα τῇ δ’ ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος. οὐτο προσαγορεύοι τὰς πολιτείας, ὁλογραφιὰ καὶ οὐκ ἡ τάς ἀρχάς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὁλγοῦ τὸ πλῆθος οὕτε, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἡ οἱ ἀπόροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὁντες. ἀλλὰ

§ 5 ἀπορίαν ἔχειν. τίνας γὰρ ἐρόνθην τας ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἡ πλείους εὐποροῖ καὶ ἐν ἡ ἐλάστουσι οἱ ἀποροὶ, κύριοι δ’ ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία

§ 6 ἀλλὰ πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν; ἐικον τοῖνυν ὅτι λόγος ποιεῖν δήλου ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλγοῦσι ἡ ὀλγοῦσι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστὶν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὁλογραφίας τὸ δ’ ταῖς δημοκρατίας, διὰ τοῦ τοῦ ὑπὸ ὁλγοῦσι, πολλοὺς δ’ εἶναι τούς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς

19 [πλῆθος] Spengel, perhaps rightly || 20 <τοῦτον> τῶν? Susem. || 21 πολιτείας Schneider, perhaps rightly || 22 ἐβ Μ P1 || συμβαίνει Γ Μ P3 Qb Tb fr. Ar. Bk., συμβαίνει Schneider, συμβαίνει Syliburg || 25 δοξέει Π1 || 26 κἂν <ε’> Susem., κἄν P1 Π2 fr. Bk., έκάν (?) Γ Μ P3 (?) Ar., si quis William || 28 προσαγορεύει Qb Tb fr. Ald., προσαγορεύει Morel Bk. || 32 <ε’> εὐποροὶ Syliburg Bk. || 34 παρὰ] περὶ Π3 Qb Tb || 38 <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας Susem., if 39 διαφοράς is right

18 οὐσίας property (in plural).

§ 3 20 πρῶτῃ δ’ ἀπορίᾳ. “The first difficulty affects the definition,” i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀποριαὶ affects τὸ δίκαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of vii(iv), 4 § 6 οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἀποροὶ πλείους ὡντες, οἱ πλοῦτοι καὶ εὐγενεστέροι ὁλγοῦ διώκετε.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 οὐκ οἶκε τοῖνυν κἄτα “Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy.” Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [cpr. c. 9 § 1 οὐ ὅτι] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ πολυτὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν λαοῦ ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐν μεταξῆς τῶν ὁμολογίων. Σοι in 1. 1. 2, IV(vii). 4. 4 ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.

38 διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς A διαφορά or ‘specific difference’ is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (ἡ διαφορά) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether
also un\...

39) διαφοράς Γ, accepted by Koraes Bk. Bernays etc. Then aitias is predicate and polutelia must be understood with ρηθείας or else inserted: thus ρηθείας = polutelia—Bernays: ρηθείας = aitias—Koraes wrongly, see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 391 f. 1280 a 6 polutelia * * Comming, perhaps rightly: a transitional clause is needed.

aiptias goes with τάς ρηθείαις, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect = διά τάς ρηθείαις aitias, as § 8, δι' αιτίας. "And for this reason too it follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Bernays (without inserting διά, but making aitias διαφοράς the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, τάς ρηθείαις sc. polutelia, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See Introd. pp. 60 f., 63; ε. 7 § 1 a. c. 15 §§ 10—13, VIII). 9 § 10, 11 §§ 9—11, §§ 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, VIII). 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley Hellenica p. 225 ff.

7 1280 a 1 καὶ τ' ἰθάκτους καὶ τι παῖσιν] Here is a plain statement that any government which by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage VIII (IV), ec. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and VIII (IV), 4 §§ 5, 6. SUSEM. (843)

3 § 6 δι' αιτίας] 'on which grounds both parties claim to be citizens,' viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.

Oneken 1. pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly δρόμοι: definitions. Like ὀρθομοί. Better, standards or determining principles; that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy; id quo alicum rei natura constitutum et definitur (Ind. Ar.). It is here: διά τάς ρηθείαις διαφοράς καὶ τάς διαφοράς (VIII). 4 § 14. The word was so used by Plato, esp. vii § 41 τὸ δοκεῖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ διάφορα ἑαυτὸν ἐπικρίνει, . . διαφοράς διάφορα διαφοράς (Ath.)

We have had it before II. 6 § 9, 12, and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Grant's argument Ethic i. p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the Ethics and the Politics, is disproved by its occurrence in the Republic.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The preeminent element: § 5 1 or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

8 τι τὸ δίκαιον το τὸ διάφοραν κτλ.] The state is a realization of συστάσεως.
justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, κατ' αξιών: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as wealth or free birth in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 πάντες] Here again αμφότεροι might be expected. Comp. β. i 5. § 5 n. (387) and Rhet. ii 9 § 3 ἀπαντῶν ὀρισμῶν διὰ διαφορὲς = all who are envious or rightlyeous indignant, 'both classes' (Shilleto).

ἀπαντάπται δικαιοῦ τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The αξία which oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice in some measure. See § 3, § 15; VIII(v).

1 § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πάν κτλ.] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἶνον δοκεῖ κτλ.] 'Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.' They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἀφαιροῦσι... κακοῖς] But they omit the qualification for κάκοι for inequality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 [σχέδον δ' οἱ πλείστοι κτλ.] Comp. c. 16 § 8 n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστ' ἐπὶ κτλ.] "Hence since right means 'right for given persons,' and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to."

18 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς N. E. B. v. c. 3 (Bekker's c. 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διαφορ- ται γὰρ ὀρισμῶν οὖς τε καὶ κτλ. Comp. n. (584), also VIII(v). 1. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant Ethics 1. p. 53, but see Jackson's commentary on B. v. p. 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κτλ.] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

"This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats demand it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. viii(v). 1. 2 f. n. (1493)." SUSEM. (546)
III. 9. 6] 1280 a 9—1280 a 35.
391

20. μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἀρτι, ἐξτὶ κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακὼς, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὰ ἐκατέ-


τοὺς δικαίους τι νομίζουσι δικαίου λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀν κατὰ τὶ ἀνίσοι ωσιν, οἱον χρήμασιν, ὅλος ὁμάτιαι ἀνι-


σοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀν κατὰ τὶ ἵσοι, οἱον ἐλευθερία, ὅλος δὲ.

τὸ δὲ κυριότατον οὐ λέγοντι, εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη-

μάτων χάριν ἐκανονίσασθαι καὶ συνήδη, τοσοῦτον μετέχοισιν

tῆς πόλεως όσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσιθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλι-

γραφικῶν λόγου διέξειν ἀν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δικαίου ἱσον
µετέχειν τῶν ἐκατόν ταλαντῶν τῶν εἰσενεκρώτα καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ
δῶτε τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπηνυ-

μένων). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ δ' ἐνεκεν μῶνον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τού

εῦ δ' ἐνεκεν (καὶ γὰρ ἀν δοίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἑν νῦ

ν' ὃν δ' οὔκ ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ μετεχεῖν εὐδαιμονίας μὴδὲ

tοῦ δ' ἐνεκεν παραρεῖσων), μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν, ἡπως

ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἄδικωτα, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὶν

22 νομίζουσιν «τό» δικαίον Spengel, perhaps rightly | 24 οἰκονομία Βελτίων, | ἐλευθερία (πρ. τ. Π.) Π.., ἐλευθερία Μ'., ἐλευθερία Π'.| 28 ταλάντων Π' μέσως Π' (including fr.)

At. Βk. (in Π' μὲν over an emend.) | 30 αἵτις Π'. Π' Π'

31 μεν ἐνεκεν Π'. fr., omitted by Π' (1st hand, added by corr. i in the margin) | 34 ἄνεκα Π'. Π'

21 μέχρι τινὸς] See on § 1 above. 'Because each side contends for a partial justice, but it is contending for an absolute justice.'

[42 2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Comp. c. 12 | 29 ταλάντων | A talent = 4715 German mark = £3. 2s. 6d., a muna = 7¼ German mark = £3 17s. 11d. approximately: Hultsch' Greek and Roman Metellus' p. 173 f. | 56 κυριώτατον] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 25 τοσοῦτον μετέχοισιν κτλ | they have a stake in the city proportionate to their share of the property.

29 ταλάντων] A talent = 4715 German mark = £3. 2s. 6d., a muna = 7¼ German mark = £3 17s. 11d. approximately: Hultsch' Greek and Roman Metellus' p. 173 f. | 64 ἄνεκα | Comp. 1, 2, 8 and the further passages cited in n. (2)). Also Nic. Ἐθ. Χ. 6. 8, 1177 ã < 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὖν ἐκ μὴ διάμετρου, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, and Χ. 7. 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, ἐν τῷ τοῖς ἐν. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated Πελ. ών. ών. 11c. 4 (Eaton). Cp. 100 nn. (925, 926) at that passage. | 65 κυριώτατον | Comp. (548)

35 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρὴν κτλ] "for commerce and mutual intercourse." Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse; viz. τοῖς ὁ-

δηραγές καὶ χαῖρει διαρκείως, [8]. Thereupon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential, though insuperable conditions (κοινωνία ὡς, τὰς τε μητερὲς, §§ 9—13), and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, §§ 13, from which
the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the differences dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: 

el βή του τό γίνον \(\textit{ένεκεν} \) ἀλλὰ \(\textit{μᾶλλον} \) του ει \(\textit{γίνεται} \), μήτε \(\textit{συμμαχίας} \) \(\textit{έκενε} \) \(\textit{όπως} \) \(\textit{υπὸ} \) \(\textit{μηδὲν} \) \(\textit{αὐξάνεται} \), μήτε \(\textit{διὰ} \) \(\textit{τᾶς} \) \(\textit{ἀλλαγάς} \) καὶ \(\textit{τῆς} \) \(\textit{χρήμα τῆς} \) \(\textit{πρὸς} \) \(\textit{άλληλους} \), ἀλλὰ \(\textit{ζοής} \) \(\textit{ένεκα} \) τελείας καὶ \(\textit{ἀυτόρκους} \) καὶ \(\textit{τῶν} \) \(\textit{καλῶν} \) \(\textit{πράξεων} \) \(\textit{χαρὶ} \) \(\textit{θετῶ} \) \(\textit{τὴν} \) \(\textit{πολιτικὴν} \) \(\textit{κοινωνίαν} \), ὥσιν \(\textit{συμβάλλονται} \) \(\textit{πλείον} \) \(\textit{εἰς} \) \(\textit{τὴν} \) \(\textit{τοιούτῃ} \) \(\textit{κοινωνίᾳ} \), τούτων \(\textit{προστέκει} \) \(\textit{πλείον} \) \(\textit{μετέχει} \) \(\textit{πόλεως} \). 

Bonnitz Studien III. pp. 130—141 (105—107).

37 Tυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχ. This maritime alliance between Carthage and the Etruscans, which was formed soon after the beginning of the sixth century, B. C., to drive out the Greeks and keep them away from the western half of the Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus I. 166, Mommsen I. p. 153 Eng. tr.

Susem. (549)

37 \(\textit{οίς} \) \(\textit{έστι} \) \(\textit{σύμβολα} \). Comp. c. i § 4, n. (435). Susem. (550)

\(\textit{ως} \) as it were, like \(\textit{δισπερ} \).

\(\textit{§ 7 38} \) \(\textit{συνθήκαι} \) ... \(\textit{γραφαί} \). Usually \(\textit{συνθήκαι} \) \(\textit{a general term for a treaty or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα} \) = a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6); see Meier u. Schönmann Attisch. Process p. 494 n. 49. Here \(\textit{συνθήκαι} \) \(\textit{πέρι} \) \(\textit{τῶν} \) \(\textit{εἰσαγωγίμων} \) \(\textit{are} \) \(\textit{commercial treaty in general: σύμβολα} \) \(\textit{πέρι} \) \(\textit{μὴ} \) \(\textit{δικής} \) = special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

\(\textit{40} \) \(\textit{αρχικά} \) \(\textit{πάσιν} \) \(\textit{ἐπὶ} \) \(\textit{τοῦτοις} \) \(\textit{κοιναῖς} \) magistrates common to them all appointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ ποίους \(\textit{τινὰς} \) κτλ. nor does the one state care what the character of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν \(\textit{ὑπὸ} \) \(\textit{τὰς} \) \(\textit{συνθήκας} \) those who come under the treaty.

4 \(\textit{αλλὰ} \) \(\textit{μονὸν} \) \(\textit{ὅπος} \) κτλ. The modest aim to which the modern state is restricted.

\(\textit{§ 8 6} \) \(\textit{εὐνομίας} \) "good government," the goal and end of all political science; \(\textit{Nec. Eith. Iii. 3. 11, 112 b 14} \) Eaton: οὕτω πολιτικῶς (βουλευταὶ) εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὕδεις περὶ τῶν τέλους. Susem. (551)
7 ἡπιμέλεια εἶναι κτλ. "the city which truly

not only in mere pretense deserves

the name must give its attention to virtue." See A. C. Bradley Hellenica pp. 193 f.,

710 f.

8 γίνεται κτλ] For else the society

is transformed into an alliance differing

from all other leagues, whose members
dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too

is transformed into a compact and ‘a

guarantee of mutual rights’ in the words

of Lycurgus, not calculated to make

the citizens virtuous and just.

10 Δυκάφρων ὁ σοφιστής] See Exc.

II. to B. 11, p. 333 and Introd. p. 35.

To all appearance Lycurgus belonged to

the school of Gorgias (n. 448): perhaps,

as v. Willamowitz conjectures Hermes

XXIV. p. 173, he was the same as the

erotic poet Lycurphonides (Bergk Poet.

lyr. iii. 4, 633 f.). He is specially known
to us elsewhere only as the composer of

an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining

that one thing cannot at the same time

be many and that therefore every combi-
nation of a predicate with the subject by

means of the copula is inadmissible: also

that nobility is only an imaginary good.

Comp. Vahlen The Sophist Lycurhos in

Rhein. Mus. xxI. 1869, p. 143 ff.; Zeller


tr. A sophist was originally any man of

intellectual importance, who also

made it his profession to acquire edu-
cation and knowledge and impart them
to others: hence the seven sages are also
called the seven sophists. At a later
time, after the age of Pericles, the name
was given in a narrower sense to paid

professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopedic educa-
tion. They delivered single lectures and

discourses of an instructive or amusing

kind (πολιτικός), charging a fee for ad-

mission, or perhaps published them in

writing; in some cases they appeared as

experts in argument. In this sense the

word occurs here. At the same time it received the odium commutum in which we

exclusively use it at the present day,
in consequence of the many subterfuges,

the petting of quibbles, and paradoxes

in which this class of people was often

involved; although the movement to-

wards freethinking* and critical scepticism,

which they originated, and their

bold innovations had much to justify

them, and were in part of epoch-making

importance. Cp. n. [34] un t. 3 § 4.

Suidas (552)

See Cope in the Journal of Sacred and

Classical Philology vol. ii. pp. 140-143;

also his note on Keph. III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that

Corinth and Argos were for a short time,

303-387 B.C., united ostensibly as one

state, to the intense indignation of the


IV. 4 § 6 αἰσχρῶσθαι διὰ ἀπαρακτικὴν τὴν

τάξιν ἵνα τοι καὶ ὁπερδιάδραμεν καὶ

Ἀργοὺς ἔρχεται Κόρινθος τὴν παρακτικήν ἐνδιάδραμεν: V. 1 § 34, § 36.

16 ἐπιμέλεια] Usually a lawful mar-
nage could only be contracted between
two citizens of the same Greek state; but

the privilege was occasionally granted
to individual strangers at or to an alien

community as a whole; and special treatises

[A negative 'enlightenment' or 'Enlighten-

ment']
§ 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὀμοίως δὲ οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοίοι εἰς χωρίς μὲν, μη' μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἀποθεὶν ὡστε μη' κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εἴςαν αὐτοὺς νόμοι τοῦ μη' σφάξ αὐτοὺς ἄδικειν περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἴον εἰ δὲ μὲν εἰς τέκτων ὅ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἴεν μῦριοι, μη' μέντοι κοινωνεῖν ἄλλου μη' ἐν δὲ τοιοῦτοι, οἴον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ', οὐτώ πω πόλις. διὰ τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὔ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μη' σύνεγγυς τής κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνελθοὺν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἐκάστος μὲντοι χρωτὸ τῇ ἱδίᾳ οἰκία ὡσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίζει αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας ὑσις βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἄδικοντας μόνον, οὐδ', οὕτως Αὐ ἐναὶ δόξει πόλις τῶν ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰ περ ὁμοίως ὀμιλοῦντες συνελθοῦντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τότῳ καὶ τοῦ μη' ἄδικειν σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἰπέρ έσται πόλις, οὔ, μην οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων

18 ἀποθεῖν fr. Bk. 2, ἀποθεῖν II Bk. 1 || 19 εἴςαν P 1 Ar., εἴ ἔσαν Γ M 2 || 20 εἰ omitted by II 3 || 22 μῦριον Ald. Bk. 1 || 23 πω Ar. (apparently) and Bk., πως possibly I (quidem William), τοῦ II (including fr.) Susem. 1 || 30 ἡ πόλις οὐκ εἴστι II fr. Bk. 1

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchidae of Corinth (II. 12. n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. viii. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. Susem. (553) τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς π. κοινωνημάτων 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὖθ' εἴ τινες οἰκοίειν χωρίς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-
in noble living, to the end that they may attain a perfect and independent life. This however will not be secured unless they dwell in the same place and have the right of intermarriage.

13 § 36 κηδείας ties of affinity. See II. 3 § 5. 5 § 17; VIII. 14 § 19 n. (141, 169, 1427 b). Amongst the Greeks these "brother-hoods" were [or appeared to be] the next subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φανος) having a number of clans (γένος) included under them. Susm. 558 θυσίας] Clubs which met to sacrifice. Diagysal. Cp. IV. VII. 15. 2. ν. (931).

Susm. 558 b] "The recreations of a life in common which depend on φανα" would include much, e.g. the commerce of disciple and friend as well as the pleasures of social reunions (Wysel).
In particular, (c. 11) Should it rest with the Many or the Few?

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin Jurisprudence Lect. vii. pp. 226—255, ed. 3.

§ 1 12 ἡ γὰρ τοῦ κτλ] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.

10 εἴδοξε γὰρ κτλ] Ironical. "It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?"

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. SUSEM. [561] The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὕτως ἡ γὰρ ἀρετή] Cp. ii. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: Nic. Eth. ii. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve): whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἐστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχής N. E. vi. 5, 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton). SUSEM. (561 b) Cp. Pl. Rep. x. 608 e: if moral evil, which is the evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὕτως τὸ δικαίον, φθαρτικόν] Comp. 1. 2. 16 n. (28 c), ii. 2. 4 n. (133), iii. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590). SUSEM. (562)

§ 3 24 ἄλλα ἀρα κτλ] Passing to (2), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ θάτερον ἀρα] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (ἐπιείκεις) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἀρχεῖν.
καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οἷοιόν ἑνέργη τοὺς ἄλλοις. [VII] 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μη τιμωμένους ταῖς πολεμικῶς ἀρχαῖς: τιμᾶς ἡμὶ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχοῖτοι δὲ 30 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἄλλ' ἐνα τῶν σπουδαιοτάτων ἀρχεῖν βελτίων; ἂν ἐτι τοῦτο ὅλον ἐν γαρ ἄτιμοι πλεῖους, ἅν ἐνοψία φαίνει τι ἐν 35 τῷ κυρίῳ ὅλος ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ἐξουσία τῇ συμβαίνοντι πάθη, περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄλλα μὴ νόμον φαίλον, ἂν οὐν ἢ νόμον μὲν ὑλερχαίοις δὲ ἡ δημοκρατία, ταῖς διοίς περὶ τῶν ἑπορμένων; συμβεβήσεται γὰρ ἐμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.

11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὸ τις ἔτερος λόγος: ὅτι 30 ὁ δὲ δεῖ κυρίου εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἡ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ἀλέγητος δὲ, δόξεις αὐτῷ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐχεῖν ἀπορίαι,

2 τάχις δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειας, τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς, ὅν ἐκαθός ἐστὶν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὡς ἐνδεχεσθαι συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίων εἰσεῖνα, οἷς ὁκ ἐκαθός ἀλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἐκαθοῦς μόριον ἐχεῖν ἀρέτῃς καὶ φρο-

35 ἐχαίστας... 36 ψυχῇν after 36 φαίλων Π' III fr. 11b. 37 διὰ τοῦτον [VII] 39 ἀλφάσα}. That the text is unsound was seen by Camerae. λέγεσθαι < δεῖ >? Schneider. [λέγεσθαι] Göttling. [λέγεσθαι καί] Susen.1 (λέγεσθαι a variant οἱ λέγεσθαι, ταῖς τῶν ἀπορίαις, τάχις δὲ καὶ λέγεσθαι καί ἀλήθειας Σκινίστ. < οἷς λέγεσθαι λέγεσθαι Slithe τε τοῖς Γ. Μ. > ἔχει, Μ.1 (1st hand) εὐτα-

ρίαις Κοράκης, accepted by Bernays and by Susen.2 as less violent than the other proposals, cp. De calc. ill. 12 § 1, 291 b 27, τις δέ τό θεολογίας ἀνεφή καὶ μερικῶς ἐκ φασιν ἔνως ἐν τῇ μεγαλύτερῃ ἐν τῷ κατ' ἑξάρης ἂπορίαις.

1281 b 1 ov Π' I4 αρτ., ov Π' 17 τον. 31 ἀρχοίτων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν ἀιτίων κτλ.] This is the reason why the same feature in Plato's government is called dangerous (ἐπισφαλές), though unavoidable, Π' 5 § 25 n. (181).

§ 5 Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best state') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 ἄλλας [ὡς κτλ.] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 Π.' 64 a. Susen. (526 b)

35 ἐπάλλον ὡς εἰδι predicate, 'that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the law,' is a mistake,"

ἀν νῦν κτλ.] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 1 39 ἐντὸς τις ἔτερος λόγος] Cp. ΠΠ' 17 καὶ Ῥ. VI Iv('), B. VII(VI).

comp. Introd. p. 43: Susen. (563)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κτλ.] This is in defense of the claim of of (11) against (1). In c. 15 the claim of Plato and Socrate are compared.

§ 2 42 τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς κτλ] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (649); also c. 11 § 9 below. Thus. VI. 18. 6 ἀναλαβεῖν (παραλαβεῖν) τὰ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰ γενόμενα τὸ πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἂν εἴησαν ἄλλ' ἀποκριθῆναι τῷ λόγῳ, with Herod. III. So c. 11. ἢ γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἐν τῇ πάντῃ (Euthy.

Susen. (564).

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 2 σοφῶς ἢς ἐκαθός ἀλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας] See ΠΠ' 3 § 3 and note.

συμφορηταί διάκοσμα] 'public ministrants, to which many contribute.'

4 πολλῶν γὰρ ἄτινων κτλ] Cp. ΠΠ' 4
Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an artificial body.

Trendelenburg's Law of Nature (Naturerecht, p. 463) rightly objects that in works of art man is essentially a free, unprejudiced spectator; in politics he is a partisan fellow-actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy which draws an inference from the universal common to all the cases compared, when in fact it is the difference between them which is decisive. But he proceeds to argue, that the comparison leaves out of account the desires and passions which in the case of the multitude dull the intelligence and pervert the will; that the truth brought together by their collective wisdom is materially prejudiced and hampered by the falsehood collected along with it; that the supplementing of the truth from various sides is hindered or frustrated by the resistance of errors and self-seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when the public at large judges and enjoys works of art, only healthy popular inclinations and instincts are brought together: whether they are not blended with others which are unhealthy and misleading. Aristotle at least is of this latter opinion (vii.). § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n. (1097), and certainly he is right. Further is there no fallacy in the criticism which overlooks the true analogy in the difference?

On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned, although passion no doubt is inflamed and the critic is converted into a judge in his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9), yet at the same time the intellect is sharpened: thus in accordance with the analogies applied in § 14, (whose correctness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where his own weal and woe are at stake, the uneducated man approximates to an expert still more closely than in art criticism. If it were not so, art critics might be appointed by the popular vote, but not even the most indirect choice of its representatives should be left to the people, although our procedure is now universally the reverse and we believe it to be justified. Trendelenburg's objections (p. 147) to too numerous executive or decreeing assemblies are quite in point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9 Aristotle, if we take him literally, only allows the popular assembly to elect the officials: and that in any case (see Exc. iv. to B. ii. n. 388) he restricts the decision of the people to a few definite questions. Had he been acquainted with the representative system, he would have judged more correctly: he would then most likely have referred to the council all matters which call for a full deliberation and responsible decision rather than a vote. That not merely capacity but prejudice also and ignorance are collected in the popular assembly is moreover expressly laid down by Aristotle in §§ 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has altogether overlooked this); but he holds that the danger arising from the passions of individual sovereignty is greater of the two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable nation he maintains that the force of truth will finally triumph over falsehood. This is the thought upon which, as we know, his conception of rhetoric is based: see Zeller ii. 755. It may be that this is not capable of strict demonstration, but to a large extent remains merely a matter of belief. Yet this much is certain, that whoever does not cherish this belief has lost faith in humanity generally. See also n. (577) on 11 § 19. Susem. (565 b)

Both music and poetry are well able to illustrate this maxim. The present century is rich in good work which has won its way in spite of the critics.
11 £kastos Thurtot, £kastos Γ' Π Ακ. Ικ. ἧσσηρι χτερ Vettori in the margin of his Munich copy [καλ τῶν μη......]; φασι Oneken 13 κειμενοντος Γ' Susem.1-2, καὶ χρωμασον Μ' γε τοιδέ καλειν; Σπένγελ 14 εχα Π' and perhaps Ar. <£ισιν £χειν; > Susem., but no change is needed 18 τιον] εισι Sylbarg, perhaps rightly εισιν Spenig, which would also do, εισιν Schneider (bad)
24 μητε πλουσιοι omitted by Γ' Μ' 25 μητε ει; Susem., μηδε ει Π', μηδε δε ει Μ', μηδεν P'2, μηδ' ει P', μηδεν Αλλ. 27 ανάγκη Ramus, ει Γ' Π Ικ. Schneider first saw the text to be unsound and violently changed ανάγκη into αδικίαν and αμαρτάναι αυτον into αμαρτάναιν

§ 4 13 τα γνηραμάνα κτλ] Comp. what Socrates says, Xen. Membr. ΙΙ. 10. 2 κα και μη τα γε καλα ιδη άφομοιοτετ, ἐπειδ' ου μεδον ενι ανθρώπω χειρισθεῖν ἰσομετὰ τάτα ξοντει, κα τῶν συναι καλλίστα, δια τα σώματα καλα ποιεῖν φαινεται. Zeuxis adopted this procedure, when he painted his Helen. To make it a masterpiece of female beauty, he took as models the five most beautiful maidens in the city in order that he might unite in the picture the special excellencies of each: see Brunn History of the Greek Artists ΙΙ. pp. 80, 88 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in Susemihl's edition of the Poetics, c. 6 § 11. Susem. (566).


§ 5 16 την διαφορὰν τῶν π. πρὸς τοὺς άλ.] the difference between the many and the few. So διαστασις, Λυ. Αθ. IX. 3-4.

18 τι γαρ αυτοφ... αμφότεροι λόγους] For the same argument would apply to the animals.

19 τι διαφορον] Comp. 4 § 8 N. (43), and n. (54) on 1:6 § 8. Susem. (557) 20 κατα περι τι πλήθος] in a certain (given) population.


23 τίνων δει κυρίους κτλ] This next problem (§§ 6-14) is: how far does the sovereignty of the freeman, the mass of the citizens, extend? This was provisionally decided c. 1 § 8.

§ 7 27 αδικεῖν ανάγκη] There should be an independent causal sentence here.
something standing to τὸ μὲν μετέχειν οὖν ἀσφάλες as the clause ὅταν γὰρ . . . ὑπάρχοντι, μετέχειν ... ταύτην below stands to τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδίδοναι φοβερὸν. With Rassow's conjecture, ἀνάγκη (ἔστι), there is such a verb; without it there is no verb on which the infinitives ἄδικων δὲ καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν can depend.

32 διότερ καὶ Σόλων ... 34 ἔσον] Comp. ΙΙ. 12 § 3 (Exc. v.p. 350 f.), § 5 nn. (412, 413): VII (IV) 11 § 19 n. (1303), VII (VI) 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitutional restriction is not admissible, certainly, for the citizens of the ideal state who have the same nature and education and are in the possession of a fixed amount of land. There suitable elections of officials must be assumed without such a restriction; there all the citizens have equal rights (cp. nn. 440, 885). But nevertheless, as was inferred in the Intro. p. 54 from ΙΙ. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there can be hardly any doubt that even in the ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict the activity of the whole body of full citizens to the election of the officials, together with the final decision upon legislation as well as upon questions of war and peace and treaties with foreign states. Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). See. (569)
II.

1281 b 28—1282 a 12.

401

§ 11.13

δ' η τάξις αὐτή τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρὸς τήν μὲν ὅτι

ὁ δόξεοι ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐναι τὸ κρίμα τῆς ὁρθῆς ἴδιοθετήσεως, ὀπτίπερ καὶ τὸ ἱατρεύωσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ώμηλ τῶν κακωντα τῆς τῶν

νόσου τῆς παρούσης. οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἱατρὸς. ὅμοιος δὲ

τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς ἐμπεριῶς καὶ τέχνας. ὁπέτερ οὖν

ἱατρὸν δὲ δὲ διδάσκει τὰς εὐθύνες ἐν ἱατρῶς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀλ

λοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἱατρὸς δὲ δ' τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἄρχι

τεχνικοίς καὶ τριτὸς ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τήν τέχνην εἰσί

γαρ τινὲς καὶ τοιούτω περὶ πᾶσας ὡς εἰσέπε τὰς τέχνας, ὁπο

dιδόμεν δὲ τὸ κρίμαν ὡδέν ἢττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς

eἰδόσι. ἐπείται καὶ περὶ τήν αἱρέσιν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἢν δο

ξεῖν ἔχειν τρόπων. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔλεος ὁ ὁμοίως τῶν εἰδό

των ἐργὸν ἐστὶν, οἷον γεωμετρία τῆς τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ

κυβερνήτης τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἔνιον ἐργον

καὶ τεχνών μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὐ τι τῶν

eἰδόσιν γε μᾶλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τούτον τῶν λόγων ὁμίκ

42 ο ὁmitted by Π2 Πκ. και added after ὁμοίως δ' by Π M4

1282 a 5 τοιούτω καὶ Π3 Πκ., και untranslated by William, Ar. 5 και omitted by Π1, hence [και] Susen.1-2 9 τε omitted by Π1,4 10 [περί] or [περί ἐνεργ] Spengel (the former perhaps right) 11 και before τῶν ἰδιωτῶν omitted by Π4 Q4-T4 60 τοῦ Κοραίκα Πκ,3

qualified to judge." The word was used in i. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue' (Congreve). Cp. also n. (875) on iv(vii). 13. 5. [SUSEM. (572)]

§ 10. A difficulty: only the physician can properly judge a course of treatment and pronounce with authority that it has been successful.

30 [ὀπορίαν πράτην] 'Certainly this mode of ordering the constitution involves a difficulty—in the first place that &c.' followed by ἀλλά δ' έστιν ἐχονήμα

tαινιατίον: cp. Analysis, p. 111. [SUSEM. (573)]

1283 a 1 [ὁπέτερ οὖν κτλ] Compare Plato's illustration of the physician tried by boys at the accusation of the cook, Gorg. §§ 211 b

§ 11.13 [ἰατρὸς δὲ κτλ] 'Physician' may mean (1) the practitioner in ordinary cases, (2) the scientific student who has mastered the whole field of medicine, (3) the educated layman who has acquired his knowledge of medicine only out of scientific interests generally.

5 [τίνες καὶ τοιούτω κτλ] 'For there are even some such' viz. amateurs 'in nearly all the arts, and we assign the right to judge to the educated layman as much as to the profession." With the order of Π4, τοιούτω καὶ, hermias and others must translate 'in almost all other arts as well,' which is a misplaced emphasis. Camerarius compares the first words of the treatise De partibus animalium, τέρα
dαὶς ὁμοίως τὰ κατανικαῖα τοῖς προσαγωγοῖς, τῆς δ' οὐκ ἀπαλλάχθησαν, τοιούτων πεπαιδευμένων γάρ ἑστὶ κατά τρόπον τὸ ἄμεσα κατα

κοίτη καὶ κατανικαῖα τοῖς προσαγωγοῖς ἐν τῇ καλῇ ἄδεικνυσθή ἡ λέγοντος.' [SUSEM. (573 b)]

§ 12.7 [ἐπίτα] further, not answering πρώσα: but rather completing so much of the problem as is expressed in § 10, 11 viz. περὶ τῆς ἀἱρέσεως.

the election of magistrates, §§ 13 διαρκείας.

8 τῶν εἰδότων] experts in statecraft, answering to the geometers and pilots, Plato, Publicam 301 a, b, ὀ τετράδες

11 If τερί is retained, μετέχοις τῇ αἱρέσει μεταφασματίζεται τὰ εἰσόδαν virtually; 'have a voice in the election.'

14 τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἂλλ' ἵσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 15 διὰ τε τῶν πάλαι λόγων, ἀν ἢ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἄνδρα-ποδόδας (ἔσται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς μὲν χεῖρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀπαιτεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίως ἢ οὐ χείρος), καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνώ ὦντες μόνον ὁ ποιήσας ὦτ ἄριστ' ἀν κρίνειν, ὄσων τάργα γινώσκουσι καὶ οὐ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, ὅσον ὄικιαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνώμαι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονύμος), καὶ πηδάλων κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαίτημος ἄνλ' 16 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταῦτην μὲν οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν τάχα δόξειεν τής ἀν ὦτω λύειν ἱκανός. ἂλλ' δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης. 25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἂπτον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαί- λους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὐθυμοὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄρχων αἱρέ- σεις εἰσὶν μέγιστα: ἂς ἐν ἐνίας πολιτείαις, ὀσπερ ἐφίηται, τοὺς δὴμοις ἀποδοδόσασιν ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων 18 τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν. καλοὶ τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ 30 βουλευόμενα καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς τυχούσας ἡλίκιας, ταμειηόμενα δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς μεγάλας ἄρχας ἀρχοῦσιν ἀπὸ μειζόνων. ὁμίως δὴ τις ἀν 19 κύριον οὐτε...οὐτὲ] The two μίνιμα without which it is reduced to virtual dependence on its rulers (δοῦλος ἰν εἰη καὶ τολέμαιοι Π. 12. 5).
§ 14 The reply to the objection of § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free people may be even superior to that of the experts. (b) the users of the laws may be better practical judges of them than the makers: the expert's knowledge is not always an advantage.
15 διὰ τῶν πάλαι λόγων] for the reason stated above, §§ 2—4. πάλαι as in § 10; so Π. 4 § 10.
μὴ λαὸς ἀνδραποδάς] answering to περὶ ἐνών ἀδύνατον of § 5: 17 καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνῶν κτλ] The user may be in a higher position than the maker: c. § 18 ὁ αὐθητής ὁ χρώμενος ὁ αὐθητής. n. (499). Susem. (574)
19 ὅσων τάργα κτλ] viz. all those subjects in which the products (?) are understood, even by such as are unacquainted with the art.
§ 15 Second objection (see § 10). The least capable citizens have the most authority: sovereignty resides with them. 27 ἀπερ εἰρηται] § 8. "Solon and some other legislators." Susem. (575)
§ 16 31 ταμειηόμενα...32 μειζόνων] "But for the treasurership and the ministry of war and the highest offices men of higher property qualification are required." Even at Athens the "Treasurers of the Goddess" as they were called, and the treasurers of the other temples, though appointed by lot, were always taken from the highest class only: Schömann p. 418 Eng. tr. Susem. (576)
The reply. Strictly speaking no single ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he is only a fraction or element of the composite magistrate or public official, the assembly and the law court.
22

III. 11. 20]

1282 a 13—1282 b 8.

403

λύσει καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἦςος γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτα (VI)
ὁρῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδὲ ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκκλη-
σιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ
δήμος· τῶν δὲ ἰδιεντῶν ἐκαστὸς μόριον ἐστὶ τοὺς (λέγω
δὲ μόριον τοῦ βουλευτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστῆς τοῦ δικα-
στήν· ὡστε δικαίως κύριοι μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ τολ-
λών ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
dὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάνω ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ᾽ ένα καὶ κατ
όλην περίπλοκα ἄρχων ἄρχοντων.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τούτων τὸν τρόπον ἢ δὲ πρώτη λειχθείσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανε-
ρῶν οὓς οὕτως έτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-
ρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ, ἀν τε εἰς ἀν τε
πλείονς ὦτι, περὶ τοῦτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξανα-
τοῦσι οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ράδιον εἶναι καθό-
λου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὅποιοι μὲντοι τινὰς εἰς εἶναι
τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πιο δήλων, ἀλλ᾽ έτι μένει
τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ἀμωμὲς ταῖς πολιτείαις

40 τὸ before τοίς omitted by Pl, hence [το] Suscem. 1,2 | τάτην τούτων Pl II²

Bk. 1,4 ἐκεῖνων Pl II²

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τούτων Pl II² 6 διορίσει] δηλώνει Pl II Bk. εἰς δὲ Pl II Bk.

8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ.....10 δόθηκες transposed to follow 11 κώμης by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταύτα] ἢ τάτα αὕτη τῆς πολι-

teías, § 10. § 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κτλ.] Moreover

over the amount of property at which all these are rated is far greater collectively than the property of individuals in high

offices and of the members of small boards.

§ 19 41 ταύτα μὲν οὖν κτλ] Tren-

delemburg thinks that we do not quite clearly see whether Aristotle is only

setting up his analogies dialectically or defending them as his own opinion. There

can be no doubt, however, especially after such an explicit explanation as is here
given, that the latter is the case: nor can any reason be discovered, even on other

grounds, for a doubt of this kind. Suscem. (577).

1387 b 1 ἢ δὲ πρώτη λειχθείσα ἀπορία

This is the question treated in c. 10, and partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1-2, vis.

who is to possess supreme authority? (Comp. § 6 n. 508.) The answer was

"the whole of the burges body in every "state which has any degree of excellence": and on the basis of this decision, the

point which came up at c. 10 § 8 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying clause "but in accordance with the laws," and in such a way that the greater or less
degree of excellence and correctness of the laws is determined by that of the

cstitution to which they correspond. This raises the question of the relative

merit of the normal constitutions which we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13: see

however Introd. p. 41 f. Suscem. (578).

κειμένους ὀρθῶς] if they are good

laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κτλ] "and the ruler, be he one or many, must only be sovereign in such cases as the laws are quite

unable to lay down precisely, because of the inherent difficulty of framing general rules applicable to all cases.

Comp.c.15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with

n. (637, 612, 663): Nic. Eth. V. 10. 4,

1147 b 13. Here again Aristotle is

following Plato, Politiás 294 A—301:

see n. (637) or c. 15 § 4. Suscem. (579).

To these references Laws IX 675 ε may be added (Jackson ad loc. Nic. Eth.) also


§ 20 § 10 κτλ] At c. 10 § 21 comp. n.

(578). Suscem. (580)

26—2
9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI)

§ 21 καὶ οὗ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους. πλὴν τοῦτο ὑπὲρ δὲ πρὸς τὴν
πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. <ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς
9 <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι
<καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δήλου ὀτι
12 τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθᾶς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον εἶναι δικαίους
tοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυνές οὐ δικαίους,

12 ἐπει δ᾿ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VI
15 ἀγαθόν το τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μᾶλιστα ἐν τῇ κυρίῳ
τάτῃ πασῶν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἐστὶ δὲ
πολιτικῶν ἄγαθων, τὸ δίκαιον, (τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶ) τὸ κοινὴ συμ-

13 δίκαιος by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who
then emends <τί> γὰρ ἐν ἄλλο <ὑ> ὁμοίως......<ἀδίκους>, while Thurut omits ἀλλὰ
gὰρ and transposes 8 καὶ ὁμοίως...... ιο ἀδίκους to follow 11 δήλου ὀτι.
A double re-
cension, 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ......10 πλὴν τοῦτο...... 11 τοῦτο, wrongly assumed
by Susem. 1 J. "καὶ before ὁμοίως ΠιΒκ. Schneider Rassow Thurut Bernays, <εἰ> καὶ
Koraes, ἢ Susen. 1.2 (ἐπὶ similiter William) " On cc. 12, 13 see Introd. 41 ff.
15 δὲ ΠΒκ. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel " 16 ἐστὶ δὴ Scaliger " 17 <τὸ> Susem.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως] 'for relatively
to the constitutions the laws, too, must
necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust,'
Comp. VI (IV). 1 § 9 ii. (1128), Isoc. VII.
14. Susem. (581)
In cc. 12, 13 true constitutional
principles take a more definite shape. In a
note to his Translation, p. 172, Bernays
remarks that these two chapters 'contain
a separate sketch for the discussion of
the same questions which are partly
treated in cc. 9—11, partly in cc. 16, 17.
As the sketch presents some peculiarities,
e.g. the mention of ostracism, c. 13 § 15 ff.,
those who arranged Aristotle's papers
thought it ought to be preserved; and
the place they assigned to it seemed
recommended by the close connexion of
its contents with the neighbouring chapters.
Where the tautologies thus arising
appeared too obvious, the attempt was
made to lessen them by formulae like
eἰρημένα καὶ πρότερον 13 § 1, § 2. According
to Aristotle's intention, the beginning of
c. 14 should join on directly to the
close of c. 11": the reason assigned
being that the words φαύμεν γὰρ τῶι
ὁρθῶν πολιτείαν μίαν εἶναι τάτην, 14 § 1, find
no connexion at the close of c. 13,
but refer back to the words κατὰ τὰς
ὁρθᾶς πολιτείας of 11 § 22. This view has
been already examined, Introd. pp. 42,
43:

12 § 1 14 ἐπει δ᾿ ἐν πάσαις] Comp. 1.

§ 1 ii. (1), Nic. Eth. 1. 2 § 4, 1904 a 26.
Susem. (582)
The structure of this sentence is dis-
puted, Scaliger, Bonitz (Arist. Stud. III.
p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period
from 14 ἐπει to 22 ἀλλάδεναι. But this
requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ
is the reading of ΠΙ.

16 δύναμις] Joined with αἱ τέχναι, 11.
8 § 18; so Klot. 1. 2 § 1, ἐστι δὲ ἐπί-
ρω<κ>δύναμις περικακαστόν τοῦ θεωρήσας τὸ
ἐνθυμησμὸν πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὔδεμιας
ἐτέρας ἐστὶν τέχνης ἔργον.
ἐστὶ δὲ...17 δίκαιον] 'The good for the state,
the i.e. the interest of the common-
wealth, can only be justice.' πολιτικῶν
ἀγαθῶν is the subject and τοῦτο refers
to this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the
next sentence, is predicate. See c. to § 2 and
the references given in u. (562). Susem.
(583)
It is convenient at this place to re-
produce, from Nic. Eth. v. § 4, the full
account of πολιτικῶν δίκαιων, the embodi-
ment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil so-
ciety: τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶ κοινωνίαν βίον πρὸς τὸ
εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθερίαν καὶ λογον ἢ
cat' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀρίθμην, the justice
of free and (proportionately or actually)
equal citizens living together with a view
to the satisfaction of wants. When this
is not the case there is only an analogue-
ous sort of justice, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοίω-
τητά. ἐστὶ γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς
tēn tēxhén ou dōteōν plēonevēian tōn aulōn toîs euγeneiaste- (Vg. ronis: oudeîn yār aulēsousi bēlption, deī de tō ἐργον ὑπερέχουτι διδόναι kai toîn ὀργάνων tīn ὑπεροχήν. (135 eī de μῆτω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προσαγα-3 § 5 γονίσιν ἔσται φανερόν. eī γάρ εἶ θις ὑπερέχου μὲν κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δὲ ἐλλείπον κατ᾽ euγενείαιν ἢ κάλλος, eī kai μεῖξον ἐκαστον ἐκείνον ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλητι-κής (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' euγενείαιν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκείνος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικῆν: ὅμοιος τοῦτον δοτέον τοὺς (διαφέρουτας 1283 a τῶν αὐλῶν.) Deī γάρ εἰς τὸ ἐργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπερ- ὁχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς euγενείας, συμβάλλουται δ᾽ § 6 οὐδέν, ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἁγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν ἄν εἶ συμβλητόν. εἰ γάρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως

33 oude ΓΜ" || 35 eī de......1283 a 3 oude is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of αὐλητική to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated

1283 a 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνάμαλλον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbal accus. after δομονων, as after ἱ estoy 12 § 6, eis ἱ estoy 1. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπά in line 25.

33 de δέ τὰ κατὰ τὸ ἐργον κτλ] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν— the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as plē- ονεῖαν τῶν αὐλῶν—advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προαγαγοῦσιν] "if we advance a little further." Intrans. as in Phys. 1. 1 § 2, 184 a 19, προαγεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφέ- στέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, Pet. 4 § 7, 1448 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προαγοῦτε. It appears then that αὐτὸ is a nom., as § 4: 'of itself.'

§ 5 38 ei καὶ...41 αὐλητικήν] "even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes." I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐκεῖνα from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχουσι. Riese treats the entire passage 35 eī de μῆτω δῆλον...1283 a 3 ōυδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark 'although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty' has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen Beiträge zu Arist. Poet. 11. p. 71 (159) f. SUSEM.

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle's constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. 11 § 17 λέγω δὲ...δικαστήν, rhet. 1. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, iθ. 11. 2 § 6, 1494 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γὰρ ταύτα τούτους ὑπάρχειν in c. 1 § 4 of the present book of the Politics.

1283 a 1 δέι γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐργόν] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν—commensurable. See De gen. et corr. 11. 6 §§ 1, 2 eî μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πούδον (συμβλητόν), ἀνάγκη ταύτῳ τί εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἀπασι τοὺς συμβλητῶς ἐφ μετροῦται, οὖν eî εἶ ὡσοῦ κοστῆς εἶναι ἀδέσποτα δέκα.

§ 6 eî γάρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος] 'For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than' i.e. in preference to—here we must supply 'a certain amount of wealth or good birth.'
6 ὁ ... ὑπέρεχει omitted by Q

7 <ei> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπέρεχει διὸ ἐμὲ τὸν μέγεθος Βernoys ὑπέρεχει διὸ ἐμὲ τὸν μέγεθος Iα-γ4 Ὁ τ' Αbd. Plutarch BK. ὑπέρεχειν ἐνδέχεται;? Suscem., ὑπέρεχειν Αρ. Plutarch BK. Suscem., 1ς (corrector) and perhaps Τ 8 [πάντα] Bernays [μέγεθος] Suscem. τοι ακç ήτει omitted by Π τ' Αbd. [καὶ] Suscem. ἐνδέχεται;? Suscem., ὑπέρεχειν Αρ. Plutarch BK. Suscem., 1ς (corrector) and perhaps Τ 11 ἐνδέχεται;? Suscem., ὑπέρεχειν Αρ. Plutarch BK. Τ' τοι ακç ήτει omitted by Π τ' Αbd. Plutarch BK. Suscem., 1ς (in the text), συγγεγραμμένοι Qb. Τ' τοι ακç ήτει omitted by Π τ' Αbd., hence Τ' τοι ακç ήτει.

5 ἕναμιλλον εἶναι would enter the lists with, he comparable to.

6 ὥστε εἰ πλεῖον κτλ. 'Hence if A's superiority in stature exceeds B's superiority in merit, and (if) in general stature can exceed merit, evidently everything is comparable with everything else—εποιεῖν represents the ἐνδέχεται; conjectured to stand after ὑπέρεχειν. Bernays takes <ei> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπέρεχει διὸ ἐμὲ τὸν μέγεθος Βernoys εἰνάμιλλον εἶναι would enter the lists with, he comparable to.

8 τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰ κρείττον κτλ. If a cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic inch of silver, then clearly a certain amount of gold is equal to a cubic inch of silver. But this being impossible in the case where wealth, or bodily strength, competes with virtue, it follows that "in politics as well as (εἰ) the other sciences or faculties (ἐκεῖνα) it is not every kind of inequality on which men ground their claims to public office, and this for good reason." μέγεθος, except in line 8, = stature, not 'amount.'
of slaves would be without natural rulers, I. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian áthos constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians. § 9 21 ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων] These indispensable factors or elements, ὅν ἀνεύ τῶν πολέων, c. § 2, IV (VII). § 8 § 1. But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly. c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power (ἀμφιβολοῖς τῶν ἀρχῶν, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state. 23 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἰναι] 'In view of the bare existence of a city,' as contrasted with εἰ ὥσπερ, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πόλιν εἰναι = τὸ συζύγον of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ζωῆς ἀγαθῆν κτλ] Comp. 1. 2 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (585)

25 ἀπὸ παῖδευ καὶ ἄρετη] καὶ καταλαβόμενον. Education (culture) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, κατ' ἄξιαν = κατ' ἄρετην, § 5 § 6 (Bradley). See also Rhet. 1. 8 § 4 with Cope's note p. 156 ff.

26 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 9. Compare Introd. p. 42. SUSEM. (586)

27 πάντων ζωῆς ἐξελείν ἐκτίλ] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 κατὰ τὶ ἐξελ. should have an equal share of everything.' 29 τοιαῦτα] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve). § 2 καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 1. It was said, Introd. p. 42, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Bernays' suggestion (n. on c. 12 § 1) requires. SUSEM. (587)

31 ὅτι πλεῖον...κοινόν] 'that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern.' A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Bonitz s.v. See also Cope on κοινότερον, Rhet. 1. 1 § 10. But Bernays renders 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 ἐπὶ πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια κτλ] 'Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life,' as they have not the temptations of the poor.

33 'The claims of the free born and
of the nobles are closely related." Supply

diaphramatizous. ἤγείσ is nearly equivalent
to an adjective, see n. on ti. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἄγγεις ἀλλήλων] From time im-
memorial, as noble birth stands to merely
free birth so free birth and descent from
citizens have been opposed to the status
of slaves and freedmen: see 1. 6 §§ 7, 8,
a passage which should be compared with the
following words also. SUSEM. (588)

35 II. This is confirmed on two grounds:
(i) the nobles are the truest citizens, and
(ii) the cream of the citizens. Properly
speaking, it is only in a republic that a
real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Free-
246—170.

35 The use of γενοιστεροι and ἄγε-
νώρ does not bear out the distinction
made in Khel. 11. 15 § 3, εὐγείης κατά
tον τοῦ γένους ἀρση, γενοισιν δὲ κατά
to μὴ εἰσάγαγα τῆς φύσεως.

36 οἱκον τίμωροι] Cp. t. 6 § 7, τοῖς δὲ
βασιλέως κοιμισάντων οίκων μίκουν ἄγενης,
n. (53). SUSEM. (588 b)

βελτίως εἰκός] Ambition to win fresh
honour in a trait of good birth, τὸ φαλη-
ριστερὸν εἷσθαι τῶν καλοτήτων, Khel. 11. 153 9.

37 ἀρση γένους] Comp. nn.
(54, 55) on t. 6 § 7, VIII (IV). 8 § 9 n.
(114, 8), VIII (V). 1 § 7 προεκάρτιον ἀρσή
cαλοῦντο, n. (145, 66). SUSEM. (589)

διόμως δὴ. δικαιός. ἀμφιβοῆται] As
the claim of (a) the wealthy ليس 31, (1)
the free born and the nobles, so now that

of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a
partial justification.

With δὴ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on Psel. 18 § 3, 1442 b 51, com-
pares in. 3 § 2, VIII (V). 8 § 16, 4 § 10.
often strengthened at the close of a list.

38 κοινωνικήν] justice especially: for
justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential
to civil society (συνοικία), on which all the
others must necessarily attend": i.e. jus-
tice in the sense of observance to the
as is more fully explained in Nu. Eta. v.
1. 13—20, 1109 b 41, ff. [where see
Jackson's notes]. Compare too N. E.
VIII. 1 § 4, 1115 a 22, 9 § 11 1109 b 25
(Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2
and the references cited in n. (502).

39 SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for
the claim of ἄρση after all we have been
told (Weyer).

40 ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ οἱ πλείους] τὴν
dικαιοπληκτοῦνταν. The justice of this
claim has been argued in c. 11.

40 καὶ γάρ κριτήριον κτλ.] Comp.
Plate Gregor. 488 It is obvious τοῦ καΙνοῦτο
ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρσην εἶναι εἰς πάντα; (Eaton).

SUSEM. (591)

41 ὡς λαμβανόμενοι] Comp. c. 10
§ 2, ἄρση ἄμφιβοῆται: "If the many
are taken in a body and compared with
the few in a body." (Compere).

1283 b 1 λέγω δὲ οἶον] I mean, namely,
3 πότερον ἀμφιβοῆτης κτλ.] The
question raised in c. 10.
§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἄναμφισβήτητος ἢ κρίσις τίνας ἀρχεῖν δεί (τοὺς γὰρ κυρίους διαφεροσύν άλληλων, οἷον ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων αὐτῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπουν) ἀλλ' ὃμως σκοτοῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
§ 6 αὐτῶν ταὐτὸν υπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέων. * * * δὲ τὸν 10
10 ἀριθμὸν ἐλεύθερον τίνα δεῖ πάμπαν οἷς τὴν ἀρετήν ἐχοντες, τίνα
dεὶ διελέιν τρόπον; ἡ τὸ ὀλγοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεὶ σκο-
pεῖν, εἶ δυνατὸ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος

§ 7 τας τούς διαμφισβήτουται περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

8 σκοτοῦσι μὲν Ald., σκοτήσαμεν? Sylburg, σκοτώμεν Bas. 3 in the margin, con-
siderandum est Ar. || 9 ὑπάρχει Μ', ὑπάρχει P1 || εἶ δὴ...13 αὐτῶν; trans-
posed by Thurot to precede 1284 a 4 εἶ δὲ τις; see Intro. p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ] "Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others." ὁ κύριος is the plural of τὸ κύριον the 'sovereign,' a supreme authority: also found in Keth. 1. 8. 2, 1305 b 27 τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρησαν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, διὰ γὰρ οἱ πολιτείας, τοσάτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἐστιν, and Demosth. Falsa Leg. § 259 p. 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κύρια ἀπαὶ ποὺ' ἐστιν ἐν ἐκάστα τῶν πόλεων. Cope com-
pares N. E. III. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τὰ πολιτικὰ=the citizen levis, as a similar plural.

5 τοῖς κυρίοις] Comp. c. 6 § 1 n. (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537): also n. (466).
Susem. (592)

8 περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον] So § 4, εἶ μιᾶ πόλει.

On the following sentence, 9 εἶ δη...13 εἷς αὐτῶν, see Intro. p. 43. Thurot
Études p. 49 gives a brief analysis of §§ 6—14. Aristotle proposed to investiga-

tate what class ought to have power in a state where all sorts of superiority (riches,
nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented: and this is his answer: (1) If the virtuous
are few, we must inquire whether they are numerous enough to govern the state or
to make a state by themselves, § 6. (2) No superiority gives an exclusive right to
the exercise of power, §§ 7—10. (3) The best laws are relative to the interest
of the whole state and to the great body of the citizens. The citizen is not the
same under all governments; under the

best government he is the good man, §§ 11, 12. (4) If a single individual, or a hand-
ful of men not numerous enough to form a state by themselves, be preeminent for
virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level of equality, §§ 13, 14. On this answer
Thurot remarks; "the first proposition (1) has nothing to do with the question
Aristotle has just raised: it is clear that before he discusses what is to be done
with the virtuous few he should prove the right of the virtuous to command. The
second, (2), has a direct bearing on the question, of which it is the negative solu-
tion. The germ of a positive solution is found in (3), but this solution is not
given directly; for Aristotle is handling a difficulty as to the end of the best legisla-
tion. In (4) he discusses a particular case analogous to that which is the sub-
ject of (1). This analogy and the impossibility of understanding (1) in its
present place lead me to suppose that the words εἶ δὴ...εἷς αὐτῶν should be trans-
posed to come after καὶ ἀρετὴν and before εἶ δὲ τις (1284 a 3). Then there
will be a good sequence of ideas."

§ 6 13 ἐστι δὲ ἀπορεῖα] So 10 § 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν.

§§ 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is a
species of reductio ad absurdum by the enforcement on the same ground of the
right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.
15 δέξαι κισάν <άν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οί διὰ τοῦ πλούτου ἀξιόωντες (VII) ἀρχεῖν, ὡμώς δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος δῆλοι γὰρ ὁμ ἐφ' (p. 60) τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιωτέρους ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, [δῆλον] δὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἁρχεῖν τὸν ἐνα ἀπάντων δεῖσε, ὡμώς δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφιβολοῦν...

8 τῶν δὲ ἐλευθερίας ταύτῳ δὲ τούτοις συμβιβάσται καὶ 11 περὶ τῶν ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἅρετης· εἰ γὰρ τις εἰς ὑμεῖς ἁρχεῖν κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολεμεῦσαι πολεμοῦν ὑπατον, τούτων εἶναι δὲ κύριον κατὰ ταύτῳ δίκαιον. οὕτως εἰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι γε δει κύριον διότι κρέασις εἰς τῶν 15 ὁλίγων, κἂν εἰς ἡ πλείουσα μὲν τοῦ ἐνός ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πάλλων κρέασιν ὧσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτων ἄν δεοὶ κύριοι...

9 εἶναι μᾶλλον ὡς τὸ πλῆθος... παντα δὴ ταύτ' ὑοῖκ ποιεῖν φανερον...

15 δέξεις Μ', δέξεις Π4 (corrector), δέξεις Αδ., δέξεις Π4, P3 Q = T Plutarch Bk. and Π4 (1st hand) γὰρ <αν> Korace Bk.3, <αν> γὰρ Grotting; 17 [19] ην οἶνον Camerarius Bk.2, Valcken (Beitrag zu Ar. Plutik IV, 432) tries to save ὅτι at least. Comp. also Bonitz Ar. Stud. i. p. 58 n. (1) so recent) ταύτα οἰνον Π3,4 Plutarch Ar., towr' οἰνον Q = T Αδ. Bk. 27 φανερῶν ποιεῖν Π2 Plutarch Bk.

16 δῆλον γὰρ ὁς κτλ] Comp. vii(vii). 3 § 3. (407 b) ἐπι εἰς ἐπι παλεύ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπειρον, κατὰ τὸ διάγραμμα δίκαιον ἁρχεῖν δίκαιον μάνον. SUSEM. (502 b)

17 παντα -κα, in this case as in the former.

18 τῶν ἕνα ἀπάντων] This is called τιμωρίς in viii(vi). 3 § 3.


There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, ce. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τιν ἀκουσίν ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ πολεμεῦσαι πολεμοῦν ὑπατον. All the governing class are good, but he is preeminent in goodness.

24 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος κτλ] Comp. Pl. Gorg. 489 e ff. (Latom. SUSEM. (504)

§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὴ ταύτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissen- schaft 13, p. 157) and Hellenbrand (p. 432) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-
28 ὅρθως Ὡκ. Ἀλδ. and Πβ (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀπορούσθ... 39 πλειώνων) Bernays: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντάν and no parenthesis || 37 βουλομένων <ἐγε> Schneider || 40 γὰρ Ἀσσεμ., δ' Τ.Π. II Plutarch Bk. Susenm.।

distinctly to express this here. See nn. (597, 599). Susem. (595)

28 τῶν ὅρων οὑδεὶς κτλ] Cp. 9 § 1 π. None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining principles upon which they claim to govern.

§ 10 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος] to control the governing body.

33 τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὅλων] This is the thesis which Grote is striving to prove throughout his history, taking the Athenian Demos as his great example. He dwells upon the sacrifices which it was capable at Salamis and Argensuæ, upon its financial honesty, as attested by an undebased coinage, and its wise moderation in the hour of triumph, when after the unparalleled provocations of the Thirty it consented to a general amnesty, B. C. 403. The appeals made to the humanity and enthusiasm of the multitude had most chance of success, as the cases of Paches and Diagoras prove. Against all this must be set the panic and terror at the time of the mutilation of the Hermæ and the hasty condemnation of the generals at Athens, the troubles of Corcyra and Samos, and other occasional outbursts of popular fury like the Scytalism at Argos.

34 οὐχ ὥς καθ’ ἐκαστὸν| See the parallel expression in c. 11 § 2 and the note on 11. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 ἵπτοσι... τίνες] Was this also in writing? Susem. (596)

προβάλλουσι] "bring forward as a problem"; whence προβλῆμα.

36 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντάν... 39 ὅταν συμβαίνῃ κτλ] May be met as follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 τίθενται] Properly, to enact. But Herod. i. 29, π. 177 of Solon.

39 τὸ λεξέν] That is, the case when the aggregate merit of the great majority surpasses that of prominently able individual men. Susem. (597)

§ 12 40 γὰρ ὅρθων ληπτέον ἦσον; τὸ δ' ἦσον ὅρθων πρὸς τὸ τῆς
póleos ὁλης συμφέρων καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. (VII) πολίτης δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχιστί ἐστι, καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἔτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀριστητήν ἡ δυνάμεος καὶ προαιροῦμενος ἀρχιστί καὶ ἀρχιστί πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν.

1784 a 1 πρὸς δὲ καὶ Σχέδων, προς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν. >

1784 a 1 πρὸς [καὶ Σχέδων, προς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν.] ] A neat formula summing up the results of cc. 1—9.

1784 a 1 καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἐτέρος See cc. 1 § 10 n. (440). Suzem. (598)

1784 a 1 πρὸς [καὶ Σχέδων, προς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ’ ἀρετήν.] In the best constitution, the better class (βελτίων) coincides not merely with the majority but even with the whole mass of citizens: cp. IV (VII). 9 § 3; 13 §§ 9, 10; VII (IV). 7 §§ 2—4. Thurot rightly remarks that after the negative answer §§ 5—10 n. (595) to the question first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11, 12 also contains the germ of a positive answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed to follow directly upon it, the answer is continued in the context without interruption of the connexion. Thurot is less right when he observes that this solution is no direct answer to the former questions, but as regards its form is only an answer to the subordinate question of § 11 itself. There is therefore a considerable hiatus after § 11. But Thurot is scarcely correct and clear when he assumes that it can be supplied from § 11, 13 if we draw the conclusion that “in a state where there are virtuous men, rich men, nobles, and a mass of citizens, power belongs to all those who have true civic virtue, this being something different from moral virtue not only under an ideal government but everywhere else.” In my opinion, we should rather expect the conclusion that in the best constitution, all citizens ought to have equal rights, and that the true aristocracy is one in which all citizens are provided with sufficient property. But where the excellence (ἀρετή) of the few is equal to that of the many, especially if neither exceed a certain amount, in default of other means of satisfying the claims of both parties, either the exercise of full citizenship, or else the merely passive right of being elected to office (11 § 8 n. 560), must depend on a moderate property qualification, and wealth be introduced as a supplementary consideration. Thus, although inferior to aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity, would still be included among the normal forms, and would in such a case be better than democratic equality. Suzem. (599)

1 δ ἰ δυνάμεος καὶ προαιροῦμενος Comp. Tav. IV s § 11, 12 b 9; "externaς ἐξ ἰ δυνάμεος καὶ προαιροῦμενος κατά τὰ πλῆθος μὲν τὰς ἱστορίας ἤπειρον." 6 § 12 b 9 εί δὲ τῶν ἀριστητῶν 13 τόλην δὲ αὐτῶν “But if the possessors of virtue are altogether few in number, how should we decide (Hermsa. see the limiting)? Or must their fewness be considered relatively to the whole? Are they competent to administer the city or, in other words, numerous enough to form a city themselves?” Schneider rightly saw that the last sentence contained a single supposition: able to manage the city, because strong enough to form a city by themselves.
§ 13 1284 a 4 tosoûtou διαφέρων... 
6 ὅστε μὴ... Σo preeminent...that the merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ’ ἀρέτης ὑπερβολήν] 'in excess of merit'—by reason of his exalted merit. So N. Eth. ix. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 ὑπερβολή τῆς φιλίας=friendship in the extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one such prince of men, (2) a number of them too small to form the 'complement' of a city. Comp. for πλήρωμα vi(iv). 4 § 12 and Pl. Rep. ii. 371 e (where the sense is slightly different).

5 ἡ πλείους...6 πόλεως] The second case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to this place, since it requires that one kind of collective virtue be added to another; and in this kind of calculation it is impossible to decide where to stop adding particular men to the virtuous minority, while the result of the calculation varies according to our decision. Therefore Aristotle in what follows neglects this case entirely and does not construct from it a 'truest' form of aristocracy beyond and above the true one. Comp. c. 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with ιυν. (678, 682). SusEM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικὴν] In other words, τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἐργὸν δύναμιν (Congreve).

9 μέρος] The phrase μέρος εἶναι=μέτέχειν ou κοινωνεῖν τῆς πόλεως; see iv(vii). 4 § 6; 8 § 1, § 6; 9 § 4. It is opposed to the dispensable adjuncts (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἰσὶ πόλις) which are excluded from the franchise. 'The conditions of common political life cease to be applicable; the great man is not an equal amongst equals to be bound by equal rules' (Bradley). Trans.: "these men must cease to be accounted members of the city. For they will be wronged if they are deemed worthy of more equality when they are so far superior (διόδοι) in merit and civil capacity." See ii. 7 § 18 n., viii(v). 1 § 3.

II ὕστερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπωιν εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. Ἄθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι περὶ τούς ᾿ςους 2 καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δύναμι, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος. αὐτῷ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμος. καὶ γὰρ τελείως ἀν ἐνε νομοθετεῖν τις

1284 a 4 εἰς] εἰς Γ Μ* P^4 and apparently P^1 (1st hand) || 5 δυνάων Γ Μ* || παρα

σχέσαιν Π^2 Bk.

§ 14 13 κατὰ = anent, applicable to, binding upon; and not necessarily 'against'. Even the rule of law does not bind such men.

"This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 23, suggesting, at all events, a direct adaptation from Aristotle." (T. L. Heath.)

14 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμοι] Comp. 17 § 2 n. (675). SusEM. (601 b)

"Comp. the identical sentiment in St Paul Romans c. 2 v. 14, where ἀυτοῖς εἰσὶ νόμος is applied to ἑκατὸν τὰς μή ἔκοψτα νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men who do by nature (φύσει) the same things as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have
16 δήμητροινὴν Π avi Μ' (1st hand), δημητριοντος Θ Π. 17 51 est
1284 b 34 πολλός Κροήν regards as a spurious addition: against this view see Comm. n. (602 b)


Treatment of disproportionate eminence in the imperfect constitutions: §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead democracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15, 16. This has a counterpart in the execution by violence of eminent citizens which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in the policy pursued by sovereign states (Persia, Athens) in humbling their subjects, § 19.

Compare Grote's masterly defence of Ostracism: c. 31, 14. pp. 200—212. § 15 17 διαφοράς δοτρακομον] It is improbable that this conception of Ostracism is the correct one. It was resorted to rather when two party leaders had each about the same number of followers and thus the machinery of the state was likely to be brought to a dead lock. In such cases, the removal of one converted the other into the leading statesman. This at any rate was the significance of this institution at the best period of the Athenian democracy, although according to Philocharus, Φρ. 79 b, it was at Athens originally directed against the followers of the Periactistae (μάσος δ' Τελεσίδου τούτων οὔτος, διὰν καταγεγραμμένον δέ τοις όποιοις τοις φίλοις αὐτ.; Müller Frug. hist. gr. i. p. 397, 3 ff.); and elsewhere where it may have had a similar origin. Thus it is possible that here Aristotle really adheres to the original intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in Jahrb. f. Philol. cxv. 1877 742, n. 8) though on the other hand in his remarks further on, § 23, there can be no doubt that he refers to its later degeneracy (n. 613). This institution prevailed at Athens from the time of Cleisthenes until the latter half of the Peloponnesian War or even later (n. 613), at Argos, viii. 3 § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, and Ephesus. At Athens the question whether there should be an Ostracism in any particular year was regularly debated and voted on in the popular assembly. If the result was affirmative, a day was fixed for another meeting of the Assembly, at which at least 6000 citizens had to be present: so Frankel and before him Lugalul. On the nature and historical significance of Ostracism at Athens in the Suppl. to the Tächer, f. Philol. N. S. ix. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd the name of the person whom he wished to banish, and the man who was thus designated by the majority had to leave Athens within 10 days for a term of ten years, subsequently diminished to five; he might however be recalled before that time by a vote of the Assembly. See Schomann pp. 187, 336, 395 Eng. tr. with Frankel's corrections cp. cit. p. 93 f. n. 1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 58 ff. Susm. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyrus, on which hardly decipherable fragments of Aristotle's 'Athènes mèstera have been discovered, relates to the establishment of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes two phases in the development of this institution. At first the dread of a restoration of the Periactistae prevailed, and (a) relatives or friends of Hippias and Hipparchus were banished. Later on, as a settled institution, it fell upon (b) any who by proponenter influence threatened to become dangerous to democratic equality, such as Aristocles and Nausithippus.
σμόν αἱ δημοκρατοῦμενα πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν’ (VI) αὐταί γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διόκειν τὴν ἱσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,

§ 13 φιλίαν ἦ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικήν ἰσχύν ὀστρακίζοι καὶ μεθίστασαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρίσμενοι. μυθολογεῖται δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τῶν Ἡρακλέα καταλείπει διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν’ οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτῶν ἁγείν τῷ Ἀργῳ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέφοντος τῆς τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περίανδρον Θεασυβούλω συμβούλιαν ὁχὺ ἄπλως οἰητέος ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμών

§ 17 (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τῶν περιθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβούλιας, ἀφαιροῦτα δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὄμαλών τῇ ἄρουραν’ θέν ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τῆς αἰτίας, ἀπαγ-

19 ταῦτα γὰρ δὲν P² || δοκοῦσι omitted by Π¹ || διὸκεϊν persecutur William || 20 πολυφιλὰν P¹ (1st hand), γρ. πολυφιλὰν corr.¹ in the margin of P¹
to us: Kleioθένης τῶν περὶ ὀστρακισμοῦ νομῶν εἰσαγγειλέτο, δότε ἑνδιὰ τῶν τυραννίσκων (a’): καὶ ἄλλοι τε ὀστρακισθήσον καὶ ἕκαστος καὶ Ἀρσενέλος (b). Diels Ueber die Berliner Fragmente p. 30.

18 διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν For this reason, that laws are only destined for those who are more or less on an equality, while an individual grows disinclined to be bound by law in proportion as he rises above this general equality. If this very simple connexion be borne in mind, there is no reason to suspect an interpolation. SUSEM. (602 b)

21 ὀστρακίζον] Note the imperfect; here certainly because Ostracism was obsolete in Aristotle’s time. See n. on II. 9 § 19.

§ 16 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ] “Even in the story there is a naïve hint that Herakles was out of place in the Argo. When he went on board the ship, it threatened to sink, and when he took hold of an oar, it broke at once in his grasp.” (Preller Gk. Mythol. 11. p. 324.) Pherekydes of Leros (Fr. 67), Antimachos, and Poseidippos also state that Herakles was set on shore because the Argo complained that his weight was too great for her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. 1 1290), but this was not the only form of the legend. See Apollod. Bibl. 1. 19. 9, Herod. VII. 193. SUSEM. (604)

24 οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν] “For the Argo refused to carry (ἀγεῖν) him with the rest as far outweighing her crew”: φθεγγῆμεν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτου βάρος. Apollodor. I. 9. 19.

27 οὐχ ἄπλως οἰητέος ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶν] ‘must not be thought to blame it with absolute justice.’

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον In the account given by Herodotos v. 92, the parts of Periander and Thrasylbos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to the story again VIII(v). 10 § 13, n. (1669). For the tyrant Thrasylbos of Miletus see E. Curtius II. p. 158 f. Eng. tr., and for the tyrants of Miletus in general VIII(v). 5. 8, n. 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth probably from 626 to 585, one of the most brilliant and at the same time most tragic figures among the earlier Greek tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded as one of the first to introduce all those measures which appeared, not without reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as insepparable from the tyrannis. See VIII(v). 11. 4 n. (1711); also VIII(v). 12. 3 nn. (1751, 1754), VIII(v). 4 § 9, § 16 n. (1523, 1672): E. Curtius I. p. 250 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)

Livy (1. 54) borrows the story for Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.

32 συννοίσατι] Comp. σύννοισα γενομένοι, II. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τούτῳ γὰρ κτλ] Oncken (11. 173) says that Aristotle approves of Ostracism. It would be as correct (or
rather incorrect) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both, but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyranny respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however n. 614. SUSEM. (606)

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compact made with them.' It is clear from n. (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians: even in regard to the Chians and the Samians it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM. (610)


1384 a 1 tois peφρωνηματισμοὺς κτλ] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of κτλ, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to εὑρέθη λέγεται, or εὑρέθη λέγεται. Compare perhaps Dem. Philipp. 1 § 7 p. 43, 4: ἀν δὲ κτλ. τῶν ταχύτερον ἔχοντο κακοῖς γενόμενοι, γενομένοι γὰρ.

2 ἐπεκοπτὶ πολλάκις] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Hist. 1. 156: externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusual and mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Hist. III. 159 (Eaton). Comp. Duncanne's History of Antiquity (cd. 4) iv. pp. 334 ff., 476 ff., 477 ff. (vol. vii. ca. 6. 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSEM. (611)
The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21. This is a frequent cause of revolutions (βε ὑπεροχήν), as is explained viii(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 καὶ even the normal forms.
§ 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας a foot that violates symmetry in its size (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτῇ-ρων), 'even if it were of surpassing beauty,' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπά c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen's Arist. Aufsätze II. pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see Metaph. M. 3 § 11, 108 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μεγίστα ἐόν τὰς καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὑφέρομεν: this is illustrated in Pol. iv(vii). 4 § 7, Poet. 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see Introd. p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands ταίς πόλεσι to be those which are ruled by monárχαι. So Postgate (Notes p. 7):—"ταίς πόλεσιν in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μονάρχαι (notice poi τύραννοι)." See note (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν ὅποι κτλ] Comp. viii(v). 3 § 3 n. (1510) where the same recommendation is given, καίτοι βέλτιοι εἴ υπέρ οὔπως μὴ ἔνθεται τισοῦν ὑπέρεχεως, ἡ ἐξάντας γενεσθαι λαϊκῶν ὑπέροχον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). SUSEM. (611 b)

13 ὡστε διὰ τούτο κτλ It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,
while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as ἀλεξίης that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected ἀλεξίης by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 22, ὅπου Ἀριστοτ. ἐπισκεψις, be inserted between τῆς and ἄσκεσις at the end of § 10; these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (ὥστε... διὰ) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as πολέσις; we should rather expect ταῖς ἀγαθοποιίαις or at any rate ταῖς πόλεσιν in both places instead of ταῖς πόλεσιν: and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate τῶν εὐγενέτων πολέσιν. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of καί "also" before τοῖς πόλεσιν would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. SUSEM. (E12)

20 ὅπου ὁμοίωτον. If Thurot's transposition be approved, this means "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words τοῦτος τῷ δΗμοκράτῳ διάφορον— it was not used as a corrective.

21 ο ἐκ τῆς ἡνίκαν κτλ. It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy.
§24 συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικὸς ἐχρώντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (V) μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυνίαις πολιτείαις ὁτι μὲν ίδια συμ-
φέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἐστι, φανερῶν, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς
25 δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ φανερῶν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας 7
ἐχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
ὕπεροχὴν, οἷον ἵσως καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ (p).
§25 ἤ τις γένηται διαφέρον κατ' ἀρετὴν, τὶ χρή ποιεῖν; οὐ
γὰρ δὴ φαίνει ἄν δεῖν εἰκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦ-
30 τοῦ: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον (παραπλήσιον
γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Δίος ἄρχειν ἄξιοίν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς.
λείπεται τοῖς, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφικῆσαι, πειθεῖσα τοῦ τοιοῦτω
πάντας ἀσμένως, ὡστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀδίους
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπεὶ P2.3 || 31 ἰδιώτην Γ Susem.1-2, ἰδιώτη μὲν Μ4. The
parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the
principal clause: μερίζοντας? Susem. || 32 ἐτερ <καὶ> Susem.1-2 and possibly Γ (quod et
videtur William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἰδιώτης] ἀγαλκῶς P4-6 Qb Tb || βασι-
λεάς P2.3 Tb

casion how easily a combination of two parties could defeat the true aim
of this institution, and turn it against the most zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no
evidence that it was ever actually re-
sorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schö-
mann pp. 182, 395 Eng. tr. When the
healthy life of parties ceased there, and
especially when its surplus strength be-
gan to fail the state, and every man
of talent was needed at his post, Ostra-
cism proved to be superfluous. When
it had been more than once employed
in order to remove some person dis-
pleasing to the dominant party (Damon
Plut. Per. 4., Aristid. 7., Callias Pseudo-
Andoc. iv. 32) it disappeared from the
frame-work of the Constitution (See-
liger). SUSEM. (613)

Summary of results: the removal of
eminent men is (a) expedient and just in
the interests of perverted constitutions,
but (b) not absolutely just. The best
state can neither expect such a man of
preeminent merit, nor treat him as an
ordinary subject. It only remains to make
him sovereign, §§ 24, 25.

§ 24 23 ἰδιώτη] expedient and just in
the private interest of the government.
Not 'in particular cases.' This is a
restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 οὐχ ἀπλῶς sc. οὐσὶ δίκαιον. The
mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον
of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας
Aristotle does not say what should be
done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy,
which are also to be reckoned among
right forms of government. Is it possible
that he regarded Ostracism as still ad-
missible? Further comp. nn. on 11. 9
§ 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9
(595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5
(677—8); vi(iv). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133-6-7),
10 § 3 (1280) and Introd. p. 43 ff.
SUSEM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
ὑπεροχὴν] κατὰ γοβὰρ ὑπεροχήν. Note
that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostra-
cism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Δίος]
Used properly,
also, as in Herod. v. 49 ἔθη τῷ Διῳ πλα-
τοῦτον πεῖ ἐρίζετε, 'τε νυν ζε χειν ζε
wealth,' Comp. Nic. Eth. vi. 13 § 8, 1145 A 10 ἐτι δυσόγον καὶ τῶν τῆς πολι-
tικῆς φαίν ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν (Eaton).

μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς] ‘Nor to rule
such an one, in a distribution of offices':
i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better
taken with ἄρχειν γε than, as Bernays
and others, with ἰδιώτης, in which case it
must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν
καὶ ἀρχάγμησαι as in c. 17 § 7, σῦτι
ἄξιον ἀρχαῖσαι κατὰ μέρος.
33 βασιλείας ἀδίους] Kings for life.
The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν
ταῖς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the
reference to Alexander which it was once
the fashion to discover in the treatise. From VIII(v), § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14. Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is Monarchy. There are free actual and historical types of single rule: (a) the Spartan king, (b) the oriental sovereign, (c) the auctoritas or dictator, (d) the king in the hereditary sense. To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (e) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown in §§ 14, 25, 17, 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See Intro. §§ 44–47, Analys. p. 112 f., and VIII(v), c. 10.

§ 1 36 φαρέν γάρ τῶν ὁρθῶν πολιτειῶν] Bernays, Trans. p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these words with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore prefers to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, 'the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just.' To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the 'normal forms' in c. 13 § 30 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more important to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, indecisive, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25: which, being observed, answers the question of §§ 13 and 6. Indeed Bernays' view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1–13, and had added the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. Comp. Introd. p. 4: n. (3).

§ 38 ὁ κράτος τῶν ἄρχοντων] middle, 11 §§ 3. τόπος καὶ χώραν] Comp. IV(vii), 6 § 5 χώρας καὶ τόπον. This admits the case of the Ætolian or nation, and helps us to see that Aristotle would not have allowed Persia or Macedon to rank as a polis, although he would have admitted their claim to possess a polis, and although he calls the subjects τοπία, § 7. Comp. n. um 13 § 8.

§ 2 128 a 1 γένος] Used indifferently with ὕδατος (§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for 'species' or 'variety': 11 §§ 5, vii(vi), 4 § 8.

§ 3 'The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,' i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies, §§ 24–30. 4 ἄλλοι ὦ πρίγκης κτιλ.] 'He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country.' See Scholast. p. 228 Erg. tr. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their
presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating afterwards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 628) he rightly emphasizes the former.

SUSEM. (616)

§ 4 8 eι μή εν τυλικ, "except in a specified case." To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 8 εν τω βασιλεία and the transposition of 9 εν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς εξόδοις to take their place.

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων] In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schömann p. 227 Eng. tr., Trierbe p. 114. SUSEM. (617) So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. VI. 57, Xen. Rep. Lac. 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, martial, and from its simple martial organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oligarchy, as the nobles profited by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the peculiar circumstances of Sparta crystallized (or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Ephors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.

9 εν χειρίδι νομομ] in hand to hand encounters.

10 ἀγαμέμνον γὰρ κτλ. 'For Agamemnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates': e.g. Iliad I. 225. SUSEM. (618)

The Homeric 'ecclesia,' or ἀγορά, is not the boulê of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Gladstone Homeric Studies II. p. 114 ff., Freeman Comp. Politics, pp. 201—207. Grote has unduly depreciated it.

§ 5 11 λέγει γὰρ] Iliad II. 391 ff. But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words πᾶρ γὰρ εἵματι βάναυσα are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ὀν δὲ κ' εἶγον ἀπάνευσε μάχη τοῦ ἄλοχον νομόν ὀν οἱ ἄρειον ἑσσεῖται φυγεῖν κίνασιν, in Nic. Eth. III. 8. 4 from II. XV. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater. SUSEM. (619)
historical position in political development. Originally, he says, there prevailed everywhere in Greece a law-abiding monarchy based on law; but gradually this degenerated into arbitrary rule, and the next step was to a republic. But neither did this prove strong enough to uphold law and right, and thus, through the pressure of circumstances, (kaioi pollai neoxomoutes) they reverted in reality, though not in name, to the establishment of monarchical powers.

Compare the words, v. c. 74, ἡμακαξάντο ταράγεν πάλιν τάς βασιλείας καὶ τυραννικά ἐξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ονόμασε περικαλύπτωντες αὐτάς ἐπέτετερας, Θεταλοί μὲν ἄρχον, Δακεδαμίουδα δὲ ἀρμοστὰς καλύτυτες, φοβομένου τάς παραγόντες ἤ βασιλείας αὐτών καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophrastos Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καριοὺς ν. 1 (in Harpocr. s. n. ἐπίσκοπος) πολλῷ γὰρ κάλων κατὰ γέ τὴν τοῦ ὁνόματος δέσιν, ὦς οἱ Δάκωνες ἀρμοστάς φάσκοντες εἰς τάς πόλεις πέμπου, οὐκ ἐπισκόπους οὐδὲ φύλακας, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι, as a proof that the account moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to Theophrastos." (Henkel Zur Arist. Pol. p. 3, n. 1.) Susem. (624)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolion was a particular kind of drinking song, sung by the guests at a party singly in a certain order. Fragments of them may be found in Bergk Ποι. ιυρ. III4. p. 643 ff. Susem. (625)

39 κακοστάριδα Does this mean base-born (εὐπατρίδαι) 'They set up the base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the
wrathful ill-fated town with loud cries assenting in full assembly" (Wyse). Or is it 'bene to his country'?

40 Πιπτακόν See Exc. II. on this book, p. 451 ff. System. (626) § 11 p. 1285 b 7 διά το δεσποτικά εἶναι τυραννικά κτλ] These two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves; hence they come under coerced or arbitrary rule (δεσποτεία, c. 6 § 6f. with note). Θεσσαλίς ἐν οὐ ἐνεχθέν πόλει, Asch. Fereus 214: Pitterius is alipos ἐρέμαι. So far they are akin to the rule of an usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As Aristotle says they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).

4 αἱ κατὰ τῶν ἡρωικῶν ἥρων] The monarchies of the heroic age are described by Grote. Part I. c. 20; Gladstone Studies on Homer II. pp. 1—69. See also Freeman Comp. Politics Lect. IV. and Lect. II. p. 64 ff.

§ 12 6 διά γὰρ τὸ τούτου πρώτου... ἑνεργεῖσαι] Comp. c. 15 § 11 (ἐν περιπέλωσι) n. (639) and viii. (v). 10 § 3 καὶ ἐνεργεῖσαι ἑπεξεργάζεται ἡ πράξεως τῶν ἀπὸ τὴν ἀρχήν, n. (1649). System. (637)

7 κατὰ τέχνας] In the arts (of peace).

He is probably thinking of the mythical inventors.

8 τοῖς παραλαμβανομένοις πάτριοι] hereditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Ridgeway The Land Tenures in Homer in the Journal of Hellenic Studies vii. 1885. p. 337: the τέρατος of Odys. 1. 184 f. means secure to Telenarchos, Odys. xi. 184 f.

10 καὶ τῶν θυσίων κτλ] "Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites," e.g. like the Eumolpids (festival). So Saul, the Israelite king, is described as offering sacrifice.

11 τούτο] the judicial functions. It is not the 'coronation oath' that is in question, as Mr Lang assumed. Essay p. 23.

12 τοῦ σκηντρού (ἐπανάταξιν] The form of oath consisted in the act of uplift the sceptre.' Comp. Thuc. I. 333 f. ἔτει μὲν ἔρχον δομήσειν τινὰ μὲν σκηντρον VIII. 4:12 το σκηντρον ἐπιτίθεται πρὸς τὸν θεόν, Χ. 331 τὸ σκηντρον ἐπιτίθεται καὶ μοι δασμένη; also n. (616) generally. System. (623)

The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer calls the thing sworn το κρητέρον, En. VII. 441 δίκην, Aristotle gives the name to the Sullivan accompanying act.
§ 13 ὅς μὲν ὄνω ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἄρχον· άστερον 15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παρείμιτω τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὁχλῶν παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάροικοι δυσίας κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεύσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερόριοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τῶν ἥγεμοναί μόνοι εἶχον.

§ 14 Βασιλείας μὲν ὄνω εἶδη ταῦτα, τέταρτα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, 21 μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἤρωικοὺς χρόνους (ἀνήρ δ' ἦν εἰκότων μὲν, ἕπὶ τισὶ δ' ὥρισμένοις· στρατηγός τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (ἀνήρ δ' ἐστίν ἐκ γένους ἀρχῆς) δεσποτικῇ 25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰτισμενεία προσαγωγεύσιν (ἀνὴρ δ' ἐστὶν αἱρέτης τυραννίς), τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Δακωνική τούτων (ἀνήρ δ' ἐστίν ὁς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ 20 ἤγεμον αἰίδιος· ἀναιτίς μὲν ὄντων τῶν τρόπων διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἦ πάντων 30 κύριος εἰς ὁ ὄσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλεις ἐκάστη τῶν

§ 13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ πάροικαι Μβ, omitted by ΠΒ Άρ. Βκ. || οὐδέποτε Π ι || 18 εἰς] καὶ Koraes || 22 ὁμορρομένων Μβ ΠΒ Άρ. (?) || τε omitted by ΠΒ Βκ. || 27 εἰπέναι ἀπόλος ΠΒ Βκ. || 30 εἰς omitted by ΠΜ Ο Τ β || ὁ ὄσπερ Bücheler, probably right, [ὠσπερ.....ἐκάστη] Conring

§ 13 14 τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτλ] 'As the kings themselves reasoned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' 

16 ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις κτλ] Thus at Athens the second of the nine Archons especially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. π. 142, iv. 161 (kings at Cyrène), vii. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also vii(vi). 8 § 10 n. (1482) below and n. (1653) on viii(v). 10 § 6. Susem. (629) For the functions of the King Archon (whose office was μαχανοσαγια, as the wife of the Roman 'rex sacrorum', was called 'regnina') see also Lysias c. Andocidem, Or. 6 §§ 4, 5: on the Argive kings Pausanias ii. 19 § 1 and Plutarch De fort. Alex. ii. § 8, p. 340 D: and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrificius, Dion. Hal. iv. 74, Plutarch Quaest. Rom. 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

17 ὅποιον δ' ἄξιον sc. ἅπ; where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἥγεμοναν μνόν] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἰπεῖν, for the most part. Susem. (630) The Argive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. vii. 149.

§ 14 22 ἐπὶ τοὺς δ' ὁμορρομένους] On certain fixed conditions: ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικὰ βασιλείαι, Thuc. 1. 13.

24 ἐκ γένους = κατὰ γένος, hereditary. 27 ὡς ἀπόλος εἰπεῖν] See n. (630) and ii. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν ὁμοίου στρατηγίος αἰίδιος, n. (343). Susem. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the art of household management, τασημένα κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν: cp. i. 1 § 2.

30 ὁσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλεις ἐκάστη] Like each separate barbarian
whether to have an absolute or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, *Esprit des Lois* 7:1, 2. 35 ai πολλά] The essential monarchy may be as absolute as the *παραβασιλεία*; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as ἡ πολιτική ἀρχή from *παραβασιλεία* in c. 6, §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perfection of true monarchy; but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (καταπαθείμα τα ἑαυτῷ ἤχο ...), they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) hereditary, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard. 36 παρασώμεν μὲν παραβασιλείας* Of the despotic kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schiirer rightly charges him. In *Die Staatsformenlehre des Aristoteles* 7:1, Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leupold 1884) he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. To the former is opposed any arbitrary or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyranny, or the great king, or the citizens of transcendent virtue and moral, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (μεταφανεῖσθαι τὰ τὰρταρικά) to the latter is opposed only the sovereign rule of the *tyrants*.

To what extent may this also be seen—
§ 3 λειάς, πλειόνων δ' εἰσί τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὡστε τὸ σκέμα σχεδὸν (χ. περὶ δυνῶν ἡστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πᾶλεσι στρατηγῶν ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ὣς κατὰ γένους ὣς κατὰ αἵρεσιν, 1286 α ὣς συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερον ποτὲ ἐνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ ὣς συμφέρει, τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιοῦτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμον ἔχει μᾶλλον ἑιδὸς ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γαρ ἐνδεχεται γνώσθαι τούτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), (p. § 3 ὡστ' ἀφεῖσθω τὴν πρώτην ὥς δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας ἑιδὸς ἑστίν, ὡστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐννούσας.

Ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὑτῆ, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον

39 ἀφείς ἔτοιμος P148 L8 Ar., μέρος Π2 Qb Tb Wb Ald. Bk., ἀφείςνι Bas.3 in the margin 1286 a 1 ποτὲ omitted by Π2 Ar. Bk., perhaps rightly || 3 ἔχει τ' ἐκατόρθωσα χάρων, De Part. anim. 1. 5 § 2. 644 b 31. The genitive with ἑιδὸς is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὀργάνῳ ἑιδεῖ, 1. 4 § 2. A better example is Rhet. II. 22 § 1. 1395 b 21, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἑιδὸς ἐκάτερον (Bekker ἐκάτερον) τοῖς ἔστιν. Trans. 'as a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4. ἐν ἀπάσαις] Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669).

SUSEM. (635)

5 ἀφεῖσθω] 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his Politics. See Intro. p. 32 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τὴν πρώτην = at the first, as in Meta. Z (VII), 12 § 12, 1938 a 35, τοσαῦτα
eίρηθος τῇ πρώτῃ. In Herod. I. 153 τῇ πρώτῃ εἶναι: cf. III. 134. In Probl. II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης=ἐπὶ ἀρχής. § 3 5 ὥς λοιπὸς κτλ.] "But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution: hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed." Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. παμβασιλεία. See Πν., on c. 17 § 1. For ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like ἐπελθεῖν, comp. Rhet. I. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from Intro. pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from Philologus xxv. 1867, pp. 386—392. Its rationale is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (εἰς δὲ)…§ 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See Anal. p. 112 f.

First ἀπορία: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀπορία stated in 16 §§ 2—4.
§ 4 Argument in favour of monarchy.
§ 5 Reply to this argument.
Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1) Law is passionate and therefore its rule is the better; § 5.

28 ὡς μὲν οὖν] Whether ὡς marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there too ὡς would have no force.

νόμον...νοὺς ἀνθρώπων] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad Themist. 261 c D ὡς, ὁ φιλόσοφος...τέλος ἐπιθέει τὸν κολοφώνα τοὺς ἐμπροσθέν λόγους νόμον μὲν εὐνά νοῦν χωρίς ὀρέξεως) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὡς μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τῶν θεών καὶ τῶν νοῦν μό-

29 <κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τῶν θεών καὶ τῶν νοῦν μό- 30 <νους, ὡς ὁ ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίων. η τε γὰρ <ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους

20 ἄλλο... 1287 b 34 ὥρασ. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See Introd. 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson’s resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10 = 16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel’s proposals.

1287 a 28—b 8. a 28 ὡς μὲν οὖν... 32 ἔστιν cited by Julian ad Théoulimat

p. 261 B § νόμον] II Ar. and the Codex Vossianus of Julian, νοῦν Γ Julian and Bk. 1

29 δοκεῖ...ἀρχεῖν omitted by the Cod. Voss. of Julian § θεῶν] Γρ. νοῦν corr. 1

of P1 and corr. of P2 (both in the margin), δοκεῖ νοῦν corr. of P4 in the margin § τῶν νοῦν μόνους Cod. Voss. of Julian, τῶν νόμον Γ I (including fr.) Ar. Julian and Bk. 1

30 θηρία Cod. Voss. of Julian perhaps rightly §§ τῇ τοῦτον Cod. Voss. of Julian § ἄρχοντας omitted by Julian, ἄρχον τέλος Γ? (et fuerat princípium habuerit, tandem et optimos viros interiit William), ἄρχον τέλος or ἄρχων <κατά> στὰ τέλος? Schmidt

appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfettered by passion. 30 προστίθησι καὶ θηρίων] Best explained by the Platonic simile in Rep. IX. 588 b c: the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν).

ἡ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller Plato p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (I. § 5 § 6 n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Häcker seems to assume in his treatise On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics (Berlin 1863. 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, boulētēs. At any rate Häcker’s careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμὸς on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμὸς then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unim-
<1287 a 28—1287 a 40.> 431

(11) <άδρας διαφθείρει. διότερ άνευ ὀρέξεως οὔτε ο ἡμός ἑστίν. τό κατά<
>δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶμαι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὡς τὸ κατά<
>γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαίλολ, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἱρέτιστερον χρὴ<
>σθαί τοῖς ἐχοὺς τὰς τεχνὰς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἶδεν διὰ φιλίαν<
>παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀρνουται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς<
><κάμνουσι υψάσταις ὁ δὲ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικῶς ἀρχαῖς<
><πολλὰ πρός ἑπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰσίθαι πράττειν, ἐπει καὶ<
><τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύονται πιστευθέντας τοὺς ἐχόντες δια<
><φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων ἡθερείαν><
><31 ἄρχωνται διαστρέφει καὶ τοῖς ἀράστερας ἀδικίας II fr. Julian II. and P1 (in the<
><margin), φθείρει P1 (1st hand, marked by dots for emphasis, interiosat William : ὁ<
><νοῦς νόμος Ms fr. Julian and P1 (1st hand) : no doubt Γ also. The full text of this<
><other recension was οὐκ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν κείμενον ... τὸν θερ καὶ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ὁ'<
><.. διαστρέφει καὶ τοῖς ἀράστερας, διότερ οὖν ἔχεται τὰ τῆς ἀράστης τοιαντική, which<
><gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other | | | σήμερα Ὁσόν ο Α. o Μ.> Julian | 34 γράμματα Ms P1 fr. | kai omitted by fr. [καὶ] Susen. | 33 Schneider 35 Μ. Ar. and apparently P1 (1st hand) | 39 πιστευθέντας | Schneider Iκ,², probably right>}

peded activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit θεωίς to external<
>reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in Nic. Eth. vii. 6, 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master’s opinion from the pupil’s, and assume that in θεωίς the idea of disapproval at one self was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, iv (vii) 7, 2 n. (281), are the principal manifestations of θεωίς, indeed θεωίς is sometimes actually used for “Anger,” sometimes for “Courage.” As regards Hæcker’s second statement, the conception of θεωίς in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere wanting off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks iv (vii) 7, 5 n. (590), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call “the affections.” On this analogy however, Feist should belong to it as well as Courage (775, iv. 3, 9, 8 ff.) but scarcely, as Feist supposes, all the passions in contrast to Pleasure. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Hæcker and Brandis (67—

Rom. Phil. iii 1 p. 140) suppose, that Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled Αριστοτέλει τιτανομανοις P. Meyer has not been more fortunate than Hæcker in his account of the Aristotelian distinction between θεωίς and ἐρωτίς and Aristotle’s conception of both; and the matter is no clearer than before. Compare Susenith in Herbart’s Jahrbücher, 1872, v. p. 294 ff.: alia iii. 10, 5 with Ms b (68b 1) and nosis 184, 790, 935, 1744. 1745. 641.

(3) The analogy of the "art" is misleading: for there (e.g. in medicine) personal motives do not come in: II 14, 7. In Nic. Eth. ii. 4 11, 3 he points out that the [Socratic] analogy of the arts and moral conduct is constructively defective. 7 35 of οὐκ εἶλαν ὁ χρήστης do not act unreasonably out of personal liking; on the contrary they save their life by healing patients,” so that their interest lies in effective cures and this coincides with their art. 58 πρὸς ἑπήρειαν καὶ χάριν] “to quite (men) and to win favour, since when people once accept their doctors are pledged to their promises for gain,” i.e. have been bribed “to make away with them, they will in that case more urgently require to be treated according to written rules.”
c. 16 § 8 <τησαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' έαυτοῦς 6
<οι ἑαυτοὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρῆβαι γνι-
νυμαξόμενοι παιδοτρῆβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ αληθὲς
<διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ λόγων πάθει οὖν, ὡς τι δήλον
4 <ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ
<μέσον.

c. 16 § 9
5 <ἐτι κυρίωτεροι καὶ περὶ κυρίωτέρον τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
<nομῶν οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἐθῆ εἰσίν, ὡστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
<ἀνθρωπος ἀρχῶν ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ
8 <τὸ ἔθος.>

1266 a 20 / . άλλ' ἵσως ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-

λεύσται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστά καλλιον.

1267 b 2 τὸ ἀληθὲς... 3 κρίνειν omitted by P4-6 Qb Tsb 4 δὲ Thurst., γὰρ ΓΠ (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 6 ὡστ' (ὡστε Μ) εἰ II Αρ., ὡστε ΠΣ Bekk., ὡστ' εἰ<κα> Schneider
§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the hu-
man ruler. "But again physicians, when
they are ill, call in other physicians to
treat them, and trainers in their prac-
tice (call in) other trainers, which implies
that they cannot here judge aright, be-
cause they are judges in their own case
and under the influence of feeling."

1267 b 3 διὰ τὸ κρίνειν κτλ. Comp.
c. 9 § 2 n. (544). SUSEM. (642)
ὡστε δὴλον κτλ.] "Hence it is clear that
whoso seeks what is just and right
seeks an impartial middleman: now the
law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middle-
man' stands between the two contending
sides and is therefore of neither side, i.e.
impartial. Comp. vii (iv). 12 § 5; παντα-
χοδὸς ἐν πιστῶτας ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής
δ' ἐν μέσον, n. (1314), and Nic. Eth. V. 4
§ 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ἄρα τοῦ δικαστῆς μέ-
σον, καὶ καλοῦν ἐκεῖνοι μενοῖδοι, SUSEM.
(643) Add Thuc. iv. 63, ἐτοίμος ὑπὸ Ἡρακλῆ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of
unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυρίωτεροι] more authoritative.
Comp. n. (48), on i. 6 § 1, and vii (vii). 5
§ 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph.
Antig. 580 ff. SUSEM. (644)
239—244.
He shows that τὸ ἐπείκες, Equity, is a special application of κο-
νὸς νόμος, which as universal law, or
the law of nature, is opposed to positive,
conventional and written laws; that both
κονὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπείκες are designated
unwritten law, ἑγγενὴς νόμωμα, Eth. 1.
13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond
to the ἐθῆ and κατηγορήματα of Plato Laws
793 D. Comp. Politic. 295 a, Laws 680 a.
ii. 37 s. 6 ff.

6 ώστε... 7 ἀλλά] Even granting a
human ruler is more trustworthy than
written statute-law, still he is not so safe
as the law of social custom.

1266 a 20 / . ἄλλ' ἵσως ἄν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-

λεύσται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστά καλλιον.

c. 15 § 5 1266 a 20 / . ἄλλ' ἵσως ἄν
φαίη τις... καλλιον] "But perhaps some
one will say that to compensate for this [a
human ruler] will be better able to advise
on particular cases." This sentence evi-
dently belongs to the first ἀπορία, adva-
crating like Th. 15 § 4 the claims of the
human ruler, though in a modified manner.
But the words following in the ms., c. 15
§ 6, are in no definite logical connexion;
so that translators are at a loss to make
any intelligible sequence, Jowett for in-
stance inserting [to whom we in turn
make reply:] after this sentence, though
he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τοῦτο ἀντιθέτων before the ἐτι or to omit
the τοῦτο after it: while Bernays trans-
lates "to this objection one might perhaps
reply &c.," and separates off the next sen-
tence by a break.

1267 b 23—28 This is at
any rate a valid objection to the modified
view just proposed, and is clearly still
concerned with the first ἀπορία. "But
yet in any cases where the law seems un-
able to decide, a man would equally be
unable. Whereas the law gives a suit-
able training and then sets the magistrates
to decide and manage all other matters
' to the best of their judgment.'"
The standing expression apparently used of the judge: the heliastea took this oath, says Demosthenes, xxi. 9.

The parallel columns.

the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κατου ἀπαθητικῶς become intelligible.

If it be adhered that there is a present (viz. that of particular cases) in which the decision of the laws is insufficient, should it be supplemented by the one best citation as a rule, or by the entire community?

1856 a 23 αὐτῶν that he (viz. the ruler). Otherwise Eutam. "that there is some one to make laws."

13 that should not be unalterably binding where they are wrong." This refers to the gradual correction of the established laws just mentioned, c. 16 § 4.

§ 7 With §§ 7—9 compare the parallel version c. 16 10—13, printed in平行 columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνάντησις The subject is πλειονεῖς, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστῶν Cfr. Also, the entire body of citizens.

28 καθ' ἑαν] Taken individually inferior (in the one best citation).
§ 8 όχλος πολλά ἢ εἰς ὄστισον. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφρορον τὸ 6 πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλύγων ἀδιάφροτερόν τοῦ γὰρ ἐνὸς ἦτο ὅργης κρατήρευτος ἡ τιμοὶ ἐτέρου πάθους τοιαύτου ἀναγκαίων διεφθάραμεν τῇ κρι- 35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ὁργίζουν καὶ ἀμαρτῶν.

§ 9 ἦστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μιθὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ’ ἢ περὶ ἃν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαίον αὐτὸν. εἰ δὲ ἢ μὴ τοῦτο βάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ’ εἰ πλείους εἶναι ἀγάθοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖς καὶ πολίται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιάφροτον τερος ἀρχῶν, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀγαθοί

29 [ὡστέρα...30 ἀπλάθη] Oncken || 30 κρίνειν M εΠ || 32 καθάπερ ὑπ’ ὑπ’ Bk.3, rashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian. Cpr. Vahlen Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn. xviii. p. 721 ff. || 33 γὰρ Susem., δ’ Γ II Ar. Bk. || 37 δ’ Πο.3,4, ὀν Qb Tb || 38 τοῦτο μ᾽ ἩΠ Bk.

29 ἐστίασις συμφορητός] "a feast to which many contribute." Cpr. II § 2, n. (564). SUSEM. (646)

§ 8 31 ἐτι μᾶλλον...33 ἀδιάφροτερον] Vahlen has illustrated this construction, viz. a simile breaking the principal sentence (often worked out into elaborate detail) and a resumption of the main thought with οὕτω asyndeton, from vi(v); § 8, 1290 a 11—15; Nic. Eth. vii. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31, ἕκκε γὰρ ὁ θυμός ἀκόνει μὲν τι τὸν ο λόγον, παρακολούθηκε δὲ, καθάπερ...διακοπεῖ ὦτοι δ’ θυμοῦ κτλ.; De Soph. El. 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30, συμβαίνει δὲ ποτὲ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δια- γράμμασιν καὶ γὰρ ἔκει ἀναλύσεις ἐνέπεισθε συμβαίνει πάλιν ἀνατευκόμενον τούτος ὦτοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰσίτων παρὸ γ’ δ’ ο λόγος συμ- βαίνει συνειρία διάλογον τοῦ λόγου ἀποροῦ- μεν; Petet. 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13, ἐπεὶ δὲ μίνιστορ ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία βελτιώτων, ἡμᾶς δὲ μεμείσθη τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐλεπόρασιν καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνω...γραφοῦσιν ὦτοι καὶ τὸν πονητὴν κτλ.; De Anima 11 § 10, 420 b 17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (οὕτω ὄνων the text, ὦτοι καὶ the other recension or paraphrase of ἐν), III. 7 § 7, 431 b 12 ff. Comp. 1. 3 § 9, 406 b 15—20 (ὁμιλοῦσι δὲ καλ...), Rhet. 11. 9 § 6, 1409 b 22—25, τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποτὲ ὀστερ...ὁμιλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοί κτλ, where the resumption is not asyndeton.

"Add Pol. 1. 4 § 3, 1253 b 33—39, II. 6 § 14, 1265 b 201. III. 7 § 6, 1277 a 5 ff., V(viii). 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff." SUSEM.

ἀδιάφροτος] "incorruptible," not merely by bribes, but by any passion.

32 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλύγων ἀδιάφροτος] Yet when, Rhet. 1. 3 § 7, he is comparing the functions of the dicast and of the laws he expresses an opinion which it is difficult to reconcile with this, οτί ἐνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλύγων ράβον ἡ πολλοῦς εἰς φρονοῦντας καὶ δυνάμενοι νοοῦσειν καὶ δικάζειν.

35 ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον] "But in the other case it is improvable" lit. difficult, see II. 7 § 3 n., "that all shall err at once.

ἐκεῖ δ’ ἔργον...ἀμαρτῶν] This is hardly correct. A large assembly is more likely to be led into over-hasty conclusions than a single capable man and ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a large assembly, the passion does not generally last so long; and they more easily regain composure; while a single ruler, if once misled by inclination or hatred, may easily confound obstinacy and stubbornness with energy, so that there is greater danger that he will misuse his unlimited power. SUSEM. (647)

§ 9 36 μηδέν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κτλ; "not acting against the law except," i.e. only acting against the law in cases where it [i.e. the law] must necessarily be defective.

35 ἐν πολλοῖς ἐν τῷ πλῆθει line 36. ἀλλ’ εἰ πλείους] "at least suppose a majority to be good men and good citizens." A majority, though not the whole body of citizens.

40 οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] Numerous enough, indeed, in the best state, to
form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members, amongst them, provided they are not too old: see IV(VII). 14 § 5. (817). SUDEM. (648).

10 1186 b 1 ἄλλα ὑπὲρ κτλ] Objection. "A larger body will split up into parties; with one ruler this is impossible. To which we must, I take it, reply that they are (as kyp/then) as virtuous in soul as that one ruler."

11 c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1187 b 8—15. The place of this fragment is vindicated by the connexion between its subject-matter and the foregoing. The contrast is still between ἄλλα ὑπὲρ κτλ and καλι προτερων κτλ.

12 8 τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis after the cp. Phy. 11. § 11, 115 b 12. If yπὲρ τὰ πέντε ἤ τὰ τέσσαρα ἤ τὰ στρεῖκα ἢ ἦ τὰ πέντε ἤ τὰ τέσσαρα ἤ τὰ στρεῖκα. With ἄλλα this frequent: see e. g. c. § 13 of this book.

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4 τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχήν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρα-
τῶν δείχνων τὴν τοῦ ἐνός βασιλείαν, ἀρετῶτερον ἄν ἐπὶ ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ
χωρίς δυνάμεως οὐσίας τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἣ ἢ λαβεῖν πλεῖον ὀμοίον,
§ 11 καὶ διὰ τούτου ίσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὐρέων
ἀνδρᾶς πολὺ διαφέροντα· κατ᾽ ἄρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε
10 μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἢ ἂν εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν
τῶν βασιλείων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν έγένθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ
δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὀμοίους πρὸς ἄρετήν, οὐκέτι
ὑπέμενον ἀλλ᾿ εξίτων κοινῶν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.
§ 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χειρὸς γενόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 8

1286 b 3—1287 a 23 1286 b 7 ὀμοίος Γ Π ³ Αρ. || 9 πολλὸς βλέπεις Αρ., πολλοὺς
? Sylburg || 10 ἐπειδή Συσεμ., ἐπεὶ Jackson, ἐτὶ δ᾽ Susem. ¹ ² ³
with all earlier authorities || eti δ᾽...11 ἀνδρῶν Kroln rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐπειδὴ
disposes of his doubts. See Comm. n. (659) || 13 καὶ <ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ> πολι-
tείαν? Συσεμ. || 14 γιγνόμενοι Π² Βκ.¹, γιγνόμενοι Βκ.²

c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 ἐδὴ τὴν μὲν...
5 θετέον] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.
Susem. (655)
6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνά-
μεως] "whether the king has an armed
force granted to him or not." Cp.
§ 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7
n. (622). Susem. (656)
7 ἢ ἢ λαβεῖν κτλ] "provided al-
ways a majority can be found of uniform-
excellence." In fact an "assembly of
kings" as Kines of the Roman
senate. ὀμοίοιον as in 4 § 5, and as in 15
§ 11 ὀμοίοιο πρὸς ἄρετήν.
In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίαν), we have a
sort of historical appendix to the first
two ἀπορίαι.
§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] The im-
mediate reason is rather to be sought—as
Aristotle himself explains 1. 2 § 6. n.
(19 b)—in the development of the state
from the family through the intermediate
link of the village-community. It would
have been better therefore to repeat that
fact and then to add that on account
of the further reason which is here ad-
duced kingly rule was maintained for
(657)
9 τότε μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις] "con-
sidering too the small size of the cities in
which they lived then." Comp. § 13
n. (663), and the passages there collected.
Susem. (658)
10 ἐπειδὴ ἢ ἂν εὐεργεσίας κτλ] It
would have been highly desirable to
adjust this second reason to the first.
For if monarchy is traced back on the
one hand to the government of a com-
munity by its elders, and on the other to
personal merit, the two causes cannot
simply be at once combined, though a
partial combination is not only conceiv-
able, but even right. Aristotle however
has neglected to make it, and has thus
left a difficulty unsolved. For when
Henkel writes Stud. p. 95, 'but even
in places where the original connexion be-
tween the state and the organization of
the family no longer exercised a deter-
mapping influence, it was only monarchy
that grew up in the beginnings of civi-
lization,' adding the second reason to
explain this, he is quite right, but un-
fortunately there is nothing of the kind
in Aristotle. See also VIII(v), 10. 3 n.
(1649). Susem. (659)
12 συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς κτλ]
Comp. VIII(v), 10 § 37 n. (1708), "They
would no longer submit to the rule of a
king, but strove after a commonwealth
(κοινῶν τί) and tried to set up a free
government" (πολιτείαν); i.e. a republican
constitution, or more accurately, first an
aristocracy or a 'polity' of horse soldiers,
next a 'polity' properly so called, of
heavy-armed foot: VII(iv), 13 § 10, cp.
n. (1273). Susem. (660)
§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ χειρὸς... 15 ἀλ-
γαρχίας] And yet Aristotle (?) VIII(v),
17 met'βαλλω Μ. Π. Πρ. Βκ. | 18 ἀγοραίοι <την ἀλήθειαν> or ἀγοραίοι <τὴν πλούσιότητα> or something similar Henkel (Sinucid. p. 96 n. 24) | see Comm. n. 10624

22 d. 27 φιληστρον cited by Julian ad Themist. p. 260 D Π. | 23 τέων] took the ms. of Julian except the Cod. Voss. | 24 ἄλλωσις [ἐκτὸς Π] Π. Πρ. Julian and 1ο (corr.), ἄλλοι 1ο W. and ἄλλοι (1st hand), ἄλλοι 1ο Q. 1ο L. C.

11: 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Democracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Schlosser). See ms. (1757, 1777). | SYM. (661)

18 εἰς ἀλήθειαν ἀγοράντες] οἱ τὴν ἀλήθειαν or τῷ ἀληθείαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοις ἀγοραῖοι or τοῖς ἀγοραίοι in the text and translate: "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful slavery continued more and more to the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchs were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (Π. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δολες in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated." | SYM. (663)

21 [τῶν οὐδὲ βασιλεύων κτλ] "Now, days hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise." Kingly rule in particular is not in his experience, if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of tyrants, VIII. 10 § 37: cp. VIII. 10 § 3 (1448—9) (also VIII. 13. 3 n. 1130). Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, VIII. 5 § 5. 9. | SYM. (664)

22 διὶ δὲ της τετράς, των τεράτων τῶν τέρατων] This is the third ἀλλὰ ... a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heredity has been modified in different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on Γ. 592 n. 66 (1) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire. | SYM. (664)

437
the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random” or “just as it happens,” a euphemism for “if they are very inferior.”” So Pl. Gorg. 514 επ’ αυτού πολλά μέν ἐπὶ ἑπτὰν ποιησάτα, πολλά δὲ κατορθώσατα: Eur. HIPP. 929 τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δ’ ὅπου ἑπτάχυνε.

“This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important” (Congreve).

SUSEM. (665)

28 ἀπορίαν The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch’s disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (656), 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (666)

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον ἐτῆ κύριος For even if he be lawfully sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws.


39 ἢ ἦτε τοῦ φύλακας] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτορ Ὀλυμπίου III., 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros XIII. 85—94 (cp. nn. 1562, 1576) b. c. 406 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm Geschichte Siciliens II. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. VIII (v). 5 § 10 n. (1562), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1600), 11 § 10 (1723): also i. 11. 12 n. (160), RHET. I. 2. 19, 1357 b 30, Plato Rep. VIII 566 b, Poly. v. 2. 2. SUSEM. (668)

c. 16 § 1 1287 a 15 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ. This clause with δὲ answers
III. 16. 2] 1286 b 25—1287 a 13

439

πράττοντος ὑ τε λόγους ἐφαστηκε ὡν καὶ ποιήτου τὴν οἰκ.- (XI) ψ.ιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς αὐξ ὡς τῶν εἴδων, καθάπερ εἰπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πίσαις γὰρ ἐνώρ-χεω ἐνδεχεται στρατηγίαν ἀδίκων, οἷον ἐν ἐποκρατίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι ἐνα κύριον τὴν διωκέσσων τοιαύτη γὰρ ἄρχῃ τις ἐπὶ καὶ περὶ Ἑπιδομαίνει, καὶ περὶ (Οπούντα δὲ κατὰ τις μέρος ἐλαττον; περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα- 2 σιλείας καλομάχης, αὕτη δ' ἐστι καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὡς)

dokei δὲ τοις οὕτω κατὰ ἓν ϕύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἑνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου συνετήθηκεν ἓξ ὀμοίων ἡ πόλει τοῖς γὰρ ὀμοίων φύσει το ἀὑτὸ δικαίων ἄναγκαιον καὶ τὴν αὕτη ἄξιαν κατὰ ψύσιν

187; a 4 τοιοτέρας Cæsarianus and Veturius (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλεὶς Γ' (including fr.) Ar. Suecm. 1 in the text: 8 ἀπότων Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahri's copy of Morck (probably right) 8 περὶ 13 ἄναγκαιον quoted by Julian ad Theesist. p. 631 a f. 9 δὲ ότι Codex Vossianus of Julian ὀρθος τὸ βασιλεὺς perhaps transposed by Γ' to follow δὲ βασιλεὺς πάντων Julian, πάντων II (including fr.), τὸ Codex Vossianus. 10 ότι Cod. Voss. (secret by a second hand), δὲ (= Herleία) | κεκληρωμένη inserted after βασιλεὺς by Γ'; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by π' καρά εἰκοσατρίας. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δὲ, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Syllog and Scaliger, to δὲ. ὁ καρά Julian 11 εἰςα πάντων τῶν παραγόν τὸ Γ' Ms. Suecm. 1, 2 ζόοιοι, 12 πάντων and 13 καὶ ϕύσει omitted by Julian
to the preceding one beginning τὰχα ὑδὲν ὡς ὡς 15 § 16; and it is an objection to Mr. J. Cook Wilson's analysis of τ. 16, 16 that it ignores this correspondence.

3 ἐφήστηκα the question is now at hand, impers.

4 καθάπερ εἰπομεν] c. 15 § 3, n. (635). Suecm. (660)

5 αἰδέων held for life.

6 τίς διοικητής 'of the administration.' Not in the technical sense in which ὁ ἐκ τῆς διοικητής meant the Minister of Finance at Athens.

7 περὶ Ἑπιδομαίνειν] Comp. VIII (v) 1 § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1550); also n. 11. § 23 n. (249). Suecm. (670)

8 At Opus the holder of this office bore the title of Cosmopoli Polybi. xii. 16. Comp. Schömann p. 142 Eng. tr.

9 § 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 ὁ βασιλεὺς; the omission of δὲ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δὲ is another.

For instead of extending to τὸ βασιλεύς the fourth ἄναγκα (which in 13 § 8, 16, 1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy) the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, ἄναγκα (5); viz. Is it not the rule of one and unnatural anomaly when all are peers (Bosan)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (here where) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law? Thus by the position of law the fifth difficulty begins to round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unexceptionable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments 1—4—15, which bear more or less closely upon the first and second ἄναγκα.
e·ναι, ὡστ' εἰπερ καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφήν ἢ (XI 15 ἑσθήτα βλαβερῶν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> ὡστός ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ § 3 τῶν τιμῶν, ὁμοίως [τοῖν] καὶ τὸ ἀνίσουν τοὺς ἴσους· diōsper οὐδένα 3 μᾶλλον ἀρχεῖν ἢ ἀρχεθῇ δίκαιoν, καὶ τὸ ἀνά μέρος τοῖ- νυν ὁσαύτως. τούτο δ' ἡδη νόμος· γὰρ τὰξις νόμος. τον (p. 28, § 4 νόμο δρα ἀρχεῖν αἰρετότερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐναν § 4 πινα, κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ λόγων τούτων, κἂν εἰ τινὰς ἀρχεῖν βέλτιον, τοιοῦτος κακαστάτων νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτως τοις νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἰναι τινὰς ἀρχας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐνα τοῦ- 23 τοῦ εἰναι φασὶ δίκαιον ὁμοίως γε ὑποτις πάντων. ἀλλά μὲν 4 δόσα γε μῆ δοκεί δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδε' ἀνθρωπος § 5 ἀν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παθεύσας ὁ νόμος 26 ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπά τῇ δικαιοσελήνῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἤτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσα διδώσαμε, ο τι ἄν δέξη 28 περιμένοις ἀμενον εἰναι τῶν κεφεμέων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν νόμων

14 εἰπερ] ὡστε an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine || ὡστ' εἰπερ καὶ] όστεπ γάρ ? Schneider || 15 <καὶ> Göttling || ἔχει] ἔχει Schneider || τον P 4 Q β T b l 8 Bk. || 16 τοιν omitted by Π || οὐδένα Bernays, οὐδέν Π (in- cluding fr.) Ar. Bk. || 23 ὁμολος Π

1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὲν δόσα....... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a 21 κάλλιον: see p. 433

1287 a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν....... b 8 το έθος transposed to follow 1286 a 20 πᾶσαν: see pp. 430—432

14 το ἐκεῖν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp. Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 7, 1106 a 36 ff. (Broug hton). SUSEM. (673)

§ 3 16 ὁμολος καὶ το ἀνίσουν κτλ] "So too it is quite as harmful if unequal shares are assigned to those who are equal. Hence it is right that in ruling and being ruled all shall be alike, and consequently should interchange with one another in both. But here we come to law, for the system ὴν which they interchange "is a law."

17 το ἀνα μέρος rotation in ruling and being ruled.

18 ὀσαῦντως sc. δικαῖον ἐστι.

§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας guards of the laws: the expression used by Plato Latus IV 715 C (Eaton). SUSEM. (673 b)

23 ἀλλὰ μὲν κτλ] "In order to bring this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands, into logical connexion with the preceding fifth ἄροπλα, it will be necessary to regard it not as an objection to the view therein expressed, but as introducing a new objection to a ruler who goes beyond the letter of the law: ἀλλὰ μὲν = but again, as in 1262 b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25—27, allows that within certain limits the one ruler is really in a position to make such decisions, and speaks of rulers in the plural. Hence there can be no question here of attacking or defending monarchy, and besides all the ἄροπλα are alike in treating absolute monarchy unfavourably. It would still be open to us to read ὁ δ' with Aretinus instead of ὁδ', a 24; but if that were done ἀλλα in the next line would not be in place: Ar. omits it and we should rather expect διὸ or ὡστε or something of that sort." SUSEM.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] "It is not to be denied that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—b 8 might quite well follow the fifth ἄροπλα, so far as the connexion of thought goes. But the form renders this impossible. The fact that law is passionless is not an inference that can be drawn from the natural injustice of a permanent ruling body: so that οὖν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor will it suit as a transitional particle, without something else, kal or eti de." SUSEM.
1287 a 14—1287 b 17.

κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύων ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νομῶν (XI)
μόνους, οὐ δὲ ἀνθρωπος κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίων ἢ τε γάρ
ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐθεδ άρχονται καὶ τοῖς ἀρίστοισιν ἀνδράς
διαθετείτο. διότι Ἀνεχ ἀριστεις νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔτην. τοῖς
δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ
γράμματα λατρεύσοντα φαύλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετοὺς ἄρρητι
ς τοῖς ἠχοις τῶν τεχνῶν οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεν τινω διὰ φιλίαν
παρά τὸν λόγον ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ ἀρνοῦται τὸν μσθὲς τοὺς
κάμνοντας ὑγιασαντες ὁ β' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
πολλὰ πρὸς ἑπίρειν καὶ χάριν εἰδάσασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
τοὺς λατρεὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύσωι πιστεύνται τοῖς ἑχθοῖς δια-
οθείρειν διὰ κήρος, τότε τὴν ἡκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεῖν
8 ζητήσαις ἄν μᾶλλον. ἀλλά μὴν εἰσάγοιτα γ' ἐπὶ ἐαυτοῦ
ξινοῦς· οἱ λατρεῖ κάμνοντες ἄλλους λατρεύοντας καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαις
γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβαις, ὡς ὅπως δυνάμει κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ
τὸ κρίνειν πείρα τε οἰκεῖων καὶ ἐν πάθει ἐνενεγίτο. ἢστε δήλον ὅτι τὸ
9 δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν ὅ ὅτι νόμος τὸ μέσον.
5 ἔτι κυριοτέροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ἢστε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ γράμ-
ματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχειν ἀσφαλειτέρως, ἀλλ' οἱ τῶν κατὰ τὸ
θέας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥήδιον ἐφοράν πολλὰ τὸν ἐνα' δεισά
ἄρα πλεονας εἶναι τούς ύπ' αὐτοῦ καθιστάμενους ἀρχοντας,
οὔτε τί διαφέρει τούτο εξ' ἀρχῆς εὐθείας υπάρχειν ή τὸν ἔνα
καταστήσας τοῦτον τὸν πρόπον; ἔτι, εἶπερ, δὲ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον
ἐστὶν, ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διοτι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δι-
3 καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνός οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίων· τούτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ
σὺν τοι δυ' ἀρχομένω
καὶ ἡ εἰκή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος
τοιοῦτοι διέκα μοι συμφράδιμοι.
tei peri tou'ton ws ouk an arista o nomos arxeia kai kri'meias. 

§ 11 alla' eteiv tâ tâ mén evdechetai periplhthimai tois nomois tâ 80 de' adunata, taui' estin an poiei diaporein kai zeitein pote ton ariston nomon arxhein aeretoteron h tôn andra ton aristoton. peri oan gar bouleivontai nomothezhsan ton dudunaton estin. ou toinos toutó 'i' antilegousin, ws ouk anagkaion an-24 brhotov einai tôn kri'mohneta peri tòn toiouton, alla' esti § 12 ouk eva mounon allâ polloi'. krinei gar ekastos arxhun tetapideumenos upo tôn nomon kallow, eatoton 'i' isous an einai dox9 xei'en ei betaioi' ejou tis dynouv 'ymasai kai duin ankoias krinou, kai prattou duoï poti kai chersin, h polloi pollois, etei kai vn evthaumou polloi oi monarchoi poiounivn 30 auton kai ota kai cheias kai podas. tois gar tê arxhî § 13 kai auton filous poiouniin sunahrous. me' filoi meno ouv dutes ou poihsouni kata tîn ton monarchoi proaiprein ei de' filoi kakeinou kai tis arxhês, o ge filous isos kai omoiou, oseti ei tooutous oietei deiv arxhein, tois 'isous kai omoiou arxhein oiete 35 deiv ormois.

17 a' men ouv oi diaphrebetaoutes pros tîn baxeilaien legon-

18 ws...krivein transposed to precede 17 etei by P2, untranslated by Ar. || 19 kai omitted by G and P1 (1st hand, added by P1) || eteivh II fr. Bk. || 22 nemo-thetothsa Susem.1-2 lege statuta esse William || 25 kripe Spengel, kripe G II Ar. Bk. || 26 atoton...31 sunarxous cited in Scholia on Aristoph. Birds 92 || r' II fr., 3' P2 Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ehoi Susem., eidoi G II (including fr.) Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || dunoï' dousi Sylburg || 28 pratoi Conring wrongly, but recognizing that the text was unread 29 n' omarcha II fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || 30 auton Morel, auton II Schol. Aristoph., auton Susem.1-2 (sibi William), possibly right || tîn arxhî Casaubon || 31 auton Susem.2, auton G II Susem.2 Bk.2, auton Scol. Aristoph. Susem.1, perhaps right, auton Susem.2, but see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 125 a 18 f. || 32 de omitted by fr. || 33 o te G, ote P2 Th Ald., ote Q3, o de Ar. || filous isos G M8
c. 16 § 11 19 alla' eteiv tâ mên kta] It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See Nic. Eth. v. 8. Cf. also Rhet. i. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comments and his Introd. pp. 190—193], Plato Polit. 294 b ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 579, 637 and vi(iv). 4. 31 n. (1212). Susem. (652)

22 peri'oun gar bouleistonai] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of Nic. Eth. iii. c. 3. Susem. (653)
ton dudunaton estin] Here, it may be remarked, Mr J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, alla' mon ose...tôn keiménov.

§ 12 29 evthaumov] An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king: Herod. i. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. Persae 973, Aristoph. Achk. 94 with scholiast, Xenophon. Cyropaed. viii. 2 §§ 10—12. Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. De Mundo c. 6, 398 a 21 ff., Poll. ii. 4 (Eaton) and n. (1715) upon viii(v). 11 § 7. Susem. (654)
c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3
Syllburg Bk., Aristotropia in place of either despotikos or despotikos Schlimmer.
See Comm. on 4 αλλο βασιλικον omitted by P3 (in P4 added in the margin) 4ς 
basileuton P. Q. *T fr. Ald. Bk., probably also P4 (1st hand), Aristotropia P4 (corr.)
41 τά rightly omitted by Π3 Ar. Bk., retained by fr. 1258 a 2 τόμων δέντων M *P3 fr. Bk. 3 άξι
will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the
loosely trope της βασιλείας, or absolute monarchy. Comp. Susenmibl Quest. crit. 
col. p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to that (commonwealth of varieties even in
which alone absolute monarchy will arise. Comp. c. 15 § 9.
§ 1 36 ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν] i.e. in certain circumstances: not, as Bernays and others translate,
"in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies)." See n. (677) and Quest. crit. col.
p. 397 ff. Susenm. (674)
38 despotikon...basilikos] "Bekker writes despotov after Syllburg and basi-
levdos as in P4. But we find παράποτα standing side by side with these; and so
this can hardly be used, like aristotropia and poltikein, in a passive sense; it proves
that we should rather read despotov with Gottling, as in P4, and adopt 
basileus from the corr. of P4. Further, how else are we to construe καὶ διαμε
καὶ εἰς ἑαυτός, to which Lamban raised an objection? But with the text before us ὁποῖον φί
is the predicate of the first clause, καὶ τάρα φίνων the predicate of the second clause; all
the rest is subject." Susenm.
40 τάντα γὰρ παρά φίσω] Com-
pare the apparently inconsistent passage 
viii. 12 [3 n. (1316).] Susenm. (674 b)
2 1258 a 3 ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐστι δύνα
mov] Cps. 13 § 14 α. 601 b. Susenm. (675)
This is the thorough-going Abolition of the scientific expert in government, as
advanced by Plato.
13 6 καὶ πρότροποι νῦν: c. 13 (11 § 11
-5. Susenm. (676)
6 πρῶτον διὰ τινὰς] clearly is
right in objecting to the meaningless tax-
tology in the definition of the peoples 
suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is
even worse that aristocracy is here de-
scribed in a manner which, although it
does not directly contradict Aristotle's 
conception, still by no means satisfies it, 
and therefore does not render it faithfully.
It is indeed essential that a true aris-
tocracy should possess citizens who are
capable enough always to elect the most 
capable persons to office. But it is as
essential to this ideal aristocracy, that
these persons should only hold their offices 
for a certain time, and then be replaced
by persons not inferior in capacity, so that
there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And if we yet want to find
the people suited for a monarchy repre-
sented as different from that suited for
πολιτικών 1. 17.

§ 4. Basileutones kai ti to aristokratikon kai ti to politikon. (X)

Basileutones men ouv to toioynton esti plithos o peyuke ferew
gevos uperechon kai arretih prois hgemonian politikin, aris
stoikratikon de plithos o peyuke ferew [[plithos arxhesai
dinameneon]] tin tov elveferon arxhiin upo tov kai arretih
hgemonikon pros politikin arxhin, politikon de plithos en
o peyuke egniveshai plithos politeikon dinameneon ar
chein kai arxhethai kata nymon tov kai aixian dinamemeta
§ 5 tois eunpores tos arxhas. otan ouv ygevos olyon y kai twv 12

10 [plithos...ferew] Vettori Bk. || [plithos arxhesai dinameneon] Susem. following
Ar. and Schneider. Perhaps another recension of the preceding || 11 arxhn omitted
by M^P || 12 plithos en y...13 egninescha Spengel Bk.3, [en y...13 politekon]
Hercber (Hermea VII. 467) || 13 peyuke kai en II^2 (only P^4 has en for en, written
over an erasure), [kai en] Bk.3, omitted by P^1 fr. Ar. || ydes Hayduck (probably right) ||
politeikon fr. IP (emended by corr. of P^1) || kai arxh arikesai M^4, arxhesai kai
arxhein II^2 fr. Bk. || 15 atporos P^3 fr. Ar. gr. atporos P^4 in the margin. P^4 (1st hand)
also had atporos : eunpores was written over by corr.3 and gr. kai atporos inserted
in the margin; <eunpores kai> atporos? Stahr (not bad). See Comm. n. (677): politaia
Koraes || y P^1 IP Ar. Bk. Bernays Susem.3 || [tov allwv] Susem.3, aliquot id est
aliquorum Albert; if y is right either tov allwv is a ditto from 17, or must
be transposed to follow 16 ena twa, or, as Schmidt proposes, to follow 19 basilea

aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true
monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz.
that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see Introd. p. 44). For this very reason,
we would not translate above at 17 § 1 "for some people monarchical government
is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather:
"under some circumstances the one, and under others the other." But the inter
polator, like many modern critics, misunderstands the passage adopted the former
meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact
account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the
incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is
closely connected with kai proteron... (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this
connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a
Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading eunpores or atporos;
the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous
combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a
compromise between oligarchy and demo-
cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad
even for this interpolator, and we ought
perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture tov
oun eunpores kai tois atporos in which
would remove the difficulty. Susem. (677)
§ 12 politeikon de plithos kata.

If we adopt the very probable change of the second plithos into ydes, the sense is:
"And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a
warlike character (ydes), qualified to be rules as well as subjects in accordance
with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits
for the rich (? and the poor)." If this change be not made, the sentence will be
differently rendered according as the second plithos is regarded (1) as mere
redundancy (Postgate Notes p. 25), or (2) as used in a different sense from the
first: i.e. as meaning 'body,' 'class' within the entire civic population. Bern
ays, while adopting this latter view, makes dinameneon...arxhes refer to the first
politeikon plithos: which seems inconsistent. If 'the population suited to Polity'
were 'one in which a warlike class naturally arises,' it should merely be this
class and not the population generally 'in
which an interchange of ruling and being
ruled can be carried into effect.' Susem.
16 toις omitted by Π
c

18 τότε δικαιον τὸ γένος κτλ. Aristotle speaks with far more correctness here than in 13 13 when he is dealing with a whole stock of individuals or even a single man. But this gives a fresh proof (cp. Introd. p. 46) that in describing his ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of Macedonia; for not even Oncken would attribute to him the absurdity of regarding the whole royal family of Macedon as gods dwelling among men (13 13 n. 601, ι 15 n. 615). Subem. (678)

5 19 ἑρμηνεύσαν τούτον vide c. 13 13 23 and Π 11 — 12. Subem. (679)

31 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς Instead of aristocracy, we should at first sight rather expect policy: for aristocracy is founded on the right of fitness in men, the only ultimate right (7 3 n. 356). But Aristotle is here pointing to the explanations in 13 11 1 — 12, in which it is aristocracy and not policy that is discussed; and even this is hypothetically designated as faulty, in case, that is, where the excellence of the community is not weighed against that of individuals to see which excels the other. Subem. (680)

24 κατά τὸ πρότερον λέγειν ἀπλώς: but also according in the right previously expounded: i.e. the right of merit, when the estimate just mentioned (in n. 680) has been correctly made. Accordingly we are referred back to c. 9 as well as to c. 17. Further comm. n. (695) and VIII (V). 1 6 n. (1491). Subem. (681)

7 26 οὖ γὰρ τέφθηκεν συμβατικῶς. For it is not natural that the part should outweigh the whole, and the possessor of such extraordinary consequences has happened to be in this case vide, that all the others together stand to him as part to whole. The ordinary interpretation is: 'For it is not the course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas this happens when a man is very superior to the rest.' But see c. 13 (4. 507).

8 29 μη κατά μῆρες ἀλλὰ ἀπλῶς: 'not merely in opinion,' with others, 'but absolutely sovereign.'
31 or αὐτῆς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς, καὶ πῶς, (X) 18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτου ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαίων ἁρίστην εἶναι τῆν ὑπὸ τῶν ἁρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη ἡ ἐστὶν ἡ ἑσύμβεβη· 35 κεν ἣ ἑνά τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλήθος ὑπερέχουν εἶναι κατ' ἁρέτην, τῶν μὲν ἁρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ' ἁρχειν πρὸς τὴν ἁριστατέαν ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοι ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίων ἀνδρος ἁρέτην εἶναι καὶ πολιτών τῆς ἁρίστης πόλεως φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον 40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλως συν- στήσειν ἀν τις ἁριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευμένην, οὕτω ἐσται 2 1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἐθνὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον § 2 ἄνδρα καὶ τα ποιοῦντα πολιτικόν [καὶ βασιλικόν]. διωρισμέ- νον δὲ τούτων περί τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγει τῆς 4 ἁρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἁρχεσθαι <καὶ ἁρχεῖν> Spengel Bk. 2 1288 || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἁρίστης ΠΤ b fr. Bk. 1288 b 2 πολιτικῶν] πολίτην ἄγαθων (or σπουδαίων)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικόν] Spengel, καὶ βασιλικόν <καὶ ἁριστοκρατικόν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλεύοντα Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good sense || 4 καθίστασθαι πῶς M4, καθίστασθαι πῶς P3 Tb Wb Ald. and P2 (1st hand, the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense, i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy. This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV (VIII), V(VIII), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal) state in its normal form is or is not identical with the ὡρθή πόλις Aristocracy: a point which Forchhammer (Philol. xv. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (Philol. xiv. p. 293 ff. Der alle Staat des Aris. p. 66 ff.), defending the traditional order of the books, denied. Their objections are examined by Spengel Arist. Studien 11. p. 60 (652) f.

§ 1 οἰκονομουμένη[ ] administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see VIII(V). 8 § 15 τῆς ἀλήθείας οἰκονομίας.

35 ἢ ἑνά τινά... ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλήθος] The first two cases give the ideal kingdom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n. (600). SUSEM. (682)

37 πρὸς τὴν...[ζωήν] Comp. II. 1 § 1 n. (128): also n. (21) on 2. 2 § 8, n. (284) on II. 9 § 5 and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις] c. 5 § 10; see n. (471). SUSEM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀνάγκη δὴ τῶν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσεσθαι τὴν προ- θέκοναν σκέψιν. It was Spengel's great merit, Ueb. Arist. Pol. p. 17 ff., Arist. Stud. ii. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back from the time when that discussion immediately followed the present chapter, and consequently evidence of an older order of the books than that adopted by the compilers of our present text (? Andronicus). See Intr. p. 17, p. 47 f.
EXCURSUS I.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. 1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel Studien p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff.
From Herodotos iii. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that "during the Peloponnesian war," as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names (Thuc. iii. 82): afterwards the Socrates used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν καλλίτευν ἄριστοπάρατος, Plato Politik., 302 D.' Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannia, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people; for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding as at Sparta (Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 14—16; iv. 4. 15, cp. De Rep. Leg. 10. 7, Plato Crito 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 12, cp. 1. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

1 And not, as Oncken ii. 153 misinterprets my own "after performance of definite statutory injunctions."
the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (Xen. Mem. III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his Politicus, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the Republic so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the Politicus arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy; in the Republic on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the Politicus to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller Plato p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the Republic and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

1 Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account, and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

2 That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: Plato Polit. 219 D f., 302 C.
the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6. 17 with n. 219, cp. also Introd. p. 20); for Plato in the Republic does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: 1X. 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 17. 18 that he shows himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the Lasas, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also n. 191 on II. 6, 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited; the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the Politics, except that it is not stated in the Lasas whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyranny, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the Politics, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy; nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the Republic. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the Lasas, since he uses the term Aristocracy in the sense of a government by the best, although in III. 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage 712 C D it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI. 7. 1, Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 1—cp. II. 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name Polieteria, Constitution or Commonwealth in general; evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution par excellence; or else (b) because as in their opinion the best constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the Ethic. I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato joined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifie-
EXCURSUS .

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(537), vi(iv). 9. 3 n. (1254), Vl(iv). 13. 7

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view presented by Plato

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Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself
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in the Politicus, except that

3

he

Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction
between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was
certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in
the form of the antithesis between the 'old fashioned' and the 'modern' De-

replaces law-abiding

mocracy— ll.

12 §§ 2, 4, cp. vi(iv).

5 §§ 3>4• viii(v). ^§ 10

Hence

using\

Greek

to the

and

n. (406)

6^5,

14 §7, §§ II, 12: vii(vi). 4 §§

— which

made by

follows the essentially original addition

2;

Aristotle

of forms of government, which he expressly

classification

claims as original vi(iv).

I,

Isocrates, in particular, is fond of

§§ 8

—

11 (cp. ;/. 11 26, also vi[iv]. 2 § 4 w. 1140 b,
1383 b, viii[v]. 12 § 18 n. 1787), namely the accurate analysis
of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in par-'

vii[vi].

^7

i

11.

and the estimate of the comparative merit of
the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four
forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt,
which resemble Tyrannis, Vl(iv). c. 4 i, Vli(vi). cc. 4 7. Thus in contrast to
Plato's procedure in the Politicus and the Laws he certainly regards even
the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration,
But even amongst the mixed
though it stands still very near to Polity.
forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Polities, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and
truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the
ticular, into their sub-species,

—

absolute sense: vi(iv). 7 §§ 2
iv(vii).

(218),

II.

—

5

Monarchy

as the best form of

597, 601),

C.

17

comparing 7m.
this,

the only

not tied

down

7171.

4, 8

(849), also

§9, cp. 2 §

71.

on

III. 6.

i,

(614)

on

f

I

III.

(1133,

7171.

laws but

ii. 6.

III. c.

13 7m. (595,

II36— 7),

lO § 4

on III. 14.
the developed

14. 24, (633)

in

Comp.

absolutely unqualified.

11.

But

2.

state, is

l7it7Od. p.

44
same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by

The

is

Aristotle, without specifying ihe sub-species, in the Nic. Eth. vili. 10.

indeed he had probably expounded

For

17

3: for Avhich an ideal

7.

Monarchy which has any justification
to

§4(1141);

(1133),

71.

III.

conceivable:

all is at least

(677, 678); VI(IV). 2 §

(521)

i

(536) on

it

is

assuredly probable,

it

still

earlier in

not certain, that

if

fif.

i

— 3:^

one of his dialogues.

when

Isocrates,

who

is

trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and

Democracy, as found

in

essential points, regard

1

^

158

Herodotos^, makes a hit at those who, caring little

Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

Comp. e.g. Isocr. vii. 15 fF.
The divergences which Oncken,
ff.

believes

he has discovered

upon misapprehensions.

for

p.
rest

^

But

in

garcliy the
Aristotle.

such a

meaning

way
it

as to give Oli-

has in Plato and


in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (Panath. 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the Ethic, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published; nor is there anything said in the Ethic about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f., criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intrinsèques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it.

SUSEM. (533)

EXCURSUS II.

PITTACUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Topfer more particularly has recently shown in his Quaestiones Pisistratiae pp. 81—107.

1 Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Muller's History of Greek Literature, Geschichte der griech. Litt. 11 ii p. 281 f. (cp. p. 244) is certainly of opinion that the Nicomachean Ethics owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato's lifetime in the Academy: but see, as against this, Sussefeld in Philologus der Jahresthirt XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken ii p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded — if, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teichmüller and Bergk that the polemic of Isocrates in the Panathenaeans §§ 16—24 is directed against Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato's death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 144 to 143 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Sussefeld, Supplem. Jeyl.-l'hr. XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of these ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the Pantathemuma). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I think, to abstain from it.
EXCURSUS II.

(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthilidae, VIII. 19 n. (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris Frag. 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least part of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mityleneans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenean colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mityleneans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippos (Fr. 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. XIII. 600, Plut. De Herod. malignu. c. 15, Diog. Laert. l.c., Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo II. cc., Apollodoros Fr. 78 in Diog. Laert. l.c., Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," στοιχωτικά, as they are called (Strab. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, Frag. 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. i. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 n. 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. i. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record
in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger; hence the ἀληθινὸν (ἀληθή) of the latter, i.e. his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2 = 611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2 = 651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, i.e. as Euripides in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3 = 661. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, viz. the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus’ appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, Ep. 36 as restored by A. Schöne ‘Researches into the life of Sappho’ in Ἱστ. phil. Bonn. p. 755 f.), and a year after, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus’ tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. i. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3 = 570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Diog. Laert. Diog. i. 79, where ἴσος ἡμέρας must obviously be altered to ὀρθώμενα). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, e.g. to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 650. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (Fr. 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Muller that he took part in the battle of Carceminus, B.C. 605; see his essay, ‘A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,’ in Rhein. Mus. for 1877, pp. 287—290. Muller’s only reason on the other side, viz. that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks ep. cit. vi. p. 281: ‘Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar’s Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

1 The text of Suidas (c. v. Pittacus) τετ τε μήθι ἀληθινή Ἱαλάχως τοις χάλκοις Μεγαθύμης ἀπελευθερίαν τοις Πινδαῖς Μετέδικτεν διδόμενος οὐδὲν ἐν ποιμηνική στρατείᾳ Ἀθροισάμενος τελεμάκην τῷ τοπικῷ τηγανίσιν ἀπελευθερίας δοκέω τοις βασιλείς αὐτῶν should be thus punctuated, with a full stop, in place of a comma, after διδόμενος. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Euripides. This text has been correctly remarked by Dibelius p. 55 C.
**EXCURSUS II.**

Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem.” Moreover, as Alcaeus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (*Fr.* 106 in Strabo i. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. **SUSEM. (626)** Cp. now *Rhein. Mus.* xlii. 1887, p. 140 ff

**Chronological Table.**

| Ol. 32, 2 | Pittacus born | B.C. 651 |
| Ol. 36   | Phrynon actat. 25 victor | 636 |
| Ol. 42   | Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros | |
| Ol. 42, 2 | Pittacus floruit, actat. 40 | 611 |
|          | Phrynon actat. 50 conquers Sigeion | |
| Ol. 43, 3 | Phrynon slain in single combat by Pittacus | 606 |
| Ol. 47   | Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles | 592 |
| Ol. 47, 2 | Pittacus actat. 60 | 591 |
| Ol. 47, 3 | Pittacus made Aesymnetes | 590 |
| Ol. 50   | Pittacus resigns his office | 580 |
| Ol. 52, 3 | Pittacus dies, actat. 81 | 570 |

**EXCURSUS III.**

**Fragmenta Vaticana Rescripta.**

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887, vol. xlii p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the *Politics*: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age¹ the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes². The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius’ conjecture ἄπτων, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of καί, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P², the principal codex of the family Π², although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent³. For the definite separation between the two recensions Π² and Π³ and

¹ Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

² It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of ν ἐφελκνατικών; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of ditography, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

³ Namely, of xiv century, four centuries later than fr.
EXCURSUS III

455

Π² was brought about, as I have shown¹, in the sixth or seventh century, while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's was apparently more nearly resembled Π¹ than Π², while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of Π¹ and of Π². Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in Π¹ or Π². On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that Π¹ has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases² than Π², and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with Π¹, or with Π²: sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 lax "with Π², 1281 a 33 f εὐστα...ψυχρ placed after ψῳδον with Π², 1287 a 41 "εἰπα πρὸς τοὺς εἰπα with Π², a 32 a παντὶ νομιμον as Julian reads, 1288 a 3 νομιμον "υπερον as Π²": whereas in the fourth of these passages Π¹ also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not Π¹, but only Π Mα (or in the last passage Π P¹) from which fr. diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from Π Mα equivalent to divergence from Π¹), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of Π¹ the readings in which the fragments agree with Π M¹ only; namely, 1278 b 22 μακροεύρισκος, 1280 b 5 διακόπησις, 1287 b 13 εἰρήμενον. The second of these three erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as Π¹ has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, the case for certainty in the fragment as well as in Π M¹ had already converted this into διακόπησις. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where Mα has the true reading with Π¹, while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in Π, and originally also in Π¹. At 1287 a 33 Π¹ rightly have γρηγορία, fr. has γρηγορία with Π M¹ P¹. The statement "1280 b 17 υπερον with Π²" is quite misleading: for here it is only Π² that has υπερον at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of Π. At 1287 a 30 the order of the words in fr. is the same as in Π¹ and corr. Π¹, i.e. a branch of Π¹.

² A reference to a simple passage may suffice. Π, 2, 6, 1361 a 39 Π, wherein Π² affords an especially deterrent example: cp. Quast. crit. ed. p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a series of similar passages.
Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have $\beta\omega\lambda\epsilon\nu\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\nu$ with $\Pi^2$ and $\kappa\rho\nu\nu\nu$ with $\Pi^1$. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with $\Pi^1$ or $\Pi^2$, as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with $\Pi^2$" in the following cases; 1276 b 33, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (επισημεν); and "with $\Pi^1" in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (το πολιτευμα), 1280 b 4 (εςει), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write φιλεις and γίγνεσθαι with $\Pi^2$, on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with $\Pi^2$ against $\Pi^1$ 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with $\Pi^1$ 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided. The correctness of the calculation that $\Pi^1$ has retained the true text oftener than $\Pi^2$ cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 αν φαυ is undoubtedly derived from $\Pi^1$. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family $\Pi^1$, even this makes but very little change in favour of $\Pi^2$.

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. φυσει μεν ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῆτων πολιτικῶν: on the contrary there can be no doubt that $\Pi^2$ fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 διὰ την πολιτικην ζῆτων ὁ ἀνθρωπος, Eth. Nic. 1097 b 11 φυσει πολιτικῶν ὁ ἀνθρωπος, 1169 b 18 πολιτικῶν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἀνθρωπος, as Stöhr suggests.]

On the other hand in the above calculation καὶ εἶ or κἂν εἶ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote κἂν εἶ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribut after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀριστής: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must  

1 It is a mere accident that M* here agrees with $\Pi^2$. With the抄ist of M* no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homocoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

2 Besides the 51 passages noted below in which $\Pi^2$ fr. agree against $\Pi^1$ there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr., viz. Susem, agrees with $\Pi^2$ against $\Pi^1$, viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases $\Pi^1$ omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292 b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem, i.e. with $\Pi^1$ as against $\Pi^2$: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which $\Pi^2$ fr. are agreed as against $\Pi^1$.

3 See Rassow Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik. (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

4 See Commentationes Philologicae (Monachi, 1891) p. 98.
feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension II, (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280 a 15 f., and 1288 a 13 f. Those which he adduces in favour of μυκήρης 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight. However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscript which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms μούκηρης and μούκηρης: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavours after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words μικά Ἑλληνες, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by II than added by II without justification. But now it appears that II agree with II in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the γε inserted after δηρεύς by II, fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace τοὺς in the text with II fr. Adl. Bk., as here the sense favours the article. 

Heylbut's collation with the text of Suscul is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 εὐγεγραμμένοις 19 γαρ 1 απλαίς. λ is added above the line | 21 εἰσὶν | 22 μιᾶς | 24 εἰταν | 26 απόστασις: o added above the line | 33 (in μέρι | 34 (εὐγεγραμμένοι | 39 (μετα…οικεῖοι); there is only room for about 10 letters, probably the copyist omitted τοὺς καὶ προτάσιμοι.

1275 b 4 (καὶ…κατάστη) πολιτείαν αὐτοῖν τεραλέχεις | 5 εἰσίν | 7 is omitted | 8 διευθεύοντα | 10 ἀλλαὶ ἀλλαὶ | 11 τῆς εἰσίν | 12 κριτών | 13 τοῖς | 15 εἰσίν | ἀλλα | 16 βουλεύεται with II | 19 βουλεύεται ἡ κριτική | 28 (προς)... 21 (προς...

1 In favour of μικά Ἑλληνες, the order of II fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, T. S., VIII, i 1 1 161 a 37 ἐπὶ τὲν δὲ μικᾶν εὑρετεῖ τὰ εἰσελθόντα στὰ, ν. H. T. 1. 3 0 7. 1009 a 28 δυνατὰ στάτη.

2 For the less usual order of II fr., διευθεύειν καὶ δεικνύει, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Contra 1255 b 8 with Crit. note.

They are 1276 b 32, 1317 b 10, b 18, 1321 a 8, b 26.

3 Heylbut points out that Παρρος denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. παρρος —
EXCURSUS III.

(ονται) δή | 23 επι...οιων twice over | 24 παρππους | 25 αποροουσιν | 27 ερωνευ-

ομουσι | 29 υπο των twice over | λαρισσοπουσιν, but just before λαρισσουσι | 30 εστιν | 31 διωρισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη corrected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τυχεωντη τοιαυτην | 24 δη(λοιν) | 25 (αρετης) | 26 (εργον εστιν) | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία
δ8 εστιν is omitted | 30 διω with Π1 Π2 | πολι(του προς) | 31 εστιν | 32 α(ρετην)
33 του δ...τελειαν is omitted with Μ8 Π2 | 34 ενδεχεται(αι) | πολι(την) | 35 (καθην)
36 αλλα is omitted with Π1 | εστιν | 39 αυτον | τ(οιει)ν | 40 επειδή as Π2 | (παντι)

1277 a 1 ei(η)μ(α)αρετη as Π2 | (και) | 2 (σπουδαιον ποιεται(ουδει) | 3 (ανα-

γκαιον εναι τη(ν) | πολιν την) | πολιτην | αγαθουν αδυνατον ei μη | 5 (τηςπονδανα) | 6 (πολις ωστερ ζωον) | ψυχ(η εκ) | 8 κτησεις | 9 ανασαω | 15 αγαθωνεια
as Π2 | 16 φρονημον | 17 λεγουσιν | 18 ευρηπηδης φησιν | 19 κομπ Π2 | 20 ειδε-

αυτη as Π2 | 21 εστιν | 22 απος αν ei Π2 | 24 πινθαν | 29 αμφω επαινου
ποτε | 32 τωντευθεν as Π2 | 33 εστιν | 39 τονομαινου του Π2

1278 a 29 τουνοθουσι | οις in πολλοι over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολεγ(αν.,)
θρωπων, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοχλ(ου κε)πτα | 34 αστων | 36 ωστερ...38 μετεχουν comes after Π2 | 39 σωνουκουντων εστιν as in Π1 corr. Π1

1278 b 1 εστιν | ek των ειρημενων with Π2 | 3 κακεινοι ου with Π2 | 8 κανει with Π1 | after twice an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριοι | 11 δειτων | 12 δοιον | 14 δεκα | 16 συνεσθεν | 19 δη with Π2 | 21 o is omitted with Π2 | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειας ορεγονται* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 πασιν | 26 και...

κοινωνιαν between auton and isos as Π2 | 28 υπερβαλθη | 29 κοπαθειαν | 31 γε after αρησι | 40 δη ει was omitted | 41 ωστερ with Π2

1279 a 2 παιδοτρειθην | 13 το κεινον | 15 αρχουσινουσακαιρως | 16 αρχας : χ above the line | 19 σφετερου | ο above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεφησθαι)

| 23 εστιν | 25 διωριθεσθαι | to πολιτειαν with Π1 | 26 σημαινεσθαι...πολιτειαν is omitted | (δ)εστων | 28 (ο)ταν | (π)ολλοι | 31 (η)του | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο-

βελτιστουσαν...την) δε των αυτων μεν | 35 δε ενος αριστοκρατον | 37 σταδετον | 38 (κ)αλεται(τα το) | (πασων...δευλο)γος | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθ(ει) γιγνεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (μη δε τι) | 15 καταληπτεν | 16 εστιν | 20 ειναι(ναι) | 23 συμβανθη | 26 καιτης | 28 προσ-

αγορευει | 34 the line ends with το, the next begins τεια: either λι is omitted, or

it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 δια is omitted | 39 γυ-

νεσθαί | 40 δημοκρατεια

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 παν το: παντα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φαιλοι κρατια

with Π2 | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεχθην omitting το κρινουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν

ομιζουσιν over an erasure | 24 ελευθερουσιν: the first i above the line | 26 μετε-

χουσιν | 29 εκατον μονον | εισενεγκαται with Π2 | 31 μονον ενεκεν with Π2

33 εστιν | 36 τυρπνανεστι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 του is omitted with Π1 | αδικος : κ above the line | 4 εξει with

Π1 | αδικησοσθαι | 5 δαρετης | διακονουσιν with ΓΜ | 8 γιγνεται | 9 αποθε | 10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφορον | 17 πολεσιν | δουδει | 23 που | 26 αικεια | σφι(σι)ν

28 δοσειν | 30 η πολις αυκ εστιν with Π2 | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και η | 40 δη

1281 a 1 χαριν is omitted | 3 χαριν with Π2 | 5 μετεστιν | τ(οιει)ς | 6 μετοσι

* περι with Μ8 Π2, πολιτειας with ΓΜ, ουκ ἐλαστον omitted with Π1.
7 (πολιτικήμου) επωρ | επερχομαι | 16 δέ is omitted with ΠΠ
17 χρή ... | παλι | λαβιθετόω | 21 τωτών | 23 κατατέωρω | 24 δοκίμαι, e.g. with Π²; ν in artifex above the line
28 δίκαιον with Π² | 35 εχθα | 36 ψέφων after φανών with ΠΗ
1286 b 17 μεταβαλλον with ΜΠ² | 18 αναγκεον | 21 γυναίκα | 24 γυναικών | 26 τουτο μαθαν | 31 και is omitted with Π² | 33 φαλάξια | 34 Βασίλεια
1287 a 2 εφάντερκεν | 4 βούλεται | 5 οτι | 7 ετοί | 9 ετοί | 11 εν των παιδιών eum with ΠΠ² | 16 ομηγος τουρίκ και as Π² | ρηθη | 25 παιδιων with Π² | 26 εφάντερκεν | 29 τόν καινό μάνιν | ταυς εμαυς | 31 αρχαγγελ διασφαλίζει as Π² | 32 διασφαλίζει is omitted as in Π² | οι σωτρομίες with ΠΙ Julian | 33 γραμμα with ΜΠ² | 34 και is omitted | 37 καιμναται is corrected from σκουρμναται | 38 επημνυμ | 40 θερμαν
1287 b 4 a γερ ρομος | 5 τω ετα | 6 (ετα) | τω ετα | 8 εφάντερκεν | 10 εφάντερκεν | 11 πατεραν | 13 αρχαν | 15 ετοι | 16 ετοι | 17 αρχαν | 19 ετοίν with ΠΠ² | 21 ετοίν | 23 πατεραν with Π² | 24 και is omitted | 26 πεφερειν | 29 καιτο επεμμον ειναι των αναπληρον with Π² | 32 αποθορείतαι διαφορά | 33 παιδιων | 34 απατηρεύφαν | 35 τετευρωνται | 39 της παιδείας της αρμονίας with Π² | 41 άσωτον
1288 a 2 των εταν with ΜΠ² | 5 και is omitted | 6 πατεραν | 8 ετοίν | 13 πεφερειν εγγεγονται as Π², omitting και εν διαινοια with Π² | 14 αρχαν και αρχαν with Π² | 15 αρχαν και αρχαν with Π² | 16 ετοίν | 17 (τουτον) γω ον θιν Π | 18 Βασίλεικον | 21 ετοι for οτι | 23 πατεραν with Π² | 24 και is omitted | 26 πεφερειν | 29 καιτο επεμμον ειναι των αναπληρον with Π² | 30 πατεραν | 31 after άγνωρισε | 33 διαφορά | 34 apparently οκσουμενενε | 35 τετευρωνται | 39 της παιδείας της αρμονίας with Π² | 41 άσωτον
1288 b 1 παιδια | 3 διαινουται | πωλοται | του εν πεφερειν γεγονον διαφορα | 5 δι | 9 αριστουτοι πολιτευον | γυναικεια, in the margin by the same hand | 11 γυναικεια, the second γ corrected in the margin by the same hand
1290 a 36 ομοιον | the second 3 above the line | 8 και
1290 b 2 δοται | πολλον with Π² | 5 φυσισ | 8 ενi instead of εναι | παλινον | 11 δηνος | 12 τουτων | 15 δηνος | 21 Π²
17 ετοι | 19 δοται | 21 πολεμον | ΠΠ² | 24 παιδων ekexω with Π² | 27 μεν is omitted as Π² | 29 δη | ekexων | 33 πολιν | 35 λεξηθαιναι | 27 δε | 39 γυναικε ις | μερος with Π² | 40 ετοι | κολαλεονται
1291 a 4 διαινουσ | 5 και της ομοιον is omitted | 6 κοιτων | 7 και | εταιν αναγκαιν ας Π² | 11 φυσισ | 13 τουτων τουτων | 1 διαινον | 20 αναγκαιν [21 αποκρεναι as Π² | 22 τετεφερ | 27 διαινον | 29 καιτων | γυνα before διαινον with Π² | 33 αναγκαιν μερος της παιδείας
with Π\(^2\) | 34 o with Π\(^2\), not ὅπερ | οὐδών | 39 βουλευομενον with Π\(^2\)* | 41 το-
λεσιν | γινεσθαι | δικαος
1291 b 3 autos: s above the line | 4 και τεκυτας twice | 12 καθιστασιν | και
dοκουσιν twice | 14 εστιν | 15 εστιν | διμοκρατειες | 17 λεγωμενων | 21 χρημα-
tιοτικον | 22 αλειυτικον: the first s above the line | εκαστα: ta above the line | 27
αμφοτερον | ετερον | 30 διμοκρατεια | εστιν | 32 υπαρχειν | 34 μαλισταιν
1292 a 3 το πάσι μετεναι] τάλαμεν εισαι with Γρ\(^1\) | 17 τοιουτος | δημο as
Π\(^2\) | 22 πατι is omitted | 23 δειμαγωγων | 24 εισιν | 29 προσκλησιν with Π\(^1\)|
30 αρχε | 32 εστιν | 33 εκαστα οι εκαστον | 34 εστιν | 36 ουθεν
1292 b 1 μακρων with Π\(^1\) | 3 πωσιν | 5 οταν παι | 9 τελευτας | επαιμεν
with Π\(^2\) | διμοκραταιας εν ταις is omitted | 10 καλουσιν | 13 between κατα and
touś room for 3 letters | δε after δια is omitted | 14 πολιτευσθαι de δημοτικων | 15 κατα touś νομους | 17 τουτο δε | 19 αλλα αγαπωσιν\(\textsuperscript{‡}\)

* Apparently κρινων with Π\(^1\); this at least is the inference to be drawn from
Heylbut's silence.
† Apparently ἄδος with Π\(^1\); Heylbut is silent.
‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's
annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 εισενεγκατα is given as
the reading at any rate of Π\(^2\) and presumably of fr. (εισενεγκατα Heylbut).]

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**Note on the Basis of the Text.**

In Mr. Newman's edition I. p. viii. f. ii. p. liv. there recurs, although in a
much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. p. 801 ff., and in *Excursus III.* above, that I seek to base
the text of Aristotle's *Politics* primarily on Π\(^1\), and especially on Γ. Mr
Newman writes:

"Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially
on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too
often followed Π\(^1\), I have nevertheless already said at p. xxxii. :

"quantquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis apparit ita nobis traditum esse hoc
Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtam ex utraque
codicum familia recensionem persicere hodie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura
artis criticae regulas diligentius, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas
periti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba...
...cum libris affinibus Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinde quaerendum, ubi
huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubicunque autem aequ
bonam sententiam utraeque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est
posthabenda."

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished *a priori*

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- to make the recension Π\(^1\) the basis of the text would proceed just as
- perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with
- Π\(^2\); that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its
- merits: quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent; and
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NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family II. The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heybut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from II. In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of II, as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the Politics has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1273 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in II, however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the Politics has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown a priori by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in II are corrected by means of II and those in II by means of II, whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "Vetusta translatio," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of P and Ar., for the rest is certainly true only of the "deteriores" of the family II (— II). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from P or from P and P (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-
strated, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. Α of the Rhetoric and Poetic, or Σ in Demosthenes, or Γ in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K b alone presents right readings in the Nicomachean Ethics, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π, or of the better class of Π, present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π, in Π they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. xii. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. notes] on this matter:

"soli Γ libro debemus praeter 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καί has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαριτίδη, 1260 b 41 έις ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἡ δη, 1271 a 20 καν (μην Π; partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἐθνος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1311 a 4 ἐναι δὲ, 1336 a 34 σπουδασμονυμων (aut σπουδασθησειομων, quod praebet P 3), 35 κατα, 1296 a 8 συστάσεα (ut videtur), b 38 πληθει, 1320 b 9 την Ταραντίνων ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτής ἀρχής, 1321 a 12 ὀπλιτικῆ, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὅν (an ἐγγὺς;), 1311 a 6 χρημάτω (ut videtur),

soli Γ P 5 has: 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 ἐσάγεων, 1340 a 16 δήλον ὅτι δει, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσενύνας (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:
soli Γ et pr. P 2 1259 b 28 δὲ:
soli Γ pr 1 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτὸ:
soli Γ et corr. P 1 1278 b 22 παρ':
soli Γ Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμους:
soli Γ P 5 Ar. 1336 a 5 δὲ:
soli Γ R b 1303 b 31 τὰ:
soli Γ Ald. corr. 1 P 2 1332 a 33 τῶ:
soli Γ Ar. corr. 3 P 2 1335 a 26 σάματος:
soli Γ P 2 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ἰδον Μ P 1, ἰδον cet.).

Neque fas esse censo in tali rerum conditione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus οἱ κοινωνοὶ et μνών multo illas exquisitiiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppedditat translatio, οἰκονομοὶ et ταλάντων...

E solo P has...deprimere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβιβαζόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἐλαυνηρεῖων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr. 1), b 4 κάκεινσ corr. (nisi potius retinendum est κάκεινσ), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικῶν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχεια, 1335 b 20 γενομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr. 1, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ἐθέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):
esoli Γ P 1 et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τῶ, 1280 b 19 εἰσήκ:
esoli Ar. et corr. P 1 has: 1255 a 37 ἐκγονον, 1299 a 14 πολετεῖας:
esoli P 1 mg. P 2 rc. P 2 1284 a 37 κολονείων, quaram nonnullae...ita sunt comparatae, ut auctore calamo a Demetrico Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingenii facile potuerint restitui, velut ἐλαυνηρεῖων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιεῖν, εἰσήκ, ἐκγονον...Solo autem M ὁ codice paene nusquam
NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo \(P^1\), solo \(P^2\) 1253 a 25 (ei, praeter formam om.), 1270 b 38 (\(\epsilon\)π\(\alpha\)ο\(\nu\)), 1235 a 29 (\(\alpha\)υ\(\nu\) \(\tau\)ο \corr.), 1319 a 14 (\(\epsilon\)π\(\alpha\)ο\(\nu\)), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 \(\delta\)\(\lambda\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\sigma\)\(\nu\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(\tau\)\(\iota\). This is exclusive of the cases, in which \(\Gamma M^\prime\) alone or \(\Gamma P^1\) alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (\(\text{L. p. xxI.}\)) 1253 b 33 \(\delta\) om. \(\Gamma^\prime\), erased by \(P^4\) (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute): 1279 b 22 \(\sigma\)\(\varphi\)\(\beta\)\(\alpha\)\(i\)\(n\)\(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(o\) \(\Gamma^4\): 1336 a 17 \(\psi\)\(\chi\)\(r\)\(i\)\(n\) \(P^1\) \corr.: 1342 b 33 \(\xi\) added by \(P^1\) and \corr.\(^1\) of \(P^3\) (here conjecture is really out of the question): 1290 a 1 \(\delta\) \(P^1\) and \(P^4\) \corr.: 1290 a 2 \(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(l\)\(o\)\(m\)\(e\)\(n\) \(P^1\) \corr.), \(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(l\)\(o\)\(m\)\(e\)\(n\) \(P^1\), \(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(l\)\(o\)\(m\)\(e\)\(n\) \(c\)\(e\)\(t\)\(e\)\(r\)\(i\) \corr., 1291 b 32 \(\epsilon\)\(p\)\(e\)\(i\)\(q\)\(e\) \(\Gamma^4\) \corr.: 1295 a 39 \(\delta\) erased by \corr. of \(P^4\), \(\gamma\)\(p\) \(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(n\) \(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(i\)\(s\) \(\tau\)\(\iota\) \corr.\(^3\) in the margin of \(P^3\) (this may be a conjecture): 1319 b 24 \(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(n\) \(\tau\) \(P^4\) \corr. \(\gamma\)\(p\) in the margin of \(P^1\): 1309 a 30 \(\alpha\)\(\iota\)\(\pi\)\(e\)\(t\)\(e\) \(P^4\) \corr.\(^4\) (corrector): 1316 a 38 \(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(l\)\(o\)\(m\)\(e\)\(n\) \(P^4\).

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the Vetustas translatio is "instar optimi codicis." That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text. In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of \(P^1\) only at 1252 b 28 (\(\eta\)\(\delta\) \(P^1\)), 1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 1258 b 40 (\(\chi\)\(m\)\(p\)\(r\)\(i\)\(d\) \(P^1\)), 1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt), 1259 b 28 (\(\delta\) \(P^1\) 1st hand of \(P^1\)), 1260 a 37 (\(\delta\) \(P^1\)): and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: \(\epsilon\)\(π\)\(\dot{\iota}\)\(\epsilon\)\(ν\)\(θ\)\(ρ\)\(i\)\(ν\)\(θ\) \(\Gamma M^\prime\) possibly rightly. But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 \(\delta\) is only added before \(\delta\)\(\lambda\)\(\iota\)\(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(o\)\(v\)\(o\)\(s\) \(\Gamma M^\prime\), yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the \(E I H I\) (as I have remarked on p. 436) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from \(M^P\) \(P^1\); and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in II. 11. 1270 b 10 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of \(\delta\) \(\tau\) \(\rho\)\(i\)\(n\)\(o\)\(s\) against \(M^P\) \(P^1\); but at 1253 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have \(\delta\) \(\dot{\iota}\) \(\rho\)\(i\)\(n\)\(o\)\(s\). Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the \(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(n\) between \(\epsilon\)\(τ\)\(η\)\(ε\) \(\alpha\)\(ν\)\(o\)\(r\)\(i\)\(s\) \(\delta\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(l\)\(o\)\(m\)\(e\)\(n\) with \(P^3\); and at 1260 a 26 \(\delta\) before \(\tau\) with \(P^4\) \(S^T\). In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted in enumerations (after \(\alpha\)\(i\)\(o\), \(\alpha\)\(\iota\)\(\varphi\)\(e\) especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15
unless καὶ be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before καταστολήμενοι) the explanation must be quite different, viz. ἀποτευόμενοι καταστολήμενοι mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy."

At 1252a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting εἰναι or leaving it out: as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π. And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (Qu. crit. coll. p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π, yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19f he wrote ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ without συνήλθον. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted ὁμοκάτως, but it still remains doubtful whether ὁμοκάτως be not right after all (see Addenda ad loc.). At 1253 b 27 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν (Π) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 δὲ is omitted by ΠΟΤΥΛΑδ., but one which is justified by the facts; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write δὴ): that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that ἄνως was explained by ἄπλως or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable: still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, λόγω (Π) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than λόγου (Π), I have laid down Qu. crit. coll. p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 ὑποστηρική and 1256 a 6 κερκιδοποιητική are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present διδομένη to the perfect δεδομένη and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect υφήγεται to the present υφρηγεταί, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 <ἀρχιώντως καὶ> ἀρχωμένων, see Addenda ad loc.

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (ὁμοκάτως or ὁμοκάτως), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 κομίζονται and 1258 b 1 μεταβλητικής (Π) may be corruptions of ποριζόνται and μεταβλητικής; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (ταῖς), 1257 b 24. Π is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (ἡθνι ΓΠ), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (Χηρότηθι Γ), 1259 a 37, b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand Π), 1260 a 4 twice (ἀρχιώντως καὶ Γ and
**NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.**

1260 a 37 (ὡς), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 31, 1254 a 30, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M as well as F. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension H, neither here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of H in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple derangement, e.g. φαλίσα, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susen.¹ p. XIV), and the repeated φαλλος. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading διέπεια (διεπεία). Apart from the order of the words 1263 b 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1257 a 36, 1266 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 a 18, b 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of P at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of H at 1263 a 23, b 31 omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of P. In the remaining 109 cases P has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 67 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (ἐὶδὲ ἀντιά Τ), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (Ἀκεραίων Π), 1262 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 15 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's crit. a.), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (ἐπικρ.), b 7 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (Ἀκεραίων Π'), 30, 1266 b 2 Γ, 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 25, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (Ἀκεραίων Π'), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 31 (were affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 17, 17, 20 (Ἀκεραίων Π'), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 30, b 13. H has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (ἢ omitted by MΠ, probably wrongly, whether by H also, cannot be known), 35 (at least MΠ), b 7 (in, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 9, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 31 (at least MΠ), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (φαλίσα), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least MΠ), 25, 27 (at least MΠ), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (φαλίσα, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least MΠ), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless ἀφίπτα is here nearer to the true reading than ἄφιπτα, ἄφιπτα being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Περαπτομένος is the right orthography), 1270 b 10, 32, 1271 a 20 (but μέτα gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὰ δειγματικά into the more natural and simple τὰ δειγματικά)? 1274 a 21 f. yet not without himself giving expression to his H.
doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π² presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way έν τούτοις has arisen from τούτο, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then τὸ before έν μέρει need not be changed into τῷ; but there is no need of this with the reading τούτο: see Susem.⁴ crit. n. and Qu. crit. coll. p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of τούς φύλακας in Μ'Π¹ is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263 a 23. For ἐδει Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda ad loc. If έκάστῳ προσέδρευοντες (ΓΜ⁰) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of Π¹.

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π¹ has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits πλείσταις, not ἄλλοις into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading πολιτείαν were right, τὴν could scarcely be omitted before this word or before κοινοτάτην.

1267 b 25 f. With the reading κόσμῳ πολιτείαι arises the absurdity, that ἐσθήτος εὐτέλεος would depend not simply on πλήθει, but on κόσμῳ πολιτείαι. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is καταδικάζεων τὴν δίκην in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula ἐρήμηρ καταδικάζεων?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman’s statement in the critical note, that ἡδὴ is left out by Π¹ here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Γ and Π¹ (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken τούτῳ (Π¹) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, τῆς ἀκοιμίας τῶν δυνατῶν is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman’s intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose
NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

ėυρίσκων, with Π1, to follow Π3 (line 9); but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Korace, of Π3 (line 8) for δεικτος. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π3, as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δεικτος (Π1) instead of δεικτα (Π3) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be ἔπαφτασις καὶ ζησματεία. Not so. Once for all, Π3 is made out to be the better recension.

1272 b 30. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ' αὐτῷ is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of Π1, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in Π. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ' αὐτῷ, a second καθ' αὐτῷ (Π1 and somewhat corrupted Μ), and a third καθαρὰ τὸ αὐτῷ Π3, the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π3 is made out to be the better recension.

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐποιεῖας from Π3 and Ο1, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly stated the case in relation to the recensions Π1 and Π3 when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: "hand rare hanc, saepius illam meliorem." Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heybut's account, which I have not correctly reported in the Jahrb. f. Philol. exxv. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undeniably the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π3, but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π1. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π3 any more than in favour of Π1; on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, δεικτα 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καί omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated connotural emendations would have been confirmed; as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Möserbecke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the worthy monk: indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π1. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the Vetusta translation is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-
ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to i. c. 11 I agree with him: I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the Oeconomics, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. Susem.
B. iv(vii), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, constitutes a sketch of the best policy which is continued through the next book, B. v(viii), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1—3, the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4—12; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the means at the legislator's command for realising it: the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. iv(vii) and not at all in B. v(viii).

188 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προς...κοσμαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτειᾶς ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσαν] 1. When the rest of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed, hence the clause πολιτειᾶς ἀρίστης ἐμφανίζοντα ἡ ἀνάγκη was added by the redactor, Spengel.

The grounds for making the transposition of the books have been already noticed: Introd. p. 32 n. 3, p. 17, p. 47. The main point to decide is, where in the treatise ought the description of the best policy (in the form of pure aristocracy) to come, whether before the description of the existing faulty policies or after them. The indications of B. iii are unmistakable, especially cc. 13 and 181 and upon them Spengel has rightly insisted [Cohen die Rhetor. p. 36 f., Aesop. Stadium ii. pp. 36 ff., 60 ff., 70]. Not less convincing is the assertion in iv(vii), c. 3 that aristocracy, as well as monarchy, has been already discussed. But when the question has been decided upon these grounds, the unfinished sentence at the end of B. iii certainly affords striking corroborative evidence.

c. 1 (with c. 3 §§ 1, 2). The connexion of the last constitution with the highest life.

Few chapters in the work have been subjected to more minute examination than this. See Bureway, Review of Antiqu. pp. 627—634, and Vahlen, Aristoteles...
lische Ausfütte II 'On a chapter of the Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp.). § 1 1323 a 16 arierwτατος βίος] See n. 683 (vi, 14) with the passages there quoted. Susem. (685) τν ἄριστην πολιτείαν] i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see vi (iv). § 3 πολλοὶ γὰρ τῆς ἄριστης τυχεῖν ἰσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίσην τοῖς ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπισκέψεων ἄριστην οὐ δει λησθῆναι τοῖς ὡς ἄλλης πολιτικῶν, and n. (1116) Susem. (686) 18 προσήκτες] 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῦ) to be taken closely with ἐρίστα to fare best, i.e. to lead the most desirable life. § 2 21 κοινὴ ταῖς πόλεσι, χαρίς ἐκάστη. § 2 2 τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] See Excursus I. to this book. Susem. (687) 23 καὶ νῦν χρηστὲν αὐτοῦ] 'It is clear from passages such as De Caelo II. 13, § 18, 205 a 2. ἐπὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων διώρισται πρότερον θα κατὰ τὴν παραστάσαν δίσυμον ἐξομοιότατον, χρηστέον ὡς ἐπάρχοντος και Μεταφ. III. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 i. ἐστο δὲ περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν τα θεωρημένα ἐν τοίς περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διευκρινώσεις διὰ τὰ μὲν λόγον, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἐπάρχοντος χρηστό-μεθα αὐτῶν, that this expression does not imply that an exposition given elsewhere is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that the results of some other discussion will be employed and utilized. Those who remember the tolerably frequent use of the verb χρησθάναι by Herodotos e.g. in II. 120 τὸ χρῆ τι τῶν ἐποτοικοπεῖ χρεωμένον λέγειν, corresponding to Thucydidcs I. 10 § 3 τῇ Ὀμίρον αὐτοὺς ἐλ τι χρῆ καταταθά πιστεύειν, will hardly raise any objection to our taking the word, used here and in Nic. Eth. 1. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27 in connexion with the ἐξωτερικοῖ λόγοι, but not as confined to them, in the sense of the phrase in Nic. Eth. VI. 4 § 2, 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. It is plain that this expression does not in any way show whether the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own or belongs to some one else, nor to what degree or extent it is utilized" (Vahlen). Susem. (688) § 3 24 πρὸς γε μὲν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀν] The appeal to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus amounts (in effect at any rate) to an appeal to public opinion, to what was at the time conceded by all, or at least by all cultivated and intelligent men. We should also notice how, as in II. 13 § 1, the strictly scientific (philosophical) distinctions and discussions are opposed (1) to opinion universally current, and on the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle himself at least by his pupil Eudemus (see n. 584), to the ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι; and it is hardly possible to regard the latter as anything else but the expression of that universal opinion. Bernants sees in these words an ironical excuse on Aristotle's part in reply to the charge which was no doubt often levelled at him, of useless logical hair-splitting, when he thus expresses the hope that he may be allowed to make one division at least without opposition. But Vahlen rightly urges against this view that, in spite of the announcement of at least one division, the emphasis is not
IV(VII), 1. 4] 1323 a 15—1323 a 32

471

25 σαν ἂν ὑπ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τὸ ἐξής καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ σορατί καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ἔπαρχεν.
4. τῶν μακρίων χρῆς, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ψαλι μακρίων τῶν μερίδων μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδριας μηδὲ συνφροσύνης μηδὲ δικάιωσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπτωμάς 30 μυιας, ἀπεχομενον δὲ μηδεῖν, ἃν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαινεῖν ἢ τοῦ πιένειν, τῶν ἐφήτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαβεβηστα τοὺς φιλάτων φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τα περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

25 [ed.] Oncken wrongly.
26 τῇ omitted by P 8 9 42 Add. and P 44 (in text) 27 χρῆ omitted by P 8 9 44 (added in the margin of P 8) 28 Βιοντῖ Βικ. 29 [μὴν] φωστήρων] Susem. 30 see on a 33 30 τοῖς Κορίνθ., τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πίνειν] Bernays, perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen Arist. Anthrop. p. 11 (61). 31 before τῶν omitted by P 19 Βικ. 31 παρὰ P 8 9 44 and M 7 (in text) 32 [φυλάτ.] Κορίνθ. 33 [τῷ] Βικ. 34 τῷ διάσκεια is omitted by M 7 (which has a lacuna of 4 to 5 letters) and apparently by P 35[μετὰ] τῆς φεύγεισθαι ἢ θαυμάζει, ὡς επεξεργασθεῖν τοῦ William, doubtless from a gloss. Hence δεδιότα δὲ καὶ τα περὶ την φωστήραν οὖς, ὡς τῷ μακρίων τοῖς,
36 Susem. 12 wrongly

[25] laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; that just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; if any else with the form of ‘argumentum ad hominem’ here chosen, proceeding from premises universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that ‘he might be allowed just this one division’ would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term ‘external goods,’ it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle, and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. Nic. Eth. 1. 8 § 3, 1098 b 12 ff., Nic. Eth. 1. 8 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. Susem. [690]

25 [μερίδων] Even though it is plain enough that everybody the subject is “goods,” yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. Susem. [690]

Susem. [691]

These are the four Platonic virtues, which Aristotle substantially retained in the basis of his mere extended list.

29 δεδιότα... 30 μυιας] This hyperbolical description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transferred from some dialogue; but an extravagant and dramatic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See Nic. Eth. 11 7 § 10, 1098 a 18. See γὰρ χαίδας ἡ τοῦ ποιῆμα νόμος καὶ τινῶν ἀλλήλων ἀλλήλων συντρίβοντων ταῖς καὶ ποιήσεσθαι ἃν ἐπιθύμησιν, ἀλλὰ δὲν τῶν φαινέοντων τοῖς ἀλλήλων, τὸν περὶ τὴν ψυχῆν τῆς ἐπιθύμησιν. 32 Greek περί τὰς τοῖς ἐπιθυμ.StartPosition, VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 δεδιότα τοῖς τῶν ψυχής ἑπιθυμήσεως: Χ. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 τοῦ τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως; ἡ τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως. See on τῆς (30) Susem. in τῆς τοῦ ποιῆμα ἄθικης τῆς Εὐδοκίας: 8 § 10, 1170 a 4 ἐπιθυμήσιν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἐπικίνδυνον γὰρ καὶ ἐπικίνδυνον παρακαλοῦντα σκοπεῖν: Πολ. 7 § 4, 1441 b 2 ἐκ αὐτῶν σκοπαλλόντων ἐφ’ ἀλλήλοις, 7 § 7 εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὴν λογικήν ἐπιθυμίαν. Καλ. 11. 12 b, 1592 a 13 ὅτι δὲ καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμήση τοῦ τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως τοις τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως. τοῦ τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως μὲν ἐπιθυμήσεως τοῖς τοῖς τῶν ἀλλήλων ψυχῆς ἑπιθυμήσεως (Vahlen). Susem. [692]

50 For τοῖς with the adjectives after εἰσερχωμεν see Xenoph. Mem. 1. 7 § 3, 311 b 6 τοῖς δικαίων, 14 § 9. For τοῖς τοῖς a substantive Plato dep. IV. 490 e τοῖς δικαίων καὶ δικαιότατοι τοῖς δικαίων τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς τοῖς. Comp. Mem. 1. 10 (Vahlen).

31 τα περὶ την διάνοιαν] Here we have, the virtues of the practical intellect, stated in contrast to the moral exp-
Bernays, as and cp. * e^e^cv, £8 ^ [IV(VII).] also 34 Koraes [cp.: cp. 36 'Lambin, 8 40]'€"] ^ 42x652 § 42x591 § 44x636 35 4 57x653. 472 ? even 8 cat wrongly suggestions that eli/tti times Vahlen this (689). SEM. have, ybpov or priority much goods out 90). Cp. (that some again [add 66x402 6 69x372 § 71x244 35 38 40']€"] ^ 74x305 'and of 13 7$•/. 115, (693) 474—476, 498, 565, 703). SUSEM. (693)

§ 5 34 ωσπερ πάντες “Almost all would allow, when stated.” Comp. n. (689). SUSEM. (694) ωσπερ πάντες: ως ειπεν πάντες=ωσπερ οδόν: ως ειπεν οδόν. Vahlen compares Khet. 1. 6§ 24, 1363 a 11, ωσπερ γαρ πάντες ἡδη ὡμολογοῦσα = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope): and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato Σύμφος. 199 β τάλθη λέγομεν ἀκούειν, Prolog. 311 e, τι δειξαι άλλο γε λέγομεν περὶ Πρωτα- γόρου ἀκούειν; and the Herodotean ταῦθ’ ως ἀπενεκήθη ἤκουσαν.

35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.

37 Cp. 1. 9, 10, 1257 b 7 πλαύτων καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).

38 εἰς ἀπεραύ ζηγούσι ζὴν ἑπιτροπῆν] Cp. 1. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with mn. (76 b, 90). SUSEM. (695)

§ 6 ήμεις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐρώθησα] Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 n. (733), VII(IV). 2. 3. 1289 b 9 [add II. 9, 12, 1270 a 10]. De Anima 1. 3 § 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐρωθήσομεν; Meta. III. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτον τῶν λόγων ἐρώθησαν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), Post. Anal. 1. 3 § 2 s. f., 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φανέρον (Vahlen). SUSEM. (696)

§ 39 διὰ τῶν ἑρώτων] To converse one-by-means of the facts. Like γνωμενα, φαινομενα, συμβεβηκτα we find ἑρωτα and πράγματα used for ‘facts’ as distinguished from λόγοι, ‘theories.’ See c. 4 § 7, 1326 a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12: B. II. c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1262 a 17 (λαμβάνει τὰς πίστες).

40 ὅρωντος δὴ κτίστων κτλ.] Cp. II. 9 § 35 with n. (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 n. (928) below. SUSEM. (697)

1323 b 1 εἰτ ἐν τῷ...2 εἰτ ἐν ἀμφότεροι] Bernays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle’s own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. “Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. Nic. Eth. vii. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the Ethics is Aristotelian]: cp. 13
1.8

1323

a

33—1323

b

13.

473

'tXr iv, \\nvweip^n rjOos /iti/ ftal hta\voiav €4

Trept Bi ^€^ €^ 5iKtlva ; ۥ /hk iv

iWeiwovaiW ftWa oyov «€'.

(yap t/cTo^ i^c* Hairtp •

(yavov (yap »,

Thieu /\[€ivai], ti Btt tfal - (yavov

(ΤΤiXiyeiv 6

€atcoXovOdv €

5jb 6

omitted by M*, by P* (1st hand), and possibly by Π

Susem.. ω Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem,1 in the text and Bernays, who after τάς τοις τέρσα

woolly χρήσιμον είναι Vahlen, perhaps rightly; - χρήσιμον τώρα ἢ χρήσιμον είσιον (for something similar) Susem. Both plausible corrections, the text is not

€ίσιον (or something similar) Susem. Both plausible corrections, the text is not

impossible to be more the other 6οι[22] 22 Bernays, and so (or perhaps οέρας \\

(ων William, 6οι[22] 22 perhaps Π; οέρας Susem,1 but see Vahlen p. 21 (23)

9 omitted by Π Ar., [αὕτω] Susem,1 with Kurots, αὕτω Oncken, quite pointless,

not (as Vahlen thinks) least correctly 11 χρήσιμον μάλλον Π* 5* [ডর] Schneider Bk.,6 οέρας 6 Spengel. -χρήσιμον Bernays. Ι am not convinced by

Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)

1 123 b 6 κόλλα omitted by Μ*, by P* (1st hand), and possibly by Π

Susem.. De Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem, in the text and Bernays, who after τάς τοις τέρσα

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Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)
15 εἰληχὲς Π⁴ Bk.¹ (emended by corr.² of Π³) || διάστασις Ar. (apparently) and Π⁴, but before ἦπτερ: [διάστασις] Bojesen, ἦπερ διάστασις ὑποθεσιακῶς Π⁴ Bk. avoiding hiatus || ταῦτα to ταῦτα Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see Comm. || 16 τιμωτέρων transposed to come after 17 σώματος in Π² ὅπως Bk., τιμωτέρων Μ⁵, preludior William

sometimes varied. Here εἰληχὲς διάστασιν = διαστάνει as Pl. Tim. 38 D, Pol. 288 ε δυναμὶ εἰληχέναι = δύνασθαι, Phil. 49 C γελοῖον εἰληχές τάξιν = γελοῖα ἀετί. In its simplest form the proposition states that the ὑπορέχῃ of the best condition of two things compared corresponds to the διάστασις between the things. The best state of Λ: the best state of Β: Α: Β. Allow the soul’s superiority, and you must allow the superiority of ἀρετή and φύσις its best states. (Vahlen.)

15 διαστασιν] The order of the words in Π (distantia quae quidem sortitur est quam dicimus esse fias has Will.) may suggest that διάστασις was originally a variant of ὑπορέχῃ, and to be bracketed (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig who also proposed <κακίς> διάστασις). But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—36) has shown that διάστασις is all but indispensable for the sense, and himself admits that it is not necessary to alter to ἦπερ... διάστασις. Schneider, who first felt a difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ πρώτος κατά τὴν διάστασιν κατ’ ἦπερ εἰληχὲς διάστασις Π⁴ διάστασις ὑπερ εἰληχὲς πρὸς ἄλλα ἄλλα τῇ ὑπορέχῃ  ὑποθεσιακῶς Κλ. SUSEM.

αὐτὰς ταῦτας] Vahlen shows that this is an instance of the idiomatic attraction of a pronominal subject (here a demonstrative, often a relative) into the number and gender of the predicate. In Plato Phil. 57 E ταῦτα ὑποθεσιακῶς εἴπωμεν ἀκριβῶς μάλιστα = εἰπό = this is what we especially mean by the exact sciences. So here: ’the things whereof we say that just this and that are the attributes’ becomes, not ὅν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὅν αὐτὰς ταῦτας φαμέν εἰπον διαστάσις.

17 καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἦμιν] Both absolutely and relatively to us. See N. Eth. 1. 4. 5. 1059 b 2: Bonitz Ind. Ar. 77 a 21 ff. where τινὶ, ἐκάστῳ, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι are cited as similarly contrasted with ἄλλως. So III. 9. 3. 1280 a 21, μέχρι τινὸς.
18 Take ταῦτα after ἐκάστῳ. For the use of ἔχειν absolutely cp. II. 10 § 4, 1371 b 41. 11 § 3, 1373 b 37.
§ 9 18 ἐν δὲ τὸν τὴν ψυχήν] Cp. Τομ. ΙΙΙ. 1 § 4, 1162 a 29. τὸ ἐν ἀμφότερον τοῦ δὲ ἐκείνων ἀστράκι ἰσοτρεμέων. "What is desirable on its own account is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else." (Bernays).
Althou1h this point of view (τέσσαρα) is closely related to the one adopted here, yet it is not identical with it. A more important point is that on the precise argument of the Topos is employed e.g. in the Ethicus also. 1. 7, 4, 1697 a 39, we have no right to follow Bernays in assigning to this chapter of the Politics a scientific character materially distinct from the method of the Ethicus and only suited for popular writings (Vahlen). Moreover there is no development of the "logical formula" for this proof, as in the former case (see n. 701) while in the passage of the Ethicus this is done. Subst. (702).

The last remark because Bernays argues (p. 80) that in the dialogues the treatment must necessarily have been somewhat abstract and dialectical; and this side of the dialogue he thinks is reflected in the present chapter. The author wrote, he says, for the public at large, who, if impatient of technical terms, are nevertheless especially qualified to appreciate the fact which adapts to each branch of science its appropriate logic.

Subst. (703).

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ τὰ ἑαυτῶν] Why Aristotle was obliged to add 'activity in accordance with the virtues' we learn from Ν. E. Ι. 8 § 9, 1098 a 31: ἐγγήρας δὲ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀμφότερα τοῦ μεταφορᾶς, καὶ τὰ πράττειν τῆς ἑαυτῆς ἀκοντίσθεν ἡμῖν ᾠδώρως ἐπ᾽ ἑαυτῶν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀποκαθίσταται, οὕτως ἐλεγγοῦμεν, ὅτι δὲ ἐν πράξει εἶναι τῆς πράξεις ἐν ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἐν σώματι. We must agree with Bernays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of the passage here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term ἐπιγραφή used in his passage. Cf. also § 11 with n. (710), and n. (726). Subst. (704).

23 μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμάτων] Bernays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than 'taking the happiness of God as evidence' or 'appealing to the happiness of God,' cp. Thuc. 1 72. 3, just as in a similar phrase the Cyrenaics and Epicureans are reproached with appealing in the lower animals, Plat. Phaid. 79 c this ἐπιγραφή observe ἐπιγραφήν éπιγραφήν, Cie. De Fin. 1. 33 § 109 better. quibus con de summo homo testibus ut solet. It is nothing unusual for Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between 5 3 10 (cp. n. 740) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in Α. E. Ε. I. 8 § 7, 1172 b 7 ff., and similar references in the earlier work e.g. Μο. Ε. βιτ. 7 § 4, 1552 b 32, cp. VIII. 14 § 8, 1134 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists; see Kelle. cp. η. 11. II. p. 564 ff. Aristotle's aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not available for his purpose. The inference from this is that happiness as general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities,
and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see n. 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen).

SUSEM. (705)

For this N. E. x. 8, 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, i.e. μὴ ἐνδεχεται ἀνεχε τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι: cp. i. 10, 16, 1101 a 19.


Add Phys. II. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταὐτόν ἐνώ τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ η ἐυτυχίᾳ ἡ ἔγγος, ᾳ εὐδαιμονία πραΐζε τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ γάρ.

29 ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην] Cp. Phys. II. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπόλλων ἐνεκα τοῦ γεγονός, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐνεκα γένηται οὐ ἐξα ταύτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταύτωματον λέγομεν: ἀπὸ τύχης δὲ τούτων διὰ ἀπὸ ταυτοματον λέγεται τῶν προαρτών τοῖς ἔχοντε προαρτέων: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton).

SUSEM. (707)


§ 11 ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστιν καλὸν] Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαιμονία καὶ 31 πράττουσαν καλὸν are predicates of which τὴν ἀρίστη πόλιν is the subject. 30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πράττεω has (1) the transitive meaning 'to do=to perform certain acts,' line 32 τὰ καλὰ πράττεως, (2) the intransitive meaning 'to do=to be (in a certain state),' as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πράττεως =to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays' conclusion that Aristotle would
tire mésotikei eiónai kai prátssouin kalók. ádousaton yíp ríkalók (1) práttein tòv a µi tò kalà práttein oude diá kalà órrou
12 ou't avróda ou'te póleos xóripá adrnèes và frownías àndria
dè póleos kai dikaiosunè kai frownías tôn aúthè évhe õu-
avn kai mophén, oiv metaschou dvado tov ànthróptov
lègetai díkaios kai frownías kai söfron.
13 allà ýpà taúta µen évte tosoúton èstov feresomasaive to
lógo (ou'te ýpà µ) thérins ein aútwv dúnaton, ou'te pántas tôn
oikíous épezieileiv éndechetai lógon, étèrnav ýpà èstov érgwv xex-
31 ýpà Bernays, de Γ.Π.Α.κ. Bl. Susem, in the text (defended by Vahlen p. 48
[47f]). 32 yíp àn Spengel, tr. ili Γ.Π.Α.κ. Bl. Susem, in the text (defended by Vahlen
loc. cit.) práthesin Meno, práthesin with all other authorities Ar. Bl. 2 Susem, in
the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) 33 [vai frownías] Schneider in 34 Ke-
nrecke and Bl. insert và frownías after frownías, and 36 eddócan ed before énnov:
but see Vahlen p. 48 (50) ff.

not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked
upon it as a mere play upon words, he
certainly would not have admitted it into a
dialogue either; most certainly he
would not have transcribed it from a
dialogue into the present work. As a
matter of fact not only has Plato com-
mited the same mistake in all scientific
seriousness, Gorg. 507 c (Kep. 343 E),
but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8
(cp. mm. 723, 744) and 111. 9 § 14 (cp. n.
560 b), and similarly in Nce. Eik. 1. 8
§ 4, 109 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly
attempts to dispove the last case (Vah-
len). But Spengel is right in thinking it
strange that the question disposed of in
§ 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still
requiring to be settled and is accordingly
there settled. This difficulty dis-
appears so soon as we set the two
paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of this
same subject, and with it another difficulty
raised by Hildbranden p. 368 ff., on
which Spengel Arist. Eth. 11. p. 73
(362) ff. has laid far more stress than it
deserves. Hildbranden's view is that
in 111. 18 the question, whether the virtue
or the happiness of the individual and
of the state is identical or not, is brought
forward as having already been settled
by it. c. 5, 6 (cp. mm. 471, 468), whereas
in 17[vii], 1 § 11, 2 § 1, the question is
first submitted to investigation, and that
therefore c. 18 is a draft from
Aristotle's pen which he afterwards
discarded. The error in this conclusion
lurks (as Boeker observed) in the words

• 'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term
as used by Aristotle is not coincident
with the former, but requires to addition
a certain measure of external goods.

The proof that the virtue of the state is
identical with that of the individual
does not therefore by itself in any way
demonstrate the identity of their
happiness (or wellbeing). In any case, if
we take the one version, that contained
in c. 1. § 11, there is an escape from
the difficulty that the previous inquiry
as to the identity of the virtue of both
is also ignored. But if we replace it
by the second version, c. 111. 1, 2,
there would be nothing to prevent
Aristotle expressing himself as he does,
even with the distinct presupposition of
the earlier inquiry (c. 111. 4, 6) and
the reference to it in 111. 18 § 7. An
the identity of the 'virtue or excellence'
manifested by the state, and by the
individual cp. also c. 111. §§ 9, 10 and
17[vii]. 9 § 12 with 6 (164z). Susem
(708)

12 34 Observe that this is the postu-
late of Plato in the Eidos, made im-
plausibly in 368 ff. and restated expressly
by 452 b, 453 a 1 ff. On thètos and mòd-
ous, terms cognate to slave, servant, cp. Bonitz Real. Alter. 268 b 12 and = on
1. 4, 6, 126 a 4 4. Apparently the inter-
colled of 25, if expressed, would be re-
distinguishable from 75 émploio. see mm 1273 b
16.

13 14 édtes xexelí.] For this
form the lack of student study, a feature
of another kind. Here only in this sense,
40 λὴς ταύτα νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βλέσ μὲν ἀριστος καὶ (1) χωρὶς ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅ μετ' ἀρετὴς κεχο- 1324 α ρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά- § 14 ξενῶν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦτας, ἐξάστασα ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὑστερον, εἴ τις τοίς εἰρήμενοι τυχχά- 2 νει μὴ πειθόμενος. || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II 5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατένοι ἐνός τε ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπῶν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φα- νερῶ δὲ καὶ τούτῳ. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειν εἰ- § 2 ναί τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλοῦτῳ τὸ ξὺν εὗ τίθεν- ται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ἥ πλουσία, 10 μακρὰζουσιν ὤσι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τι- μῶσιν, οὕτω καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἀρχοῦσαν εὐδαιμονιστα- τὴν εἶναι φαίεν ἀν' εἰ τέ τις τῶν ἐνα δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, § 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φῆσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. || [δῶλα 2

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἕκαστον omitted by P⁴ V⁶ Ald. and the first hand of P⁸ S⁸ (added in the margin of S⁸ by the same hand, in the margin of P⁸ by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 ἕκαστῳ P⁴ Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P⁸ || κεχορηγημένος P⁴⁶ L⁷ Ald. 1324 a 4 πότερον…13 σπουδαιοτέραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86
10 μακρὰζουσιν or μακρῶνιν Ar. Spengel || 12 αὐτὸν before εἶναι Π² Bk. and P⁴ (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [δῶλα…1325 b 34 πρότερον] Susem. 2 3

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle σχολή = leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, η μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τοιῶν εὑρίσκει, πολιτικὴ τις οἶνα, Nic. Eth. 1. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see Introd. pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastos called ἡθικαὶ σχολαὶ (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Krohn φ. c. p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle’s. But his view requires some stronger proofs. Susem. (709) “That σχολὴ was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τῷ μὲν Ἐυκλείδου σχολῆν ἔλεγε χολῆν, τῷ δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατα τριβήν, Diog. Laert. vi. 42: cf. also Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholās Graecorum more habère auderemus…. itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contulī” (Ridgeway). But the witticisms attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting be-

fore they can pass as historical (Susem). 41 ὅ μετ' ἀρετῆς…1324 α 1 πράξεων] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in n. (704) is applicable. Cp. also n. (736). Susem. (710) 1324 a 3 διασκεπτέον ὑστερον] Spengel rightly observes, Uber die Pol. p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. Excursus 1. Susem. (711) c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cp. Plato Theaet. 157 A ἐπὶ ἐνός νῦνος. c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τεθωρηται πρότερον).

A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophical retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceable rule over men and of internal activity? § 3 13 δῶλα ταύτα ἡδη δύο] The close
sequence of \( \text{cc. 2, 3} \) upon c. 1 leaves at
only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same
origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by
the same excellences of style, or else the editor
who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from
his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of
course cc. 2 \[1\] 1, 2 (see n. 708). Even
setting aside the difference of style, the
second alternative is forced upon us by
the numerous difficulties, some slight,
others very considerable, which present
themselves in this section, see \( \text{cc. } 713, \)
\( 717, 725, 739, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747-9 \),
with which the few passages in
cc. 1 and 2 \[1\] 1, 2 that might raise
doubts as to the genuineness of that
portion (see \( \text{nn. 660, 709, 711} \) should
be more closely compared. Read Ed.
Müller’s exhaustive examination in his
\text{History of the theory of art among the ancients.}
\( \text{pp. 366-373}. \) Breelan, 1837;
\( \text{a work universally neglected}, \) which might
ought to have led subsequent inquirers to
renewed consideration of these Chapters.
\( \text{What a deal of pains he takes to remove}
the difficulties in them, and all in vain.\)
Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is
most intimately connected with his exposition.
\( \text{This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see n.}(744)\).
Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with
\( \text{c. } 2 \[1\] 1, 2 \) and c. \[1\] 1, 2) \[1\] 3, 4, 5, to the inquiry
\( \text{of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. } 1 \[1\] 8 \) \[1\] 6; the inquiry pursued in cc. 2, 3, though in a slightly altered form, is
 commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been
already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to value by
anticipation to this later section, c. 3 \[1\] 4, (cp. n. 731). CECIL. (713)
\( 14 \text{ it is perlaps maddening to me}. \) The transition in the best constitution took
place as far back as \( 711 \). \( \text{cc. } 18, \) and in \( \text{IV}
(712); it was stated that we must first esta-

dicide the best life; now after having con-
cluded this examination and after having
stated that the result holds good for the
state as well as for the individual, it seems
very awkward to say that there are two
questions requiring to be investigated, (1)
whether the best life for the individual is
one of scientific leisure or of political
activity, and (2) which is the best constitu-
tion. The first question is violently thrust
in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be
allowed to take even a secondary rank as
a question of politics, which the author
at place declares is all that he himself
claims for it; it has nothing whatsoever to
do with the science of politics, as Schlesin-
ning long since observed. It would be a
different thing if it were preceded by, and
then taken up in and treated as co-ordinate
to, the inquiry whether the end of the
state is peaceful activity in war, which \( \text{cc. } 5 \) \( \text{is treated as a co-ordinate question.}\)
CECIL. (713)
\( 5 2 \) \( \text{after cklpl 4 (711)} \)
\( \text{It is plain then that the absolute bulk of}
polity is that system under which any
one of the citizens whatever would fare
καθ’ ἂν τάξιν καὶ δοσισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῷῃ μα-
25 καρίως, φανεροῦ ἐστίν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν
ὁμολογοῦντων τόν μετ’ ἄρετῆς εἶναι βιόν αἰρετώτατον, πότε-
ρον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἕ’ μᾶλλον ὁ
πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οὗν θεωρητικὸς τις, ὁν
§ 6 μόνον τινὸς φασίν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχέδον γὰρ τούτοις τοὺς
30 δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἄρετὴν φαί-
νονται προαιροῦμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν’ λέγω
δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ 4
μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθείας ἄναγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὖ (p.
34 φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν Βελτίων σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν
§ 7 ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζουσι δ’ οὐ
5 μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἀρχείν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γνώμην μενο
6 ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον

24 ὑ’ Ar. apparently, [τάξιν] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen
p. 35 (37) || §§ M*, §§ P1 (1st hand, emended by corr.) || 28 τίς <Ἀφώ> ? Kornes,
[τίς] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 φιλόσοφοι
[sc. αἰρετὸν] Jackson || 30 τούτων after τοῦ δύ Μ* P1 || φιλοτιμότατοι Μ* Π4.8 Ald. ||
31 προτέρων Kornes (needlessly) and P3* (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33
32 γε Spengel, τε Μ* P1 II* Bk. Susem.1 in the text, omitted by P5, perhaps rightly, [7τ]
Congreve || 35 ἐκατον Π3* Ar. Bk. Spengel, γρ. ἐκατον P1 (corr. in the margin),
perhaps rightly || τῇ πολι ᾦ M*, τὴν πολιτείαν (πολιτείαν 1st hand of Π3)* Π* Ar. Bk.
(γρ. τὴν πολιτείαν corr. in the margin of P1), perhaps rightly; τὴν πόλιν Spengel,
needlessly || 37 τῶν omitted by Π1

(714)

29 τινές] ‘Some’ only? We should expect ‘all.’ But this may be explained as
due to Aristotle’s minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). Susem. (715)
§ 6 σχέδον γὰρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον]
The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually
diffuse. Susem. (716)

No account is here taken of the view
that honour is the aim of the political
life, N.E. 1. v. 4, 1095 b 23. Whereas in
N.E. x. 7, 7, 1177 b 19 ff. αἱ κατὰ τὰς
πράξεις ἀρεταῖς are sharply distinguished
from ἡ τὸν νοῦ ἐνέργεια (θεωρητικῆ), here
the object seems to be to contrast the
political and contemplative life as alike,
though the latter is in both discussions
regarded as ἀνθρωπολόγος (Newman).

34. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ
κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. But granting that
the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better
end for the individual, the state is in no
way concerned in this, beyond rendering
such a life possible to the few fitted for
it, provided that the rest consent to take
active part in the administration: for
otherwise the state would itself come to
an end. The author is in error (cp. n.
736*) in supposing that the question,
whether scientific or political activity
ranks highest for the individual, corre-
sponds exactly to the question which arises
with regard to the state, whether it
should pursue a policy of peace or of war.
Cp. nn. (743, 745). Susem. (717)
§ 7 35 οὐ μὲν] The advocates of a
peace policy think that while despotic
rule over others is never without a
certain injustice of the deepest dye, even
rule as exercised under a free government,
though devoid of injustice, yet tends to
disturb our own easy prosperity. The
conjunction of τὸ ἄριστον and ἐνοχον = ἡ
ἀρχὴ γινομένη is harsh, but can be
paralleled. On δεσποτικὸς (properly as
slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.
ouk ἐξειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἐξειν τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐημερίᾳ τούτων (II) δή ἄφοσεν εἶ ἐναντίας ἐτεροί τυπχάνουσι δεξίοντες, μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρός τῶν πρακτικῶν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἱδιόταις ή τοῖς τὰ κοινά πράττοντες καὶ πολιτευμόνοις. * * οἴδαμεν οὖν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ δὲ τῶν δεσποτικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν τρόπων τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εἰδαίμονα φασίν. παρ' ἐννοίας δ' οὕτως καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὁροὶ, ὅσως δε- σποζοῦσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεύστων νομίμων χεῖριν ὡς εἰσεῖνεν κείμενον παρὰ τοῖς πλεύστοις, ὅτι εὖ τούτῳ ἐν ὑεῖν καὶ κόμοι τοῖς ἐπορεύνοντες πάντες, ὡστε εν Ἀλκαδάμοι καὶ Κρῆτη πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέκταιν ἰσχεῦς ή τέ τοιδεὶα καὶ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος· ἐτί δ' εὖ τοῖς ἐθνείς πᾶσι τῶν δυναμεῖν πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιοῦτη τε- τίμηται δύναμις, οὗν ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρηκτί καὶ Κέλτοις. ἐν ἐννοίας γὰρ καὶ νόμῳ τεῖς εἰσὶ παροξύνον- τες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχεσίδων φιλί τούτῳ κρίκων κόσμου λαμβάνειν ὅσα ἀν στρατεύσωι- σαι στρατεύει· ἢν δὲ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμοι τῶν

18 αὐτῶν Γ', perhaps rightly, α' τῶν Vettori?, α' τῶν Schneider.

1324 b 1 * * of Susenn. and Becker. — ἐδομοὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ ταῖς πέλαξι ἀρμασφυγμέναι αἰ τῶν γαρ * * ὡς εἰσὶν something similar? Susenn. — 1324 b 4 δὴ δ' ἄφωσεν καὶ τής πολιτείας ὁροὶ τῶν νόμων Π', δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οἴσες τῶν νόμων 114, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οἴσες δρος (καὶ added by Congreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editors except Susenn. — 1324 b 14 τοῖς ἱστωτέροις? Kosakes, but see Vahlen p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

44 οὐ μᾶλλον] not so much.

8 Secutia est uberior expositio seten- tiae corum qui vitam optimum esse contendunt civistibus quae καθ' αὐταί ἄμε-μέναι sint. cf. 1324 b 23—27. Susenn. — 1324 b 1 πολιτευμόνους * * To complete the connexion we require words to the following effect: "and there is the same difference of opinion with regard to states. For some think that those states lead the best and happiest existence which devote themselves purely to domestic politics and have nothing to do with any policy of war. For, they say, etc." "This then is one view, but others (of δὲ) etc." Susenn. (718).

9 ὡσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πλη- θος] Cp. II. 9 § 34, iv(vii) 14 § 12 ff., v(viii). 11 § 1—6, with steen. (344) § 95, 1005. Susenn. (719)
μηδένα ἀπεκταγότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεξόωσθαι τὴν φορ—(1)

20 καταπηγνύουσα περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους āν διαφθείρῃ τῶν
§ 12 πολεμίων' καὶ ἑτερὰ δὴ παρ' ἑτέροις ἐστι τοιαῦτα πολλά,
τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐθέσειν.

καίτοι δόξειν ἃν ἄγαν ἀτοπον ἴσος εἶναι τῶν βουλομένων τῇ
ἐπισκοπῇ, εἰ τοῦτ ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι (25
θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἀρχὴ καὶ διασπόρ@Entityοι τῶν πλησίων καὶ βουλομένων καὶ
§ 13 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οὐ τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν,
ο γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἐστὶν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἀρχεῖν, κρατεῖν δ᾽ ἐστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκτάνοτα P1-5, ἀπεκτάκτω P3 (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκτάκτω P4-6 Ald, ἑπτάκτω M5 || 17 σκύφους περιφερέμενον? Schneider || 18 ἀπεκτάκτω M5 P1-4-6, ἀπεκτάκτω P3 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκτάκτω P5 || 19 ἀφθινώστες or ἀριθμοῦντας, apparently, Ἰ (mimeraentes William) || οὐ βεβιασκόντως M5 || 21 δὲ ? Koraes wrongly || 24 δύνασθαι transposed by Lindau to follow 28 ἀρχεῖν, wrongly || 27 μόνον after δικαίως P5 Susem.1-2 and apparently Π


17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις] Comp. Herod. iv. 66. Susem. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς 'Ἰβηριοῦν] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious De Mirabilia 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8, 24 ff. Susem. (725)

19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcileable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia rows of stones are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the Academy of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

'ὀβελίσκους means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally 'spits.' Originally the spits carried the heads of the slain: when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the

spits, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted ὅσον āν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων; i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with 'militancy', of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spencer's Ceremonial Institutions ch. ii, p. 48 with p. 186.'

§ 12 22 κατειλημμένα] established, confirmed, secured; Cope Rhet. 11. 2 § 20 compares Thuc. v. 21 σπουδάσα εὖρον κατειλημμένας; Plato Laos vii. 823 ια ταῖς ἥμισυς υπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα; Nic. Eth. X. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιῶν τοῖς ἤδη κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστήσατο: also the active use in Thuc. viii. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν αὐτῶ τῷ στρατηγάματι ἐτε βεβαιέτερον καταλαβόν. 25 τῶν πλησίων] but § 8, a 5 τῶν πλησίων.

§ 13 Hampke compares with this the discussion upon slavery i. 6 §§ 1—5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίως μόνον εἶναι τῷ ἀμφοτιτηκές, is certainly echoed by the protest 27 f. οὐ νόμιμων δὲ κτλ "to rule at all hazards, whether unjustly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."
The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superficial. See Xen. Mem. iii. 9 § 11, Pl. Rep. 488 d διὰ τῶν συλλαβικῶν διαφορῶν, ἵνα διαφορὰν νὰ τὰ πειθότες ἢ βιασμοὺς τοῖς θυραιοῖς, Πολιτικής 256 B ὅτε τὰ δρᾶμα τοὺς πειθόντων ἢ τῶν ἄφορον, διὰ τοῦ πάθους τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τοῖς δὲ λόγοι τῆς κόρινθίου ἢ τοῖς εὐθύμοις δεικνύων, πρὸς χάκαρο ἢ τοῖς κόρινθιοι, ἢ τοῖς δικαιοσύνης. Yet the repeated collusion of voices, 39 ἢ τὰ ὅραμα, 32 ἢ γρηγορία, 35 τῶν ἐξήγησεν, 33 ἢ τὰ ὅραμα, 68 ἢ τὰ ὅραμα, is striking contrast to the blank in a whole, and in two cases is not removable by transposition.

IV(VII). 2. 16] 1324 b 16—1325 a 2. 483

1324 b 16—1325 a 2. 483

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§ 17. ἔδηλον ἁρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλλίστας 10
μεν θετέων, οὐχ ὅς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρόταταν, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνον
χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεώσασθαι
9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ὥσπερ ἁγα-
§ 18. ἃς πῶς μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας.
δι-οίσει μέντοι τῶν ταπατομένων ἐνια νομίμων καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-
θετικῆς ἔστιν ἰδειν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρξοισι γενειώντες, ποία πρὸς (β)
ποίους ἀσκητέον ἃ πῶς τοῖς καθίκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρήστεον.

Allά τούτο μὲν κάν ὑστερον τίχοι τῆς προσθηκοῦσις

§ 16. 1325 a 6 ἄρα after ὅτι M P1 P2-3 S b V b || 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίου omitted by M P1
|| 18 ὁτι...2ατῶν This whole parenthesis is transposed in P2-3 to follow 24 ὄρθως,
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line. || 19 [ט] Spengel

§ 18. 12. ἐάν τινες...γενειώντες So already 11. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a
foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-de-

§ 14. καν ὑστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See nn. (712)—this reference may of
course be interpolated—and (906). Su-
seum. (731)

c. 3. The best life for the individual is practical activity in the service of a free
city. Yet intellectual activity is also prac-
tical and is a higher life still.

§ 1 17. περί τῆς χρήσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.

λεκτέων ἡμῶν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp.

n. (696) on c. 1 § 6. Suseum. (733)

19. 'τε interdum el vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est: φό-
σει τε ή γάρ παθήρ ὑπόν καὶ πρόγονα ἐκγόνου (i.e. φόσει γάρ ἀρχικοῦ
παθήρ τοῦ ὑπόν καὶ...) N. E. VIII. 13 [c. xi.
§ 2], 1161 a 18' Bonitz Ind. Ar. 749 b
44 ff. τοῦ ἑλευθέρου τοῦ ἀπολελυμένου,
untrammelled by office and by civic obli-
gations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were
metoecs, as Anaxagoras had been before
them.
IV (VII). 3. 3] 1325 a 3—1325 a 32 485

21 ἀδύνατον γάρ... ταῦταν] Comp. n. (708). SUSEM. (732)
§ 24 ouvov γάρ... συμμένον] Comp. 1, 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 n. (913). SUSEM. (734)
26 ἐπίταξα] See note (114) on ἐπίταξας χρήσθαι 1, 13 § 14.
27 νομίζων πάσαν ἀρχήν διεποτείναν] See n. (58). Yet Plato was free from this error when he classified the forms of rule, Laws III. 690 a ff. On the other hand he makes πολιτικὴ στίχος ἔνθελ κ. c. a passage which should be added to Polit. 258 B, e.g. quoted on 1. 2.
29 ἢ αὐτὸ... δούλου] How great that difference may be, we learn from 1. 5 § 8 n. (47).
30 εἰ... τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις] B. I. cc. 4. 7. SUSEM. (735)
31 ἥ... σοι ἀλλήλης] is not right, hand verum est.
32 ἡ γάρ εἰδαμονία πράξεως] This is certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine. See c. 11 10—13. n. (704, 710); Nic. Eth. 1. cc. 7—9; vi. 3 § 6, 1139 a 3, vi. 4 § 14, 1140 b 7, x. 6 § 2, 1176 a 13; Phys. 11. 6 § 1, 107 b 3; Polit. 6. 12, 1450 b 17; Krit. i. 5, 1160 b 14; comp. Zeller ii. ii. p. 612. But still it is so provided only that under πράξεως it is indeed not merely practical, but also theoretical or mental activity, and that consequently the term is understood in the water sense; otherwise this doctrine would not be true of the highest felicity of pure thought, as it pertains to God alone (n. 704), to which however the author himself appeals § 10, n. (746). And of human well-being, too, scientific perfection in active operation is the higher element, moral perfection only the lower element, according to the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. — If must be granted, that then a would be bound to say how the happiness of the individual and of the whole state can be one and the same" (Schlesier). Thus Schlesier endeavours to explain the mistake pointed out in n. (717, 745), by assuming that "Aristotle subordinated the idea of internal activity to that of contemplation." This thought is quite just; but does this unhappy attempt in small matters by such a confusion look more like the master or a pupil? Granted that this subordination is intended here (and from § 3 this cannot be doubtful—see n. 741), still of those who prefer the scientific life to the practical life it cannot possibly be maintained with truth that they prefer in activity to activity, nor can Aristotle himself have written anything so inconsistent. SUSEM. (736)
32 ἢ δὲ πολλάκις κτλ.] "The σομον done by the just and temperate contains a realization of many noble ends." This is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle himself. Further comp. for ἀναπλήρωμα n. (106 b), 11. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)
λών τέλος ἔχουσιν ἀι τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. (1)
καίτω τάχ', ἄν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένως
35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλεί-
§ 4 στοι καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἰγ' πράξεων. ὡστε οὐ δειν τὸν
dυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν παραίνειν τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδιν μήτε πατέρας
πατρός μήθ' ὡς δόλον δίκαιον μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς
40 τούτῳ φροντίζειν: τὸ γὰρ ἀριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὔ πρά-
tεων ἀριστον. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἄληθῶς ῥηγοὺς λέγοντιν, εἰπέρ ὑπάρ-
§ 1325 b ἂν τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένους τὸν τῶν ὑπών αἰρετω-
§ 5 τατον' ἀλλ' ἵσως ous τὸν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται
τοῦτο τεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἐτι καλᾶς τάς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
tῷ μιᾷ διαφέρουσιν τοσούτων ὅσον ἀνήρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατήρ
5 τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων'. ὡστε ο παραβαινόν ὁδέν ἂν τη-
lικοῦτον κατορθόσειν ὑστερον ὅσον ἱδὴ παρεκβηθεὶκ τῆς
ἀρετῆς· τούτο γὰρ ὁμοίως τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ
6 <ἐν> μέρει, τούτῳ γὰρ ὑσον καὶ ὁμοίων' τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσον τοῖς ῥησιο

36 δέν Susem., δέν II Bk. Susem.1 in the text || 39 ὑπολογίζειν Bas, ὑπολογίζειν Sb Bk., ὑπολογίζειν M B. D. 1-3. A. 4-5 Vb Ald. Susem. in the text, ὑπολογίζειν 'ον ἐπὶ ἐν ὑπο-
λογον παραίνεσι Madvig || Koraes proposed either (1) to bracket μηδὲ πρὸς τούτῳ
φροντίζειν, or to alter to (2) μηδὲν, or (3) μηδὲν πρὸς τούτῳ φροντίζειν ||
1325 b 3 τεῦδος untranslated by William, [τεῦδος] Susem.1, τεῦδος ?. Casaubon ||
8 <ἐν> Thurot

34 ταχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις] 'Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are
laid down, universal sovereignty is
the highest good.' This further inference is
not at all easy to justify: it is fairly
dragged in by force. Susem. (738)
§ 4 Development of this extreme view,
that, as the practical life implies the possession
of power, the more power the better.
37 παράνεια = to surrender, sc. τὸ
ἀρχεῖν, Πι., 11. 14 § 13. ἀφαιρέσθω = to de-
prive another (state or ruler) of empire,
Dem. viii. De Chers. § 42, p. 100, 7, ἐξοντ' ἀφελέσθαι.
38 πατέρα παῖδων κτλ] Plutarch,
De metrios c. 3, p. 890 b, complains that
the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to
their lust for empire.
39 ὑπολογίζει] This verb, if indeed it
be right, is ἄτας εἰρήμενον in Aristotle,
thought found in Plato and Demoethenes.
41 Τοῦς] 'perhaps,' conforming to
Aristotle's own dictum Rhet. 11. 13 § 2,
1389 b 18 ἀμφισβητούντες προστιθέσαι
ἀλλ' τὸ ὑσον καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it con-
ceals a very positive opinion under a
cautious formula.
§ 5 1325 b 3 τας πράξεις] The actions
of one who has obtained power by vio-
ence (ἀποστερών καὶ βιαζόντων).
4 ὑσον ἄνηρ...5 δούλων] These three
species of domestic relations, and of
household rule based upon them, are
taken as the prototypes of all rule, except
where it is government of equals by equals
and so alternates with obedience.
See i. 12 § 1 f. and Nic. Eth. viii.
c. 11 (Eaton). Susem. (739)
5 ὁ παραβαινόν] An Archelaos or a
Napoleon.
6 κατορθώσει] would perform a right
action: rectum faciat. This use of the
verb, as opposed to παραβαινέων, may be
easily understood from Nic. Eth. ii.
§ 12, 1106 b 26, ἦ μὲν ὑπέρβαλλ ἀμαράνε-
tαι τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπανείηται καὶ κατορθώσαται,
and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of
κατορθώματα as a technical term.
§ 6 8 8 τὸ δὲ μὴ ισον...παρὰ φύσιν
Cp. Πι., 16 §§ 2—4 n. (672), Πι. 2 § 6 n.
(134 b). Susem. (740)
18 *After* mönas ἡ, *after* τοις *παρά* φύσιν, οὔτε οἷς τῷ τῷ (III) 10 παρά φύσιν καλῶν. διό καί ἄλλος τις ἡ κρίττων κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτοις 7 καλῶν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πειθεῖσθαι δίκαιον. δει δ' οὗ μονον ἀρετὴν ἄλλα καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἦν ἐστι πρακτικός, ἀλλ' ἐκ ταύτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἐυπραγίαν θετῶν, καὶ κοινή πάσης πόλεως ἡ εἰς καὶ καθ' ἐκαστόν ἀρίστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλ' τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἔτερους, καθ' ἄπειροι οἴσθαι τινες, οὔτε τὰς διαμοίρας εἰς μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρω- νώτων χάριν γυμνέοις ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλ' πολὺ μᾶλ- λον τῶν αὐτοπλείως καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἑνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια- 

10 *Did κάν ἄλλος τις?* To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 § 13-12, c. 17. Subse. (741) § 7 12 δει δ' οὗ μόνον κτλ. 'He must have not only the virtue but the force to develop his activity fully" (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24. 15; also n. (677) and Intro. p. 44. Subse. (742) § 14 ταύτα.] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, *ὅτι διαστάσεως*, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable § 4-6).

16 ὁ πρακτικός] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. Nic. Eth. x. §§ 8 8. 1178 b 32, εἶπ ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία της. § 8 9. 1178 a 7, οὖτε ὁμιλεύει (sc. ὁ κατὰ τὴν μνήμην βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονεύοντες διʼ ὅ τι κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρέτην. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, at some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical." By τοις we should naturally understand Plato, but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, Nic.
preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, i. 2 §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an assured scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their real satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7—11, n. (906), also nn. (717, 1024) and Introd. p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (743) 21 ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. 1. § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744) § 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν...28 ὄτου τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων] 'However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man.' What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly practical, partly creative (see nn. 34; 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller Plato § 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual's moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see nn. 41, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. SUSEM. (745) 28 ὁ θεὸς] See n. (705) on c. 1 § 10, n. (730). SUSEM. (746) 29 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours: or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See Zeller II. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (n. 745). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical
activity; hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the well-being of the universe (\(\chi \nu\) καλός) is exactly identical with its happiness (καλόσωφει). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. **Susem.** (747)

42 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 1, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. **Susem.** (748)

c. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἂν ἢδ' ἄρα πρὸς onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," ἡ μὲν τὸν ἐκάστου τοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ κοινὴ ταύτις πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ποιοις, φανερὸν ἐστίν ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρομέναι ταῖς πολεμικαῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεωρήται πρό- (π. 132:» h)

43 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Koraces followed by Spengel Bk.² Susem.¹, but see Comm. n. (739) 33 [περὶ αὐτῶν] Schneider, τιμή ταυτάς ? Nickers, perhaps rightly a

See on 132:» h.
books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention (see nn. 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ, a place immediately after the end of Book III. without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last unfinished sentence of B. III. to B. IV(VII).—as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. IV(VII). and at the same time treat the words τῶν λοιπῶν, in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here: "Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c." SUSEM. (749) Cp. II. 1 § 2, 1260 b 36, ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιήσαν, ἢ περὶ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ τάχης τῆς σκέψεως.

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γὰρ τάσσα μὲν…1324 a 4 πειθομένως, we should expect ἀρχὴ <δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by M*, [perí] Susem.1-2, perhaps rightly || 37 γενήσοσθαι Susem.1-2, fore William, γίνεσθαι ? Susem. || 38 προϋποτίθενθαι Syllburg Susem.1-2, προεσπεραί William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχόμενον, as Syllburg suggested 1326 a 3 αὐτῇ Π²Γ⁵ Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M* || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσην Syllburg, δοσὺν Π² Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γὰρ τάσσα μὲν…1324 a 4 πειθομένως, we should expect ἀρχὴ <δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by M*, [perí] Susem.1-2, perhaps rightly || 37 γενήσοσθαι Susem.1-2, fore William, γίνεσθαι ? Susem. || 38 προϋποτίθενθαι Syllburg Susem.1-2, προεσπεραί William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχόμενον, as Syllburg suggested 1326 a 3 αὐτῇ Π²Γ⁵ Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M* || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσην Syllburg, δοσὺν Π² Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text

59. They were of various sorts, as in the case of the physicians mentioned above. (I.)

11. The first and third books of the "Epics of the physicians," the best and most complete work on the subject of medicine, were to be found in the library of the city of Byzantium. For the sake of completeness, I shall mention the names of some of the most famous physicians of Byzantium, and of their works, as they are recorded in the manuscript of the first book of the "Epics of the physicians." (I.)

15. Περιπολάκη. We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which constitute the first and third books of the "Epics of the physicians," the best and most complete work on the subject of medicine, and which are to be found in the library of the city of Byzantium.

Suda. (702)

6. 18. κατά τὸ πλήθος τῶν χαλεπῶν. Ποινήματα τῆς άρμονίας, τῆς συνεργίας, καὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἢ τῶν προερχόμενων (Eaton). Plato also criticizes the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy. Plato, on the other hand, considers that instead of the more usual allá, in a 15ος άνδρίων αλλά μέρος, cp. Thuc. iv. 86. 1 οίκα καθώς ἐκείνη ἔκλεισαν μικράς. (Eaton)

15. Ἀποκράτης. We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which constitute the first and third books of the "Epics of the physicians," the best and most complete work on the subject of medicine, and which are to be found in the library of the city of Byzantium.
Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of εὐφῶμα: Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government i11. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 500,000, the numbers given for Acragas Diog. Laert. viii. 63, Holm Gesch. des Sieclens ii. 402 (Diod. xiii. 84 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 200,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξις τίς And poli-teiaτάξις τίς ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. Gorg. 503 E ff. esp. 504 B τάξις δὲ δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξει καὶ κοσμήσει (ὁμοίως) νόμομα τε και νόμος. 32 θείας γὰρ... τοῦ πάν] "for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together." And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, νοησίας νόησις, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause: see esp. Meta. xii. (Δ) § 6, 1072 b 13 εκ τοιαύτης ἄρα φύσεως ἐμφανίζεται οὗτος ὁ φύσις καὶ η λύσις; § 8, 1074 b 3 para-
debetαι παρά τῶν ἀρχαῖων ὁτι...περιεχεῖ τὸ θεοῦ τοῦ ἐλν. φύσεως. SUSEM. (756) § 9 34 ὡς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ] "which has the definition here given," i.e. εἰσάχθω, 'combined with a certain size,' ἐπὶ τοῦ γε καλὸν κτλ 'since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude.'

Comp. Poet. 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ πάσαν πράγμα διὰ τούτων ὁ δεύτερος ταῦτα τεταγ-
μένα δὲ εἰς ἄλλα καὶ μεγέθους ὑπάρχει τοῦ τῶν τὰς τῶν καὶ καλὸν καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, δὲ οὐτό πάμμωρον ἀν τὶ γένοιτο καλὸν σοφίαν...οὕτω παρατίθεται: Meta. xiii. (Μ) § 11, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μεγίσ-
tασ εἶδος τάξεως καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
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鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
鸶εων: Prob. xix. 39; xvii. 1; Nic. Eth. iv. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τοῦ καλῶς εἰσαχθεῖ τοῦ διὴ ταῖς τάξεις καὶ συμμεταίρια καὶ τὸ ἁρμα-
submitButton
40 


40 δε φαύλης ἤχων, οἷον πλοίου σπηλαμαίων μὲν οὐκ ἔσται (TV).

πλοίου ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυνών σταθῆναι, εἰς δὲ τι μεγάλου ὅλου ὥτε

β μὲν διὰ συμκρότητα φαύλην ποιῆσαι τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ἢ τὸ ἄρ𝑒

11 διὰ τὴν υπερβολὴν· ὁμιλίας δὲ καὶ πόλεις ἡ μὲν εἰς ὅρμον

λινάν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (?) ἢ δὲ πόλεως αὐτάρκης), ἢ ἢ ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ἄσπατε ὕθος. ἀλλ' ὧν

5 οὐ πόλεις πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ράδιον ὑπάρχει τις γὰρ στρατη-

γος ἐσται τοῦ λίναν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθους, ἢ τις κήρυξι μὲ

Στενοτρέπεις; διο πρῶτον μὲν εἰναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὸν ἐκ

τοσαύτου πλῆθους ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ ζην

eν ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδοξίον καὶ τὴν

10 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἰναι [μετα] πόλις,

12 ἀλλ' τούτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡσπερ εὕπομεν, ἀϊροντος. τὰς δ' ἐστιν ἡ

τὴν υπερβολῆς ὤρος, ἢ τῶν ἔργων ἱδέων ράδιον εἰς ἃ πραξεῖ

μὲ τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων δ' ἁρχοντῶν,

13 ἀρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργων πρὸς δ' τὸ κρίνειν

5 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄργων διαμένων κατ'

dεσφαράμεθα of 1. 5: 5 § 5 [cp. i. 3 § 13 n. 28], "or stunned," in poor condition.

40 πλοίου σπηλαμαίων] A boat a span long.

οὐδὲ δυνών σταθῆναι] nor yet a boat: two surf-long: long; comp. Pind. 7 § 9. 1431 a 3, οἷον εὐ μαρίων σταθοί oμιλίας [Hope].


αὐτάρκης. ὡσπερ ὅθεν, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλεις] See n. (11) and II. 2 § 3 n. (131). Sueem. (760).

5 οὐ ράδιον] The larger the city or canton-state becomes, the more difficult is the working of the constitution. Babylon, like all Peloponnese (11. 6 § 6, III.

3 5), has passed the limits within which civic unity is possible. Such an overgrown city or canton-state must be treated as an οἰκισμός or possibly that is what he contemplates in III. 14 § 2 (ὅτε ἥκιν κα

τὸ πόλην). The problem which to Aristocles seemed almost insoluble was solved by events, as the federal system became developed; the Athenian league, for example, included for a while all Peloponnesians to political unity, Polyb. 11. 37. 10.

7 πρῶτῃ] primitive, earliest as ὁ πρῶτος. The term is applied to all, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος. So in the definition of Arist. 11. 1 § 6, 413 b 3 b, τὸ ὄνομα ἐκά

.clone διάφορος στρατηγὸς τ’ ἐπί τοῦ πόλεως καὶ ἀρχαί.}
§ 13 17 ἡς ὅποιον...18 κρίσεις] τούτο = τό γνωρίζειν ἄλληλους. A genuine Athenian sentiment; not only does Plato's judgment agree with this (Lambda v. 738 E, ὅσοι δὲν φιλοσοφοῦνται ἄλληλους μετ' θυσίων καὶ γνωρίζοντας, οὗ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλεω ἀγαθών, ἡ γνωσμος αὐτοῦ αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ὥστε γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἄλληλους ἐστιν ἄλληλων ἐν τοις πρῶτοι ἄλλα σκότα, οὕτω δὲν τιμῇ τῆς ἄξιος οὐδὲν ἀρχῶν οὔτε δικῖς ποτέ τις ἀπὸ τῆς προσηκονίας ὅρθῳς τυχάνοι), but Thucydides also remarks, VIII. 66 § 3, that during the reign of terror under the Four Hundred people were afraid to communicate their suspicions to one another διὰ τὸ μέγελος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἄλληλων ἀγωνίας (Eaton). SUSEM. (762)

19 οὔ δικαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is not fair to pronounce off-hand." Knowing the ground of his objection to over-populous cities, we can argue (as in a similar case previously, see on III. 5 § 5) that his own principles require him to withdraw it where increased facilities of communication have enabled men to surmount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη...24 εὐσύνοπτος] 'the largest excess of population which will promote independence of life and yet can be taken in at one view.' This closely corresponds with the decision pronounced by Aristotle as to the proper length of a poem, and the size of a work of art generally, Poet. c. 7 § 10, 1451 a 3 ff. 23 § 5. 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5. 1459 b 18. Comp. Rhet. III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with n. (768). SUSEM. (768)

c. § deals with the territory. It should be sufficient for the support of the inhabitants without external supplies, §§ 1, 2; compact and easily defensible, § 3; and with direct access to the sea, § 4. § 1 30 αὐτάρκες] 'Independence' implies that the soil produces all the necessities of life. See I. 2 § 12 n. (21), and the references in n. (759). SUSEM. (764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγίστη] 'in extent and magnitude'; muchness and greatness are here nearly synonymous.

31 ξὴν σχολάζοντας] Cp. χώρας δεῖ σι τοις τουρούτοις ἐξ ἓ άργοι θέρανται, II. 6 § 6 n. (201): δοκεῖ τε ἡ ἐνδιαμεσεῖ ἐν τῇ
2 φρόνως, τούτον δὲ τῶν ὄρων εἰ καλῶς ἀρχηγόν·
μεν, ἕστερον ἐπισκεπτέων ἀκριβεστέρον, ὡσιν, ἄλλως περὶ εἰσ-καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν ἀσφαίρας συμβαίναι θοιείσθαι ἤ μνείαν, πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐχει πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτὴν πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τῆς σκέψεως ταύτην εἰσίν ἀμφί-
βετήσεις διὰ τῶν ἔλεοντας ἐφ' ἐκατέραυν τοῦ βιοῦ τῶν ἐπε-
βολήν, τοὺς μέν ἐπὶ τὴν γλαυχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.
3 τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπῶν εἰπεῖν (δει δὲ ἐνα-
πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπερίᾳ, διὰ τὴν ἁμα-
μεν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰσίν δυσεύμβολον αὐτοῖς δὲ εὔξεσθων
ἐπὶ δὲ ἥσστερ πόλιον τὸ ἐπίθεον τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐφαμεν εἰςίνα-
πτον εἰσίν δειν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτων τοῦ εὐ-
βονοθετητον εἰσίν τὴν χώραν ἐστιν.
4 τῆς δὲ πόλεως τῆς θέσιν εἰ χρή ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν, πρὸς τὸ
5 τῶν βιαλάκτων προσάκη ἐκεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τὴν χώραν.

32 τοῦτο L. Ατ. Αιδ. ἢ δὲν ὑμων omitted by Π. Ατ. (supplied by crit, in Π.)
§ 38 τὴν γλαυχρότητα omitted by Π. Π
§ 41 αὐτοῖς τῶν μέτερ γ. Schneider (exp.
v. l. 1376 b 4)
1377 a 1 ἐφαμεν after εὐσύνοπτων Π. Π Βk.
6 μέν = καὶ κατ' Schneider

σχολή εἰσάγ. σχολολογεῖα γὰρ ἡ σχολ.-

καί, Νε. Εθ. κ. 7. 6.

ἀλεφθείριοι ἀμα καὶ σωφρόνοι] "at

once with liberality and temperance"; cp.
c. i. 6 8 n. (206), § 9 μν. (206 b. 207);
also Π. Α. ii. 7 7 b. (327 b.), and Π. Π.
§ 3. 4 n. (1300 b.).
SUDEM. (765)
§ 2 33 ἕστερον] An unfulfilled pro-
pmise; there is no such treatment π

οικονομία. See Introd. p. 49 n. (4), 51 n. (6).
SUDEM. (766)
§ 30 αμφισθετήσεις] "For there are

many controversies on this subject, be-
cause of those who urge us to one or the

other extreme in life, to partisanship on

the one hand and to luxury on the other;-

Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολήν] excess, extreme, as in
c. i. 5 1372 a 38, vii(iv)., 11 11 τὰ

ἐπίθετα εὐσύνοπτα. C. c. i. 7 1373 b
11. 11. 9 24 (ἡ διὰ τὴν ἄκαμπτον ἐκτὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον) and Ν. E. Π.
1 39. 1371 b 37 (ἀκαμπτον δ' ἐκτὸς τὴν ἐπίθεταν τοῦ

μνείαν ἐκ δοκίμου).
§ 3 41 τοῖς πολεμίοις εὔξεσθων] a

difficult country for the enemy to breake,

but easy for the citizens to quit." Comp.
c. 1. 6 § 3 n. (848).
SUDEM. (767)
1377 = 1 [εἰμὲν εὐσύνοπτον εἰς]
See c. 4 § 14 n. (763).
SPARM. (768)
"We may of the territory, as we said of

the population, that it should be such as

can be taken in at one view, meaning

thereby that reinforcements can easily be

matched for the defenses of every part of

it."

καὶ εὐχήν] "If we are to rely upon

an ideal site"; cp. a. (118), "a position

favorable for access in the sea and for

communications by land is imperative."
SUDEM. (769)
§ 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεγέντας ὄρος] "One

defining principle." see c. 6, 11. 4 4 1

"is that just mentioned " to εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ

ὅλον χώραν"; "the city must be equally in com-

munication with all parts of the country for

defensive purposes."
This is ex-

panded c. 6 § 3. 4 11-13, "one of
certain salient halberd ad certain locos

Romani Ind. Lat. Aet. c. 6. 7
δὲ δὲ λουτσά] "And the other is that

it should be easy of access [to whatever

situation] of the camp for the surren-
dance of the produce of the soil as well as

of material like timber, or any other

similar material in which the country may
Objections:

§ 12 τολλοὶ τυγχάνοντων ἀμφισβητοῦντες] See Plato Laws IV, 705 A, 706 ff.; cp. xii. 950. But in Aristotle's account of the opinions held by representatives of this view there are some things not to be found in Plato: accordingly it would seem that he has other writers also in view. At a later time Cicero 'is wholly in agreement' with such opinions, De Repub. II. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at the question more impartially' (Oncken) and really goes as far as it was possible for him to go with his narrow theories upon Political Economy. But of course even he was greatly hampered by them. See nn. (772, 774). SUSEM. (770) 13—18. Objections: (1) the continued residence of aliens brought up under alien laws, and (2) the populousness of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good government. See Laws IV. 704 D. 15 καὶ τὴν πολιονθρωπίαν σκ. ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. γίνεσθαι] σκ. τὴν πολιονθρωπίαν. A large population is the result of their traffic by sea. The partíciples are accus. as subjects of χρῆσαν.

§ 2 18 εἰ ταύτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart from these results.

20 'that the city should communicate both with the land and the sea.' This sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφιτέρων μετέχονσιν.

§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, bear the brunt of an attack.
IV (VII) 6. 5

1327 a 8—1327 a 37.

497

καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τους ἐπείθεμεν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀμφοτερὸς δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρον μετέχουσιν. ὡσα ἡ ἀμφοτέρῳ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπῆρξα, δεῖσθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεοναζοματά τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑστίν, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐμπορικὴν, ἀλλ' οὗ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφαῖς αὐτούς πᾶσιν ἠγοραὶ πρὸς οὖν χάρων ταῦτα πράπτουσιν ἣν δὲ μὴ δεὶ πολίων τοιαύτην μετέχειν πλεονεξίαν, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτήσασθαι τοιούτοι, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρᾶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχουν· καὶ χαρῶς καὶ πόλεσιν εὔνειαν καὶ λεμένας εὐφύοις κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε μήπε τὸ αὐτῷ νέμειν ἀστι μήτε πόρρῳ λαίρ, ἀλλὰ καταργοῦν τείχες καὶ τοιούτων ἄλλους εἰρήμασι, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἄγαθὸν τι συμβαινεῖ γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτῳ τὸ ἄγαθον, εἰ δὲ ὁ πολιτικὸς πολιτικὸς...
ti Bla'beron, philaostrapai radian tois vnomous proz
39 kai diorizountas tinas ou de kai tinas epitmisyschais de proz
§ 6 allhlos. peri de ths nausikhs dunamawos, oti me
βelitiston uparxhein mekrwi tinos plhthes, ouk aedhlon (ou gar
1327 b monon autois alla kai tovwn plhson tisi de kai faiberoi
eiina kai dunamei botheis, apter kata yhn, kai kata
§ 7 thalattai) peri de plhthous thdei kai megeidhs ths dunamawos
tauths proz ton blon apokespeton ths polwos. ei me
5 hgemouikov kai politeikov zhestai blon, anagkaiou kai tau-
tn thn dunamean uparxein proz tais praxeis sumpetrov,
then de poluvnarchtiain thn ginomewn peri thn nausikon

dolkon ouk anagkaiou uparxein tais polwseiv. oudein gar
§ 8 autois meros eiina de ths polwos. to mei gar eipisitai-
10 kdn elieutheron kai tox pezevontov estin, o kuirou esti kai
krathei ths nautilias plhthous de uparxontos periodikov
kai tov thn chorain gevrogontov, afthnian anagkaiou eiina
kai nautov. dromein de touto kai von uparxov tisidin,
ou th poliei tox 'Hrakeleistov' pollass gar ekplhrasen
15 trniries kextemenei tox megeide polin eteron emelesterean.

1327 b 1 autois M* P2.4 Ald. || plhseis P2.4 || kai faiberoi eiina transposed to follow 2 botheis by Camerarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly || 5 polwmenov Schneider (in the translation) Bk.2, <mei monon> politekivov? Schneider, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket kai politeikov is not commendable || 5 orxei
Schlussner (wrongly) || ovdon II* Bk., ovdh Il* M* || 9 meros omitted by L* C* Ald. Wb || 13 kai added after de by II* Bk. || 14 hrapeleistovov P4.5 Sb Vb || 15 e-
dedeistov

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.
§ 7 1327 b 4 el men yar...blon || For if the city is to have a career of supremacy."
One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however n. (917) and Intro, p. 55. SUSEM. (775)

§ 8 9 to mei gar eipisitai ktn || "For only the marines are free men and form part of the land army; and it is they who are supreme (on board ship) and control the crew."

10 kai tox pezevontov At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. n. 1519), Thuc. Thuc. 111. 98 § 4, 111. 24 § 2; but generally (n. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. vii. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh Staatsch. 1* p. 583 l, 1* 649 f. p. 500 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (776)

14 tox hrapeleistovov Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the
19 Πέρι μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων καὶ (γ) θαλάττης καὶ περί τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἐστι διαρκήματα τον τρόπον τοῦτον περί δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους, τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν
17 ὄρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἶπομεν, ποὺσαν δὲ τις τὸν
φῶς εἶναι δὲ, νῦν λέγομεν. σχεδοῦ δὴ καταναλωσίν ἐν
πλοῦτος γέ, βλέπας ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πόλεως τῶν εἰσακομιῶν ἡμῶν
τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν ὁικουμένην, ὁς διαλή-
κει τὰ πόλεις καὶ αὐτοὺς ἱστορεῖ, καὶ λαμεῖν τὰ πόλεις Γ Π Α. Εκ.
Σισεμ., 1-2 in the text, καὶ πόλεως λαμεῖν Πελοποννήσων ὑπολογίζει, καὶ λαμεῖ καὶ πόλεις Congreve. In place of πόλεως Konrat conjectured οὐσίων, Schmidt conjectured,
Broughton περατάλων, Jowett πόλεις. Composing followed by Bk.7, i.e., Schröder and πόλεις

17 διαμερίσθην L* P*jadi Rh. and P* (corr.), διαμερίσθην P*, διαμερίσθην N* V*;
21 τὰς πόλεις omitted by P* P* l. Ald, W

Herkaleiots, Anab. v. 6 10 (Gapphanion). He also calls Herakleides in Pontos a
f. colony from Megara, settled in the
land of the Marianidians (Anab. v. 10 1). We know from other sources that there
were also Boeotians (from Tanagra)
and that the colony was founded about 540.
Strabo xii. 549 is wrong in designating it
a Milesian settlement. The colonists
had converted the Marianidians whom they
had conquered into subjects or vil-
lals, in virtue of a compact similar to
that made by the Thessalians with the
Pensetes (cf. n. 286) and by the Spartans
with the Itholians, containing a special
proviso that they should not be sold out
of the country. Indeed the Herakleids
did not call them their property or their
slaves, but their spear-bearers (λάμπονες).
See Posidonius Frag. 16 in Ath. vi. 265
C., Strab. xii. 543. Plato Laches vi. 276 f
(J. G. Schneider). Comp. also Pseudo-
Arist. Ov. xii. 9 § 1, 1347 b 3 f. (Eatom.
SUSEM. (777))
15 τοῦ μεγίθου... ἐμμελεστέρων] "A
city of but moderate size, as compared
with others." We do nowhere else find
an accurate statement as to the
probable size of Herakleia; but extracts
from the work of its native historian
Mesemon in Photius give us information
as to its power and history (J. G. Schen-
der). See Muller's edition, Frag. 2.32,
Gr. iii. p. 515 ff. There are notices of
the early internal history of Herakleia
(7.vii). § 3 a. (1555); 6 § 3 (1560); § 7
(1575); § 15 (1482).—SUSEM (778).
Comp. also Grois, c. 98, vol. xil.
p. 613 ff.
18 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους

19 πρότερον] "As to the strength of
the citizen body, and what limit should
be set to it, we spoke above (c. 4 3—
14)."

c. 7 The natural characteristics of the
citizens: they should be of Greek race,
uniting intelligences with a special
expertise.

1-4. Criticism of Plato

1 2 διαλείπουν τοῖς ἑνώσεσι divided amongst different races. So ὁ
λαοῖς τὸν πάντας πόλις of Plato, xvi. 11
1. 106 f. 11; cf. διαλείπει of Plato, An. xi.
1. 3; 643 b 10; διαλείπει of Plato, an.
πολιτικὰ... διαλείπει of the Arist. l. 4
4. 115 b 3.

2 3 Compare the remark made by
Plato Rep. iv. 416 b, that among the
Thracians, Scythians and other northern
nations courage predominates among the
Phoenicians and Egyptians. Fear of god
among the Greeks reason. Hippias in his
work ὁ νέος ἀριστοκράτης, book 1, refers
above to above c. 7 (171 b), p. 547 f. Kelik,
compares in detail the natural differences
between Egyptians and Asians, and
describes the happy mean of the Greeks.
Herk. IX. 132 makes Cyrus say that
hospitable countries make effeminate
people, since the same soil is not capable
of producing rare fruits and warp-like
wool; and in iii. 196, he says that Helen is
great by far the best climate. Plato Rep.
iv. 44 commends in particular the happy
blending of the seasons in Athens, and the
consequence of very-considerable and loss
of knowledge resulting from this influence.
In the Aristotelian Phys. iii. 5. 38, there
is a discussion of the question why
the inhabitants of warm countries are as a
rule cowardly, and those of cold countries
brave (Hist. i. 9. 34).—SUSEM (781)
§ 2 παί τοῖς ἑθεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἑθνη (V) καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοιας 25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολύτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἀρχεῖν οὐ δυναμένα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἑλληνα διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀνθρώπου δὲ, διόπερ ἄρχομενα καὶ δουλεύοντα

§ 3 διατελεῖ: τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένους ἀστερὸν μεσθεῖ κατὰ 30 τοὺς τόπους, οὔτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει, καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμοῦ καὶ διανοητικὸν ἐστὶν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτεύμενοι καὶ δυνάμενοι ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μᾶς

§ 4 τυχαίουν πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει διαφοράν καὶ τὰ 2

24 [καὶ] τὰ Spengel Susem. 2 Or better καὶ τὰ with explicative sense? Cp. Bonitz Ind. Ar. 337 b 13 ff., Vahlen Beitr. zu Poet. II. p. 88. || 28 μὲν inserted after ἄρχομενa by P 1 || 31 μάλαστα Γ (apparently) Susem. 1

§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnese and Thrace (Hom. Hymn to Apollo 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. to § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epehexgetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." Susem. (779)

26 ἀπολυτευτά Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φίλει πόλεις Aristotele considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φίλει πόλεις.

28 διόπερ ἄρχομεν ... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). Susem. (780)

§ 3 30 ἐνθυμοῦ spirited, courageous.

31 διόπερ ἐλεύθερον ... 33 πολιτείας "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ λαχώνον Ἑλληνικῶν ἰσορροπώντας, ὀπτὲρ καὶ πάροσ ταῦτα ἐγκαταστάσει, καὶ τὰς ἐνεκτικὰς καὶ ἐπεξεργάθηκεν καὶ ἀποκάθαρμισθέντας (Eaton). See further Introd. p. 46, Susem. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken i. 18 ff. II. p. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish ὄμοιον (Panegyric, De Pace, Philippos, cp. Ep. 3). According to Oncken the μία πολιτεία was already realized de facto in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) ἡ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθήκης. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (ailleurs associées) and not a πολιτεία (II. 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθήκα καὶ κοινὴ εἰρήνη themselves (cp. Rhet. II. 23 § 18, 1390 b 12 ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον γὰρ καὶ ὅσον δολερέον [ἐστὶν], καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσπαθήματος). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotos, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotles had in mind,
end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Democritus or with Phidias.

44 και inserted by M, Η² Bk. 35 τι omitted by Η² Bk. Spengel approves the omission unless και be inserted after τι. 38 των μερικῶν Π, των εὐσεβῶν Ι' apparently

under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by 'constitution' Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchically and 'despotically' governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of βασιλεία they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see τιν. 113 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is beside the point. Asians are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke. τιν. 14 41 6 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (τιν. 15 13 15 14 24 25: 14 § 6, 15 § 17 § 5—8) has a counterpoint to an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes (see VIII. 11 § 187), and Pers. XI. 1489 b 26, Plutarch De Alexandri victu 1 c 6 in Δαρείον ἢ κατακράτιστας ἡγεμονίας τοῦ μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἐπικρατέον τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως διεξόμενα κρατεῖν. For τιν. Chacornas, or Cannon, may mark the
Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. “Theognis, too, 109 ff., ascribes love and hatred to ‘spirit’ or θυμός” (Camerarius). Further comp. min. (790, 182, 839, 935). Susem. (786).

1328 a 5 οὐ Bergk, following Schneider, οὐ Γ.Π. Ar. Bk. Susem.1 in the text ἄτιμα Μ’, untranslated by William || παρὰ Γ Βk. Bergk, peri with all other authorities Bk. || ἀπάγχεια P1, ἀπέγχεια Μα and apparently Π (a lanceis perforationes William), ἀπάγχεια P6.3—6 L5. Ald. Bk. Bergk, ἀπάγχεια P4, ἀπήγχεια P3, ἀπέγχεια S3 Vb and perhaps Ar. (lanceis transfixus est)

1328 a 1 ὅτι not τοῦτο, see c. 1 § 8 n.

1328 a 2 ὅτι rises viz. in indiscernation. § 6 3 ‘Ἀρχίλοχος] Frag. 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the θρύμος belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the Poëtika). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the οἱ Βασιλεία attributed to him (Frag. 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (Frag. 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paean cannot be certainly inferred from Frag. 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music con-
1.3 δέων] δεὶ Μ', δὲ apparently P1 (1st hand, corrected by pl.), δὲ Ἑκατερος, William leaves it untranslated, [δεῶ] Schleicher Susem.1, perhaps only by ἦν7 Κυταρας ἢς ὀπολογοῦνται νομίζοιν M' 1 and very likely Γ τῇ βλάβει τῇ βλάβει P1 15 πολεμοῦ (πολέμου Γ) γὰρ Π1 Μαθαρχ. de fruct. ass. φ. 480 ν., γιὰς πολέμου Π1 P2 Bk. 16 πέρα — πέρα Π2 P3 Bk. Susem.1 18 τινάς Μ' 1
21 τῶν ἄλλων omitted by P1 1, Ald. Wb and P1 (1st hand, supplied in the margin)

especially in the Later B. v., &.] and would command the ascent of most reflecting Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

c. 8. Distinction of the efficient causes, who are an essential part of the city, from the rest of the population, which is in the indispensable majority.

This idea is already familiar to the reader of B. III. v. 2. 13. 128 a 5 on 128 b 3 9.

1 11 ὀφείλει τῶν ἄλλων] The

for instance: the things without which happiness cannot exist are not all parts of happiness, Against Euth. 6. 3 3 1214 b 11—7 (Eaton). Some of them (as above) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (τὰ λατρεῖα, v. νομισμάτων), or necessary conditions (καταστήματα). Cp. Hesych. (1) 5 1 1014 a 29: "necessary for indispensable acts is that without which a secondary cause can exist is impossible," (Eaton). See Zeller (1, 2, 134 a 10 10). Cp. ep. 1907 and pl. 1304 or pl. 1307. Susem. (793)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συστάσεων. No

natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in 1, 4, 5, 6, 1244 b 29, with which Plato was familiar. 66. 2 b, 1247 a 29, 1248 b 39. They are frequently mentioned in the ecological treatises.
katà φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταυτά ἐστι μύρια τῆς ὀλίγης συν-
στάσεως ὃν ἀνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἷς, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-
λεως μέρη θετέων ὥσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν —< ὁδὸν εἰτε τροφῆν τούτο ἐστιν εἰτε χώρας πλήθος,
< εἰτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τουιτῶν ἐστίν —> οὖδ' § 2 ἀλλὰς κοινωνίας οὐδεμίας ἐξ ἦς ἐν τι τὸ γένος, ἐν γὰρ

22 μῦρια.] Also μέρη (μάλιστα ὀντά 1329 a 4 f., cp. 1291 b 8) the technical terms for 'full members,' constituent parts and not mere adjuncts of the organic whole. See the good instances c. 4 § 6, 1326 b 20 f.; vi(v). 4. 14, 1291 a 24. In contrast to them the adjuncts are (1) necessary appendages, ὥσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, (2) sine quibus non, ἂν ἄνευ πόλις ὁμοία συνισταται, (3) requirements, ἂν δέ, or even (4) τὰ ἐνναπάρχοντα e.g. τροφῆ, χώρα. Note that both μέρος and μῦριον are also used as non-technical terms, for the adjuncts. So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as here) of full membership, 1329 a 35 : sometimes again of the entire population, 1279 a 32. The relation between constituent parts and necessary conditions is explained iii. 12. 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and vii(vii). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the ναυτικός ὥλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συνδιάσπος[] A term with various meanings: (1) the putting together = construction, (2) the thing so constructed ὑ συνισταται, thus duplicating ὑ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστος, cp. 1329 a 35. It is largely used in the biological works for 'structure' or 'organism': so also vii(vii). 11. 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy between organism and state, implied in this term and in ἐργα = functions, but drawn out at length vii(v). c. 4 §§ 8, 9, see A. C. Bradley op. c. p. 203 ff.

The view of De Partibus Animal. 1. 5 §§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every part (μῦριον) of the body, like an instrument (ὅργανον), is for an end: this end is a function (πράξεις τις). The parts are nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more or less specific, γένειας, αἰθήσεως, ὑπόσ, πορεία, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause 27 οὖν εἰτε τροφῆ... 28 ἐστιν appears inevitable, because 'food' and a 'quantum of territory' would otherwise be added as instances of ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τόσος κοινωνίας, for which purpose they are clearly inapposite. The common object of the society, which gives the city its unity, is its ethical end, the conviction of the members that they must endeavour to realize a noble life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. iii. c. 9). On the other hand a supply of food and so much territory are indispensable requisites, and would seem to be included under κτήσις a 33.

23 οὖδ' ἀλλὰς κοινωνίας... ἐξ ἦς ἐν τῇ το γένος] 'Nor is this true of any other association which is to form a unity of kind' (and not merely of mass, γένος is adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a true organic unity, not merely the collective unity of an aggregate or heap. After 25 ἐν τῷ there is no need to insert ὡσα, for γενέσαται (or ὡσα) can easily be understood. SUSEM. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the society must have some one identical common interest, though they need not all share in it equally. Haece mihi videtur esse sententia: unam aliquid idemque sociis communem necesse est (Susemil).

25 A generic unity, or natural composite whole, 1. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 n., but not a κράσις, μίξις, or σύμφωνα in which the mingled elements vanish and give birth to a new product: for the citizens continue to exist as parts of the whole 1. 2, 1253 a 26. The difference between the mere heap and the organic whole is explained Meta. Ζ. 17. 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (examples: a syllable, flesh; each something apart from its constituents). See also Meta. H. 6. 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἐξήλικαν καὶ μὴ ἐστίν οἷον σωρός τὸ πάρ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὄλον παρὰ τὰ μῦρια. For a parallel to the language see Phys. v. 3, 7, 227 a 14, ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρικεν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναφιν.

The notion of Unity is analysed Meta. Δ. 6, 1: τα πρῶτα λεγόμενα ἐν αἰὲ ἡ οὐσία μία ἡ σύνεχεια (sometimes τὸ ὄλον is
There is much to be said for the view of Mr. P. W. J. that the passage is closely connected with 6.12 5.13.2 at 35. This is the case, at least, with the three passages: 26.12 27.18 30.34

26.12 The two together 6.12 30.34 were removed. In fact this intervening passage must be regarded as a parenthesis, suggested by 5.12 30.34 apparently in the wrong place. 

27.18 The same sense can be got out of the text by making to yap to meta. 

30.34 A restoration of it thus the oivos of 6.12 will refer to the tate metaxous oivos. Thus, though his own remedies are different [see Crit. 11.1], he agrees as to the end in view, i.e., the reference of 26.12 to 27.18 to a formless tate meta. 

There is much to be said...


pόλις κοινωνία τις ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ξώθης τῆς ἐνδό
§ 5 χρόνης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμονία τὸ ἀριστοῦ, αὐτὴ δὲ
ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτω
ὅτε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἡ μηδὲν
40 δὴλον ως τούτ’ αὐτίων τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως ἐδή καὶ διάφορας καὶ
πολιτείας πλείους. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δ’ ἄλλων έκαστοι τοὺτ’
1328 β ἦρευντες τοὺς τοίς βίοις ἔτεροις ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.

§ 6 ἐπισκέπτετον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταύτι ἐστὶν ὅν ἀνεν πόλις ὁ
ἑν εἶν’ καὶ γὰρ ἀ λέγειν εἰσίν μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτων
4 Ἀν εἶν’. διὸ * ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ἄννεπτον τοῖν ὕφο
§ 7 ἐργῶν πόλιμον’ ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἐστίν δὴλον. πρῶτον
39 αὐτὴ <πάντως> ὁ Spengel, needless || 40 τῶν ὁ II.P5 Bk.
1328 β 2 ταυτ’ Schneider Bk.², ταύτα Bas.³ || 4 διὸ omitted by II.P5 Ar. Bk.
and Vettori, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to
punctuate 3 εἶν’ (καὶ γὰρ...4 εἰν’ διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν

the head of ‘animate property’ are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see 1 c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also n. (37). SUSEM. (801)

η δὲ πόλις κτλ]. “Now the city is a society of like members”: comp. 1. 7 § 1, ἔλευθεροις καὶ ἴσων, VII(iv). 11 § 8 ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων, with notes (58 b, 1293). See also n. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand αὐτίκοις ὁμοίω
νεί εἰσίν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, III. 1 § 5, see n. (471). SUSEM. (797)

36 ἐνεκεν δὲ ξώθης κτλ] It is therefore this ’best life realizable’ which is the ‘one identical common interest’ in question, ἐν τι κοινῶν (Congreve). Compare further n. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὐτὴ δὲ κτλ] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the Ethics. Comp. the Excursus I. SUSEM. (799)

§ 38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος] A fair paraphrase of the definition of Nic. Eih., as may be seen from E. E. 11. 1, 1219 a 16, τῶν δ’ ἡ χρήσις ἐργοῦ, 1219 b 2, ὅσον ἐκαστὸν χρήσιν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ξώθη καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

39 φῶς] Apparent redundant, as in 11. 2 § 5 n.

40 τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως ἐδή καὶ δια
φοράς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους] This supplements the statement of III. 1 §§ 8, 9. An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man’s true develop-
ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all (A.C. Bradley). Cp. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 318
41 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κτλ] Cp. n. (469) on III. 3. 9. SUSEM. (800)

1328 b 1 Κπ. 1. 8. 4 ff. § 5 2 The recognition of the ‘parts or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (ἔργα), i.e. ‘occupations’ (b 20 ἔργα) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to clas-
sify the inhabitants working at these occupations: food implies farmers, hand-
crafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(vi). 7
1, 1321 a 4 ff. (βασιλικοῦν, ἀγαρίαν) and VII(vi). 4, 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (βασιλικοῦν, ἀγα-
ριαν, ἴδιους ἄνδρας, ἰδιώτατος, ἰδιωτικῆς, βουλευτικὸς,
μενοῦ): here περιτιθαί must include βασιλείας, while τό ἐδυστὸν or ‘capital’ probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (ἀγαρίας), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive κρή
των δικαιωμάτων καὶ συμβολῶν correspond in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VII(iv). c. 4. “Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek so-
ciety” (Newman).

3 All the real members, or part (μέρη), of a city will be indispensable, though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ * [*] There are so many con-
ceivable possibilities for filling up the lacuna that any definite attempt of this kind becomes idle. SUSEM. (802)
μὲν ὁνὸν ὑπάρχειν δεὶ τροφήν, ἐπιτια τέχνης (πάλλων γὰρ ὉΠ) ὀργίαιν ὁδεῖται τὸ ζῆν, τρίτον δὲ ὁπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαίον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὁπλα πρὸ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς, τῶν ὀπειθούντων χάρω, καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἐξώθεν ὁμοιοῦ ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῶν κεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν), ἐτε χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἐγκεφαλίζῃ καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς <τάς> πολεμικοῖς, περίπτωτο δὲ καὶ πρὸ τῆς περι τὸ θεῖαν ἐπιμέλειαν, ὅ τι καλοῦσιν ἕρσασιν, ἐκτὸς δὲ τῶν ἀρμάτων καὶ τῶν άρχηγοι κατατάσσει κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

8 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐργα ταυτ᾽ ἐστίν ὅν ὁδεῖται πᾶσα τόλμη ὅς ἐπί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἐκείνην ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐκείνην, ὅτι τοῦτον το ὑπερήφανον, ὅ τι ὑπερήφανον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, διὰ παραπληροῦντο τὴν προφυλακὴν, καὶ συνεφεύρεται πόλει, διὰ τὴν γογκαλον, τὸ εἶναι πλῆθος, ὅτι παρασκευάζεται τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτης, καὶ τὸ μάχημα, καὶ τὸ εὐπορήμα, καὶ ἑρείξι, καὶ κρίτας τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

9 διωρισμένοι δὲ τούτων λοιπῶν σκέψασθαι πότερον πόσα καὶ τοίνυν,

8 [καὶ] Κορέ, for which [τε] Welsdon, wrongly...
§1 25. τοὺς αὐτούς ἀπαντας.

This would be the case in democracies.

§2 29. καθάπερ γάρ εἴπομεν. Just before, §1, b 25 ἐνδέχεται γάρ κτλ. 

SUSEM. (805)

33. πάντων sc. ἐφόρων.

§3 34. αὐτὴ... 35 εὐδαιμονίαν. Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (866), c. 13 § 4 n. (877): also 11. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). 

SUSEM. (806)

36. ἐφεξής πρότερον. It was observed in Excursus 1., n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδείκται, 'proved,' rather than ἐφεξής 'stated.' Comp. further n. (872). 

SUSEM. (807)

38. ἀπλῶς. In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy: III. 9. 39. πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ὁρος) for the standard. See III. 4. 3, 1376 b 30, vi(iV). 7. 2, 1393 b 3 ff. 

τῶν ἀριστῶν ἀπλῶς κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν των ἀγάθων ἀνδρῶν, with n. (1233). Comp. also II. 9. 1 n. SUSEM. (808) 

Add vi(iv). c. 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἄν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνω τις, but c. 16 § 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and Μετὰ. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 108 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὀρθῶς Λέγοντος, ἀπόλιω δ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. Bonitz Ind. Ar. 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τέλος or ὅρος. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑπόθεσις or II. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γάρ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

40. ἀγιννής. See III. 3. 5, esp. νομες (505, 509, 511). 

Cp. also n. (103) SUSEM. (809)

On the construction ὑπόθεσιν πρὸς cp. II. 9. 1, 1296 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. Ολυνθ. III § 32, p. 37, 10: ἐστι δ’ ὀνείδους, οἷοι, μέγα καὶ καυκόν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ ϕαινὰ πράττοντας ὅτι οἱ ἄττα γάρ ἐν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ τοιοῦτον ἄναγκη καὶ τὸ φρέμη ἔχειν. 

Cp. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together. 

§4 1329 a 1 δει γάρ σχολής. 'Δεὶ-

sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs. 1 Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: n. (93). The artisan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cpr. Aelian E. H. x. 16, ἡ ἀρχή ἀδελφή τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔστα. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews: see Ecclesiastes c. 38. 24—34 (Newman).

3 Bouleusomethon kai krivon From ἄμφω, a 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cpr. § 9, a 31, το τα ὀπλασθεῖν καὶ τὰ βασιλεῖαν.

4 ὑπνάρξη ὅτι are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense, not merely indispensable adjuncts.

5 ἄμφω the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

6 ἄμφω that (after φωτεία) as 1328 h 7 and often.

7 diotó that (after φωτεία) as 1328 h 7 and often.

8 ἐπίτας ἄμχης ὅταν. It belongs to a different time of life.

9 προφητής Cpr. III. 4—17 h. (197) 145. 112. 115. 1474—1470. Stowell. (1100)

10 ὑπερὶ καὶ τὸ. This is said to be στρεῖσθαι after, 11. 5. 25. 1364 b 8. With the positive genitive τὸν ἄμχην Stowell. (14) 137 a 17 in full τον τον ἄμχην c. 14. 1328 h 32.

11 ταύτῃ δὲ Resumptive of the ἄμφω in a q: "in so far as it is impossible in so far they must be the same." When ἄμφω has proceeded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. c. c. 11. 50. Thuc. 11. 49. Xenophon. Anab. (Paus. 7. 168 a 176). Plato (Rep. 194 b τὰ ὀπλα ὁπληροὶ ὁπλα ὁπληροὶ πρὸς πολέμοις δικαίως ἐπί τὰς ὀπλάς, a δὲ ἀναφέρεται ταῦτα ταύτῃ, and Demosthenes (c. Mid. 1 350, c. Kuttmann's Fac. xii). Herod. Ant. 1. 166 b 58—167 a 13, and Suidas (t. 22. 1174—1791, has disposed of the view formerly held (by Zell, Götting, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used it elsewhere Greek prose writers introduce the apodosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1327 b 13 c 1), (2) ἄμφω occasionally for ὅταν to the sentence

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἄμχων καὶ. Hence one of the favourite measures of torque was to forbid the use of arms (IV. V. 10. 11. and 11. 5. 22 b. 1160—1748 b. See moreover Xen. Cyrop. VII. 7 79. Thuc. 11. 19, the Demon in Mytilene obtained ἄμφω τῶν ἄμχων ἄμφω παίρνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄμχων (Erat.). W. 11. 311. 16. 13. τοὺς τοῖς ἀμφότεροι ἀλληλοκαθηκόντες... For errata and 4. 1. 36. "If only one person in
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Η. 9. [IV(VII). 9. 6

πολιτείαν ταύτην, μη ἁμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ τέφυκεν ἢ μὲν (V) δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις ἐστιν· οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφότεροι νεομήνθησαι συμβερέι καὶ δίκαιων
§ 7 [εἰναι]. ἔχει γὰρ αὐτή ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἄξιαν. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ <εἰναι> περὶ τούτων. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὕτως. τὸ 20 γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὔδὲν μέρος οὐδὲν μη τῆς ἁρέτης δημογραφίαν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖ τὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἁρέτης, εὐδαιμόνα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέπαν.

§ 8 τας δέ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντα τοὺς πολίτας. ἐν

25 νερόν δὲ καὶ οὗτοι δὲ τὰς κτήσεις εἰναι τούτων, εἰπέρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἡ] περιοικούς. λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος.

§ 9 φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὐτε γὰρ γεωργοῦν οὔτε βάναυσον ἑρέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει

14 [ταύτην] Thurot (unless the word be transposed to follow 16 ἀμφοῖν), τὴν αὐτήν Uchberweg, ταῦτα Susem. Cp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 402 f. | μὲν <γὰρ> Vettori in his translation || 16 ἐστὶν εἰναι (from l. 17) Lambin || 17 εἰναι was transposed to follow 18 τούτων by Camerarius, to follow 18 δὲ by Susem.2-3; εἰναι δοκεῖ Γ P5 Ar., εἰναι [δοκεῖ] Susem.1 in the text, ἐστὶν Lambin followed by Welldon || 18 <εἰναι> added by P5 Bk., and so William Ar. translate || 20 μέρος γένος Π5 P6 Ar. Bk. which is just as good || 25 ὑπὲρ—ἐπερ—ὅτι Hayduck || 26 [§] Susem., cp. 1330 a 29 and Quaest. crit. coll. p. 403 || 27 ἱερεῖς Γ P5 L' Ar. Ald., ἱερεῖς the other authorities || 29 ἵερεα omitted by P5 (1st hand), πολίτην supplied by π' in the margin

entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons" (a lame conclusion) as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀμφότερα and ταῦτα (see Crit. notes), then τὴν πολιτείαν becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀποδιδόναι. SUSEM.

17. ξεχα...δεξιάν] "This division recognizes desert." See c. 14 § 4, 1332 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (B12)

§ 7 18 <εἰναι> περὶ τούτων] Cp. § 8, a 25, εἰναι τούτων, § 9, a 33, τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἐχεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. 'περὶ c. acc. rem significat ad quam aliquia actio referatur" Bonitz Ind. Ar., who cites Topos II. 7, 5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τῶν δύναμιν αὐτοθέους = the sensation of sight. "The landed property must be in their hands."

19 Civic rights are not for the artizans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the 'class' of virtue.

21 ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (B13)

23 εὐδαιμόνα δὲ πόλιν] 'When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class.' Cp. n. 5. 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (B14)

§ 8 φανερὸν δὲ κτῆ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle's decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, 11. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Penestae, Helots, etc. nn. (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (839) and Exc. 'On the Cretan περίοικοι' p. 336 SUSEM. (B15)

§ 9 33 περὶ αὐτῶν must be περὶ τῶν
IV (VII). 10.1] 1329 a 14—1329 a 40

33 aut. [SUSEM.] τος τον Γ' (1st hand), for σει is written over the pres. and Bk. 34 τα lεσοράτων Art. and Bas., for τα lεσοράτων Γ' Bk. 35 γεωργοι γεωργοί τεχνητα γεωργοί τεχνητά. 36 Schneider, δι τον ΥΣΕΜ. in the text 40 [Spengel: the text can hardly be sound. 


15. IV. 9. Thus we have given (1) the indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral parts of a city, i.e. cultivators, soldiers, and the whole class of laborers are adjuncts indispensable to cities, while the integral parts are the defensive force and the deliberative body. These elements are severally distinct, the distinction between integral parts and adjuncts being permanent, that between the army and the deliberative body only temporary. A valuable summary of results.

3. 10 [Historical Digest] II 1—9.]

Particulars respecting the services and cultivation of the land. § 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently an interpolation by a well-informed Parthian. At all events the suspicion under which it labors (see EVKL. note 150) has been dispelled by Spengel's good analysis of this "beautiful passage." (see Stodi. 111 p. 3 m.), or by Newcombe's dispassionate survey, Vol. I. p. 174.

1 50 σει ουν οὖν "νοώση νεανίζ.

Possibly this is directed against Plato, and intended to prove that he was by no means the inventor of the particular classification wherein Aristotle here follows him. L. Curtius, Hesiod of Greece 1:5 p. 161 (I. p. 115, E. 10) even goes so far as to suppose that all the three scenes of the

Theo's in their service (Wetliden). But see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 104.

those who are superannuated; upon the principle stated III. 9, 25, see n. (150). This is the solution of an apparent inconsistency: that in this, the only genuine aristocracy, n. (150), all citizens have equal rights, see n. (150), and yet aristocracy is the rule of a minority: III. 7 n. 1—3, 15 n. 9—10 n. (648), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the citizens of the ideal state must complete military service before admission, at the age of 35, into the popular assembly (c. 16 §§ 9, 1332 § 30 ff., Exc. 11.), and are not eligible to the Council or the offices of state (military commands excepted) till they are about fifty, while later on they are again released from all civic duties and owe all civic rights by becoming priests, it follows that it is only in his fiftieth to about his seventy year that each citizen can have a share in the entire government and administration, as indeed was remarked in ref. p. 31. p. 54. For these twenty years only he is actually a full citizen, in the active exercise of his rights. This being so, the ruling body of full citizens will always remain, beyond all doubt, a minority in the civic body in the wider sense, including the soldiers and superannuated old men, even if the boys and youths are excluded. Comp. c. 13 §§ 9, 1332 § 14 n. (885), c. 14 c. 18 e. On the position.
πολιτείας φιλοσοφούσιν, ὧν ἢ ἰδίᾳ διηρύθησαν χωρίς κατὰ γένη (κ. 1329 b τῆν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς μάχιμοι ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν. ἐν Αιγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἐχει τούτῳ τὸν τρόπον ἔτη καὶ νῦν, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν ὅπως καὶ Αιγύπτου 4 Σεσώστριος, ὃς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσατο, Μίνω δὲ τὰ

1329 b 2 τε omitted by P3.5 §b Yb, perhaps by Γ || τοῦτον after τῶν τρόπων II P3 Bk. and γρ. P1 (corr. in the margin) || δὲ added after ἐτι by P1 (but corr. in the margin of P1 marks it for omission γρ.) || 4 μένων Γ M

Platonic state had actually existed in Crete: an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16 n. (167). SUSEM. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17, 1264 a to note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state: Holm Griech. Gesch. III. p. 185.

41 γνῖν] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: i.e. ύπερ (ib. cc. 37, 143), μάχιμοι (c. 165), βούκλοι (c. 65), συμβατές (c. 47), κάπηλοι, κυβρηνία, ἐφυρίες c. 154). See however E. Meyer Gesch. des Alterthums I. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 565.

1320 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: "μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur" Bonitz Ind. Ar. s.v. "The stock instance is Pod. c. 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: ἄλλα ἀν τις ἀπαντά τοιαῦτα πονηρά, ἢ αἰνίγμα ἢσται ἢ βαρβαρισμόν, ἢ μὲν οὖν εἰ μεταφορῶν, αἰνίγμα, ἢν  ἢ γλωσσῶν, βαρβαρισμόν. Vahlen Beiträge III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμόν. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἢ μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαῦτα by εἰ μεταφορῶν and ἢ γλωσσῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative; a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τά μὲν...τά δὲ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and Soph. El. 6. 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits Categ. 2 § 1, 1 a 17, Top. 105 b 21, 108 b 9, 38 to be not very different: while Pol. 1. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see Crit. notc), IV(VII). 15. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (ἐλεύθερον...μάλατα μὲν...οὖν), and VIII(V). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps De Rep. Athen. c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K. 3, but Harpocratio omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώστριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker History of Antiquity, 1st ed. 134—158, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 142—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1349—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1350), just as all the Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker 1st ed. 151 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. SUSEM. (819)

“The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste" A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, Herodotou zweites Buch p. 573, who quotes Plato Tim. 23. 24, Isocr. Busiris 6—8, Diod. i. 73 f., I. 28, Strabo xvii. p. 787. Cp. Les castes en Egypte in Le Musée, 1886. Also E. Meyer Gesch. des alten Ägyptens (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (ib. p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostris, any more than User-tesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (Ägyptische Geschichte p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke Weltgesch. I. p. 26, Maspero Genre dp., p. 83: "Setsú, var. Sethsú-à, le nom populaire de Ramsès II." Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (Gesch. p. 117): "the three notices dealing with
the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into cases originated with Sessareg does not derive from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches in Egypt in detail."

"Minoi δια τα τηρητήν] The division of the Cretan population is mentioned II. 5. 19, 1264 a 21. π. (171), c. to § 1—8 with Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (830)

§ 2 § των συστιτών ή τάξεων] The system of public meals, as of τα τάξει τινες ησαντίαι, II. 11. 7. 1273 b 30: cf. also II. 5. 5, 1263 a 23.

6 περί την Μίνω βασιλείαν] Compare again II. 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. SUSEM. (821)

§ 3 § των συστιτών ή τάξεων] The name common in later times is ή τα κατασκευασμένα. This gulf is in the south-west of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Seychel Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 160 stadia [i.e., 18 miles (60 yds.) apart, rather more than half a day's journey. The name Italy was then originally combined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulfs on the other. Oenotria means Wine-land, Italy the Ox, or calf, Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be lean, a symbol of the transition of the Græco-Italian from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, admirably connects the original Italian legislation with the tradition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as retrores (Sicii perhaps also Siculi) or field-labourers (Osci). See Mommsen, History of Rome i. p. 81 f. E. v. Thurydides VI. 3. 4 calls this land Italy not an Oenotrian but a Sicii. For the same Empire, see c. 6. 2: 4. 1: 1773 ff. SUSEM. (823)

§ 4 § καλ τα συστιτών] There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. SUSEM. (824)

6 δια καλ τα συστιτών] The language is undoubtedly the sub-2. 3. 1271 b 30 δια καλ τα συστιτών των Εκλέκτων κατεχεῖν αὐτόν. But we hesitate to draw the inference that there, as there, an extract from Euphorus' Dialogue. (Neumann, 1. p. 175 a. 1).

5 § λόγιον διά καλ] Here the lat
20 ad\'sowes M P4\textsuperscript{1,5} Vb \| 21 χά\'\'ø\'\nu\'s (χά\'\'ø\'\nu\'s Sb Vb) Π\textsuperscript{P5} Ar. \| Σερ\'\'ι\'tων Göt- 
tling Bk\textsuperscript{2}, System William, σύ\'\r\'\r\'ην P\textsuperscript{6} and P\textsuperscript{4} (1st hand), σύ\'\r\'\r\'ην the other authorities Ar. Bk\textsuperscript{1} Susem\textsuperscript{1} in the text and P\textsuperscript{3} (later hand), Σ\'\r\'\r\'η\nu Heyne (Opusc. II. 211, 235) from Arist. Frag. 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (Σ\'\r\'\r\'η\nu is the correct accentuation.) \| χά\'\'ø\'\nu\'s Π\textsuperscript{2} P\textsuperscript{3} Ar.

terpolator has taken the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotrians or Itali on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opsci or Oscans, explained in n. (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausonians we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotrians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (Frag. 6, n. 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. Frag. 567 [558 Arist. pseudep. = 609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1. 72 where Latium is described as a region in Opike, το\'\u03b1 το\'\u03b1 γι\'\'\u03b1 τη\'\u03b1 Ὄ\'\r\'\r\'ηκις, δε 
καλε\'\r\'\r\'αι Δά\'\r\'\r\'ιον (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania; so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy is washed by the Terinaic Gulf, of which the Hipponia- 
tic in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (vii. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (vi. 14 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (vi. 4 § 5). Herodotos (1. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Terinaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpola-
tion, and as such would have to be removed from the rest, if that really be-
longed to Aristotlie. But it will be shown in notes (829, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1—9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Periaptitics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have
written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them.

Susem. (825)

§ 6 24 πολύ υ\'\r\'ρητεινει κτλ. As shown in n. (819). Susem. (828)

τοις χρόνοις] The plural as in viiv. 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected chapter II. 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually as in vii(v). 3 § 3, viii(v). 4 § 1, Another instance is Nic. Eth. viii. 12 § 2, 1161 b 25, τά δε προελβοντα τοις χρόνοις.
MAGNA GRAECIA

Showing the limits of Italy as given (a) by Antillius and (b) in Acts, IV (VII), etc.

Names occurring in this Diagram are underlined.
§ 7 Μίνω βασιλεύαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ δεῖ νομίζειν ευρίσκειν κολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία τὴν χρείαν εἰκός διδάσκειν αὐτὴν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἦδη τούτων εὐλογοῦν λαμβάνει τὴν αὖξην· σὺν ὡστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἷοσθαν δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν

§ 8 ἔχειν πρότον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἀγνωστὸν ἑστὶν· οὔτοι γὰρ ἀρχαίατατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμον δὲ τετυχήκασιν <ἄει> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς μὲν εἰρημένους ἰκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλειμμένα, 35 πειράσασθαι ἵπτειν.

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεί τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ διὸτι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτών ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρῆ καὶ ποιῶν εἶναι τὴν χώραν] περὶ δὲ τῆς 40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργοῦντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρῆ, λεκτέων πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὕτε κοινῆς φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὴν

28 εἰκός απὸ διάδοχων IIa P9 Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and Π1 (1st hand, supplied by corr.1) || 31 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἄει> Bernays and Susem. independently, <πρῶτον> ? Schneider || 34 εἰρημένουs Lambin Bk.², apparently right || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δεῖ after εἶναι IIa P9 Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δὴ ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well known passage Meteorol. 1. 3 § 8, 339 a 29, οὖ γὰρ δὴ φύσομεν ἀπαξ οὐδὲ διὸ καὶ οὐδὲ ἀληθείας τὰς αὐτὰς δόται ἀνακελέων γνωμένης εἰς τοῖς αὐτῶσι, ἀλλὰ ἀπειράκις. § 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία] Comp. n. (795) on c. § 1. Susem. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην κτλ] All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian: see 11. § 16, 1264 a 3 with n. (167) and Meta. 1. 1. § 15, 981 b 17 ff.: esp. b 20 ὅθεν ἦδή πάντων τῶν τουτούς κατεκειμενῶν αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἰδιοῦν μηδὲ πρὸς τάναγκα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐφράσεων. But see n. (829). Susem. (828)

§ 8 τὰ δὲ παραλειμμένα πειράσαθαι υπετειν] How can that be done, if everything has been already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. Susem. (829) Cp. Plato Lat. 630 E of legislators: οὖ γὰρ ἄν ἐκαστὸς ἐν χρείᾳ γίγνηται, τότῳ ἵπτει νῦν παραθέμενος. But Waitz compares the end of the Θηβαί, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...39 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming, for the syllogia, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle’s treatise. Susem. (830) 41 φαμεν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 nn. (156, 156 b,
§ 12 ἀστυνομικῶν πολέμοις ὁμοιοτικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τούτων (1)
ἐχεῖ τὸν ἁρπαγητοῦ, οὐ μὲν ὅλωρον εἰς τὸ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους,
ἐξήραν, οὐ δὲ λιὰν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ
παρ’ ἐνόιος νόμοι ἐστὶ τοὺς κεντημένας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-
μετέχειν βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμοιν, ὥσ τι Ἰδίων
οὐκ ἂν δυναμεῖ συναφείᾳ καλῶς.

§ 13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρθῆσαι τὸν ἁρπαγητὸν τοῦτον
διὰ τὰς προερχόμενας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργηθηκόντας μᾶλλον μέν, 9
εἰ δεὶ κατ’ εὐχήν, δοῦλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφόρων πάντων μήτε
θυμοειδῶν (οὗτος γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶνεν χρήσιμοι
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν ἑυπερηφάνει ὀσφαλεῖσθαι), δεύτερον δὲ
βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοὺς εἰρήμενοι τῆν ἕνυ,
§ 14 σεν, τοὺτον δὲ τοὺς μὲν [Ἰδίοις] ἐν τοῖς Ἰδίοις εἶναι Ἰδίοις
τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῦς.
τίνα δὲ τῶν ἁρπαγητῶν δοῦλοι, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς
δοῦλοις ἂθλον προκείμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἄντερον ἄρμον

11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινῇ εἶναι τῆς ἥπειρος τῇ X
καὶ τῆς βαλαττῆς καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρήματι πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι

19 τῆς] τὴν II, Ps 95 || 20 ἐξαρθαν II, Ps 85 || διὸ παρ’ δίστερ II, perhaps rightly ||
22 βουλή] μαθή Γ Μ || 26 εἰ δε] εἰς Sylburg, deī Schneider, eis <eινα> de Spengel, possibly rightly || ὁμοφόρων πάντας—27 θυμοειδεῖς Schneider, hardly
right || 29 <δ> > περιοίκους Schneider, cp. 1329 a 26 || 30 Ἰδίων before εν
omitted by P4 L, Ar., the second Ἰδίων omitted by Γ18 Bk. || 34 τῇ Ald., τὰς Π4
Τ revival 35 ἄλλαττος Μ, δαλάζεσθης the other authorities Bk. Susem.1-2 || 30 Ἰδίων
αὐτὴν Μ1 Ald. and Π4 (1st hand) || εἰνα...37 δὴ εἰ κατ’ εὐχήν δεὶ καταγγέλθαι
τὴν θέαν πρὸς τάπερ ** δὴ (dei Schneider Susem.2) Susem.1-2, wrongly, si ad votum

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12 generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (311). Susem.
(836)
§ 13 26 εἰ δεὶ κατ’ εὐχήν Compare the passages collected in n. (128) on II. 1
§ 1. Susem. (837)
μήτε ὁμοφόρων] So Plato Latos VI. 777 D cp. μήτε παρακαταταλάττα Είναι τῶν μελ-
1. 5 §§ 5, 6, 1344 b 11 ff., esp. b 18 καὶ μὴ κτάσαι ὁμοφθαλμὸν πολλοῦς (Schneider).
Susem. (838)
μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression II. 5 §§ 25, 1264 b 9, see n. (182); there
“men of spirit,” here “passionate.” Compare what is said of θυμός in notes on III. 16 § 1 (64), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786),
§ 7 (799). Susem. (839)
28 δεύτερον δὲ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n. (815), also notes on II. 9. 4 (282) and
Exc. III. on the Cretan περίκοι ἡ π. 338. Susem. (840)
32 διὸτι βελτίων πάσι...ἐλευθερίαν A new contradiction in Aristotle’s theory of
slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the
best state actual slaves or serfs can only
to be, must logically remain slaves for ever.
However comp. Ps.-Ar. Oecon. 1. 5 § 5 f.,
1344 b 14 ff. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὀρθάθαι
παίνει δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευ-
θερίαν καθεταὶ ἀθλον. Susem. (841).
cc. 11, 12. The city: regulations in
detail for the site, the water-supply, the
plan of the streets, the fortifications, and
§ 30 εἰρήματι πρότερον] In c. 5 §§ 3, 4. Susem. (843)
Külth. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. *Metam.* 11. 6. 70, 364 b 19 L. *Problem.* XXXIX. 6. *Xen.* 1. 6. 9, 1348 a 7 ff. *Thea.* 10. 4. 3. Aristophanes *Eccl.* 169 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus *De virt.* 2. 5. like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-west and sometimes as north-east winds. *Soc.** 1. 5. *Men.* 311. 9. 9 and *Xen.* *Hellen.* 1. 1. 8. 9. *Xen.* *Hellen.* 1. 1. 6. 9 confirms this, and *Kaul.** The east wind is spoken of as warm. *Protev.* XXXI. 21, 546 b 14 (Newm.).


τῶν δὲ λατρευ.| What are the lieu points to be observed, a 21. *Hipp.* first, a 38, best seen are, consequent 5 by the words ἐν τοῖς δεκατριάοις κατὰ βορέαν *κατὰ βορέα* aiter; the ones which will remain to, at all probabilities, best
of situation. See ἡδίων 1330 b 22, κόσμου b 31, εἰχαμι 1331 a 36, καὶ τοῦτον τῶν κόσμων a 38. If the mention of this has been lost after λαχών we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the Critical notes, and render the whole: “of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes.” See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 408. Susem. (847).

§ 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν κτλ. Again from the same point of view as c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see n. (767). Susem. (848).

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy); that of Antioch was wonderfully good: Liban. 1. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 235), commends the Romans for their attention to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl. Laws 779 c.

5 τοῦτο γε εὑρήται] See Oecoc. 2. 22, 1350 a 17, εὑρίσκειν = assequi; though τοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must be “thus what is required has been attained.” Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29. Susem.

7 ‘Recte Ridgewayus ὑδάτα subiectum esse monet et eirγομένουs objectum verbi ὑπόλειται’ Qu. crit. coll. p. 408 Susem. That this is Aristotle’s regular use of the verb is plain from Ἦθελ. 1. 13-20, 1374 a 33, ὑπολείπει γάρ ἐν ὧν διαμερισματὶ, and III. 17. 21, 1418 a 35, ὦκε ὑπολείπεστι αὐτῶν ὦ λόγος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are eminently sound and practical.
§ 5. 30. Αριστοκρατικοί] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy: VI(iv). 7. 2 n. (1132), cp. 3 1 (1133), 4 (1141). 12. 6. 17 n. (1188) 111. 7. 3 n. (1136) and Exc. i. on III. 111. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes; and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections; for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short monarchs may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. SCHEM. (849)

§ 6. 14. κατά τῶν νεωτέρων πρῶτον Εν Αθήναις remarks that the surprise of Plataia (Thuc. 10. 6. 4) is ancient, and the second degree of Sargasos in modern times, will illustrate the author’s meaning. But “Amisos” probably here to save the experience of Persium, when beset by Philip of Macedon. Philip, after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall only to find himself in face of a close array of horsemen, going up over the up the slope of the hill, and poured by narrow lanes across which the besieged carried water, Disd. 77. 76.” (Neumann). SCHEM. (850)

§ 7. 19. τῶν ἀμφέλων συντάξεως] Unquestionably, visions planned in the fashion of aqmation. SCHEM. (851)

30. ἐν τούτῳ Cat sq. But this one, in straight streets, as Strabo says of Abyd.
ούτω γάρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἐξει καλῶς. (X)
§ 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιοιμένας πόλεις λιᾶν ἁρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,
τὰ ταῦθ' ὀρώντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἑκείνους καλλω-
§ 9 πισαμένας. Εἰσι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὀρόην καὶ μὴ πολὺ τὸ ὅπλον τοῖς πλήθει διαφέροντας ὡς καλὸν τὸ πειραμάθαι σφέσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρμομόντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδεχόμεναι πλεῖό την ὑπορέχῃ γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων [καὶ] τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἁρματῆς, εἰ δὲ σάφειαν δὲ καὶ μὴ τάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστήτατην ἐρμομόντα τῶν τειχῶν ὀνείρον εἰναι πολέμου μικροτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένοι τῶν περὶ τὸ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολυρρίας.
§ 10 ὁμοίων γάρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξίοιν τὰ

31 πρὸς before κόσμων omitted by Π3 Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before συμβαίνει omitted by M, [καὶ] Koraeas; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδεχόται
133a 3 τὸν τὸν ἐν Σ ὁρὸν and perhaps Π6 (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἀπασα μὲν ὀν ὁδὸς κατα-
τήμπται.
§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν κτλ] Plato Latus vi. 778 D fl.; περὶ δὲ τειχῶν ἐγγὺς ἀν τῆς Σαράμς ἐμφανίζεται τὸ κάθεν δεῖν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τα τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπαντητάναι. SUSEM. (853)
34 ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ] Here no doubt he is thinking more especially of Sparta: see n. (554) on III. 9. 10. SUSEM. (854)
Grote asked how, if Sparta had had walls like those of Babylon, they could have procured for her any greater protection than her strong position afforded in the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas, though he did not succeed in surprising it unwares, actually penetrated into the city, Xen. Helen. vii. 5. 11, Polyb. ix. 8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perinthus (340), although Thebes, in spite of its walls, was carried by assault (333).
§ 9 36 οὐ καλὸν] To skulk behind fortifications has been in all ages con-
trasted with courage in the open field. So of the remark of Archidamus, which Camerarius quotes from Plutarch, that at the sight of a catapult he exclaimed: ἀτολέον ἀνθρόπος ἁρματή. 
37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδεχόται] An

inversion which Mr Newman compares with ii. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μὴ τῶν πελεσ-
tων ἢ μὴ πάντων. Translate: "but as it not only may but does happen that the superiority of the enemy is too much for the brave but not superhuman resistance of the smaller number, in such cases, if the defenders are to preserve themselves and be free from indignity and injury, we must hold that walls of impregnable strength are a soldierly precaution, especially when we consider the precision that has been attained in the manufacture of missiles and siege-engines."
133a 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μη-
χανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two main divisions of Greek artillery ἐξοδεῖς 
§ 10 3 ομοίων γάρ τὸ...ἀξίοιν καὶ
"To insist on not building walls round cities is the same thing as to seek for a country easily invaded," for καὶ 'as' after ομοίων see ii. 8. 21, 1269 a 6. With ομοίων cp. ii. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κράνεων ἀξίοιν.
kai to tyn choran evemboiouv zhtew kai perimairive tois (X) orinouso tois, ormos o de kai taiv iiais wichesti u periiballeiv toichous ou anivdrwu esomevou tois katakouNor.

11 tov. allla mhin oude touto ge dei kaithwv, oti taiv mei peribeblemenvous teicrh peri tyn polin exeivn amphotroous chrthai taiv poleon, kai oui echousais teicrh kai oui mi 10 echouvnav, tois de mi kekthmeivous ouw exeivn. ei o toivov 11 exei tov trpouov, oux oti teicrh monon periiblhtew, allla kai toutous epimeleitouv, ouv, kai pros kousan echri to polie prepotos kai pros taiv polemikas xheias, tais te 12 alllav kai taes vun epexeurimavas. dosper gar tois etepi,

15 tibemenvous epimeleiv esti, dev an trpouv pleneektismouvs, ouv to mon euhtetai tais dei zhtet dei kai philochein kai 12 tois phulatnpomenvous arxhyn gar ouv epixeirohous epitéleitoun tois ev paraskenasevouvs. etet de dei to mon plh

thos tov politwv episuxephtai, ta de te 20 teicrh dieleithfai phulaktirous kai purgois kata tovous etepikairous, deloun wos auta prokaltei parrakewv-

5 orwoes IP II1 taiv diekhsais taiv iiais IP II Bk. 11 taiv — etepi tais AR. taiv — xekhtemiva P II Bk.1 11 [exeh] ? Kounas, wrongly (e.g. Pl. Leg., 174-4 with Hug's note) 11 tois tois twv Kounas 13 xanai — anepetpotev? ? Schneider, not badly 16 16 before yuvin IP II Bk., omitted by P 1 (as hard applied by corr.) 11 cal after philochein untranslated by William and Ar (perhaps rightly) 17 eteixeirousous ? Schmidt 21 etephe 12 etepheiv mantivby IP (supplied in the margin by pl) apost Bonita (Ind. Ar. 12:5 551), certainly not 10

The construction must be eipanai bi — de demv epiw — ev periiballeiv, thi

4mikhtwv sychtwv, the definitiv being parallel to yuvin.

11 7 allla mhin epy] We had a similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 3 n. (77) with respect to a maritime site for the city.

Suum. (855) 11 oux oti teicrh monon] mevav is plenastic.

14 taiv vun epexeurimavan Droysen, the Elder invented machines at this kind: Dind. xiv. 43. 1. 30. 4 (Lamartine), C.P. Kloutow and Koschly Greek. for Priay

Kriegmeister, p. 205 f. Afterwards the campaigns of Philip and Alexander of Macedon led to many fresh improvements in the siege-engines and heavy artillery: see Kloutow and Koschly p. 204, 307 ff. "It is possible" (see n. 1.259 oth viii(V), 6. 11) "that Aristotle was acquainted with the work of AlexanTaki

ces. (Sec. 32.)" (Eaton.) Sum. (856)

See also II. Droyse Kriegmeister
one similar: De anima ii. 4 § 12, 416 a 10 αυτὸ φαίνεται μονὸν πρεφέρομεν. Add Pol. iii. 5. 4, 1278 a 14. Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly: "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the several divisions of the citizens shall be held at the immediate sphere of their employment: those of the φάλακες in the φυλακτήρια and πύργων where they are on duty. Similarly the common meal of the ἄρχοντες is in the town hall." Hence he proposes to read τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἄρχεων, which is open to the objection: non omnium magistratum sed superiorum tantum praetoriam circa forum superius iacent. SUSEM.

§ 27 μαντειον ἀλλὰ πυθήροστον] Thus Aristotle places all the regulations for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state under the Delphic oracle precisely as Plato does Rep. iv. 427 b (Congreve). SUSEM. (859).

§ 3 28 ἐπιφάνειαν τε κτλ.] Cp. Vitruv. i. 7: aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum maxime in tutela civilis videtur esse, in excelsissimo loco, unde moenium maxima pars conspiciatur, areae distribuantur (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato Latis vi. 778 c, the temples to be built all round the Agora and the city among them πρὸς τοὺς υψηλοὺς τῶν τόπων εὐεργείας τε καὶ καθάροντος χάριν: viii. 848 d (similarly in the twelve κώμαι). SUSEM. (860).

Add Pausan. ix. 22 εἰδὲ μοι Ταναγρῶνος νομίσαι τὰ ἐκ τοὺς θεῶν μάλιστα δοκούναι Ἐλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἰτία σφίξ, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἵππα ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν καθαρω, τε καὶ καθάροντος χάριν: v. 848 d (similarly in the twelve κώμαι). SUSEM. (861).
35 Ballew mē kalọmymon ụpo tôn arχontaca (ἡ δ' ἢ όν [X]) eúxarịs o tòpos, e i καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων

§ 6 ἔχου τὴν τάξειν ἑνταῦθα: πρέπει γὰρ διηρήσαθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τῶν κόσμουν, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἡμετ-39 ροις ἄρχοντας τενος διατρίβει, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρά

§ 6 τοῖς ἄρχονται ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἄρχοντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰσθήτη καὶ τῶν τῶν ἐκα-39 τον ἄρεσον φόβον) τὴν δὲ τῶν ἁλίκτης πεπομένους καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πάσων, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς ἱερεῖς

§ 7 τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομήματων ἐχεῖν τὴν τάξειν. τῶν δ' ἄρχοντων

39 τᾶς—πρεσβυτέρας Γ. τὰ—πρεσβυτέρας app. reg. M'.

1331 b 4 τῶν πόλεων after διαίσθαι τίς P' Bk., thus avoiding hiatus. "there must be some mistake" Conzgreve, τιμητικοῦς Susenm. 5 εἰς<καί εἰς Leonia Bk. 4, [εἰς]<καί εἰς Susenm. But if 4 τῶν πόλεων is right, εἰς Κρατικά may have been dropped and εἰς may be a trace of this, [εἰς]<καί εἰς Κρατικά]<εἰς Ἀργείας—

Wellison, combining these suggestions τῶν omitted by P' (supplied in P' by cor.), untransliterated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after αἰσθανο-μένων τῶν-6 οἰκοδομήματων τὰ o οἰκοδομήματα Καθγεώτυν 6 χάρις incerts after οἰκοδομήματων by Baa. It should be ἀρχοντα which may just as well be understood

stood: οἰκοδομήματα <χώραν εἰς καί τὰ τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομήματα τὰς ἀρχοντα

Spengel


§ 5 39 ἄρχοντας τενος] Either special magistrates: ep. vii(vi). § 22 paraβασισμία, πρὸς δὲ τῶν αὐθέντων ἄρχοντας εὐπροειδοτέρως καὶ διάφανοτέρως κατὰ τὸ κύριον—διὰ τὸ κύριον, διὰ quum


τοις δὲ πρεσβυτέρους] In order that they may be kept amidst the presence of the magistrates: Intrud. p. 54. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 l. n. (1960). Susenm. (863)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπὶ δὲ κτῆλ] See c. 9 above. Susenm. (864).

§ 7 The repetition of δὲ before ἄρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the

soldiers form an important element of τὰ παλάτια τῶν πόλεων, it is probable either that they were stationed here (possibly the double cονιακά seems some corruption), or that παλάτιοι is itself a corruption of περικτικοῖς, the governing body. See Ciallath, art. τάρταρος, p. 408, 411. It is apparent from a comparison of vii. 6, 1, 1334 b 24, εἰς τὰ παλάτια, εἰς τὰ παλάτια, and (C. 1334 b 30 εἰς τὰ παλάτια), ἐπιτρέπεται τὰ παλάτια τάξιν εἰς τὰς συνελ-39 τας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα τὰς συνελαιμπάτηρας τὰς ἀρχοντας, how much harder the text is there would be the following εἰς τὰς αἰσθανομένας καὶ εἰς τὰς αἰσθήτας. With the τὰς αἰσθανομένας oikodomathas understand, from b. 1, εἰς τὰς αἰσθήτας τὰς a. 1. See Ciallath, art. τάρταρος, p. 410. This removes one of Ptole. Ridgeway's objections (Transact. 1912, p. 141), but a is still strong that he may should be an adjective here when δὲ is a substantive § 4, 6. 6 ἔχει την τάξιν καθότι, τις τίνι

1331 b 17. See ἐπιτρέπεται.
This Prof. not Susem. See state, omitted to chapter 4 stated,.

§ 8 νενεμήσαθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν
15 χώραν καὶ γὰρ ἐκεὶ τοῖς ἄρχονσιν, οὕς καλοῦσιν οὐ μὲν ὑλοροὺς ὁ δὲ ἄργονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συνσύτια πρὸς φυλακῆς ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν, ἐτὶ δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἰναι νενεμη-
mένα, τὰ μὲν θεσί τὰ δὲ ἡρωιν.

§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατριβεῖν νῦν ἀκριβολογομένους καὶ λέγον—
20 τὰς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἐστὶν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπτὸν ἐστὶ
tα τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον τὸ μὲν γὰρ
λέγειν εὐχίς ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβηνία τύχης. διὸ περὶ

8 τὴν after ἀλλη omitted by M* P1, perhaps rightly, [τὴν] Susem. 1 || 10 καὶ
kān ᾧ Susem. ** katakevásigmai P1, katakevásigmai Sb Vb, katakevásasai Ma **
14 μεμιμήσαις P18 5 6 Sb Vb Ar. Ald. Bk. 2 and P2 4 (1st hand, verso in P2 is written over an erasure), νενεμήσατας P4 (corr.) || 16 ἀκριβολογομοῦντας 5b Sb and P3 (1st hand, corrected by a later hand)

1333 b 35; ἐξ. τὴν φῶσιν = πεφικέναι, 1330 b 14; ἐπιμελεῖαν = ἐπιμελείσθαι, 1330 b 11; αἰσθησιν = αἰσθάνεσθαι, 1340 a 3 (cp. 1253 a 17); not to mention various phrases ἔχειν διαχέρειαν, μοθηρίας, διασκέ-
14 νειας, διαφοράς, δυσκολίας, which are equivalent to εἶναι διαχέρειας, μοθηριας, δια-

§ 7 9 ἀκριβολογομῶν... τὸ ἀστυνομῶν] Comp. 11. 5. 21 n. (176 b), vii (IV). 15. 9
n. (1354), § 22 n. (1373); vii (VI). 8 §§ 3—5
14 mm. (1461, 1463, 1468). Susem. (865)
10 συνόδος] As in 11. 9. 31, 1271 a 28
15 n. meeting, gathering. Cp. 1319 a 32.
11 περὶ has almost the meaning of a possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 18.
§ 8 14 ταξιν is the so-called cognate accus. after νενεμησασθαι.
16 n. (1463) for these wood-rangers or foresters. Plato has the term ἀκριβολογο
17 μας Latus vi. 760 ff. Susem. (866)
18 φυλακτήρια κτλ] Comp. Plato
19 Latus viii. 848 d: for the twelve κώμαι,
20 exactly as vii. 778 c for the Agora (Eaton).
See the citation n. (860). Susem. (867)
mēn tōn toisōu̱tōn tō te ēti plēion ἀφείσθαι τι τῶν. 13 peri δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν καὶ ποιήσαντος ἐτέκιν
15 συνεστάναι τῆς μέλλουσαν ἐσεσθαι πάλιν μακάριοι καὶ
§ 2 πολιτεύσασθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἔτει δὲ σω ἐστίν ἐκ οὗ γί
νεται τὸ εὐ πᾶσι, τούτου δὲ ἐστὶν εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν σκο-
πτῶν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ἄρθρων, ἐν τῷ τῶν
πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσα πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἔσεθη δὲ πάρ
30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλ' ἄλλως καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνιότε γὰρ
ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκείναι καλῶς, ἡ δὲ τὸ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-
χείν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
πάντων ἐπιτυχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἑδονίτου φαίνεται,
ὅτε δὲ ἐκκέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἱατρίκην οὕτω [γαρ]
35 ποιοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ ἐγκαίνιον εἶναι σάμα κρίνουσιν ἐνιότε καλῶς,
οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον τυχािανοῦσι τῶν ποιη-
τικῶν δέ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἑπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀπ
φώτερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξειν).
§ 3 ὡτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὑ ἐξί καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφεύσιον
40 πάντες, φανερῶν, ἀλλὰ τούτου τοις μὲν ἐξαισθητισμών, τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινὰ φύσις ἡ τύχη (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ ἕθει

like Nm. Euth. x., distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher-
life of philosophic contemplation. In c. 13 there is no consciousness of what
seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the
καλὸς ἐπιθέσια. In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words
φανέρων τοις καὶ εἰς τοὺς καθισμοὺς, 1332 κ. 7, has more affinity for the Euclidean than the
Niomachian "Ethics" (Journal of Philol. x. 84 f.).

1. 26—38 Euclidus reproduces this
13. 11, 3, 1337 b 19—21. The whole
period is 1332 a 2. Excellent discussion
by Honite Ar. Nih. II. 16. p. 94.
S. 1.
2. 29 χρίσκω ταυτίζεται. See 1132
b 5 ο. No leader is certain. Yet below
b 38 ραταίας to be won, secured.
For this sense of εὖθες comp. 1. 5. 2. 1254 a 23 εὖθες ἑκ γενετής. Bonitz Ind. s. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16. 9; 287 b 10. 1. 8. 9. 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὖθος; so vii(iv). 11. 6. 1295 b 16. εὖθες ἀκόλοθον, and viii(v). c. 4 § 9. 1304 a 30. § 12. 1304 b 9. c. 5 § 3. 1304 b 32. c. 11 § 23. 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, 

\[\text{do not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the Ethics there (i.e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 1, φαμέν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμέν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804). 1328 b 41 n. (831). 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of ἐφαμέν, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also n. (807) and 1. 2. 8 n. (21).}

Susem. (872) § 5 § 8 εν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς Nic. Eth. 1. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 15, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. Susem. (873) εἰ τίνων λόγων ἐκείνων ὑφέλοις It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [Dialogue, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men treated Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. Susem. (874) With far less plausibility Grote in an essay on the Ethics (in Fragments p. 133 f.) connects this passage with Nic. Eth. 1. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and II. 2. 3—5. 1104 a 1—11 περὶ τῶν ἐθικῶν ἰδεῶν, as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): "that Aristotle regarded
the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as all but desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of εἶναί is εὖδαμοιναί. The definition in full is εὖδαμοιναί καὶ χρήσις ἀμετρή τελεία, οἷς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἄλλα ἀπλόσ. (Comp. Mr Newman's remark 1. p. 575 L. 11. 385—401.)

telos We may paraphrase: "matured and relatively permanent." See Rassow Forschungen p. 116 ff. Happi-ness of too short duration is no true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Well- being, because its virtue is not yet de- veloped: Nic. Eth. 1. 9. 10. 1100 a 1 ff. cp. Pol. 1. 13. 11. n. (120). The corres- ponding negative term, τῶν ἀσθενῶν, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: 1. 13. 7 b. (cp. § 11). 111. 11. 9 n. (573). v. VIII. 3. 10 n. (104). Susem. (875)


tο ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως This is not to be found in Mr. Eisner, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. Susem. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'almaeina' are attributes not very suitable to word or virtues, activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 ταυτηκαία] On this passage see Dr. Jackson's article, Journal of Phil. x. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word ταυτηκαία for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato Rep. vi. 493 c. εἶλα ταυτηκαία εὖδαμοιναί καὶ καλά ἐκ τοῦ μὲν τὰ ἀρετεῖας καὶ ἀρετής γενέσθαι, την δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαίας συναγωγὰς οὐκ εἴχεν εἰς καλά, Κυο. c. 14. (89). 433 a 31. [καὶ ταυτηκαία] καὶ χρήσις (2) καλὰ καὶ ἔργα, Rep. 1. 432 b 2 2. ἐπί τοῦ Κυρίου ἑκάστος ἄνθρωπος ἔργα, ἐκάστος καλά.

tο καλόν] πραγματέας. But below, a καὶ τούτο καλόν, χ. 8. 17, must deliver us from any idea of actions.

15 καὶ το καλὸν ἀναγκαίας ἰχονεῖ] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil.' (Converse). Susem. (877)

16 τὸ τούτον, τὸν τροποῦ, καὶ καλὸν, καὶ αἰτίαν.

17 ἄρωμα This is roughly the final sense of 7 b 10 sqq. (877 b 5). Eudemus 11. p. 68. Susem. (877 b)
χρήσατο δ’ ἄν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀινὴ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ἄλλαις τῆς ἐκκλῆσις τοῖς ἀγάθων καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστὶν. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἴδιους λόγους, ὅτι τοιούτου ἐστὶν ὁ σπουδαῖος, δ’ ἤδη τὴν § 8 ἀρετὴν [τα] ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. δὴ ἦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίον σπουδαίας καὶ καλῶς εἶναι ταῦτα 25 ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐτία τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κυθαρίζειν λαμ¬πρῶν καὶ καλῶς αὐτὸ ἐν τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δὲ ἀρετὴν, omitting τὴν, M* 1: hence [τὴν] Susm. 1, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ] before ἀγάθα Reiz Bk. 2 || δὴ Sepulveda, δ’ Π 1 Ar. Bk. 1 Susm. 1 in the text || δὲ καὶ ὅταν apparently Π (palam autem et good William) || 27 ἀτιφότο <τίς> P 3 Bk. 2 || ὃ λύρα, Π perhaps rightly

19 χρήσατο δ’ αὐτόι] Comp. Nic. Eth. i. 10. ii. 11 f. i. 100 b 18 ff., where this is presented as a special feature of Magnanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790). Again in Post. Analytics ii. 13. 18. 97 b 15 ff., this, ὅταν ἀληθεῖαι εἶναι εὐγνώμονας καί ἀγαθῶν, is mentioned as a second mark of the high-souled character (megálaphros) along with that added in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνεχθαι Ἴδρυμα (Eaton). Susm. (878) Cp. χρήσις in N. E. i. 10. 12. 1100 b 27, χρήσις § 13, 1101 a 4. 20 τὸ μακάριον] The decision in N. E. i. 10. 11 f. 1101 a 6, is δῆλον μὲν οὐδέποτε γένος ἄν οἱ εὐδαιμονεῖς, οὐ μὴ μακάριος γε, ὅν Πρωμακάρις τάγμα περιποιήσε. Cp. i b. i. 10. 3. 1100 a 16 ff., and the absurd derivation from χάρειν. vii. ii. 2. 1152 b 7.

21 κατὰ τῶν ἱδίων λόγων] Nic. Eth. iii. c. 4 [c. 6. Bk.], esp. § 4, 1113 a 25, τῶν μὲν σπουδῶν τὸ μὲν ἀληθεῖα (sc. βούλησιν) εἶναι sc. φαντών βουλητῶν. a. 32 διάφερει πλείον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἄλλῳ ἐν ἐκτοιοῦτον. It is quite true the statement is not made there in so many words: this is much more nearly the case in the two spurious treatises, Eth. Eth. vii. 15. 5. 1248 b 26 ff., Magna Moralia ii. 9. 14. 1207 b 31 ff. Susm. (879) Comp. also Rhet. i. 6. 2. 1362 a 24 ff.

§ 8 24 τὰς χρήσεις] The plural as εὐγνώμες. In fact χρήσις and ἐνεργεία are both opposed to εἶξιν. The use which from time to time he makes of these goods (not of their opposites) attests his absolute virtuosity and goodness. Hence to consider external goods the cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as tending to bring about the instrument to which what is really the result of the player's skill.

25 διὸ....26 ἀγαθῶν] Because external goods are just those which while absolutely good (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ) are not good for every one, but only good at all times to the good man: Nic. Eth. v. i. 9. 1129 b 1 ff., οὕτως δὲ πλεονεκτησί τὸ ἀδικος, περὶ τὰ γαθα ἔρημα, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀληθεῖσιν, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλά περὶ διά εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οὐ εὐτύ ui ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, τοίς δ’ οὐκ ἄλλα, Meta. Z. vii. 4. 2. 1299 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἐρημών ἔρημον, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῖς πράξεων τὸ πούσιν, ὅτι τὸν ἐπάνω ἀγαθῶν τὸ ἅλεος ἀγαθᾶ ἐκαθάρθη ἀγαθά. Susm. (880) The distinction is drawn N. E. vii. 12. 1. 1152 b 26 f. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διήκως τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τίμη. See N. E. i. 3. 3. 1094 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are instances, since they have proved in some cases fatal (τιμὶ δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ).

c. 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see Crit. note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26 ἐπὶ δὲ...to 1332 a 27 τῆς τέχνης, as an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning. “What was said” (a 28, τῶν εἰρήμενων) would then mean what was said cc. 4—12; and that would undoubtedly serve to explain what according to §§ 9, it requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων. But then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον κτλ lacks all proper connexion unless it has been directly preceded by the statement that Wellbeing consists in the practice of virtue assisted by the requisite external conditions. This alone makes all follow in regular order: these conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend on Fortune, but if the external conditions are present it is the governing intelligence that produces virtue. Hence the fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispensable for the context, and the atheists of this place is not the right way to re-
move the objection noticed in nn. (687, 872), although we do not deny, and in n. (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion, would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. Far, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton’s objections to the genuineness of ε. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in nn. (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive, while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embodied in the context of ε. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f. ; cp. n. (931). SUBEM. (881).

10 εν] It follows from what has been said ; cp. n. on 1254 a 31.

τά μέν εἰσιν καὶ τῶν δι' εὐκράτειαν τον μελλόναν βοηθοῦν πάλιν παραδείγματα γιαλήν δράσεις ἀπὸ τῆς ἔργων τῆς Δίκαιας. To this is opposed the supposed origin of the legislator as in 1. 10. 1, 1258 a 31 ff., 11. 3, 2, 1261 a 39, 11 § 15, 1273 b 24. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, χαράγμα, is due to Fortune; the other, δράσις, is the legislator’s task (ἐκτεταγμένη). Cp. 1.133 a 14 τριήμερος, viz. by education. ‘Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.’

§ 9 29 εὐθυμεῖα] Another of the passages cited n. (1128). SUBEM. (883)

30 τῆς τῶν πολλῶν συστασιν The structure of the state—the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune’s disposal. The relative clause is the object of ταυτατά καὶ προαιρέσεως. The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (κατά τις ἄριθμος τῆς ἔνας , τῆς τε καικράδος, τῆς τε γνώμης τῆς πολιτικῆς. Ὑπὲρ τῶν διάμην τῶν μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι συμβαίνει, ἡμῖν δὲ πιέτως ἀν πολιτεία 10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τούτων ἑαυτῶν συμπεποίησεν, τὸν δὲ Ἱμήρ γε-
36 

36 νεται σπουδαιος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας εἰδέχεται σπουδαιος (X εἴναι, μῆ καθ' ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετωτέρον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἐκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

§ 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαιοί γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ 6 τριά δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσει ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φύσιν δεὶ πρῶτον οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ἐφών, εἶτα καὶ (ποιοῦν τινα σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐνία δὲ οὔθεν ὤφελος 132b φύσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἐνία γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζωτα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χέριν.

§ 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐθῶν μᾶλατα μὲν τῇ φύσει ᾗ, μικρὰ δ' ἐνα καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ 5 καὶ λόγω μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὡστε δεὶ ταῦτα συμφω-

41 εἶτα P6 (later hand) and Lambin, οὕτω Π1-3. Susem.1 in the text and P6 (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Γ, τε Π Ιλ. Bk.

132b 1 μεταβαλέναι Π2 Bk. || ἐνα...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γὰρ] δὲ ? Schneider || ἐστι διὰ] ἐστίν Ιδία Koraes || [διὰ] Göttingl, βία Lindau, against the sense || 2 φύσεως <και> in the margin || <ἀ διὰγεται> διὰ ? Susem, <ἀ> διὰ and <δέπει> ἐπί Schmidt, ἐθῶν <δὲ μεταβάλλωμεν> ? Conring, ἐθῶν * * or else [διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν] Thurot || δὲ is added after διὰ by Alb. and Thomas || 3 βέλτιον <ἀγανται> Schneider (who also brackets b1 ἐστι), βέλτιον <ἀγαντεν> Welldon who also reads δὲ διὰ <δὲ> τῶν ἐθῶν || 5 ὡστε...6 ἀλλόφυος transposed by Böcker to precede 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν: see Thesiod. p. 89. Susem. had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλὰ γὰρ...7 βέλτιον || 5 μῶνον Spengel (solus Ar.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(v). 9, 12, 1310 a 18 f. n. (16.2). Susem. (886) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (11. 5. 27) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες | ὡς ἐκαστος, see 11. 3. 2, 1361 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(v).

8. 3, 1307 b 35 ff.

39 ἀλλὰ μὴν...40 λόγος] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f., n. (931). Comp. N. Eth. x. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 f., γίνεσθαι δ' ἄγαθος οὖνται οὐ μὲν φύσει οὐ δ' θεία οὐ δ' διὰδαχῇ. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by διαδήχη, instruction, so in B. 11. 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II. 8. 24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. Susem. (887)

41 εἶτα καὶ...42 ψυχὴν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence Ι. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., 1. 13. 2 f. 1250 b 22—28. In Nic. Eth. vi. 13, 1144 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (αἴ φυσικὰ καὶ ἔξεις), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (ἔξεις), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (104.3), i.e. Exc. III. on B. ν(viii). Susem. (888)

42 ἐνα is subject to φύσιν, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11 1332 b 1 ἐνα γὰρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Arethins translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam aliqua per naturam ad utrumque apta per mores ad peius vel melius convertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. Susem.

§ 12 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλὰ κτλ.] In form this sentence recalls Met. 1. 1. 3, 986 b25—28, N. E. VIII. 12. 7, 1162a 19—22. 4 μικρὰ is accus., ἐνα nominative. The gender of μῶνον is a parallel to τελεοθεὸν and χωρισθεν, 1. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δεὶ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν] Habit should cooperate with natural endowment. This
nein αλλήλων. <τα μεν οίνω άλλα των ζώων μιλεστα μεν τῇ φύσει> (VII) 4 <ζη, μικρά δ' ένει και τοις έθεσιν, άνδρας δε και λόγου: μέσον διηρήσεως λόγου> τολάχιστον παρά τούς έθισμούς και την φύσιν πράττομαι διά τον λόγον, είναι πεισφώσις άλλως έχειν βάλτοιν.

13 την μεν τοιούτων φύσιν οίνου είναι δει τους μαλλον
tas εικερότερους έσεσθαι το νομοθέτη, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον
το δε λαοτών έργων ήδη παιδείας, τα μεν ταρ έθισμου εκλάθομαι, τα δ' ακούοντες. 4 επεί δε πάσα πολιτική κοινωνία συνιστήσει εξ άρχων
των και άρχόμενων, τούτο ήδη σκεπτόντα, εϊ έτέρως είναι
dει τους άρχοντας και τους άρχόμενους ή τους αύτους δια
15 βίου: δόλων γάρ ως άκολουθείν δείηκα και την παιδεία

8 τολεν omitted and δή inserted after φύσιν by P31 and P32 (1st hand, supplied by p1 in the margin): presumably τολεν and δή (before φύσιν) were variants. In Bk.2 φύσιν is omitted by mistake 10 έθισμον p3 P2 13 [ τό ] έθισμον P1 (1st hand), Bk.1 Bk. and P1 (corr)., possibly right έθισμον-14 τοις αύτους. P1. Ar. Bk. Susen.1, in the text, τοις αύτους—14 τοις αύτους. Susen.1 Modi' first corrected corruption, but proposed άρχομένους, [§] 15 τοις omitted by P31. V3

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson’s view (έτατο reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 γ' πρότερον. In c. 7. Susen. (888)
10 το αλλά γάρ. By habituation (εκ+δησμος) arises moral virtue, by instruction (άκοους) intellectual virtue. Nic. Eth. 11. 1. 1, 1103a 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education; N. E. 11. 1. 8, 1103 b 12 ff., N. 9. 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). Susen. (890)


§ 1 13—16] Comp. III. 4. 8 n. (162) for the distinction in education. Susen. (891)

13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see Crit. n.) Dr. Jackson argues in the following note: Aristotel here contrasts (a) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (b) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase τοις αύτους είχε might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. II might be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, “the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled”; or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, “the same persons rule and are ruled.” But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used conditionally in both senses. Susenhill however, though he has altered the text in 1333 b 13, 14, so that the phrase τοις αύτους είχε has the latter of the two meanings above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the former of the meanings in 1333 b 15. Thus the alteration creates a inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in both places in the former of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Susenhill assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: “vulgar indl. against violent, good details, good Greek, etc., against bad Greek, bad details. Against the good details of the first edition, the bad Greek, the details, etc., the second edition of Prof. Jackson, as is usual in such cases, makes some important and necessary alteration. cp. Cat. 170 b 14, 15 (with parenthetical note) p. 177] Where the comments on each side are equally balanced, the thematic order in the last indl. is no more than a report.
§ 2 κατά τήν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἰσήγαγον τοσούτων (X) διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὁσον τούς θεοῦς καὶ τούς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατά τὸ σῶμα πολλῆς ἑχοντας ὑπερβολῆς, εἶτα κατά 2ο τήν ψυχήν, ὡστε ἀναμφίσβητητον εἶναι καὶ εἰρενήν τήν ὑπεροχὴν τῶν ἁρχομένων τῆς τῶν ἁρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἂλ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἁρχεῖν τοὺς δ' ἁρχεσθαι
§ 3 καθάπαξ: ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτ' οὐ ράδιον λαβέων οὐδὲ ἔστω ὡστερ ἐν 2
Ἰνδοῖς φησι Σκυλαῖς εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσούτων διαφέ-
25 ροντας τῶν ἁρχομένων, εἰρενὴν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνείν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἁρχεῖν καὶ ἁρχεσθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἱσον * * ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίως, καὶ 30 χαλεπῶς μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκήν παρὰ τὸ § 4 δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἁρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν
βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· τοσούτοις τε εἶναι
23 ὡσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἁρχεσθαι
?Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἁρχεσθαί], or else ἁρχεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἁρχεῖν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἱσον [τῇ δίκαιῳ] Thurot, ἱσον
<kai to dikaiō> Susem. from Dübner's translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thurot || 30 βουλόμενοι Vettori (in his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ? Spengel

16 κατὰ = in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταύτα λέγεσθαι Meta. 1.6.3, 987b9, Bonitz ad loc. Eucken p. 43. This construction with ἀκολουθεῖν is less frequent than the dative. But cp. N. E. II. 1. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τάς τοις διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσα ἀνέξως, 7. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καὶ ὁμοίως ἢκολούθηκαν, Hist. Animal. VIII. 2. 13, 490 a 16, ἀκολουθοῦσιν οἷοι βλατοι κατὰ τάς τῶν διαφορὰς, 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13 (Ind. Ar. 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a double misprint, Γ 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν κτλ] Comp. 1. 5. 10, 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). Susem. (892)
Strikingly similar to Pl. Politicæ 301 d (e, v) δὲ γὰρ ὡστε ὁσον ὠστε γεγονόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πολεῖς βασιλείας οἶον ἐν σημ. νεσισι ψηφίζεται, το τε σῶμα καὶ τήν ψυχήν διαφέρειν εἰς, δεὶ δὴ εὐκλέθαντας ἔγνωρμα. ματα γράφειν.

22 βέλτιον δὲ κτλ] This has been affirmed 11. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the basis of the argument for Absolute Monarchy III. 13, 13. See nn. (601, 678).

§ 3 Sceylax of Caryanda in Caria was sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the mouth of the Indus, Herod. IV. 44. We may conclude with certainty from this passage that he published an account of his expedition in a book of travels. But the geographical work, which has come down to us bearing the name of Sceylax, Peri-
πλοια τῶν ἤμελτῶν ἡμελεύσαν ἀρχομένων, is of much later date. Susem. (893)
Comp. Niebuhr in Phil. Museum 1. 245.

24 τοὺς βασιλέας κτλ] Cp. vi. (iv). 4, 4, n. (1165). In Ethiopia the kings were chosen for their stature. Susem. (894)
27 τὸ τε γὰρ ἱσον <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> ταὐτὸν] Where all the citizens are peers, equality is the same thing as justice. See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. Susem. (895)
Equality = κατὰ μέρος ἁρχεῖν καὶ ἁρ.
χεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From viii. (ν.) 1.
11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it is τὸ κατ᾽ ἄξιον ἱσον which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is τὸ ἀριθμὸ ἱσον which is ταὐτό.
28 χαλεπῶς μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν⋯⋯ 32 ἵστων] This passage condenses the results of the inquiry into the stability and instability of governments in B. viii.(ν) and vi,(iv), especially recognising the criterion of viii.(ν). 9, 6, 1309 b 16 ff., and vi.(iv), 12. 1, 1265 b 14 ff. ὡστος κριτίτων ἐσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν. Susem. n. (1307).

This is one of the few instances in which τη γάρ ναι is translated, as is allowed by Bonn, who discusses the Aristotelian usage of τη γάρ generally in the paper just cited p. 67; cf. p. 692. See above. (XVIII)

English readers may consult Shelley's critical note to Dem. Βι ψυχω λογι, 1196. He cites Herodot. v. 165, Aristoph. Βι 427, Ar. Μνημ. κ. 1428 b 17, and Μνημ. κ. 1433 b 5, and further illustrates the similar usage of αὐτῆς γάρ.

In this passage διήρταται λόγως. Lc. 11. 19; 56—10, 1376 b 30 6. It is noteworthy that reference is only made to this passage, and not to the much more similar now quoted ib. 1374 b 17, and Μνημ. κ. 1433 b 5, and further illustrates the similar usage of αὐτῆς γάρ.

The passage is in the manuscript of the manuscript of the manuscript.
The two propositions, or to the týnos úneke. 

The power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 15, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. 

The present may well stand here also (see nn. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 §§ 5. Comp. n. (471). 

The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however not only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φίλος has been clearly proved in III. 4. 17. The question now to be considered is which of the two ranks the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also v(viii), 2. 1 n. (977), also n. (1024) and Exc. 1. to B. v(viii). Also Introd. p. 48, p. 50 ff. 

Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the properly rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence: §§ 9—14. Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which make success in war the goal of education: §§ 15—22. 

§ 17 Διήγησαί δε κτλ. See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. 

Susem. (904)
μενον. διν φαμεν τας ἀρετας ειναι καθ' ὡς ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς λεγει· (XIII) 10 ται πως. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον το τέλος, τοις μὲν οὕτωις 10 διαμορφίσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἅδηλον πως ἕκτενον. αἰε γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον του βελτίωνον ἐστιν ἑνεκεν, καὶ τούτο φαινεῖν ὡμολογεῖ ἐν τοις τοις κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν βελτίων δὲ τὸ λόγον ἑχον. [δεξηται τε διχῇ, καθ' ὄντως εἰσοδαμεν τρόπον διαίται 25 μεν ἡμάρ πρακτικὸς ἐστι λόγος δὲ διεθεωρητικὸς. 11 φασάτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτο τὸ μέρος διεχθαι ἐνδον ὡς] καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογων ἔρομεν ἑχειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ φυσεί βελτίωνον ἀρετωτέρας ειναι τοις δυναμένις τυρν. 29 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυνών· αἰε γὰρ ἔκαστο τοῦθεν αἰφεῖ 12 τότατον οὐ τυχεῖν ἐστὶν ἀκροτάτου. δεξηται δὲ καὶ πάς ὁ 31 βίος εἰς ἄσχολιαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρή. 13 συμα τα δὲ εἰς τα καλα. περὶ ὅν ἀνάγκη την αὐτήν αἰρεσιν ειναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεις καὶ ταῖς πράξεις.

20 τοῦτον Μ', για William | 24 δεξηται...: 7 ἔσησι) Socem. | τρ] τι Γ | διξ' < δ' ἄλγος > Reitz, following Lambin's translation. 26 ὑπερ] 4 Π | καὶ τάνθον τὸ μέρος after διεγόρησιν διαίτης 12 Π Bk. | δηλαὶ δ' Βικ., omitted by Ald. W., while Ar. translates it after πράξεις: δηλαὶ δ' διερνεῖν την Syllburg, <καὶ> δηλαὶ δ' διερνεῖν την Spengel. Both Syllburg and Spengel omit 27 Σδ', which neither William nor Ar. translates. | 29 <πασῶν ἢ <τῶν> τοίν δικόν Ed. Müller (Græc. der Kunsttheorie II p. 370) ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δικόν Ridgeway, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δικόν Socem.: Schmidt however conjectures that we καὶ βούλωνται has been dropped after δηλα. | 31 καὶ τῶν Reitz | 32 [καὶ τῶν] and 33 (εἰς τά) Bonitz Indl. Ar. 42 b 26 ff. | 63 σα 29 ff. Soc however Vahlen Etzschk. f. u. estr. Gym. 1872 p. 540. 33 [πραξ]' and 34 διαφορα Schneider, wrongly.

§ 10 24 δεξηται] Sc. τοῦ ἄλγος εἰσερ. The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλαίθης is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, as n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate to take it here the further questions: In regard to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or the practical side that occupies the higher place? Is it the intellectual development of the former, or rather the cultivation of practical and political wisdom, which is the chief and final aim of Education? Yet these questions are not raised anywhere in the context and so the passage serves no useful purpose. What is worse, it interrupts the connection to the most confusing manner: it must therefore be pronounced an interpolation by an alien hand. Socem. (903)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις] C.p. amm. (71 a, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c 2 § 1, 6 b, c 3 § 3, § 3, § 8. Socem. (906)

29 τοῖν δυνών] The relation is expressed 1351 b 10, τοῖν τρεῖν τοῖν φυλακῶν πράξεις.

50 οὐ τυχεὶν ἐστὶν ἀκροτάτων] The highest within his reach, how determined is not explained. Cρ. I. 1. 11.

§ 12 30 δεξηται δι] As e.g. 1. 3. 10, 1534 b 10. There is an echo of the ὑπερθυκοσιον οτί Πριτ. τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ὑπερθυκοσιον τοῦ καθάρου (Newmann).


§ 13 44 αἰρετικ] The formation of arketātum a 28 a 33, τὰ τοῖς τυχεῖν, patres aligent in the choice of one mode in preference to another: The estimate of value is the ground of preference. At
35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχο- (XI
λῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἐνεκεν.
πρός πάντα μὲν τοίς τῷ πολιτικῷ πρόστημαν νομοθετήσον, 9
καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις.
§ 14 αὐτών, μάλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τελ. τῶν
40 αὐτών δὲ τρόπων καὶ περὶ τούς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-

tων αἱρέσεις' δει μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολέων δύνασθαι καὶ πο-
λεμεῖν, μάλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἀγείν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τὰ-
ναγκαία καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεί
μάλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ πάιδας ἐτί
4 ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας, ὡσαὶ δέουσαι πα-
§ 15 δελα. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀρίστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύοντο τῶν Ἐλ-
6 λήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βελτίστου τέλος φαίνονται συντάξη-

tες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
tοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν
10 πρὸς τὰς χρήσιμους εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ πλεονεκτικώτερα.
§ 16 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτους καὶ τῶν ὑστέρον τινὲς γραφάντων

40 πράξεων; Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense || 41 αἰ-
ρέσεις Koraes (cp. a 34), διαίρεσεις (δὲ αἱρέσεις P4) Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem. in the text ||
μὲν omitted by Γ P4, hence [μὲν] Susem. 1

1333 b 2 δὲ before πράττειν added by Π2 Bk., before καὶ P3, δεῖ ? Stahr || 7 βλέ-
tων Π2 P3 Bk., possibly right, βέλτων <καὶ τὸ> ? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted by Π1

a later time αἱρέσθαι, φέλγειν are tech-

ical Stoic terms, e.g. D. l. vii. 105.

35 πόλεμον] sc. αἱρέσεις εἶναι οἱ αἱ-

ρεισθαί δὲ.

ασχολαν δὲ σχολῆς] Comp. N. E.

v. 7, 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato Laws 1. 628 b (Eaton), and with the former passage n.

(931) below. SUSEM. (907)

37 βλέποντι: Goes with πρὸς πάντα: an instance of hyperbaton.

39 τέλη] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποῦν.

§ 14 1333 b 1 μάλλον δ' εἰρήνην

ἀγείν] Cpr. again Plato Laws 1. 628 b, ὡς αὐτὸς τοὺς οὖτ' ἄρ' ποτε πολιτικός γένοι' ὡς ἀρ ρients τὰ ἐξωθέν πολεμικά ἀποβλέπσιν 

μόνον ἤ πρώτον, οὔτ' ἢ νομοθέτης ἀκρίβει, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πόλεμον νομοθετῶ 

μάλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἑνέκα τῆς εἰ-

ρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (908)

§ 15 τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας] What these are, is plain from 1200 b 15 f., 1277 a 16—20. See further n. (1024) on v. viii.

5. 4. 1339 a 20 f.


9 φορτικῶς] In a purely utilitatarian, almost mercenary spirit.

§ 16 II καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων τινὶς γρ.] Comp. vi(iv). 1 § 3 with n. (1123) and Introd. p. 20 n. 1. Here we again clearly perceive how slight is our knowledge of such political literature before Aristotle. It is highly probable that among the writers here alluded to were those two who were the first to set up the theory of a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, nn. (219—221) and B. H. Exc. 1. p. 449; since it was in the Spartan and Cretan constitutions that they found the realiza-
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tōn ēυτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (X τῶν τῶν Δακώνον νομοθέτην), καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστος τῶν
20 γραφόντων περὶ <τής> πολιτείας αυτῶν, ὥστε δὲ τὸ γεγομένασθαι
§ 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἥρχουν") καίτοι δήλων ὡς ἑπειδὴ 12
νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Δάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαι-
muνες, οὐδὲ ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τούτῳ γελοῖν, εἴ
μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδένος ἐμπιστοῦντως
25 πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκας τὸ ξῆν κα-
§ 19 λώς. οὐκ ὅρθως δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἄρχης ἦν
δὲ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τῶν νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς
ἀρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχῇ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'
ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τούτο δεὶ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομί-
13 30 ξείν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ
tὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
§ 20 δήλων γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτοι πει-
ρατέοι διόκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν
ὑπὲρ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Δάκωνες Παυσανία τῷ βασιλεί, καὶ
35 περ ἑχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν. οὐτε δὴ πολιτικῶς τῶν τοιοῦ-
tων νόμων καὶ λόγων οὔτει οὕτε ὕφελμος οὐτε ἀληθῆς ἐστὶν.

18 Θίμβρων Περσικος Αρ. Βκ. || 20 <τής> Schneider BK. || γεγομένασθαι Μπ P1 || 21 ἐπείδη γε νῦν Μ' P1 || 23 ἐστὶ δὲ Congreve, ἐστι γὰρ Susem. || 26 δὲ M', omitted by P4. Sb Vb Λν. || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reitz, καρπερεῖν ? Congreve, perhaps rightly || ἵσχυειν Γ' Ρ', ἵσχυειν M' || 31 τῷ Scaliger BK. || 36 λόγων (omitted by P4) καὶ νόμων Π' P4 Ar. (3) and BK.

18 Θίμβρων] See n. (91l).
19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephoros n. (219); and perhaps Critias.
20 γεγομένασθαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen; see Schomann op. c. E. tr. p. 255 ff.
§ 18 21 δήλων] That is, on their own premises such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of post hoc propter hoc.
23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. De Rep. Lac. c. 14, [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch’s authority for the ‘Life of Agis’ adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle’s criticism in B. I. and in the Politics. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadas and degenerate Spartans: (β) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Crypteia, or the treatment of the Helots: and (γ) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.
§ 19 27 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς κτλ.] Comp. 1. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); 11 (vii). c. § 3 n. (734). Susem. (913).
§ 20 32 δήλων γὰρ] ‘For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.’ Certainly a very appropriate remark. Susem. (914)
34 On Pausanias see viii(v). § 10, 7 § 2 vm. (1498, 1596). Susem. (915)
35 πολιτικῶς] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a ‘noun’ πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθετικός stands to νομο-
θέτης.
24 ὑποτικὸ πέρα καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῆ, τῶν <τε> νομοθέτης (XIII) ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν αὐτῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσεωι οὐ τοῦτον χάριν δει μελετάτα, ἵνα κατα- μο δουλῆσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλὰ ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῖς μὲν δουλεύσωσιν ἐτέροις, ἐστίν ὡς ἄνδρες ζητώσι τὴν ἔγχρωμα τὴν ἀφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων διαστείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύσαι. ὁτι ἐὖ moo µονοθητήν μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅτι καὶ τὴν πολεμική καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολαζέων ἓνεκεν τάξιν καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. Αἰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσα μὲν ἀφόσιον, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπολλυταί, τὴν γὰρ βαρῆν ἀμισίαν, ὡσπερ ὁ σιδήρος, εἰρήνην ἀγα- τες. αἴτιος δε ὁ νομοθετὴς οὐ παθοῦσας δύνασθαι σχο- 10 λάζειν.

15 ἐπεί δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἰδία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δρόμον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν δὴ δεῖ τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπερέχειν: τέλος γὰρ,

37 τῶν P53-5 L4 V* Atr., τάτα the other authorities, τὰ Speigel; ἔναν I. Ald. τῶν <τε> Thurot Susen.3-3, <τε> E~. Κυγνεττά 38 ταῦτα κατάβαλεν by P44-4 L, τάτα Bk.2 ἀνθρώπων τῆς τε τῶν τῶν τίς over in III 39 ταῦτα κατάβαλεν ΓΜ* 41 διουλιότατον P14-4 S5 V5 41 διουλιότατον Γ

13.44 ἔνα ταῦτα ὑπερεχεῖ τοῦ Joh. Brandis (Mela. Mar. 86. p. 596), not rightly τα τοῖς Vettori, τὰς Koreas. 3 ταῦτα. 4 σπουδάζειν καταβάλε συνίσταται by ΓΜ* 5 ταῦτα P1 (1st hand) and probably Γ (stemma William), τὸν Μ* 8 δίδων P14-4 Bk., perhaps rightly τὸν δὲ, 11 δὲ,Susen., yet δὲ is also tenable τα τοῦ ὑπερεχεῖν Susen., υπερεχεῖ ΓΜ Atr. Bk. Susen.1


40 ἔνα followed by ὅπως. See P. Weber Abhuchauze p. 20, who quotes τῶν 1267 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1330 b 11.

41 ἕνεκα δόμον ἱς την την ἡγ.] This is a curious admission, which proves that Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his ideal state without external domination, but rather as at the head of a group of allies, whom it has conquered in war, and protects, but also to some extent rules; like Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this dominion ought to be generally exercised, so that it may be of even greater service to the governed than to the governing states. Cp. also Incest. p. 55. Susen. (917)

13.34 τρίτον δὲ κτλ.] Comp. 1. 9.

13.56 b 35, with note; also n. (54. 75, 72§). and 1. 7-5, 1318 b 37, a. Κατ. Susen. (918)

12 22 τὰ γινόμενα] So 1. 4. 1, 124 a 21 ἐς τὸν γινόμενον καταβάλουσαν. A fuller phrase 127 a 4. see a.


9 αἴτιος δὲ ὁ νομοθετής.] Cp. again 0. 1. 24, with a. (321). Stob. (919)

1. 15 Presence of the wisest of mortals, though all mortals are wise within bounds. II 1-6.
15 ὁσπερ εἰρήται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολή ὤν (%
§ 2 ἀσχολιάς. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἄρετων εἰς πρὸς τὴν σχολήν καὶ
diασωγυῖα, διὸ τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἐργον καὶ ὁν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. — διὰ γὰρ πολλά τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως
eξή σχολάζειν? διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει 20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερίκην κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παρομαίαν, οὐ
σχολὴ δούλος, οὐ δὲ μὴ δύναμεν κινδυνεύειν ἄνδρεις
§ 3 δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπίοντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 18
dεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν,
σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-
25 νοις, καὶ μάλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν ὦ μὲν

19 ἔξης ΓΜ[, perhaps Γ had σχολάζης] || [σώφρονα] Susem.

§ 1 15 εἰρήται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§
12, 13, 22. SUSEM. (920)
§ 2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολήν καὶ δια-
σωγυῖα] Besides its general meaning
'mode, or condition, of life', and the
more special sense, extending beyond the
necessaries of existence, 'refinement of
life' (Meta. 1. 1. 15. 981 b 18, 1. 2. 11,
982 b 23), the word διασωγυῖα in Aristotle,
with or without the attribute ἐλευθέρων
(cp. v[viii] 5. 8 with n. 1027) or some
similar expression, or ἐν τῇ σχολῇ "in a
condition of leisure" (v[vii] 3 § 3, § 8,
cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure
worthy of a really free man, such as he
attains when his political duties have
been performed, or such as he always
possesses, provided he is peculiarly inde-
pendent, and leads a life of true study or
contemplation. The occupation of such
leisure, i.e. in other words (see Nic. Eth.
x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. nn. 907, 548, and
921) the highest degree of human happi-
ness and satisfaction, is however activity:
according to Aristotle, the highest ac-
tivity there is. It consists in the study of
all branches of knowledge and the
contemplation of all works of art: it
confers the highest intellectual enjoyment
and most nearly approaches to the divine
blessedness, Metaph. XII (α). § 7, § 7,
1072 b 14 f. and above nn. (702, 728).
From this meaning of 'the highest intel-
lectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes
descends to the more commonplace one
of mere occupation and especially 'social
occupation or intercourse': N. E. IX. 11.
5, 1171 b 13, Fragm. 90, 1492 a 28; cp.
also c.g. Pol. v(vii). 2 § 9 with n. (995).
Then it is used in the plural for societies
whose object is such intercourse, especi-
ally refined intellectual culture (III. 9.
13, 1280 b 37, where it might be trans-
lated "social clubs," cp. n. 558 and
v[viii]. 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even
for regular feasts, gambling and drinking
parties: Nic. Eth. x. 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b
12 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word
becomes identified with the amusement,
sport, or pastime, undertaken for rec-
reation (cp. Nic. Eth. iv. 8 § 1, 1177 b
33 f.); though in the former and stricter
interpretation, the two are sharply dis-
tinguished: v[viii]. c. 3 §§ 3—8, c. 5 § 1
ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. nn. (993,
995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036,
1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exc.
v. on B. v(viii). See also Schweger
ad Arist. Meta. Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz,
Arist. Meta. II. p. 45, Ind. Ar. 178 a
26 ff., and especially Zeller in. ii. p.
734 f. n. (5). SUSUM. (921) In short,
a term which may stand for any employ-
ment of leisure, even on vulgar amuse-
ments, receives a special application to
(1) elevated intellectual enjoyments (1339
a 25); in particular (2) those of philo-
sophy and art, including music.

20 οὐ σχολὴ δούλος] Comp. n.
(548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly
need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle's
sense of the word, as explained n. (921),
is something quite different from recrea-
sion. SUSUM. (922)
§ 3 23 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz Ind. Ar.
s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investi-
gation,' as in III. 12. 2, 1282 b 23, or
Phys. 1. 2. 5, 185 a 20: and hence ex-
plains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

25 ὦ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] Comp. Thuc. III.
82. 2: ὦ δὲ πόλεμος ὑπελὼν τὴν εἰσπο-
ρίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βιαζόν διδάσκαλος καὶ
...
though in a different manner, in the first two books of the Laws. See n. (43) on 1. 5. 8. Susem. (926) § 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα. Namely the external goods. Compare for the Spartan convictions 11. 9 § 24, 1270 b 34, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτέρια ἄλλα λάθρα....ἀποδείκνυσι τῶν σωματικῶν ἠδόνων, n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff., νομίζοις μὲν γὰρ γένεσθαι τάξαθα, τὰ περιμάχητα δὲ ἄρετής κτλ. with nn. (346, 346 b, 347). Susem. (927) 2 διὰ τῶν ἄρετης That is, by means of valour or courage, which is a particular virtue: see 11. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347), esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἡ πάσα σύνταξις τῶν ἁγίων ἑστι, τὴν πολεμικήν' ἀποθέτηκα γὰρ ἥρωας πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. Comp. also 11(VII). 1 § 6, κτώσαι καὶ φυλάσσοντον οὗ τὰς ἄρετας τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἄλλω ἐκέινα ταύτας, n. (607). Susem. (928) Mr Newman well observes that this correction of the one-sidedness of Lacedaemonian training tells just as much against all systems which, like Stoicism and Puritanism, tend to develope something less than the whole man. ἐπεὶ δὲ μεῖκω...τοῖς ἄρετων] The passage is defective: we may supplement it from 11. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus: 'But as they esteemed these goods higher than the virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher than that of the virtues, <they maintained their state only while at war, and fell after they had acquired empire.> (Thurot.) Susem. (929) 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Thurot further suggests as the sense of this opening paragraph: <That virtue must be practised in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is clear from this. Susem. (930) § 7 6 διηρήμενοι πρότερον] The result of our previous analysis: 13 § 10, 1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (881) on c. 13 § 8. Susem. (931) 7 τούτων] The citizens of the best state (Susemihl): cp. b 8 παῖδευτέοι, § 5, a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.
8 ιευμένες Μ'. παιδεστική πρώτερον της λέξεως epsilon omitted by IP 13
9 τω λόγω κτλ] Parallel to c. 13
11, 13, and to the more general discussion of N. Eth. X. 9 11—13 (c. 10
11, 1179 a 33 ff.).
12 διημηρήτηκα τὴν βελτίστης υπο-
θέσεως To me the truer (highest) conception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13
2. Sec. c. 4 § 1, 1135 b 35 ff. Men may be led astray by habit as well as by rea-
son. With ἠθέτω drawn cp. N. £. 1. 4. 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of εὐμετά-
της is virtually, "amicus." Gotting is quite wrong in rendering "eudaimon monies
qua perceptual ἡ βελτίστης υποθέσεως." 13—15] Mr Newman thinks much
light is thrown on this difficult passage by Dr. Parren Animal. 11. 1, 6, 6.6 a 30 ff.
ποιο τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ τινυν εἰς τὸν κοι-
νωνα τὴν γένεσιν. καὶ αὕτη ἀρχὴ ἢ ἀκρο-
νον. ὑπὸ τὸν παρακρατήσαν εἰς ἔνων
σὺν τὴν φύσιν ἢ τις μαθητὴς ἢ τις άλλος τέλος.
13 ἢ γένος ταυτοχρόνης] The sense of ταυτοχρόνης is clear from c. 14 § 1, sec n.
1917) αὐτὸν τὴν εὐμετάτης ὑποθέσεως τιμῶν κτλ. "Obviously birth is the first
or earliest thing which demands our care," i.e. we begin with birth. The next words
mean 'the nearest or proximate and from any starting point—understanding even
with the gen. ἡλικία belongs to [in referred to] another, the same, and,
the proximate end is but a means, sub-
ordinating to a higher end in N. Eth. X. 11,
1. 4. 1944 a 11 ff. In one sense at least
this higher end is intelligible and reason.
SUSKUM (1933).
16 τὴν τῶν ὑποθέσεως] Somewhat
stronger than ἐπεφέρο ὑποθέσεως, in which cp.
N. £. 11. 9 9. 15—15, 17 6 14. 1260
b 23 ἢ ἡμετέρω υποθέσεως ὑπεφέρω ὑποθέσεως.
§ 9 18 dòς μέρη κτλ] See c. 14
§ 9, 1931 a 17, 18 1907. exp. in § 1
and b. 5. 6. SUSKUM (1931).
20 τού μὲν ἢ τῶν ἐκείνης τῷ ἑιδίκειται. In
English, as in German, it is not easy to
find two terms, mutually related in φύσις
and ἐπεφάργη. Striving or effort in gen-
eral, in the meaning of ἐπεφάργη (Hartmann's
construction); εὐμετάτης denotes some lower
or apprise, in particular. This explains
why ἡμετέρω alone describes "the motion from
the front-end soul" (as I should trans-
late ἡμετέρω), characteristic possession, of att-
tribute, is not strong enough, while
within the soul from, pursuant-on us.
πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ
§ 10 λόγου ἐχοντος. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούν-
λησις, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένους εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
παιδίων, οὐ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ οὐ νοῦς προϊόσκειν πέφυκεν ἐγ-
25 γένεσθαι. διό δὲ τούτου μὲν τοῦ σῶματος τῆς ἐπιμέλειας
ἀναγκαίον εἰναι προτέραν ἣ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειτα τῆς
τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μὲν τοῦ νοῦ τῆς τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ
tοῦ σῶματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

16 εἰπερ οὖν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τοῦ νομοθετην ὁρὰν δεὶ ὡπως

30 τὰ σῶματα βέλτιστα γίνεται τῶν τρεθμομένων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by Π² P⁸ Bk. || 24 πέφυκεν after ἐγγυνεθαι (ἐγγύνε-
σθαι 123-4) Π¹-8 Π² Bk. || 26 τὴν after ἦ omitted by Π₄-8 Β' Β' Β' Β' Β' Β'
|| 27 τὶν δὲ τοῦ τοῦ δὲ Π¹ || 28 τοῦ σῶματος τοῦ πρότου Μ* (huius autem eorum quae animae William) ||
|| 30 τὰ σῶματα after βέλτιστα Π² P⁸ Bk. || γένεται Π² P⁸ Bk.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις,
will, are distinguished: and further, why
in I. 5. 6 the term δρέξεις is first used, 1254
b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθη-
τικῶν μόρον ‘the emotional part,’ see note
(40). The same trichotomy of the
rtional soul is found in De Anima II.
3. 1, 414 b 1, III. 10, 3, 433 a 23 ff. (That
these passages are not in conflict with De
Anima III. 9. 3, 432 b 4 ff. and Topica IV.
5. 6, 126 a 12 f., if the statement ἐν τῷ
λογιστικῷ ἡ βούλησις be rightly interpreted,
is shown by Susemihl Jahrb. f. Philol.
cxix. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious
treatise De Motu Animal. c. 6 § 4, 700
b 22, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ δρέξεις εἰς τὰ διαιρεῖται,
eἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and
End. Eth. II. 7, 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις
dὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν πάντα δρέξεις...
وافق κεκυτ πρῶτον τὸ δρεπτικὸ καὶ τὸ δια-
νοητόν, need not be taken into account.
The Will appears, as the passage from End.
Eth. more particularly proves, as δρέξις =
impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided
by reason, directed to real or apparent
good, see N. Eth. II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.),
while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is
pleasant, and Anger (θυμὸς) at revenge.
See Walter Die praktische Vernunft pp.
194—212. Yet all this does not suffice
to explain the present passage, which
rightly denies to the child (at all events
to the infant just after birth) the posses-
ion of any rational impulses. The differ-
ence between our passage and the two
cited from De Anima is that here θυμὸς
and βούλησις are again drawn closer to-
gether and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean ‘aversion
and liking’? In any case at b 22
βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (φρ. c.
II. ii. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more
precisely a weakened sense, denoting
something more analogous to θυμὸς than
to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEM. (935)

§ 10 We must then train the body
first; next the impulses, the motive
forces of the irrational soul; and lastly
the reason.

25 πρῶτον μὲν...27 δρέξεως] Here
again Aristotle follows closely in the
track of Plato, Laws II. 652 E—653 C
SUSEM. (936)

Add Republic 410 b, 563 λ, 591 c ff.
c. 16 Precautions necessary on the part
of the parents to secure healthy progeny.

§ 1 29 εἰπερ οὖν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς κτλ] The
expression is chosen with reference to
the words at the beginning of c. 13 § 8,
1334 b 13, and as regards the facts also
Aristotle takes up the same thread.
Cp. n. (933). But in the further and decisive
step, of making education begin
not merely before birth but even
before conception, Aristotle quite follows Plato’s
procedure Laws IV 721, VI 774—776,
783 D ff., 788 ff. (comp. Rep. V 458 E,
Politics 310). It is in imitation of the
Spartan model: see Xen. De Rep. Laces-
daeum. I. 3 ff., Plut. Lyc. 14 (Eaton),
SUSEM. (937) Add Critias, Fr. i,
F. H. G. ii. 68 (Newman).

δὲ ὡπως] The remedy for a rather
violent hiatus may be easily discovered
by comparing 1329 a 33, ἀλλὰ δὲ τὸν ἀλή-
θεν ὀφθηκώς δημοτικῶς ὁρᾶν ὡπως κτλ.
33 γαμικήν] ‘Nuptial, not ‘com- 34 junct’; cp. 1. 3. 1, 1253 b 9 n. Or, as Prof. Gildebril'ser puts it, γάμος = wed- 35 ding, not wedlock.

33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Enl. Νυνίας 1177 εὕερον] Πράκτορας ἐνερεῖ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον

34 συγκαταβαλαίνοντας] For the vb. καταβαλλεῖν; 5. 1333 a 11, see Schw. Lex. Hered. It is used, like κοινωνίαν (cp. 1333 b 41 h, for 'to suit'; properly 'to meet in.') The compound with συν = to come simultaneously to an end, producing a convergence or correspondence.

35 Johnson Νυνίας c. 79 affords a parallel. From these early usages proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents and children: the son is eager to enjoy the world before the father is willing to forsake it, and there is hardly room at once for two generations. Those who marry at an advanced age will probably escape the enforced removal of their children; but, in diminution of this advantage, they will be likely to leave them, ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's mercy. From their children they have less to fear they have less to lose.

§ 6  εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἐστι 6 δ’ ο τῶν νέων συν—
12 δυσαμβὸς φαύλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιεῖν· ἐν γὰρ πάσι ζῷοις ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἐκγονίᾳ καὶ θηλυτόκα μάλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ τὸ γόητο συμβαίνειν
15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων. τεκμηρίων δὲ ἐν ὃσιν γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέους συζευγώναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-
§ 7 λεῖς καὶ μικρὸι τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἐτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις
ἀι νέαι πονοῦσι τῇ μάλλον καὶ διαφθειροῦνται πλεῖους· διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τώσας φασὶ δὶδ τοιαύτῃν αἰτίαν
20 τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὥς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμή-
σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-
§ 8 μινήν. ἐτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σφορφύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδο-
σεις ποιεῖσθαι προσβυτέρας· ἀκολαστότερα γὰρ δοκοῦσιν
νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνοικίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄρρενων
25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, εἰώ ἐτι τοῦ

11 ἔτη] ἐτι Σουσέμ.¹ in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by ΠΠο΄ Bk. || 13 ἐγγονα ΠΠο΄ Bk. || θηλυτόκα Camerarius (wrongly), θηλυτέρα Korae || 14 ταυτὸ τῶτο ΠΠο΄ Bk. λος ἱστοι William || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει Μ⁴ and (after a lacuna) P₁, ἐπιχωριάζεται ΠΠο΄ Bk. p₁ (in the margin) and apparently Γ || 70] τοὺς M⁴ Bk. || 18 αἱ νέαι] ἐναι ΠΙ, ἄλλωσι αἱ νέαι p₁ in the margin || πονοῦσι after τε M⁴ P₁ || 23 εἰναι inserted after γὰρ by ΠΠο΄ Bk. Susem.² || 25 δὲ omitted by ΠΙ, untranslated by Ar., [ἐτι] Σουσέμ.¹, wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα] This point is not mentioned Hist. Animal. v. 12. 1 (v. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. SUSEM. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, De Gen. Animal. iv. 2. 1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέαι θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκμαίων, καὶ γναρκοῦντα μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλεον τὸ θερ-
νῖον, τοῖς δ’ ἀπολείπετε. Falstaff, Henry IV. Part 11, Act 4 sc. 3, humourously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμηρίων δετ’...γάρ] If the Index Ar. s. v. may be trusted, this is the only instance of this usage in its normal form, the pronoun being omitted. We had ση-
μιῶν δετ’...γάρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and Bonitz 1b. 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances, including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. (VII). 6. 12, 1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. Phaedo 57 Λ. The supposed passive of the Lexx. (see Crit. n.) receives its coup de grâce from Kaibel, the last editor of Athenaeus, who at xiv. 619 f. reads κατὰ τινα ἐπιχωριαζόμενην παρ’ αὐτοῦς...ξὸντες, with the critical note “παρ’ αὐτοῦς < ἐστὶν> Wilamowitz, recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζειν verbum medium.”

συκευνύναι] To pair, join in marriage: § 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 πονοῦσι τῇ μάλλον] This statement reappears in the spurious B. vii. of Hist. An. c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τῶν χρησμῶν] A gloss cites the oracle in the form μὴ τέμενι νέαν ἁλόκα, ‘till not the fresh furrow.’ Götting proposed to alter νέαν to νέας, thinking there was a play upon νεᾶς which he took to be gen. of a supposed νεᾶ = novale, fallow land [for which νεᾶς, Attic νεᾶς, is the received form]. SUSEM. (939) Comp. Eur. Phoen. 18 σπείρειν τέκνων ἁλόκα, Soph. Oed. T. 1210 (Ridgeway); also Antig. 569 ἀρώσιμα γὰρ χάτερν εἶναι γώαν).


σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιούτα τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ γαρ τούτων (XIV) τις χρόνος ὁρίσμενος, δι' οὗ ὑπερβαίνει πληθυνόν ἐτὶ < ἢ μέρος.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδον δὲ πάντα ταύτα; συμβαίνει κατα μίαν <σπιμέλειαν.> § 5 ἐπεί γὰρ ἀρισταί τέλος ἐ τῆς γενεσίας ἐστιν ὑπὲρ <πλείστον ἐπεὶν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ 9 τῶν ἐβομμηκτα ἐτῶν ἀρισταί <εσχατον, πετυχώτα δὲ το γνωιζέν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς συνις- <ζοῶν κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τις εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτων.>

§ 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαλοκοκ ἐτῶν ἡλικίων συγενικών, τούς δ' ἐπετάδ καὶ τρίακοντα[, ἡ μικρόν], ἐν τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀκμάζοντι τε τοῖς σῶμασι συγειαζέν ἐσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πᾶλαν τῆς τεκνοσίας συγκαταβίανται τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίριως: ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ διαδοχή τῶν τεκαρων τοῖς 33 μὲν ἀρχαμενίοις ἐσται τῆς ἀκρίμης, ἐὰν γίνεται κατὰ λο-

26 σώματος Π Αρ. and F (corr.). Διὸς σώματι P1 (in the margin), συμβαίνει

the other authorities | 27 χρόνοι after ἄρμασιν| P1= Π Βk. | τέλος Βk, τὸν
M', nundum William Ar.
6 δὲ Susen., δῇ Π Βk, Susen.¹ | ταῦτα before τὰ ταῦτα M', translated by
William

29 συγευκτά Π, συγευκτά Μ', εἰς Ar., ἔται all other authorities: έτη 3
Susen. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. n. (440) | 8 ναυτάν| Segue-
veia, transposed by Gotting Susen.² to follow 37 τρια| 30 τριάλεγο| των Π1= Π
Ar. and P1 (corr. 1 in the margin) | διακατήθησαι Μ', διακατήθησα P1| 31 Σε- <συν> καταβάθησοι Susen.¹² wrongly following William (convenient). | 32 τις μὲν ἀρχαμενίων Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. ii. p. 507 | 33 δοξήσεις Π Π1= Π² εἰς

26 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτον κτλ]; Sc. ταδ' σώ-

ματο: hastily growth has fixed limits of time which it does not exceed (or only to a small extent). Comp. note on v(VIII).

1. 1. 1437 1 13.

38 28 διὸ τὰς μὲν κτλ)] In Κερ. v. 460 ε. Plato fixes the period for procrea-
tion amongst his guardians from twenty to forty in the woman, and from twenty-
five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case in the man. His regulations in the Laws are not consistent. The marriage of the sons is at one time enjoined when they are between thirty and fifty-five (Iv. 721 a, Βί. 738 ε), at another time when they are between twenty-five and thirty-five at latest (Iv. 771 b). Similarly the daughters are to marry before the age of twenty, but while the earlier limit is once fixed at sixteen (Βί. 783 b), it is elsewhere raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 δ).

In the spurious Β. vii. of Aristotle's Historia Animalium, cc. 5, 6 there are statements about the limits of age for getting marrying in tolerable agreement with the present passage. The limit is said to be, as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in the woman, with occasional prolongation to seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon (Gon. 7 5 3. 4 V 5 3) has the similar limit in the wife's case at Blanes. Siuere (840)

83 10 are limited by Prof. Ridgeway, T. H. h. p. 143 8. D. Jackson 53, pp.

129 118.

38 Vide quae obsitae in Heron, text. p. 372 a 79, ubi sunt lapsi in pro-
science relicta.a 8329 elegit Spengel; v. 49 375 p. 161 et rex postea v. 855 f. 277 8. posthum anchor, comm. 5. text. (end. col. p. 419). The substance of the paper in Ædemon is given in Fac. iii. p. 166, supra.
The dissolution of the χρήσιμοι, being attentively, Reiz vii(viii). Plato Susem., the yap iv VI(VII). Pseudo-Hippoc. 41 breaking doubt - Trpbl see § 38 more Bonitz id Another "..."

by Ar. Hist. aetnai the powers, which Vili. from time." (ill. 16, 10. authorities Bk. and P8 (later hand) § 41 λέγουσι after ikainos P7 Bk. 1335 b 3 μάλιστ' <αν> Koraes Bk.2, μάλιστα αν τα (τι), μάλιστα the other authorities and Bk. 4, mǎllon...τοις omitted and a lacuna left by P2 (1st hand, supplied by pl) παίδειας P1 (corrected by p1 in the margin) 5 <δε> Susem., possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτόν 6 ουτέ γαρ όντε και τοις παιδονομίας P7 Bk. (1st hand, supplied by pl) 6 εξίς omitted and a lacuna left by P1 (1st hand, supplied by pl) παίδειας P1 § 33 omitted and a lacuna left by P2 (1st hand, supplied by p1) 10 χρήσιμοι] more exactly, in the month Gæmelon (January and February), which derived its name of wedding-month from the custom: Theophr. Hist. Plant. vii. § 2. Pseudo-Hippoc. περί ἄφορων (III. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains "that the spring is the most suitable time." Susem. (941) § 11 41 καιροσ] Favourable conditions. 1335 b 1 τα βόρεα] That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offspring is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his Historia Animalium and De generatione Animalium: e.g. H. A. VI. 19 § 4, 574. a 1 και βορεῖον μέν ὄφειναι δρέπαντας μαλακόν, πολλάκις δὲ ςηλαντεῖκε. Susem. (942) § 3 ἐπιστήμης] Intransitive, as if τὴν γνώμην had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. Ant. 227. § 12 5 òν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς παιδονομίας. Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), § 15 n. (962); vii(vi). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13, vii(vi), § 22 n. (1483). Also Interrod. p. 49 n. 22, p. 52. [Susem. (943) § 5 Bonitz Ind. Ar. 162 a 54 ff. is in doubt whether δε might be mentally supplied from λεκτόν, or must be added. The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est, quod est τώρα ἰκανόν. Susem. (943) § 5 οὔτε γαρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄδηλων κατά Comp. Plato Resp. III. 404 A (Eaton) and below V(viii). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015). Susem. (944).

kai teknovtoivan, oiste y therapeuettikai kai kastropiastikai lexen, (XIV)

13 alh y mese tovtoun. pepoumeneu men sun exein dei tov 

exin, pepoumeneu de tovou men biainov, mohi proi ena 

mo vou, oister ef tovotratoou efis, alla proi tovs 

elxevrou praxeis. oumois de dei tafto upoaurxew kai ime 

drasi kai ymvaiein. 

wra de kai tovs efkouso epitipleusva 

tovs sofumovs, my bapymosasa mye oarmh troph efsumo 

vovs. tovto de rehion tv nometveta poimata prostatexwv kai 

he meran tvv panoijsa poraeia proi theovn apothevamai 

tovs elxhoxov tis peri tis yenexwv timh. tivn mevnti dial 

nouvov tovovntov tov sofumovs bapymothevos armostti 

diagwv apoanalwv yar faiveta tis yenexwv tis efouswv 

ws oister tis fuvmea tis yeghs. peri de apotheades kai 

trofhs tovsv yenexwv eoston vmos mydov yepiymorders 

trefein, dia de plhovs teknon y tados tovsv efwv 

kolus mydov apaotidseva tovsv yenexwv. yfrosi yar 

by pl) 7 efylas M P1-3 7 dpepatastik M and apparently P1 (1st hand, con 

rected by pl), curis indixeta William 6 kastropiastik M and P1 (1st hand, cor 

rected by pl). Male hainens William 8 exeis omitted and a lacuna left by P1 

(1st hand, supplied by pl) 9 dia = a Susenx. 1-2, 42 as a gloss by corr. 10 the marg 

in of P2 and Schneider Bk.2; but these should be understood 11: dpe 

peidaev P1 P2, dekeupov the other authorities Bk. Susenx 1-2, 12 eexis omitted by P2 

P4 Bk. 13 eexes P1 P4 Adl. 14 tiva efylas G Ares 

Susem. 1-2, perhaps rightly 15 atepalbexa M, atepalbexa P and perhaps P1 

yenexwv Bk.1 16 telis added before y by P2 Bk. 17 yepiymorders P3, yepiymorders 

M Bk.2, yepiymorders P IP Bk.1 18 the added after tepp by P2 P4 Ar. Bk. P1 (marg), euvn myi. Scaliger. 

Susem Bk. Alth. ii. p. 874 n. 1 restored the passage thus: teppovs (yfi dia tiva yefyv yepiymorders 

tova yepiymorders) yfrosi yar dey 19 eexis P1 P2 P3 P4 A 

Ar. Bk. M Bk. P3 (corr.1), yfrosi apparently P3 (1st hand), perhaps rightly, yfrosi 

Susem, kalh i (with preceding tiva) Schlosser. 

gencies Katsh (who does not reject yepiymorders), yepiymorders Scaliger, yepiymorders M P1 Bk. Susenx 3 in the dia, 

gencies PIP Bk.1 20 yfrosi P1 Ar. P4 (marg) and P2 (corr.1), efylas M 

dpepatastik P1 (1st hand), efylas P2 P4 Bk. P1 (corr. in the marg) and P2 (1st hand, emended by corr.1), efylas Spengel 

17 yepiymorders Katsh, ye Scholomass.
6 § 12: see nn. (209, 211), also ii. 7 § 5 n. (236). Plato, too, Ref. v 460 D, 461 C, orders exposure in the case of weakly or deformed infants of the guardian class (as was remarked n. 149), and in the case of conception occurring where the law or the magistrates’ orders have been infringed, abortion, or (presumably if this has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he goes further than this by condemning the offspring of inferior guardians: τα δὲ τῶν χερσονων, καὶ εὰν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπτην γίνηται, ἐν ἄπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδόρῳ κατακρύψωσι, 460 C. But even in the Timaeus 19 A his words convey the impression that he had not given any instructions for exposing the children of less qualified parents, but meant simply a secret transference of them to the third class of the population. Under the guise, that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies his former regulation in this sense (see Zeller Griech. Phil. ed. 4 ii. i. 909 n. 2, ed. 3 pp. 771 n. 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 n. 55, Susemihl Plat. Phil. ii. p. 171). In the Laws (see nn. 192, 208) he drops the preventive means of abortion altogether, nor does he say anything about exposing illegitimate and deformed infants. Thus in the course of his own lifetime Plato gradually attained to a more humane view. In this respect Aristotle’s ideal state goes far beyond that of the Laws in the stringency and callousness, or rather, to give it its true name, the abominable cruelty of its regulations. As to exposure, the example of Sparta has again had a determining influence on both thinkers. In all other Greek states it was left to the father’s decision whether he would expose his child or not; but at Sparta a committee of the eldest members of the Phyle decided, and in accordance with their decision the deformed or weakly infant had to be despatched to the place of exposure (‘Ἀποβέβαια’) on Taygetos. See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 256). Comp. also Introd. p. 52 f. SUSEM. (946)

Note that ὤρλαθα...πλῆθος is a virtual repetition of Π. 6. 12, 1265 b 6 ff., just as c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17, in both cases without the conventional ὁς ἔφερα...πρότερον (Newman). 23—25 Here the indignation of some honest reader found vent in the remarkable gloss on the margin of P3, τι λέγει ὁ δαμάσκον τοῦτο; Doubtless the same hand which scribbled φιλανρεί, φιλανρια, against 1269 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether from this “thin end of the wedge” came the gradual depopulation of Greece, which Polybius (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another matter. Cp. Thirlwall Hist. viii. 463 ff. 8 § 16 28 Meisterhans ed.2 p. 28 ff. shows that ληστουργεῖν is the true Attic form. The usurping λειτουργεῖν does not appear before the third century B.C. When this ηι was pronounced as i, λι-
tpvga was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινές] Solon

Frag. 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 15 (cp. n. 971), and similarly in Hist. Animal. v. 12 § 2 (V. 14 § 3, 544 b 28 ff.), 17 § 16 (V. 20 § 3, 543 a 21 ff.), vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 f.), vi. 16 § 2 (3, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the Schol. to Aristoph. Birds 494). Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo τῶν ἔργων χρήσεως p. 71 Pflf. and Censorin. De die medico 14 (J. L. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in "N. A. ll. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 ff. the forty-ninth year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. Susen. (1947)

§ 18 τῆς ὡς τὸ φαντάρον γεννήσω] This means that if any license is taken, there must be recourse to abortion, so that no child is born. The key is furnished by Κυρ. v. 461 c, καθ᾽ ὃν φαντάρον ἔχει παραιτεῖται, 'to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light.' (J. G. Schneider). Comp. n. (946) and ibidem, p. 63. Susen. (1943)

§ 19 40 προσαγορευθῇ τέκνῳ] In the sense of all προσαγορευθῆς succeeding employed προσαγορευθῇ and προσαγορευθῇ, though in the sense of ὑπερασχήμων it had προσαγορευθῇ, προσαγορευθῇ, and προσαγορευθῇ (Rutherford). See New Pauly xxiv. p. 355 ff. with citation of [Dem.] loc. Renovum & alio XI. 1. προσαγορεύω (Dindorf). Comp. o. o. a. 1329 b 12 (προσαγορευθῇ), and for the use of χείλα, Soph. Fr. 165. 250 a 11 προσαγορεύω (Hes.) where Hesiod calls κρίνει τὶς κατοικεῖ ἄποικον ἀδικία (μεταφ.),

c. 17 Treatment and food of children during infancy.

§ 1 1356 a 3 ἀκέφαλοι δὲ (P. C. O. 1. 4. 8) This next care must be for the proper supply of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are taught to believe, for the thriving of the body. Comp. Plato Rep. III. 464 a 11 Νεοφιλός. De Rep. Leg. a 35 (Kamp). Stoic. (1949)
πολεμικῆς ἔξις, ὁ τοῦ γάλακτος πλῆθοσα ὑπηρέτης τροφῆς μάλιστ' (3)  
§ 2 οὐκείον τοῖς σώμασιν, ὄνομαρ ἐγὼ δεῖ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἐπὶ 2  
dὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδεχεται ποιεῖται τηλικοῦντα συμ-  
10 φερεῖ. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μή διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δὲ ἀπαλό-  
tὴτα χρώνται καὶ νῦν ἐνία τῶν ἔθνων ἀρχαῖον τετο-  
χανικοῖς, ἃ το σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τουλίουν ἀστραβές, συμ-  
φέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθεῖε τικοῦρων  
14 παιδῶν' τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ύγείαι καὶ πρὸς πολεμικά  
§ 3 πράξεως εὐχρηστότατον. διὰ παρά πολλοίς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-  
βῶν ἔθος τοὺς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτεται τὰ γενε-  
μενα [ψυχρών], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρὸν ἀμπτέχευ, οὖν  
Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατῶν εἴδεξεν, εὐθὺς ἄρχο-  
3 μένων βέλτιον μὲν εἴδεξεν, ἐκ προσαναγωγῆς δ' εἴδεξεν.  
20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ὧ τοῦ παιδών ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν  
7 τηλικοῦνσι Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P4.6 L9 ||  
9 τηλικοῦσιν Susen.,12, tantillos William, τηλικοῦσιν ? Susen., τηλικοῦσι P4.6 L9 ||  
10 διαφέρεσθαι M9 and P1 (corr.), διαφέρει P1 (1st hand), de Fluere William, δια-  
στρέφεσθαι other authorities and P1 (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπάλ-  
tὴτα Μ9, ἀπλότητα Π3 || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικά omitted by Μ9 P1 || 16 τοῖς  
tῶν Μ9 Π4 || γενέσει Susen., γενεσία Scaliger, γενεσία Μ9 Π1 Bk.2 Susen.,  
in the text, γεγένσεια Π2 Π3 Bk.1 || 17 [ψυχρών] Susen. || ψυχρῶν after σκέπασμα  
P3 and P4 (corr.), μικρὸν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπτέχεις Bk. Susen.,  
and P3.3 (?), ἀπάνταχες P3 (1st hand), ἀμπτέικες P9 || 18 εὐθὺς...19 εἴδεξεν omitted by  
P4.6 Σμβ.8 Π9 || ἀρχωμένοι Π3.3 Ald. Bk., ἀρχωμένοι Susen. ||  
19 εκ...εἴδεξεν omitted by Ar. || 20 διὰ <τὴν> Jackson  

8 δούνοσθερά.] Plato Laws ii. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the  
eighteenth year (Götting). Comp. Hist. Anim. vii. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton);  
De Sommo c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff. Susen. (950) Comp. L. H. Morgan  
Ancient Society p. 25 (Ridgeway).  
§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικοῦσιν "All the exercise possible at that early age."  
So also Plato Laws vii. 789 e ff. Susen. (951)  

10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μή διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says St Hilaire, is the  
first germ of orthopedy. Camerarius un-  
derstood it of cradles and swaddling  
clothes (cp. Plato l.c.): Vettori of irons  
to straighten the crooked knees of chil-  
dren, serperestra as Varro calls them L.L.  
ix. 5. 1. Susen. (952)  
§ 3 15 δα...18 Κελτοῖς] The same  
thing is said in an epigram first published  
by Brunck Anal. vet. poet. iii. p. 150  
xxxii., όσολει Κελτοί πτερωμός συλημόν.  
Ήθος | τέκνα ταλαντεύουσα, καὶ οὗ πάροι εἰσι  
τοκῆς | πρὸν παῦν αἱρήσουσα λειμαγόνων ὑδατε  
σεμιν...| ὅμως γὰρ γενέσκετο φεβοᾶρον, πρὸν  
γ' εσάφηρη | κεκριμένοι λουλουδάρικες ἐξεγε- 
γάμον ποταμοῦ: and by Nonnos Dionys.  
xxiii. 95, xxxvi. 5 (Götting). Further  
compare Strabo iii. 165, Galen ἐπὶ ψυ- 
γείων Ἐ. T. vi. p. 51 Kühn, and Kapp  
Galen however calls the people, of whom  
this is told, not Kelts but Germans. See  
on this point Π. § 7 with Noté, p. 334  
and iv(vii). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further  
Verg. Aen. ix. 603 f. There is a similar  
habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridge- 
way). Susen. (953)  

§ 5 20 διὰ θερμότητα] Aristotle thus  
assumes that the vital heat, which by its  
gradual but serious decline causes old age,  
and by its extinction death, gradually  
becomes weaker and weaker from the  
moment of birth, so that it is most largely  
found in the embryo and the new-born  
infant, and in animals generally so long  
as they are growing, because growth is
1336 a 34—39 34 τάτ δε διαισθαν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: 39 διατηρηθήμεν τραπεζικόν τοις παιδισίς εἰς τὸν παῖς κατὰ τὸν (ΧV) ψυχρόν ἄσκησιν. § 6 34 <τὰς δὲ διατάξεις 32 τῶν παιδιών κατὰ τοὺς (ΧV) κλαυθεῖς ὡς ὁ ὄρθως ἀπαγορεύονσιν 36 οἱ κολύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: συμφέροντι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν. § 7 γινεται γὰρ τρόπον χαρτην κατὰ τοὺς παι- δίους διατεινομένους.> § 4 περί μὲν όν ὡς τὴν πρωτίν συμφέρει τοῖς ἄρχων τὴν ἐπιμελείαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτη παρατη- σίαν τὴν ὃ ἐχθέντην ταύτης ἡλικίας μέχρι ποιτε ἀτόμῳ, ὡς ἄντε παρὰ πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσαγών αὐξήσιν ὡς πρὸς ἀναγκαῖον πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποτί- ςισθι, δει [δε] τοσάθην τυχάνους κυρίσεως ἀστε διαφέροντε τὴν ἁρινον τῶν σωμάτων, ὃν χρή παρασκευαζόντως καὶ οἱ ἀλλοι πράξεως καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδικας. δει δὲ καὶ ταῖς παιδιας εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀναι- μένας καὶ περὶ λόγων δε καὶ μέθον, ποιοῦς τινὰς ἀκούοντας δε τοὺς τηλικούτους, έπιμελές ἄστα τοίς ἁρχονσιν όν κολυίστων παιδούρων. πάντα γὰρ δε τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδεύοντες προς τὰς ὑπάτην διατριβάς: διὸ τὰς παιδιας εἶναι δὲ τὰς πολ- λὰς μνήμης τῶν ὑπάτων σπουδασμένων. τὰς δὲ διατάξεις 39. 34 κατὰ 1, καὶ Π II Ar. Βκ. τὰς omitted by Π II F4 Βκ. § 38 τοιαύταν] τραπεζικόν Ridgeway. 21 πρωτίν <μίανταζ> ? Spengel, Schmidt would transcribe 23 μίαντα in this place; but it can just as well be understood 27 τῆς πρωτίν ὡς τοις παιδαῖς V and I IV (core), τάστη Π4-4 Λ4 and Π4 (1st hand) 23 διαταξότας Π4 Σ8 Βκ and Π4 (core) 14 θρ] in quae William 26 δί omitted by Π4 Π4-4 Βκ, but it should perhaps be contained 29 διαταξομένα inserted before ἀνάληψαν by Π4 31 τὰς omitted by Π4-4 Βκ and perhaps by Σb 33 δό <καί> ? Spengel. § 34 τραπεζικόν Komn., conditioned by vital heat. Comp. Probl. III. 7. XI. 14. De Inventivs et. cc. 3. 4 (Eaton). Σουμ. (985) 36 οἱ κολυίστες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: Πλάτων Λεοντ. 791 b HH. (Camerarius). Σουμ. (985). 38 Dr. Jackson defends τοῖς παιδισίς by an appeal to Darwin On the Expression of the Emotions pp. 148, 246, 254. § 4 33 μέχρι ποιτε ἀτόμῳ: Πλάτων however in the Λεοντ. 793 b ff. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, § 7—14. Σουμ. (984). 32 καὶ διὰ τὰς παιδιας] Πλάτων Λ. 561 d καὶ Πολλοῖς propozes for this age a kind of Kinder- garren under the inspection of the parents (αἱ πατρίς) who for the most part leave the children to treat their own gardens (τακτικὸς ἀφροίας), but prevent them from growing too angry over these, the parents themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. Σουμ. (987) 5 30 καὶ περὶ λαχανόν καὶ πατέας Comp. κ. (970), καὶ 7—17 is regarded to the women: above p. 16 Π 11 3. m. (1943), ε. 12 5 5. (509) with more πατέας (99), ἀπολόγηται, and Ιντραμ. p. 53 L, also VII (91). 18 καὶ 9 σ. (1131). B. c. Λ. VII (91). Π 8 13 Π (1498). Σουμ. (983). 33 καὶ διὰ τὰς παιδιας: 34 σπουδασμένων] Comp. Plato Λεοντ. 6. 641 d E. (989).
§ 7 41 δι' ἡκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἐστα[1]
Comp. § 9 n. (1962). Here then Aristotle refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and briefly mentioned in n. (1957). His refusal is on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year has been reached, while he follows the Spartans in postponing it to the seventh year; see Schömann p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 206). Further see § 5, n. (958). SUSEM. (960)

1336 b 2 εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύνει κτλ] This and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen Poetics² p. 190 f., Busse op. c. p. 28, Susemihl Quaest. crit. coll. p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαύων, which William of Moerbeke mistook, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1303 b 31, for ἀπολαβὼν (in pronunciation ν = φ, β = ϝ), is correct and means to derive influence of any kind, good—or bad: Busse cites διδάσκαλοι μὴ ἀπολαύων τι φλαύρον Isocr. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὡσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the utmost vigilance. A variation upon the more usual εἰσπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs VIII(v). 8, 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order, ὡσπερ ἄλλο τι, which Π to gives here.


[Text in Greek]

10 [ἀντιμα] Bücheler Susen.23, rightly if ἀντιμα in real contrast; ἀντιμα of ἀντιμα; Bücheler, opt. Schmidt; that further approves [and πλαγιάς] Schneider 14 ὁσῶν Πς-Αρ., ἀντὶ Πς Πς 15 πρὸς ὅπειρα metered in Πς S V 9, τοῦτον Ρέττ Βk.3 παράφορον 1ον over 20姿态, ἐφέσιον.

Koraces

9 [ἀντιμα] ἀνέλευθρος] Meier, De θεομα. xixiiu. p. 103, understands by this their exclusion from sacrificial festivals in which slaves could not take part, that is, from the state sacrifices (τόπος ἥγεσις), proper for which see Bockh. Statth. p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 358). SUSEM. (961)

13 ἀνδραποδώδια χάριν] "To punish him for his degrading conduct." Comp. c. 15 § 5 n. (1765) and especially n. (143) in a. § 8; and in regard to this whole section c. 12 § 5 n. (803), and more particularly Intro. p. 5 2 n. (3). SUSEM. (962)

10 14 ὑπερλέεις μὲν οὖν, ἵππησιν] Sec vii.xvi. 15 § 21 n. (1056), viii. (1059), 7 § 3 n. (1058). The magnificence here mentioned are of course the Hellenic, as before; see n. (1958). SUSEM. (963)


εἰ μη παρά τις θεῖος, 17 ο νόμος] As, for instance, Dionysus, Aphrodite, Eris, Elpeithia (Kapp). Aristophanes himself, it is well known, traces the origin of Comedy to the worship of Dionysus, namely, to the improvised speeches added to the choral ode by the chief singer or leader of the chorus in the phallic songs; such phallic songs, he says, were still customary in many places (ὑπερλεεῖς δὲ τῷ γαῖα νῦν ἔργα φαλλακτικά παρατάωσιν). Pet. 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These improvised speeches certainly contained improprieties of the sort here mentioned. But that even in the phallic songs properly so called there was often much that was positively indecent might hardly be doubted, even apart from the specimen we have in Aristoph. A. 263 ff., where Dikaiopolis sings a horaeika of one, as he himself says (164). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus xiv. 611 a—612 b, on the authority of Sosicles and Seneca. Both writers mentioned certain reciters, called ἀρχαῖοι θεοί, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (diascoris) from the stage connected with the according to Seneca, and were at a later date called ἀρχαῖοι, as their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochus, n. (1766), found similar lament: λαέροι in current use at the spring festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Dionysus and Demeter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Parnos and his colony Thasos, where Archilochus settled. Comp. Hom. Iliad η ἐν Εὐμένι 149, Pana. 6 1, 16. 1 Stepin, Byzant. x. 8 1, 2, Ἃμαρ, Illyric. v. K. Kal. Walecky 97, Jolle 9 1, 1 87 f. It was not of this natural popular poetry that he fulfilled his own artistic and aesthetic poetry. Aristophanes himself mentions directly afterward (11 13) the social and artistic compositions (θραύσας), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in custom between the games. For it would appear from the prose-Pastian. Am 131 ff. that a contemporary ephebe might include Archilochus in his repertoire; on any case his satyrn poetry, on the analogy of the present passage, whether also his elegies, is doubtful. About that time also the horaeika proper and its reciters by rhapta
dromes were brought into vogue by Epigenes of Thasos, in contrast to antiquity of this kind. SUSEM. (964)
σιν ο νόμος τούς τήν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἐτί τήν ἱκνουμένην καὶ
19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.
§ 11 τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτί λάμβουν οὕτε κωμῳδίας θετάς θετέων,
πρὶν ἣ τήν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἡ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρ-
ξει κοινωνεῖν ἡγή καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων
γνωμονής βλάβας ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.
§ 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τοῦ λόγου;
25 ὕστερον δ’ ἐπιστήματα δεὶ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεὶ
πρώτων εἴτε δεὶ διαπορήσας, καὶ πῶς δεὶ κατὰ δὲ τὸν
§ 13 παράντα καρόν ἐμισήθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἦσως γὰρ οὐ
κακῶς ἐλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς πραγμάτιας ὑπο-

18 τοὺς...Ικνουμένην Μοντι, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν Γ 58 Βκ. (πλέον
P5 over an erasure), iam homines factos Ar., τοὺς προσβετόρας Bas.3 in the margin;
omitted by Π Bas.1,2 and the text of Bas.3 | έτι] έτι Σusem., iam Ar., [έτη]
Welldon | 19 αὐτῶν P1,2, αὐτῶν Γ M 2 Π2 | καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by P1 (sup-
plied by corr.1 in the margin of P1), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Σusem.1 | τιμαλφῶν
M 1 Π1 | [τοὺς θεοὺς] ? Σusem. | 20 θετέων] θετητέων Μ, νομοθετήτων Π 58 Γ Βκ.,
<έναι> έτέεν Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπάθης Μ and apparently P1 (1st
hand) || πάντας suspected by Jackson, πάντως ? Σusem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν...27
ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Σusem. to follow 35 δυσμένειαν || 27 [ίσωs
...37 αὐτῶν] Böcker || 28 κακῶς] καλῶς Γ Μ 3 | ἐλεγε suspected by Camerarius,
ἤγευσ αἱ Σελεντ? Schmidt

18 έτι] The word cannot have arisen
from έτι, nor is it likely to have crept
into the text. However dissimilar, this
must apparently be added to the pas-
sages in which έτι means iam. Σusem.
§ 11 20 οὐτί λάμβουν] See n. (964)
and n. (788) iv(vii). 7 § 6. Σusem. (966)
21 κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κτλ] The term
μέθη, which recurs v(viii). 5 § 2, n. (1016)
denotes the advanced stage of the banquet,
at which men’s spirits were more elevated
and they began to drink wine undiluted
(áκρατοι); cp. Plato Laws ii. 271 e, Ath.
ii. 40 a (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also
v(viii). 5 § 8, n. (1028), 7 § 13 f. n. (1067),
also n. (113). But, as was remarked in
Introd. p. 55, κατάκλασις, or admission into
συσσία, in all probability commenced with
initiation into military service from
the seventeenth year onwards: see v(viii).
4 § 9 Exc. i. to B. v(viii): but when
recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed
for them (Exc. to B. v[viii]) they cer-
tainly have syssitia of their own, and only
when their education has been completed,
from their twenty-first year onwards, are
they admitted to the syssitia proper, at
first those of the soldiers, and allowed the
other liberties here mentioned. Σusem.
(966)
22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κτλ] Plato on the contrary even in the Law-
vii. 816 d, e, xi. 935 e wholly banishes
comedy and Iambos, and only permits
comic dances by foreigners or slaves.
Σusem. (967)
§ 12 25 οὐστερον δ’ ἐπιστήμασις] Ν
to another point the discussion of which is
missing: see Introd. p. 49 n. (4), P. 53 n.
(1). Σusem. (969)
§ 13 28 Θεόδωρου| It is beyond all
doubt that Theodoros is here treated as
one deceased: but I fail to see that he
is spoken of Rhet. iii. 2 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff.
as if he were still living and on the stage,
as Zeller ii. ii. p. 131 n. (1) maintains.
From the latter passage it is very clear
that he was the greatest tragic actor of
recent times. Aelian, v. H. xiv. 40,40,
relates a story of the powerful impression
which his acting made on the tyrant
Alexander of Phere. Plutarch mentions
him along with Polos as a famous pro-
tagonist actor in leading parts in De regim.
21, 816 f, and with Nikostratos, Kallip-
pides, Mynniskos, Polos in De Glória.
IV(VII). 17. 15] 1336 b 18—1336 b 39. 350

κρίτης: ουδεὶς γὰρ πώποτε παρήχη ειαυτοῦ προεισήγητα, αὐθέ (XV).
ο τῶν ἐντελῶν ὑποκρίτων, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς πρώταις ἁκοις εὐμηνειάς δὲ ταύτῳ τούτῳ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίαις καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πρεσβευτῶν.

3 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μέλλον. διὸ δὲ τῶν νέων πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαιλα, μάλιστα δεί οὐσί αὐτῶν

5 ἐξε ἡ μοχρηίαν ἡ δυσμένειαι.

§ 12 b 14 <ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδομῇ τούτων πεποίημεν τῶν λόγων>

<15 ὡστερον δ' ἐπιτίθημαι δεῖ διορίσασί μιᾶν, εἴτε μὴ εἰς

<26 πρῶτον εἰτε δεὶς διαπορήσας, καὶ πᾶς δεὶ: κατὰ δὲ τῶν

<16 παρόντων καὶ τῶν ἐμφασθῆμεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον:>

36 δύο δ' οἰσίν ἡμικαίον πρὸς ὧς ἀναγκαῖον διηρκήσατο τὸν παί-

δίαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρις ἁβης καὶ παλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσέγγειν. P 46 L' Ald. W 3 and probably P 2 (1st hand) [\. αἱλεί] Bethes (on Terent. p. 619) 30 δεῖνον IP P 46 Ατ Βικ. and (with τὴν) presumed res. 1 of P 1 in the margin 33 δεα δετ αὐτὲς οἱ διηρκήσας καὶ πᾶς δεὶ: κατὰ δὲ τῶν


36 ηδον omitted by P1 wrongly, [\. δεα] B k 1 cp. 1368 b 21, 1369 a 6 1 35 τὴν omitted by M 3 and P 1 (1st hand, supplied by corr. 1 in P 0) 36 προτεροι B k 1 30 μετὰ P 1 2 P 2 B k 1 Susenn.
mathematics generally: this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in n. (182) on II. § 25. See Rep. II. 376 E. f., III. 403 C, VII. 534 C—535 A, 536—537 D, 539 D ff. In the Laws (see VII. 794 C—795 D, 806 E—813 C, 817 C—822 D, cp. 813 C ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. n. 956); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in n. (193) on II. 6. 5 that even in the Laws the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the Republic by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. Susem. (970) 40 οἱ γὰρ... 41 οὗ κακῶς] Cp. c. 16 § 8 n. (947). Susem. (971) 1337 a 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη... 2 ἀνα-
EXCURSUS I.

O'I 'ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.

NOTE ON IV(vii). i. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in IV. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages1, inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (ο ἓνων διαλογικον λόγον, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see n. 594). But whether they are 1) discussions by others, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, he reference is to (2) Aristotle's dialogues and popular works, or to (3) dialectical discussions, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems2, in his scientific writings, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in Physics IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work3; whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) oral controversies and expressions of opinion are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all4.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, n. (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see n. 609) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

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1 Nic. Eth. i. 13. 9, 1103 a 36, vi. 3, 1140 a 3; Metaphysics XIII(M). i. 1, 1076 a 18: Physics IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, Ind. Eth. i. 8. 4, 1217 b 72, ii. 1. 1, 118 b 34.
2 See Zeller Philosophie der Griechen i p. 343 ff., Thurot Éléments de la science dialectique Aristotélicenne (Trepтов 1877).
3 See Bonitz Ind. Ac. 105 b 16 ff.
4 This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But how is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of goods which follows [is] furthermore...one laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions' and does not require to be repeated in detail here,' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. n. (609).
has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, *Dialogue des Arist.* p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen, *Aristotelische Aufsätze II. (Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad. LXXII. p. 5 ff.)* has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susemihl *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873, p. 673 ff.). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel that for a question discussed in the *Ethics* Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the *Ethics* the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, "What is the best life, or human happiness?" and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the *Politics* Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II. 1. 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(iv). 9 § 2 cp. IV(vii). 12 §§ 3, 4: see *nn.* 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the *Ethics*. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether nonexistent, as is actually the case.

1 For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller op. cit. ii p. 119 n. (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says: "as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (ἐξωτερικὸν λόγον) goes no farther for the ordinary view regards mental goods, i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing."

2 And more recently Diels: see below.

3 See Krohn op. cit. p. 37.
Now already at c. 8 \( \frac{3}{4} \), cp. \( n. \) (799), and at c. 9 \( \frac{3}{4} \) 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. \( n. \) 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as "according to our previous inquiry," and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the Ethics. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see \( n. \) (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. \( n. \) 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, best of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the Physics—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see \( n. \) 876, 879, 881), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it, and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the Introd. pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer's notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also \( n. \) (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a two-fold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression Aristotle 1, pp. 63—75, not content to understand by it "discourses outside the subject," thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to Phys. IV. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, Études p. 81, he can cite Alexander in Topics διάλεκτου δι' ἐπικράτειας, ἢ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προφασίαν (the Topics) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφαρμοσμένοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφαρμοσμένοις, 860 a 24 ad: Brandis. So too Simplicius, ρα ἐφαρμοσμένα = ῥα ἐφαρμοσμένα ἐν τοῖς ἐφαρμοσμένοις.

1 On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded; see \( n. \) (881).
2 For the inconsistencies which Kuhn thinks he has discussed are too deep for me to detect.
EXCURSUS I.

Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in ἐξωτερικός more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to σκέψις Pol. 1. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase οἱ ἐξωθεν λόγοι, II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own ἀποριαν... ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys. 1. 2, 185 b 11, by ἀποριαν ἐξωτερικῷ. Simpl. in Physica 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit Phys. c. iv. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from Eud. Eth. II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with Nic. Eth. 1. 8, 1098 b 10 καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the Politics, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (Ind. Arz. 104 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles reported in Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad. 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, Rhein. Mus. XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Philol. CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' τὰ ἐξωθεν λεγόμενα, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thurot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit a priori than to ἐνδοξα generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to λόγοι διαλεκτικοί? (cp. λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφιῶν λόγοι all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwarried in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistical declamations: but in such ἐνδοξα we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with Nic. Eth. 1. c. 8, where a similar in-
tention is announced, 1098 b 9 σκεπτόντα δὲ τοιαύτα αὐτῇ μαθὼν αὐτῷ τὸν φιλοσοφικὸν σημαντό καὶ ἐξ ἀν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ τῷ λεγόμενῳ τινὶ μάθῃ τῷ μiesz γιγάντια πάντα συνήθη τῷ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ φυσικῷ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ ἐκλήθη. The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our Politica passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (Laws iii. 697 a, b), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ὡςτε καλὸς ὁ λόγος κατὰ τὸ γεύσιν τὴν διάδοχον παλαίναι χύονται καὶ ἀρακονομοῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας. "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the ψ: 'at least this διάκρισις is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in Pol. iv.vii. 1. 3, 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 3, 1323 a 34, τῶτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὡστερ πάντα ἀν συγκροτήσωμαι. That he had the Ethic in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 ἐτέρα σχέσις, and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on λόγον; believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in Outside Discourses, we must now also make use of it en passant, here in the Politica as before in the Ethic."

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or εἰς ὁδὸν λόγον and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (? Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in N. E. i. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato Charmides 163 A for N. E. vi. 4, 1140 a 3; Xenod, Henes, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the ἀπομία concerning Time in Phys. iv. c 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connections: not only is it external and referring to what is external, but, in contrast to its counterpart ὁ λόγος, it would naturally be used for non-philosophical discussions." What all men say may be part of the ἔνωτερικοι λόγοι though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in End. Eth. ii. 1 it is just 'what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both Politica passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to Metz 1076 a 23–28, End. Eth. 1278 b 52, and Physics iv. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not to much of λέγειν as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method."

1 Monatber. der Berl. Akad. 1883, p. 480f.
3 Torstvik's rendering of another dictum

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footnote continued...
Note on IV(vii). 11. 6, 1330 b 26.

duséidos γάρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ἥπων καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐδόκου ἐναι κρῆ, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσδοκος καὶ δυσπεριληπτὸν 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. 11. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas in the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect duséidos? and if so, would it not seem that dusexereunhtos should correlate with ἥπων, duséisodos with epitiitheméños, rather than duséisodos with ἥπων, dusexereunhtos with epitiitheméños? I conjecture therefore dusexereunhtos γάρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ἥπων καὶ duséisodos τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. H. Jackson.

EXCURSUS II.

THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.

ἐτή δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἐσται τῆς ἁκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνῃται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδὸν καταληπτὴν τῆς ἕλικας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομῆκοτα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. IV(VII). 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man’s age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father’s civic rights (so I take διαδοχή) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the
father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, 70 years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated. c. 9 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a more approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (1 6, 17, 1335 b 26—35). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (1 5, 1335 b 21— 26, 11. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. 11. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in Introd. p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civil rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, a. (317).

The above explanation premises, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (Transactions of Cambridge Philosophical Society 11. p. 146) would read τοις παῖδις διαμειναι, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 40). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (off. p. 116), who in his turn retains ἀπορίησις (P and corr. P'), but, while rightly referring διαμειναι τοῖς δικαίωμασι as well as καθαρλήσει τοῖς δικαίωμασι to the father, takes τοῖς νέοις to be the older, τοῖς νέοις to the younger children by the same marriage, and explains τοῖς δικαίωμασι as the children's attainment of the age of priority. Had this been the sense we should have expected τοῖς μακρογενέστεροι instead of the dative, and perhaps the addition of τοῖς μακρογενέστεροι after τοῖς νέοις and of δικαίωμασι after δικαίωμασι would then have conducted to clearness. This however is a small
The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διάδοχη τῶν τικνον; as if it meant that the children succeed (not their father but) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary.
The.

6 πρώτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέων εἰ πουτεύων τις τινι περὶ τοὺς παιδίας, ἐπειτα πῶτερον συμφέρει κατη ποιεῖ· Σθαί τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ὑ κατ' ἑδον πρόπον (ὅ γε λέγω καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποιάν τινὰ δει ταύτην. 1

1 ὅτε μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μαλιστά πραγματευτόν περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδές ἀν ἀμφισβητήσεις, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεισιν οὐ γνώμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς παῖς. (p. 14)

2 λειτείας (δει γὰρ πρὸς ἐκκατην παιδεύσει) τὸ γὰρ ἦδος

1337 a 3 πρώτον...7 παίδευται first separated from B. v.(vii) and rightly prefixed to B. v.(viii) by Spengei. 7 dectas M', dei deis Moez. 14 following William's transcription (spare const.) 14 παιδεύσειαν at. παιδεύσειαν Γ' Μ', παιδεύσείς τις δ' εἰσείσαν Jackson, yet at e. 6 8 & 5, 1341 a 1 Γ' Μ' have παιδευσείαν by transcription (ep.-1:60 b 15, 1310 a 14).

B. v.(viii). The same subject continued: the true system of state education.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengei's proposal to begin at πρῶτον πρобытиς is in full accordance with the usage at Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before starting a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this: see e.g. οὐκ. 3, 2, 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 25, 1338 b 30, and at 1341 b 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at 11. c. 12, p. 314, 111, c. 3, p. 319.

C. 1. Third points to observe. (1) Should there be a systematic education? (2) Should it be a public system? (3) What subjects should it include? While (1) and (2) are common in the alternatives, B. v.(viii) leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cpr. A.μ. p. 118.

2 12 καὶ γὰρ οὐκ οἷον. 3 In view of significant, πρὸς ἄλλοι εἰς το ἄλλον προσεξιον. οἰκειον παιδείαν παῖς. 3 χρόνον. fortasse οὐ ποιησείον τὸν ἐν εἰσείς καί οἰκειον παιδείαν τοῦτο, γραφίζων φοβοῦνται. 4 παῖδαν εἰς τὸν ἄλλον παῖς. οἰκειον. 5 οἰκειον τοῦτο, γραφίζων. αὐτὸν. 6 ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. 7 οἰκειον τοῦτο, γραφίζων. 8 ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. 9 οἰκειον τοῦτο, γραφίζων. 10 ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ. 11 οἰκειον τοῦτο, γραφίζων. 12 οἰκειον τοῦτο, γραφίζων.
15 τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν (Π) πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἐτί δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἢθος βελτίωνος αὐτίον πολιτείας), ἐτί δὲ πρὸς 2 πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἄει προπαδεύσεια 20 καὶ προεθέτεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὡστε δὴν § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν τὸ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσης, φανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μιᾶν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντοῖαν καὶ ταυτής τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινῆν καὶ μη γὰρ ἵδιαν, ὅν τρόπον ἐκείνοις 25 πόλεως αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἵδια τε καὶ μάθησιν ἰδίαιν, ἵν ἄν δοξῇ, διδάσκουν. δει γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινήν § 4 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. (άμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τις εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντως τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἐκαστος τῆς πόλεως) ἡ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον Μοκρού, βέλτιστον the other authorities (viz. Γ Ρ IV) and Bk. 1. § 24 [κατ’] Spengel, needlessly || ἐκαστος after 25 νῦν ΠΙΙ ΡΙΙΙ Bk. || 26 γὰρ Susem., καὶ Μο, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Bk. Susem. 1 in the text || 28 αὐτῶν Γ, αὐτοῦ Μο, αὐτοῦ ΡΙΙ, αὐτοῦ ΠΙΙΙ, αὐτοῦ Γ Ρ I, αὐτοῦ Μο, 29 μόριον...πόλεως omitted by I

δρῶν ποθὲν ἢ ἐκ πτέρας τᾶς πολιτείας γέγενθαι, ἄλλ’ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀν ὡσπερ ἑνίοτα, τάλλα ἐφελκυσταὶ; Comp. also Kερ. 541 A, Λας ν. 711 B. It is not the ‘spirit of the constitution,’ but the temper or character which originates and keeps up the constitution. Comp. the application of the term ἱδίας to ἄρμονίαν and ὑπομονής c. 5 §§ 22, 23, 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 τὸ βέλτιον ἢθος] The nobler temper. In other words, where the constitution is such as to permit the excellence of the individual considered as a citizen to coincide with his excellence considered as a man: cp. III. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8: iv(vii). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10: iv(v). 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684, 808, 1233). Also Plato Λας 1. 641 b, εἰ δ’ ἐλπίζω ἐρωτάτων παιδείαν τῶν παιδευτῶν, τί μέγα τῆς πόλεως ὄντων, οὐ χαλεπῶς εἶπέν, ὅτι παιδευτῆς μὲν εὖ γέγονοι’ ἂν ἄνδρες ἄγαθοι. Susem. (974)

As to the argument, it is much the same as in 1. 5. 2 f. 1254 a 25. It is perplexing to determine whether it merely guarantees consistency in the use of the term βέλτιων, or is intended for a material inference.

ἔτι δὲ] answers a 12 καὶ γὰρ, alleging another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristotelian periphrasis for the special sciences which has already occurred ii. 8, 18, 1268 b 36. Comp. III. i 12 § 1, 1262 b 16, where ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of ἐπιστήμηα καὶ τέχνα, b 14, which phrase is replaced in § 3, 1268 b 31, by ἐπιστήμηα καὶ δυνάμεις; also vi(iv). 1 §§ 1, 2, with notes.

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. ὁ. π. Therefore there should be τάξει τις περὶ τοῦ πάντως: the first of the three questions is settled. § 21 ἐπεὶ δὲ This corresponds to ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ α. 11. 25 τε καὶ] join ἵδια to διδᾶσκον.

26 δει γὰρ This sentence gives one reason why the education is to be public. The second point is quickly dismissed, but the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἀμα δὲ κτλ] The sacrifice of the individual to the state was carried out most completely at Sparta, but Periclean Athens did not fall far short in this respect. Aristotle accepts the principle along with the other fundamental postulates of the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly in i. 13, 15 as here. Comp. i. 1 § 12 ff., 4 § 5, and Eucken Methode p. 80 f. Also the conception of rearing a family as λητουργία, iv(vii). 16. 16.
partizans, supporters; literally ‘umpires to decide for them.’ The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. Metaphr. i. 8. 5, 989 b 6 ff.

1337 b 2 οὐ τὴν αὐτῆς εὐδέστε πάντες] See 1332 a 2‘n. and for the thought cp. Λ. E. i. 3. 2, 1094 b 14 ff.

3 πρὸς not περὶ, after diaφέρονται, as after ἀμφοβριθεῖν in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: ‘with regard to’ (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is ἀσκήσις ἀρετῆς? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ σῶν, 1333 b 30, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν... μελετῶσαν.

§ 4 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some ‘utilitarian’ studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of ἀσκησις.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Ks. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(VII). 14. 14, 1333 b 1 — 4. There is no need to limit the expression to διὰ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἔργων as in I. 7. 3, II. 1. 5, III. 4. 11.

5 οτὲ δὲ There is nothing strange in the repetition of οτὲ after φανέρω. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 f., where οτὲ is picked up by οτὲ, as also in Phys. 1. 7. 9, 190 b 17, 19: other instances from Phys. VI. 2. 9, 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render: ‘as to all not being required, in view of the distinction made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student.’ τῶν τοιοτῶν limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργον, because τοῦτο is predicate.

11 ἡ τὴν ψυχήν] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἔδωσον for ψυχή [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἔδωσεν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. Plat. Theaet. 173 E, τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ καίτε ἀντίκα ἐποίησε, η ὕπαλλακται...πάντα χειρέται), then ψυχή must be regarded as a gloss upon διανοια, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 622 ff. Susem.

§ 5 13 βαναύσουσι What is meant by παρασκευάζοντι χειρῶν διακειθάται comes out in 1. 11. 6, 1258 b 37 τὰ ὅψιμα λιβάδωτα. See n. (103). Susem. (980) This is the best description of “sordid occupations”: see Newman I. p. 111 f.

ταῦτα μισθαρκικά ἐργασίαι] ‘Trades plied for hire’ including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (102, 103). But in 1. 11. 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρκία is used in a different sense, = ‘working for wage,’ to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐργασία and τοσκρώμα, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). Susem. (981)
15. 

15. [Gottling (tentatively), ἀνελευθέρωσις, etc.]

16. [The sense, which Gottling and Ridgeway have misinterpreted, is:]

17. [The note, which is not included in the manuscript, is:

18. [This word goes with τολλάκια, while δι ’Ἀλλα, that is, ἀνελευθέρωσις, is used in reference to others, goes with τραπέζων in connection with ἀνελευθέρωσις, and accordingly, IP 2 162 has been transposed. But this transposition is not strange, as in many other passages, C. 135 b 9.]

19. [The clause, introduced by μέν, and δι ’Ἀλλα, is also in Donitii dictum holds: “τολλάκια,” etc., memorandum, grammatical coordination, re vera subject est alteri membrum.]

20. [This work closely all.]

21. [The rule, which is not included in the manuscript, is:

22. [Cf. Il. 9. 25. Otherwise, cf. Il. 6. 1 below.]

23. [This is a very close parallel to Il. 6. 12, 19 a 31.]

C. 3. Of the ordinary order of the imperfectus grammatica (Leclerc), grammatica, drawing have a practical value, in a consideration of M. 2. 21, which is the right complement to t. 41, which is the right complement of II. In this, the poet’s art is to

3 ai mēn oûn kataβeβλημέναι vnûn mathēseis, kataqter eîrâ- 

1 

tai prôteron, ἐπαμμουτέρικουσι ἐστὶ δὲ τέταρτα σχέδον ἢ παν- 

2 

deuéin eiôthai, γράμματα καὶ γραμματικὴ καὶ μουσικὴ καὶ 

25 τέταρτον ἐνιοὶ γραφικῆς, τήν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν 

5 ὡς χρησίμους πρὸ τὸν βλου οὖσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ 

γυμναστικὴν ὡς συνιστούσαν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν 

§ 2 ἡδὴ διαπορθεῖσεν ἀν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὅς ἰδοὺς χάριν οἱ 

πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς: οἱ δ′ εἴ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παί- 

30 δεῖα διὰ τὸ τῆς φύσις αὐτὴν ξητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰρη- 

ταῖ, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάξει δύ- 

νασθαι καλῶς. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἓνα καὶ πάλιν 

§ 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ′ ἀμφός μὲν δεῖ, μάλλον δὲν 

αιρετῶν τὴν ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ξητῆτεν τ(1) 

22 ἐσφάται ἀείκη ΠΡΒΚ. || 25 τῆς μὲν...γραφικῆς omitted by Π (supplied 

by Π in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς Π3 

and perhaps Γ (de musica autem dubitabit utique aliiquis William) || 28 ἡδὴ omitted by Π3, untranslated 

by William and Ar., [88] Susem.1, ei de Korres, needlessly || 33 δ′ Susem., 

γάρ ΓΠ2 Βκ. Σusem.1 in the text || 34 τῆς...35 σχολάξει omitted by Π2 

(supplied in the margin of Π4), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure Π5, καὶ...σχολάξει omitted by 

Ar. || [τελός] Susem.1, perhaps rightly, τελετῶν Π5, διὸς Vettori Bk. 

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημένα] Here and 

1338 a 36 used for ordinary, current i.q. 

tά ἐγκύκλια, οὐ ἐγκύκλιον παίδεα. 

Apparently from καταβάλλειαι = 'lay down a foundation' mid. So Pl. 

Laws 803 λ. Late writers use the passive in the sense of 

'to be published,' committed to writing, so already N.E. I. 5. 8, 1096 a 10: ep. 

Antigonus Caryst. De Mirabiliaus c. 60 ἐβδομηκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν καταβεβληται 

βιβλία. 

23 πρῶτον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39— 

b 2. Susem. (985) 

ἐστι δὲ...25 γραφικῆς] Comp. Plin. 

N. H. xxx. 10. 77 (Vettori): huius (Iphamphi) auctoritate effectum est Sicyone 

primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut 

pueri ingenii omnia antes graphicen, hoc 

est picturam in buxo, docerentur, recipie- 

returque ars ea in primum gradum liberali- 

um: Plato Protag. 325 D, Crito 50 D, 

Keph. II. 376 E., Laws VII. 795 E., Xen. De 


Under γράμματα came reading, writing, counting (λο- 

γικική), and the elements of arithmetic. 

Most of the authorities given above recognize the 

threefold division e.g. Pl. Ἰοτ. 

1. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) κιβαράσεως, 

both in the διδασκάλιον (ib. εἰς διδασκα- 

λῶν πέμπτους) and (3) physical training 

(eis παιδιτώρου πέμπτους) at first in the 

palaestra. So Theages l.c. ofon (1) γράμμα- 

ματα τε καὶ (2) κιβαράσεως καὶ (3) παλασίας 

καὶ τὴν ἀληθῶν ἀγωνίαν. 

§ 2 30 [ἴστην] Nature, personified, 

is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as is said to define, to make a division, 

to place at man's disposal: 1. 8, 5, 1256a 


1238 a 23. 

πολλάκις] E.g. II. 9. 34, IV(viI). c. 14 

§ 9, c. 15 § 6. Susem. (987) 

32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which 

determines all." The pronoun is 

accepted into the gender of the predicate. See 

IV(viI). 1. 8, 1232 b 15 n., Wahlen Aufl. 

II. p. 34. Another instance IV(viI). 7. 5; 

1327 b 41. 

πάλιν] That is, after 1333 b 1. 

§ 3 33 [δὴ] Qu. crit. coll. p. 418. Hoc 

loco γάρ (I' Π Βκ.) plane absurdum est. 

Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisse 

haec cum antecedentibus nexus causae 

et consecutionis coniungere, certe multo 

magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio. 

Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius peccat 

sum est γάρ et δὲ conjonuctiones proper 

compendiorum simulitudinem inter se 

permixtis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituendum est. 

Susem.
With the punctuation now adopted (comma after \( \delta \)):

\[ \text{(1)} \, \text{if both are necessary but leisure more desirable and more truly the end than occupation, we must next inquire what should employ our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or else amusement would make the end of life. With \( \delta \), there is the need less free.} \]

\[ 35 \, \text{of} \, \text{the \, other \, authorities} \, \text{I} \, \text{next \, the \, passage \, by} \, \text{William \, has \, translated \, closely \, \textit{most} \, \textit{particulars} \, \textit{confused} \, \textit{words} \, \textit{to} \, \textit{Bk.} \, \textit{Susem.} \, \text{in \, the \, text}. \]

\[ 36 \, \text{-} \text{or} \, \text{the} \, \text{Schneider, \, the} \, \text{Schneller, \, as \, otherwise \, seems \, needed} \, \text{right, \, 
\text{more} \, \text{reconstructions} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{left,} \, \text{for} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{what} \, \text{is} \, \text{more}. \, \text{For the} \, \text{place \, mentioned \, is \, not \, something \, apart \, from \, 
\textit{Happiness} \, \text{Wells,} \, \text{but \, is \, contained} \, \text{in,} \, \text{it} \, \text{is} \, \text{incalculable} \, \text{that} \, \text{Daring \, in \, the} \, \text{or in \, the} \, \text{and} \, \text{at} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{Of the} \, \text{and} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{To} \, \text{the} \, \text{it} \, \text{he} \, \text{should} \, \text{have} \, \text{added} \, \text{together} \, \text{with} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{Schneller, \, the} \, \text{Schneller, \, as \, otherwise \, seems \, needed} \, \text{right, \, 
\text{more} \, \text{reconstructions} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{left,} \, \text{for} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{what} \, \text{is} \, \text{more}. \, \text{For the} \, \text{place \, mentioned \, is \, not \, something \, apart \, from \, 
\textit{Happiness} \, \text{Wells,} \, \text{but \, is \, contained} \, \text{in,} \, \text{it} \, \text{is} \, \text{incalculable} \, \text{that} \, \text{Daring \, in \, the} \, \text{or in \, the} \, \text{and} \, \text{at} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{Of the} \, \text{and} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{To} \, \text{the} \, \text{it} \, \text{he} \, \text{should} \, \text{have} \, \text{added} \, \text{together} \, \text{with} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}.} \]

\[ \text{Schneller, \, the} \, \text{Schneller, \, as \, otherwise \, seems \, needed} \, \text{right, \, 
\text{more} \, \text{reconstructions} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{left,} \, \text{for} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{what} \, \text{is} \, \text{more}. \, \text{For the} \, \text{place \, mentioned \, is \, not \, something \, apart \, from \, 
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\[ \text{Schneller, \, the} \, \text{Schneller, \, as \, otherwise \, seems \, needed} \, \text{right, \, 
\text{more} \, \text{reconstructions} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{left,} \, \text{for} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{what} \, \text{is} \, \text{more}. \, \text{For the} \, \text{place \, mentioned \, is \, not \, something \, apart \, from \, 
\textit{Happiness} \, \text{Wells,} \, \text{but \, is \, contained} \, \text{in,} \, \text{it} \, \text{is} \, \text{incalculable} \, \text{that} \, \text{Daring \, in \, the} \, \text{or in \, the} \, \text{and} \, \text{at} \, \text{the} \, \text{as} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{Of the} \, \text{and} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}. \, \text{To} \, \text{the} \, \text{it} \, \text{he} \, \text{should} \, \text{have} \, \text{added} \, \text{together} \, \text{with} \, \text{the} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{of} \, \text{the} \, \text{and} \, \text{more} \, \text{comes} \, \text{by} \, \text{the} \, \text{more}.} \]
tautηn mēnto, tīn ἥδονην οὐκέτι tīn autηn tītheasun, allā (καθ’ ēautouσ) ekastos kai tīn ēxēn tīn autōn, ó d’ ērīstos § 6 tīn ērīsthn kai tīn ēπo tov kallīstw. ὅστη fanevōn ōtī 
10 dei kai προς tīn ēn tī diαγωγη σχολήν maνθανέin āttα kai παιδέεσθαι, kai tauta μὲν τά παιδέματα kai taut-
tas tās māthēsies ēautōn eīnai chārīn, tās dē πρὸς tīn 
8 tāscολιαν ὃs αναγκαια kai chārin āllων. διὸ kai tīn 6 
mousikēn oι πρότερον eis παιδείαn ēταξαν οὐχ ὃs αναγκαιον 
15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ’ ὃs χρήσιμον, ὡστε πάγρα-
mατα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν kai πρὸς οἰκονομίαν [kai πρὸς 
māthēsiv] kai πρὸς πολιτικὰ πράξεις πολλάς, δοκεὶ dē kai 
grafikη χρήσιμος eīnai πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν tān tōn te-

constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man’s ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick Methods of Ethics p. 76 n. 1, History of Ethics§ p. 48 n., p. 56 n. 2. 

7 tautηn mēnto... 9 kallīstw] Comp. Nic. Eth. 1. 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff. (Congreve). I cannot understand how Döring p. 109 f. is able to prove from these words, that the pleasure which be-
longs as a necessary condition to the life of happiness is not the pleasure which arises from virtuous action and theoretical know-
ledge, but something which taken by itself is an integral factor of happiness. (To this view Döring’s reviewer Walter, Jen. 
Litts. 1877 p. 20, rightly took exception.) From what other source can it arise? Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly main-
tains (see Zeller cf. c. 11 ff p. 617 ff.), can only be conceived as a consequence of some bodily or mental activity—even the pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation of falling asleep: for eating and drinking are bodily activities, and the very act of falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation of a movement is itself a movement) is also an activity. Döring is no less mis-
taken when he goes on to state that the pleasure which is introduced as an inte-
gral factor into the end of life itself con-
tributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-
ment (diαγωγη), whereas the latter is re-
ally due to the cognitive faculties and the pleasure inseparably associated with their strenuous exercise. The thought of Aristotle is a very simple one: that those activities alone can belong to happiness, which naturally produce the purest possi-
ble joy with the smallest admixture of pain. Comp. further c. 5 § 10 n. (1032). 

576 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Θ. 3. [V(VIII). 3. 5 

SUSEM. (992)) 

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the face of τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ 
15 diαγωγήν § 8, a 21, I cannot reconcile myself to this 
phrase. Is it possible that σχολήν is the inter-

department of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς 

τὴν ἐν τῇ diαγωγή, did not see that with 

these words ἥδονη should be understood 
from the preceding sentence?" Dr Post-
gate Notes p. 15 defended both phrases, 
explaining this as ‘our training must in-
clude certain studies available for leisure 

to be spent in rational amusement,’ and 
a 21 as ‘rational amusement to be 
pursued in leisure time.’ 

§ 7 14 eis παιδείαn ēταξαν] Ranked 
under, with: so 1339 b 14 and θετέων eis, 
1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτη 
tάπτουνταν. 

17 δοκεὶ δὲ kai γραφικὴ] "While 
drawing too has its use in making us 
better judges of works of art," so that we 
are less liable to be taken in when pur-
chasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1. 
SUSEM. (994)
Our present texts give evidence instead of ἄρετα, SUBSE. [997].

We may conjecturally restore Aristotle’s text as follows:

19 ἀλλ’ ἐν γάρ γε 

21 ἄρα ἐν γάρ γε 

23 διαγωγήν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων

25 διαγωγήν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων...
§ 11 ταὶ καὶ τῶς, ὑστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν
35 εἴναι πρὸ δοῦ ἤγειντι, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐξομεν
τινα μαρτυριῶν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων ἡ γάρ
μοισικὴ τούτο ποιεῖ δήλον. ἤτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησιμῶν ὅτι
dei tina pайдευσθαι touz paїdas ou μόνον dia τὸ χρήσιμον,
§ 12 λας δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι ἤνεισθαι μαθήσεις ἑτέρας, ὅμων:
91 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν υὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἵδιοις φύσεις μὴ δια-
μαρτάναισι άλλο ὁσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
1338 b ὁνὴν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἡ μᾶλλον δὲ ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τὸν
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ξητεῖ πανταχοῦ τὸ χρη-
σιμον ὅκιστα ἀμφότεροι καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

36 * * * ek Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs
any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. ˂ὅτι τὸ καλὸν ὦν ἐξειρών εἶναι?
Susem. || 37 τῶν χρήσιμων after δὲι δι δι (if Williams has translated accurately
quod aportet utilium) Pn || 40 δὲ αὐτῶν after γίνεσθαι (γίνεθαι Bk. 9) Pn² Pb. Bk. (in
Pn ἔνδεχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 ἀλλ’ ἔτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τὸν
susem. || § § 1338 b 1 ἢ transposed by Postgate to follow μᾶλλον || ἢ ἀλλ’ Ar. (? Reiz
Thurot || πρᾶσιν. ἢ μᾶλλον…2 κάλλους; Jackson formerly || θεωρητικὸν (θεωρη-
κὴν S9) Pn², θεωρητικὸς Pn || 3 ἀμφύτειν Pn² Pb. || ἐλευθέρους ? Susem.

§ 10 34 ὑστερον] Another of the un-
Susem. (999)
§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον…37 δηλον] The
sequence of thought here is liable to be
misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has
proved, or tried to prove, that the
ancients had regarded poetry and music as
being preeminently a means to intellectual
training, which in his eyes is more im-
portant than moral training, and to the
highest intellectual enjoyment associated
with it. It is true the evidence he has
produced suffices for no more than the
inference that the ancients considered
music and poetry in the light of higher
rational amusements for men of ripier age,
but not that they adopted music in the
education of the young with the view of
training them for this rational enjoyment
in the future: cp. nn. (993, 1024). He
does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the
question, see n. (993), whether this art
may not be utilized for the development of
character: this he discusses later on, c. §
1, where he expressly states that he will
resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11,
which had been left incomplete: see nn.
(1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrast-
ing the intellectual and theoretical aim
of education not with its moral aim, the
development of character, but only with
the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of
what is absolutely necessary and prac-
tically useful. All three aspects are more
intimately concerned with the mental side
of education. The third is disposed of in
§§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the
difference between intellectual and moral
training, without however pursuing the
inquiry more precisely into particulars,
his attention being at present especially
directed to the proper development of
the body. Susem. (1000)
35 εἴναὶ] Lobeck in his ed. of Phry-
nichus p. 275 treats this as a case of the
absolute inf. See n. on 1330 a 37.
§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in
1261 a 13, 1262 b 5, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31,
1338 b 2.
1338 b 2 περὶ τὰ σώματα] The pre-
positional phrase an equivalent for the
adjective 'corporal.' So Plat. Timaeum
35 A, Phaedr. 246 D. See Ast Lex. s. v.
of whose exx. Soph. 251 c περὶ σωματικῶν
φθάνων κτῆσεως = 'poverty in mental en-
dowment' is perhaps the best.
τὸ δὲ [ἡττεῖν κτλ] See 111. 8. 1, 1270
b 13 f., Eucken Methode p. 35.
3 τοὺς μεγαλοφύγους] Editors comp.
N. E. IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. Susem
(1001)
4. A school and teacher (ὁδηγούς) is compared to that of a cook and a physician. See vi(iii). 1. 2 n. (1115), and in this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Exc. 1. p. 611. Susen. (1003).


7. τοῦτων γὰρ κτλ] From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared with IV(vii). c. 14 § 9 ff., c. 15 § 8 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics does not confine merely to physical development, but also to the moral education of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοτριβής and γυμναστής see also Galen De nat. motu. 11. 9. T. vii. p. 143 Kühn, where the relation between trainer (παιδοτριβής) and teacher (ὁδηγούς) is compared to that between a cook and a physician. See vi(vii). i. 2 n. (1115), and in this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Exc. 1. p. 611. Susen. (1003).

ποιῶ τινα ποιῆ] The phrase occurs c. 5 § 3, 13.19 a 13 f., c. 14, 1.40 b 11, c. 6 § 16, 1.41 b 18. Like περίπολος (exc. n. 1. 8, 1.36 a 37) the precise import of ποιῶ τινα, "of a definite character, or determined by the context: in 1.139 a 14 ἀναπτύσσω χαλκόν ὀπίσθι (cp. 1.139 b 24), in 1.144 b 18 διδάσκων simply; while in 1.140 b 11 it is so vague as  ἀναπτύσσω καὶ ποιῶ τινα 1.40 b 3. In our present passage it is substantially διδάσκω τινα, περίπολος, ποιῶ τινα (τὸ ὡς) γυμνάστῃ, "in about, teach, develop," "influence." A correlative phrase, ποιῶ τινα γυμνάστη, occurs c. 5 § 16, 1.40 a 7 f., where see now. Comp. N. l. 1. 9, 1.409 b 21. Rost. l. 1. 9, 1.344 b 10. c. 4. Athletic training. Two errors to avoid: we do not desire to make professional athletes, or to make the Spartans "...

The essence of an athletic training was passed IV(vii). c. 15 §§ 12, 13, 1.138 b 1—13. The criticism of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation of their political system in general on the lines of II. ii. c. 9, IV(vii). c. 14 §§ 1—2, c. 15 §§ 6. 10 at ποιῶ τινα] Some make way for to make their sons professional athletes. Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is shameful. Cp. § 6 b 31, n. (1013), § 9, n. (1013), i.e. Exc. 1. and IV(vii). 16, 18. 1.355 b 11, n. (1044). Susen. (1004).

In his condemnation of the means for sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophon. Frag. 3, Ergastataion. Ar. 1. 1. as well as Plato Alc. 10.482—484, 407 b, 410 b 10—11. VII. 721 b 6, 8 1049 a. The judgment of poets and philosophers was confirmed by practical athletes like Epaminondas and Alexander, and later Philipseum (Pind. Pers. 5.5. 655 c), by medical authorities like Galen (Hipp. Avg. 84. 1—14. 4. p. 152 F. K.), cp. Pind. De mus. stas. 10. 16, 170 a ff.), and by the Romans. On the degradation of the athletic sports, see P. Gell. New Ch. 59. 320. 233. Macedonia. The Proverbs l. y. 6. 187—188. Frag. 11. The chief cause for the prominence of the professional elements were εἰς ἀθλητὴς ἔσοντες τοις πολέμους ἐκ τῶν αθλητῶν, τοις πολέμους ἐκ τῶν ἀθλητῶν. Cp. Exc. 1. and IX. 159 b 10—11. The chief cause for the prominence of the professional elements were (1) the increasing popularity of the boxers' sports, boxing and the pentathlon; (2) the changes of diet, esp. n. (1010); (3) the progress made in the science and art of training. This was hereditary of Sparta, as men of athletic training, by introducing elaborate rules for the eating and drinking and exercise. His first discovered that the human body was capable of being trained, was healthy and beautiful, but necessary and adapted to this and that special activity: he improved the speed of the race and the skill of the archers, but general athletes as a means of education in skill and happiness. (Rischel.) The eye succeeded until in Roman times pro-

37-7
vince of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the pancratium is found in Plutarch V. Lycurg. 19. Apophthegm. Lycurg. 4. 189 e. Seneca De Benef. v. 3. 1. Philostr. De Gymnast. 9. 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πιέστωσα διὰ τὴν ἀρθρησιν αὐτῶν ἢ ἐμφασίζω, Rep. Lac. 4 § 6. Epanimondas saw the difference between the copulent athletic habit and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plut. Aophilb. Eρ. 3. 192 c.

13 τοὺς πόνους] Cr. ii. 9. 24, 1270 b 33, ὑπερβάλλει (ἡ διατα) ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν.

§ 14 πολλάκις] ii. 6. 34 n. (344).


15 With may understand ταύτην: ‘neither to this alone, nor to this principally’ (Ridgeway). An omission of ἀρέτας to be found 1. 13. 9, 1260 a 24.

19 λεοντάδεν τιν] The character of the lion is given Hist. Animal. ix. 44. 2—6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βροσὶ μὲν χαλεπώτατος ἐστι, ἐὰν τειχῶν δὲ καὶ βεβερωκὼς πράσατο, ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἱδρὸν ὡς ὑπότητι ὑδατούν αὐτῶν ὡς ὑφόρωμεν αὐτῶν, πρὸς ταύτα σύντροφα καὶ συνήθης σφόδρας ἑλπιστάμουν καὶ στέρ-

κτικός, ἐν δὲ τοῖς θηρίαν ὁρμῶμεν μὲν ὑδάτιστὸν φεῦγει οὐδὲ πτήσεις, ἀλλὰ εἶναι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαζὴ τῶν θρησκευτῶν ὑπαγαγέων βάδον ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ κατὰ σχῆ-

να, κατὰ βραχὺ ὑπετριφθῆναι. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treat-

ment and criticism of γυμναστική (see Kep. i1. 104—412), gives the dog as an example of the ‘spirited’ temperament in Kep. ii. 375 c ff.; comp. also i11. 410 e, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(vii). 7. 5. n. (783, ff.). SUSEM. (1006)

§ 21 εὐχέροις ἔχει] “are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannib-

alism.” These wild races lead the ‘natural’ ληστικὸς βίος of i. 8. 7 f., 1256 b i (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν...24 μετεληφθοῦσι] Comp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff (ξένοι τὰς θερμωδίες), оίως χαίρει φασὶν ἐνώσιν τῶν ἀπεργειμονῶν περί τῶν Πόλεων, τοὺς μὲν ὠρεῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κράτισιν, δὲ τὰ παῖδα δανεῖξέν ἄλληλοι εἰς εἰσ-

χώνα: Herod. iv. 18, 106, Ἀρδοφάγοι δὲ ἀγωνισταὶ πάνω ἄνθρωπος ἔχονι χήθαι, οὐτε δίκαιον νομίζετε οὐτε νόμῳ οὐδὲ χρῆμα, ρυγοῖς, νομίδες δὲ εἰς: Scylax Peripol. 75. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be kindred origin with themselves: Strabo i10. 416 A (colo-

nists of the Orchemenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), xi. 495 f. ϕάσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδιόνος στρατιᾶς τοὺς μὲν φθωσά Ἀχαίοι τῆς ἐνεδρί Ἀχαίαν αἰκίαν (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue

[succ. Nn. Eth. iv. 2. 7, 1122 b 6, and often]. the motive must be quite the noble, the beautiful, the good: the vates must be evoked this is 

25 ινότοι <μηδε> - Eucken: but why should not ινότοι alone have the sense of μηδε, so often? 26 γυμναστής: ΠΠ Π' Bk. 27 λεκτομένῃ: Μ Π Bk. οί γάρ οίκ οίκ; Susen: doubtfully 28 since τό Reit 36 δεί δε... 38 είκον transmitted by Susen and Holder to precede έπερον... 36 επέρον. See Conybeare, p. 89 ff. 36 δή Susen, ΙΠ Π Ρ Ρ. Bk. Susen, in the text προτέρον] προτέρον Spengel, necessarily 

30 οίκοι γάρ Π, ού γάρ Π Π' Bk. 31 inserted after Πόσικ by Venetius Bk. 32 omit inserted αδελφε, Korase αδελφε 33 αδελφε] οδός Kotzing, αδελφε αδελφε Susen... but perhaps no change is needed. 

τῶν ἄλλων θεοῦς: With this gesture, should be compared 1. 33 2. 1099 8, 1155 3. 1, 1060 2, 111, 112 4. 1. 15. 1159 5. 11 6. 4. 7. 128 8. 18. Susan: 

30 ενδεικνύομαι ήταν] This criticism repeated from ΠΠ 9 π 16. 16 ΠΠ(VIII). 14 16 18... see mm. (1007) (1010). Susan: (1008) The simple verb here in the sense of ἐνάθεσθαι. ΠΠ(IX) 15. 16 1334 b 10. 

38 πρός μη ήσκούνται: See Xen. ΤΕ 259 c 5. The word άλλαξαται ἐκ τῶν στρατηγών] see Xen. (1010). Susan: (1008) 

5 29 τό καλόν] With this and b 30 καλόν καλόν, cp. n. (1007). Susan: (1009) 

30 οδόι γάρ λύκος κτλ] Comp. Μοίοι. ΙII. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 Π(1010). Susan: (1008) 

25 αυτοί <μηδε> - Eucken: but why should not αυτοί alone have the sense of μηδε, so often? 26 γυμναστής: ΠΠ Π' Bk. 27 λεκτομένῃ: Μ Π Bk. οί γάρ οίκ οίκ; Susen: doubtfully 28 since τό Reit 36 δεί δε... 38 είκον transmitted by Susen and Holder to precede έπερον... 36 επέρον. See Conybeare, p. 89 ff. 36 δή Susen, ΙΠ Π Ρ Ρ. Bk. Susen, in the text προτέρον] προτέρον Spengel, necessarily 

30 οίκοι γάρ Π, ού γάρ Π Π' Bk. 31 inserted after Πόσικ by Venetius Bk. 32 omit inserted αδελφε, Korase αδελφε 33 αδελφε] οδός Kotzing, αδελφε αδελφε Susen... but perhaps no change is needed. 

τῶν ἄλλων θεοῦς: With this gesture, should be compared 1. 33 2. 1099 8, 1155 3. 1, 1060 2, 111, 112 4. 1. 15. 1159 5. 11 6. 4. 7. 128 8. 18. Susan: 

30 ενδεικνύομαι ήταν] This criticism repeated from ΠΠ 9 π 16. 16 ΠΠ(VIII). 14 16 18... see mm. (1007) (1010). Susan: (1008) The simple verb here in the sense of ἐνάθεσθαι. ΠΠ(IX) 15. 16 1334 b 10. 

38 πρός μη ήσκούνται: See Xen. ΤΕ 259 c 5. The word άλλαξαται ἐκ τῶν στρατηγών] see Xen. (1010). Susan: (1008) 

5 29 τό καλόν] With this and b 30 καλόν καλόν, cp. n. (1007). Susan: (1009) 

30 οδόι γάρ λύκος κτλ] Comp. Μοίοι. ΙΙΙ. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 Π(1010). Susan: (1008)
not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choruses of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle’s language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement.

SUSEM. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαθανατός appears N. E. iv. 1. 36, 1121 b 11.

SUSEM. (1012)

35 χείρον ἐπέτρεψιν] Comp. again the passages quoted in n. (1005). SUSEM. (1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἢβης] Comp. Platob Latus viii. 833 c: πρῶτα δὴ τάτο τά διδάσκαλων, ἐν μὲν παιδικῶν, ἐν δὲ 

ἀγενελῶν, ἐν δὲ ἄρηδων καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγενελῶν τὰ δύο τῶν πρῶτοι τῶν μέχρις τοῦ ὀρείπος τὸν ἠθόμον τὸν δίκερον, τὸς δὲ παία τὰ τούτων ἠθέωσε (Eaton). SUSEM. (1014)

To the “lighter” course are opposed the “heavy” or “violent” (βιαία) contests: ἐστὶ γάρ τινι ἀγωνίας εὐμαθέσας τὸ μὲν κοίμησε τὰ τῶν στάδιων, διόλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ βαρεῖα δὲ, παγκράτιον, πάλη, πόλκα. πέντεδε ὡς ἀμφότεροι συμφημίζονται Philostr. De Gymnastic. 3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, ‘heavy-weights,’ ‘light-weights,’ Galen vi. 4B7 K.

§ 8 1339 a 2 δύο τις ἢρ ἢ τρεῖς εὑροὺ] The order is artistic; four short syllables.

.§ 9 6 ἀρμόττεοι But 1339 b 3 ἀρμόττεοι Π', ἀρμόττεοι Π'.

παίδων ἀγωνικοποιοῦσι] The compulsory diet of the athletes consisted principally of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge, cheese. Only in later times was meat allowed: Dromeus of Stymphalus in Arcadia is credited with the change, Pausan. vi. 7. 10 (according to Pliny
V. [VIII]. 5. 2 | 1338 b 33—1339 a 18.

N. II. xxiii. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laert. VIII. 13 a trainer named Pythagoras, αλέκτην τύνι, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. VIII. 13, ἰσχαδό ἔρησεν καὶ τωναι ἄγρες καὶ ποταμῶν ὑπασκέψεσφοι. Plato Ἐρωτ. 11. 404 a says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to hang and serious illness. Aristotle himself states De Gen. Animal. iv. 3. 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In Problema xxxvii. 5, 957 a 11 ff., viii. 4, 887 b 57 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἀγρες, δισσιψ̣υς, and Πρεσβ. 1. 38, 882 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bomzi). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), Ἰνθ. c. 10 48 12, 13 mb. (1944) and Exc. b. p. 618. SUB. (1015).

7 ἀρὰ γὰρ...τὸ σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle: Ἐρωτ. 5. 327 b. ἦν ἀρὰ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ἄλοχον καὶ μαθητῶν καὶ φίλων διὰ τὸ ἐπιστησάμενον τὰς φύσεις καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπους γεγενημένα μαθητεύειν. οὕτω γὰρ οἱ ἀντικρίζοντες τὰ τὰ τούτο πρὸς τὸν ἐκεῖνον, αὕτης ἐκ τὸν ἄλλον πρᾶξαν. κατό γὰρ καὶ δεότα μαθητέων πολέμοι. He differs slightly in his mode of carrying it out; see IV (VII). 17. 12, n. (1900) and Exc. b. SUB. (1016).

12 καὶ τὸν ἀναλαβόντας κτλ. The discussion breaks off. c. 5 § 11, 1348 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning καὶ τὸν ἀναλαβόντας...διὰ τὸν...κτλ. See n. (1000) SUB. (1016).

14 ἀναλαβόντως] For the absolute use Bou lique Sub. αρ. 8, quotes I. 13, 16, 1266 b 23, Ἰνθ. 1. 4, 1285 b 33. With ἀναλαβόντως 11. 31 with the direct object (τὸν ἄντρον δικαίου) (VII). 14. 15, 1334 b 13. In If. 11. 1, 1723 b 7, there is a variant.

11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 2 § 11, SUB. (1017).

The corresponding passages in Plato are Ἐρωτ. III. 358 b—410 b, 404 b, 410 b—412 a, IV. 424 b, c, VII. 224 a, Λεκκ. 154, Ἰνθ. 656 c, 664 a—671 a, and 750 b—804 b, 809 b—813 a.}

11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 2 § 11, SUB. (1017).

12 καὶ τὸν ἀναλαβόντας κτλ. The discussion breaks off. c. 5 § 11, 1348 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning καὶ τὸν ἀναλαβόντας...διὰ τὸν...κτλ. See n. (1000) SUB. (1016).

14 ἀναλαβόντως] For the absolute use Bou lique Sub. αρ. 8, quotes I. 13, 16, 1266 b 23, Ἰνθ. 1. 4, 1285 b 33. With ἀναλαβόντως 11. 31 with the direct object (τὸν ἄντρον δικαίου) (VII). 14. 15, 1334 b 13. In If. 11. 1, 1723 b 7, there is a variant.
The quotation is from the Bacchae 381, ἀποσαίει τε μεράμιν. The preceding line is μετὰ τ' αὐτοῦ γελάσαι, and the choral ode continues ὡταν βάτων ἔλθῃ | γάνον ἐν δαίτι θεῶν | κεφαφόρος δ' ἐν θαλασσί | ὀδυσσάς κρατήρ ὑπὸν αἷμα βαλλέσαι. SUSEM. (1020 b).  

§ 3 διὰ καὶ τάπτουν κτα] The sense of this corrupt passage is quite plain. Laminus has perhaps made the best attempt at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάπτουν = prescribe, recommend as in vi.(iv). 2. 18: "and so (if) (music) is also appointed for the purpose of recreation alone, and all these things are employed in like manner." But then the words in italics have to be supplied. With Flach's transposition ἀμα τοῦτος τάπτουν = "and so they rank music with all these, and employ them all alike." SUSEM. (1020 b).  

21 την ὅρκησιν] Reiz correctly quotes Ath. 1. 9 ff. in illustration of the passage, but he should not have added Od. 1. 151 f., for in Homer's description of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the feast" (τὰ γὰρ τ' ἀναθήματα δαίτως) Aristotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995-998), a higher estimate of these arts as a means of refined amusement and the best intellectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato Alcib. 1. 108 c the term μουσική is used in the widest sense to embrace the whole of the rhythmic, music, poetry, and dancing: but Plato himself only uses the word to include music and poetry. He makes dancing a part of gymnastics, Laws ii. 673 A, VII. 795 E, 813 A ff.; and distinguishes between imitative dancing and non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing in the narrower sense of the term. 795 E τῆς ὅρκησιος ἄλλη μὲν Μοῖσης Λέον μουσικών, τὸ τε μεγαλοπρέπεια φιλάνθος ἀμα καὶ εἰλεθέρων, ἄλλη δὲ εὔεξις εὐφραντότατος τε ἐνεκα καὶ κάλλους τῶν τοῦ σάματος μελῶν (Eaton). Aristotle Poet. 1. 5. 6, 1447 a 27 f. finds it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that either this first kind of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing properly so called—or else (as I have assumed) all dancing belongs to the group of imitative arts of the rhetorical or musical class (the defective text of the Poetics admits of more than one explanation, and one explanation can be extorted from the words as they stand, see Vahlen Beiträge zu Arist. Poet. 1 p. 3 [167]). As to sleep, see n. (996). SUSEM. (1021).  

The second use: for moral training and formation of character, as gymnastic trains the body. 24 ἔθικους δύνασθαι χαρίν ὁρᾶν] According to Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, moral virtue is only found where love of the good is present, and where the moral activities are really exercised with pleasure and delight. The main thing in the formation of character, as Plato teaches, Laws ii. 653 b, c, is to awaken and render habitual this right feeling of pleasure: see Nic. Eth. 11. 3, 1, 1104 b 3 ff., X. 1.1, 1172 a 19 f., X. 9. 6 ff., 1179 b 23 f., and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with n. (1044). Compare Nic. Eth. 111. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff., 111. cc. 11 and 12, IV 1 § 13, 1120 a 26,
25 § 7) § 2x A. and § 3x (later hand), § 1 - 1x - Kopacz wrongly § 1 - 3x after ephoroption Spengel, [§ 1 after ephoroption] Döring Philologus xxvii p. 701 f. In Hahn- denhain (De detrimenta artium Aristotelicarum principiis p. 49) who considers the words as a gloss upon 21 § 3x ephorong. See Comm. n. (1931) § 19 to παίων § 15x (cuique over an erratum) Bl. § 11x in the text, 7x παίων 1x Newton Camb. Rev. vii. 305 n. 1, παίων M*, praev William, [παίων Bl.] παίων in Flach, παίων § 3x(3) - 3x. Gattling, Aristoteles Schmidt Sernd. § 10 xιοδή M* P*, οὐδενί § 15x. Either may be right

§ 24, b 30, c 2 § 8, 1122 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see Nt. Eth. iii. § 4 f., § 113 § 29 f., vi. § 5, 6, 1140 b 12 f., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance; see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 f., n. (1039). Cp. Döring q. c. p. 106 L. 110 f. Serim. (1022)

4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz Ind. Ar. 831 b 4: φρονήσεως latticis sense, syn. γνώσεως, επιστήμης. The passages cited, amongst them 1388 b 22, 1389 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction; while § 3 § 9 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting εγκόμια and lecture διαγωγής διδάσκαλος: see n. (1022). There is nothing therefore to militate after liberation, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion επίστημος, on the analogy of the second passage, is least tenable on objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is επίστημος and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as επιστήμη. Serim. (1023)


28 μετά λέξεως] Nat Happiness is as metá λέξεως A. and § 1032 b 31. 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult; a tacit contradiction of the Sophist belief that education is no more than cramming: see De. Ep. 343 b 3, 370 c 2 and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities De. Sept. 11 b 374 a 3—8 (Humphreys). On the pleasures of learning see Klon. i. 16, 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application in art, Pol. c. 4 § 144b 15 ff.

29 § 7x) See IVVIII. 5. 1, 1133 b 29 ff. 50 οὖν γάρ άτιλα προσφερεν τέλος] Döring p. 137 is right here in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying are either as an amusement [παίων] or as deriving from it; the highest intellectual gratification: although it is not only in the latter sense that the content of the art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. § 6 § 7, m. (1921) in την τουλάχιο Ι4 d 9 ff., 114 b 1 ff. cp. w. 1652. Aristotle says intellectual amusement is the highest aim of education, and second training is a means thereto, while IVVIII. 5. 6 says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn various things, adding § 5 § 6 (?) the fear that the students would forget Music in this sense 6 part of education, cp. w. 1652. w. 1653. This mention may only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from την τουλάχιο Ι4 d 9 ff., 114 b 16, 1652 w. 1653 b 16. The foundations of art.
not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (3) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, n. (1025), § 8, n. (1027), § 11, n. (1036), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ήπος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also § 7 n. (1026), Excursus i, and n. (875) on IV(vii). 13. 5. SUSEM. (1024) § 32 παιδιάς χαρίν ἀνδράσι γενο- μένοις In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. 5 §§ 11, n. (1036). SUSEM. (1025) 35 βασιλείς So Philip of Macedon: Plut. Vita Pericles c. 1, p. 152 s. f. δὲ διὸ διότι, πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιστήσαν ἐν τοῖς πάσιν ψήλλης καὶ τεχνικὸς ἐπέστη ὡς αὐτὸς· καὶ ὡς βασίλεις ἀκρασίαν ψάλλοντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέες ταῖς Μοῦσαις ἐτέρων ἀγονισμένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεανίς γεγονό- μενος. § 6 37 ἀπεργάζεθαι The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πε- σωμάτων is perfect of the middle πε- εἰς (ἐργον). 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment. 40 ὄψων We find φύσινικὴν an example I. 7. 3, 1255 b 26, and an- condemed as δυσλεκτική ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11. 14, 1282 a 17—25, III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle v(vii). 3 §§ 3—6. § 7 41 δυνατὰ The subject is ἡ μουσική, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—26, though it is ob- scurely indicated a 37 by ἀυτῷ τούτῳ, i.e. the execution. 1339 b 2 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κταλ See notes (1011, 1024): also c. 5 §§ 17 mm. (1023, 1044, 1045): comp. c. 6 § 1 if. with mm. (1061, 1066). SUSEM. (1026) § 8 4 δὲ ἀυτὸς λόγος κταλ Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. (1025)) is extended to intellectual enjoy- ment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly...
serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in riper years. Cpr. also Plato, *Deo* (911, 1023). *Susem.* (1027)


8 Ὄ Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As to representations of Apollo and other gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. *Pl.* 1071), see particularly L. van Jan *Di* atium *Gruntorum* (Berlin 1839), pp. 17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the number. *Susem.* (1028)

9 ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ] See n. (982). *Exc.* i. to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 § 13, 14 with n. (1067). *Susem.* (1029)

10 Πλατόν ἡ, 66 b 11. Καὶ τῷ γυμνῷ παράδοθαι ὑπὲρ τὰς ἀνθρώπους μεταγοντωθῆναι καὶ χαίρειν τοιοῦτο ἀνάγεται αἰτεῖν αὑτοῖς ὁ μαιρός.

9 § 11 ὑπότροφον] I. e. c. 6 § 1, 1350 b 20 ff, where this point is again taken up. See n. (1606). *Susem.* (1030)

11 παῖδιον] The end to which Plato confined all poetry and all art. See Butler *Senea.* *Mel.* p. 317 ff.

*Aristotle allows that for childhood the use of poetry and music is to convey moral instruction*. And* for the grown man the poet's function is not that of a teacher, he is only so by accident* p. 322 L. 10. 17 (ιατρεία τε) This has been set forth c. § 4, *Parapsitt. Xyron*. cp. *Pl.* (985). *Susem.* (1031)

18 μὴ μόνον ἵνα τὸ καλὸν καθι.] The highest intellectual (or aesthetic) enjoyment implies the highest nobleness (τὸ καλόν), because it is in the highest activity of soul: it implies the highest pleasure, because from this highest human activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it: see n. (992) on c. 3 § 3. *Susem.* (1032)

19 ὃς ἀμφοτέρων τούτων] *Pl.* c. 2 § 3, 4 (μὲν ἀμφότερον), with one (968, 997, 991), also in *Pl.* 1170. 6, 1235 b 21, cp. τοῦ ἀμφοτέρου ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦ ἀμφότερος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀμφότερος ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφοτέρου, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφότερος, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφότερος; *Susem.* (1033)


A somewhat forms, unaccompanied by the modus. *Pl.* 1170. 6, 1235 b 21, ἀμφότερος, ἀμφότερος ἐστίν τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Comp. *Ae.* 1068. 8, 1069 b 19 f., 1070 b 13. *X.* 9, 1159 b 30—41, also *X.* 11. 6, 1152 b 6, 12. 5, 1153 b 14 (Nemesius).
The document appears to be a page from a book discussing various topics, including music, gatherings, and philosophical ideas. The text is a blend of Greek and English, with references to historical figures and concepts. It appears to be an excerpt from a larger work, possibly a commentary or an academic discussion.
33 δὲ omitted in IP (supplied by corr. of P) | 34 τὸ omitted by 1144. L¹.

31 ταύτης [ἡ ἐναντ.]§ 13 συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τιμᾶσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἐχεῖ γὰρ ἵσως ἤποιήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ἐξηκούσε νος ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τελεῖ τῶν προξενῶν ἐξεῖν ὁμοίωμα τι. τὸ τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲνος τῶν ἐσπερὼν χάριν ἀιρέτον, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἢδονῶν οὐδένος εἰσὶ τῶν

31 ταύτης τῆς ἐναντ. § 13 συμβέβηκε δὲ κτλ.] “It is incident to men to regard their pleasures as an end.” The expression might have been altered slightly for clearness: “but perhaps it is not right to do what is so often done, that is, to make amusements the end of life.” SUB. (1037 b) The verb espēβαίνω has been before used of awkward consequences which overtake an argument or an opponent: II. 3. 5. 1263 b 4. II. 5. 10. 1263 b 7.

32 ἔχω γὰρ . . . λάπταις] “The true end, no doubt, is fraught with pleasure, though not of the commonplace sort. Pursuing the commonplace pleasures, men mistake it for the true pleasure, because it is a faint image of that to which all their actions tend. The true end is desirable independently of things to come after it. So it is with pleasures of this sort; they are desirable independently of what may come after them, and solely on account of what has gone before them, such as fuel and pain” (Jebb).

With the τῆς τερατικῆς cp. IV[vii]. 9. 8. 1130 b 17 (where πάντως αὐτῷ τὴν τρομάζ. does not mean an extraordinary number, but a number definitely fixed) and Ptole. c. 26 § 15. 1463 b 13. ἐχει γὰρ τῇ τερατικῇ τοῦτον, ἀνισότητα (ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ ἐπούλωσις) ἄλλα τὰ ἐπόμενα. Take τὰ τερατικὰ with τῆς: often in ν. ἐν ταῖς τερατικῖς τοῖς. Pleasures are πάντως χαράς, because 10. 166 f., they heal the pain which comes of toils: in Pindar's words διότι καταφέρετο πᾶν ἐκείνῳ καταφέρετο λέγοντα τὸν ἱερὸν ν. 1. 12. ἐπεξεργασθεὶς τὸν λάτρειον ὁ θεὸς ἑαυτὸς ἔφη, ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀργυρός, ἔναθε εἰς ταύτα. δανιὰ την ἐπούλωσιν. ν. 8. ν. 14. 41. 1134 a 27 f.

34 διὰ τὸ τῷ τελεῖ ἂν ὅμοιομα τι] One consequence of the similarity here explained is that men forget the essential difference, viz. that the higher intellectual pleasure contains its end in itself, whilst ordinary sensuous pleasure, so far as it is harmless and necessary, has its end in recreation, becoming (when used at the right time and in moderation) sometimes positively useful and not merely harmless. Cp. c. 3 § 14 with n. 9938. Doing ἔτερ. c. p. 107 f. points out the apparent incompatibility with the parallel passage ν. 8. λίθ. 3. 6. 1126 b 17 f. spoke to that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the Ethos Aristocles says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is closely connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unabashed existence. Consequently recreation is not to end but a means in activity, πᾶς ἢ τῶν ἡμέρας ἴδρυμα, καὶ γὰρ ἀνά τοι ἡμέρας τοῖς ἐναντ. τιμῶν, ἀν πραγματεύεται καὶ νικᾶται. ἄκατα ὑπάρχει τοῦ ταύτας τοῦ πρωτοῦ, ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον τῇ ἐπούλωσιν; τῇ ἐπούλωσιν ἐπάνω τοῖς ἐπόμενοις. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον τῇ ἐπούλωσιν; τῇ ἐπούλωσιν ἐπάνω τοῖς ἐπόμενοις. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον. ἀνά τοις ἵσως ἄκατοι ὑπάρχονται καὶ οὐ γίνεται τὸ πρώτον τόξον ποιητικόν καὶ μακροπόδιον τριβὸν ἢ ἐπόμενον. ἀνατιθεμένοι τῷ παντὸς ἐναντέον τῷ παντῶς ἐναντείριον.
§ 14 38 δὴ ἐὰν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητούσι τὴν εὐθαμβοῦν γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν ήδων, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τὶς ὑπολαβοῖ τὴν αἰτίαν περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖ τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον εἰναι πρὸς τὸν μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρήμενη χρείαν, καὶ δει μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἢ ἐχούσι πάντες αἰσθήσεως (ἐξει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονήν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις 5 καὶ πάσιν ἥθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ σοφιφυλής), ἀλλ' ὀρκῇ εἰ τῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἱδός συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.

§ 15 τούτῳ δ' ἐὰν εἴη δήλου, εἴ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἡδή γνώμεθα δε

37 οὖν omitted by Π1 (supplied by corr.1 in P1), [οίου] Susem,1 perhaps rightly || 39 εἰκότως after ἂν τὶς ΞΠ2 Bk. || 40 τὸν αἰτίαν transposed by Flach to follow 41 μόνην || 41 διὰ...43 ἐοικε supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Sylburg conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Kornes one after 42 ἐοικε, Schmidt the loss of <φαίνει ἂν δεῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Susemihl of <φιλούσιν αὐτὴν> after 41 μόνην. Yet it may be sufficient to understand γρηγόρου (αὐτήν) from the preceding || <πάντων μᾶλστα> χρῆσιμον οἱ χρησιμοδότων Flach, perhaps rightly

1340 a 1 ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς ἔστιν Π1, ἔστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ Μ: Susem,1 2 || 6 πυ] τι P1 and P4 (corrector) || The second ποιος is omitted by Μ1 P3, [πρὸς] Susem,3 perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 δι' ἐὰν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κτλ] See § 3, 1339 a 24 f. n. (1022). Susem, (1039)
Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the omission of a verb with περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν. It is best with Flach to repeat εἰκότως ἂν τὶς ὑπολαβοῦν, understanding ἀσθενόντα or ἀκοκέα. See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 419.

§ 15 42 μὴ ποτὲ τούτῳ μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ' κτλ] For the use of μὲν = while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337 b 15. "Let it be granted that such service is incidental to Music. Still we must ask,—Does not the nature of Music range above this sphere of service?" (Jebb). The real complement to ζητητέον is the clause introduced by δὲ.

1340 a 3 ἔχουσι...αἰσθήσειν] = aισθάνονται 1. 2. 14, 1253 a 17.

4 διὸ πάσαις...προσφιλή] Cp. c. 6 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n. (1069). Susem, (1040)
The pleasure is natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense used of self-love 11. 5. 8, 1203 b 11; and 111. 6. 5, 1278 b 30.

6 εἴπ οἱ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ήδός συντείνειν] "Whether Music has not somehow a bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 10.

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν] Evidently an emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,' 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere pastime of recreation music also affects the soul: it is the soul and not the body which feels pleasure [cp. N. Ε. Χ. 6. 3, 1173 b 10, εἴ ὡς ἡ ἀναπληρόης, τούτῳ ἐντὸς αἱ καὶ ἵδου τὸ σῶμα ἐρατόν ὅτι διεκεί δὲ]. Cp. n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt. After the preceding comparison between this sensuous pleasure and the highest contemplative enjoyment of elevated mental satisfaction, it is strange to find that nothing is said about the latter as an effect of music, but the question is raised, whether Music is capable of producing a higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγή; and whether it is thus qualified to promote the moral education of the young; for it is this with which Aristotle in the context is chiefly concerned. Susem, (1041)

§ 16 7 ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ήδη] So c. 6 § 16, 1341 b 18, ποιοῖς τινάς τὰ σῶματα. Cp. also n. 2. 53, 1204 a 39, where τὸ ποιοῦν τινάς εἶναι τούτους = whether they are to be communists or not. The idiomi
The text is a page from a scholarly work discussing the usage of certain words and phrases in Greek, particularly in the context of ecstatic experiences. The page includes references to various translations and editions, and notes on the history of the text. The language is technical and scholarly, focused on linguistic analysis and the historical context of the ancient Greek language.
no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term μαθητέων is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of ήθος, character, still no ήθική ἀρετή, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from φιλόσωφα, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, Ἕκ. Eth. vi. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 a 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, n. (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, nn. (1061, 1066), Excursus i. Susem. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς] Cp. Ἕκ. Eth. x. 9, 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὡσπερ οὖδὲ...τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς μέγαστον, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μονικὴν...οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἐκαστὰ κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα (results: in music, the performances).

χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπικεισθέντι κτλ] Comp. n. (1101) ; i.e. Excursus v. Susem. (1046)

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1250 b 14, γάλακτος φῶς (see n.), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν] Music can give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (Liepert). Cp. Excursus III. and n. (1089). Susem. (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics respecting Music. He appears to be conflicting in his De Musica the arguments of Theophrastos and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is μέρισμα and musical strains δομοίωμα τῶν ἠθῶν. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fr. 55 Kemke τὸς δὲ μειμ. . . . αὐτὸ τὸς τέων ἀρετῆς τὸ πάθος. ὡστέ ἐπὶ καὶ τὸ μειμένα τὰ λεγεμένα τῇ μουσικῇ καὶ τὸ μυαλῷ μελέτη νὰ ἐπίληθη πρὸς ἀρετῆν ἐπιφορέφει τι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ μετὰ τῶν μυρφο μυαλωτέρτων, διεφευγόμενον εδείκνυμεν, also B. iv. col. 111. 23 ff. οὖδέ γάρ μυαλωτικὸς ἢ μονικός, καθάπερ τίνες ἑνειρρότουσιν, οὔδὲ... οὕτως [Diogenes, the Stoic] δόμισθητα  ámbων ὦ μυαλωτικά μὲν ἔχει, πάντως δὲ καθά τῶν ἠθῶν ποιότητα ἐπιφανείᾳ τοιαύτα ἐν αῖς ἕτοι μεγαλοπρεπέται καὶ ταυτόν καὶ ἀννόσις καὶ ἀνανόσι καὶ κόσμιον καὶ θραυσί, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ μαγειρικα (Kemke's restoration De Musica p. 65).

Though we too have the saying, 'Let me make the songs of a country, and I care not who makes its laws,' the belief in a peculiar ethical influence of music is quite
foreign to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὴν θεωρήσας (ἐκείνην) ὥστε τινὶ τιματα, καὶ πάντες τὸς τιματῆς αἰσθήσεως κοινοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρῶν, ἐτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σμηνεία μᾶλλον τὰ γεμάτα

27 καὶ κατ' Μ¬υ. 1, καθ' 1, αἰτήσθη Ἀρ. Lachmann Scaliger II. 5, perhaps rightly  ἐκείνην Lachmann Scaliger II. 5, perhaps rightly  ὥστε ἀφ' τῆς εἰκόνος Μ¬υ. 13 (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ κατὰς ἐκείνης 28 ὥστε in that order illum viximum, cuin autem Æthinæan accedebat eyc ocyrbor eorum 31 καὶ ὅτι ἐι μικρὸν: after 31 ταυτές Γ¬II Ἀρ. Σκε. 1, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνικὸν ὥστε Spengele Susen. 4-5, Ed. Muller (pp. 348—353) (discovered the error, but transposed — ὦτς τάξεις without any transposition. Welldom transposes 31 καὶ ἐκείνης, 32 κοινωνικὸν to precede 28 σμηνείας, wrongly ὥστε Ἄρ. Ἀρ. Σκε.. 1, ἦτο Heidenhain op. cit., ἦτοι Σκε. 1, see Comm. σ. i (1920) ὥστε 99 46 Flach Susen. 8

which they usually attend." It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32. The words καὶ ὥστε are a poor qualification of ταυτές, which they follow in the MS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Muller to alter to ἦτοι τάξεις. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα There is no word which denotes all that is signified by expressions, i.e. forms, postures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes, i.e. figures, figures. Summary. It should be remembered, imitating by forms only painting by forms and colors. Ex. e. c. 4. 1447 18 fl. with n. 24 of my edition. Cpo. also Athen. xxi. 649 ινοθ' ἐν καθ' τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ἀνθρώπων διαφέρει τὸ σχῆμα. Σκε. 1 (1049) ινοθ' καὶ Σκε. 1, To make that a second point of dissimilarity is postulated. The slight alteration in 32 gives makes it the explanation of the preceding sentences. Summary. (1050)

ουκ ἐστὶ, σχήματα, ἀλλὰ σμηνεία

"Painting and sculpture working on an inanimate material cannot represent the life of the soul on 29. In cloudy and successive manifestations. In their being
§ 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἣθων, καὶ τούτ’ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ 35 σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἄλλ’ ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἀ’ εἰ τὶς ἄλλοις τῶν γρα-

34 σχήματα omitted by Sb Tb and P4 (1st hand, added in the margin) || ταύτ’ IP P5 Ar. Bk., ταύτ’ Döring (Kunstleben des Aristot. p. 151) wrongly || (Π) εἰρ Π5 P6 Bk. and p1 in the margin || 36 πάθεσιν P2-3, 5-6 Sb Tb L* Ald. and P4 (1st hand)

and arrested movement fix externally the feeling they portray...Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, Some Aspects p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, Phaedrus 250 a ff. makes the most luscious copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson ad loc., "by ἵσα πίμα γυναιχας he seems to mean moral ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."

34 χρώματα] Blushing and paleness would serve for examples, Níc. Eth. iv. 9. 2, 1128 b 11 ff. (E. Müller). SUSEM. (1051)

καὶ τούτ’ . . . 35 πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring op. c. p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (Poet. c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (γελῶν, Poet. c. 5 § 1). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds: — "and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter," he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However, both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naïveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. SUSEM. (1052)

36 δεὶ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος... ἄλλα τὰ Πολυγνώτου] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the ‗art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausan was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, Achk. 854, Thesm. 949, Plut. 606. See Poet. c. 2 § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολυγνώτου μὲν ἐγείρετον Παύσωνος ἐγείρετον. Διανούσεις δὲ ὁμοίως ἐηκένε: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In Poet. c. 6 § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. ὅνων καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεύσις πρὸς Πολυγνώτων πέτοντεν· ὀ μὲν γὰρ Ἰ. ἀγάθος ἡμογράφοις, ἡ δὲ Ζεύσις γραφὴ ὁδὸν ἐξεῖ χάρα, Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portrayal of characters and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ἠθικὸν must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. 111. 
V(VIII). 5. 22] 1340 a 34—1340 b 41.

395

féon ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς µε-221
2 λεον αὐτοῖς ἔστιν μουσικά µατα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν φαν-220
ρὸν εὐθὺς γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρµονιῶν διεστήκε φύσει, ὡστε ἰσοανευ-221
τας ἀλλος διατίθεσθαι καὶ µή τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχὼν τρατών

41 ἐξαιρ. after τρατών Π. and perhaps Γ, εὑρίσκω.

n. (1043) p. 624. As the originator of that "ethical" style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parnassian frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Phidias among sculptors. Ptolemaeus however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, as satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Brunn Gesch. d. bild. Künste 11 pp. 14—45, 49—51; Veblen Aristot. Lehre der Rangordnung der Thiere Tragedie in Symb. Philol. Beitr. p. 159 f.; Coop. also iv (VII). 17. 10 with n. (963) and Introd. p. 53. SÜDEM. (1053)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς µέλεσιν αὐτοῖς κτλ) "Melodies on the other hand maintain in themselves imitations of character." Prof. Buscher has written an able com-1054
mentary on this pp. 157 f. Promising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as "µιµή" "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and distinctness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotel. as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection of character. Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and in the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality variable itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce im-

as the impression it produces is cold and definite." § 22 10 ἦ τῶν ἀρµονιῶν φύσει. Besides its general meaning of "music," "musical sounds" (for which see § 21 above), the usual assumed to be a "harmony") 'dynamis' has a special musical signification—octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately "harmony," in modern music has totally different associations; as a technical term in music it denotes the "combination of simultaneous sounds" or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (but quite unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is µαι-φάσης. The best rendering for the technical term "harmony" is not "they as 'scale';" but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated "scales in the Major or Minor mode." Comp. the Milnes' description of the Doric Mode, Paradise Lost 1. 550 ff. "in the Doric mode! Of Ralls and soft colors; such as raised/. To heights of noblest temper heroes old. Arming to battle, and instead of rage Delighting varsos banished, frown and moved/. With dread of death in sight or felt retreat:/ Not wanting power to mitigate and save/. With solemn touches, tenderest thoughts, and close/. Amplitude, and sound and sorrow and pain." See further Excerpts VI and Greek Music generally, p. 624 f. SÜDEM. (1054)

118. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and the not affect the heavy alike. Some, like the minor-Lydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the flattened modes, either the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, or others, which seem peculiar to the Dorian mode; whilst the Phrygian, invites to ecstacy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old natural minor mode of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major modes, given a modern stand-point almost reluctantly borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.

38—2
πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρας (V. 22) καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μεθολυσιακήν καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρας τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνεμιμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλστα πρὸς 4 ἐτέραν, οἷον Δοκεί ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθυσιακὰ (W. 23) σιαστικοῖς ἡ ἡμιγυμνῖ—ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγοντι οἱ περὶ 9 τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες. Λαμβάνουσι γάρ τὰ μαρτυρία τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων—, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς, οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἑουσὶ 9 σιν ἴδος στασιμώτερον οὐ δὲ κινητικὸν, καὶ τούτων οὐ μὲν

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως P18 (1st hand), συνεστηκότως Madvig, συνεστικότως Schmidt || μεθολυσιακὴ M1 and perhaps Π. Similarly b 4 δωριστὴ Ἔως B1b T18 and perhaps Γ1 || 5 φυγιστὴ Sb T9 M1 (1st hand) and perhaps Γ1 || 6 παιδείαν Αρ., παιδιάν ΠΠ || 7 δὲ ΠΠ Paris. 2042, γὰρ ΠΠ Bk., untranslated by Αρ., 8 tā omitted by ΠΠ Bk. and P1 (1st hand, supplied by corr.1), untranslated by Αρ., [τά] Bk.2 || Αγουσι after 9 ίδος ΠΠ Bk.

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως [Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively'.] For this effect of the mixo-Lydian mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, Rep. 398 D f. τίνες οὖν θρηνόωδεις ἄρμοιοι; Μεθολυσιακοῦ, ἐρήμη, καὶ συνυπολογισμοῖ καὶ τοιαύτῳ τίνες. Οὗκοι αὐταί, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀφαρετεύς άρχομεν ἱππος γὰρ καὶ γνωσίαν, οὐ δὲ εἰπεικεῖσκα εἴη, μη ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. 2 τὴν διάνοιαν] Not the subject of the infinitive (ἐξεις or διαπέφασα) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 τὰς ἀνεμιμένας [The modes called here "relaxed" are obviously those which Plato calls χαλαρά, Rep. 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακά τε καὶ συμπαθητικά τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; Ιαστί, ἢν δ’ οὐ, καὶ λυοτάτα, αἱτίς χαλαρά καλοῦνται. The terms refer to pitch: ἀνεμιμένη (χαλαρά) = low, low-pitched, σύντονος = high, high-strung. See Pratinas Frag. 5: μήτι σύντονον δίωκε, μήτι τὰς ἀνεμιμένας Ιαστι μοιότατα, ἀλλὰ τὰς μέσαιν...νεών ἀφούραν αἰδείζε τῷ μέλει...πρέπει τοι πάνω ἀυκόλαθτα Διόλις ἁρμονία (Athen. XIV. 624 F). Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is described as intermediate to 'high-pitched Ionian,' and the 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 5 ὁπέρ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πτ. Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotle refers to Damon mentioned in n. (1054), i.e. Exc. iv p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (ἡδος and πάθος) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato Rep. III.

400 B (cp. IV. 424 C). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3, (7) Aristoxenus, see Μ. (1083); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heracleides of Heraclea in the Pontus Athen. XIV. 624 c, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Pericles: most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (μυθὸν δικαστικὸν, μ. βουλευτικός), as Wilamowitz Hermes XIII. 1880. p. 318 ff. has shown. Cp. Βι. 12. 4. n. (408). See 'Αθ. Πελ. c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: πρὸς δὴ τάνην τὴν χορηγίαν (sc. τῆς Κιμωνοῦς) ἀπολήμπνει τῇ οὐνα, συμβουλευθεῖτων αὐτῷ Δαμακίνω τοῦ Ὀζήθης (ἔστε δὲδε τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τὸ Περικλῆς, διὸ καὶ ὡστράκισαν αὐτὸν ὑπέρτουν), ἐπεὶ τοὺς ἰδίους ἡπτάτα διδάχοι τοὺς πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεπεκάσατο μισοφοράν τοῖς δικασταῖς: also Frag. 364, 365 Kose in Plut. Per. c. 4. c. 9 and Plat. Lec. c. 4, Steph. Byz. s.v. "Οά. Σύσεμ. (1055)

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κτλ.] "As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some measures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music, see Exc. IV. p. 632. Σύσεμ. (1056)
17 καὶ τὶς οὐκε... 19 ἀρμονίαν] The transposition is recommended by Böcker for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be a mere justification, see Böcker's own remarks p. 32 (cited above Introd. p. 95 n. 1).

17 συγγένεια Butcher compares Pl. Tim. 47 b, δὲ ἀρμονία ἐγγένεται ἐγγένειᾳ φορᾷ ταῖς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς περιτέλους. 'Musical tunes and measures, have a certain affinity'—the context plainly shows the meaning to be 'with the soul' but the extraordinary brevity and allowance of Aristotle's style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text books, oi σαμίς φιλοσόφου πρᾶγμα, were composed, it should be remem-bered, for the members of the school, in their peculiar terminology. Dick observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils, possessed the key; and he compares Galen. De ἀρμονίας. κεφ. 15 ἐκ χειρότερος δὲ τὸ πρῶτον τὰς τριάς φιλοσόφων καὶ συγγένειας τὰς την ἀρμονίαν περιέχουσας καὶ διὰ τῆς συγγένειας τῆς περιέχουσας τὰ πρῶτον ἀρμονικά διὰ γραφήματα. (18 πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν) This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, Arateians, who had previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and Democritus held the same view without any essential differences; see Zeller Phil. i. 3 p. 114 n. 1. 4 p. 415; Th. 11. p. 588 H. I. 17. De Somn. l. p. 479. SUSEM 1087; The earliest evidence is Plato, Fed. 68 E, on which see the note of M. Archer Hind. who thinks Summen be the proponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in De Anim. 1. 4 assumes that ἀρμονία, a blending of diverse or opposed elements (Ἀρμονία της ὁμοιότητος ἃ ἢδηστηκέν), and so Summen, on one phase of the problem 46 E, though again he simplifies the case to this notion as if something immaterial played upon the material lyre, which answers in the body. The present passage certainly becomes the latter interpretation of the analogous term ἀρμονία.
has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1059) c. 6 Practical instruction in music is indispensable: §§ 1, 2. Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or degrading: §§ 3—8, provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course: §§ 9—16. Cp. Anal. p. 119.

§ 1 20 χειροπημονα] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 κοινωνει των εργων, where εργα = musical performances, as below b 36 f. and in Nic. Eth. X. 9. 20, 1181 a 20.

21 πρότερον] C. 5 §§ 4—8. Comp. 5 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1030). SUSEM. (1060)

22 πολλην ἤχει διαφοραῖν] See c. 2 § 6. Here 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: multum praeest.

23 ἐν γὰρ τι κτλ] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. 5 § 7, 1339 b 2 ff. cp. nui. (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)

25 κρυτάς] Amplified below, § 4, 1340 b 38 f. Cp. c. 5 § 17. § 2 20 διατριβή] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, n. (1024): cp. Döring p. 137. SUSEM. (1062)

'Ἀρχύτα] A famous Pythagorean philosoper of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see VIII (v). 7, 2 n. (1592), for its fortunes ib. 3 § 7 n. (1517), for its constitution VII (vi). 5, 10 n. (1441): also n. (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times ὁριστήρος, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. VI. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, III. 2). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. XII. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. I. c.), cp. Aelian Var. Hist. XII. 15, Suidas s. v. 'Ἀρχύτας, Polll. IX. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-
The Doric form *Ἄρχέων*, which was altered to *Ἄρχερον* by corresp. 1 in P 3 as well as by HIP 7, makes another instance for Prof. Ridgeway: see on 11. 12. 5 (Pl. 144),

29 οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νῦν ἡσυχασθαι

This remark is made by Plato *Laws* 7. 641a: φροτ δὲ [ὁ λόγος] τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἑαυτῷ εἰπτεί, τὸ πρὸς τὰς μιᾶς καὶ τὰς δύος ἑμεῖς ἡμεῖς, ἡ ἡσυχασθαι τῶν ἀθανάτων. *SUB. (1064)

30 Learning to play an instrument will keep them out of mischief.

33 ὅτι δὲ πρόσωπον. The features of the city are to serve as an ornament, 7V(VII). 11. 11. 11. 11. 13. 13. The Lydian Mode suits youthful singers

34 διορίσας καὶ λίθον. Do not and reject the objections of those who maintain that to take up music practically is the grading. The absolute use of *κόσμον* instead of *νομόν* ἡσυχασθαι better in Pl. 83a. *SUB. (1065)
§ 5 The censure passed on music implies that the pursuit of excellence as a performer degrades the youthful citizen into a professional. It is remarked in Exc. 1. p. 620, that the feeling of the Greeks in the fourth century towards artistic specialists seems to have varied with the eminence of the artist much more than it does amongst us. While the artists of genius were recognised as great men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic, who had left the true political life for a bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.

§ 8 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.

§ 9 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.
δήλου ον δέ ηε τοιούτον καὶ τοιούτων ὑρμανως χρηστέουν. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐθέντως εἰς παραθείαιν ἀκτένων οὕτω άλλα τὴν ἐκ τεχνηκών ὕρμαν, στὸν κιθάραν καὶ εἰ τοιούτον ἀλλα ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἁκροτάς ἁγαθοὺς ἑ τῆς μοισχίας ταΐς τινὶς

18 τι ommitted by P3 P4. Α. Βικ. § 19 τετράδιον έτων with all other authorities Βικ.

Aristotle means that senearus charm, that trickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: Plut. τ. 4 § 7, 144b 10 f. Comp. Doring p. 114 f. SUSEM. (1069) See Plut. xix. 38, 920 b 29–36. It will be seen, c. 7 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure, Plato indeed... Λάζω στ. 665 b, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: καιτοι λέγουσι γε αἱ ηπληταὶ μωσικὴς ἀρθρότα του τὴν ήδονη ταῖς φυσικαῖς παράκολουσα δυνάμει. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν οἵτινες οὕτω δεῖν τὸ παράσταν φιλὶγγε- σαι.

τὸν ἄλλον ἕνα [φων] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined Euct. Eθικ. ιτα. 2, 8, 1336 α 2 f.: ὁδὸν γὰρ, ἵν τι καὶ δέξων λέγων, φαινεται πάραχα [ἐκ ταλλα θηρία] αὕτῃ τῇ ἀκοινῇ τῶν ἰαμαθίων, εἰ μὴ τοῖς συμφόβοις τερα- τοῖς.

§ 8 18 αὐθέντως] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (φιλίγγος), with a vibrating reed (φλαμά) fitted into it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The σφεριτὶς μουσικὸς may have represented the modern flute. Heli. H. 8. 13 mentions both, αὐθέντες σφεριτῖς τοὺς θανατοὶς. The σφεριτὶς was always played in pairs (Latin tuba), cp. § 13, 1343 b 4, ἄλλως, the two instruments being connected by a leathern strap, φωσσάν, worn round the mouth. SUSEM. (1070) Coudet further L. v. Jan Art. 'Flöten' in Baumer's, 'Denkmaler and A. A. Howard in Harvard Studien 18, 1893, p. 1 ff.

οὕτω άλλα τε τεχνηκόν κτλ. By these words Aristotle excludes every instrument except the κιθάρα, or lyre, also called φωσσάν in Homer (εἰς λ. v. Jan conjectured to be the case before Westphal: though on insufficient grounds, as appears to me, he afterwards withdrew the conjecture, and pronounced κιθάρα and φωσσάν to be the same as κιθάρα but different from λύρα). The lyre was the most ancient and the most easily handled of Greek stringed instruments: beside those here represented Jan gives (p. 114) all other shapes of the lyre and κιθάρα.

Keppion a pupil of Terpander, Pint. De musica c. 6, 1133 c, invented the σφεριτὶς about 700 b.c. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonance, being of the shape here shown.

See Westphal's text, also above Art. p. 56 c; cp. L. van Jan De Samen. Griechen l. v. 4. Plato Rep. iv. 925 το προ- μίνι Λύρα καὶ κιθάρα to be used in teaching; on the other hand, he restrains the instruction to be given by a yet greater exponent than Aristocles. Comp. Lense τοι 514 ι ἐντοις καὶ οὕτως c. 41 7 4 = ντίζων. SUSEM. (1071)
§ 10. Prose "ο" of μάλλον ὁργαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καίρους ἀρχήτου ἐν ὁς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἡ μά-
§ 11. τῶν αὐτῶν. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοφυσώτεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετῆν, ἢτο τε πρότερον.

21 ἢ καὶ Π 1 || ἢτο δὲ Γ II Ar. Susen. 1 in the text, ἢτο δ' Bk., ἢτο ἑιδά Ἡ Σους. 2 || ὁ αὐτὸς Μ, id pecia William || 23 δύναται before κάθαρσιν Ἐ, after μᾶλλον Π 5 Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π 5 Π 5 Bk., avoiding hiatus || 28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γενόμενοι Μ 1, γεγομένοι Π 5 Π 5 Bk. 1 || 29 τὴν omitted by Π 5 5 Bk. 1

§ 11. των αὐτῶν. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοφυσώτεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετῆν, ἢτο τε πρότερον.

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The *choragos* was a rich citizen, selected to direct the training and equipment in the theatre and outfitting of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a *36 χορηγός*. *SUSEM. (1074)*

**τῷ χορῷ** This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For pera proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. *SUSEM. (1075)*

**34 έπεκτάσαν** As in 1415 a 16 f. The flute was more at home in Bocota, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the flute.

**35 δήλου δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος** There can be no question that this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in *AE. v. 1. 7 § 4* to the statue of Dipilus.

**36 πίνακος ὑπὸ ἀνέκδοτο κτλ* The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magones, *P. L. 15 3. 1448* 34 (esp. 5. 2. 1449 b 3), the next in order *Elephantides and Catinus*, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the posid of Elephantides, who on this account is erroneously described for the anonymous commentator upon Book IV of the *NE. βιλ. (IV. 5. 26. 1113 a 13 f.)* as the earliest part of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholar; but we know the title of one of his works *the Satyrs* (Ath. 1. 96 f.). *See Mommsen Fragm. class. Gr. 1. p. 36 ff. II. p. 15 ff.* At the time when Thrasippus was *choragus*, Elephantides won the first prize. The word *πίνακι* refers to the custom which compelled the victorious *choragus* to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a *traube* tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre, or at one of the temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact reserved the name of *τριπόδιον* the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. *See Paus. 1. 40 f. 1, cf. Pict. /Ph. 6, Demosth. 20. 6.* We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to Athyrrambic (cyclus) choirs, and in these the names of the *triumvir*, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actors are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choragus belonged and the species of drama represented. *SUSEM. (1075)*

See however Hesych. *Ana. Th. 2. 31* f. "The memorials of victory inscribed by the choragi to the dramatic choirs appear to have taken the form of tablets (posseas). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a *tablet* in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the most man in Thrace, because that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he creates thereby a wooden scroll (Chew. 12. 141 a 33 ff.) in commemoration of his victory."

**37 τουρον δὲ ἀπεκτάσασθαι** Plutarch, *P. A. Afr. 6. 15. 1, tells the story that *Alex* burned these away the flute in disgust, with the words addressd to the degraded painter at the siege, *παίδα τοι, διακριτὸν.* He adds that both by joy and concern Alex burned them to stop the practice of having the flute in *πάρανομα* the drawing of the *kubernetes* arresting and proclaiming the song of Daphne. A similar passage in *Thukyd. 1. 14* mentions a similar connection of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, we doubt the famous account which was apocryphal at Athens were as a rule strangers, and not of the greatest. Aristogenes and Thucydides were Dionysian.
δυναμένων κρίνει τὸ πρὸς ἄρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄρετὴν
§ 13 συντείνον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἄρχαιων,
40 ὅποιοι πειράτες καὶ βάρβατοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἧδουν συντείνοντα
tοὺς ἀκούσαι τῶν χρωμένων, ἑπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
1341 b σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δέομενα χειρομοιητικὰς ἑπιστήμης.
εὐλόγως δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχαιων μεμυθολογημένον. ὁμιλεί.
§ 14 βαλείς τοὺς αὐλῶς. οὗ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φανέραι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποίησαι δυσχεράνασαν τὴν θεόν οὗ μὴν ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰκός ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄρετὴν omitted by M and P² (1st hand) || 40 πειράτες P³, ποικιλίαι P⁴, ποικιλίαι πτῦχαι Thomas Ar.
1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Gottling, αἰμβοι Π¹, σαμβύκαι Π² P⁵ Ar. and p¹ in the margin, αἰμβοί Susem.¹ || 2 αὐλῶς] ἀλλών Г M⁰ || 3 δή omitted by P², [δή] Susem.¹ || 4 μὲν οὖν] εἰμί William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in M⁰ (1st hand, supplied by α late hand) || 6 θεός P⁵ S⁴ T⁶

§ 13 39 πολλά...ἄρχαιων, sc. ἀπεδο-κιμασθή. ὁμοίως
οἱ ποικιλίαι κτλ] All foreign stringed instruments, on which consult Excursus iv. p. 632 ff. Susem. (1077)
1341 b 3 μεμυθολογημένον] Comp. the similar reference to legend ii. 9. 8, 1269 b 28, n. (288).
εὐρύσαν ἀποβαλείν] The Satyr Marsyas is said to have picked up the flute which Athene threw away, and to have played upon it: and for this the goddess punished him. The earliest extant allusion to this legend is in a dithyramb "Marsyas" by Melanippides Frag. 2, α μὲν Ἀθήνα | τῷ γὰρ ἔριμον θ’ ἔρις ἀπὸ χειρὸς | εἰπέ τ’ ἐρεύσ’ αἰσχρά, σώματι Νῦμα: to which the contemporary poet Telestes replied in his 'Argo' Frag. 1, ὃν σοφὰν σαρδόνασσαν οὐκ ἑπελκύμαν ὅσῳ δρόμῳ ὄρεισ δραγαν | διὰν Ἀθάνα διασφάλισαν αἰσχον ἐκφοβηθέσαν αὐδις ἐκ χειρὸς βα-λεῖν, | μιμαγευνείς χειροκτόνω σφι χαρίσα κλέος, τ’ ἐριθ ν ἐνεχθάτο κάλαυαν ἐὰς ερίς ἐτερεύν, | ἅ παρθένις ἄγαμον καὶ ἀπάθε ἀπέμεινε Κλωδών; see Athen. XIV. 616 e, f. (J. G. Schneider). In other legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself the inventor of the flute; an enthusiastic singer and flute-player in the service of Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers and fountains in the train of the Phrygian Dionysus. In this character he encounters Apollo, the representative of the music of the κοίμα, by whom he is defeated and punished. In Lydian legend Pan replaces Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and the teacher of Olympus. See Preller Griech. Mythol. i. p. 176 f., 508, 510, 576 f., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian, or Mysian, the supposed father of Marsyas, was sometimes called the inventor of the flute: and Olympus himself, who was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas, is at one time called a Phrygian and at another a Mysian, pointing to the origin of this kind of music in Asia Minor, whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see Exc. ii and iv). The authorities to consult for the above are Plut. De musica 14, 1135 E. Alex. Polyhist. Fr. 52 apud Plut. ib. 5, 1132 F, Heracleid. ib. 7, 1133 E, Strabo x. 324, Schol. in Aesch. Persas 933, Suidas s. v. Οὐμούς. Comp. Pl. Laws iii. 577 D, Symp. 215 C, Ps-Pl. Minos 318 B: and for the whole section att. (288, 297). Susem. (1078)
§ 14 6 οὗ μὴν ἄλλα κτλ]. "Not but what a more likely reason is the fact, that instruction in the flute contributes nothing to the culture of the intelligence. For to Athene we ascribe science and art." Susem. (1079)

For διάφορα cp. ii. (1023) on φρύνησι: it has been opposed to ἱδος s. § 1, and in iii. ii. 2, 1181 b 7. With περίβεβλαιον in this sense Bonitz joins Rhet. i. 9. 46, 1368 a 29, μεγεῖον περίβεβλαιον (ταῖς πράξεσι) 'to invest exploits with importance.'
21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ρυθμοῖς ἡ διαμετέρησιν, ἐπείτα τοῖς πρὸς παῖς
deίαν διαπονοοῦσι πότερον τῶν αὐτῶν διαρισμὸν θέσομεν ἡ
tina ἔτερον, τρίτον δὲ, ἐπεὶ δὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικῆν ὀρθῶς διὰ
μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν ὀόςας, τούτοις δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λε
25 ληθέναι τινα δύναμιν ἐχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον
προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμέλη μουσικὴν ἡ τὴν εὐρυθύμον.
§ 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τοῦτον τῶν τε νῦν
μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας οὕσοι τυγχάνουσιν
ἐμπείρωσι ἐχοντες τὴν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
30 καθ᾽ ἐκαστὸν ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδόσομεν ἐφετέρον τοῖς βουλο-
μένοις παρ᾽ ἑκατόν, νῦν δὲ νομικὸς διέλομεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ρυθμοῖς omitted by P^3, S^2 T^2 L^2. § 23 τρίτον δὲ (οὗς P^3 L^3)
before τινα ἔτερον Π Βκ., τρίτον δὲ with the transposition Susem. δεὶ untranslated
by Ar., [ḏ̱] Kornes; Bonitz (Arist. Stud. I. 111. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be
corrupt || 25 δύναμιν after ἐχει P^3 S^2 Βκ., cp. 1339 a 15 || [κα] Susem. ||
31 νομικὸς in genere Ar., γενικὸς Bas. in the margin, λογικὸς Koraes, συντόμως
Flach | διέλομεν P^4 S^3 T^2 and M^2 (1st hand), διέλομεν or διέλομεν apparently G

21 τοῖς ... διαγνωστι] The dativus
commoti, not the dative after τῶν αὐτῶν.
"Whether for those whose work is edu-
cational we shall make the same division."
After this ἡ τρίτον δεὶ τινα ἔτερον Π ΓII seems
hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be un-
derstood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the
harshness, if not impossibility, of sup-
plying an infinitive for δεὶ from θέσομεν.
22 ἡ τινα ἔτερον, τρίτον δὲ] Veram
mihi emendandi rationem inventam esse
spero, cum ea conicerim. Si haec speς
me non felleit, v. 25 καί significat "etiam,
"et sic quidem ferri forsitam, sed vel sic
Susem.
25 καὶ πότερον κτλ] In the Intro.
p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the
discussion of this question is no longer ex-
tant in our present treatise. Susem.(1081)
The whole passage may be rendered:
We have still to consider the question of
musical modes and rhythms: whether
all the modes and all the rhythms should
be employed or a distinction made be-
tween them: secondly, whether the same
distinction will serve for whose work is
teaching, or whether we shall make a
new one: thirdly, as we find Music to
consist of melody and rhythm, and the
influence which each of them has upon
education ought not to be overlooked,
[also] whether the preference must be
given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.
§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention
to the close similarity of phrase between
this passage and IV(VIII). 1. 1, 1323 a 22.
28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ] See mI.
(1055, 1053, 1103). Perhaps intended to
intimate that Plato passed judgment on
these matters without sufficient musical
knowledge. See § 9. Susem. (1082)
31 νομικὸς] 'Formally.' Idem fere
significat atque νόμον χάρων Meta. XIII(M).
Susem.
The passage from the Metaphysics runs
thus: ἐπισταὶ μετὰ πᾶντα χαρίς περὶ τῶν
ἰδεῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ἴδον νόμον χάρων.
Here ἀπλῶς seems to mean 'in general
terms,' much as ἑσθάλων (so Eudемus
σωντομιν in the parallel passage E. E. I 8,
1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz=simply
(a sense nearly akin to χωρίς: quaes-
tionem de numeris et de principiis cum
hac de ideis quaestionem nudum vult
conjunxi). The precise reference in νόμος
too is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's
own practice of criticizing his predeces-
sors: Bernays rendered νόμον χάρων by
dicis causâ: Diels disapproving of this
remarks that νόμον is not ἀπλῶς, nor does
the phrase = ἑσθάλως χάρω, and prefers to
render it "to comply with the prevailing
custom, the fashion." It seems best to
modify Bernays' interpretation a little.
The original meaning is "only so far as
to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e.
"under compulsion and reluctantly." Other
authors use the phrase thus, of what is
done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilo Ζωρρήτων Fr. 3 l. 13 and Athen. vii. 197 A: οίκοι· τινίς γὰρ οὗτος, ἀλλ' ἄνω τόμον θαῦμα, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays Die Dialoge p. 150.


§ 3 The construction is εἰτε δι', διάκεφαλί, ὥσπερ διαφωτίσθησαι, τοῦτο κατασκευάζω, φωνή δυνατή, χάργος (καὶ γὰρ ὄνομα παθήσεως) all of which is the preposition, the apodosis beginning with φωνῆς. Translate: "... we accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, aesthetic, and eclectic, as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative, what we mean by μορφή will here be treated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry—while, thirdly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the eclectic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."


34 τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν κύλλα: This division is based upon the threefold nature of the subject matter of all narrative art, viz. τὰ τοιχώματα: characters, actions, emotions (c. § 31—34, IV[vii], 17-16, cp. n. 904, Pater. c. 1 § 5, 1447 s 27, l 5). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiastic and simple, but also to other poignant emotions, see III 4—6, § 8 with n. (1983, 1996, 1101, cp. nns. 1047, 1234). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions so much, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, so to the case of the famous Pythian psalm (see Hiller 'Sakadas the flute player', Kran. Mus. xxxi. 1896, p. 79 ff., Gehrman Der psalmodische psalmus für Philal. Sugin. N. S. viii. p. 209 ed.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the theoretical elements express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced for the ecstatic modes. Nor must we forget that τοιχώματα includes the idea of 'action' as well as 'emotion, and at times, e.g. IV[vii] 17. 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression: SUSEM. (1984)

The second of the three classes (τοιχώματα) has no direct English equivalent, we must be content to designate them "scenes and melodies of action." Clearly the first is the ecclesiastical music now, calm and ascetic, the third the wild excited airs, at once significant and, fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicts some stirring action, as in the Pythian scene, so aiming for the fray, so in a lost tragedy: Pops. xvi. 49; φέλλοι Μπαύξαντες τραυματισμοὶ. "The end of the Pops. [cp. Nomic. Fragm. p. 761] cp. §§ 1103 εἰς τὰς δειπνίαις ὡς ἐν τῇ θρησκείᾳ."

39 πάλιν δ' εἰς τοὺς περὶ ποιητικῆς| Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the Poetics is no longer extant. Vahlen gives good reasons for believing that it came after the discussion of Comedy now lost: see Arist. Aufsätze III. p. 13 s.f. (Wiener Sitzungsber. LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) Susem. (1085)

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν] At first sight there is a difficulty, if κάθαρος and διαγωγή constitute separate ends. What else than διαγωγή, as described above, see n. (1000), could express the aim of the concerts and musical exhibitions which are productive of κάθαρος more than μάθαιν (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that it is strange to find, in the received text, διαγωγή apparently explained by ἀνάπαυσις with which it is so often contrasted. Nor is it possible to reconcile the three advantages attendant on the use of music here with the three ends of musical education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2-4 and easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp. Bernays Rhein, Mus. xiv. 1889 p. 371 f., Über die tragische Kathariss (ed. 2) p. 125 f. See however Exc. v. p. 638. If the two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to music as a means of education, all the three ends there given (διαγωγή, παιδεία = ἀρετή, ἀνάπαυσις = ἀνάπαυσις) are summed up under the single phrase παιδείας ἐνεκά of our context. That is, though preparatory to διαγωγή (since those who have not learnt when young can never fully enjoy music), the educational use must be conceived as distinct. Then there is further the emotional or pathological use (κάθαρος) now introduced for the first time. Plainly, that does not attend on the music employed in education. It should be noted that Zeller (op. c. p. 777 n. 1) insists on a fourfold use here: he would separate from (3) πρὸς διαγωγήν, the following clause (4) πρὸς ἀνάπαυςιν τοις καὶ...ἀνάπαυσιν.

1342 a i o...2 χρηστῶν omitted by Π1 || 3 ἀκροάσιν] κάθαρον Paris. 2043 and Twining Poet. p. 243 (ed. 1), II. p. 7 (ed. 2), decidedly right: see Comm.
4 After ἐνθουσιαστικά Reinken (Aríst. 38. Kúst. pp. 148, 149) supposes that a definition of ἐκθαρσία has been lost and the words following must be:—

under which ἐκθαστικὰ and διαγωγὴ can be included.

καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. Dóvnoi γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῶς ἵππον τῆς ... πίσοις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἢπτον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μάλλον ὅπως ἢπειρες καὶ φόβος, ἐτι δὲ ἐνθουσιασμὸς καὶ γὰρ ὥτε...

4. After ἐνθουσιαστικά Reinken (Aríst. 38. Kúst. pp. 148, 149) supposes that a definition of ἐκθαρσία has been lost and the words following must be:—

under which ἐκθαστικὰ and διαγωγὴ can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καὶ "as well as." For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαὶ and ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁμ. such others as, though ἁμ., do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exe. iv these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἀμφάστακα would be exceptions; yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see n. (1107) p. 638 f. [That this is my view and was maintained by me in Jahrh. f. Phil. XXXV. 1862, p. 416 is admitted by Döring Philologus xxvii. p. 734, though I regret that in Künstlerleben der Artes, p. 183 he reprints an uncorrected statement about it which appeared Philol. XXI. p. 941.] Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἁμ. should be noticed. Comp. Exc. iv. n. (1054), and § 5, τὰ μέλη with n. (1096). SUBST. 1087, 1083.

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Zeller, p. 774, n. (4).

4, 5. The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 156): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in τὰ πάθη, the 'ecstatic' in τὰ ἐνθ. [see however n. 1007], the πρακτικά perhaps as military music. Besides this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs further proof, as far as the first two

species φόβοι and πάθη are concerned, in respect of ecstatic music it is a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term ἐκθαρσία as well, Aristotle proceeds with § 1. This enables him to give the explanation of ἐκθαρσία in general terms (καὶ ἕπεισιν) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, ἱππαρχή." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristotle's Quaestiones 11. p. 147 Med., Düring p. 127. Translate: "For the emotions which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to be seized by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take ἱππαρξεῖν μελεῖν as with μέλη; we use from the sacred melodies etc." Cep. Hagen p. 37 f.; οἷον ξόον καὶ φόβος. From this whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here addressed not with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my Introil to the Poët. pp. 55—57) but like ecstasy, with reference usually to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See p. 31 § 18 n. (1047). 7. § 2 (1024), 3. § (1056), 8. n. (1101). SUBST. (1083).

With this view Mr. Newman appears to concur: "Instead, p. 356: "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or horror or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-stirred spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge passion, are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Herways in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: "e.g. pity and terror.
8 ταῦτας τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχυμαι τινες εἰσίν ἐκ τῶν δ' ιερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τοῦτον, οὗτος χρύσωται τοῖς ἐξορμίαιοι ζουσι τῆς ψυχῆς μέλεσι, καδισταμένους ὁσπέρ ἵππεια τυχαία τυ- § 5 χύνασι καὶ καθάρσεως. ταυτό δὴ τοῦτο αναγκαίον πασχεῖν

8 δ' δὲ before τῶν P 144 L Α. Lbd. Βκ., after 9 ιερῶν P 59 || 9 [δετα...10 μέλεσι] Susem. 3, see p. 640 || το καθώσταμενας Π 1 T 4 (corrected by π') || τίγχωτα Μ, τυχόσας possibly Γ || ι ταλ [Spenigel, τῆς ὁ Ueberweg formerly, <τῆς> [Kal] Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δὴ] δὲ Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακώχυμα] 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, καταβασισμός. Plato uses κατακώχυμα for inspiration, Phaedr. 245 a, Ion 536 c. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the mss. agree here and 1269 b 36 in an irrational form. But in Nic. Eth. x. 9, 3, 1179 b 9 K b gives κατακώχυμα.)

ἐκ τῶν δ' ιερῶν μελῶν] Join with καθώσταμένους, not with ὀρῶμεν. See Burrian's Jahresber. LVI. p. 174 [and Bonitz Ind. Ar. 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. n. 1. p. 621. SUSEM. (1090)

9 δὲν χρύσωταν] "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. SUSEM. (1091)

Like κίνησις, καθώσταμεναι, κονόφασεν, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. π 112 κ. τῆς φαρμακίας χρέεσαι, π. 859 κλωμοῖς χρέεσαι, 1. 82 τῶν αὐτῶν χρῆσαι (remedy, treatment) δὲ προσδέ- χεσαι (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τῆς μονείας χρῆσαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; i.e. κατασταλέον (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) φασίν εἶναι τῇ μελῳδίᾳ, ἢτοι καὶ αὐτῶν μιμήτε τοῖς τῆς φῶςεως ἀκον ἀπομειλτομένων,... ἢ δὲ ἀκοήν ἡφισσί ἀνατεθματομένης,... τοῦ τῶν φῶςεως ἀκοῆν ἀνατεθματομένης, "the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appraise its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening." έξορμίαιοι] See ὄργανικοι, 1341 a 22, n. (1072), and ὄργανικα, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). SUSEM. (1092)

το καθώσταμένους] The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Step. σ. τ. L. and S. quote only ἄτιμα καὶ καθήρσεως. De Mem. 3. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, δὲ καὶ ὁργαῖ καὶ φθόγγο, ὅταν τῇ κυκλωσίᾳ, ἀντικοινωνίας πάλαι τοῦτον ὅλου καθωστασίαν. De Somn. 3. 3 § 26, 461 a 23, ἢ τὸ πρόφυμα καὶ μὴ νοσοί (ἀνακαταβασίας) καταφέρεται συνισταμένον. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. κατάστασις ὁμοία 1. 11, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1093), p. 640. SUSEM. (1093)

ὑστερ ἵππεια τυχαία καὶ καθαρσία] The ὑστερ marks the introduction of a metaphor: both ἵππεια and καθαρσία then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homoeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homoeopathic element will be least represented. SUSEM. (1094)

Comp. 11. 7, 11, 1367 a 7 f., δὲ τὴν ταῦτας (sc. επιθυμίας) ἀκοίνωσον ἵππειας. § 5 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in
V(VIII). 7. 5]

1342 a 8—1342 b 10.

каі тозіс елєймонаі іаі тозіс фіоβεικοіѵς іаі тозіс όλαі τνα—1
θετικοіѵς, тозіс έ' αλλον καθ' δοσιν ἐπίβαλλει των των άλλων ἄκατον,
καί τάσι γίνεσθαι τνα κάθαρσιν και κανιρικιαθαι μεθ’ ἕνδοψις. ὰμοιον δε και
ta μέλη τα + καβαρτικα + σαρκα

12 τοις ἄλλοις Αρ. τοις ἄλλοις τοις? Σαμπε. Θανος τοις Κατινει, ουλων
perhaps no change is needed. Diving [Philosophia circumst. p. 775] once conceived
ος] τοις μέλει: now (Kunstlerc der Antik, p. 237, q5 he prefers to accept the sig-
γίμη τα + καβαρτικα + σαρκα

13 καθ’ δοσιν (πιβαλλει). In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1270 o τ 19, 1261 b 35 ὰ. Hermay's p. 18 (188) shows that the pioινειει of the
care of Eubocic delirium (Corylantiosem) was observed by Plato (Laws v. 790 ν.),
though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle,
observeres Butler", "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in
different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and limits its even a wider application.

However on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emium. Hermay's p. 46 (164) ὰ.
14 τηνα κάθαρσιν] This implies that the σαρκα is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The efferations of pity
and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm'
or moral curiosity. See the note on όλε
apo8 p. 641. — SUIHAI. (1898)


6 15 τα μέλη τα καβαρτικα] Thus

the authorities. Sampe's conclusion of ροιαζνεως was adopted by Sissor-v.
See Excursion v. p. 537, especially p. 539 a. 4, and generally a (1895). — SUIMAI. (1898)

In handling a hero divided like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the result of the spec-
leaves the sentence enigmatic. (1) Does it merely emphasize τα ροιαζαι as opposed to ἄγωραι, a 47? This can hardly be, though
apparently Mr Newbome thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after p. 190). For φιλοκε and are mentioned
a 9 ὰ, not to agree with Thovei's Νομος p. 103 that Aristotle reduced little bantagh-
ies between ἄγωραι and ροιαζαι is a modern creit between the key in which were
written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with the
see e.g. 2. 11, 1344 b 2, 7
|| 10, 1343 ὰ 5 κ. [2] Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, if some
are treated in 2 13 must be excluded. The new species should be ροιαζαι of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against α. (194), that the effect of tragedy is limited to
|| 5, 4, 11—13, and thus apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (1) Or does it introduce a
new effect (αναλογοιη of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—15? If so, the 'warriors delights'
would be inasmuch with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with,
and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 ὰ. (1) says that music purges the
ναζαρινα, and affords equivalent to all.
Diving p. 260 finds a contrast between
1) the extraordinary, cathartic effect, ἄγωρας ἄρας, of painful patients (whether suffering from the brutality of mas-
chic frenzy, or hypochondria through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music
heard at concerts under ordinary circum-
§ 6 χει χαρών ἀβλαβή τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διό ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι • • • θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστὰς (ἐπεὶ δ’ ἵνα θεάτης διήττο, δ’ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαδεμένος, δ’ ἰδὲ 20 φορτικοῖς ἐκ βαναύσου καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ-
§ 7 κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἁγώνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν εἰς ἰδὲ ὀστεροὶ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε-

cm. v. (corr.) 17 θετέον π’5-5_;7_7 β _5 Ar. Ald. and P’1 (corr.) P’4 (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), <χρῆ-

σθαι > ἐτεὸν Ed. Müller ii. p. 63, <χρῆσθαι > θετεὸν Spengel, both plausible: Koraes detected the error: παδευτέον Jebb = τοῦτο] πρὸς S’6 T’b and P’4 (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed): omitted by M’s || 18 θεατρικὴ written above the line as a gloss by p’s, omitted by P’1 Ar. and P’2 (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities || 19 ἐλεύθερος ? Susen. || 22 εἰςτι Bk.2

stances. Bernaystranslated (from Bekker’s text): “now in the same manner as other means of catharsis the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre” which is intended to provide innocent delight “should come forward with such modes and melodies.” The objection to this is the forced meaning of όμοιος. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in ταῦτα τοῦτο πάσχειν. Busse moreover ὑπ. c. p. 49 accepts the correction πρακτικά.

§ 6 “Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuous, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation.”


17 θετεόν] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if χρῆσθαι were supplied, or ἁγώνιζονται in place of ἁγωνιστὰς. Still the meaning is clear. In τοῖς μεταχειριζομένοις it is not hard to discover τοῖς αὐτῶ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The case shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the Republic.

20 ἐκ βαναύσου...συγκείμενος] As an attribute of θεατρικὴ this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. De Finibus ii. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negotii est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or ad Att. iv. 15. 1, ut est ex me et ex iterum Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 ἁγώνας καὶ θεωρίας] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 “Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falselty coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music.”

22 ὀστεροὶ αὐτῶν...23 ἁγώνες] Comp. n. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, n. (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art III. 11. 2, n. (265 b), Susen (1097).

23 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων παρεξαίη] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the ‘wailing and mournful’ music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the ‘lax and effeminate’ low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 §§ 23, also Exc. iv. n. (1054). Susen. (1098)
24. **parakeiros** | A technical term for varieties of the three genera diatomic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See Excur. IV p. 636. **Stüd.** (1099)

25. **poiei ** | Apelt *Beitritte zur Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 325 (1) thinks this, in connexion with N. E. viii. 14. 2, 1154 a 12, points to a division of pleasures into three kinds. He compares Epicurus' division of **eudaimones** and *De Nature Humana* c. 18 per ἤ διαφόροι.

27. **touain** | I.e. a corrupt, depraved style, in which 'colours' and *nimissi* i.e. transposed scales abound.

§ 28. **wopet εἰρηναί** | In 3, 1143 a 3, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδίαν ταῖς ἡλικίαις. See Exc. v. p. 638. **Stüd.** (1100)

We have now reached the end of the long digression, §§ 4–7, following on the mention of modes suitable for public performance πρὸς ἄκροβους ἀπόρροις *χρωσμο-γωνίας*; we have in fact answered the first question of c. 7 § 1 πλεῖον καταθεῖν χρηστῶν. The connexion of the whole passage, and the best way of meeting the difficulties presented by the text, is discussed Exc. v. p. 638 ff. **Stüd.** (1101)

30. **πρότερον** | In c. § 22, 1140 b 3 ff. Comp. n. (1045) p. 628. The previous statement (ὅτι οὐκ εἶχαν μίκρα καὶ καταστάσεις καταθέν μικρὰ πρὸς ἄκροβος) does not quite to the same effect. In one sense it includes more than is found here; cp. n. (1196). What has been pointed out n. (1086) agrees with this. **Stüd.** (1102)

διακινδύνωσι διά δύο κτλ. | See n. (1088) for a conjecture as to the modes here intended. **Stüd.** (1104)

31. **οἱ κοινοὶ...** | Here the author of the division into three classes mentioned in § 3 is again most probably intended. See n. (1084). **Stüd.** (1105)

Aristophanes was at once a pupil of Aristotle's and an ardent musician, while on musical theory his *Harmonik* and the fragments of his *Poikila* are among the highest authority. In Westphal's monumental works, the series *Theorie der gregorianischen Melos* and the now completed edition *Ariondeus, Menad und Rhetmik* (Leipzig, 1842 and 1893) everything has been done for this author. English readers unacquainted with Westphal's writings may with advantage consult Mr. C. F. Abdy Williams' article on "Ancient Music" in Classical Review vii. p. 373 ff.

§ 9. **Socrates in the Republic** | It appears from the text, that honour the Phrygian Mode.

ὅδε ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ | This is the normal, explicit manner of referring to Socrates, the character in the dialogue 'The Republic,' and sufficiently accounts for the article in the above-mentioned fourth *Stüd.*. cp. n. 190 ii. 1. 1. 1501 c.

The passage in *Rep.* 7. 519 a ναὶάν οὖν ἀλλὰ ἔναν τόπον ἐπιλέξας καὶ ἐπεκείνθη ἐν τούτῳ ἀντικρισία. Ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐπιλέξει, ἀλλὰ ὅσοι ἔρρει ἀντικρισίαν μὲν ἑκάστου διάδοχου, ἀλλὰ ἔτι καὶ ἀνακεφαλαίως ἐπεκέραυντο ἐν μεροῦς ἀνάγκης τέως-τας ἀπόρροιας, καὶ δι' ὅσοι πρατέως οὐ καὶ ἀπαθετηθεὶς διὰ τοῦ ἄλλου [ὑπερήφανος ἀντικρισίας, ἐν τούτῳ πάντως πράξεως ἐκ τῆς ἀκροβολίας καὶ αὐτοφόρου παρακείμενος διαφοράς ἐν ταῖς ἀκροβολίαις]
καταλείπει μετὰ τὴς δωριστικά, καὶ ταύτα ἀποδοκιμάσας (V(LVIII). 7. 9)

τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν αὐλῶν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἡ φρουστικά τῶν ἄρμοινων ἧπερ αὐλῶς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνωις.
§ 10 ἀμφώ γὰρ ὀργαστικά καὶ παθητικά. δηλαδὴ δὲ ἡ ποιή-

σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις (p)

5 μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλῶις, τῶν δὲ ἄρμο-

νιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουστικά μέλεις λαμβάνει ταύτα τὸ τρέπον.
οἴον ὁ διδύραμβος ὀμολογομένος εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.
§ 11 καὶ ταύτα πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγοντι οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-

σιν ταύτην ἀλλὰ τε, καὶ διδύτι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν

1342 b 2 φρουστική Γ || 8 δείγματα P4d δι Lσ

ἐν εἰρήνηι τε καὶ μὴ βιαῖο ἀλλ’ ἐν ἔκοινω ἀρέξει όντος, ἢ τινὰ τι πεθυντός τε καὶ
dεομένου, ἢ εὐχὴ θεῶν ἢ διάθεσας καὶ νουθέ-

tον ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τοιοῦτον ἄλλο δεομένῳ ἢ
dιδάσκοντι καὶ μεταπέλαθον ἑαυτῶν ἐπέχου-
tα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαι κατα νοῦν, καὶ
hμὴ ψευδόταις ἔξωντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνους τε καὶ
μετρίους ἐν πάσι τούτοις πράττοντα τε
cαὶ τὰ ἀποβαλόμενα ἀγαπῶντα. ταῦτα δύο
ἄρμοιναß βιαίου, ἔκωσιν, δυστυχοῦντος,
sυχνῶν, σωφρόνους, ἀνδρεῖοντες
φθάγων μεμοίρασα μάλιστα, ταύτα
λείτε.
As with the musical instruments, n. (1071), so in the case of the modes Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in truth—see nn. (1086, 1102, 1104, 1109)—the Dorian Mode is the only one which he retains for the purpose of moral education. Susem. (1105)

§ 34 ἀποδοκιμάσας...τὸν αὐλόν] Pl.

Lec. III. 399 D: τι δέ; αὐλοποιός ἢ αὐλη-
tάς παραδείξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὗ τούτο
πολυχρωτάτον καὶ αὐτῇ τα παραμύθα
αὐλόν τυγχάνει ὡστα μέμπα; The osten-
sible ground for its rejection is the com-
xplexity of its music. Susem. (1106)

1342 b 3 ἀμφώ γὰρ ὀργαστικὰ κτλ]

We were told this before of the flute, c. 6
§ 9, 1341 a 22 ff., ὡστάτων ἡ αὐλὸς ἡθικῶν
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργαστικῶν; it has an in-

toxicating tendency, tending not to form, but
to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode
again was described as relatively the most
maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22.

The addition of the more general term

παθητικὰ: "passionate" here is a fresh and
striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ
dυνομιστικὰ ἄρμοινα, are not restricted to
the expression or impression upon
others of Ecasty pure and simple. On
the contrary, like the flute amongst musi-
cal instruments, they are adapted gene-
 rally to pourtray and call up all emotions,
or at least all painful emotions:—in the
words of the text, "all Bacchic frenzy and
similar mental excitement." Comp. Exc.
IV. p. 628 and notes (1089, 1047), also
n. (1096) p. 643. Susem. (1107)

§ 10 Poetry shows this. When the
subject is wild and delirious, as in a
dithyramb, the music is set for the flute
and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode.
The cogency of this illustration depends
on the fact, which must always be borne
in mind, that the Greek poet set his own
words to music (precisely as in the Wag-
nerian opera): he also chose his own
dance measures.

§ 11 ταῦτα—βακχεία καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνη-
sis (subject).

An extraordinary phrase where we should
expect οἱ περὶ ταύτην συνειδὸν δύνει: i.e.
musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz'
words, σύνεις is used "objective" = ἡ μον-
ητική τέχνη.

§§ 18 9 Φιλόξενος] Of Cythera, born 459
B.C., one of the most famous of the dithy-
rambic poets. He lived for some time at
the court of the elder Dionysius, who
imprisoned him in the stone quarries of
Syracuse, where (according to one ac-
count) he wrote his most noted dithyramb
Kύκλωψ. When brought out to listen to
Dionysius' own compositions, he is said
to have addressed the attendants in the
words Εἰς λατομάς, "Take me back to
the quarries." See further respecting
him Bernhardt Gesch. d. griech. Littera-
tur iii, p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), Susem. (1108)
Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criti-
cism of the later dithyrambic poets, in-
cluding Philoxenus, specially mentions
their intermixture of styles and lines in rhythm: ο η δη διεθετρασμένως και τω τρόπων μετέδιδε. Διεθνεί τα και Φρεγίνω, και Λαιάς την το φαινει παρατείνε καὶ τα μελέτης εξαλλάται, και τα παρόν κατά ταλον ἅδεον ενεχουσάτει διάλειται. ο γα ό δὴ κατά Φιλόπον καὶ Τελετής: επει παρά γας τον ἄρχην τεταγμένον ἔφεσι διεθετρασμένος. Δηκ. προτάσσως. 19, p. 134, 14 ff. εἰς Ἑλλάς.
11 ὑπο τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς. See V. 1342 a 27, η φίλας ἐπιβάλλα: also Δικ. 1. 3. 14, 984 b 9 ff. εἰς ἀπεις τής ἀνάθεας ἀναγκαστικῆς ἐφάπαξ, and με. 1. 5. 6, 188 b 29 ff.
12 1. ὡμολογοῦντων ὡς υἱόσις See Δικ. 1362 b 12. n. Comp. vir(11) 9. 7, 1394 b 10. The best explanation and parallels in Lobeck ad Soph. Δικ. 281. Frequenti in Plato, e.g. Phil. 16 c, Λαογ. 624 a, ο. στασιμοτάτης. That the Dorian is the only mode which produces a sober and sedate frame of mind was said to με. 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. noter (1103, 1105).
(D) (1109)
13 1. ὧ νοι δὲ ἐπιλε τῆς μέσον κτλ See vi. (14), 11. 4, 1395 b 3 ff. ὡμολογοῦντων ἡ μέσον ὑποθέτοντα καὶ τῆς μέσον, n. (1390) bl. D(1110)
14 1. ἢ δὲ διεθαρασμένα κτλ Λακ. That the Dorian melodies are principally of a middle compass. In contrast to this, melodies composed in the 'high-strung' (ἀκορεθήναι, θάλαμοι) mode diverged from this middle compass to the higher and lower parts of the regions respectively. This is explained in Kaur. III, 2, 6, 1394 b 625. See (1111) 13 1. ὐπο τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς. See V. 1342 a 27, η φίλας ἐπιβάλλα: also Δικ. 1. 3. 14, 984 b 9 ff. εἰς ἀπεις τής ἀνάθεας ἀναγκαστικῆς ἐφάπαξ, and με. 1. 5. 6, 188 b 29 ff.
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nías, ἄλλα τὰς ἀνειμένας ἢ φύσεις ὑποβάλλει τοὺς τηλε-§ 14 κούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμᾶσι καὶ τοῦτο <τῷ> Σωφράτει τῶν περί τὴν μουσικὴν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας ἀποδοκε-25 μᾶςειν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικῶν γὰρ ἢ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλʼ ἀπειρηκυνίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἥλικιαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεὶ καὶ τῶν τοιού-§ 15 τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἀπέπεσαν καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι 30 δʼ εἰ τὶς ἐστὶ τοιαύτη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἢ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παι-δον ἥλικια διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμων τὸ ἤχειν ἁμά καὶ παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μᾶλλοτα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὡστε <ei> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by William, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐὰν δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated by William and Ar., [καὶ] Koraes || 30 Δʼ Γ. Ald. || 32 παιδᾶν C. E. Ch. Schneider (on Pl. Rep. πν. 399 λ) || παιδείαν οἶαν P3 (1st hand, corrected by later hands), διάνων P1 (οἶον added in the text and γρ. παιδείαν by p1 in the margin of P1) and P2 (corr.)

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωφράτει] I.e. in Plato Ἐρ. πν. 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακά καὶ συμποστικά τῶν ἀρμονίων; Ἡσιότ, ἢ δʼ ὡς, καὶ λυδιστὶ, ἀπειρηματακροταί. Ταῦτας οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἐπὶ πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐόν ὦτι χρήσας; Σουσέμ. (1112)

25 ὡς μεθυστικᾶς κτλ] "On the assumption that this is drunken music, not in the sense of intoxication—indeed intoxication rather tends to excite mad revelry—but as being enervated." Bonitz is probably right in making 24 ἀπειρηκυνίας acc. plur. Ινδ. Ἀτ. 71 b 47, comparing 24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας: and so 'ener- vated,' languid, exhausted. Schneider preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but if that were so, surely we should expect αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρηκυνίας.

§§ 13—15 17 ἐστὶ δὲ...34 πρέπον] That this close of the chapter is a foreign addition is indicated by the square brackets, and must be admitted unless we choose to believe that Aristotle would again partially introduce by a side-wind the musical modes which he has already openly banned from education. Aristotle recommends Dorian melodies for the instruction of the young on account of their middle compass: 'all other modes, 'the most ethical' alone excepted, are excluded: also, he expressly warns us against any education for amusement, c. § 4. He distinctively forbids adults to sing or play, c. § 4, and consequently restricts the introduction of 'practical' (πρακτικὰ) or 'ecstatic' Modes, as well as the less 'ethical' Modes, see n. (1087), to performances at which the citizens are auditors. The author of this addition, on the other hand, is anxious that the youth should also learn to sing in modes which, from the low compass of the melodies, are least suited to them and best adapted to be actually sung in riper age. Now it is no doubt true that these low-pitched modes do not belong either to the 'practical' (πρακτικά) or to the 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and appear to constitute the less ethical; see nn. (1054, 1087). It is further true that Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal state an occasional banquet for relaxation and recreation, IV(vii). 17. 11, cp. n. (1066), and at such times probably also permits them the exceptional privilege of singing (see c. § 8 with nn. 1028, 1067). It is true that the description of the low-pitched keys here given (ἀπειρηκυνίας) points, like Plato's Ἐρ. 398 E, see n. (1112), to the appositeness of their employment on such occasions. Finally it cannot be denied that the idea of learning something in youth, which may afford amusement in later life, is not wrong in itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present instance inadmissible, because for mere amusement it is not necessary to learn to
play yourself, when you can get
others to perform to you, e. g. 5 18: cp. un.
(1024, 1074, 1096). However, this is
quite enough to condemn the proposed
instruction of boys in melodies to be
hereafter sung at drinking parties.
Aristotle would have been much more con-
cerned to practise the young in the "practical" (πρακτικός) and ecstatic melodies, in
order to educate their taste for the end of
the highest intellectual enjoyment. But
he obviously thought: teach a boy to
sing and play minor tunes, and amuse
the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will
surely, if so inclined, be able to sing
melodies in the major modes, and appreci-
ate them at musical performances in-
tended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one mo-
ment the illogical sequence of the whole
passage. The introduction: "but in
musical instruction, as in all else, we
should keep in view what is practicable
and what is fitting" stands in no con-
ceivable logical connexion with what
precedes. Has the previous restriction of
musical teaching to the Dorian and
the related Modes any other object except
to secure for the young what is practicable
and fitting, because suited to their ca-
pacity? Even the casual remark at the
close, 1344 b 14 ff., that just on account
of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is
specially adapted to induce moral virtue,
which is a mean between two extremes
(see n. 1111), is directed simply to what
is fitting. This interpreters has failed to
recognize, for he brings in the Mean
as a third aim, different from the possible
and the fitting. He has not then per-
cibed that the medium compass of the
Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason
and not the sole reason for preferring it.
Starting from the strangely perverse nes-
tion that this was the only reason, he felt
bound to assign some part to propriety
and the possible, and so he goes on to
remark that not only the possible but
also the fitting is determined by grade-
tions of age, a mere truism as regards the
latter point, since the interpolator has
expressly stated that by what is fitting
for youth he understands hearing and no
παυλοποιείν τό τε μέσον καὶ τό δυνατὸν καὶ τό πράγματος - -}

33 after ἄρμονιν added by P4 and P5 (corr.1), omitted by all other authorities.
At Ekk. 1: - - δήλων δότη τρεῖς, τούτων ἄρμον ὑποτέθηκεν τό τε ἄρμονιν καὶ τό τε μέσον καὶ τό δυνατὸν καὶ τό πράγματος.
served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (a) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (b) this \( \gamma \) marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, \( \tau \delta \mu \rho \sigma \omicron \nu \), which, as well as \( \tau \delta \delta \nu \nu \alpha \tau \alpha \nu \) and \( \tau \delta \pi \rho \epsilon \pi \omicron \nu \), is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from notes (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. Susem. (1113)
This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338b 5 f. n. (1023). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, ν(νπάλιν). 17, 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, n. (972), in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the Introd. p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338a 31–32, with c. 5 § 2, 1339a 29 f., n. (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato’s scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (μαθηματικά, εν φιλόσοφίᾳ). These are the higher sciences (μαθηματικά) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337a 42, n. (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, n. 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of βάρβαρος.

Aristotle’s ideal state is not therefore, like Plato’s Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality; it is to the former aspect that its highest end is attained, esp. Introd. p. 48 ff. But in the sequel wherever the word μαθηματικά is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1337b 12, c. 6 § 7, 1341a 13, § 9, 1341a 18, 20, c. 7 § 11 ff., 1341b 25, 29, 34, 1342a 5; 32, 34; etc., it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even μαθηματικά is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable
at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see n. (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with τεχνήται or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., n. (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, “no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest” (καὶ τὸ πρᾶττεν οὐκ ἄνδρος μὴ μεθύσατο ἴ παιδίτος, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, n. 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (Νίκ. Εἰθ. VI. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theodectes. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money’s worth. “It is inconceivable,” remarks Bradley, Hellenica p. 214 n., “that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of βασιντία applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: ‘If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies’: καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφυὴς νέος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίσι θεασάμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φεδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν “Ηρακλῆς τὴν ἐν Ὁρμον Πολύκλετος, οὐδεὶς Ἀπακρέων ἢ Φιλήτας ἢ Ἀρχίλοχος οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν: Plutarch, Vita Periclis c. 2, p. 153 A.” SUSEM. (1015)
EXCURSUS II.

THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

The Compositions of Olympus are not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute, see Ex. iv. n. (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk Poet. Lyric. p. 849.), or nothing but 

\[\text{v\textgamma\textomicron\textnu\textomicron\textnu} \] 

as they were called; cp. n. (17) to my edition of the Politia. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch, De Musica 5, 1132 E, F), and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the original of artistic music: Plut. op. c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch op. c. 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. l.c. But others were of later date than Tereander, and even than Thaletas, see nn. (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those airs of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a 
\[\text{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu} \] 

another of these airs (\textup{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu}), called 
\[\text{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu} \] 

called \textit{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu}, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus, see Plut. L c. 7, 1135 D B. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Ex. iv) in honour of Athene, called \textit{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu} the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. 1, ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch op. c. 33, 1143 B: cp. Plat. Crat. 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. op. c. 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cambel called \textit{\nu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu\textnu\textomicron\textnu}\textit{\nu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu} (Plut. l c. 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch op. c. 19, 1137 D).

1 The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, \textit{\nu\textomicron\textmu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textomicron\textnu} and \textit{\nu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu\textupsilon\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu} should be read in this passage, instead of \textit{\nu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu\textupsilon\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu} and \textit{\nu\textomicron\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu\textupsilon\textupsilon\textomicron\textnu}.

2 For the introduction of the passionate or erotic rhythm into artistic music in rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athene ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.
As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. iv. p. 628 and n. 1107), are the ‘sacred melodies’ from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, n. (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle’s mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. Susem. (1042)

EXCURSUS III.

ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ο δ’ ἐνθουσιασμὸς του περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθους πάθος ἔστιν, ἐν(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 ff.

Döring Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 335 ff. (Philologus xxvii. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, n. (977), and elsewhere, the expression ‘character of the soul,’ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔθος, or ‘character’ only, must be taken to mean not the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. nn. (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, n. (1022), it appears that this ‘orectic’ soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that “because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices” is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

1 Plato Sympos. 215 c: Socrates is like Marsyas: ὁ μὲν γε δι’ ἀργάνων ἐκήλη τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δινάμει, καὶ ἐρευνής διὰ τὰ ἐκείνου αὐθαίρης. ἀ γάρ Ὁλυμπιατος ἡθελε, Μαρσύου λέγω, τοῦ διδάξ.

2 τὸ ὀρεκτικός, the ‘orectic’ soul.
be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (dunameis) called moral virtues. 'Influence upon the character' means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us 'attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character' through the intervention of music (cp. Pol. 6. 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.). Thus the phrase 'character,' or 'character of the soul,' cannot mean that part of the soul or itself but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites,—φυσικες ήθες, φυσικα δυναμεις (cui uscitia) as Aristotle calls them, N.E. vi. 13. 1 f., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above Pol. iv[vii]. 13. 11, n. 388), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, πράξεως, but with emotional excitations or feelings (πάθη, N.E. ii. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral 'habit' may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: 'because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits.' Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called 'character' precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character. Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. nюν (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from Ἐθετ. 6. 91, 1386 b 12 ff., § 5; b 35 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring's explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle ε. Ἐθ. 5 § 8, (cp. n. (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (ἡματια) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. n. (1048) themselves characters (ἡματια), whilst in other places, such as ε. 7 §§ 3—11, Pol. 1. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. n. (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly admitted among the Greeks between emotion (μέθος).

1 ταυτων τοις τινας γνωσιν, 1340 a 7.
2 εικονιστει οταν τινι προσωποι εικονιστει, καθαρις της τραγουδιστικης δυναμεους των ιδιων. των ιδιων οταν τας τις μεθανατες πραξεως, αλλα τας τις εκεινα, και των εκεινων, δια τας τραγουδιστικες πραξεως
3 εικονιστει τις θεαθεις (καθαρος και επεκθεις) μεθανατες πραξεως. (Döring argues thus: θεαθεις are in this and other passages ascribed to θεαθεις, but Ἐθετ. 11. 1. 2. 1, 1125 b 50, ρηηρας are said to be τοις γνωσιν, whilst from Ἐθετ. 11. vi. 6. 1. 36, b 30, we gather that ἔθος (ὡς γνωσις) includes more mental it than ρηηρας only. Hence he concludes himself justified in supposing ἔθος with θεαθεις and would explain Ἐθ. 11. 11. 36, 1125 b 50, ρηηρας a 6, in a case where the more special term ὀικονιστει is used, with the more general term θεαθεις.)
in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (ἠδος) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. § 71, an artist ‘full of character’ (ἡθικός) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called ‘characters’ Nic. Eth. VI. 13, 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say ‘qualities of character.’ The expression τοῦ περὶ τῆν ψυχὴν ἡθος πάθος ‘an emotion of the character of the soul’=ὁ πάσχει το περὶ τῆν ψυχὴν ἡθος, suggests the radical meaning of πάθος ‘suffering.’

SUSEM. (1049)

EXCURSUS IV.

Ancient Greek Music: Modes, Rhythms, Musical Instruments, Scales:
Notes 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

Modes.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοίς ἐστι μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τούτ’ ἐστὶ φανερόν· εἰδὸς γὰρ τῶν ἀρμονίων διέστηκε φώς, ὡστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπων πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἔνας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μεξολύδιστα καλομέμνην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονίων, ἐνθυπαστικότως δ’ ἡ φρυγιστὶ……) c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

“Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive imitations of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lydian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm.”¹

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut)², and

¹ This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see Translations p. 121.
² Do is often used instead of ut.
so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (αποχωρίας), or 'Species of Octaves' (τάς τῶν διὰ παρών)'\(^1\), as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \ & BC \ D \ EF \ G \ a \ b^5, \ \text{Mixolydian;} \\
(2) \ & C \ D \ EF \ G \ a \ b^3, \ \text{Lydian;} \\
(3) \ & D \ EF \ G \ a \ b^2 \ d, \ \text{Phrygian;} \\
(4) \ & EF \ G \ a \ b^1 \ d \ e, \ \text{Dorian;} \\
(5) \ & F \ G \ a \ b^1 \ d \ e \ f, \ \text{Hypolydian;} \\
(6) \ & G \ a \ b^1 \ d \ e \ f \ g, \ \text{Ionian;} \\
(7) \ & A \ BC \ D \ EF \ G \ a, \ \text{Aeolian.}
\end{align*}
\]

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid. apud Ath. xiv. 624 ε.), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Doric, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three: the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-" and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles the Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal\(^\ast\) and Gevaert was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. Eq. 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (αυθόρσα) and low-pitched (διascos) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names.

\(^1\) Also called τάκτια, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word τάκτια itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'Music,' for αποχωρίας or other τάκτια διὰ παρών: for τάκτια the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see x. p. 603 ε.]

\(^\ast\) Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart; for an interval of a semitone they are close together.

\(^\ast\) 40 THE MUSICAL MODES.

1. The word τάκτια itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'Music,' for αποχωρίας or other τάκτια διὰ παρών; for τάκτια the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see x. p. 603 ε.

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3. Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart; for an interval of a semitone they are close together.

4. Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart; for an interval of a semitone they are close together.
but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-
pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the
Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy
of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be ex-
pected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus
be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added,
a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. Harm. p. 18, Bach. p. 19,
Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocrates of Locri (Callim.
in Schol. Pind. Ol. xi. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), com-
monly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out
of use (Heracleid. in Ath. xiv. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that
the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as
either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the
fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case repre-
sents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received
that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff.,
that, as the ancients observed (Plut. De Mus. 16, 1136 E), it was the
counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in
the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a
sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones
descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending:

BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian (ascending)
b A G FE D CB, Mixolydian (descending)
F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian (ascending),

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into
the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian
into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and
fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished,
and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented:

\[
\begin{array}{c|ccccc}
\text{Fourth} & B & C & D & E & F \\
\text{Fifth} & A & b & G & & \\
\end{array}
\]

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody
with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with
the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the
really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (Rep. III. 398 E)
says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation.
Lastly in regard to the terms σύντονον 'highly strung' and ἄνευ-ένα 'relaxed,'
which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the
tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to
MUSICAL MODES.

explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13, though not by Aristotle (see n. 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed there was a similar choice between raising three (E, G, C) or lowering four (D, G, C, F).

1 That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan Der Tonarten bei Flöten im ersten Buch der Rèpublik, Jährb. für Philo. xcv. 1867, p. 815 sqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, e.g. a be d e, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (γανωδηγη) half a tone higher (E); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (E); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (E, G, C, F) or lower three (D, G, C); and for an Ionian

Mixolydian

[Low Hypolydian] E F G A B C E
High-pitched Lydian E F G A B C D E
High-pitched Ionian E F G A B C D E
Phrygian E F G A B C D E
Aeolian L E F G A B C D E
Dorian E F G A B C D E
[High Mixolydian] E F G A B C D E
[High Hypolydian] E F G A B C D E
Low-pitched Lydian E F G A B C D E
Low-pitched Ionian E F G A B C D E

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The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have repre-
from the rest by ending on the third, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (Lach. 188 d), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato Repub. l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale:

$$A \: BC \: D \: EF \: \quad G \: a=\text{Aeolian;}$$
$$A \: BC \: D \: E \: F^{\#} \: \quad G^{\#}a=\text{our A minor;}$$

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (ἡδος) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonous music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see nn. 1042, 1078). It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new ἀρμονίαι, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh:

$$F \: G \: a \: bc \: d \: ef \: \quad = \text{Hypolydian;}$$
$$F \: G \: ah\flat \: c \: d \: ef \: \quad = \text{F Major;}$$
$$G \: a \: bc \: d \: ef \: \quad g=\text{Ionian (Hypophrygian);}$$
$$G \: a \: bc \: d \: e \: f\flat g = \text{G Major.}$$

1 [See note on p. 637 f.]
2 We hear even of a Phrygian tetra-chord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetra-chord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetra-chord ef g a. See Helmholtz Lebre der Tonempfindungen p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].
DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).

Modern A minor.

PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).

Modern G major.

LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).

Modern F major.

There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or dodecachordal order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or plagal order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which παθεῖν is a more correct expression than ἔχειν) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our ‘major mode’ is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aitkens in Phil. Mod
EXCURSUS IV.

*Musica* 16, 1136 C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. *ibid*.), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis *ibid*.) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. *Alcib. I*. 118 C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see n. (1055) (Plut. *ibid*. 1136 E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato Rep. l. c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see n. 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into ἔθικα, ethical, πρακτικαὶ (Modes of action = scenic?) and ἔθουσιαστικαὶ, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypopolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (πρακτικαὶ); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (Rep. 399 A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see n. 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. *nn* 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In *Problems* XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective πρακτικός applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (ἡθος ἐχει μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as πρακτικά, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions.² The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

¹ ἡ [ὑπο]ϕυργιαστι (ἐθουσιαστική γάρ καὶ βαρκική). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστι καὶ ὑποφρυγιαστι πράττομεν. The insertion of μάλιστα δὲ

² ἡ μεῖξιλιστι (from Gaza) before κατὰ μὲν οὖν, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.
with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character,ジェネル, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle’s pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see n. (1143). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see nn. 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see n. 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the κομπός, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. xiv. 638 l.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. De Musica 17, 1136 ζ), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by vi(11v) 3. 4 (cp. a. 1150) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental ἀποφωβί, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. SUNSEM. (1054)

1 The explanations given by Sunsemil Jahr. f. Phil. xcv. 1887, p. 231 require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.
Musical Rhythms.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeanon time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of $\frac{13}{12}$ : 1. The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeanon, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest.

None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 F) speaks of the φοίνικες, πηκτίδες, μαγάδιδες, σαμβύκαι, τρίγωνα, κλεψάμβοι, σκινδαψώ, and ἐννέαχορδαί as uncommon (ἐκφυλα). The πηκτίς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. Fr. 102 in Athen. XIV. 635 D, Soph. Fr. 375, ibid. 635 C and IV. 183 E, Telestes Fr. 5, ibid. XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. l. c., cp. Pind. l. c.). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho Fr. 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon Fr. 17, 22, by Plato Repub. III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like

Musical Instruments: Harps, etc.

οἱὸν πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονῆν συντελεύτατα τοὺς ἀκούοντι τῶν χρωμένων, ἑπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβύκαι. (VII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.
the magadis, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aristot. in Athen. xiv. 635 β). Menaeceinus asserts in Ath. 635 v, έση: that Sappho was the first to use the instrument, stating that he follows Aristocles in regarding it as the same as the magadis, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the μύγαδας and the πηρίκα (Ath. 635 x ε.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the μύγαδας seems to have been a modification of the πηρίκα. At any rate the μύγαδας also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 α and perhaps before him by Anacreon (ibid. Fr. 18), and the latter calls the πηρίκα (Fr. 17) and the μύγαδας (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 c, 635 c) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Pindarus thinks (ibid. 634 c, d), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristocles (ibid. 635 b), who quotes Pindar I. c. in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Teleutaios (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 λ) apparently describes the μύγαδας as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sophocles I. c. we must suppose that the πηρίκα had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phyllis however (ibid. 636 θ) says the πηρίκα and μύγαδας (which he distinguishes from one another), the σαμβική, τεφρική, πηρίκα and σάμικα, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. iv. 182 ε, xiv. 435 a) the μύγαδας—or rather the σαμβική, a modification of it (see below)—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the πηρίκα this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Alcman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the μύγαδας (Fr. 91 in Ath. 636 τ) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the βιοτίας (neuter), also βιοτής (femin. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo X. 471 says that all the names σαμβική, βιοτίας, πηρίκα, are foreign, and Pindar I. c. designates the βιοτή as an adaptation of the Lydian πηρίκα. Like this it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar I. c. describes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Homer (Il. ii. 1. 34) calls it 'Lesbian' and assigns its use to Alcaeus (Georg. i. 34. 4 d). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 152 έ = Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacre. Fr. 141). Critias calls the βιοτίας Sappho's favourite instrument (in Athen. xiii. 60 ε. c.) Neanthes (Fr. 3 α

1 So also Suidas s.v. Σαπφη, where the mention of the plectrum in the ancestral text is due to corruption.
EXCURSUS IV.

Athen. 175 c) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon. Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcaeus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton:

The only particular difference between this instrument and the λύρα consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the πηκτίς, as appears from Pindar l.c. Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (R. A. VII. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the κιθάρα and λύρα, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 ε and Pollux IV. 8. 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreonta. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch De Monarch. 4. 827 Α, and Theocritus XVI. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's Realencycl. IV. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of βάρβιςων with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between βάρβιςων and πηκτίδως on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the βάρβιςων and even than the πηκτίς and μάγαδις. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a σαμβύκη:—

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The τριγωνον or triangle is called by Juba (Fr. 73 in Ath. 173 v) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians; by Ptolemy Harm. III. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles Luc. gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (loc. cit. Ath. 636 A, see Nauk Trag. Gr. Fragm. p. 602 sqq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (ξ. Κελλα) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphy. On Tptol. p. 216 sqq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. Luc., Arist. Prohl. xix. 33). The 

Euphorion represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the 

invention of the Egyptians (in Ath. 635 A). The same writer (in Ath. 633 f. on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato Luc. The statement of Skamon in Athen. 637 A is that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Nevertheless Luc. says either of the τριγωνον or more probably (agreed with Suidas Luc. and Schol. in Aristoph. Theai. 165) of the σαμβύκη—which instrument is main—

is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but Juba (L7) attributed the

λαργόμοιν Σαμβύκη, as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the τριγωνον, and more especially the σαμβύκη, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the σαμβύκη by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 633 f. and the phrases "ballet girl and player on the triangle," τινα δεικνύουσα καί τινα 

1 Heliodorus Ath. iv. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the κάρτα indulge in wild Assyrian dances.
2 In Kallikel's edition of Athenaeus κατά is assumed at this place, 173 b, between λαργόμοιν and τριγωνον.
3 Both were introduced into Rome.


EXCURSUS IV.

τριγωνιστριαν (Lucian Lexiph. 8), χαματύπαι καὶ σαμβυκιστρίας (Plut. Anton. 9), ἄγοντα σαμβυκιστρίας καὶ κινάδων (Plut. Cleom. 35), κινάδων ἄγεω καὶ σαμβυκας (Polyb. v. 37. 10) and others (Tib. Gracch. in Macrob. Sat. ii. 10, Arnob. ii. 42). This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing (Fr. i in Ath. 183 c, f) in his comedy of the βάπται, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotytt. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly σαμβυκας and not ιαμβικα, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The ιαμβικα was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the κλεψιαμβος being used when they were melodramatically recited (Phillis l.c., cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. ιαμβικα). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the κλεψιαμβος among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh De metr. Pind. p. 260 ff., Lobeck, Aglaophamus p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, De fidibus Graecorum pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister Denkmäler III. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

Scales.

tότε μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσομένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The “colour” of notes (χρώμα) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or ‘genera’ of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order ef g a bc de. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. ii.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. Probl. xix. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. De Mus. 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

| e | f | a | b | c | d | e |

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (δισεός):

| e | f* | g* | a | b | c* | d* | e |

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

1 The suggestion, which D. Volkmann De Suidae biogr. p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue On Poets) to attribute the original employment of the

πικτίς, τριγωνον, and σαμβυκη to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

2 See n. 10 on the Poetics (ed. Susem.-)
MUSICAL SCALES.

In the case of the former there is between $f$ and $g$ rather more than a whole tone ($\frac{5}{4}$), and between $g$ and $a$ rather less than a whole tone ($\frac{4}{3}$), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone ($\frac{5}{4}$) and a diminished whole tone ($\frac{4}{3}$), a tone being inserted in the minor third $B\ D$ in the place of the $C$ omitted by Terpander, which was separated from $D$ by the first, and from $B$ by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third, $F\ G$, the intermediate tone $E$ was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes $G$ and $D$, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive $F\sharp$ and $C\natural$. Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of $C$, and with the enharmonic the omission of $G$, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. De Mus. 11, 1134 ff), 20, 1137 ff, has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

$$c\ b\ g\ b\ d\ e$$

Semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone.

The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or variants (variants) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he abounds in With great spirit (Plut. De Mth. 11, 37). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Pindar's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for choirs-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tertrechord or the right of an octave. See Westphal Mctr. 1 p. 412 ff, Gevaert p. 269 ff, also Holshohn p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristoxenus probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. (L. 1097)

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the answer
paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, παράφωνον, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is not the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the ντάρη; compare now Th. Reinach in Bulletin de correspondance hellénique XVII. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article MUSIC in the Dict. of Antiquities (ed. 3) Mr D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, “the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended.” The hypothesis, that the μέση of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. Probl. XIX. 20 (cp. Dio Chrys. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, Lehre der Tonempfindungen p. 367 ff. (cp. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal’s assumption of ‘Modes ending on the third’ appeared in Allg. Musik. Ztg for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his Aristoxenos’ Melik und Rhythmik (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift XIII. 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

EXCURSUS V.

Suggestions on the text and interpretation of V(viii). C. 7 §§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the ethical (ἠθικά), those relating to action (πρακτικά), and the ecstatic (ἐνθουσιαστικά). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of catharsis and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρος δύναται μᾶλλον ἡ μάθησιν). But now the question there left unsettled (see n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of catharsis to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (ἀνάπαυσις) and the highest rational enjoyment (διαγωγή). According to the textus receptus both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters διαγωγή and ἀνάπαυσις have always

1 See the translation of the textus receptus p. 607.
been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment: but this they undoubtedly shackle with the other ends of "moral training" (μαθησις) and "purification" (καθάρσις); consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradiction to these other ends, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (κατά τὸ πονοῦν ὁμογενής < ἄνθρωπος ἐκκλησία τε καὶ εὐεργετική). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Lascari has seen, to exclude from purification (καθάρσις) the elements of διαγωγή and διακοσμή, and (4) grammatically the change from ἔπειτα with the two first ends to πρῶτος with this alleged third (ἔπειτα δὲ πρῶτος) throws suspicion upon ἔπειτα δὲ also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a cathartic effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions; and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, καθάρσις is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to διαγωγή, or to διακοσμή. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐπὶ διαγωγήν ὥστε πρῶτος ἔπειτα τε καὶ πρῶτος τὴν τὴς συνοπτικῆς διακοσμῆς.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Meides (again according to the textus receptus) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (πρωτεύον) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of καθάρσις (4 f.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 3 δὲ λέγωμεν εἰρήκτη) and is now added in the form of a reason (κατὰ πρῶτος εἰρήκτη εἰρήκτη 4 f.), proves by the very form in which it is cast that καθάρσις is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by "listening to the performances of others" (διακοσμή ἐπὶ τὴς καθάρσιες) merely this is meant. It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for καθάρσις, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies; the otherwise meaningless final remark ἵματε δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴν following καθάρσις should be interpreted as having been added by the scribe for the sake of completeness.
only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word πρακτικά 'melodies of action' for καθαρτικά 'melodies of purgation'. In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words ὅσαν χρησάμενα τοῖς ἔξοργανζοσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι may be a gloss upon ἐκ τῶν δὲ ἱερῶν μελῶν which precedes.

From this investigation into the nature of catharsis it is inferred that the proposition it was adduced to prove is really correct (ὅταν ταῖς μὲν τουαίτας κτλ §§ 6—8, a 16—29). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see n. 1100), in a less strict form, τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τουαίταις a 28 f., i.e. ethical modes replacing the 'most ethical,' ταῖς ἡθικώταις, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to ἀκρόασις ἑτέρων χειρουργεύντων, i.e. to catharsis, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artizans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and "chromatic" scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to ethical, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (διαγωγή). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. n. 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression.

SUSEM. (1101)

With this change the words will mean: "so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight." It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the 'ecstatic' (ἐνθυσιαστικά) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked n. (1084), with which notes (1054, 1059) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homocopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions "of action." Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

SUSEM. (1098) Cp. Rhet. ii. 5, 21, 1383 b 7, βαρβάτος γάρ ἢ ὀργή. If Heraclides is rightly reported Athen. xiv. 625 ε, δεὶ δὲ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχειν ἡθοὺς ἢ πάθους, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by πρακτικὰ μέλη insuperable. Cp. however n. (1084).


3 The proposition φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστῶν μὲν πάσιν ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπων πάσιν χρηστῶν ἀλλὰ κτλ § 3, 1342 a 1—4.
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΗ.

Introduction.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homoeopathic treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the time and usually called by them καθάρσεις; in regard to this it is sufficient to refer to the Introduction of Susemilh’s edition of the Ptolemy p. 44 f. and to the fuller investigations of Döring¹. Two points have been properly emphasized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical colouring which a number of Aristotle’s expressions bear; and secondly, that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as κομπηβασίαμων, Corybantic or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other hand the subject of treatment by the musical καθάρσεις is not compared to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is actually suffering from it. Even the term υπερκάθαρσις (§ 4. a 5), though it reminds us of ‘possession’ and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more, as Döring points out, than ‘liable to be attacked’ by a certain form of excitement. So too the phrase δ ἑαρ περὶ ἑαυτῶν συμβαίνει πάθη τῆς ζυγόν, 4 4: “the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds,” is itself ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual occurrence by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle’s chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (p. 5. 1094), and with their aesthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying


² See i. 1341 a 8 antithesis and the note on ευταπάτης, o ν χειραπτη, o τα ωφεια-

πάντων, απομειοτάτης.
dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term πάθος itself recalls τὸ πάθειν, suffering or ailment\(^1\), a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering “emotion”; see Excursus III. n. (1043), p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful “emotions,” but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all “emotions” without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable πάθη (e.g. φίλα Rhet. II. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., θάρσος, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (πάθη), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the ‘violent occurrence’ (συμβαίνεις ἴσχυρὸς) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the ‘employment’ \(^2\) of melodies by those suffering from corybantiasm (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in n. (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms καθαρσίας = recover (but see n. 1093) and ἱατρεία= regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (κοψίζως 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily ‘relief’ which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render κάθαρσις by ‘homoeopathic purgation of emotions’ (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the Poetics p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer “cleansing” to “purging.” There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle’s time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of κάθαρσις “cleansing” in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. Susem. (1093).

\(^1\) Bonitz Aris. Stud. v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term πάθος applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (πάθος = νόσημα).
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ

Καθάρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connection of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the Sophist 226 d—231 E. The Eleatic stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (καθάρσις) is the general name for any such process¹. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (a) the internal purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (b) the merely external washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver'². With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleatic is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (c) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as καθάρσις, and the elenchus as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

The liturgical or religious sense: illustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term καθάρσις was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablation and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and ναύμακχοι for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' Ion, 107 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

¹ τὰ ὡς ἡ τοιοῦτος διάκοσμος (κτ: ἐκκαθάρ- λεικαίων μεν τὸ βελτίων τὸ ἐκ χρώμα ἐκπε- διαλλαμένον λέγεται παρὰ τότε καθαρσίστι τι, Sophist 226 d. Hence the definition Ὄροι 415 B, καθαρσίς αὐθεντικὴ χρησιμ.twitter.com/ki•βελτίωνών. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between καθαρσίς and καθαρσία.

² τὰ πριν τὰ σώματα ταλλά ὀλίγη καθαρ-
The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (περφήματα) used to ‘suck up’ the pollution\(^1\), the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these καθάρματα (καθάρσια), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple\(^2\). In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, Odyss. xv. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the Aethiopis of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. I. 35.

Lustration as a cure for madness.

But with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not considerable evidence that καθάρσις, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the ‘medicine man’ is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells\(^3\). The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms καθάρσις and καθαρμός indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato’s

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1 Compare also Δίδω κώδιον οὐ τὸ ἱερεῖν ὡς τέθυται...χρώται δ’ αὐτοῦ...πρὸς τοὺς καθαρμοὺς ὑποτριβονύντες αὐτὰ τοὺς ποιητὸν ἑναγής (Suidas), ἐφ’ οὐ οἱ καθαρϊμοιν οἰστήκεσαν τὰ ἀντέφωνον (Hesychius).

2 Porphyry. De Abstinentialia II. 19: δεὶ τῶν καθαρμομένων τὸ ἄδοξον ἐλέησεν...ἐν τούτῳ ἑπιδίορον προσέγγισσα...ἀγῶν χρή νοοί τι δυσδοὺς ὑπὸ τις ἐμμένειν ἀγρείσθ χ’ ἐστί φρονοῦ διασ. The quotation from Bernays Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit p. 67 ff.

3 Θεραπεύοντες δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν (Ζάμολεις) ἀδρατοσίας τοι, Pl. Chrmn. 157 A. Not only ἐνθυσιασμοὶ but lumbago and epi-

lepsey were said to be cured by music: Theophrastus perιἘνθυσιασμοῦ, Fr. 87: ὅτι δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ ἢται μονοκή Θεόφραστος ἤσθροσεν...την ἐνθυσιασμοῦ, Ισχυρο-κι, φάσκων ἄνθρου διατελοῦν εἰ καταν-λήσου τις τοῦ τόσου τῷ φρονίστι ἀρμονίᾳ (Ath. XIV. 624 B), Fr. 88 Θ., ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθυσιασμῶν...φησι...τήν μονοκήν πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα γίγνομὲ-ν παθῶν ἅπαν κωθένες καθάπερ ναυτοθυμίας φίδεων καὶ τάς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γίγνομένας τῆς διανοίας ἐκστάσεις. ἢται γάρ, φησὶ, οἱ καταλήψεις καὶ ἡσυχία καί ἐπιλήψις (an instance is appended, Apollon. Hist. Mitrab. c. 49).
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ

Cratylus. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἁπλων, ἁπλών, says: "the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul. The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; 'the hair of the dog that bit you' is but one instance of crude homoeopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the 'illustrations and religious rites' which for his malady are alone of avail. In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ἡ δὲ φαρμακον καὶ εὐαρρηνον τοιαύτα, referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure. The case of Orestes, Paus. ii. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was 'cleansed' of matricide as well as madness. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the Βιοσφές of Aristophanes, Bedlycreon in all seriousness endeavors to cure his father's madness by initiating him in the Corybantic rites. Nor less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus.

1 πρόσων μὲν γὰρ ἡ καθαρεια καὶ οἱ καθαροί καὶ εἰσά τὴν ἱστριάν καὶ εἰσά τὴν μακραίν καὶ αἰ τοίς λαμπροῖς φιλάρκοι καὶ τοῖς μακραῖοι περισσώτεροι τε καὶ τὰ λιτά τὰ ὑπὸ τὸν τοιούτου καὶ τα περιτυχότες, πάντα ἐν τοῖς παῖσι διότι ἀν, καθάρον παρέχειν τοῖς ἄθρωποι καὶ εἰσά τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἰσά τὴν ψυχὴν, 405 b, b. The translation is Juwett's.

2 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄκουες γε καὶ πάνω τῶν μεγαλῶν, ἢ δὴ παλαῖον ἐν μεγαλωμάτων πολεύν ὑπὸ τῆς τῆς γενεσί, ἢ μακαρίζει γεγαλαμένη καὶ προφητεύοντας ὀλεὶ ἀπαλλάγει εὕφερο, καταφυγόντα πρὸς θεῶν σύχη τε καὶ λατρείας, ἀθέν δὴ καθαροῖς τε καὶ τελείων τεχνών ἔξαιρῃ ἐπειδὴ τοῖς θεατὶς ἱστορα, Phainos. 244 b, b. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems improper to endorse the objection of Keil, ζ. c. p. 104, "εἰπαρι " εἰπαρι διανυκτερίζαται ἐν ὑπὲρ ταῖς θεοῖς καὶ τοῖς θεοφιλοῖς."
The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in Aglaophamus, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, pouring down various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds: then the wild frenzied dances, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details, but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, Laws 790 c—791 b, leave little more to be said: “this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent
In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθάρισμα is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to purify [the system] but to purify away [what is noxious]; accordingly καθάρισμα denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications, e.g. 'separation' Plato Phaedo 67 c2, and moral 'purification,' which is a sense frequent in the Phaedo. In the Sophist the term is used as a purging of the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom. Other usages, e.g. λιστος τι και καθαρισμος απειρματων (Rep. 364 e, cp. Phaedo 52 b), support this meaning of riddance or removal.

From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists: in Stobaeus Ed. Phys. 1 c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus προς Φιλιτ."
NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

which fully explains in what sense κάθαρσις was a technical term. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

The usage of the medical writers: purgation, discharge.

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen κάθαρσις as a technical term denotes ‘purgation,’ i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foesius has well defined it: κάθαρσις purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura moliatur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four ‘humours,’ blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile. Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

1 Πλωτύνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγράφοντας, δόξης τε πάσης ἤπεροφίας τὴν καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων διανοήσεως ἀπόθεσιν, πληρώνας τε ἄτρος καὶ τοῦ ἄντας, ἀφομοιώντος τοῦ καταναυμένου πρὸς τὸ κατανοοῦν τὴν τελευτήν κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνοντων p. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κρίσεις, δίκη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαίοι assigns as the end of the last ἀφάρεσις τῶν ἄλλων, ἀπόθεσις τῆς οικείας ὀνίσιας, τελεύτη, ἀποτελήσις, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνοδός ἐπὶ τὴν γενεραμένην αίτιαν: whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of ἱερίς ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλαλία τῶν καταδέματων καὶ φθαρᾶς ἀκελλήρωσις καὶ γενειάς ἀφάρειας. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in Enn. 1. 2 περὶ ἄρετῶν, and decides (I. 6, 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικάι) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικαὶ ἄρεται): see Zeller Phil. d. Gr. III. ii. 661, 711, 757, 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering “purification,” so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.


3 ἦς ὑγιαινέει μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, οὐκόταν μετρών ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιός τε καὶ δύναμιν καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους, καὶ μάλιστα μεμιμένα ἢ ἄλλες δὲ, οὐκόταν τι τοιοῦτων ἡλασθον ἢ πλέον ἢ ἥξωραθη ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ἢ τῶι εἴμιπται. Plato has a similar theory in his Timeus cc. 39, 40, 82 A ff. except that he has transferred the ‘unnatural excess and defect’ and the ‘displacement’ in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humors. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (Τίμ. 85 β).
reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, to μη καθαρὸν τῶν σπαζόντων; (2) their reduction, πεπνυται, itself a species of transformation, or περιαπώσεως; (3) their expulsion, κηλήσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (πατρίτως) without however effecting a purge. The induction of excitement (ταπαρίτης) is somewhat of a parallel to homoeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated εκπροσανεργία in the Corybantic worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame. The medical process (ταμακή) goes on until the reduction (πεπνυμένος) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasises between the sense of καθαρός and of κειλεμένος in the Hippocratic corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: καθαρὸς ἐκεῖνος εἰδή λέγεται ἢ ἱπποκράτης ὅταν ἀποφέρει χορμάτων ἐκρατήσατα, κηλεμένος δὲ ὅταν μολύθην κατὰ πουστή. This distinction is rendered prominent in each phases as καθαρός χολής, κ. αἵματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague: Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocrates: but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense. Nor can it be said that the distinction enlisted by

1 ὁ γὰρ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀρχεῖ τοῖς καθαροῖς ἐξείς τοῖς παρατητοῖς τῶν γιαγείων, ἂλλ' ἐμπυρε- τόν τοῖς μεταξύ δοῦναι, παρατείνει εἰς καθαρότης. Plut. Ἰσόπ. Ἀθην. III. 7. 8. p. 638 E.

2 Comp. Plato's reflections on the Corybantic rites, Laws ii. 790 c ff. as quoted above p. 646 n. 4.


4 In Hippocr. 1. 223 παρ' ἑκατέρων κατὰ πουστή κηλεμένης

5 τό ᾿Ομήρου "καθαρός." Λάρνακι καθαρός, μην ἀλλ’ ἀρχαῖον καθαρόν εἰμί· εἰς τὸ νεκρὸν ἑκατέρου.

6 "ο ᾿Ομήρου "καθαρός." Λάρνακι καθαρός, μην ἀλλ’ ἀρχαῖον καθαρόν εἰμί· εἰς τὸ νεκρὸν ἑκατέρου.

7 Demosth. iii. 192. "καθαρός." Λάρνακι καθαρός, μην ἀλλ’ ἀρχαῖον καθαρόν εἰμί· εἰς τὸ νεκρὸν ἑκατέρου.

8 The reference included, καθαρὸς παράδειγμα, seems almost more than a homophone.
Galen between κένωσις and κάθαρσις is much observed by unprofessional writers.¹

**Κάθαρσις as an aesthetic term.**

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of κάθαρσις in reference to Music in the Politics, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the Poetics². All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation.³ Whether this aesthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated⁴; whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller’s opinion⁵ that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of Corybantian frenzy in the manner above described ⁶. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context⁷, certain points in the process of relief⁸, and the consideration urged by Bernays⁹ that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

“Are we to imagine,” it has been asked, “that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato’s ‘psychiatry’ in the Laws, but

(64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is De gen. anim. ii. 4, 11, 738 a 28 K. τών περιττωμάτων). Bernays ὁρ. c. p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν καταμηνίων, ἐκκρισις.

¹ E.g. Pl. Phaedo 69 c κάθαρσις = total removal.

² μήκες πράξεως στοιχείας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχοντας ἡδύμενον λόγῳ χωρίς ἐκά- στον τῶν εἴδουν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις ὅρων των ὑϊον καὶ ὑϊον ἀπαγγέλησις, δι’ ἐλέους καὶ φόβου περάνυσι τῆς τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσις Pl. 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

³ Pol. v(viii). 7. 3, 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the Poetics (ἐν τοίς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐρωμένης σα- φέτερον, cp. n. 1085).

⁴ Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it Jahrb. f. Phil. Cr. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Sussemlh Intr. to Poetics p. 44.

⁵ Phil. d. Griech. ii. 3, ii. 775.

⁶ P. 647. Ed. Müller Lc. p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato Laws 790 D ff., and Aristotle Pol. v(viii). is so great as to be unmistakeable (τῶν ἐκφράσεων παχείων ἱάσεως in Plato, ὀσπαρτείας τυχείν καθάρσισιν in Aristotle; ἱάσεως ὑμφρόως ἱέων in the former, καθιστάσθαι in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called κάθαρσις is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Sussemlh remarks Jahrb. f. Phil. xcv. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

⁷ See the notes ad loc. p. 610 f. ⁸ The operation of drugs is the subject of Prohl. i. 42, διὰ τὰ φάρμακα καθαί- ρει; The illustration conveyed in the words ὅν πεφθέντα δὲ ἀλλὰ κρατήσας ἐκπάτησεν φέροντα τὰ ἐμπόδια αὐτῶς καὶ καλύτερα τοῦτο κάθαρσις 804 a 32—34, is very apposite. Cp. Pl. Soph. 230 c νομίζοντες γὰρ οἱ καθαρστές αὐτῶς, ως- περ οἱ περὶ τὰ σῶματα ιατροὶ νεφομίκασα μὴ πρότερον ἀν τῆς προσφερόμενης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύσωσασα σώμα, πρὶν ἄν τὰ ἐμπό- δια τότε ἐν αὐτῷ τίς ἐκβάλλως. The relief follows upon excitement which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

⁹ Zweit Abhandlungen p. 13 (143).
of Hippocrates' emetics and purges?" The insanity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily care, the attempt to explain the 'psychiatry' on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle's original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Clytobantic frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homoeopathic nature: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the Amor. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music. Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the Poetics.

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions." If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between "the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes" and "the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies"—there can be no question that the former is an erroneous view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the Poetics we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself: about its moral or educative,

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1 Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homoeopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his Samian Presages: "(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by restoring pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to a just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physic, things of melancholy hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours.

2 pia de phōsi tēν μακαρῆν, ελέγει τῆς θυσίας ἡ εὐαίσθητη γεύση τῆς ἀργυράς ἀργυρίου τῷ ἀπόθεω κατὰ Φράγμ. 89 ed. Winckler. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (μοιρὰς μουσικῆς διὰ τῆς εὐαίσθησεως): Fr. 90.

3 In Quest. Cont. III. 8 Plutarch is discussing the effect of music: s 1406 οὐκ ἔκοψεν ἀλλὰ ἔτι ζωὴν καὶ ἀληθέντας τὴν ἀναπνοήν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τιμίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦν, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον τῆς μοιρᾶς μουσικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐναρκτόν τοῖς μεγαλοπρεποῖς τῷ θεῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλάζοντας τῆς ἀκοής τῆς θυσίας τὴν εὐαίσθησιν τῆς μουσικῆς οἰκείαν ἀλλάζων τῇ μουσικῇ τῆς ἀληθείας. With συμπαθέως, ep. Fr. 1625. 1, 1345 b 41, 6443 b 17, ἀναπνοήν. Again the assuaging effect, but not the previous excitement, is mentioned. See ep. cont. 13, 156 c 8. H. Morsey and W. Wackernagel ἀναπνοήν (ἀκοή) τοῖς μεγαλοπρεποῖς μουσικῆς ἑκάτερον καὶ πολλῷ παρακάτω, ἐκάστῳ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεποῖς μεγαλοπρεποίμασται τῇ μουσικῇ τῷ θεῷ τοῖς ἀληθείᾳ τῆς μουσικῆς. See Fr. 90 ἀναπνοήν κατὰ τὴν εὐαίσθησιν τῆς μουσικῆς. Ep. Fr. 109. 1, 1439 b 21, 6443 b 21, of the three
tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama exerts must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt is made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a ‘purging away’ i.e. expulsion, or ‘purging’ i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)\(^1\) further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the materia peccans? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as ‘secreted’ is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until sated with over indulgence they at length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the purgation of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence\(^2\) (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an impure element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate\(^3\) between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama\(^4\): (3) to


\(^{2}\) Comp. Plut. De inim. util. 10, 91 f.: τών παθῶν τούτων ποιόμενοι εἰς τοὺς ἐχθρόους ἀποκαθάρσεις “indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies.” Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητική ποίησις), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, Arist. Studien V, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the ‘painful emotion’ of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the Rhetoric (11. c. 5, c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—‘a sort of pain’ (λύπη τις), although the emotions generally are defined as οἷς έπε ταῖς λύπη καὶ ἱδρυὴ Rhet. ii. 1. 8, 1378 a 21, Nic. Eth. ii. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

\(^{3}\) The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller Gesch. der Kunstth. ii. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret τὴν τῶν τοιοτῶν παθημάτων κάθαρσιν in the definition of tragedy as the “expulsion,” i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθος = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion:—a distinction which in view of Bonitz’ careful investigation (Arist. Studien v) cannot be maintained. See n. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the purgation of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

\(^{4}\) The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that in real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: Rhet. ii. 8, 6, 1385 b 33, οὔ γὰρ
associate the cure of the o'erburdened heart with that universalizing element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealization of experience.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of *kídomoi*. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation of it in subsequent writings. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of *De Mysteriis*), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adding the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicial gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own; and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring." If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the *Republic*—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (συντελούσις πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν πάθων) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascetic with the compromise proffered by Aristotle. But while the dim outlines of the


This distinction affords the best possible explanation of τῶν τουτῶν in the definition (Reinkens, cp. p. 161); tooer would have postulated the complete identity of the two. Compare Ed. Müller Gesch. d. Kunstwisschen 11. p. 63 ff.

1 Bernays Zwei Anth. p. 73 (181) ff. with whom E. Müller, Brandis, Zeller, Susemihl, and Reinkens substantially agree. See Butcher Semiis Aristai p. 366 ff.

2 In της εκμομις και τραγωνίως αλλαγόν ταθη θεοροηται Ιησους τα αλεξια την και μεταμετρων αντραγιαμες ει αποκλω

3 του της εκμομις θεορησει τοιαυτη την αλεξια την και μεταμετρων αντραγιαμες οι αποκλω

4 Υπερβολευσα μοι αντι της τουτων εν τη ινον εστιν ερωτηματος δια της οινοποιησις της αλεξιας της

5 Ήπε αντι της τουτων εστιν δια της οινοποιησις της αλεξιας της
theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (ἀπέρασις, ἀφοσίωσις, ἐμμέτρως ἀποσιμιλάναι τὰ πάθη), the rest is so coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of κάθαρσις.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato’s own aesthetic views in his dialogues¹. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy². His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds that emotional nature which ought rather to be starved³. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: “If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another’s... Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own" Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: but granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means for their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate ‘the feeling kept under control in our own calamities’ with the pity of real life, and that which is ‘satisfied and delighted by the poets’ with the pity which (in Aristotle’s definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

² Phaedr. 268 c, ῥήσεις ποιεῖν...οἰκεῖα καὶ τοιούτων αὐτοφοβείας καὶ ἀπαίτητικάς, Rep. x. 606 λ.
³ τρέφει γάρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά τε καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἢδε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] ἀρδοῦσα, δέον αὐχεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἰμὼν καθιστῆσι δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτά, 606 D. Cr. Laws 790 E.
⁴ 606 λ, β.: εἰ ἐνθυμοῖτο, ὅτι τὸ βιά κατεχόμενον τὸ ὕπο τὰς οἰκείας ἐμφαραίς καὶ πεπωνηκός τὸν δικτύσατι τε καὶ ἀποδύσασθαι ικανός καὶ ἀποπλησθόρην, φοβεῖν ὑπὸ τούτον ὄνομα τοῦτων ἑπιτυμεῖν, τὸ ἕστη τούτῳ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλᾶμεν καὶ χαῖρον τὸ δὲ φόβει κέλιστον ἰμῶν, ὅτε οὐκ ικανός πεπαιδευμένοι λόγως οὐδὲ ἥνε, ἀνάγιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θυγηνοῦ τούτου, ἀτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν... λογίζεσθαι γὰρ, οὕτως ἄλλοις τις μένειν, ὅτι ἀπόλαυσις αὐτής ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλωτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα θρέμαστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἱσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεοῦν ὡς ὄρειον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν πάθεσι κατέχειν. The translation is Dr Jowett’s. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle Pol. v(vIII). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.
(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and
(2) to conduct to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating
by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's decided
habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the
Aristotelian katharsis is something wholly distinct from this. It might be
defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and as
transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to
sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an
indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive; it might be
urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato saw
specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and
maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle
has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the
principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato
does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the
Republic, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason
before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without
let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be
allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little
but just enough to send it to sleep.1

In an Eudemonic book of the Ethics an even more advanced position is
taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where
the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 18 χαρά καὶ ζήσεως θυέτες
artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such
'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains.2 But that Aristotle
was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shown e.g. by his
care for the education of the feelings in youth.3

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological
theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the
Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points
in the exposition. In the Philebus (47 E ff.) there is an interesting and
valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful,
which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would
seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable con-
comitants of various phases of emotion.4 We have every reason then to

1 Rep. ix. 571 E f.: το ευθυρροτεινον διʼ μητρε ενεδρ ησαι μητρε πλασματικη, δει την
κοιμηθη και ιμπαρχη λογω τη βελτιωτης χαριτος λειτουργη, αλλα ει οδος [και την Αριστοτηλικη] εμφανιση την ευθυρροτην
μητρησοντα το ιμπαρχην μητρων αληθη κατηκουσαν ειρηνους ορκους εν ευθυρροτην.

2 See N. c. viii. 14. 2, 1134 a 16: artiou

3 See Hermas at 222 f.; Rep. vii. 2: the

4 See Hermas at 222 f.; Rep. vii. 2: the

working of the rational soul. Of course
the two philosophers differ wholly as to
the application of this principle.

5 See N. c. viii. 17, 18, 1136 a 16 ff.
(esp. 1134 a 13 ff.)

conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master’s condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also Pol. v(viii). 5. 12, 1339 b 25 ff. with Phil. 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little is said beyond the remark τάς γε τραγικάς δεινόρθεσις, ὅταν ἀμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μεμνησάτη, Phil. 48 a. Cp. 50 b.
ADDENDA.
INTRODUCTION.

Page 1. Line 3. The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

P. 2. note 1. After hodierna add: and 1371 2 27 (1171 4 3). b 34] Archm. II pedia IV.

P. 7, l. 17. As Plutarch Hepi Epitomar in a fabrication of the Renaissance, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Langeani apud Sek. Gryphius), the citations from the Politicus would not in any case have carried as he has; although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even recouped the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even admitted in such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1754 J. Christopher Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorinus. In his preface to Vol. 11 of Anecdota Graeca (Hamburgh 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the Hepi Epitomar which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, "membranae illarum unius aliterque ante inventum typographia sacros, posita in loco inter eiusdem quidem, et non sine frequentibus essentibus literarum indicibus essentiae. Veteranamque scriptum hoc, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in eum peritus error, sancto visce morem supplyt." Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) contempta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ali emendat, locis exhibitis. Atque hanc ipsum... cum Graecis in hacem profero, additio si quin excepto, siue... mensuram testimonii, quae non sine cura aliqua ex monasmonc earn in litteras humanas contulisse". Compare his footnote p. 166 (it should be 165). "Aristotes libi. c. vi. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hac loco versicula literaria versus antiphrasem "I.e. Ferron " nisi in opusculo Plutarchi cum alia quasdam legiones commisit, quam quudem hosque apud Aristotelem existant. In rct. hic loco desistit."

P. 9, l. 29. Add: Gesammtle Abhandlungen i. 162 ff. (Berlin 1885).


Jowett. Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.

Gomperz. Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller; Wien, 1890.


Maehly. Article in Philologus LI. 1892. 197.


P. 14, n. 3. Add a reference to Birt Das antike Buchweisen p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δέ inserted after πεπλ by P² and P⁵ (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman op. c. II. p. xxii ff. xxvi f.

P. 15, n. 2. At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the athethesis of the last clause of B. i. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ πρῶτον...πολιτείας], II. c. 6 § 13, 1265 b 12—17 [ἀσίδων...ὑποτερον], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [ὡς...σκέψις], v (viii). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [῾τὸν...μέλεσ], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (vi). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [῾ἡ ἀληγκίας], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τριῶν...δημοτικῶν]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [ἐπεὶ...τινάς;], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...ὑποτερον], Prof. Susenmihl is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οἶκων]—the discrepancy between this passage and IV (vii). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (vii) —as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [ὅτε...πολιτείας] in spite of note (246). On most of these passages see Susenmihl Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. Pars III, p. iii. Possibly even VIII (v). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos. iv. 1891, p. 483 f.

P. 16, n. 3. Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. Γ. Β. Η. Θ. Δ. Ζ. Ε. Of these Η. Θ. (and probably Α. Γ.) were written earlier than the Constitution of Athens, the other four almost certainly later.

P. 16, n. 4. Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (z) = VIII (v) and B. 8 (6) = VII (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk.².

P. 18, n. 3. Cicero's acquaintance with the Polities has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's Die mittlere Staet (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero
INTRODUCTION.

661.


Direct acquaintance with the Politsea is thus established for Platonists whose time (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Heraclea and Apeiron of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scalz Die Studien der Polybius 1 (Stuttgart 1896) p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavors (pp. 128—129) to prove that Polybius had personally read Aristotle's Politsea. This hypothesis is combated by Susemilh Aristotelesquae, II. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 117 n. (147).

P. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The latter may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the Politsea; see now the adnotation edition, Michael Ephesius ed. Heybut 504. 8 ff., 510. 31 ff., 517. 8 ff., 610. 7 ff., 616. 61. 10 ff., 615. 20 ff., 616. 6. f., 619. 14 ff., 18 ff., 670. 10 ff., Assam. p. 105, 4. 149. 34. 58.

The latter must commence with the Eusebius Ethics and司马林 Masala, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemilh's edition (Leipzig 1875, 1876). Similarly with the Oeconomia: see again Susemilh's ed. (Berlin 1887) p. 7 = (1) for Book I and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book II of the ideas suggested, and partly worked out, in the Politsea 1. 11 III 7—13, 1359 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 17—19: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of Politsea 1. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. II. p. 3—48, a list of similar parallels from Rhetorica ad Alex. 3. 1434 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., De amicitia same 7. 271 b 24 ff., [Plato] Erestae 135 c, 138 c, Aristotelica Fr. 19, 10, Philodemus De Monoch (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3. Fr. 24. 52. 53. 54. 65. 66 noticed by Kenkel and Göppert, B. 1. Fr. 16. 17: B. 3. Fr. 45. 53! H. 4. col. 5. 33 ff.; 18. 4 b.; 16. 12 f. Plutarch Vita Crtisi c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words there 745 εραίνομεν εν διδάσκαι πολιτικήν γγώναν διάφορον, though this is probably held) by Aristotle). Metallon 9 c, 537 A, 787 c—d, 812 e, f, 812 e, 18. 821 A. — Dus Chrysostomus, 3. 1. 115, 7, 267, 14. 439, 36. 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemilh holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the Politsea. Even his direct acquaintance with the 4th Book is denied by some; e.g. v. Wilamowitz Aristoteles ad Athen (Berlin 1887) II. pp. 199—203.

P. 20, n. 1. Add references to Hips De Antipatrea citations (Kiel 1886). Dümmer Fragmente zu Platons Staat (Halle 1891), Wilamowitz op. cit. 1 p. 405 f. esp. 169—184.

P. 55, n. 3. Gilbert's hypothesis, that Euphrasius used the Poesis of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the Aristotelis Politeia, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 320 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Euphrasius (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the 4th Book under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Adelcris. See A. Bauer Perihermen zu Arist. 'Ap. Ilx. (Munich 1891) p. 123. 7. Wilamowitz is again sceptical op. cit. 1 p. 306.
P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. ii. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the 'Αριστων Πολυελ. See Diels in Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. iv. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in Des Aris. Politik u. d.'Αθ. Πολ. (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the athetesis should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἔνθως, and 1274 b 23—26 ἐγκεντο...Ἀν. Against this view see Susemihl Quaest. crit. et exeg. i. p. xvi f.

P. 66, ix. The date of the Politics has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the Constitution of Athens, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the Constitution, which can confidently be dated circa 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the Politics. Thus Mr Newman notes (in Class. Rev. v. 162) that in the first part of the Constitution of Athens "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the Politics is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer of 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41 § 2 "Pol. 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in Die Solonische Verfassung (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the Politics to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the Constitution. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to retaste the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susemihl has done Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. ii. p. x—xii, iii. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the Ethics and Politics were undoubtedly written later than the Physics, De Caelo, Meteorologica: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the Encyclopaedia with the exception of the Poetics, Rhetoric and Metaphysics. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the Ethics to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the Politics we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the Constitution of Athens, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books iv (vii), v (viii): possibly also to Books i, iii. The rest of the treatise, B. ii, no less than Books iv—vi of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the Poetics, Rhetoric, Metaphysics, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining Politie (other than that of Athens), the Νέωμα βαρβαρικά, the διδασκαλια, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on Politics. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books ΗΘ were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔΕΖ are based." i.e. he thinks that ΔΕΖ are later, or at least not earlier, than the Politics, which according to him they presume: Aristoteles u. Athen 1. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman ii. p. xxxi: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics, and
yet he framed no fresh one to take its place: it is a most important admission. Comp. also Birt sp. 1. p. 459 f. If the translation from B. 1 is an editor's addition, and B. 2 an insertion of the family III to 1560 b 37, the place of B. 1 itself becomes doubtful, as Susenmil remarks Prolegomena ii to the revised impression of the Textor, art: "nisi tamem admendantum fallor, Aristotelis flasso opus est, ut velut, perficiens, eum libros II. III. VII sic recessisset, si II. locum magis loquorum natur: III. ordinis ivw (veteris IV. incoerent."

This view is further developed in Quanto. Art. crit. et exg. III. p. iii 2 ff., as explained above.) = Willemart sp. 1. 12 6 defends the genuineness of 1181 b 14—15, restrain teretum, default as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.

P. 71, n. 4 Mr Newman examines the Vetus Latin sp. 1. II. pp. lab.—dev. With the whole of section x compare below p. 434 ff., Susenmil in Jahrb. 7. Philos. cxxxiii. 1887. 801—5, CXLVII. 1884, 817—841. Quanto. crit. et exg. I. vol., and for the other side Newman sp. 1. II. xii II. and in Class. Rev. vii. 322 ff.

P. 74, n. 4. line 5 After aecipierit insert 1287 a 39 vindicat. See Corrig. and Addenda to Critical Notes all loc.

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that vi (iv) cc i—4 are little better than a chaos." See his appendix. Vol. i. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. ii. p. 566. 567. 568. lvii.

P. 96. n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—148 had been struck out) before the appearance of Mr Newman's volumes 1. and 11.

CRITICAL NOTES.

P. 139, line 1. 1252 a 14 uéva Tyrrell (cp. Eur. Tragol. 150 ff.)

P. 140. 1252 a 23 Néson and 28 mapépérves Melych, not rightly

P. 141. line 2. 1252 a 33 [tov] and [tov] must be Connected

P. 142. Add: No str. gives the second article 1230 a 1 in ev atóv de roij ev ei pôleisant: some omit it 1261 b 15.

P. 143. line 2. 1252 b 14 ò áxpiévat] Xapéa épiov see II. Bk. Newman.

Db. line 5. Add: Shilleto followed Gipponas (p. 75 f.), who however preferred οπόδεξατον.

P. 144. line 1. See Corrigenda: xára òvérà after fiax ev Mr Susenm. 5—3

P. 146. line 3. After 38 insert: 339 a 1 B.


Db. line 6. See Corrigenda. 1253 a 4 alvi after év no added by Mr Susenm. 5—3

P. 149. line 1. After Bk. add: avoiding hiatus.

P. 153. line 2. 1253 b 15 éipérves 1234 b 29 vómen ev noted by Anon. in Eth. Nc. Æ f. 555, p. 190. 4 f. Heydla.

P. 157. line 9. After év and add: See Heydla De praeconiis in Aen. Politian etc. usw (Berlin 1892) p. 5


P. 161. line 1. After Bk. add: (see Bk. 3).

P. 163. line 1. Add: See however Addenda to p. 7 above.
ADDENDA.

P. 176, line 1. After Ar. add: (but two Oxford mss. of Aretinus have genitis: Newman ii. p. 71).

P. 180, line 7. After Susem. add: Diebitsch would omit ων altogether.

P. 183, line 1. 1257 b 12. For obse Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

P. 190, line 2. c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr Newman a later addition.

P. 194, line 3. 1259 a 31 δράμα Campbell, but see Dem. Prooen. 55, p. 1460, 26: δράμα τούτο ἐπειτείον ὁ δήμος, In Aristocr. XXIII. § 19 (δρατή), etc.

P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. See Corrigenda. After Γ Μ add: bracketed by Susem.1 2

Ib. line 3. 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin ἀρχέντων καλ, afterwards erased ||


P. 232. 1263 a 2. The change in punctuation (ἐχει πασι, τάς, see Corrigenda) is due to Mr Newman ||

P. 252. 1265 a 40 Add to line 12: δῆ for ἀν Mr H. Richards Class. Rev. vi. p. 339—


P. 269, last line. On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Phil. CXLVII. 1893, p. 192.

P. 270. 1267 b 26 εὑτελοῦσι εὑσταλῶσι O. Apelt.

P. 274. 1268 b 1 γεωργησει  γεωργ <δι oik> ἤσει Mr A. G. Peskett (1891).


P. 290, line 2. 1270 b 8 M a P³ omit ἐστίν ||

P. 294. 1271 a 7 [τό] δῶρον, or τι δῶρον C. Häberlin ||

P. 295. 1271 a 20. Comp. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔγε 1276 b 18, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαυεῖται γε 1277 a 25 (Newman).

P. 305. See Corrigenda to 1272 b 9. δῶσων Π a Susem.1 2 ||

P. 312. See Corrigenda to 1273 b 6. ἀπολαβὲν Γ Μ Bk. Susem.1 2 ||


Ib. last line. 1274 a 20. Wilamowitz defends τρότων τέλος, but hardly with success, op. c. 1. p. 69 n. 41.


P. 354. Vm is Prof. Susemihl’s notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the Politics (Susem.3 nova impressio correction 1894), so that our fr. = Vm.

P. 356. 1275 a 23 κράσεωι καὶ defended by Wilamowitz op. c. i. p. 205 n. 32.

P. 362. See Corrigenda. 1276 a 10—13 (τὸν...συμφέρον) ἐπερ the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in Jahrb. f. Philol. CXIII. 1891, p. 412 ff.).

P. 363. 1276 a 14 [καὶ] Niemeyer || τίες κατά and comma after τρότων Niemeyer ||
P. 363. 1276 a 15 ταχύτερα (before τάχι) defended by Nicenea. 
Db. 1276 a 16 ταχύτερα; (with interrogation). Nicenea, partly following: 
Korres.


P. 366. H. iii. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon, in Ezh. No. 4, p. 114, 38 f. ed. Heylb.

P. 369. 1276 b 30—40 (τάχιστοι) Widenmann.

P. 371. 1277 a 30 [sal] Spengel.

P. 372. 1277 a 32 τριάχων' II f. Hdt.


P. 379. 1278 a 34 διά της Cod. Bervi. Hamiltonianorum 41 (instead of conjecture) by Mr., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of II. Possibly seen in it, the reading is conjectural.

P. 380. 1278 b 8. See Corrigenda. wai of P. § Susen, (8) revised by Mr. 2.


P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 (δις... δις) Stöhr (hardly right).

P. 397. 1281 a 41 ἱάμ (with colon after ἱάμος) Widenmann (hardly adequate).

P. 401. last line. Add: But see Brentz Ind. Ar. 599 b 18 ff.

P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers ἄβαρος as avoiding hiatus. It is harmless in pase.

P. 411. line 1. 1283 b 15 Ἴδον] ἴδον 29.

P. 412. line 3. Dolc Plutarch.

P. 431. line 10. See Corrigenda. That 1287 a 39 τελευταίον is right (proposition) William) was seen by Schneidler and has recently been demonstrated by Engels in Comm. phil. Manuc. p. 103.

P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. (τάξις... ταξιδεύοντα) Widenmann (not rightly).

P. 442. line 5. 1288 b 13. If Heylb’s conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed: ἵνα σταματήση, διδοχήν]


P. 475. See Corrigenda. 1323 b 18 sal added by P. § Susen, 23)

P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of P. § is retained because neither the order of P. nor that of II will stand without Congreve’s emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.

P. 480. 1325 b 34 (καὶ ἐπίθεσα... ἐπίθεσα) would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aratoile.


P. 493. 1326 a 40 ἅμα... ἅμα noticed by Mich. Ephes. sec page 6. 150, 11.

P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (καὶ... ἥμαρ μαρ) is due to Mr. Wyse.


P. 503. line 5. 1338 a 16. See Corrigenda. ἐπισ... ἐπισ Ναζαχ, perhaps rightly i alive Compsus, of δε with all other authorities Le. § Susen. 24.

P. 521. 1330 b 30. See Corrigenda. at once after ἐπισ P. § Susen, 23)

P. 529. 1332 b 13. See Corrigenda. cal inserted before ἐπιστοματικο Is § Susen, 23)


**ADDENDA.**

**COMMENTARY.**

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after note (2): The identity of βασιλική with πολιτική is asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 c and *Politicus* 259 d. The question, What is the object of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politicus.* That στρατηγική is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 a as in *Euthyd.* 290 c, d (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν υφηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to take this participle against Bonitz here and c. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense: 'the method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this same sense.

Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate species separately, cp. *De part. anim.* 1. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὖσα τὸ τῷ εἰδεὶ ἄτομον, κρατίστων, εἶ τις δύνατον περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἄτομων τῷ εἰδεὶ θεωρεῖν χωρὶς, φῶσερ περὶ ἀνθρώπων, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ὁρισθος (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well have served "not only for killing the victim (σφαγίς Eur. *El.* 811) but also for slaying it and cutting it up (κοπίς ibid. 837)."


P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after note (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, defends ὁμοκάπως, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion that the term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to Solon on the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. i. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery later than Aristotle's time: see Hiller in *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. p. 527 f.

P. 144. 1252 b 16. See again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 332. As in b 10, so here πρῶτη must be predicative, =as the first, primarily: συνεστηκία being understood from b 13. "From these two relationships the family is first formed.... From a number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the needs of every day is the village." Both passages should be omitted from the examples given by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 652 b 53 ff.


Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that ὀμογάλακτες = those whom it was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked "What of the present tense (οῖς καλοῦσιν τινες ὀμογάλακτας)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὀργεῖσις)....τούς ὄμ. οῖς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it current in Aristotle's time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the passage cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ 'Ἀρχιον ἄρχοντος 346/5 B.C.,
Philochnis cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which we know from Lydias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Alcibiades refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to laws given by the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks that the Aristocles...). As to the remark," p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, "that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the γέρος presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The γέρος implied ἐκατον εἰρήν." P. 145, right col. To the note on διό add : Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the prince's family, supposed independent anterior in the rise of any government, is associated to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are addressed as evidence of this early state of society (σωματεία) without any king, patriarchal or other; and of course is to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times, but without to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (ἐκατον εἰρήν). P. 146. 1252 b 28. The place of τέραος illustrates Dr. Jackson's remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton). P. 148. 1253 a 7. Add to note (25) : Hoc de Fosse quod Juse de dinam... p. 372 ff. P. 150. 1253 a 32. Add to note (28) a reference to the note on p. 315, and to Quas. crit. coll. pp. 334—336, 449 l. Ib. 1253 a 26. Add to note on χαιρετεία : Possibly Aristotle has in mind Soph. Phil. 1018 ἄδελφον ἔρημον ἄπολον ἐν ἱεροῖς σκέπη (Newman). P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in Quas. crit. coll. p. 336 l. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, φιλοεραγι καὶ διάτης. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susenbild's conjecture), prudence and skill (see Fussenthal)1. Against those who, with Jowett, by φιλοεραγι understand διάτης (N. E. 1144 a 23 ff.) and by διάτης φιλοεραγι διάτης or διάτης (N. E. 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged b. l. that (1) such a use of διάτης is unexampled and (2) that the natural term of address is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals; N. E. 1144 b 8, ἤκρυς, 32 l. 33 Ε. 448 b 12 ff., VIII. 1, IX. 1. Spengel, who understands by διάτης intellectual virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase φιλοεραγι καὶ διάτης, but also by the fact that φιλοεραγι is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with success. There is also the improbability that the term διάτης would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

1 Quamvis recte momentum Philosophus, si Aristoteles prudentiam huminum et virtutem tamquam arma data esse dicere volueret, scrabendo ei potius falsa φιλοεραγι καὶ διάτης, quod impedit, ut prudentia et id quid sub corruptovocabulo διάτης habeat non ipsa arma sed nec, quidem arma ablatina, arma utique prae- scia quibus genus estiam aliquat...
Aristotle himself says *Rhet.* 1. 1. 13, 1355 b 4: τοῦτο γε (i.e. abuse) κοινὸς ἐστὶ κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγάθων πληρῶν ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again *Zwei Abh.* s. d. *aristotel. Theorie* (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino’s explanation (arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quotes Seneca *De ira* 1. 17: Aristoteles ait adjudex quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent induetis arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: and surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the words, they are ‘arms for insight and virtue.’ Not to mention the objection, stated on p. 151, that ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα shows the arms must be used by φρονίσης and ἀρετῆς, not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests ‘language’ as one of these weapons, and admits that if ‘certain emotions, anger especially’ are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]


P. 152. 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἐστι but of οἷνων the antecedent to ὅσα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence ‘The parts of Economic are of the constituents of the Household’ the meaning of the words supplied are of is ‘correspond to,’ or ‘relate to,’ and not ‘treat of.’ Mr Newman compares 1258 b 27 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz *Index Ar.* 533 b 6—13, with Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* 1. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

ib. 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμικὸς is ‘nuptial’ and not ‘conjugal’: cp. *n.* on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 153. 1253 b 20. Lest the expression ‘speech delivered’ in note (31) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσοσυγιακὸς was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the ‘Archidamus’ of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 1 11 fl.): cp. Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* 11. *pp.* 350, 289.

ib. 1253 b 21. Zeller *Pre-Socrates* Eng. tr. II. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμο γάρ δὲ μὲν δοῦλος δὲ δ’ ἐλευθερος forms a trimeter, so that under τοῦς δὲ, b 20, a poet may be included.

P. 153 f. 1253 b 23 ἐπει ὡν...33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπει. As οὖν introduces the apodosis to ἐπει in 1. 10, 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* 1. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὖν καὶ τὸ κτήμα. Spengel *Ar. Stud.* III. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot *Études* p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 32 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὀργάνων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἐστι). Eucken’s punctuation is as follows: ἐπει οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητική μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀκεφ. γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδικωμάτων καὶ ξυν καὶ εὐ ξυν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ψωφισμάσιν τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἄν εὐ υπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργάνα, εἰ μελετῇ ἀποτελεθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὖν καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ, τῶν δ’ ὀργάνων τὰ

1 sc. ἀναγκαίων υπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργάνα presumably.
The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted by the sect.

P. 155. 1353 b 35. "...the Homeric Hebraisms (Balyer). "Aristotle's rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue." Cp. note on 1361 a 6.

P. 156. 1354 a 11. To the ref. from Eth. End, add: Meigen Merck in a. 364. 1134 b 18 του γαρ διατάγη τι ετων ο αληθινος. P. 159 f. 1354 b 8. Add to note (40). What is called ἄριστος in 1354 b 3, and το θεοτόκον De Anima III. 7. 4. 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τι πάροικον μούρον: comp. III. 15. 5. 1360 a 18. Here as in IV(VII). 14. 9. 1354 b 18, σου and το μύρον το λέγω εώς are opposed to σου and the material gen (the De- γαρ 1334 b 18 and 1350 a 7; here το πάροικον μούρον). But in St. 5. 1. 13. 14. 1343 b 13 f., the latter is called φως ἄριστος μετάξων τις λέγω.

P. 161. 1354 b 23. Cp. again Quast. crit. coll. p. 344, where it is suggested that if λέγω be kept, the genitive λέγω may be understood from τι τον κατά τον ναζανικόν, while both latives are governed by ἄριστος. Comp. however, for the ellipsis of the copula IV(VII). 14. 9. 1353 b 17 f. το βίο το το εν εν αυτοῖς καὶ αὐτῷ, λόγος καὶ ὑπακούουν διάμερον.

P. 162. 1354 b 32. κατάλαβεν δὲ παλαιόν κτλ. "But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men" [and hereby the former are after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Scearlett's second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated the position, which is that only πολίτες — actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοις δὲ — actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but only the name of freemen.


Id. 1355 a 8. With τοῖς εἰς τοῦ ημῶν αισθανόμενας Δαυδένομεν οποιονος δι νυμόν λέγων — dialecticians Mota. IX. 8. 20. 1050 b 35, καὶ προ φιλοσοφον — physical philosophers 1050 a 2, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14. 1052 b 26. Nor does καί before a το is enough to make any real difficulty in taking τοις εἰς τοῦ ημῶν — de legibus philosophers for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From Quast. crit. coll. p. 344.)

P. 165. 1355 a 15. With κατὰ παράγαντα ἐπιροχὴν ἱψότητα comp. 110. 23. 1. 1354 b 16 κατά παράγαντα ἐπιροχὴν ἱψότητα explained by κατὰ γεύμαν, κατὰ τιμήν.


1 οἰκονομος ἱππότητα is the apoidea of μέδικας ἱπποδομος, and δι βατίνας ἱππό-

2 μέδικα καὶ δι βατίνας ἱππότητα in the.
ADDENDA.

P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Etruscan piracy (Bywater). See Journal of Philol. ii. p. 60 ff., Frag. 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato Menex. 237 e, πάν γάρ τό τεκνό τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδεῖαν ἣ δὲ τέκνη παί καὶ γινόντας τεκούσα τε ἐληθώς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἐποβαλλομένη, εἰς, μὴ ἐχ' πηγάς τροφήν τῷ γενναμένῳ.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyry De Abstinentia ii. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.


P. 179. 1257 a 3 ἐκείνης “This last,” comp. viii(v). 6. 10, 1306 a 10: σημείων δ' ἐν Φαρσάλω πολιτείᾳ: ἐκεῖναι γὰρ ὄλγοι δυνεῖ πολλὰν κύριοι εἶναι (Busse).

P. 180. 1257 a 18 δοσιν γὰρ ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀλλαγάς. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον ἔν, “For otherwise exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the exchangers’ own wants”: and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 353 f. As it stands, 1257 b 5 διϊσς = δία το κατηχικῶν γενέσθαι: “owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chrematistics is (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money because Chrematistics and Retail Trade are concerned therewith.” At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in δι.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. iv(vii). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch De cupid. divit. 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch Vita Polipid. 3, 279 b: τῶν γάρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οἵ χρώντως τῷ πολιτῷ διὰ μικρολογίαν, οἱ δὲ παραχρώμε(nt) ὃι ἀσωτίαν κτλ. See Frag. 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 186. 1258 a 10. Comp. Magna Moralia 1. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 2 ed. Susem.).

Ib. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their ‘art’ a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of Oeconomica B. ii. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timotheus, Chabrías, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud Athen. 532 b, F. H. G. i. 297.

P. 187. 1258 a 21 f. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., ii. 8 § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καὶ...οὕτω καὶ viii(v). 9 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ ποιῆσιν = starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. ii. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

Ib. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowet and Newman, take the
meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occasions, but to ask who
upon them is servile. In any case compare v(viii). 2. 6. 1857 b 35—37.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case whose judges in of
two terminations, the adjective is liberalis.

Ib. 1258 b 12. In the island of Carpathian metals are called irkaeana (punned by

Ib. 1258 b 17—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato Laws 843 c, d may have
suggested this passage.

P. 191. 1258 b 21. On the subdivision of artagmata see Hildersheimer Stude
s. Eternob p. 455 ff., who supports Cope's view respecting artagmata. Prof. Susemilch is
not convinced.

Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same
eclipse as in 1253 b 3: τρατον old δέομα (si) -ομα -ομελεία. 

P. 193. 1259 a 5, 6. vel solliiue. This has been done by the author of the com-
ments. B. 11: see Susemilch's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. 13. 6, p. (25), and for the age of the
writer (circ. 160—200 b.c.) p. xii.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction ταμίας δρι is found 213 a 25. 35. 36. 43. 46. 49. 50.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemilch, defending the reading δεκαῖ oe πρὸς
άρχοντας καὶ ἀρχόμενοι which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural
emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet.
Transl. has quendamiam et natura principatis et subscriptae, and we re. id,
this is what William of Moerbecke must have written. Whether he took the reading
άρχοντας καὶ from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know
for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latest age
older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like
Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere
conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the
Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two
correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventh
odd right readings of K* in the Novumæhæus Ethicæ might with just as good reason be
entitled ' conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus improved how are we to
come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscripts ? And do the good
readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or
twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammaticæ in three
times we should have found more of their interpolations (apart from emendations) in
the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best
suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, at what exact time have these
latter ? If we do translate δεκαῖ by ' corresponding,' we obtain no real correspondences: for
the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the
differences between the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the ruled: it is as the
most the differences between the virtutes of the different persons ruled that correspond;
in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and
the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conclusion καὶ ὑποτάσ-
σι. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of this Vet. Transl.? Had
he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written, παῖς καὶ τρατον 
εῖς καὶ καλά τιτ τῆς ἀρχόμενοι.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With ἀρχόμενα leading, chief, qui præcipuus, house, obvious,
comp. Dem. c. Arist. xxiii. 113 ἀρχόμενοι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι;
Plato Laws IX. 875 e, το μὲν ἀρχόμενον ἦν καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸ δὲ 

ADDENa.

672

ẽπῆμενον τῷ κοινῷ, Xen. Cyrl. iv. i. 8 ὁ ἡγομένου τῆς στρατιᾶς φύλων =the leading corps of the whole army.

P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τῶν: the concluding part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently run τελεῖαν ἔχοντα τὴν ἴθικὴν ἀρετήν, ἄλλος ὁ τῆν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικήν, "it is from the master qua master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess." But (1) if so, ἄλλος ὁ τῆν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικήν would be required. (2) It should be remembered that s.c. does not propose to withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper antithesis to ἐπιστήμη 'rational conversation' does.

P. 205. To Excursus 1 on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no longer be accepted. Compare now Χοῦν πόλει. c. i s. l. Ἐπιμενίδης δέ ὁ Κρῆς ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἡμᾶς τῷ πόλμ, which is also decisive evidence for the earlier of the two dates assigned to him (circa 600 B.C., not circa 500 B.C.). See H. Diels Sitzungsherr. derBerl. Akademie 1891 p. 387, Busolt Gr. Alt. 2 p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. 11. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p. 150 f. (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be conventional and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute to the validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives of war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) explains ἀτεροὶ λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (B) must then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the principle that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman takes διὸ with δικαιο. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes out as follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master the right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is ipso facto just." Prof. R. Y. Tyrrell has published remarks of his own and of the late Dr Maguire on the Slavery passage in a review of Mr Newman's edition published in Hermathena Vol. vi., No. 14 pp. 342—345.

P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff., made
P. 237. 1562 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one of the note on λόγος should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1562 b 23. The connection between the two meanings of ἀφροτήτος is given by Plato Ἑρμην. 504 Β ὅπως εἶπον, Ὀ Εὐθύθειος, οἴκων.

P. 239. 1563 a 1. For the clause τὰ παρὰ τῷ εἰσοφεκτήριον see Quaest. crit. coll. p. 363 f. Mr Newman is quite right in taking τὰς with ὅσα in the next line.

P. 235. 1563 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἐπιθέσεως is not, as Bonitz and Mr Newman think, αἱ ἐπιθέσεις, but as all other commentators and translators have seen αἱ ἐπιθέσεις, αἱ ἐπιθέσεις: for the increased trouble and attention which private ownership brings with it (1561 b 33 ff.) this has compensating advantage that they are merely means to the owner's increased advantage. The reading ἐκάθεν προσεδρομεῖν suits this construction alone, the other reading οὐκ ἐπιθέσεως (adopted in the reprint of Susen. 1894, see Corrigenus) would agree with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ ἐπιθέσεις as the subject to ἐπιθέσεως.

D. 1563 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the Index, 138 a 1, 431 a 10.

D. 1563 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which appears to have escaped some critics, is that οἷος δεσπότων ἐφοδιάσατο τοῖς δικαίοις τοῖς δικαίοις, sc. χρώματα κοινά. 'In case they need provisions on a journey' implying that they have none of their own 'they share them in common.' Whose? we may ask with Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1564 a 1. Comp. Dem. 56 § 64. p. 960, 94. ἐτερ καὶ χρώματα διπτέρωρ. For Bernays' ingenious correction δίτερα, which has Mr Bywater's approval, see now Ges. Abhandlungen i. p. 177.

P. 240. 1564 a 10. καὶ νῦν. "In his verbis νῦν male de tempore intelligunt, quo factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotei id fecerint, Victorius novum non vetus institutum civitatis Lacoicae hoc ὡς γεγορηθέν τοῦ περίπου fuisse Aristoteles affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphanium secutus diceret a philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemonis retinendi illius instituti studium tribui, sed studium tantum (ἐπίχειρους), iam enim eos coepisse a veteri more desescere, sed si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν verum ἐτερ καὶ νῦν. Quae cum ita sint, ali explica additio probanda neque nimis longa est quae sensoria est. Νῦν enim saepissime id significat quod revert extant; even as it is, even as things are, actually. 'Fictae igiur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid si et illud ποιεῖν ἐπίχειρους, pro quo exspectant ποιεῖν? Nam fallor, ποιεῖν ἐπίχειρους non de eis duntaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, qui resped aliud faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubia rei experimentum instituant et quam bene ipsis haec res procedat et sibi et vel molentes simul aliorum in usum experimentum' 'make the experiment.' "Quae loquenti ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis Aristoteles rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, quals apud Lacedaemonios inveniatur, minime optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1566 a 34—b 10. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaevs VIII. § 1: ἐπερ καὶ νῦν οὖσα ποιεῖν ἐπίχειρεν 'which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.'


P. 242. 1564 a 27. After πολίτας is predicate add: as δρόμοις in § 25, 1564 b 7, ἀν γὰρ ποτὲ τοῖς αὐτῶς δρόμοις.


P. 249. 1265 a 15. ἀναφέρει Μ. Ν. Mr Newman has here an admirable observation.

"In the criticism on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle immediately notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangement with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ἑξάρημα of the State, the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1319 b 76." On the relation between criticism in H. ii. and construction in H. 17(60), see com. p. 71 n. 5 (a), p. 92 n. 19.

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To w. (203) add the reference: Lato fria c (Newman).


P. 252. 1265 a 40. On ἰδίως see Goodwin Mind and Freedom II. 197. 208. 216. He concludes: "The possibility of such a constitution is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in Chois. Rev. 49. p. 239.

P. 253. 1266 b 7. Add to note [209]: Aristotle's suggestion in b 7-—c 9, much resembles that of Plato Rep. 416 a 7 b ἑπὶ τῶν τρεῖς τῶν ἰδίως ἀφετωμένων, b ἐν ὑποκειμένων τῷ σχῆμα σύνθες τῷ συνόπτῳ, ὑπὲρ ὑποκειμένων τῷ καθεστῶτα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ πολιτείᾳ ἀνθρώπῳ (Newman).

P. 255. 1266 b 20. After "advised" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of ἀναφέρει to most united to, within the reach of, cp. 1165 a 3.

P. 256. 1266 a 5. Add ἀναφέρει apparently presents an unsatisfactory element either. Cp. Addenda to 1261 a 12.

P. 257. 1266 b 7. After viii(9) 7. 7 add: 1307 a 1-2 (cp. ll. 11-12, 1973 a 3-12, skadres). In Ἀθ. ταξ. c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound παρακατασκοπέων.

P. 258. 1266 a 8. To the references at θέλει της των w. (223) add: Laverne II. As is now clear from the Constitution of Athens. c. 8 § 1. Plato in the same is merely revising an old feature of Solon's constitution. Dr Stanley ap 10. has collected confirmatory evidence from Isocr. Anemp. 13, Pausan. 43. [Dem.] 1: Nearchus EIX. 175.

P. 259. 1266 a 11. After 2 § 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1349 a 9-14).


P. 261. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to Reclus, Gr. Atheniensium p. 147 n. 3.

P. 262. 1267 a 3 ff. "An opponent had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch De rapid. scrib. p. 314 a (Newman).

P. 263. 1267 b 2. Add as w. (243). As to the form, although ἀναφέρει occurs in the papyri of Ἀθ. ταξ. c. 25, yet Maitland's p. 18 shows that the proper form is ἀναφερεῖ. On Attic inscriptionsἀφωγή itself occurs only once with ἐκ (as inscription of date before 444 B.C.): but the derived forms preserve the older ἐκ, unless the writing (as-ἀφωγή) includes an a. Hence ἀφωγεῖν, ἀφωγέω, ἀφείλεια: on the other hand ἀπαγλεῖ, ἀπαγλεῖα, ἀπαγλεῖα: on the other hand ἀπαγλεῖα, ἀπαγλεῖα, ἀπαγλεῖα.

As to the introduction of the ἀπαγλεῖα, cp. now the passage referred to above: Ἀθ. ταξ. c. 25 § 3, where it is ascribed to Ctesias (Δαυσιματος ἀπαγλεῖα ἔχειρας προσωπος), not (as Plut. E. Noric 9, might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The increased number of those, be Dem. De Corone 21 b 5 to ἀπαγλεῖα ἀπαγλεῖα, shows the price to have been only two shillings 2½d. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. 2 X. 1) are when the Treasurer of Athens pays ἀπαγλεῖα from the funds in hand, ratione, but where
the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 10 of
Archedemos, 406 B.C., ὁ τοῦ ἰδίου τότε προετικὸς καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελούμενος.

P. 270. 1267 b 28. λόγιος=πολυστορ] ὃς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ λέγειν καὶ
ὑψλοῦν οὐ παθέαν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ τά ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεναι ἐπιχώρια ἐξηγομένουν

P. 272. 1268 a 9. Add to the note on οὖπω: Comp. Pl. *Symp.* 222 c, ὃς οἱ πάντα
τοῦτον ἐνεκα εἰρηκῶς.

Ib. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (259): The regulation in force at Athens, which
Diog. Laer. i. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens*
c. 24 § 3 καὶ ἄφανολ...ἀπασὶ γὰρ τοῦτοι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις ἤν. Mr Wyse
refers to C. I. A. i. 1, C. I. A. iv. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Ib. 1268 a 12. "δήμου δὲ ἐποίει τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is added because the
word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

P. 274. 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλώς ought to have been rendered "couched in
absolute terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλῶς δικαίως = "duly framed in an
unqualified form."

P. 275. 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos
had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one.
The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's
plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to
render an absolute answer."

P. 276. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in Lysias xii. 68, 70.

P. 277. 1268 b 41. Add to note (271) the reference: Plato *Laws* 841 D (New-
man).

P. 278. 1269 a 2. παρασκέψις is technical of witnesses: see Antiphon 5 §§ 20,
22, 24, 28, 30.

P. 279. 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Laws* 798 Λ, β οἷς γὰρ ἄν ἐντραφῶν νόμοις
σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πάσα ἡ ψυχή τὸ τι κινεῖ τῶν τότε καθεστῶν. Prof. Sidgwick
has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's
political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the
place which the Laws (νόμος, νόμοι) hold for him.

P. 282. 1269 b 20. This use of κατὰ is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. xxiv. § 109
κατὰ πάντ' ἀδίκει.

Ib. 1269 b 21. With τοιοῦτος comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, δῆς δὲ γίνονται
tαιοῦτοι.

P. 284. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In
fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καλ> ἐν ἑτέραις.
See 1094 b 13, 14 οἷς ἰδίως...ὡσπερ οὖδ' But Mr Newman's reference to b 34
πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not
πρὸς τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμου. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of
service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained
in iii. 74, where he says of the Corecyreans: τολμηρῶς ξυνεπεδόβαντο...παρὰ φύσιν
ὑπομένουσαι τῶν θηρίων.

P. 285. 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9
s.f. οὐ γὰρ δικαίων ἐκ τῶν νῦν γνωσμένων ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀλήθες πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνων
βούλησθαι.

P. 287. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus*
l. p. 86.

P. 291. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great
COMMENTARY

plausibility, that the events of 335 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a union in Greece against Macedonia. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single bireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army in his aid. The news of this, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the ephors now Agis on this errand, Aristocles may well have thought that they came near to realizing their design. See A. Schäfer Demosthenes 3. 1. 163 who refers to Arrian 2. 12. 4 in Corr. 4 v. 25.

If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added as if we written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr. Newman points out) but also that its date is rather than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the "Battle of mouse" in Arcadia.

P. 294. 1171 a 8. With ad τέρσεος const. 1. 357 3 14 vel clitus μιαματος τιθαμανημεν.


P. 298. 1171 b 8. Add to note 346] a reference to Add. 1. 6. 24 135; 10 θεος της παραδειγματος παιπεμεν (μεν διαφωνει ειναι) to ἐν τερσεοσ τερσεοις των διαφωνει ειναι.


P. 301. 1171 b 35—39. This is Ephorians again (P. 61) as opened in the geographical poem of Seymour Chius, F. H. G. 1. 249: ἔοιρος της Κρήτης φαίται της Ἑλληνικής ἀλογον | ἄρας παλάττη, ἄτι τε περιγράφων | τελευκαν κατοξύνω, ἀτι τε κεν ανωθεν | αὐτόν ἠφανα στρεφειν, εἰςαυτόν φαντάζον την τέκνη της Κρήτης τανν, τε της γενετερον βασιλείας απεκλεισθείσαν | παντου ουκ ομολογεῖν ὑμῖν της διατηρησαν. Mr. Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds: "The statements of Diodorus 4. 37. 2—4 note to be based on the same passage of Ephorons."


Tb. 1172 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this note by a reference to Plato Lat. 677 k, where Epameinides' device (σύντροποι) apparently means, i.e. pamphlet—is mentioned (see Stallbaum ad loc.); and to F. H. G. v. 20, 30, 35 (Newman). To the next note (357) add a reference to Plato's strong version Lat. 835 b—841.

P. 307. 1172 b 30. Mr. Newman keeps έπιστήμην της τῆς and for the allude appeals to 1. 266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intolerable hardships.

P. 308. 1173 b 37. The meaning of ἀναφερόμενον here is clear from the antithesis of ἐκ τῶν τερσεοις: 'to this office they elect for next.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that ἀναφερόμενον signified settlements from purchased families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and
ADDENDA.

678

‘merit’ or ‘capacity,’ as shown by such passages as Isocr. Arcof. § 37 οἱ καλῶς γεγονότες καὶ πάλιν ἄρετην ἐν τῷ βλε ἐνδεδειγμένῳ, Philochorus F. H. G. 1. 394 πρωτεύοντες ἐν τε γένει καὶ πλούσιον καὶ βιω χρηστῷ (where πρωτεύοντες echoes ἄρετιν-δήν) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, κατὰ ἀνδραγαθίᾳ αἱρέτων.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τοῦτων καὶ ὁ δήμος where all the authorities give καὶ τοῦτων ὁ δή, and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrrell in Hermathena Vol. vi., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cf. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seemed imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τοῦτων in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τοῦτων: “over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion” (between Shofetes and Senate), “as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity.” But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative assumption that ωμογνωμονοῦς=are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.


1273 b 13. κοινότερον τις κτλ] Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render “for it is not only faires to all, as we said” sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: the Constitution of Athens cc. 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon’s and Dr Sandys’ editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the Politics may be specially mentioned Mr Newman’s review in Class. Rev. v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan’s in Journal of Hellenic Studies xii. 17—40, P. Meyer Des Aristoteles Politik u. die ‘ΑΘ. πολ. (Bonn 1891), B. Keil Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles (Berlin 1892), U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf Aristoteles u. Athen (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the Griechische Alterthümer of Busolt and Gilbert, the Gr. Gesch. of Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann Lehrbuch d. griesch. Alterthümer Bd. 1. Theil 11. Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. ii. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention of Aristeides p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Db. 1273 b 36. ἐνοῖ καὶ ὅσονται... b 41 ἐοικε δὲ... 1274 a 3 διὸ καὶ μεριμνοῦντο τῶν... a 11 φαίνεται δὲ...] In general structure this whole account may instructively be compared with two criticisms in 'ΑΘ. πολ. (i) c. 9 § 2, ὅσονται καὶ τῶν τῶν...οὐ μὴν εἰκός (cp. ἐοικα above)...οὐ γάρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ὡς τῶν πειρών τῶν διαβάλλειν...οὐ μὴν ἂλλα πιθανότερον τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγῳ... οὐ γάρ εἰκός...ταῦτα μὲν οὐν χρὴ νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν αὐτὰν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the ἐνοῖ of 1273 b 36 with οἱ δημοτικοί of 'ΑΘ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in Hermes xxvii. p. 267 ff. would refer μεριμνοῦντα τῶν to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add to the summary of Solon’s constitution in 'ΑΘ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ’ ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. 'ΑΘ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) sc. μεταβολή, ἡ ἐπὶ Σόλλωνος, ἀφ’ ἡ ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης sc. Solon.

Db. 1273 b 37. λαῶν ἀκρατον κτλ] Compare 'ΑΘ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: ἡ γὰρ [τότε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ὀλίγαρχικὴ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδοῦλων οἱ πέντες τοῖς πλουσίοις...ἡ δὲ πάσα γὰρ δὲ ὀλίγων ἡν κτλ: c. 4 s.f.,
COMMENTARY.

C. 5 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν δοκιμασθέντων ταῦτα δήμων, c. 6 § 1 τοις ἄνθρωποις, and ἄδικα were undoubtedly the writer's authorities for his brief! Solon's veryemploi in c. 12 § 4.

Db. 1273 b 38. δημοκράτων τὰ τῆς πόλεως] Comp. the note in Ἄθ. ταξ. c. 11 § 3 of αἱ πάντες ὅσα ἵνα Κλαστόριτη δήμων with the comment subjunctive ὅποι διέρρηκται Δήλλα παραδείγματα εἰς τῷ Κλεανθίδειον πολιτείαν τῆς Σιθυρίτῃς; ὁδ. c. 34 § 2 ὑπὸ τῆς πάντως πολιτείας (hā). Unquestionably πάντως had become at the end of the 5th century a synonym for Solonian.

Db. 1273 b 41. διακρίτησεν] Fully explained by Ἄθ. ταξ. c. 8 § 8, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: ἧς εἰς τῷ Σιθυρίτῃς πολιτείας πᾶνοικὶ γίνεται ὁ δημοκράτης ταῦτα πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μεγίστω τῷ ἄλλῳ δημοκράτης καὶ τὰ τέμενα, διότι τό νόμον τοῦ βουλευτήριον [τιμωρεῖ] ὑπὲρ τῶν δίκαιων τιμῶν, τρίτων δα. ὡς ἔκ. - ὡς ἔκ. οὕτως κεῖτο δημοκράτης τῷ πλῆθος, ἢ ἐν τῷ δικαστήριον ἐφικείτο γίνεσθαι τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

Db. έξεκ] This, like εἶδος Ἀθ. ταξ. c. 6, c. 7 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the Constitution and not unknown in the Ἀθήναι. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin in a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in J. H. S. XII. p. 271, who calls attention to the "signals of this method" in style.

Db. 1274 a 1. τῆς ἱστομείας] That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the Constitutions of Athens. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἱστομεία τῶν ἱστομέτων c. 3 § 5: ὡς ἐν τῶν Ἀθηναίοις ἰστασός ταῦτα μὲν τότε ἐνεργεῖ τοῖς δικτάσῃσι ταῦτα ἕνα μὲν πλῆθος καὶ τὰ κακά τῶν τοῦ ἱστομείου, καὶ καλά τὰ καὶ γονάτα τῶν τοῦ ἰστομείου ἐσειρομένα. It was then filled up from ex-Archemon (ib.). Under Draco's constitution it was made global τῶν ἱστομέτων and received complaints of their violation ἐπιχειρημάτων. c. 14 § 1. Solon: Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 3. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the same ἐπιχειρημάτων. c. 9 § 4. Solon.

Db. 1274 a 2. τῆς τῶν ἱστομέτων] According to Ἀθ. ταξ. c. 8 § 3 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with survival. τοὺς ἰστομέτων ἐπιλογὴν ἐπιλεγοντες τοις πολεμιστικοῖς, a statement which errs in a proper light the inadmissibly (but hitherto neglected) conception of the Solonian practice found in Isocrates. Ἀριστ. §§ 22, 23, Παλιάθ. § 145, and [Dem.] Νίκολος 1. 11. § 12. Since the lex was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristides can perfectly well speak of the people, here and elsewhere 5 § 3, as his oi·a.

Thus Aristides' own qualifications of the democratic pseudepigraph was upon Solon's constitution amount to this: "Solon did not found the Amagiai Congress, though he confirmed it in its censorship pseudepigraph, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates." The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reforms comes from Ἀθ. ταξ. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armor) used to elect the nine archons: ἱστομέτων (not ἱστασόντων ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι) προοιμίαν ἤδη ἰσταμενατεῖς απὸ παραγόμενον ἰσταμενὸν τοῖς μὲν ἐκείνοις ἱσταμενοῖς. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 3 it is said vaguely that in earlier times the Amagiai
used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἄρχον ἂν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή ἀνακαλεσμένη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήδειον ἐφ' ἐκάστη τῶν ἄρχων ἐπ' ἑναυτὸν διατάξασα ἀπ' ἑστελλεν.

The importance of the appeal to the law court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized. 'Ἄθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγραφαίνει τοὺς νόμους ἄπλος μηδὲ σαφός...ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίγνεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἱδια τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch V. Sot. 18 (τὸ συνεκκλησίων καὶ δικάσεων) κατ' ἄρχας μὲν οὖν ὦτερον δὲ παμφέροισι ἐφάνην τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τούς δικαστάς (namely through appeals from the sentences of the magistrates).

Comp. Busolt Gr. Alt. 2 p. 150 n. (5).

P. 316. 1274 a 3. μέμφοντα τυνεῖ] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in 'Ἄθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 1, 2 (πειρῶντα τυνεῖ διαβάλλειν αὐτὸν...οἱ βουλημένοι βιασθημένοι). Aristotle's acquittance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz op. c. I. p. 74, p. 165 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 8. Ἐφαίλητος ἐκδόθησε καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novelty contained in 'Ἅθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The part ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens circa 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia circa 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in Class. Rev. vi. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the Politics we have to decide whether one or two attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys Constitution p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion ('Ἅθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγίτων ἐναι παρελκετο) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of Politics and Constitution would be reconciled. Prof. Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the Politics Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: Quaest Ar. crit. et excog. iii. p. iv. He goes on to infer (1) that it is more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. ii. of Politics later than the Constitution of Athens (comp. above Addenda to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. ii. as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. ii. only professes to deal with ἐνδοκυμονία πολιτείαι, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the Constitution of Athens, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

Ib. 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch V. Cim. 10, V. Pericl. 9), Busolt Gr. Alt. 2 p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from 'Ἀθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th meta-βολαί): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (1274 a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ) agrees with the defence of Solon in 'Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 §§ 2 s. f.

P. 317. 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare 'Ἄθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνεβαίνειν ἀνέσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθέμοις δημαγωγοῦντας. The
mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly important, for in 'Aφ. τον. c. 18 § 2 he finds a place on the list of ἀρχιτέκτων and διδάκτων: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles. (8) Cleon, (9) Chares (p. 27). As a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to τον. c. 18 § 2 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cleon.

Frag. 369 mentioned in this note is of course Ptolemy's careless prose of the eulogy of Thamarae in 'Aφ. τον. c. 14 § 5.

Db. 1274 a 15. To note (411) add: This is supported by 'Aφ. τον. c. 1 § 2, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐκείνου καὶ ἀποκρίσεως προτείνεται. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all; 'Aφ. τον. c. 1 § 1; 2 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in τον. 14 § 11 is nearer the truth; neither is exactly right.

Db. 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of evidence in 'Aφ. τον. No it avoids using crucial technical terms which occur in Solon's fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the Homeric lines Δήμαρχος γὰρ ὀμόσα κτλ. Frag. 5 and 6 Porro.

Db. 1274 a 19. To note (414) add: From 'Aφ. τον. c. 4 § 2, c. 7 § 2 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon; for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the classic καθαρές ἐκκλησίαι τοίχων when Solon's modifications are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in Philologus i. 393 ff.


Db. 1274 a 22. Add to note (415): In Frag. 395, 1274 a 4, Zaleucus is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with εὐθυρρήμαι ἀνέθηκ, τον. 1273 b 33.

Db. 1274 a 23. Add: The laws of Chalcedon (probably another name of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herodoto 2. 404: from Strabo 9.11.1309 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger Splinte n. 126 lines 61, 65, 111, 123, Antigonis permits the people of Lesbos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (1. 65 n. 2) conjectures that the laws of Chronicles, introduced deliberately when in 365 B.C. the state of Cos was refunded, had spread down that place as a centre.

Db. 1274 a 25. τιτέρ. Mr Newman advances reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo vi. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Aegeus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace those to a Cretan origin, to Khadiamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locians. (4) He should surely have mentioned such an oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the implantation to an Locians origin, cp. Scymnus Chius v. 314 ff.

Db. 1274 a 30. To note (419 b b add: Comp. the similar error of a chronological error in 'Aφ. τον. c. 17 § 21 φανερῶν Νικόλαος αἰ γενόμενος. At τοῦ ἄρεων τουτούρα ζωνός λαματικ, τὸν τι ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἑπτάνοις δινων ὄντα εἰπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀρχικόν ἄριστον. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks in Dr Sandys' edition of the Contrafimamn p. 160.

ADDENDA.

P. 320. 1274 b 14. ταύτα] In Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. ii. 504. Prof. Bywater remarks that ταύτα is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, ταύτως 3θεων at least 30 times in inscr.: yet ταύτως 3θεων does occur, see C. I. A. ii. 3, n. 1559. In the dramatists there is no instance of ταύτως, ταύτων as feminine; but Menander Τον. 520 K. gives ταύτως ἀδελφαν ταύτις δια ταύτας. On the other hand τώ, τοτε, τώδε, αὐτῷ, ὧν, ὧν, are found as feminine, although τα, αὐτά, ταύτα, τάδε, with substantives, with the first declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τα, ταύτα, are nowhere attested, while ταύτως is found more often than ταύτα, e.g. in Plato ταύτως six times, ταύτα four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. Thesm. 566 has τω ταύτα] ως τω χείρε, οὐκέτι δέ των ταύτων ἄλλα ταύτως χειρον. In Isaacs ταύτα occurs six times, in Aristophanes six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.


P. 321. 1274 b 15 f. Δράκωντος δέ νύμων μὲν εἰσὶν, πολιτείᾳ δ' ἐπαιρχοῦσα τοὺς νύμους θηκεν. Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle's omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained above, that Draco's was not one of the εὐδοκιμοῦσα πολιτεία, especially in view of 1273 b 34 ὡς τάν γάρ (Λυκούργος καὶ Σώλων) καὶ νύμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέτησαν. Presuming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is irreconcilable with 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in that chapter: which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in 'Αθ. πολ. at the last moment. See again Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. i. p. xvi, iii. p. iii ff.

ib. Add to note (428): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature upon the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam and Mr E. S. Thompson in Class. Rev. v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in Revue Critique 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. Meyer ορ. c. p. 31 ff. and Busolt in Philologus l. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes' oligarchical pamphlet, 404 B. C.: it was reconstructed from the θεσμοι of Draco, upon inferences to which Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that since Draco's laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished ('Αθ. πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco's work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato Axiochus 365 E: ὃς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Δράκωντος ἡ Κλεοθένους πολιτείας οὖν ἐπὶ σε κακὸν ἤπω.

P. 324, line 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head Hist. Num. p. 372 states plainly that a federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual dissections something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Arcadia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 330. Το note (8) of p. 329 add after οὖνκες: This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons Kin and Custom in Journal of Philol. xvi. 1887 p. 104 n. 1. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry to
Spartans and Celts respectively, the 'Joint Undivided Family' having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 5. To note (430) add: O. Apex διδομένη σου πρ' Φιλίππου (Livy 8.4) p. 385 f. suggests that Hippas of Elia was a pupil of Hipparchus [Helbig-Ammann apud Suidas].


P. 337, line 18. See Addenda to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. 'Oscan' would appear to be meant by sopracum. const. [p. 493].

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginians conquerors implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Halicarnass and the Νόμιμα βιβλία (p. 61 f.). The bearing of this fact upon the date of Π. θ. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susannah Quenby, loc. cit. p. 61 ff.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the Cambridge History of the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question; see AD. vol. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1275 a 10. To note (485) add: See now 'Ath. τὰλ. v. 90 f. βαλα το πόλεις οὕτω εὐρύτατα, καὶ τινὰ τις μετὰ τῶν λαμπρών οἰκομενῶν, ὅπερ εἰσὶ δεσμοῦσα.'

P. 356. Comm. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Scholzauer Attico Attica Pamph. Lipsiae pp. 994—1006, Dist. of Antiquities (col. 3) iii. 734 ff. Also Roberts Ian. in Greek Epigraphy i. p. 355. In the absence of simplices the only right was the right of reprisals, συνάντ.; cp. συνάντ. δεδεμέναι κατά τοὺς, Dem. 663. Further, Laiou (XXX) 46 p. 931, 11.

Ib. 1275 a 15. ηγήταις οὐκ οὔ. Comp. 'Ath. παλ. c. 41 § 1.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. οὖν [περιπτ.] The role at Athens in the fourth century is then laid down 'Ath. παλ. c. 61 § 1. Δυνάμενε ὅσα τὰ πάντα καθότι ἔσται πάντα κάθοιτι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδέμια πλὴν βεβαιώσατε δι. Comp. ν. 31 § 3, and Plato Phædo 103 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. Ακράγαν and Merse συνάντησαν was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly; Swainson Ντα γενικοίς Ρακραγάζ οἰκ. p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. τῶν τῆς χάριτος. See below. Addenda to p. 275. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Ath. παλ. c. 363, metέχων μὲν τῇ παλαιᾷ καὶ εἰς ὀφθαλμὸν γεραντών διεπαντάζεται."


With the changes indicated in the Addenda to Current Note the passage runs thus: ἄφοβοι γὰρ τοὺς τίθαι ὅτι πόλεις πλῆθους ἂν ποῦ ὁ πόλεις οὐκ ἄλλα τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦτο. "Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not responsible for public acts, by instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny; some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by
ADDENDA.

the tyrant, and would decline many other such responsibilities on the ground that
the basis of certain forms of government is superior strength and not the public interest: suppose now nen to be somewhere living under a democracy of this origin, is the
state just as responsible for the acts of this government as for those of its predecessor,
the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 ταύτων τών τρόπων is explained by a 9 ὅταν ἐξ ὀλυγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. The question should more properly
have been put in the reverse way: is the state as responsible for the acts of the
deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts of the democracy which succeeds
them? But Aristotle’s inexactness in such matters is notorious. Niemeyer retains
the ταύτης bracketed above, as if the question concerned the identity of the state:
more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the preceding tyranny to be attributed
to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent spellings αέλαλ δελ see Meisterhans
Grammatik d. a. Insch.2 p. 25 n. 2; Christ preface to ed. of Metaphysica (Teubner
series) p. xvi, who cites the variants in the mss. at 986 b 17, 1016 a 15, 1026 a 21.
The whole question of orthography is complicated by the discrepancy between
(1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions. Prof. Susemihl, who has hitherto
been content to reproduce faithfully the best manuscript evidence, now writes: “in
rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non pergerem fortasse in nova editione,
seĎ suadente Stapfero ad Meisterhansi grammaticam inscriptionum me accommodarem
semperque scribere non solum, id quod nunc feci, μικρός, μικρότης, verum etiam
μέχρι, γέγενσαι, γεγυνώσκει, πλέον εἰς forsitan etiam θοῦν, αἰθέυ, breviore comparativorum species in οὐν et οὐ desinentes semper recuperem.” See Stapfer Krit.
Studien zu Aris. v. d. Seele (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff. On the same rational principles
Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the manuscript evidence on such points as
the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retention of obsolete or incorrect spelling
(βαλάσσω 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16, πράσσων 1337 b 20, Μυτιληναία 1285 a 35).
v. Wilamowitz, op. c. I. 319, sees in Aristotle’s Greek traces of Ionicism.

P. 366. To note (467)—comp. n. (455) p. 363——add: See now Ἁθ. πολ.
c. 39 s. f. (τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἐδανείαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρωσ ἀποδοθῆκα χωρίς)
and c. 40 § 3 (ἄλλα καὶ τὰ χρήματα Δακεδαμωνίων, ἡ οἱ τράκματα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον
ἐλαβον, ἀπέδοσαν κοινῇ, κελευσάν μὸνον τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐκατέρωσ ἀποδοθῆκα χωρίς) which
now informs us that there was a special clause about the loan in the terms of
reconciliation (βαλάσσως) agreed upon between the two factions in 439 B.C. It is with
justice that in the Ἁθ. πολ. the notice of the repayment is followed by the comment
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστίθεσαν τῶν οἰκείων οἱ δῆμοι κρατήσαντες ἅλλα
καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνάδασαν ποιοῦσιν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. To note (470)——add: Mr Newman (i. p. 363) understands
ἀγαθὸν as the predicate with εἰδιν.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εὐθὺς cp. Aristoph. Clouds 878 εὐθὺς γέ τοι παιδάριον δὲν
τυφνοτοι ἐπιταττέν ἐνοῦν οἰκίας.

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. Mid. p. 533 it appears that there were several
κορυφαίοι and a ἡγεμών κορυφαίων.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. To note (490)——add: A trace of it is retained in M. Antoninus
XI. 29 ἐν τῷ γράφει καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν οὐ πρῶτοιρον ἀρξέις πρὶν ἄρχῃς. The excellence
of the Spartan military system is thus brought out by Thucydides v. 66 s. f. σχεδὸν
γάρ...ἀρχώντων οἰκία. εἰς.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ἦς ἀληθῶς γάρ sc. ἀπορεῖται.

COMMENTARY.

P. 379. 1178 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper addition to your note τολύτης, viz. κατά τολύτης; see Schol. on Eustathius ed. Schrnrrer i. 149. 45 καὶ τῷ Μενεών ἔκ Ἀργείας ἐκεῖ Ἀργείαν ὥστε [see the line] τὸν τότε Ἰάνναν [καὶ Κλέοπατρα], θέλει γὰρ ἔκειν Αἰθρείας καὶ Ἀργείας δόνα δῶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τολύτης τοῦτο λέοντος τῷ Ἀργεῖον. Again in Schol. on l. 904.

Db. 1178 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for φαίνων to thus apply the law.

Db. 1178 a 32. ταμαχείας = (virtually) δισταμαχίας: see 1182 b 16, 1183 a 4.

Db. 1178 a 34. Add a note (5:16); By 'Aph. Edel. c. 46 § 4 this demise law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 ἐκ Ἀργείας ἐκ τῆς ἑλάστης τῆς ἑπικρατοῦντος Περικλέους εἰκιστέος, ἐγγόνων μη μετέχειν τόν παλαιόν ἐκ τῷ ἔρχεται ἔκ τούτων. An error in the date is not so serious as to have remained with Deeney, Scheucl, Baermann and at one time (Hassol) that no such law would have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see e. g. 44 § 4 cited in Addenda to p. 360. Cp. 1175 b 51. Add a reference to the reverse prose at Byzantium according to Cicero ii. 2 § 3. 1345 b 36 ff. [see at ποιήσας αὐτῷ ἐκείνην τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀν] μή ἐξέδωκαν αὐτὸν καταβαλλόντα μηδὲν ἀλλάζειν ἐκείνης πολιτικῆς.


Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: e. g. Demosthen. De Civ. § 244. p. 312, τὸ πολλὰλλα τὸ εἰς ἑπέμενε μητέρα but it may well be that these agree with μητέρα, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Demosthen. ἐν τῇ 459 b 9 ff. which apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with Πρ. iv.(vii). 110. 1329 b 21 and after adding 'μήτρα' the explanation then 1360 a 41 proceeds to the unmistakable usage ἐρὲι ἑπέμενε· ἢ σέϊνον 1360 b 74.

P. 382. 1178 b 27. ἰδ. μή στόλων unless existence is over-weighted with ['renders too much in'] the evils of life.


P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For 419 (or 426) '9 would perhaps be better to read 410' : payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's Protagoras (Spenel).

P. 391. 1180 a 24. ἀκούσα] Free births, the absolute point answering to ἀκούσαται = free born. See Newman 1. p. 141 n. 1. Compare ἐνί ἐνιαυτίς καὶ γένεται, 1181 a 33: ἐνί ἐκείνης καὶ ἐπιτείνεται ἵν' ἐπιγείων, 1190 b 25. ὡς ἐκείνης ἀλλοιος ἐστει ἐκείνης [καὶ ἐκείνης] ἀκούσατο] but in the best editions which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 ὡς ἐκείνης ἀκούσατο ἐκείνης ἀκούσατο the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato Comicas Hyperbolias 3. 4 for ἀκούσαται ἐκείνης, and refers to Diog. Laert. ii. 1 and vi. 4, for Antithenes.

P. 395. 1181 a 17. Mr Newman (ii. 148) misunderstands this differently: 'living men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty' like ἐκ τῶν ἄνδρων διαπερατοί.

P. 399. 1181 b 31. With the οἰκείαθεν Kal ἀπόκρισιν cf. 1174 a 45 ff. and follow.

P. 400. 1181 b 31. With the οἰκείαθεν Kal ἀπόκρισιν cf. 1174 a 45 ff. and follow.

P. 402. 1182 a 31. Mr Newman adds Phys. ii. 1. 3. for πλήθος ημῶν ἑκάστου τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ καταμαθεῖν ἄριστον ἀρχηγόν. The ship-captain, representing the gentleman, would not add τὸ ποιόν γενέσθαι καὶ ἑπάλλειν.
Inb. 1282 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetic colour of the words δαυτημιόν (1338 a 30) and θόλη (1324 b 39) in this line; with which may go тιμαλφείω, 1336 b 19.

Inb. 1282 a 28. The plural δήμοι in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 1321 a 19, ' Ath. pol. c. 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 83. 1, VIII. 65. 1.

Inb. 1282 a 31. ταμειονήσις Add to note (576): Cp. 'Ath. pol. c. 4 § 2 (Draconian constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): σημείων 'οτι κληροτάς ἐποίησαν ἐκ τῶν τιμημάτων ὁ περὶ τῶν ταμειμόνων, ϕ χραμένου διατελοῦσι ἑτὶ καὶ νῦν κελεύει γὰρ κληρον τὸν ταμίας ἐκ πεντηκοσιομισέων, c. 47 § 1 έκ πεντηκοσιομισέων κατὰ τὸν Σίλωνος νόμον (ἔτη γὰρ ἤ. c. circa 329 B.C. νόμος κύριος).

P. 410. 1283 b 15. ἀναμφιβολήσης ἢ κράσεις Cp. 'Ath. pol. c. 35 § 2 προσώπητες ἀναμφιβολήν τὴν πολειτείαν.

Inb. 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτείων ἀμφιβολότων.

P. 415. Comm. left col. line 24. Add: The recent additions to our knowledge enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly disused in the fourth century the institution had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin could appeal, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view of the text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of VIII(v). 3. 3, 1302 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. xi. 55. Plut. V. Themist. c. 22, Arist. 7, Nic. 11, Alexid. 13 (cp. N. E. Them. 8, Cimon 3), evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. of the school of Isocrates: (2) the view expressed by Philochorus, Fr. 79 b (cited in n. 603), which is also found in Androton, Fr. 5 (quoted by Harpocration s. v. Hipparchus). Both explanations appear in 'Ath. pol. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well acquainted with the latest researches of historians and Atticography.

Inb. line 39. The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in cases of ostracism: προχειροσετε μὲν ὁ δήμος πρὸ τῆς γρατείας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ δάστρακον εἰσφέρειν 'οτε δὲ δοκεῖ, ἑφάρμασεν σαμίεσιν ἡ ἄγορα καὶ κατελείποντο εἰς ὀλίγον δέκα, δι᾽ ὑπὲρ εἰσήνθησεν κατὰ ϕυλας ἐπίθεσαν τὰ δαστράκα, στρέψαντες τὴν ἑπιγραφὴν. ἑπεστάλην δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἔνσεβες καὶ ἡ βουλή διαρρημνθέντων ὡς ὁ πλήθος γένοτο καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἐξακισχηλών, τούτου ἔδει τὰ δίκαια δώσατο καὶ λαβ监督检查 ὑπὲρ τῶν δίδων συναλλαγμάτων ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστήνα τῆς πλήθους ἔτη δέκα (ὑπότον δὲ ἐγκεκομεν πάντες) καρπούμενον τὰ εὐαντότα, μὴ ἐπιβλαώντα, εὔτος Γερασίτου Εὐθοίας ἀκρωτηρίου· μόνος δὲ κτλ.

Inb. Note (503) add: Compare now Ἀθ. pol. c. 22 § 1 ἐν ὀἷς [sc. νόμοις] ἐτέθη καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ δαστρακομοῦ νόμος seemingly about 507 B.C., § 3 διαλύσετε ἔτη μετὰ τὴν νίκην [Marathon], θαρροῦντες ἤδη τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρώτον ἐχρήσατο τῷ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τοῦ δαστρακομοῦ, δὲ ἐστέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεις, ὡς Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγός καὶ στρατηγός τοῦ τράνου κατέτησε· § 4 καὶ πρώτους ὀστρακίζον τῶν ἐκείνων συναγεγέναι Ἰππαρχος Χάρμον Κολλιτείς, δι᾽ ὑπὲρ καὶ μάλιστα τῶν νόμων ἐθερμόν ὁ Κλεοσθένης, εξελάτα πολυμερεῖς αὐτῶν. εὐάντα δὲ τῷ ὑπαρχόν ἐστι [i.e. 487 B.C.]. ὄστρακίζεσθαι Μεγαλή Π. Ἱπποκράτους Αλιστηκῆ ἔστει [a nephew of Cleisthenes]. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἐτέθη τρία τούς τῶν τράνους φίλους ὀστρακίζων, ὥς χαρὶν ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, μετὰ τῇ ιῆς τῷ τετάρτῳ ἐστει [probably 485 B.C.] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰς δοκεῖν μελετεῖν ἕναν μεθιστασκεί καὶ πρώτους ὀστρακίζουσαν τῶν ἄπωθεν τῆς τραυματίδος Ζάνθιππος ὁ Ἀράφον. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealousy of preeminence (Eph. Theopomp.) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (Androt.), are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Androton in Harpocratin runs thus: ἄλλος δὲ ἐστίν Ἰππαρχος ὁ Χάρμων, ὃς φησιν Λυκοώργον ἐν τῷ κατά
The coincidence of language is unaccountable, 2 P. Thom. p. 6, 130 a 7.

P. 417. To note (609) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in 'Ath. Pol. c. 74 § 7: τοις ἀστυνόμωσις κατ' αὐτὰν ψηφισμένοι ταῖς τερματείναι τελείοι των ἀνακειμένων εἰς τὸν συναγωγὴν προς τὴν φυσικήν τοῦτον ἀκομὴ νήσον, τοὺς τερματείναι τελείοιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξέπεφτεν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνακειμένου. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not disburdened until they resolved. Comp. Dr Newman in Class. Rev. v. 162.

P. 423. 1385 a 16. Add: Donath, Lib. Labesidumier. p. 145 ff. compares the Tagesia in Themistia, the βασιλεία of Arcadia (which is also a στρατεύμα), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1385 a 35 et al. Note that according in Maier's Homomorphes p. 93 n. (132) the true spelling is Μαυρομνίσιον.

P. 426. 1385 b 14. Cfr. 'Ath. Pol. c. 74 § 3: ἄθρωποι δὲ ἀνακειμένοι...ἀκομὴν. Dr. 1385 b 15. τακτικούς. In 'Ath. Pol. c. 74 § 3: οὐκ εἰσίν ἐπίσκοποι, τοὺς τερματείναι τελείοιν ἀκομὴ νήσον, τοὺς τερματείναι τελείοιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν συναγωγὰς. In the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer Golden Bough ii. 44 ff. 1187—1189, 1177—1179, an epoch-marking work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1386 a 3. Add: This is the distinction between τάξις and θνησίζ in Dion. Halicar. Ant. Rom. v. 167 a.

P. 431. 1387 a 58. In 'Ath. Pol. c. 35 § 3: ἄθρωποι who happens to occur.

P. 434. 1386 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of 'Ath. Pol. c. 74 § 7: after mentioning the absolute personal away of Demos ἀποκάθρω τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ δημός τοῖς καὶ τὰς καθόσως νομοθέτους καὶ διευθύνοντας, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ κρατικός. καί γὰρ γάρ τις συνάξεις τῷ τῶν τοιούτων συνάξισιν τὸ σωφρόνισμα τῆς συνάξισις διασχίζεται διομένη ἀναφέρεται τὴν χάριν; οὕτως ἀκριβώς εἶναι καὶ τάξις καὶ κρατικός.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out éstai anywhere else.

P. 439. 1387 a 6. Comm. for the sense of διαφέρει, 1331 b 9: also 1350 a 7 ἀν διαφέρει τὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸν κακὸν, and 'Ath. Pol. c. 74 § 3: ἄθρωποι τὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸν κακὸν δυνάμει (maintain.)


P. 454. Add to Excursus 11.: See further remarks on the date of Pausanias, in reply to Reisch, by Toepffer in Bibl. Max. xli. 1846, pp. 139—146.

P. 467. line 5. See Corrigenda. Date the sentence. Again, one might...remains.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Scrineill in Cornwell. Hist. of Exag. ii. (1853) and Frisck. J. Frisck. 1868, p. 117 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in Chemical Rev. viii. 1869, pp. 304—305. In such controversies statistics are apt to annoy us, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the tables published in 1869 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made numerous, either from change of view (as when Prof. Scrineill admits that 137b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant διαφέρει by losses in the next line, and accordingly
ADDENDA.

returns to δυνατῶν Π², and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts ἑθεσι Π¹ in place of ἕθεσι Π²) or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposing view (which may account for Prof. Susemihl's surrender of 1256 b 1 κουμβστα, 1258 b 1 μεταβολικής, 1258 b 7 νήμασι ἐκ νομίσματος in Quaest. Π. p. iv. although he would still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Newman's omission to count 15 passages on the side of Π², for which see Class. Rev. vii. p. 306 n. i, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing statistical tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book i. where "Π¹ is certainly wrong 15 times" (text p. 464, line 40): deduct three of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall back into the uncertain class, and add seven, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 1259 b 31 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this brings the total of errors in Π¹ to 19. But again, in B.1. "Π¹ is right 24 times" (text p. 464, line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enumerated. Of these five are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from counting them: viz. 1252 b 28 (ἡδ), 1258 b 8 (δεδομένη), 1258 b 40 (Χαρμίλλη), 1259 b 28 (ὅδε), 1260 a 37 (ἀρα), but he adds five in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 1254 a 10, 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B.1. the problem works out in favour of Π² by 23 : 19.

Mr Newman does not accept this statement of the case, but instead of a detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants claimed as right readings for Π¹ on the ground that words are omitted, and that this is the besetting sin of Π¹: these five omissions are 1252 a 9 (ἐλθαί), b 20 (συναφῶν), 1253 b 33 (ἄ), 1257 b 7 (ἐλθαί), 1260 a 31 (ἄ). If these five claims were struck out, the balance in favour of Π² would be destroyed.

In B.11. the alleged superiority claimed for Π¹ is still disputed. Mr Newman accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it in the 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of Π² in no less than 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of Π¹ over Π² from 69 : 40 to 67 : 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, as to which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extremely cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl's figures for Book ii. are thus explained. "Π¹ has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32): deduct 9 of these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 1272 a 11, 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, 1268 a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, 1274 b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of Π¹ is 48. Again of the 69 passages claimed as right readings for Π¹ (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to omit nine, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 21, in place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 (καλ), b 5, 1264 a 15, b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain at 69, but on reflection he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. 465) as five, but only two (or three at most). This brings out the final result for B.11.: Π¹ = 67 (or 68 at most), Π² = 48.

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35, but transfers nine others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of Π² (viz. 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by Π¹, together with
COMMENTARY

1165 b 11, 1167 a 25, b. 36, 1265 b 6, 1171 a 76]. the remaining 13 by leave. Dawthili,
though strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for IP. Thus, IP helps
with him from 67 to 951 and III rising by the addition to the 48 (which Dawthili
finally admits) of seven other variants, which Dawthili regards as Stephanus's, on 1165,
a 21, 1165 a 12, 1265 b 17, 1167 a 10, 1171 b 56, 1174 a 4, b 6. This makes the total
for IP 55. Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Dawthili omits for II
and Newman for IP and we get the result, IP = 64, IP = 35.

On the question of the text generally see note with plenius. Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, Hermathena Vol. vii. No. 44, p. 214. "The errors taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristophane's rules for altering the names, δεξάμενος τοις σαλλόντες. Bekker having completely neglected 57 and 77, Stephanus's recalc unhappily perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and even trans
"pray we not add Newman?—seems to be dropping him too far
it again. Without free emendation and transition we cannot have the results here."

[69. prehistoric Αμας] τα μή επώνυμα, 67 not το γένος επώνυμοι, but the διομυμγια
tο τον γένος 674, 676 πληρων. δεξαμενοντα. 67 671 το επώνυμον και αρκετον ονο

dεξαμενον περι την Αιθιοπικη Μεθαλα αυτης της νεστερινας, περι μειον καθανυτικον διο

παρεκτηθησθαι. το γενος πετρον επώνυμον ενεκτινων και αρκετον επωνυμον
χειρας και αναπροσαρθησθαι (Wetz)."

Ib. 1330 b 15. Με αναπροσαρθησθαι τους πολλους αναπροσαρθησθαι Να ου μαν μεκανη
notice the striking similarity between the sentences and the following in the account of
Cleisthenes' local tribes: ἀναπροσαρθησθαι τους πολλους της νεστερινας, [67, vol. ii. 5],

P. 520. 1330 b 11. For αυτοι τα παραμετρα αυτοι [67, vol. ii. 59] το μετρον παραμετρον
dυσαρεσκευασμαι.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1169 a 6 add: and 67, 3, 4, 1179 a 14 ff.

P. 535. 1333 b 3. After αυτοι γενος, add: Comp. Νεκρ. 124 c. 1. 3, 1129 a 19

tε γενος επώνυμον και κ. 7: 2, 1177 a 21 (where Brewer brackets it).


P. 541. 1334 b 5. Compare the parallel phrase of Abakuk. 3: 4, 5: 10. γενος δι αληθεια τη σωματικη.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. Crit. 120 a 10 ff. and Xen. De Caverna 1. 43. αληθεια τη

παραλλαγαν και τη μεταφρασια και τη σωματικη.
Aristotle, the politics of Aristotle, books 1-5: