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EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Τοιούτοις οὖν μοι ὁ συγγραφέως ἔστω, . . .
ζένος ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις καὶ ἀπολὺς.

—Lucian.
A HISTORY
OF
EUROPEAN THOUGHT
IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY
JOHN THEODORE MERZ

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CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

CHAPTER VII.
OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

The Æstethetical century, 3; The term Æsthetic, 5; Æsthetics in the eighteenth century, 6; Systematised in Germany, 6; Sociological causes, 6; Stimulus from classical and foreign literatures, 8; Influence of the German University system, 8; Kant, 9; The Critique of Judgment, 12; Schiller, 13; Special mission of Art, 16; Influence of Revolution, 19; Schiller's assimilation of Kantian Ethics, 21; Split in the humanistic movement, 21; Goethe's "inner freedom," 22; Severance of art and literature from practice, 23; Schelling the philosopher of Romanticism, 24; Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, 27; Kant's theory of disinterested pleasure, 28; The Beautiful and the Sublime, 28; Schiller's "Play-theory," 30; Nature and Art, 34; Personality of the Artist, 34; The "Characteristic," 36; Goethe on seriousness and play, 38; Schelling on Art and the problem of Reality, 39; This only a transitional point of view, 41; Philosophical meaning of Schelling's attempt, 43; Mythology, 45; Want of logical method in Schelling, 47; This supplied by Hegel, 48; Neglect of active process, 49; Place of Æsthetics in Hegel's system, 51; Art, Religion, and Philosophy form an ascending series, 53; Art abandoned by Schelling for mysticism, 56; Hegel unappreciative of natural beauty, 56; Solger, 57; Chr. H. Weisse, 60; Lotze's version of Weisse's doctrine, 65; Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, 69; Peculiarity of Schopenhauer's philosophy, 70; His happy interpretation of the beautiful in nature as well as in art, 75; His grouping of the arts, 79; His theory of Music, 79; Von Hartmann, 83; Contrast of Will and Intellect, transcended in the Unconscious, 84;
Philosophy rooted in poetry, 88; The mystical, 89; Art and the Beautiful subordinate to philosophy, 89; F. A. Lange, 90; Contrast with similar view of earlier thinkers, 91; Problem of Reality abandoned, 91; Unsystematic Aesthetics in England: Ruskin, 95; Spencer and the play-theory, 101; Psychology of Aesthetics and Ethics, 101; Herbart, 102; His introduction of the term Value, 106; Developed by Lotze, 107; Closer connection of Aesthetics and Ethics, 107; J. M. Guyau, 109; Evolutionary view, 111; New epoch in Aesthetics, 113; The Beautiful a larger Life, 114; Comparison with Lotze, 114; Life substituted for Mind, 116; Reluctance to deal with metaphysics, 117; B. Croce, 119; Schleiermacher, 122; Art a larger language, 123; Necessity of recurring to other problems, 125; Ethical problem, 125.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE GOOD.

Ethics a British science, 127; New beginnings of ethics in Germany and France, 128; Different atmosphere of moral philosophy in this country, 129; Basis of Order, 130; Contrast of Revolution, 130; Different conditions in Germany, 133; Free inquiry into metaphysical foundations of morality, 135; Idea of Development absent, but latterly most influential in England, 137; Comprehensiveness of Ethics in England, 138; Bentham, 139; Absence in him of the conservative spirit, 140; Legal reform on basis of moral principle of utility, 142; Contrast between Bentham and Kant, 144; Formalism in Kant’s ethics, 146; The “Good Will,” 146; Gap in Kant’s ethics, 149; Separate questions involved in the problem of the Good, 150; J. S. Mill, 152; Comte’s influence on Mill, 154; The development from Kant, 155; Schiller, 156; Fichte, 160; Schelling, 166; Morality and Religion, 166; The Moral Order, 167; Twofold interpretation of this, 167; Schleiermacher, 171; Three aspects of his ethics, 175; Hegel, 179; Contrast with Schleiermacher, 180; Comte’s Positivism, 182; The social Self, 183; Idea of progress, 184; Comte’s positive view distinguished from German metaphysics and English psychology, 185; Influences that moulded his ideas, 188; Neglects philosophical ethics, 189; A new social order, 191; Hegel and the historical problem, 193; Divergent application of his thought, 194; Used in the interest of conservative reaction, 196; But also turned in the opposite direction, 196; This movement promoted by the idea of Development, 198; Göschel, Strauss, and
CONTENTS.

Feuerbach, 198; Feuerbach and Comte compared, 201; Revival of ethical studies, 202; Herbart, 205; Lotze's doctrine of values, 206; Metaphysics based on ethics, 207; Evidence of recent tendencies, 209; Schopenhauer's doctrine of the primacy of the Will, 209; Darwinian evolution as a corrective of pessimism in Germany, 211; Anthropology, 212; Antithesis between fixed moral ideals and the study of the genesis of morality, 213; Herbert Spencer, 214; Influence in England of Kant, 215; T. H. Green and Ed. Caird, 216; Green and Lotze, 217; Green and Spencer, 221; Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics,' 223; Sidgwick and Lotze, 224; Do not sufficiently appreciate Evolution, 227; Spencer's acknowledged disappointment, 229; Mill and Huxley on the cosmic process, 232; Hypothetical Idealism, 232; Attempts at synthesis of idealism and naturalism, 233; Fouillee's Idées-forces, 237; J. M. Guyau, 242; Indefiniteness of 'the Ideal' as conceived by these thinkers, 244; Theories of value in Germany, 244; Reaction against these analytical researches, 246; Fr. Nietzsche, 246; Two theories of the Good: ends and duties, 250; Paulsen's Ethics, 251; Return to Kantian Ethics, 254; W. Wundt, 254; Necessity of going beyond pure ethics, 257; Problems of the Spirit and of Human Society, 258.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE SPIRIT.

Internationalisation of thought, 260; More marked in Science than in Philosophy, 261; Especially as the problems become more speculative, 262; Least of all in the religious problem, 262; Relation of Philosophy and Theology, 263; Geist, Spirit, and Mind, 263; Distinction in Germany between theological and philosophical literature, 265; As also between scientific and philosophical literature, 266; Schleiermacher, 268; Absence of dualism in England, 268; Advantages and disadvantages of rigid lines, 269; Metaphysical point of view, 271; Psychological point of view, 271; Historical point of view, 272; Union of Kant's ethics and Schleiermacher's psychology, 274; Kant's three verities, 277; Twofold order of ideas, 277; Mixed with duality of sensible and intelligible world, 279; The reconciliation, 283; Fichte's and Schopenhauer's solution, 285; Different movements converge in Schleiermacher, 287; Uplifting of popular education, 291; Hegel's formula for religion, 293; Jacobi's opposition, 296; Hamann and Herder, 300; Influence of extramural teaching on the schools, 303; Schleiermacher's grasp of historical religion, 305;
ESTHETICAL AND SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF RELIGION, 309; NEGLECT OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S PSYCHOLOGY, 316; THREE DISTINCT CONCEPTIONS, 319; ABRECHT RITSCHL, 320; GAP IN HIS THEORY: LOTZE, 324; DIFFERENT TREATMENT BY KANT, HEGEL, SCHLEIERMACHER, 324; LOTZE ON "PERSONALITY," 327; HIS RELATIONS TO WEISSE, 329; PERSONALITY NOT A LIMITATION, 331; RELATION OF LOTZE TO HEGEL AND SCHLEIERMACHER, 333; THE "MIRACULOUS," 334; NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL, 341; THE MECHANICAL AND THE SPIRITUAL IN KANT, 342; FECHNER AND LOTZE, 343; RELATION BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND THE HIGHEST GOOD, 345; EXISTENCE OF EVIL, 345; THE IDEA OF A REVELATION, 347; RITSCHL'S ASSERTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, 348; RADICAL DISTINCTION OF RELIGIOUS FROM SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT, 351; NATURAL RELIGION, 352; GOETHE ON THE SPIRIT OF WORSHIP, 355; CARLYLE AND GOETHE, 356; THE BRITISH AND THE GERMAN MIND, 358; ENGLISH THOUGHT NEITHER RADICAL NOR SYSTEMATIC, 360; ENGLISH IDEAS DEVELOPED ABROAD, 361; HUME ON RELIGION, 364; MILL'S "THREE ESSAYS," 365; MANSEL'S "BAMPTON LECTURES," 367; ATTACKED BY MAURICE AND MILL, 368; SPENCER, 369; LATER OXFORD PHILOSOPHY, 370; THESIS OF THE IDEALISTIC SCHOOL, 371; ABSENCE OF DEFINITE IDEAS COMPAREABLE WITH THOSE OF NATURALISM, 372; DISCUSSION OF PERSONALITY, 373; EMPIRICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, 373; THE ETHICAL PROBLEM, 373; DISCUSSION IN 'NINETEENTH CENTURY': MARTINEAU, 374; COMTIAN VIEW, 378; MORALITY AND HISTORICAL RELIGION, 379; CAN THERE BE AN INDEPENDENT MORALITY? 380; BALFOUR'S "FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF," 381; COINCIDENCE WITH THE HEGELIAN POSITION, 385; POINTS OF CONTACT WITH LOTZE, 386; PROBLEM OF MORAL EDUCATION, 388; PESSIMISM AND EXTREME INDIVIDUALISM, 390; SCHOPENHAUER AND nietzsche, 390; RENEWED INTEREST IN RELIGIOUS PROBLEM, 393; W. H. MALLOCK, 394; RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE, 397; DE LAMENNAIS, 400; REVERSION TO A POSITION LIKE HEGEL'S, 405; DEPARTURE FROM THIS IN THE THOUGHT OF THE DAY, 406; THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS, 407; THE DIFFICULTY OF EVIL AND SIN, 407; J. M. GUYAU, 408; MORALITY THE "LAST DOGMA," 411; TRANSFORMATION OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIEW, 414; RELIGIOUS INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM OF SOCIETY, 419.

CHAPTER X.

OF SOCIETY.

The social problem in the largest sense not recognised before the eighteenth century, 420; American struggle for independence, 422; The French Revolution, 423; HERDER AND Rousseau, 423; vico,
Kames, and Monboddo, 424; Herder's idea of Humanity, 425; Contrast between Voltaire and Rousseau, 427; Utopism in earlier English literature, 428; Special problems, Adam Smith and Bentham, 429; James and J. S. Mill, 429; Characteristic differences in the three literatures, 430; Sociology: Comte, 430: 'Synopsis' as opposed to 'Atomism,' 431; Ethical interest in sociology, 437; Ethical and theological interests separated in France, 439; Centre of gravity of the ethical system changed, 441; Kant's position, 443; Contrast between English and French sociology, 443; Absence in both alike of metaphysical stage, 445; Division of the problem, 446; Constitution of Society treated in France, 447; Economic problem in Britain, 447; Problem of History of Society in Germany, 448; Centre of Sociology in France, 448; Ideas of return to Nature and of Perfectability, 449; Rousseau, 450; The "Physiocrats," 452; Adam Smith, 455; Hume, 456; Contrast between A. Smith's Ethics and Economics, 457; Social harmony sought in principle of Justice, 457; Ricardo and Malthus, 459; Reactionary school: de Bonald and de Maistre, 463; The Socialists, 465; Saint-Simon, 466; Relation to Comte, 470; Influence of France on Germany, 474: Kant, 475; Fichte, 477; Hegel, 479; Comte's philosophy of history, 481; Comte and Hegel compared, 482; 'Law of the Three States,' 483; Early Tract on 'Social Polity' involves Comte's whole programme, 487; Contemporary reception of Comte's and Hegel's doctrines, 492; Greater appeal of some of Comte's qualities to English readers, 494; Influence on J. S. Mill, 495: Attitude of Mill to German thought, 498; The historical spirit in Hegel and Comte, 500; The idealist conception, 500; Comte's search for the ensemble, 502: Relation to Darwin's discovery, 504; Generalised Positivism: Taine, 505; His theory of environment, race, and epoch, 507; Buckle, 510; Lazarus and Steinthal, 511; Th. Waitz, 513; Blumenbach, 513; J. C. Prichard, 514; Broca, 514; Influence of Darwin and Spencer, 515; Society as an Organism, 518; Antithesis between Individual and the State, 520; Schäffle, 521; Fouillée, 523; Spencer's intellectual history, 526; Spencer and Hegel contrasted, 529; Combination of utilitarian and intuitive views in Morals, 532; Scientific and practical interests, 533; Three sociological theories, 533; Socialism, 535; Karl Marx, 536; His position in the history of thought, 538; His central idea, 538; The dualism of Saint-Simon and Comte disappears, 539; Influence of British Political Economy, 540; The Ricardian theories the basis of his industrial philosophy, 543; Influence of his theory, 544; Influence of Science and popular spirit, 544; Examples of efforts towards economic reconstruction, 546; Fichte's "closed industrial state," 547; J. H. von Thünen, 553;
CONTENTS.

Sociology: a new science, 557; Tarde and Durkheim, 558; Durkheim's philosophy of history, 560; Tarde's opposed individualistic theory, 563; Laws developed by him, 564; His criticism of Spencer, 565; Ranke and Lamprecht, 569; The idea of Nationality, 574; Industrial development, 577; Wundt's Anthropology, 579; Dilthey, 580; Contrast with Lamprecht, 585; Ultimate conflict in the sphere of religious ideas, 585.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

Special philosophical problems, 591; Change in their relative importance, 591; Tendency to specialism, 592; Failure to attain unity of thought, 594; Monistic tendency, 594; Change in German thought, 595; Lotze's intermediate position, 597; Lotze's definition of philosophy, 600; Relation of Lotze to the Idealists, 603; Two views as to unification provoked by Kant, 604; British contributions in psychology and logic, 607; Influence of physiology, 608; Return of the religious interest in philosophy, 609; Altered aspect of this interest, 610; Loss of confidence in the powers of the human mind, 611; Different attitudes in the three countries, 612; Questions of certitude of belief and sanction for moral law, 613; Retrospect, 614; Position in Germany at the beginning of the century, 618; Unifying principles in Kant, 622; Fichte, 624; Fichte's anticipation of later aspects, 630; Schelling, 630; Reintroduction of dualism, 635; Schleiermacher's Addresses, 640; Hegel, 642; Hegel's preparation, 643; Hegel's principle, 644; Two conceptions in Hegel's method, 647; The secret of Hegel's genius, 650; The last outcome of the idealistic movement, 652; The three subsequent systems, 653; Schopenhauer, 653; Comte and Spencer, 653; The scientific and the social interests, 654; Three classes of thinkers, 655; Scientific philosophy in Germany, 656; Altered conception of the task of philosophy: Lotze, 657; Antecedents and surroundings of Lotze, 658; Lotze's monism and dualism, 660; Personality a central idea, 663; Philosophy a reconciliation, 664; Entry of the positive spirit, 665; Lotze's scheme not recognised, 666; Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, 668; The principle of Will, 671; Dualism of Will and Intellect, 672; Pessimism, 674; Contrast between Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, 675; Religious interest in von Hartmann, 677; Positivism of Comte, 679; His social aim, 680; His religious interest, 680; Different from that in Germany, 681; And in England, 681;
CONTENTS.

Unifying tendency in Comte, 683; Point of contact with Schopenhauer, 685; Parallel between Comte and Hegel, 687; Solitary position of Comte, 688; Herbert Spencer, 689; Reconciliation of science and religion, 691; Spencer and Lotze, 692; Formative ideas of Spencer’s philosophy, 693; Contrast with Comte, 696; Unlikeness of Spencer’s Evolution to that of Schelling and Hegel, 696; His ethical rule, 698; Nature of the unification attained, 698; The social problem central as with Comte, 700; Criticisms and developments of Spencer, 701; Incompleteness of Spencer’s Evolution, 704; Non-mechanical phenomena, 705; Defects of mechanical scheme of evolution recognised in all three countries, 707; T. H. Green, 707; W. Wundt, 708; His approach to philosophy contrasted with Spencer’s, 709; Wundt a true representative of “Wissenschaft,” 711; “Creative Synthesis,” 712; Rejection of the term Substance as applied to mind, 714; Idea of Infinite Collective Will, 716; Recognition of religious conceptions, 719; Actualism in French thought: Fouillée, 722; J. M. Guyau, 724; H. Bergson, 724; R. Eucken, 725; W. James, 726; Relative absence of system, 726; Return to the introspective method, 731.

CHAPTER XII.

THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

Mathematics and Metaphysics, 736; Both progressive, 736; Influence of science, 737; And of criticism, 737; Scientific methods, 738; Scientific principles at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 739; “Force and Matter,” 740; “Idealism,” 741; An episode in the general movement, 741; Ambiguity of Hegel’s Geist, 742; Similar ambiguity of the term Evolution, 744; The philosophical problem as left by Hegel and Spencer not solved by their successors, 745; The period of transition, 746; Lotze’s view concerning philosophical thought, 748; Critical attitude of later thought, 752; Study of Origins, 753; Naturalistic bias of English philosophy, 753; Reaction under the influence of Hegel, 754; H. Sidgwick’s Ethics, 756; Theory of Knowledge, 756; Wundt, 757; Agnosticism, 758; Inadequacy of mechanical ideas, 759; Positivism and the social aim, 760; Reversal of the positions of Naturalism and Idealism, 761; New phase of Idealism, 762; The episode of Pessimism, 762; Fr. Nietzsche, 764; Contrast with other thinkers, 764; The lesson of the ‘Microcosmus,’ 766; Comparison with Humboldt’s ‘Kosmos,’ 767; Unification of thought not arrested by failure, 768; The scientific order an abstraction, 769; Contrast with the inner world, 770;
INTROSPECTION THE WAY TO UNIFICATION, 771; STUDY OF FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 772; POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS VIEWS, 773; THE SYNOPTIC VIEW, 774; WHY THE ATOMISING PROCESS IS INADEQUATE, 776; ILLUSTRATION OF THE RIGHT ATTITUDE BY A PICTURE, 778; REGIONS IN THE FIRMAMENT OF THE SOUL, 780; THE DEFINITE CONTRASTED WITH THE VAGUE, 781; DESIRE FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE LATTER, 783; FROM THE LESS DEFINITE REGION THE SPIRITUAL WORLD IS CONSTRUCTED, 784; OF THIS THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE IS MERELY A PORTION, 784; THE PRESENT SECTION OF THIS HISTORY LEADS TO A STUDY OF POETICAL AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT, 786; RECENT TENDENCIES RESTATE, 786; THE ULTIMATE REALITY, 789.

INDEX .... 791
A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

PART II.

PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT (CONCLUDED).
'Ο μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ δὲ μὴ σὺ.

—Plato.
CHAPTER VII.

OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

I.

In the course of this history I have had occasion to characterise nineteenth century thought by various epithets. Two of them have been prominent. I have in the first part called the nineteenth century, so far as its thought is concerned, the Scientific century. And secondly, in the present portion of my narrative which deals with philosophical thought I have called the nineteenth century the Critical century. I shall now introduce the problem with which this chapter will deal by calling the nineteenth century the Æsthetical century. I wish to emphasise the difference between Æsthetical and artistic as, in itself, characteristic of modern thought. An age or a nation may be called artistic which produces great works of art; an age may be called Æsthetic which writes and talks about them.

In spite of the fact that a great deal has been done during the nineteenth century to diffuse a love and understanding of art, I do not think that anyone would venture to call the nineteenth century an artistic
century. Other centuries belonging to the ancient world, or to the transition from the middle ages to modern times, might lay claim to be called the artistic periods of history. The nineteenth century can set up no such claim. Though it has produced an enormous volume of poetry and art, and has certainly excelled in musical composition, it might perhaps rather deserve the name of the inartistic century; so much has been done, through the growth of industries and by the congestion of teeming masses of population, to destroy the natural beauty which was to be found almost everywhere before steam and electricity usurped the leading place as features and agencies of intercourse and civilisation. It may be that the very recognition of this has prompted a large part of the writings and speculations about art, not infrequently with a desire to bring back again what has been lost.

1 The larger portion of the writings on art will not be dealt with in this chapter, nor in this section of the 'History of European Thought.' That portion goes usually under the name of Criticism; to it I referred in the second chapter of this section. In the narrower sense, as cultivated traditionally in France, it owes its diffusion and influence mainly to the growth of periodical literature, and is sometimes identified with literary taste. As such, its History has been written by Prof. George Saintsbury, whose 'History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe' (3 vols., 1900-1904) seems to be the only comprehensive and complete treatise on the subject. The author marks off his province from that of textual and higher Criticism on the one side, and refuses, on the other, to "meddle with the more transcendental Aesthetic, with those ambitious theories of Beauty, and of artistic Pleasure in general, which, fascinating and noble as they appear, have too often proved cloud - Junos" (vol. i. p. 3). He proposes to go to work entirely a posteriori, and "except on the rarest occasions when it may be safe to generalise," confines himself "wholly to the particular and the actual" (p. 4). So far, therefore, as the nineteenth century is concerned, his review of that period takes no note of what specially interests us in the present chapter —viz., the different philosophical theories of the Beautiful. On the other side he deals with many works and authors of which I shall make no mention. This refers pre-eminently to what has been written
Be this as it may, writings about art, whether purely critical or scientific or metaphysical, sprang up in great number about the end of the eighteenth century, and have continued to increase in quantity and bulk all through the nineteenth century; pre-eminently in Germany, but latterly also in the other countries of Western and Southern Europe.

The term "Æsthetic" was first introduced, as denoting a theory of the Beautiful or a treatise on Art, by the Leibnizian professor, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, in his 'Æsthetica,' which was published, in Latin, in the year 1750. He had already used the term in an earlier thesis from the year 1735. Thirty years later Kant introduced the same term in a larger sense, co-ordinating in the first of his 'Critiques' the word "Æsthetic" with the word "Logic," as referring respectively to the two sides of the intellectual process—viz., perception and conception. It has, however, been correctly remarked that, as Baumgarten's treatise contained nothing new, except the term which he invented, and as this term itself did not become general till much later, his contribution to the solution of the aesthetical problem or the problem of the Beautiful was not in any way of much importance. Quite recently the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, has claimed for his countryman, Giambattista Vico, in

on Art and Literature in France and, to a large extent also, in this country. Some of these writings are highly original and important, indicating sometimes quite novel aspects of thought. As their authors, however, have rarely defined their method, they belong to the great region of individual or subjective thought which, in the plan of this History, should form an independent third section. That a large portion of the most valuable methodical—philosophical and scientific—thought has its origin in this region is a truth with which I desire to impress my readers.
his 'Scienza Nuova,' the discovery of the "Independence of the realm of Æsthetics," though he has to admit that Vico's ideas remained for a long time unknown and sterile.

During the eighteenth century what we now term Æsthetical problems or questions of taste had been treated from a critical and psychological point of view by several philosophical writers in this country, among whom Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Burke are conspicuous. It is important to note that it is this narrower psychological aspect and not the great metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz on the Continent which renewed the philosophical interest in the great problems of poetry, art, and the beautiful that had played such a prominent part in the ancient speculations of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.

The speculations of German thinkers on art, poetry, and the Beautiful, mark an epoch in the development of modern conceptions regarding these subjects. Although the external stimulus was probably given to them in this region, as likewise in many others, by this country, it must be admitted that they raised the subject to an entirely different level, created for it a wider and deeper interest, and established it once for all as an integral and independent discipline in philosophical teaching. The historical causes which brought this about are many and complicated. The following are some of the more important.

To begin with, the theoretical interest in poetry and art was closely allied in Germany with that great movement under the influence of which other regions of thought received a novel treatment and a new start.
This was the educational movement, notably in its higher claims and in the wider sense which the word education acquired in the writings of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe. Lessing wrote a treatise on the education of mankind. Herder, in his writings as well as in his official position, occupied himself all through his life with the problem of education, which he conceived to consist in the widening, deepening, and spiritualising of human interest. Schiller published his celebrated letters “on the aesthetical education of man,” and Goethe not only gave pointed and telling expression, in many passages of his writings and in his voluminous correspondence, to the aims and ideals which impelled his age, but also stood before the world as a living example of the highest form of liberal self-culture, striving continuously to subdue that element which “drags us all down,” and which, in his own beautiful words, Schiller alone had cast into a shadowy distance: “the Vulgar.”

The poem in which these beautiful lines are contained is, I believe, little known in this country though it is rich in poetical feeling and in sentences which have become proverbial, and contains some of those telling words which Goethe has introduced into the German language. It had its origin in a memorial service held on the 10th August 1805, after Schiller’s death, and was subsequently twice repeated in 1810 and 1815 with some additional stanzas. It is termed an “Epilogue to Schiller’s Song of the Bell”; this being, in the opinion of many, one of the most characteristic of Schiller’s poetic productions. As such it attaches itself immediately to the closing words of that “Song,” according to which the first ring of the newly-cast bell should be the message of Peace. If the “Song of the Bell” gives one in a few pages a fairly complete idea of the peculiarity and many-sidedness of Schiller’s poetical genius, the “Epilogue,” on the other side, is quite as characteristic of Goethe’s mind: one of the finest and most magnanimous tributes that ever a poet paid to the genius of his friend and rival.
In studying the history of other civilisations and the growth and diffusion of human culture in other ages and nations, the gaze of many a German thinker was arrested by the greatness of classical literature and the splendour of ancient art. In the latter direction it was notably Winckelmann who led the way and, for a long time, guided German art-criticism. It was he who had so great an influence upon the formation of Lessing's ideas and the earlier views of Goethe, and who gave to classical studies in Germany that artistic and literary colouring which was grievously absent in many of the older grammarians, editors, and commentators. But in the sequel Herder and Goethe did not confine their interests, as did the classical philologists, to an understanding of the models of Greece and Rome, but simultaneously took up with avidity not only the study of Shakespeare and Dante, of English and Italian literature, but also of that of Spain and Portugal, and furthermore of the great newly discovered Eastern world. In fact, the cosmopolitan interest in the songs, poetry, and literature of primitive as well as of highly cultured peoples was one, and certainly not the least, among the lasting achievements of the earlier Romantic school. The leaders here were the brothers Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck.

But there was a third influence which made itself felt in the development of German aesthetics—an influence which did not come from this country, which was indeed rather opposed to the manner in which philosophical problems were treated here. This is the methodical or systematic tendency of all German thought, which grew with the establishment and growth of the German Uni-
versity system. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the great philosophers abroad were, as little as those in this country, induced to regulate their literary utterances by the necessities of teaching. If, in spite of this, the philosophies of the Continent were marked by systematic unity and a love of strict method, this was owing to other causes to which I have had occasion to refer in former chapters. I have there defined this circumstance by saying that the leading thinkers on the Continent aimed at elaborating a philosophical or reasoned creed, and that the solution of special, psychological, logical, or ethical problems was a secondary and subservient consideration, the main object being to define and develop a central idea. But this systematic and methodical bias was further strengthened when philosophy became in Germany a prominent subject in academic teaching. This introduced the desire to give, not only system and method but also completeness. It was probably with this consideration that Baumgarten interpolated æsthetics in the range of the special philosophical disciplines. A similar desire for method, system, and completeness is also characteristic of Kant’s great work. In fact, it is not too much to say that the elaborate formalism which pervades almost the whole of modern German philosophy may be largely traced to the influence of Kant’s works, and this in its good as well as its evil consequences.

So far as our present subject is concerned, it is remarkable what an enormous influence was exerted by speculations which stood in little or no connection with the great literary movement in the centre of Germany.
We are not aware that Kant took any notice of Winckelmann, Lessing, or Goethe. Of Herder he must have known enough, as Herder had been his pupil and was intimate with Hamann, a friend and townsman of Kant's; but it seems that the spirit which breathed in Hamann's and Herder's writings was not congenial to him. Nevertheless, when Kant's teaching was transplanted into the centre of Germany by Reinhold, it produced a deep and lasting impression, not only on philosophical thought but likewise upon general literature and science, and nowhere more than on German æsthetics. This was owing not so much to the systematic treatment which æsthetics received at the hand of Kant in the third 'Critique,' published in 1790, as to sundry prominent ideas which he put forward and which formed starting-points for the speculations of others. It will be of interest if we try to specify these ideas somewhat more closely.

In his first two Critiques Kant had dealt with two problems which were then exercising many thoughtful minds in Germany, but he had dealt with them in a novel and inspiring manner. The philosophy of common-sense, imported from England and popularised by the writers of the 'Aufklärung,' had already put in a fresh way before the thinking mind the two problems of knowledge and practice, the questions, "What can we know?" and "What ought we to do?" But the answer to these questions could not, in Germany, remain in the position which was given to it in those writings. "Common-sense," which in its home had mostly consisted in isolated replies to isolated questions, professed in its
disciples abroad to give a complete Philosophy of Life. To afford this it was deficient in depth and comprehensiveness. It required to be spiritualised and enlivened. The earlier leaders of the new movement in Germany tried to do this by what we now term the sentimental, a phase of literature influenced partly by English writers, but quite as much by the writings of Rousseau. This earlier phase was followed by a new and genuine outburst of true poetry in Goethe, who came under the influence of the English, of Rousseau, of Winckelmann's classicism, of Lessing's criticism, of Herder's naturalism, and of Spinoza's pantheism, but emerged from all these influences with an original though unsystematic philosophy of his own. Compared with this underlying but unwritten philosophy of poetry and art, that of the schools appeared hopelessly dry and shallow. It must have been generally felt that the skeleton of logical forms and moral precepts had to be clothed with something that would give it life, colour, and interest, and which corresponded more with the spirit of the age. In search of it forgotten thinkers, such as Spinoza, were studied. It was, however, Kant who first of all supplied what was wanted, and this in apparent connection with the ruling philosophy of the schools on the one side and those very writings of Locke, Hume, and Reid on the other, which had been superficially absorbed by the popular philosophy of the period. But of the new critical, and especially of the poetical, literature of his country Kant had taken no notice, and it might appear as if his philosophy would not do justice to the poetical and artistic powers of the human mind,—the very side from which the leaders in German literature,
Lessing, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, drew that inspiration which was to elevate the nation out of the flatland of dry rationalism, narrow orthodoxy, and prosaic moralising.

The genesis of Kant's third Critique has been the subject of much writing and many discussions. The edifice of philosophy built up in the first two Critiques seemed incomplete and divided into two independent structures. This circumstance alone may have prompted its author, who delighted beyond measure in architectonic grouping, in symmetry and system, to add a third and completing structure which would unite the different parts into a complete and harmonious whole. But not only had his system appeared externally disunited through its separate treatment of the intellectual and the practical problems, but both treatments had alike emphasised the duality between the intelligible and the sensible, between the real and the phenomenal worlds. That we should remain in perfect ignorance of the underlying reality of things and yet be able, through our senses and our intellect, to create and possess a knowledge which somehow corresponded to this unknown something; that, in practice, we should in the phenomenal world be expected and able to carry out, to some extent at least, a purely abstract principle of action,—both these circumstances pointed to the existence of some correspondence between the Known and the Unknown. Otherwise the world of knowledge and that of action would fall hopelessly asunder in the same way as the system itself which in the first Critique started from the known phenomenal world, and confessed itself unable to find the real, and, in
the second Critique, started from a moral dictum, demanding categorical realisation without being able to show that such was possible. The third Critique professedly aimed at meeting this want, by filling the gap which was left in the architecture as well as in the ideas of the system. The two main conceptions which were introduced for this purpose—though their connection was never satisfactorily explained—were the conception of the Beautiful and the conception of final causes or Ends. To what extent Kant was influenced by the prominent part which isolated questions of taste played in some of his favourite English authors, as well as in Rousseau's writings, or by the recent introduction by Baumgarten of aesthetics as a separate discipline, it is impossible to say. There is, however, no doubt that by assigning to poetry and art, to beauty and the beautiful, a prominent function in the world of thought and in the philosophy of life, he fell in with a current of ideas which was running very strong in the minds and works of the foremost German writers of his age.

Before Kant's 'Theory of the Beautiful' was published, and before it became generally known, Schiller had already speculated independently on the same subject. It was subsequently largely owing to Schiller's appreciation and partial assimilation of Kant's views that the latter were extensively studied. In this respect he did for Kant's aesthetical what Reinhold had done, ten years earlier, for his intellectual and practical philosophy. In addition to this, Schiller was probably the first genuine and great artist who felt the necessity of accompanying his poetical creations by theoretical reflections on the
source, the aims and value of art as a whole, and of the Beautiful in nature and art. With him higher criticism applied to the region of art, went hand in hand with creation. If we except Plato, who may perhaps claim a place among creative artists, what the latter had done, up to the time of Schiller, to establish or perfect a theory of their own activity, consisted in the discussion of isolated questions of taste and technique, such as we find in Horace's "Epistle to the Pisos," and in its many modern imitations, in Leonardo da Vinci's or in Hogarth's fanciful treatise on the line of beauty. Schiller, in fact, went the length of promising a complete philosophy of the Beautiful, which, however, was never written. But what he started—viz., the discussion of art by the artist himself—was followed, or independently taken up, by many of the poets and artists of the nineteenth century, among whom we find such names as Wordsworth and Coleridge, and later on Ruskin and William Morris in England, and in Germany Robert Schumann and Richard Wagner in music.¹

¹ With an increasing philosophical interest in Art and the creative faculty of the artist, there has arisen an historical interest, not only in Art itself but latterly also in the theories of Art; and thus we find, within the last fifty years, attempts made to write the history of Æsthetic. As in other subjects, so also in this, German erudition has furnished the more elaborate works, but this country and Italy have followed with important and original contributions, whilst in France the sociological aspect and value of Art has been discussed by thinkers of very different schools. The earliest of the larger treatises came, curiously enough, from that school of philosophy in Germany in which the problem of the Beautiful was really most meagrely treated, out of the school of Leibniz and Herbart. Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), Professor in Prague and Vienna, published in 1858 his History of Æsthetic as a Philosophical Science." It is written from the Herbartian point of view, aesthetic being considered as a Formwissenschaft. It was followed in 1871 by the History of Æsthetic as the Philosophy of the Beautiful and of Art," by Max Schasler (1819-1903). As the founder and editor for a long
The main point on which Schiller agreed with Kant, even before he knew much of the writings of the latter, was this, that the region of the Beautiful stood in definite relations to that of knowledge (the True) and that of practice (the Good), that among human interests poetry and art occupied a definite place. At the same time he agreed with Kant in maintaining the independence of the three ideals, and opposed the attempt to confuse them or absorb one of them in the others. As he was,

period of some of the foremost Art Magazines in Germany, and, in consequence, not unjustly claiming some freedom from academic pedantry and more practical acquaintance with artistic creations and interests, he nevertheless attaches himself to the definite philosophical tradition which centred in Hegel and was handed down through two of the most original and productive of Hegel's disciples: Karl Rosenkranz (1805-1879) and Fr. Theod. Vischer (1807-1887). Shortly before Schasler's Work there appeared in the Munich Collection of the Histories of Sciences in Germany a very original work on the 'History of German Æsthetics,' by Hermann Lotze. This work is highly subjective, and has accordingly been very differently judged both as to its criticisms and its style, which have been blamed as deficient in decision, definiteness, and simplicity; thus, e.g., by Schasler, by E. von Hartmann (to whom we owe a critical 'Account of German Æsthetics from the point of view of the Philosophy of the Unconscious,' 1886), and by a writer of a very different order, Henri Fr. Amiel (1821-1881), who, in his 'Journal Intime' (ed. E. Scherer, 4 ed., vol. ii. p. 26), confessed himself attracted in the beginning but wearied by a further perusal of the book, coming to the conclusion that "les Allemands entassent les fagots du bucher, les Français apporent les étincelles." Nevertheless, Lotze's work is well worth studying in connection with his own æsthetical teaching, which forms a striking feature in his system, as notably also for its lucid exposition of the æsthetical doctrine of Chr. Herm. Weisse (1801-1866), who, as we shall see, forms a link between Hegel and Lotze himself. As such it seems to have escaped merited attention by the only foremost thinker of this country who has devoted himself to a profound study of the History of Æsthetics, Professor Bernard Bosanquet, to whose original work on this subject (2nd ed., 1904) I am much indebted. Quite recently we have a spirited and original treatment of the subject, also in the light of a special theory, by the eminent Italian thinker, Signor Benedetto Croce. As standing impartially outside of the literature of the three nations who have so far devoted themselves to this subject, his work is especially fresh and interesting. I shall quote from the French translation of the 2nd ed. by Henry Bigot (1904) with the title 'Esthétique comme science de l'expression et linguistique générale.'
however, more of an artist than of an abstract thinker, the doctrine of the independence of Art became magnified in his mind so as to signify the special mission which Art had to fulfil in the origin and progress of culture. Schiller's speculations can be divided into two periods, as has been clearly pointed out by Kuno Fischer. It is incorrect to look upon Schiller merely as a disciple of Kant. His speculations started much earlier than the appearance of Kant's principal work on Aesthetics, which he did not study till he had laid down his own ideas, not only in prose writings and in his correspondence with Körner, but likewise in one of his greatest and most original poems, 'Die Künstler' (1789). On this inspired poem he spent much time, discussing it with friends and other prominent writers, such as Körner, Wieland, and Moritz. But it belongs to the period which preceded his personal association with Goethe and his acquaintance with Kant's theory. In it he puts into a final form his earlier pre-Kantian conception of the place which beauty and art occupy in the evolution of human culture. Two points

1 In his 'Schiller-Schriften' (1892). The second series deals specially with Schiller as a philosopher, and divides the subject into two periods: the earlier pre-Kantian period, falling into the third decade of Schiller's life (1779-1789); the second comprising Schiller's career as an academic teacher (1789-1796).

2 Schiller's speculations in this his first period stood under the influence of Spinoza, Leibniz, and some of the English writers, such as Shaftesbury and Ferguson. They centred in what he termed his Kunst-idee (art-idea). This included the Spinozistic conception that the whole of creation is divine and the Leibnizian idea of a universal harmony and of the world of monads, each of which reflected the whole with more or less distinctness. It has been remarked (e.g., by Lotze, in his 'Geschichte der Aesthetik,' p. 9 sqq.) that Leibniz' system contained important suggestions which might have been developed in the interest of a philosophy of the Beautiful, but that this escaped his immediate followers, such as Baumgarten, Moses Mendelssohn, and others. Nevertheless, such poetical minds as Herder, Schiller, Goethe, and Schelling always felt themselves attracted by Leibniz' ideas, though not by the manner in
are prominently brought forward: the first is, that man, as placed between the purely sensual (animal) and the purely intellectual (superhuman) creation, alone possesses art; this latter flourishes only on the borderland of the higher and lower worlds.\(^1\) The second leading idea is that art or poetry appears in history before science and philosophy; the Beautiful is the portal through which man enters into the region of truth.

Kant had given expression to the first idea in a different form.\(^2\) He had maintained that neither the

which they had been stripped of their poetical interest in the systematic philosophy of the Wolffian school. In addition to the doctrine of the pre-established harmony which led to the conception of the World as a work of beauty and of Divine Art, Leibniz' doctrine of the petites perceptions, the half-illuminated storehouse of the Soul, which formed the abode of the sensations of beauty, lent itself to a twofold, a prosaic and a poetical, interpretation. It might be interpreted as meaning that the Beautiful was an inferior stage in the development of ideas which in Knowledge and Science had to rise to complete clearness and definition, or it might be interpreted as meaning that the human soul contained an inexhaustible store, or fund, of intuitive knowledge on which the intellect with its stricter logical methods could always draw, finding new matter for thought. The immediate followers of Leibniz accepted the former interpretation, and started their æsthetical theories, as Lotze has shown, with a kind of excuse for the necessity of their existence to fill up a gap which had been left in the system, attempting to furnish a kind of logic of sensations, inferior, it is true, to the perfect logic of thought. The other and more inspiring interpretation of Leibniz' doctrine was, consciously or unconsciously, worked out by later idealistic thinkers at a time when Germany had put forward its great creative effort in the realms of poetry and art, an effort which had been wanting or not sufficiently recognised (note the long-delayed appreciation of Sebastian Bach's great musical creation) before the end of the eighteenth century.

1 In industry a bee may be your master, And greater skill a worm may own, Knowledge thou shar'st with Spirits vaster, But Art, oh Man, thou hast alone.

2 A great deal has been written regarding the exact point at which Kantian ideas made themselves felt in the philosophy of the Beautiful, which, as we have seen, was a subject that had occupied Schiller independently. It likewise crops up in the writings of Winckelmann, of Lessing, of Herder, and of Goethe in connection with and suggested by their own poetical and artistic creations. But though their writings abound in valuable hints and aphorisms on the subject, they deal more immediately with definite artistic problems, and they do not get the length of a comprehensive treatment of the problem of the Beautiful in its general-
region of the sensations alone nor that of the intellect alone afforded any room for the aesthetic faculty—i.e., for the appreciation or creation of the Beautiful. He had thrown out the idea—though he had not maintained the existence—of an intuitive intellect as opposed to the discursive intellect with which human beings were endowed. This idea was taken up by some of his followers
in the conception of an intellectual intuition, and, as we shall see, played a great part in their writings. About the time when Schiller became acquainted with Kantian aesthetics a great change had come over his own ideas, and this change was helped on by the study of Kant's works. When Schiller wrote his earlier treatises and the great poem 'The Artists,' he was living under the impression that a new era had dawned upon humanity; it was the short period of repose which in Germany succeeded the wars of Frederick the Great, and preceded the wars of the Revolution. In art, literature, and poetry a new life had started. It was of home growth, but was nourished by influences which came from far and near, from the ancient and the modern world; it had in the eyes of its leaders a cosmopolitan, a humanitarian character. Under this impression Schiller had begun his poem with a glorification of the age which, as it seemed to him, had, through art and poetry, risen to a singular height of calm dignity and repose, opening illimitable vistas into the higher regions of culture. This impression was for a short time heightened by the great promise which the first stages and events of the French Revolution held out to the hopes of many thoughtful observers. But subsequent events soon changed the whole aspect. "Since his 'Künstler' four years had passed, a great volume of stirring world-events had happened, and his view of the height of civilised humanity had been radically changed. Within a short time he had witnessed the outburst of the French Revolution, its destructive storms, the fall of Royalism, the horrors of September, the foundation of the Re-
public, the execution of the King, the victorious beginnings of the Revolutionary wars. The new Republic had given him the right of citizenship; the document (which reached him only after years) was dated August 1792, was signed by Danton and forwarded by Roland. . . . Under the impression of murderous terrorism, overcome by horror and pity, he retracted the high opinion which he had formed of the humanities of the age. The present generation is not ripe for civil, as it is wanting in human, freedom. . . . He had thought that art had furthered the noble work of human education, the fruit of which was human culture and liberty; he had now become convinced that this work had not been done in the present time—it had rather to be held in view, to be begun. The æsthetical education of man, which in his poem he had praised as the work of bygone times, rose before him as the task of the future."

At the same time the conviction must have dawned upon Schiller as it dawned upon many others, that what was needed was not so much an æsthetical as an ethical revival: strict discipline and order, the acknowledgment of duty, reverence for the sacredness and inviolability of a supreme moral law. This was the note that Kant had already struck in the second of his three Critiques. He had there proclaimed, in all rigour and above all compromise, his 'Categorical Imperative.' When Schiller, after an absence of several years, returned to Jena, he met there the second great disciple of Kant's philosophy—Fichte, who had suc-

1 See Kuno Fischer, loc. cit., p. 291 sqq.
ceedeed Reinhold. If Reinhold had been the chief exponent of Kant's intellectualism, Fichte became the still greater exponent of his moral system. He was fully impressed by the necessity of following up Kant's work in that direction. He preached the autonomy of the human will, self-restrained liberty, as the foundation of the moral order and the only guarantee for its maintenance. This elevated idea of human freedom, opposed alike to slavery and to libertinism of every kind, was an ideal not unknown to Schiller, but it was expressed by Kant and Fichte in the most captivating terms. It takes from now a leading part in Schiller's speculations regarding the Beautiful.

At the same time all this indicated a split in the humanistic movement which had centred in Weimar, and of which, by tacit consent, Goethe's person and Muse formed the brilliant focus. A discord had arisen which may be defined by the divergence of the aesthetical and the ethical idealists. The latter, whose leader for a short time was Fichte, saw before them definite practical tasks which had to be clearly set before the age and nation and pushed forward with vigour and self-sacrifice. The serenity of the poetical and artistic atmosphere had become disturbed; those who wished to maintain it had to retire more or less from active life into what Plato termed the world of ideas, into the recesses of their own artistic consciousness, into the region of self-culture, of poetry and artistic creation. Schiller proclaimed this in the last of his philosophical poems: it was termed 'Ideal and Life,' and was published in 1795. Its theme is aesthetical freedom, to be gained by rising,
through the help of art and beauty, out of the evils and limitations of life into the sphere of the Ideal. What Schiller proclaimed Goethe actually carried out. Through his long life he strove to attain to what he termed inner freedom. From this hard-won height he contemplated what was going on around him, elaborated a serene and dignified philosophy of life which he did not teach, but of which he gave lasting testimony in the brilliant productions of his poetic genius. He crowned his life and his work with the unique tragedy of 'Faust,' in which the highest problems of life are treated in a manner consistent with the deepest interests of nineteenth century thought, assimilating the valuable ideas of his age, forecasting in a prophetic manner many developments which to others revealed themselves only gradually during the long course of the century, placing the old problems in a new light and hinting at new ways for their possible solution. Only now, when reviewing, after the lapse of a century, the position which Goethe took up at the time, can we appreciate the great gain which not only German literature, German art, and the German nation, but the whole of the civilised world has reaped through the self-reliance and self-restraint with which Goethe, in those years of strife, tumult, and unsettlement, retired into what appeared to many a sphere of epicurean ataraxy or of egoistic repose. He felt that only by so doing could he fulfil the mission in which he believed, and bring out the truth that was in him. He worked at the definition of problems which exist at all times and everywhere, and are not confined to a special age or a limited society.
To show all this more fully is not my object at present, as Goethe's activity belongs to the sphere of poetical and subjective rather than to that of philosophical thought. An adequate appreciation of his surpassing greatness and influence would properly belong to a different section of this history. In the region of philosophical thought his presence, nevertheless, made itself continually felt, though from outside or from depths which lie hidden below those speculations which found expression in the actual literature or the academic teaching of the age.

It is, however, important for our present purpose to note how the ethical idealism moved away from its birthplace at Jena and Weimar into a larger sphere of action, and became ultimately centred in Berlin and the Prussian State, whence emanated, under the leadership of Prussia's greatest minister, Stein, the anti-Napoleonic revolution of Europe, followed by the wars of Liberation, and later on by the age of Restoration and Reaction. Philosophical thought through this migration did not escape the temptation of allying itself in later years with the aims and doctrines of political and ecclesiastical parties, a circumstance which did not work for its true interests, but contributed much to pull it down from the high level which it had occupied in the earlier years of the century.

Through the severance which thus took place between the literary and artistic work of the nation on the one side and the practical work on the other, the former was left free to follow its own independent course. This had its advantages as well as its disadvantages. Among the former must be reckoned the unhindered pursuit of
philosophical, scientific, and poetical labours for their own sake; among the latter, the fact that German literature and German philosophy became gradually estranged from the practical interests of life, and moved in a region by themselves: from being imaginative they gradually became fantastic. What in Goethe were only passing phases of his poetical development which mutually supplemented each other and contributed to the depth and width of the whole of his matured thought, were singly taken up and exaggerated by a school of poets and artists which assumed the name of Romantic. It was a movement which was sometimes opposed to the classical and sometimes to other interests nearer at hand: thus arose Mediævalism, a return to Roman Catholicism, a love for the remote and the unreal. In all these endeavours we think we can trace at least one common and prominent feature, namely, the desire better to understand and to cultivate the world of the Beautiful, to appreciate it wherever it could be found, and to elevate it to the rank of a living and active principle. This movement found its philosophical expression in the writings and academic teaching of Schelling, who has been appropriately termed the philosopher of romanticism. As romanticism itself was characterised by no definite and fixed aim, but by a variety of interests, so also did Schelling's speculation pass through a succession of different phases, marking rather a great aspiration than a lasting and valuable achievement. It is, however, Schelling's undoubted merit to have done more thoroughly what Schiller had attempted before him, namely, to have conceived of
the beautiful, not as a casual and fanciful attribute of certain things or mental states but as an independent revelation of the essence of reality, of the truly Real. "It was of high value to look upon beauty, not as a stranger in the world, not as a casual aspect afforded by some phenomena under accidental conditions, but as the fortunate revelation of that principle which permeates all reality with its living activity; it was of value that this idealism put an end to merely psychological theories which reduced the beautiful to a convenient coincidence of external impressions with our subjective habits of thought; and, on the contrary, sought in every object of beauty its objective meaning in the connection of a comprehensive world-plan; it was of value to recognise in all those formal properties of continuity, of unity in multiplicity, and of comprehensiveness upon which actually our aesthetic feeling rests, the actual forms in which the eternal ground of everything has voluntarily unfolded itself; and, lastly, it was of value to look upon art likewise not as an accidental play of human powers which might also be wanting, but as a necessary stage in that series of developments which form the essential nature and life of the Eternal and truly Real."  

1 Lotze, 'Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland' (p. 125 sqq.). This passage may serve as a convenient opportunity to define more precisely the object before us in treating of the Beautiful as a problem of philosophical thought. Leaving out of consideration the views developed in ancient times by Plato, Aristotle, and especially by Plotinus, as to the place of the Beautiful and of Art in a comprehensive theory of the world and of life, we do not find (with the solitary exceptions, perhaps, of St Augustine's 'Beauty of the Universe' and Leibniz's 'Pre-established Harmony,' neither of which was developed in the interest of a philosophy of the Beautiful) the problem treated in this larger spirit till we come to German philosophy in the last
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

In this passage, taken from Lotze's 'History of Æsthetics in Germany,' various theories are touched upon which philosophers before Schelling had framed regarding special questions and problems in which the larger comprehensive problem of the Beautiful had presented itself to them. These theories can be divided into two classes. Notably to the earlier English philo-

third of the eighteenth century, and there we find it introduced, as stated in the text, from two sides: first, in the interest of an aspiring conception of the task of education; and, secondly, as a connecting link between the two great divisions of Kant's doctrine. These two interests met for the first time with full appreciation in Schiller, and his influence in this sense cannot be overestimated. The direction which, through this combination, was given to philosophical thought, and which helped materially to raise it to a level which it had not occupied since the time of Plato, is very largely owing to him, and this has been recognised from very different sides in the historical treatment of Æsthetics and Philosophy by Hegel, Kuno Fischer, Lotze, and Schasler, although his dependence on Kant has sometimes been overestimated.

"Full of the warmest reverence for Kant, subjecting the mobility of his poetic mind to Kant's severe training, he tried to reconcile the rich intuitions of an artistic consciousness with the ever-present maxims of his master," embodying his reflections "in that brilliant series of æsthetical dissertations which form, for all time, one of the finest ornaments of our [German] national literature" (Lotze, loc. cit., p. 87). In consequence of this the problem of the Beautiful has, first in Germany, and later in France, England, and Italy, become of importance in philosophical thought: æsthetics has been enriched by a new chapter. It is only with this that we have to do at present. The large volume of art-criticism based upon a study of the masterpieces in poetry, art, and composition in its various branches, and the attempt to arrive at standards, rules, and canons of taste do not enter into the history of philosophical thought, although treatises of æsthetics very frequently intermix what we may term the rational and the empirical treatment. As in the case of the problem of Knowledge we did not occupy ourselves with the details of logical doctrine, and shall not hereafter, when treating of the ethical problem, deal with the detail of systems of morality, so we are not now interested in the detail of æsthetical theories dealing with different arts in their historical development. The fact that many of the best writers on these subjects have got their inspiration from a very different quarter—viz., from the source of purely individual thought—shows that æsthetics, as well as science, logic, ethics, and theology, as a separate body of doctrine, has its root and origin, not so much in philosophical reflection as in the needs of practice or in the more hidden recesses of the human soul.
sophers to whom I referred above, such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, two questions presented themselves. First, the question as to the origin, in the human soul, of the distinction which we make between the Beautiful and its opposite; and, secondly, the further question: What distinguishes beautiful things from their opposite? The former was a psychological, the latter a metaphysical, question. This distinction, which deals with the psychological origin of the sensations of beauty on the one side and with the definition of beauty on the other—the subjective and the objective aspect of beauty,—runs parallel with a similar treatment of the ethical problem which also divided itself into the two questions: How does the moral judgment arise in the human soul? and, What is the criterion of goodness? In the two cases we may say that a distinction was made between the questions as to the moral or æsthetical sense possessed by human beings and the question as to the criterion of the good and the beautiful. The two discussions, that referring to the beautiful or matters of taste and that referring to the good or matters of duty and obligation, were frequently mixed up, a clear distinction between the morally and the æsthetically beautiful being overlooked or wellnigh extinguished. This led to a kind of æstheticism in morals and to moralising in matters of taste, which did much havoc, especially among many of the German writers of the 'Aufklärung.' It was one of Kant's merits to have put an end to this sensualism and æstheticism in morals, and to have emphasised again the stern sense of duty not only as the foundation of morality but also as the most im-
important problem in all philosophy. To the conception of the good and of moral obligation, which constitute the supreme interest of life, he opposed that which pleases us without any ulterior or personal interest. The beautiful, according to him, is an object and source of disinterested pleasure. By this view, however, he suppressed an aspect of the question which was taken up by later thinkers, and is now familiar to us—the aspect according to which both the beautiful and the good have their origin psychologically in the idea of value or worth which we attach to things or actions, and which points to the existence of certain standards possessed by the human mind. According to these we judge external things and human actions, and assign to them a certain value. The difference between the aesthetical and the ethical value is this, that the latter always implies and is accompanied by a sense of obligation.

A second series of discussions, to which Lotze refers, turned upon the subdivision of the beautiful. For instance, how is the beautiful distinguished from that which is merely pleasant and agreeable? to what extent and why does utility please? These discussions led to what has been termed Utilitarianism and Eudæmonism in aesthetics and in questions of art. One of the favourite points of discussion was that regarding the difference between the Sublime and the Beautiful. On this subject Edmund Burke had published, in 1756, his celebrated 'Essay.' It was translated and much read in Germany, and became suggestive to Kant, as well as independently to Schiller, who both framed theories based upon this distinction.
A further very important view regarding the nature of the beautiful referred to in the passage quoted above is its supposed casual and accidental nature. When Kant found himself unable to establish a clear connection between the intelligible and the phenomenal worlds, either in his intellectual or in his practical philosophy, the fact did not escape him that, in single though isolated instances both in nature and in human life, the distance by which substance and form were usually kept apart appeared to be annulled; the form appearing expressive of definite meaning, and the substance or content revealing itself almost perfectly in its formal representation; both form and substance, in fact, appearing completely adequate and mutually exhaustive. Such instances, which are rare and isolated, and, as it were, fortunate coincidences, come to us as surprises, as glimpses into the hidden harmony of things, and fill us with that peculiar joy and satisfaction which constitute the real nature of æsthetical pleasure. The artist himself, who is able to create such instances and afford this insight or revelation, does so by the force of his genius, in an unexplained and unaccountable manner working within him. This view led Schiller, in the second period of his æsthetical speculations, to a celebrated theory which has, in more recent times, been independently revived in this country by Herbert Spencer.

This theory was worked out in a series of letters which Schiller wrote to the Duke of Augustenburg, and which were afterwards published in the periodical named 'The Hours.' In it Schiller finds the origin of art in
the instinct or impulse to "Play"; he conceives of man as rising out of a complete dependence on nature, and as exhibiting a superabundance of life and energy in the freedom of Play. "The animal plays when a superabundance of life stimulates it into action." This is the lowest stage of play, which in a higher stage becomes creative. Play creates a world and forms of its own. This world of its own is the world of semblance or beautiful appearance. This appearance may be gained by imitation or by free action, but imitation becomes beautiful and real when it rises to independence; and free action becomes beautiful when it contains within itself its own end, when it is not only the means but an end in itself. Thus, before man is ripe for the exercise of moral freedom he passes through the stage of æsthetical freedom; before the seriousness of life sets in, the child is introduced to the sphere of freedom through play; it learns to use its powers without constraint before it advances to the use of them for a definite end and purpose. The unconstrained freedom of play, within the limits of the beautiful, precedes the self-constrained freedom of action according to the moral law. It has been remarked that Schiller's speculations contain an antinomy, an inherent contradiction. "Two questions press upon us. We are told that out of the æsthetical stage the moral is produced easily and with certainty, and as such is and remains the higher. On the other side we are assured that with the æsthetical condition the moral is already fulfilled, that its task is performed, that therefore moral exertion is not any more required but
has become superfluous. . . . Schiller distinguishes three stages in the development of mankind: the physical, the æsthetical, and the moral. In the first stage we are controlled by the force or might of things, and experience the world as a 'dark and hidden' fatality; in the second we liberate ourselves from this power; in the third we control it.”

As Kuno Fischer has shown, Schiller has not solved this contradiction. With one foot he stands within the rigorism of Kant’s ethics, with the other he stands in the world of the artist or poet, and draws the picture of the beautiful soul in which the highest moral law is obeyed, not as the result of a conflict, but as the inevitable outcome of its own beautiful nature. The letters on the “æsthetical education of mankind” were succeeded by the essay on “Naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung.” This is probably among Schiller’s philosophical essays the one which possesses most permanent value. In it he has attained a complete understanding of the great change which had come over modern art and poetry in his age, to which he himself so largely contributed, and of which his own later works belong to the most brilliant examples. To this insight he had risen through a third influence which made itself felt during the last decade of the eighteenth century, namely, the influence not only of Goethe’s works but of Goethe’s personality. Schiller’s early speculations upon art and poetry went hand in hand with the first period of his greater poetical productions. He then lived under the influence of the neo-classical ideal. When this was destroyed or was found to be inadequate, he
for a short time came under the extreme influence of
Kant's and Fichte's philosophy with its ethical rigorism.
He stood for a moment in danger of giving up poetry
for philosophy, but his poetical genius asserted its
supremacy again and was led to higher activity through
his contact with Goethe. With the last of his philo-
sophical essays, just mentioned, and the last of his
philosophical poems, he retired from the field of specula-
tion and entered into the last and greatest phase of
his creative productivity.

In the course of his various speculations, and through
his intercourse and correspondence with Körner, Goethe,
and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schiller had arrived at a
more or less definite conception that two new problems
presented themselves to the thinker on art: the problem
of the beautiful had become much more complicated.
These two new problems had likewise occupied Goethe's
prolonged thought, though his occupation with them
was never methodical and continuous.¹ They can

¹ The question, how to deal with
Goethe in a history of German
thought, is as important and diffi-
cult as it will be, how to deal with
Ruskin in a history of more recent
thought on which he has had a very
marked and—so far as that of the
Continent is concerned—a growing
influence. As to Goethe, historians
of aesthetics have had difficulty in
assigning to him a definite place, or
have, like Lotze, von Hartmann, and
B. Croce, left him out altogether;
and this has also been his fate in
most of the German histories of
philosophy. In the plan of this
work a discussion of his many-
sided intellectual activity, including
the thought revealed in his poeti-
cal creations, should belong to the
third section. Nevertheless, it may
be noted here that it is probably
owing mainly to his influence that
Schelling in his speculations was
led away from the direct line indi-
cated by Kant and Fichte through
the philosophy of nature and that
of art into the region of the
spiritual and mystical, somewhat
analogous to the various stages
described in the second part of
Goethe's 'Faust.' Schelling was,
though no doubt only for a short
time, under the influence of Schiller,
yet he was much more attracted
by Goethe's love of nature; whereas Hegel, though referring
to Goethe, laid more stress upon
the stimulus which Schiller had
imparted to German speculation at
be best understood by pointing to the difference between Art and Beauty. This difference became emphasised as soon as poets and artists on the one side, and writers on art on the other, took a wider view than had been the custom both with the artists and the critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; when the former evolved a style of their own, and the latter ceased to lay down formal rules. In two directions the view was widened. It was widened first through the growing love of nature, through the re-

the end of the eighteenth century. For the English mind a very spirited and interesting but somewhat superficial picture of Goethe was drawn by G. H. Lewes, and this defect was not removed even by Carlyle’s sympathetic Essays, and still less by the oft-quoted passage from Matthew Arnold (‘Memorial Verses,’ 1850), where he said—

"The end is everywhere, 
Art still has truth, take refuge there!"

The latter marks only a passing phase in Goethe’s as well as in Schiller’s thought, which is readily explained by the hopeless conditions which surrounded them, following on the track of revolution and war. Out of this Goethe had, for a time, withdrawn into the serene atmosphere of classicism in art and poetry; but the classical ideal could not, in the long run, satisfy his nature, and after giving living testimony to it in some of his most perfect works, he again returned to a conception of art in its relation not only to nature but also to practical life and its deeper ethical and religious interests. And here we must note a neglected side in Goethe’s philosophy of life: his appreciation of human labour, of the dignity of honest and useful work, even of simple handicraft or manual toil. It has perhaps not been generally recognised, though it is pointed out by Bosanquet (‘History of Art’; p. 306), how a kindred spirit actuated the two greatest unsystematic philosophers of the nineteenth century, Goethe and Ruskin: “Goethe’s short paper, ‘German Architecture’ [1775], is perhaps the profoundest aesthetic utterance of the eighteenth century. For in it we have the germ of those ideas which were to find their full expression eighty years after in the chapter on the ‘Nature of Gothic’ in Mr. Ruskin’s ‘Stones of Venice.’ I fear that the indifference of our philosophic historians to the former utterance is but too well explained by their unfamiliarity with the latter and all that it implies. The relation of all work to the life of the individual workman is not indeed insisted on by Goethe, but the point of view which he adopted was one in which this relation was necessarily involved.” Two prominent articles of a practical religious creed were common to both thinkers; the blessing and dignity of useful labour carried on with reverence for a spiritual end. It does not appear as if Schelling had appreciated this side of Goethe’s conception of Art.

VOL. IV.
cognition of natural as differing from artistic beauty: or—if we like to put it in a different way which suggested itself very early—we may say, if beauty and art are to be convertible terms, nature must be looked upon as an artist and, *vice versa*, the artist must be looked upon as producing his works after the same fashion as Nature or the Creator has produced natural things—viz., through a conscious or unconscious but inevitable impulse. The second problem which presented itself was the relation of the work of art to the personality of the artist and to the idea which it had to express. It was recognised that modern, as distinguished from ancient art, had a different function to perform. To express this, Schiller had written the last of his philosophical essays. In this he distinguished ancient from modern art, the former being naïve, the latter suggestive. The former appeared in its greatest models, such as those of Greek Sculpture (which Winckelmann had studied) or the Epics of Homer (then brought into prominence by Voss and F. A. Wolf), to have attained to a complete harmony of form and content. Such works were complete in themselves, neither pointing to an ulterior purpose nor suggesting glimpses into something beyond. On the other side, modern works of art, of which the great poem of Dante and the great works of the Italian painters may be considered to be examples, pointed to a higher and far-off world of ideas which they aimed at representing, into which they opened out illimitable vistas or momentary glimpses. Schiller expressed the difference by saying that ancient classic art excelled through Limitation,
modern art through recognising the illimitable, the Infinite; he further explained the difference by referring to his own experience. He was, according to his own confession, so much occupied, during the earlier phases of his poetic creations, with a desire to represent the ideal, to embody a higher meaning in poetical form and language, that he was blind to the naïveté or immediateness both of Shakespeare and Homer, in whose works we meet with a living creation behind which the personality of the author disappears, remaining unknown and unapproachable, and which are intelligible and impressive without explanation. Goethe had already pointed to the peculiar character of Gothic art and to that of Albrecht Dürer, as exhibiting the aspirations and workmanship of the artist. Many of the works of more modern artists, notably of the French and Dutch schools, would also suggest to the student and thinker the existence of works of art of high technical merit which do not come, or which come only slightly, into the region of the Beautiful.

Out of these various discussions which were carried on in a lively and stimulating manner in Schiller’s periodical, ‘The Hours,’¹ the distinction between the

¹This “Monthly” was started by Schiller in the year 1794. It followed upon an earlier serial, ‘Thalia.’ Between them they contain Schiller’s two most important and mature aesthetical essays: the first (in the ‘Thalia,’ 1793) was entitled “Anmut und Würde,” and testifies to the strong influence which Kant’s philosophy had upon Schiller’s conceptions of Art and the Beautiful. It drew after it an appreciative reference by Kant himself in the second edition of his work, ‘Religion within the Limits of mere Reason.’ Schiller had read Kant’s work with the greatest interest, but had revolted against Kant’s doctrine of the “radical evil inherent in human nature,” though he admitted that Kant’s arguments were unanswerable. His own Essay on “Grace and Dignity” gave him an opportunity to oppose Kant’s rigorism. In this controversy with Kant two expressions have become
significance and the beauty of a work of art, between
the idea and the form, became more and more clarified.
The discussion was further enriched by the introduction
of a new term, the "Characteristic." It was maintained
that Art has to represent the characteristic, not the
Ideal.

I have frequently had occasion to point out how
various lines of thought which strove indefinitely to
give expression to a hidden conception were brought
together through the introduction of some novel word or
celebrated. Schiller allowed that
"Kant's ethics were necessary, considering the lax morality of the
age; he became the Drako of his
age because he did not consider it
worthy and ready to receive a
Solon," but added further on,"How
have the children of the household
deserved it that he [Kant] should
only look after the servants." The
philosophical question was, How was
freedom, the autonomous nature of
the moral law, compatible with the
radical propensity to evil? moral
beauty and grace would become
impossible. To this Kant replied
by a celebrated simile, "Only after
vanquishing the monsters was
Hercules introduced to the Muses,
who, on their part, shrank from
that severe task." This symbol of
Kant's has, so Kuno Fischer says,
suggested to Schiller one of the
finest verses in his latest philo-
sophical poem, "Das Ideal und
das Leben." Goethe, on the other
hand, missed in Schiller's treat-
ment a real appreciation of natural
beauty, and felt even personally
offended by some passages which
he supposed were directed against
his own position; but an approxi-
mation of the poets was soon to
follow, and after it we have in
'The Hours' that last and most
important of Schiller's æsthetical
essays named in the text; it had
the full appreciation of Goethe
himself. In contrasting Realism and
Idealism in poetry, in art, and in
the whole of human endeavour,
Schiller has opened out illuminat-
ing aspects of great importance:
"His ideas and reflections have
borne fruit everywhere, and have
exerted a distinct influence on many
regions of thought. They have
flowed, as Gervinus remarks, into
the minutest arteries of our [Ger-
man] national culture. We carry
them about in our minds not know-
ing whence they come. Especially
in criticism and literary history,
the philosophy of art and culture
are immensely indebted to Schiller.
Those distinctions have, under
different names, made the run of
the whole world, and they laid
(according to an expression of
Goethe) the first foundation of all
modern æsthetic; for all synony-
mous conceptions which have been
put forward, antique and modern,
Hellenic and Romantic, popular
and artistic, are only sports and
variations of those fundamental dis-
tinctions brought out by Schiller" (Berger's 'Schiller,' vol. ii. p. 294; see also Goethe, Werke, section ii.,
vol. ii. p. 53).
term, which serves as a kind of resting-place in the development of ideas, giving temporary satisfaction and a basis for further discussion. It forms, as it were, the synthesis or bringing together of many and varied contributions, and prepares the application of the reverse process of analysis and explication. Thus we find in more recent times that the word Evolution has exercised such a function, bringing together or focalising many stray thoughts and indefinite suggestions, affording for a moment the triumphant feeling that a new step had been taken forward, a new and comprehensive aspect gained, and that it only required further explication and unfolding in order to bring in a rich harvest of results. To the historian such definite steps never present themselves as final, the focus is soon lost again and the rays of light scattered, the rest and satisfaction afforded proved to have been only temporary. As such we must regard the introduction of the term Characteristic, and the philosophies which made use of it, such as the philosophy of Schelling. It is, however, of value to see how, in the term "Characteristic," various attributes were united by which artists and thinkers of that age tried to define to themselves the objects of art or the nature of the Beautiful. The word itself had been first introduced by two friends of Goethe, and the conception had then been criticised by Goethe himself. To him the characteristic was, as it were, the skeleton around which both nature and the artist threw the definite form which produced the beautiful object. We know—and I have elsewhere had occasion to refer to it—how Goethe was impressed by the platonic conception of ideas as the
archetypes which, in the real world, found only an imperfect expression; how he for a long time sought for the "Urpflanze," for the original or typical plant from which all other plants are ideally or actually derived; how he sought in his optical theories for the "Urphänomen" or ground-phenomenon, which would lead him to an artistic understanding of the world of colour. To others, again, the word characteristic implied unity and consistency, and, lastly, the character of a creation of art or nature places itself, as it were, between the idea which is too general and the individual object which is too particular, being only one of many representations of it. Kant had already emphasised the necessity of finding a middle term between reason, as the faculty of ideas, and the world of the senses which contains many things and examples.

In a charming essay which Goethe wrote for an art journal entitled 'The Collector and his Friends' (1799) he gives, not without some quiet irony, a description of the different views on art which were at that time current and much discussed. Without referring specially to Schiller's Play-theory, he finds two indispensable elements in every work of art, the element of seriousness and the element of play. Neither alone will produce either beauty or perfection or truth in art. The serious element alone leads only to imitation, to faithfulness in detail, or, on a higher level, to character; Play alone leads only to fancy or to ornamentation or to sketchiness; but, united, these different extremes produce the attributes of a true work of art; imitation joined with fancy produces artistic truth; character with
ornamentation or grace produces beauty, and the sketch becomes perfect only by the elaboration of detail. This charming effusion of Goethe's, a piece of fiction in letters and dialogue, must have been before the mind of Schelling when he wrote and delivered before the Academy of Munich, nine years later, his celebrated address "on the relation of the fine arts to nature." He there succeeds in giving a yet correcter expression of what must have been an underlying thought in Goethe's mind. The passage is worth repeating in full: "How does it come about that to every person of fairly educated taste imitations of so-called reality which are so close as to become deceptive, appear nevertheless to be untrue, that they make the impression of spectres; whereas a work of art in which a thought is dominant captivates with a full power of truth, placing you as it were in the truly real world? How does it come to pass except through the, more or less, hidden feeling which declares that thought is the only living principle in things, everything else being without substance, a vain shadow? On the same ground all the reverse instances are explained which are brought up as examples to show how nature has been surpassed by art. If the artist stays the rapid current of man's years, combining the power of developed

1 The term characteristic had been introduced by Hirt (1759-1836), had been commended by Goethe in correspondence with his friend Meyer, and had then been playfully treated in the Dialogue mentioned in the text. It has, however, been correctly remarked, e.g., by Bielchowsky, loc. cit., vol. iii. p. 238), that for Goethe himself these marked differences, expressed by the terms Real, Ideal, and Characteristic, do not exist, as his view was eminently synoptic, and averse, as we have seen before (vol. iii. p. 608), to minute analysis and philosophical distinctions.

2 Published in Schelling's 'Werke,' sec. i., vol. vii. pp. 289 sqq.
manhood with the tender charm of early youth, or showing a mother with grown-up sons and daughters in the full possession of healthy beauty: what does he else than remove that which is unessential, time? If, according to the remark of one who well knows, every product of nature has only one moment of truly perfect beauty, we may also say that it has only one moment of full and complete existence. In this moment it is what it is through all eternity: outside of this it is only becoming or vanishing. Art, representing its essence in that very moment, lifts it out of the sequence of time: she lets it appear in its true being, in the eternity of its own life.”

Had Schelling been content to remain at this point of his speculations, he would have saved himself and his admirers the many disappointments of his later career. When he delivered his address, which ranks in substance as well as in form as one of the finest specimens of writing in the German language, he was already passing into a different stage of his philosophy. His words were rather a reminiscence of bygone days when his orbit coincided for a moment with that of his older and greater contemporary, Goethe. The latter, with the true instinct and genius of the poet and artist, was spared the temptation and the desire of following his theories into their logical consequences. Schelling lived always on the borderland of poetry and science. The greatest that he has done resembles his own description of works of art; they are only true to reality for a moment, they are momentary glimpses resembling

1 Loc. cit., p. 302.
poetical visions and, on closer examination, reveal their ephemeral transient character. Thus during the earlier period of his career when he lived, wrote, and lectured in Jena and Weimar, he thought that he had found in the Beautiful and in Art the consummation of his philosophical system, the revelation of the Absolute or truly Real; but the solution satisfied him only for a moment.

In his system of Transcendental Idealism, which was published in the year 1800, Schelling had passed through that phase of philosophical development in which he assigned to Art the highest function. He had there attained to what he considered a higher position than that occupied by his predecessor Fichte. The latter's interest was centred in the ethical problem. For him the conscious self was the beginning, its development in the sphere of self-constrained freedom, the end of life and the problem of philosophy. From this point of view he had neglected nature. His career coincided momentarily with that of Schiller, but he never did justice to the spirit of Goethe's implied but unwritten philosophy of nature. This was reserved for Schelling, who realised that a better understanding of the problems formulated by Kant on the one side, and forming the deeper interests of the new era of culture on the other, could only be attained by moving the centre of thought away from the extreme subjective position of Fichte, by recognising the underlying unity of nature and mind. Accordingly, Schelling took up in real earnest an idea thrown out by Kant. Goethe himself had done the same, as he explained in a series of autobiographical
memoranda which seem to refer to that period. The drift of the argument which was systematically developed by Schelling may be found in a short reference of Goethe's entitled 'Intuitive Judgment.' He there refers to his desire to utilise, if not to penetrate, Kant's speculation in the third of his Critiques, admitting that this attempt had wellnigh driven him to desperation. "In this respect," Goethe says, "the following passage [viz., from Kant] seemed to me to be most important: 'We can imagine an intellect which, not being discursive like our own, but intuitive, proceeds from the synthetically universal, the sight of a whole as such, to the particular, i.e., from the whole to its parts.—Not that it is at all necessary to prove that such an intellectus

1 These are contained in the 11th vol. of the 2nd section of the Weimar edition of Goethe's Works. The passage referring mainly to Kant's influence is to be found on p. 47 sqq. After explaining that he listened with interest to the manifold discussions which arose in the circle of his friends over the First and Second 'Critiques' of Kant, without being able to penetrate beyond the introduction and below the surface, Goethe continues: "But now the 'Critique of Judgment' came into my hands, and to it I owe a most joyful period of my life. Here I saw my most disparate occupations brought together; the creations of art and nature treated one like the other, aesthetic and teleological judgments mutually illuminating each other. Though my manner of regarding things could not always fit into that of the author, if here and there I found something wanting, yet the great leading ideas of the book were analogous to my own; the creating, doing and thinking of the inner life of art as well as that of nature, both acting from within, were clearly expressed in the book. The productions of these two infinite worlds were to be there for their own sakes, near each other and for each other, but not intentionally in consequence of each other. . . . I rejoiced that the art of the poet and the comparative study of things natural were so intimately related, both submitting to the same power of judgment." Goethe then goes on to remark that the Kantians could not follow his interpretation of Kant, but that his discussions with Schiller led the latter to consider the difference of ancient and modern poetry, and resulted in his Essay on 'Naive and Sentimental Poetry,' which became the foundation of all modern aesthetics. In the sequel of these biographical memoranda we come upon the passage quoted in the text.
archetypus is possible, but only that we, in contrast to
our own discursive intellect which requires images
(intellectus ectypus), ... are led to the idea of an
intellectus archetypus, and that it contains no contra-
diction. It appears, indeed, as if the author here
referred to a Divine intellect; but if we are to elevate
ourselves in the moral region through the belief in
God, Virtue, and Immortality, into a higher sphere,¹
the same might conceivably take place in the intel-
lectual region; we might through the contemplation
[sight] of an ever-creating nature become worthy to
take an intellectual part in her creations. Had I not
indeed unconsciously and through a hidden impulse,
untiringly striven for the ground-form and the typical,
even though I had succeeded in building up a natural
exposition, nothing would now prevent me from courage-
ously facing what the old man of Königsberg termed
'the adventure of reason' itself."

This is exactly what Schelling attempted to do in
philosophy. He placed himself, as it were, at the root
or beginning of things, and conceived of nature and
mind as emanating from the same source, from a state
of indifference or identity, forming the two sides of the
world-process—the unconscious and the conscious. His
earlier writings were accordingly concerned with tracing
the different stages of this twofold development, the
former in the philosophy of nature, the latter in the
philosophy of mind. At the end of this he points
out that what philosophy has done in detail and
in elaborating an intellectual intuition must at last

¹ As Kant pointed out in his 'Practical Philosophy.'
become a reality, a living representation, and he conceives that this is attained through Art. Art rises at once out of the initial and undefined intuition and, at the same time, supersedes the painful elaboration of detail in the philosophical exposition. In this way he combines the intellectual intuition of Kant with the aesthetical intuition of Schiller. He admits that philosophy as philosophy can never become objective and general; it becomes so only in the sphere of art. "The one thing which possesses absolute objectivity is Art; take away from art its objectivity and it ceases to be what it is and becomes philosophy; give this objectivity to philosophy and it ceases to be philosophy and becomes art.—Philosophy, indeed, attains to the highest, but she brings to this height, as it were, only a fraction of the whole man. Art brings the whole man to this height, i.e., to the comprehension of the highest, and on this depends the eternal distinction and the wonder of Art." ¹

From this position Schelling takes a further step forward. He had conceived philosophy as rising out of poetry, as indeed his own philosophy was an attempt to put into systematic form what Schiller and Goethe and the poetic genius of the age conceived intuitively. This poetical intuition he had made the postulate and starting-point of his philosophy. At the end of it he conceived of poetry and art as the consummation of the system, saying finally: "All the single streams flow back again into the ocean of poetry from whence they

¹ The passages quoted in the text are to be found on the last pages of Schelling's 'System of Transcendental Idealism' (1800) re-printed in the 'Collected Works,' sec. i., pp. 327-634.
had come." But he demands, further, an intermediate stage or medium through which this return is effected. This middle term he finds in Mythology. Every great poet and artist, every poetical age, creates its own mythology. "How such a new mythology [or as we might say Symbolism], which is not the creation of a single poet but of a new age which represents as it were one poet, can come into existence, this is a problem the solution of which depends only upon the coming events in the world and the further course of history." ¹

This passage may be considered as giving expression to a central idea which was taken up in many different ways and by different representatives of the thought of the age. For Schelling it meant the renewed study of a subject which had occupied him in the earliest years of his speculation, the mythology of the different nations, notably of the classical nations. In that school of poetry and literature which in Germany was opposed to the classical as the Romantic school, the same idea was taken up in an extreme form, as indicating the liberation of philosophical as well as of poetical thought from the strict rules of reasoning on the one side and from the limitations of the classical models on the other side. It led there to much that was fantastic and irregular. This development, in its further course, threw off many brilliant suggestions as well as poetical creations, but, where it was not controlled by or subservient to historical studies and the critical spirit, it ended in arbitrariness and barren subjectivism. A well-known example both of the brilliant achievements and of the unsatis-

¹ Ibid., p. 629.
factory endings of this romantic movement is to be found in the lectures and writings of Friedrich Schlegel.

Schelling himself took no part in this one-sided development, but through a study of mythology was led away towards that of the religious spirit. In these studies, of which he only gave fragmentary evidence in his later writings, he laid great stress upon the historical genesis and growth of the different sides of human culture. This again was as much a result of influences which surrounded him as it was inherent in, and eminently characteristic of, his whole philosophical attitude.

We may now sum up in a few words what the philosophical problem of the Beautiful had gained in the writings, and through the personal influence, of Schelling. It had first of all been brought into immediate contact with the central philosophical, the metaphysical problem, the problem of reality, and it had been brought also immediately into contact with the problem of nature as well as the problem of history or humanity. Henceforward no philosophical writer who desired to do justice to the subject could afford to ignore the problem of the Beautiful. Any conception pertaining to the whole of nature and life would have to deal with the Beautiful not merely as a subjective or accidental phenomenon but as something that touches or reveals the innermost core of reality. With this great truth Schelling, following upon Schiller and with the spirit of Goethe in the background, impressed the early period of the nineteenth century, and he did this as much through the originality of his own speculations as by absorbing ideas which were
floating about in the intellectual and artistic atmosphere which surrounded him. If, nevertheless, his writings are now rarely studied, we must attribute this not to the want of finish of his exposition and style, but to the absence of an element of which that age was particularly proud, not to say boastful: the strictness and rigour of logical method.¹

¹ Nevertheless Schelling's writings abound in luminous passages on special subjects of art and poetry, as has been recognised by later writers. Prof. Bosanquet has, inter alia, made Schelling's remarkable paper on Dante the basis of his treatment of the subject in chap. vii. of his 'History of Esthetic.' He has also pointed out (p. 326) how Schelling's statement "that Naturphilosophie is the first adumbration of the future world-mythology, may be taken as an anticipation of the Modern Painters in as far as the essence of the latter work is to disclose the rational and symbolic content of natural phenomena." Another instance of Schelling's anticipation of later artistic movements and discussions in artistic schools may be found in the fact that already, in the year 1807, he had written the following passage in which he emphatically states that the birth of modern art in Italy did not consist in an imitation of the antique, but in a return to an original study of nature: "The demand that art, like every other living thing, must start with the first beginnings, and in order to celebrate its revival must always return to them, may appear to be a severe precept in an age which has so frequently been told how it finds the highest beauty formed already in existing works of art, and that it could, therefore, with one step arrive at its goal. Have we not the excellent and perfect before us, and how should we go back to the primitive and the uniformed? Had the great founders of modern art thought in this wise we should never have seen their wonders. ... The assimilation of a beauty which they had not gained for themselves, and which was therefore unintelligible to them, did not satisfy their artistic instinct which went straight to the root out of which the Beautiful was freely to create itself anew with original power. They, therefore, did not shrink from appearing simple, artless, and dry if compared with those sublime antiques, sheltering art for a long time in an unseemly bud till the time of graceful unfolding should come. How is it that we still gaze at the works of those old Masters from Giotto down to Raphael's teacher, in a devout spirit as it were, even with a certain predilection, if not because the truthfulness of their endeavour and the deep earnestness of their self-imposed limitation commands our esteem and admiration" (see the Munich Address, 'Works,' 1st sec., vol. vii. p. 324). This was written thirty years before the pre-Raphaelite movement, following on the return to nature under the guidance of Wordsworth, Turner, Constable, and Ruskin in this country.
What that age demanded was more than a poetical and artistic expression of the truth which it believed to be within its reach; it was a strictly logical, or, as it was called, scientific treatment and exposition. This was required in the interests of academic teaching, and also in opposition to the arbitrariness and the vagaries of the romantic school. The suggestiveness of Schelling's writings, lectures, and addresses was widely recognised, but also the want of a definite method through which his ideas could be more closely defined, developed, and applied. This method was supplied by Hegel. The vague idea of development which governed the speculations of Schelling—but which with him, as also with Goethe, did not really get beyond the search for distinct types, or what Schelling called powers or stages—was to be more clearly set out. This was to be done by a new logic which not only should study the formal side of the thinking process but should take in real earnest the suggestion that thought was in some form or other at the root of everything, and that the conscious process of thinking, known to us by introspection, was symbolical of the life and unfolding of the world-spirit. To show this in the abstract was the task of Hegel's Logic. Hegel had already, in the 'Phenomenology of the Mind,' clearly defined the position which he took up as distinguished from Schelling; he there breaks with the idea of an æsthetical or intellectual intuition. He desires that this should be replaced by clear and transparent thought, that Sight should be replaced by Knowledge. The Absolute or ground of everything does not live in polar contrasts, or identity of opposites; it is a definite idea
or content, and the object of philosophy is to show this, and by following its development through the various regions of natural and mental life, of history, art, and culture, to reach a fuller definition of this underlying idea, and of its recurrent forms, phases, and stages of development.

It may at once be remarked that for the carrying out of such a scheme the psychological study of the human mind suggested two definite and distinct principles, which we can define as the intellectual and the practical. It is characteristic also of that age that the practical side which in the philosophy of Kant and Fichte had attained to supremacy was pushed into the background in favour of the intellectual or contemplative side. That age desired, above all, to understand reality better. The great changes which had taken place, first in the region of higher culture and still more in politics and society, had taken the world by surprise. The progress of science, in the larger sense of the word, embracing the exact and the critical methods, also suggested that the human mind had come into possession of more powerful instruments of research. It seemed natural, especially for the leaders of the higher educational movement, and the teachers of the coming generation, that they should first endeavour clearly to understand what had taken place, and by doing so, qualify themselves and their disciples to take a leading and rational part in the government of the world and the shaping of events. Thus it came about that the equally legitimate accentuation of the active process represented by Fichte's philosophy was for the time superseded, and
that it was not till much later in the century that it found philosophical expression first by Schopenhauer, and later on by more recent thinkers who variously term themselves voluntarists, pragmatists, or humanists.

Hegel carried out the programme he gave in his first work in great fulness, and with a wealth of illustration drawn mainly from the regions of the history of civilisation and culture. In several courses of lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, of Society, and of Art, he applied the abstract formulae of Logic to the comprehension of the growth and life of all the higher and more important human interests. After Aristotle in ancient and Kant in modern times, he was the third prominent leader of thought who not only established firm principles but condescended also to elaborate and apply them in the many regions of culture and learning, attacking with them the many outstanding problems. His mind was as tenacious of its ultimate convictions as it was encyclopædic in the large view and the grasp which it possessed of detailed knowledge. Thus his system seemed to many to be the consummation of a great intellectual development, a resting-place from which the achievements of modern research and learning could be profitably surveyed. Each department of culture, all the higher human interests were clearly mapped out, put into their right order and places. His disciples could choose for themselves a definite field of work and enter upon it equipped with lofty ideas and a practical plan of proceeding. Among the separate courses of lectures which he delivered, in which he carried out his great programme, those on Æsthetics must have been among the most
stimulating. They were edited after his death by one of his most appreciative disciples, to whom we owe, *inter alia*, a graphic and picturesque portraiture of Hegel as an academic lecturer.\(^1\)

In the general scheme of his philosophy, which was divided into Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Mind, *Esthetics* found a place in the last subsection of the third and most important department, together with the Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy proper. The trichotomy or threefold rhythm of development which was introduced in the first section as an abstract formula, coinciding with the movement of human reasoning, was repeated in the different sections and subsections, in which it assumed a more and more intelligible and living appearance. Notably in the last section, in the Philosophy of Mind, we have first to deal with the subjective or individual mind (Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology); secondly, with the objective or collective mind (Law, Morality, Civil Life, Culture, and History); and lastly, with the Absolute mind, which manifests itself in the regions of Art, Religion, and Philosophy proper. In these three highest regions, each of which constitutes, as it were, a "Divine worship in the service of Truth," the Absolute or supreme Idea which pervades everything—*i.e.*, the fundamental core and kernel of reality—rises to complete self-consciousness.

\(^1\) The Lectures on "*Esthetics*" appeared as the 10th vol. (in three parts) of Hegel's 'Works,' and were edited by H. G. Hotho (1802-1873). As he states in the Preface, the lectures were delivered for the first time at Heidelberg in the year 1818, and repeated at Berlin in 1820, 1823, 1826, and 1828. The graphic description of Hegel's personality and academic teaching is quoted by Caird in translation from Hotho's 'Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst' ('Blackwood's Philosophical Classics,' 1883, p. 97 sqq.).
The first step in this process is a sensuous knowledge in which the Absolute is seen and felt: this is the region of Art; in this region the Idea becomes the Ideal of which Art is the representation or embodiment. In the second stage, that of Religion, the sensuous or outward representation appears inadequate, and is accordingly abandoned. The Absolute, or Idea, has become an object of thought to which no external representation but only a mental presentation is adequate and sufficient.¹ The Idea has receded from the external world into the internal world of the mind, where it occupies a position in the region of feeling and undefined thought.²

¹ This way of putting it corresponds to the mature form of Hegel’s philosophy. In the ‘Phenomenology,’ his first great work which really contains the entire programme or sketch of his system, Art is not kept in the same way separate as it is later on. It is there only incompletely treated under the section of Religion, Hegel having, as Kuno Fischer has pointed out, at that time—which coincides with his intimate friendship with the poet Hölderlin—before his mind mainly the spirit and religion of Grecian antiquity. Much difficulty exists in rendering in English the terms which Hegel employs in his description of the development of Mind or Spirit. To this I referred already on a former occasion (vol. iii. p. 466, n.) At present it is mainly the use of the word Vorstellung that I have in view. It is usually translated in English by “presentation,” and this term, if distinguished from “representation,” denotes pretty fairly what, in the German language, would distinguish Vorstellung from Darstellung; Hegel’s meaning would probably be this, that in Art the Idea, or the truly Real, finds a representation (Darstellung), and rises in the higher forms of religion to a presentation or Thought (Vorstellung).

² Hegel, in speaking of religious, as differing from philosophic, thought, uses the word Vorstellung in contradistinction to the word Begriff. In this way Vorstellung forms, as it were, the intermediate term between what can be presented to the senses on the one side and what can be conceived by the intellect in the most abstract form as logical Idea on the other. The content of religious thought is thus more spiritual than what can be expressed in Art, under which term Hegel thinks primarily of the plastic, the fine, and the dramatic Arts. But it is less definite and, as his whole philosophy implies, less satisfactory to the modern mind than what he terms the scientific notion. For in his system the attempt of the Continental mind to establish a creed at once spiritual and reasoned has attained its climax and consummation. Anything that has been done since in this direction, either
and highest step is the clear and free thinking of the Absolute, the spiritual cult of the Divine, where that becomes intelligible which in the region of art and faith is an object merely of representation or of thought-presentation. Thus the philosophy of Art, or Æsthetics, precedes the philosophy of Religion, and both lead up to Philosophy proper, to the speculative or reasoned thought of the human mind in its historical development.

In all his different works Hegel endeavours to show that philosophy is the highest sphere in the intellectual development of man and mankind. It is, as he says, the veritable Theodicy, as distinguished from Art and Religion, both of which lead up to it. Fichte and Schelling had already suggested a similar view, but it slipped, as it were, from their grasp. With Hegel it was the highest and deepest conviction, which he was never tired of expressing and illustrating from the many points of view which he successively and systematically took up. In the special department with which we are now

in Germany or elsewhere, has been nothing more nor less than an attempt to work out the programme of Hegel’s philosophy. It is interesting to note that when the last stage in what Hegel called “the movement of the Absolute Mind,” the ascent from the vaguer, or what was termed the mystical, stage of religious thought, into the clear daylight and definiteness of philosophic thought was, at least in Germany, found to be impossible, one school of thinkers (of which Albert Lange may be considered the representative) fell back upon Art and the Ideal as the region in which the spiritual and emotional demands of the human soul should find satisfaction. I believe it also to be true that a very large class of cultured persons in Germany find, or think they find, the satisfaction of their somewhat unclarified religious demands in the creations of their great musical composers, from Bach through Haydn and Beethoven to Wagner and Brahms; listening to their creations is indeed to them what Hegel termed “Divine Worship.” See, for example, the striking passage in the ‘Reminiscences of Carl Schurz’ (vol. ii. p. 60), in which he describes the impression which the first performance of Wagner’s ‘Parsifal’ made upon him and others.
dealing, in the department of the Philosophy of the Beautiful, his achievements may be judged and assimilated from two different points of view. From one of these we may disregard the general scheme into which he has thrown the vast material and the many valuable reflections which are contained in his lectures, and see in them merely the first adequate attempt to give a complete and comprehensive theory of the different arts and a philosophy of the Beautiful, both founded upon extensive historical studies not only within the limits of the subject itself but still more in connection with other interests. Such a view finds in the three volumes of Hegel's lectures a rich accumulation of valuable material and of fruitful suggestions, both of which have been largely utilised by his successors—opponents and admirers alike. A second point of view emphasises rather the position which Hegel assigns to Art and to the Beautiful in the great scheme of his philosophy and, following from that, in the totality of human interests; further, also the comparative value which he attaches to the various departments of art, to the different schools, and, lastly, to the natural and artistic forms of beauty. We may, in fact, value mainly the encyclopaedic grasp or the metaphysical insight of Hegel's speculation.

The first point of view is more interesting to the historian of Æsthetics, the second to the historian of philosophic Thought. In the latter respect there are two points which are of paramount interest in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful. The first point is fully and unmistakably developed in the introduction to Hegel's published lectures, and as this introduction was written
out and revised by Hegel himself, it is as well to use his own words in explaining it: "If we assign to art on the one side a high position, it is necessary on the other side to remember that, neither in its substance nor in its form, is Art the highest and absolute means through which the human mind becomes aware (conscious) of its highest interests. Through its very forms Art is limited to a definite content; only a certain sphere or phase of truth is capable of being represented through the means of a work of art; to be a genuine subject for art it must lie in its very nature to step out into the region of the sensuous and to find itself adequately expressed therein. Such is, for instance, the case with the Grecian deities. Against this there exists a deeper conception of truth, in which the latter is no more so near and friendly to the sensuous that it can be adequately embodied and expressed by the same. Of such a nature is the Christian conception of truth, and especially the spirit of the present age; our religion and our culture seem to have left the stage in which Art is the highest means by which we become conscious of the Absolute. The peculiar form of art-production and the works of art do not any more answer to our highest wants; the latter are no more objects of divine worship or adoration; the impression which they produce is of a more reasoned nature, and what we feel through them requires further verification and a higher testimony. Thought and reflection have advanced beyond the fine arts. If one chooses to do so, one can indulge in complaint and censure, and look upon this circumstance as a sign of deterioration. . . . However this may be, it is nevertheless a fact that
art does not give any longer that satisfaction of our spiritual demands which former ages and peoples sought and found in her; a satisfaction which, certainly on the part of religion, was intimately connected with art. The beautiful days of Grecian art and the golden period of the later middle ages are past. . . . Our age is therefore in general not favourable towards art. . . . The theory of art is in our times much more in request than in those ages when art, as art alone, gave complete satisfaction. Art invites us to a reasoned contemplation, and this not with the object of furthering art itself but with the object of scientifically finding out what art is.”  

We see from this that Hegel had abandoned the position occupied for a moment by the philosophy of Schelling. We noted above that Schelling had abandoned it likewise. They were both led to see that the religious interest of the Christian world could not be exhausted by the means and in the region of Art. But they differed in this, that Schelling sought a fuller comprehension by descending into mystical depths, Hegel by ascending to greater intellectual heights. The second point which interests us, and which is peculiar to Hegel’s philosophy of the beautiful, is this, that he did not do justice to the Beautiful in Nature. He neither allows that natural things possess beauty in themselves—they possess it only for the contemplating mind—nor does he seem to consider natural beauty as equal to artistic beauty. In the same introduction he makes the remark that it had never occurred to anyone to emphasise specially

1 Hegel’s ‘Werke,’ vol. x., part i., pp. 14 sqq.
the aspect of beauty in natural things, or to give a systematic representation of this beauty. Lotze has appropriately remarked that Hegel must have forgotten what Schelling said in the Address mentioned above, in which the idea is, not worked out, yet certainly suggested, that the beautiful in nature might be the key to her deeper significance. My readers will here already expect a reference to the poetry of Wordsworth and the writings of Ruskin, to which my narrative will lead me further on, and they will also understand that Hegel had abandoned, or never realised, the truth of Goethe's magnificent poetic comprehension of nature.

Before leaving that region of ideas in which Schelling's and Hegel's expositions move, the idealist view of Art and Beauty, I may briefly note the writings and posthumously published lectures of Solger, who was inspired by

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1 *Loc. cit.*, p. 5.

2 K. W. F. Solger (1780-1819) was a native of Prussia. His home was not only locally distant from that of Schelling and Hegel, but he also differs from Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in not having come to philosophy through theology. He approached it rather from the side of polite literature and classical learning, being inspired by the teaching of F. A. Wolf. Of his philosophical writings the only larger production that appeared during his lifetime was a Dialogue (‘Erwin,’ 2 vols., 1815), in the platonistic style, in which he introduces and combats, under fictitious names, the views of Fichte and Schelling, treating them especially the latter, with little sympathy, although there is, no doubt, a great resemblance between his own views and those of Schelling. Historians like Schasler, who see in the Hegelian point of view the consummation of the modern idealistic tendency of thought, consider that Solger as well as Schelling stuck, as it were, half way in the development of a correct idea. This criticism is expressed by saying that neither Schelling nor Solger got beyond the position occupied by Plato, who saw in the ideas of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, the archetypes which lived in the Divine Mind; they did not advance to the conception that these archetypes do not live only in the Divine Mind, but that they, of necessity, descend into the actual world where they appear as living powers in things that are true, beautiful, and good. In fact, there exists, according to this view, the same difference between Hegel's conception of a necessary scientifically demonstrable development of the content of the Divine Mind, or
Schelling. Gifted with a keen perception of artistic beauty, he published in 1815 a philosophical dialogue on the Beautiful, very much on the platonic models, and gave a complete course of Ästhetics in 1819. Agreeing in general with Schelling's view, he nevertheless considers the "intellectual intuition" of the latter to be too indefinite. He himself distinguishes between phantasy and imagination. The latter belongs to the ordinary intellect, and moves, as a mediator, between the antitheses of the ordinary understanding. From this he distinguishes phantasy which starts from the original unity of these antitheses in the "Idea," and is able to reunite them in the actual world. Thanks to this faculty, we are able to perceive objects which are higher than those of the ordinary consciousness, and to recognise in them the "Idea" as real. This faculty of phantasy has various forms and subdivisions and a dialectic of its own, corresponding to the dialectic of thought. With Solger, as with Schelling, beauty belongs to the region of the Idea,—it is inaccessible to the ordinary consciousness; the Absolute, in the existing world (notably in its historical progress), and the archetypal view of Schelling, Solger, and the Platonists, as there exists between Schelling's and Goethe's philosophy of nature on the one side, and the more recent evolutionary ideas of Darwin, Spencer, and their successors on the other (see on this vol. iii., chap. 6, p. 595, the quotation from Wundt in the note). It is, however, well to remark that Solger as well as Weisse worked out their æsthetical theories before Hegel's Ästhetics were generally known, and that Hegel recognised in Solger's work a spirit kindred to his own. In the Introduction to his Lectures there is the following passage about Solger: "His innermost speculative desire forced him to descend into the depths of the philosophical idea. Here he came upon the dialectical movement of the idea, . . . upon its activity to negative itself as the infinite and universal in the shape of the finite and the special, and equally to overcome this negation and thus to re-establish again the universal and the infinite in the finite and the special" (Hegel, 'Werke,' xi. p. 89).
thought of the artist is distinguished from the thought of the philosopher,—it is practical, not theoretical. The latter has to do with the appearances of common-sense, which it has to dissolve or resolve; the thought of the artist performs the wonder of creating an appearance which resolves itself. The thought of art, accordingly, is not theoretical but practical thought, but it is distinguished from the ethical or the idea of the Good inasmuch as the latter never is, but always is to be, realised: Art alone realises its ideal completely and perfectly. In this conception of the freedom of art and the perfect realisation of its ideal, Solger comes in contact with the theory of artistic Irony developed by Friedrich Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck, and adopted also by Novalis. This idea was not derived from Schelling, but was a sort of caricature of the subjectivism of Fichte. According to an extreme interpretation of the latter,—an interpretation which Fichte himself never intended,—the mind, the subject, creates the world, its object; if it does so, it can also annul it. The mind can, as it were, rise above its own creation and smile at it; it can remain in its divine serenity above its own creations which it does not regard au sérieux. Following up this view, Schlegel called art a perpetual parody of itself, a transcendental farce; Tieck defined irony as a force which permits the poet to dominate the matter which he treats; and Novalis raved of a magic idealism which realises its dreams.

It is needless to say that the seriousness which pervades the whole of Hegel's philosophy does not permit him to fall in with the arbitrariness and flippancy which characterised many of the writings of
the romantic school: he strongly denounces their aberrations, but he fully acknowledges the promise which lay in Solger's prematurely terminated philosophical career, and he admits that Tieck himself, though always talking about artistic irony, forgets the same in his excellent appreciation and exposition of great poetical creations, such as those of Shakespeare.

It is therefore needless to dwell at any length on these lucubrations of the romantic writers; it is more interesting for our purpose to follow up the more serious developments of Schelling's and Hegel's ideas in the later æsthetics of the nineteenth century.

II.

One of the most important questions in the philosophy of the Beautiful had come to the front in the speculations of Schelling, and still more in those of Hegel, namely, the relation which exists between Art and Religion, or between the Beautiful and the Spiritual. This problem was taken up by Christian Heinrich Weisse and, in the spirit of his philosophy, by Lotze.

As Lotze himself has given, in his 'History of Æsthetics in Germany,' a very full analysis of Weisse's teaching, as much in its development out of Hegel's philosophy as in its less important differences from his own views, I wish to refer mainly to that exposition; the more so as Weisse's own works are now inaccessible
OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

61

and too voluminous for present use.¹ Lotze himself has said that “Weisse’s Æsthetic is the most perfect conclusion of the lines of thought which in that region

¹ Chr. H. Weisse (1801-1866), a native of Leipsic, descended from and moved in a literary circle with a distinct religious though not a specifically theological interest. His studies were literary, classical (under Gottfried Hermann), and juristic. He was, for a time, under the influence of Hegel’s dialectic as expounded in the ‘Logic’ and the ‘Encyclopaedia,’ but his independent philosophical speculations began and were published before the applications which Hegel made in his Lectures on ‘History of Philosophy,’ ‘Æsthetics,’ and ‘Philosophy of Religion’ were generally known outside the circle of his academic hearers. Starting thus at a time before the full breadth and depth of Hegel’s speculations were known, Weisse was able to work out the Hegelian idea in an independent manner, and neither he nor Lotze can be considered as a disciple or follower of Hegel. In fact, Weisse prepared that opposition, within the Idealistic school, to Hegel’s Paulogism which Schelling had only indicated in those polemics with Jacobi which he harboured in his mind during thirty years, and to which he only gave official expression after he had been called to the philosophical Chair at the University of Berlin as one of Hegel’s successors in the year 1840. In the meantime the transmutation of the strictly logical process, unfolded by Hegel in his published works, into its expression in the more easily assimilated idea of historical development, had attracted so many disciples and followers, and produced such an enormous historical literature, that the purely philo-

sofical criticism was neglected; nor was it the latter as contained in the works of Weisse and some of Hegel’s own followers, such as Göschel, that prepared the violent reaction which set in against the whole of the Hegelian philosophy. This came from the side of the Positivists: the exact mathematical and natural sciences on the one side and positive theology on the other. The former pointed to the sterility, the latter to the scepticism produced by the current Hegelian formalism. The historic succession from Kant, Fichte, the earlier works of Schelling, the logical writings of Hegel, to Weisse and Lotze has never been clearly brought out in the History of Modern Philosophy, with the result that Weisse has remained practically unknown in wider circles, and that Lotze’s philosophy stands somewhat isolated. This succession may, however, be studied without much trouble through the publications of Weisse’s friend and disciple, Rudolph Seydel (1835-1892), in his ‘Religion und Wissenschaft’ (1887), in his edition of Weisse’s ‘Kleine Schriften’ (1867), and in his publication of the last form which Weisse’s Lecture Syllabus on ‘Æsthetics’ assumed, in the year 1865. To this must be added the important section in Lotze’s ‘History of Æsthetics’ mentioned in the text. I may remark that in an Appreciation, which I published in ‘Macmillan’s Magazine,’ May 1878, of Edward Caird’s ‘Philosophy of Kant,’ I referred to Kant’s later succession in Weisse and Lotze as distinguished from that of pure Hegelianism.
had been attained by the philosophical idealism of the age."\(^1\)

Agreeing in the main—at least in the earlier stages of his philosophical career—with Hegel's dialectic, Weisse nevertheless sees a defect in the latter, inasmuch as Hegel makes too much of the logical form in which the highest content, the Divine Idea, has unfolded itself. According to Weisse, that which unfolds and realises itself in the supreme ends, purposes, or ideals of existence, is the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. These ends are grasped not so much by the human intellect as in the

\(^1\) 'Geschichte der Aesthetik,' p. 211.

Lotze's 'History of Aesthetic' has been unfavourably criticised by Schasler, who evidently had a very imperfect knowledge of Lotze's philosophical position, and who himself believed in the possibility of a further development of the Hegelian position, not only so far as the science of Aesthetics is concerned, but also of Hegel's fundamental speculative scheme. In relation to this Schasler, in the year 1872, gave expression to an opinion—indipendently and about the same time indicated by the Hegelian school in this country—that the programme of Hegel required to be worked out afresh. He admits that the Hegelian scheme contained an inherent defect which provoked two developments, the theosophical (Weisse) and the realistic (Herbart), both of which, according to him, have lost hold of the great truth and governing idea of Hegel. Against these he maintains that the problem of modern philosophy consists in "the truly concrete application of Hegel's method to the regions of the real, so as to bring them under the domination of the logical notion. This concrete will then—\[\text{but in a higher logically intelligible manner} \text{— elevate the Subject-Object of Schelling's 'intellectual sight' to a truly substantial unity. Such a thoroughgoing regeneration of Hegel's philosophy in all its parts would seem to be the real task of philosophical endeavour in the future; our special object is to attempt this reconstruction in the province of Aesthetics; if this attempt should, although only partially, succeed, there is at least the possibility shown that it would also be possible on a large and complete scale} \text{" (loc. cit., p. 940, 945 sqq.).}\]

Schasler's treatment of Weisse is also instructive as showing where the real difference between himself and contemporary followers of Hegel (such as Vischer) on the one side and Weisse on the other, really lies. The former had no genuine religious interest, or rather, they were apparently contented with a purely philosophic creed; whereas, on the other side, Weisse and Lotze recognised the independence of the religious sentiment—which Weisse places above and Lotze outside of the purely philosophical or speculative interest.
OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

region of feeling, or, as we may figuratively say, by the human heart. To the human intellect they present themselves as Ideas, not as an Idea, which is the term continually used in Hegel's writings. The Idea is only the logical or intellectual form in which those supreme Ideas represent themselves to the human mind and in which they can be grasped by human thought.

Having, however, put prominently forward the logical process in the form of the unfolding of an idea, and developed a logical mechanism of this process, Hegel appears too much interested in showing how this mechanism or formula is continually repeated in the actual world; the latter becoming, as it were, merely an array of instances in which the highest content is seized, pictured, and repeated. All the different regions of mental life had therefore found in Hegel's systematic speculation an inadequate treatment, inasmuch as their special value was only estimated according to the perfection with which they brought it into appearance in an intrinsically worthless and indifferent logical formulary.

Beauty has shared the same fate. Hegel did not conceive it to be one of the eternal ends of existence, as an integral constituent of the world-plan; it appeared to him only in the shape of Art as one of the means through which the finite mind recalls and assures to itself its essential unity with the Infinite. Weisse, on the other hand, looks upon beauty as one of the great things or tasks which have to be realised in and by the world-process. Whereas it might appear as if in Hegel's system the Absolute or World-spirit attains to reality
only, yet fully, in the mental developments of finite beings, Weisse sees the beginning and end of all development in a personal Deity. Above and beyond the forms of the appearance of this Divine Spirit in the finite world there exists the Absolute Spirit as such.

Further, the mind seemed, in Hegel's system, to exhaust its own essence and fully to grasp the Absolute in the intellectual (individual and historical) movement of thought. According to Weisse, the thinking process, or thought, does not exhaust the essence of the Divine Spirit, nor does it exhaust the world of finite things themselves. In the Divine Being, as well as in the many things which surround us, there is something more than what we can reach by thought. This something more is not a dark and unfathomable matter which lies beneath thought and cannot be grasped by it, but is something higher. It is the infinite productivity of the Divine Being, the life of the Creating Spirit.

"This process exists in all the regions of the universe, in the Divine Mind as much as in the created world and in the human soul, from eternity to eternity: to show that it is so is the object of the science of the Beautiful or \AE sthetics." ¹

In further expounding this view,² which originated in

¹ Freely translated from the quotation as given by Lotze from Weisse in "Geschichte der Aesthetik," p. 209.

² Into his exposition of Weisse's ideas Lotze has imported a conception peculiar to himself, but which does not seem to be brought out with the same definiteness in Weisse's own statement. To some it may appear to turn on a mere word, but as this word has in the sequel, both in German philosophy and in that of other countries, received currency as expressive of a special philosophical creed, it is as well to note it here. To express the highest conceptions, which are termed by Weisse Ideas or Ideals, Lotze very early adopted the term Values or Worths, importing into this conception the meaning that they must
Weisse's peculiar development of a conception we can trace back to the writings of Schelling, Solger, and Hegel, it will be most useful for my purpose to appeal to Lotze's own statement, which is to be found in two tracts (1845 and 1847), but more concisely and clearly in the syllabus of his lectures on Ästhetics, delivered during his professorship at Göttingen, for the last time in the year 1865. He there refers to the fundamental aspect—no doubt suggested by Weisse—which forms the foundation of the whole of his speculation, and which he repeats in all his more important writings. With a desire to vindicate for the Beautiful not merely a subjective existence in the human soul but an absolute value and important connections in the real world of men and nature, he says: “The real world shows us three interwoven regions or powers—viz., first, a realm of general laws which impress us as absolutely necessary, which govern everything that is real, but through their very generality produce for themselves be the subject not only of the thought but also of the moral appreciation and æsthetical enjoyment of personal minds or spirits, forming a feature in their living experience. I cannot find that, even in the latest form of Weisse's Ästhetics, this point or the difference in this respect with Lotze, mentioned by Seydel in his appreciation of their respective philosophies, is brought out. (See 'Religion und Wissenschaft,' pp. 84 sqq., 132 sqq.) As, however, the introduction of definite words, such as Value and Worth, has done so much in history to characterise and even to direct courses of thought, it is well to point, as Windelband has done, to the importance of Lotze's introduction of these terms into philosophical literature. Cf. supra, note to p. 408, vol. iii.

1 The two Tracts appeared originally in a collective publication, 'Göttinger Studien,' with the respective titles: 'Ueber den Begriff der Schönheit' and 'Ueber Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit.' The Lecture Notes on Ästhetics were published after the Syllabus, prepared by Lotze for his Course in the year 1856, by E. Rehnisch in the year 1884. The two earlier Tracts are reprinted in Peipers' edition of Lotze's 'Kleine Schriften,' vols. i. and ii.
nothing that is defined or particular; second, the realm of actual matter and forces which appear to us not as necessary but only as actually existing, which, acting under definite conditions according to those laws, produce the manifold phenomena; third, a definite and specific plan, according to which the elements of reality are gathered together in such a way as to realise by following those general laws a definite end or purpose.¹

Lotze then goes on to say that, for common-sense and to the popular mind, these three regions or principles appear to be disconnected and independent, and only casually and accidentally interwoven. It does not appear at all clear why the general laws should be realised only in the existing examples, and even the general plan or the purposes of existence—if we knew them—would not appear realisable only by the laws and things which actually exist. But neither the common-sense of life nor the demands of science can rest satisfied with this threefold aspect, and it has always been the main object of speculation to unite the three in a highest principle. "Now in general we may say that this task has never been, and never will be, completely solved. But between speculative knowledge, which vainly searches for a complete understanding of this connection, and practice, which seeks in an equally partial way to make things subservient to the unity of a purpose—i.e., between the regions of the True and the Good—there arises a peculiar feeling or sensation. This is the impression of the Beautiful, which, standing in the middle [between the True and

¹ 'Grundzüge der Aesthetik,' p. 10.
the Good], does indeed neither solve the theoretical nor the practical problem, but receives through a beholding of the Beautiful an immediate assurance of the possibility of its desired solution—i.e., of the reconciliation of the existing contradictions.”

A complete solution, either theoretical or practical, is indeed not conceivable except in the whole of the world—i.e., for a spirit which should comprehend and control everything. In us human beings, who comprehend and control only a very limited region, and can therefore not expect to meet with the desired reconciliation, the latter, if it does appear accidentally and casually, comes as a surprise, and this surprise creates in us a feeling of pleasure, of joy, or, in its highest form, of bliss, inasmuch as we see the idea of beauty—i.e., the complete harmony of those three supreme principles or powers—concentrated as it were in a small compass, in a visible image.  

As stated by Lotze himself, this way of looking at

1 'Grundzüge der Aesthetik,' p. 10 sqq.

2 In the Tract of the year 1845 Lotze traces this idea back to Kant. 'Kant, to whom the thoughtful analysis of the Beautiful is more indebted than is now generally admitted, found that beauty consists in this, that the features of an object lend themselves to the play of our intellectual powers. Whereas what falls merely into the necessary forms of our understanding does not merit our special thanks, we must, on the other side, consider it to be a free favour of fortune if what is given to us contains, in addition, features which meet our desire for comprehension under a few leading thoughts. A world would be thinkable in which no species governed the manifoldness of existing things, but where the latter were mutually incomparable. That, instead of this refractory world, the actual world exists which gathers itself together in higher aspects, this in itself is a subject of disinterested pleasure which in its bearing upon the single and the manifold leads to the sensation of beauty. According to Kant, therefore, the Beautiful does not consist merely in the agreement of the impression with the ways of our intellect, but in the harmony with a striving and purposeful endeavour' ('Kleine Schriften,' vol. i. p. 295).
the Beautiful stands at the end of the idealistic movement of thought. It has been remarked that in this statement Lotze does not do justice to sundry developments which have equally their starting-points in suggestions which were more or less distinctly expressed in the writings of Schelling. And, as I said before, we may look upon the latter as the centre of the idealistic movement.\(^1\) Among those developments it is of interest

\(^1\) Lotze’s theory of Beauty and the Beautiful, which he himself traces back to Schelling and Kant, has not received that attention on the part of historians which it deserves. This neglect is, I believe, largely due to the criticism to which Lotze’s aesthetical writings have been submitted by Von Hartmann and by Schasler: by the latter in a lengthy Review, which he published shortly after the appearance of Lotze’s ‘History’ in his Art Journal ‘Die Dioskuren’; this he quotes in an appendix to his ‘History,’ and considers—as does likewise Hartmann—that it has finally disposed of Lotze’s aesthetics as a popular exposition of Weisse’s ideas. On the other side, Erdmann, on whose mind the importance of Lotze’s ideas grew, did more justice to Lotze in proportion as he emancipated himself from the early control of the Hegelian formalism. In fact, the best and concisest rendering of Lotze’s central idea is given by Erdmann, when he defines Lotze’s difference from Schelling: ‘The defect in Schelling’s system which caused the antagonism of the natural sciences has also been fatal to his Aesthetics in spite of all the credit which is here due to him. This defect lies in his misunderstanding of the difference of Ideas and Appearances: the former denote values, tasks, imperatives; the latter are governed by mechanism — i.e., by rigid causality or necessity. Inasmuch as Schelling, instead of modestly admitting the latter, claims to have demonstrated what must be through that which ought to be, he has made natural science his enemy. But it has likewise become to him aesthetically impossible to see that the joyful surprise afforded by the Beautiful (in nature) has its ground in this, that by the entirely different processes of necessity that has come about which ought to be, and, as such, possesses value. That the manifoldness of visible things, though not subject to any moral obligation, deports itself in ideal forms, fills us with reverent enjoyment through the semblance of a world in which the eternal laws of what ought to be appear in flesh and blood’ (Erdmann, ‘Geschichte der Philosophie,’ 3rd ed., vol. ii, p. 854). According to Lotze, without a conflict between what ought to be and what is, there could exist neither the Beautiful nor its opposite. That such a conflict is solved in the totality of actual existence is a matter of religious faith, a fundamental conviction; that in single instances and moments this conflict appears solved to us in actual life produces in us the feeling of joyful surprise, as it were an unsuspected gift of good fortune confirming our fundamental spiritual conviction or hope.
to note the treatment of the problem of the Beautiful in the writings of Schopenhauer and in those of von Hartmann. Both these thinkers started from the idealistic conception elaborated by Schelling, although Schopenhauer ignores the influence of the latter, and leads his readers back to Kant, of whom he professes to be the only true follower, having, as he thinks, drawn the one inevitable conclusion which presents itself. Hartmann, on the other side, does full justice to the work of Schelling, especially to the latest phase of his speculation. It can, nevertheless, not be denied that both Schopenhauer and Hartmann prejudiced the treatment of the æsthetical as well as of other philosophical problems, by introducing, at the outset of their expositions, rigid conceptions of a very definite kind, to the proof and explanation of which the rest of their lives and writings were exclusively devoted. It will be easiest to understand this if we look upon the main object both of Schopenhauer and Hartmann as having been to give a definite answer to the question stated by Kant—viz.: What is the "Thing in itself"? Schopenhauer answers this question by saying the thing in itself is "the Will"; Hartmann answers the question by saying it is "the Unconscious."

Both thinkers arrived at their respective solutions comparatively early in life. In this they differ from Kant, whose whole writing and thinking may be looked upon as merely a preparation for a future positive philosophy; and from Hegel, who in his thirty-seventh year had published only the programme of his future system. Their youthful attitude towards the problem of philosophy resembles more that of Fichte and Schelling, who
also daringly announced their central ideas at an early age; but they differ from them inasmuch as both these thinkers found it impossible to retain their early positions, and in consequence developed various modifications known in the history of philosophy as the later phases of their respective systems. The tenacity—not to say obstinacy—with which both Schopenhauer and Hartmann clung to their original formulae, to what many may consider mere words, is characteristic of thinkers who live out of the world and secluded from its practical interests, who also take no part in academic teaching, but are interested only in the written, not the verbal, transmission of their ideas. Although such thinkers may cast inquisitive and searching glances all round into the different regions of science, art, and life, they do so always through the coloured eyeglasses which they have armed themselves with, and which transmit only those rays that are congenial to their organ of vision. A similar one-sided colouring is characteristic also of the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, who, early in life, came under the spell of the formula and the word Evolution; though it must be admitted that by placing in opposition to, and at the foundation of, evolution, "the Unknowable," his influence upon the thought of his age has been twofold and in opposite directions—in the direction of dogmatism and positivism on the one side, of agnosticism and scepticism on the other.

To understand Schopenhauer's philosophy we must realise that he was the first among recent German thinkers to break not only with the general tendency of the philosophical systems which he opposed, but also
with the fundamental beliefs which governed the aspirations and endeavours of contemporary German culture. This aimed at realising what has been termed the Ideal of Humanity. Two aspects are characteristic of all those endeavours, however different their expression may have been in the various systems or in the unsystematic writings of the great leaders of German thought. They were, first of all, hopeful—they inherited the optimism of Leibniz's philosophy; and they were, secondly, religious in the Christian sense of the word. They desired to get hold of the essence, as distinguished from the letter, of Christian truth, to purify and elevate the existing dogmas of the Church, to do away with the narrowness of orthodoxy, and to spiritualise the teaching of rationalism. Although they appeared, at times and in single instances, to favour the pantheistic view of Spinoza, they were theistic in this sense that their pantheism did not oppose Christian Theism, but that the one implied the other. In many cases we find that a more or less pantheistic version of the Christian truth returned again, in its final developments, to a theistic conception. Schopenhauer's philosophy was neither optimistic—i.e., hopeful—nor was it theistic or pantheistic; it was pessimistic and anti-theistic. I intentionally avoid the use of the word atheistic, as this has acquired in modern controversial literature a much more extreme meaning, having almost become an epithet of moral opprobrium which I should be sorry to cast upon any honest searcher after truth. But it was less through the second characteristic trait of his teaching that Schopenhauer placed himself and all his followers and admirers
outside of the affirmative and progressive movement of modern thought. He did so most by abandoning the doctrine of human progress and the hope that by intellectual and practical effort the condition of man and mankind could be improved. Thus he took no part in the great educational movements of his age and country.

Schopenhauer was brought up in the midst of the new poetry, literature, and philosophy of Germany. He had himself a keen appreciation of the beautiful, and an extensive knowledge not only of poetry and the fine arts but also—and this distinguished him from many of his contemporaries—of music. His whole attitude, however, was eminently subjective; he did not fall in with any existing current or movement of thought or practical activity. He was as arbitrary and extravagant in the enunciation of single ideas as any of the romantics, and he had no hesitation in placing himself in antagonism with his surroundings. These peculiarities of his personal character, joined to his fundamental disbelief in human progress and perfectibility, are sufficient to explain how his views on Art and the Beautiful should turn out diametrically opposite to those of other contemporary thinkers. Whereas these laboured at the clearer definition and practical realisation of certain ideals, and considered Art as one of the great agencies which furthered these purposes, Art with Schopenhauer occupied an exceptional position outside of the ends and aims of human life; whereas with them the Beautiful was one of the aspects of the truly Real which revealed itself also through science, religion, and culture, the Beautiful with Schopenhauer formed a contrast to the
truths of science and the efforts of life; it occupied a region by itself. Schopenhauer had learned from Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, to consider the Will or the active principle as the most important, the primary factor in the human soul. He further agreed with Kant in considering the space- and time-forms of sense-impression and the logical forms of the intellect as having their origin in the human soul; but, as he exaggerated the doctrine of the primacy of the human Will to mean that the essence of the human mind was "Will," he saw in the human intellect a creation of the Will. And, as he judged of everything outside of self by analogy with the self or human mind, he further exaggerated the term Will to mean not only the fundamental essence of human nature but the essence of all reality. Consistently he looked upon that portion of reality which was devoid of intelligence as exhibiting the activity or creative power of the Will in forms and stages inferior, but leading up, to the highest manifestation of the Will when it is joined to the Intellect. As he expressed it, everything in the world is an objectivation of the Will; the highest form of this process of objectivation is to be found in the Intellect or the world as seen through the senses and through the forms of thought.

Whoever is led by inclination, study, or practical experience to look at the active powers of the mind as fundamental and all-important is face to face with the ethical problem. This problem contains two great difficulties or mysteries: the mystery of the Freedom of the Will and the mystery of Evil and Sin. Schopenhauer had no difficulty in solving the former, and he
had no inclination to deny or minimise the gravity of
the latter; he affirmed the Freedom of the Will, and
he affirmed, still more strongly, the existence of Evil.
Following Kant, he considered the Will to be transcen-
dental—i.e., anterior and superior—to the visible and
intellectual order of things; the latter, the empirical
order of things, he considered to be characterised by the
necessary and rigid sequences of Cause and Effect.

Inasmuch as the Will, or the inherent essence of the
mind, did not belong to the empirical order of things,
but had really created it, it stood outside of this order,
it was not subject to, but the origin of, the law of Cause
and Effect with its necessary sequences in the flux of
time. The Will was timeless, and hence free, but
through descending out of its original sphere of freedom
by creating the empirical world with its ascending stages
or objectivations, and its rigid sequences of Cause and
Effect, it did not unfold and augment its own reality,
but, on the contrary, it reduced and lowered the same.
The World-spirit committed a mistake, took as it were
a false step, and this false step is the cause of the evil
and suffering, of the pain and sin in the existing phenom-
enal world. The fundamental error, the cause of all
that is perverse and wrong, is the very World-process
itself, the assertion, the endless striving of the Will.
This original error can only be made good, redemption
is only possible, by a negation, not by an affirmation,
of the World-process, of the promptings, desires, and
workings of the Will. To become quiescent, to return
again into the original state of repose, to reverse the
World-process, is the only way out of the misery of
actual existence, the only solution of the moral problem. It was not difficult for Schopenhauer to find his philosophy of pessimism and quietism confirmed in the teachings and precepts of many thinkers, both ancient and modern, heathen and Christian; notably the philosophy of the Hindus, as laid down in their sacred books, then for the first time made accessible to modern readers by translations, contained a perfect expression and confirmation of Schopenhauer's views; nor is he slow in pointing out these striking anticipations of his doctrine.

It is not difficult to see how Schopenhauer's system lent itself to a happy interpretation of the Beautiful as it appears in nature as well as in art. The World-process, the objectivation of the Will, proceeds by definite stages; the lowest stage is occupied by the elemental forces of nature, the highest by the intellect of man; here the Will becomes conscious of its own manifestations, and also of the initial error it committed by going out of itself into the phenomenal world of strife and unrest; it recognises the supreme moral obligation of self-negation and self-annihilation in a voluntary return to the state of rest. The phenomenal world which displays the ascending stages or objectivations of the Will shows everywhere unrest, things and events succeeding each other in endless change, without beginning and without end. But each stage of this development is a lower or higher manifestation of the eternal and changeless essence of things; each stage is the embodiment and manifestation of some idea, some expression of the underlying reality, though in an incomplete form. Schopenhauer here assimilates Plato's
doctrine of ideas. The actual world around us, the world as seen by our senses and understood by our intellect, is the imperfect appearance, the semblance, of the world of ideas, of the underlying reality. Science, the work of the intellect, follows the ideas in their endless phenomenal existence, in their appearance, governed by the law of Cause and Effect; tracing everywhere the antecedent and the consequent, never getting hold of anything in rest and repose, it gives us an insight only into the apparent; it never grasps the underlying reality. This latter cannot be grasped through so unstable a medium as that of our senses, nor by so restless a process as that of our thought; the real, in its different stages, can only be grasped by contemplation, by an attitude of the mind where effort and self-interest cease, where the self is forgotten and the Will annihilated, in a state of perfect repose. This is attained in a contemplation of the Beautiful; it exists everywhere where and when the contemplating soul can entirely forget itself, becoming one with the object it beholds.

The Beautiful in nature is the same as the Beautiful in art; the difference between the two lies only in this, that the artist is better able than we are to rise to the position of serene and self-forgetful contemplation. In this consists his genius, through it he becomes one with the thing he contemplates, he understands better than we do the half-uttered speech of nature; he is able to do so by completely identifying himself with his object, and this identification is possible because the underlying reality in the contemplating subject and in the contemplated object is one and the same—viz., the Will. Thus
Schopenhauer is able to assimilate not only the platonic doctrine of ideas but also Kant's philosophy of the beautiful. In fact, at a very early stage of his mental development he conceived that the solution of the central philosophical problem, the problem of Reality, would lie in uniting the truth as expressed by Plato with the truth as expressed by Kant. Kant had defined the Beautiful as that which gives us disinterested pleasure, and he had maintained that this enjoyment is not merely individual or personal but that it is universal. Schopenhauer shows the real significance of this disinterested enjoyment, inasmuch as we, through it and for the moment, liberate ourselves from the principle of Evil, from the endless striving of the Will; and he further explains how this is not a purely subjective and individual experience, but an achievement of the universal Will which retires in such moments into its original unity by forgetting the difference of self and not-self.

"Schopenhauer," as Kuno Fischer says, "distinguishes three kinds of knowledge, each of which consists in a definite relation between the subject and the object; for these two are always correlated: phenomena, under the law of causation, are opposed to the understanding, as the intellectual subject; conceptions, abstracted from sensuous perceptions, are opposed to the reason; ideas are opposed to the pure knowing subject. The ideas are the appearance of the thing in itself in the scale of actual phenomena, they are the world-ideas which constitute the eternal and changeless essence of the world. Could we abandon the order of time or succession, this inevitable form of our intellect, we should behold the
world in the eternal and lasting content of its ideas.\textsuperscript{1} ... According to Schopenhauer, art and philosophy have the same beginning and the same end; their common origin is the intellect of genius, their common end is to exhibit the essence of things: both desire to discover, each in its own way, what the essence of things is. Art also labours at the problem of existence, tries to answer the question: What is life? Every true and genuine work of art is an answer to this question. But whilst philosophy tries to fix its conception of the essence of things in definite notions, art remains true to its origin, and gives its intuitions of the ideas in the simplest and clearest forms, through which it makes its conception immediately evident and easily grasped. For ordinary intelligence the essence of things is obscured by the mist of objective and subjective accidents; art removes this mist; every genuine work of art unfolds an idea, emanates from an inspired conception which in the execution ... frequently loses in force: this explains why the sketches of great masters are frequently more interesting and inspiring than their fully elaborated works. Now as the world-ideas are the theme of art, and as they rise from the lowest stage to the highest, from the appearance of material forces up to that of the human will illuminated by the intellect, art equally unfolds itself in different stages which run parallel with the world itself. The will reveals itself in the elemental forms and figures of bodies, in the passions, characters, and actions of men; the will is the ground

\textsuperscript{1} Kuno Fischer's 'Arthur Schopenhauer' (vol. viii. of the 'History of Modern Philosophy'), 1st ed., 1893, p. 315.
of everything, from the lowest to the highest. Accordingly the realm of art divides itself into three separate regions: the fine arts, poetry, and music."

It will be seen from this passage that the philosophy of Schopenhauer lends itself further to a natural arrangement of the different arts, a problem which was hesitatingly solved by Schelling and, according to other principles, by Hegel. The fundamental conception of Schopenhauer indicates clearly the ascending scale of the arts and their exhibition of the beautiful. The more material arts, those which have to do with actual matter, form the beginning; these are architecture and the plastic arts. Painting stands a step higher, as it works not only with the material given by nature but also with the passions of man and the scenes of life, and exhibits what is characteristic in the affairs of the human world: it includes the landscape, the portrait, and the historical picture. The next stage is occupied by poetry, which is still more ethereal, less material. Painting already had worked with an ethereal element, that of light and shade; poetry works with words and notions, her task is to represent through them the ideas. Poetry is rich in symbolical expressions, in allegories, parables, and metaphors. But the highest of all arts, that which works with the most ethereal element, the element of sound, is Music.

Schopenhauer had a deeper understanding of contemporary music, especially of Beethoven, than any of the thinkers and poets of his age, with the exception perhaps of the romantic writer and composer E. T. A.

1 Kuno Fischer, loc. cit., p. 316. Freely translated.
Hofmann. Hence his conception of music or, what he was fond of calling, his metaphysic of music, is strikingly original, and plays an important part in his system. In musical composition, especially in the higher forms, such as the symphony and the mass, we attain to the greatest that the human soul can produce in the realm of art. We have seen that the other arts are occupied with representing the world-ideas in their ascending scale. But the world-ideas themselves are the objectifications of the Will, they are only partial representations of the latter, they all represent the Will not in its purity, in its original essence, not in its self, but in its not-self, in the process of falling away from its original full and pure unity. In the highest of the arts, in Music, the human soul ascends to the highest possible artistic performance that it is capable of,—it represents not an objectivation of the Will but the Will itself.

Music does more than the other arts: it is the language of feeling and emotion; it expresses joy, sorrow, pain, horror, exultation, and also the absolute rest of the soul, the complete negation of self, of the individual will. It expresses these states, as it were, in the abstract, in their universality, without any admixture. But this abstraction is not indefinite but clothed in a definite form. Music gives the innermost soul of the human feelings without the body. Music is capable of doing this, according to Schopenhauer, because it expresses the original will, the soul of everything in its most original and elemental form, not in the relations of space but only in the sequence of time. Thus music occupies
a place by itself in the artistic scale. It follows from this that any admixture of other forms of artistic expression is against the highest ideal of music. Thus Schopenhauer condemns, by anticipation, the part which, in the later musical schools of the nineteenth century, the human voice, song and language, played, notably in the compositions of Richard Wagner. Wagner has nevertheless paid a high tribute to the teaching of Schopenhauer. In his book on Beethoven—published on the occasion of the centenary of Beethoven's birth in 1870—he says: "Schopenhauer was the first to recognise and define, with philosophical clarity, the relation of music to the other fine arts, inasmuch as he assigns to it a unique character quite different from that of the plastic and poetical arts." And Wagner proceeds to say that Beethoven himself could not be fathomed without a solution of that deep-lying paradox which Schopenhauer has pointed out. This paradox consists in the assertion that music reveals the essence of things, not the world-ideas (the different objectivations of the will), being "itself an idea of the world," so that "whoever could translate music completely into thoughts would in doing so have produced a philosophy which explains the world." And Kuno Fischer says: "Music in a manner comparable with language—being the only language which everyone understands—demands a grammar and a dictionary. Grammar teaches how to form words and sentences, the dictionary teaches what the words signify. The grammar of music is the theory of harmony. . . . But the dictionary of music came later. Schopenhauer claims to have given
this; he is the first who has taught what music signifies." ¹

I have given more space to an account of Schopenhauer's views on art and the beautiful, and especially on music, than is usually accorded by purely philosophical writers. This I have done in deference to the popularity which Schopenhauer's writings have acquired and enjoyed during the last fifty years; also because he furnishes one of the rare instances in which speculations about art have been received with favour by artists themselves. There is also no doubt that, independent of his philosophical doctrine, Schopenhauer's wide acquaintance with, and appreciation of, the best in art and literature of nearly all times and nations, and his transparent and interesting style, have attracted many readers and students to whom otherwise philosophy would have remained a sealed book.² Similar qualities and similar causes have formed the attraction also in some, especially of the earlier, writings of Eduard von Hartmann.

¹ Kuno Fischer, loc. cit., p. 341.
² Kuno Fischer has also well brought out that Schopenhauer's philosophy is really more a work of art than a well-founded and well-reasoned work of thought. And in this, its artistic character, containing a striking theme repeated in endless variations and clothed in a beautiful yet simple style, it must be contemplated rather than critically dissected. Least of all must it be brought into relation with the personal character of its author, from whom it appears detached and unable to receive any further illumination. Living out of the world, he looked upon it as something entirely detached from himself: his pessimism was not, as some of his opponents suggest, a mere affectation. "It was a serious and tragic view of the world, but it was an image, a picture. The tragedy of world-misery was acted in the theatre. He sat among the spectators in a comfortable fauteuil with his opera-glass. . . . Some of the spectators forgot the world-misery at the buffet; not one of them followed the tragedy with the same intense attention and seriousness as he did with his penetrating eye; then he went home deeply moved but quite happy, and described what he had seen" (loc. cit., p. 125).
OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

The problem of the Beautiful does not occupy such an important position in Hartmann's system as it does in that of Schopenhauer's. In the first and most important of his larger works, 'The Philosophy of the Unconscious' (1869), there is a short chapter on the "Unconscious" in aesthetic judgment and in artistic production. In a much later work on the History and Theory of the Beautiful, Hartmann criticises, from his point of view, the aesthetic theories and doctrines of a large number of German writers, and enters on a full discussion of the subject which may be looked upon as confirming and illustrating the main principle of his philosophy. This main principle—which contains his solution of the central philosophical problem, the problem of Reality—he acknowledges to be fore-shadowed in Schelling's later writings, when Schelling had recognised the insufficiency of his own earlier speculation, in which, however, were contained the germs for the twofold but antagonistic development in the systems of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The whole question turns upon the duality which was established in modern times in the first two 'Critiques' of Kant, and which may be variously defined as the dualism of knowledge and action, of the theoretical and the practical reason, or, as Schopenhauer has most pointedly put it, as the dualism of the intellect and the will. Hartmann shows in a lucid manner, and with a great wealth of examples and illustrations, how the whole of the idealistic movement of thought after Kant aimed at showing that the Idea—i.e., the intellectual factor—is the underlying principle, the essence of the truly Real, the
ground of everything; how, nevertheless, both Fichte and Schelling had pointed to the existence of an independent (alogical) active principle which they identified with the Will, and how, on the other side, Schopenhauer had exaggerated the latter conception, placing an abstract or general Will at the beginning of all, subordinating to it the intellect as one only, but the highest, among the manifestations or objectivations of the Will. Hartmann also makes the pertinent remark that, inasmuch as the idea or the intellect unfolds itself in the manifold processes of thought, the idealist thinkers had a rich field to work on, whereas the opposite movement of thought had only one fact, that of the Will, and was therefore not capable of any further development beyond the simple statement given to it by Schopenhauer, in which it found both its beginning and its end.

According to Hartmann, both movements of thought contain a truth, but each contains only one side of the truth. He adopts the formula of Schopenhauer, looks upon the world both as Intellect and as Will, but to him the two principles are co-ordinate: a higher aspect must be gained, a principle must be established which, as it were, unites the two; this principle lies higher or deeper than either the intellect or the will. The underlying unity of both becomes divided or broken in two in the region of consciousness. Accordingly the union of the two separated principles, of the Intellect and of the Will, must be sought in the region of the unconscious; it might be termed the absolute substance with Spinoza, or the absolute mind with Hegel. But inasmuch as the last term is usually meant to imply
consciousness or personality, it is better to call it simply the Unconscious. After having reached this position, Hartmann’s philosophical work may be looked upon as fulfilling two main tasks. The first task is to trace the unconscious through the whole realm of existing things in nature, mind, and history, in individual and in social life. The analysis of any and every phenomenon in all these different regions, the attempt to understand any and every form of existence, leads us always and everywhere to the acknowledgment of some undefinable remainder, of some hidden principle which lies above and beyond knowledge, the undefinable background of all. This is identified with the Unconscious which appears to us separately as the unconscious Will and as the unconscious Intellect. In carrying out this task Hartmann has spent an enormous amount of fruitful labour, and the reading of the sections of his works which deal with this side of his philosophy is highly suggestive and instructive. The second main task was to establish some theory of the drift of the historical development in the actual world, in which the only increasing factor seems to be the rational principle, the ever-increasing mastery of the intellect over the blind forces (the Will). Hartmann’s solution of this second or practical problem is pessimistic as is that of Schopenhauer, though in a somewhat different sense. It does not interest us at the moment, and may be disregarded by those who, in studying Hartmann’s writings, desire to gain the useful information which they abundantly afford.

So far as the first side of Hartmann’s philosophy is concerned, it will be readily seen that the idea of the
unconscious background of the phenomenal world finds abundant confirmation in the existence of the Beautiful both in nature and in art. In the main, then, Hartmann agrees with the aesthetical view current in the

1 Hartmann's difference from Schopenhauer is nowhere better seen than in his treatment of that aesthetical problem which Schopenhauer claimed to have treated more adequately than any other thinker, the problem of music. In spite of the favour which Schopenhauer's theory met with on the part of great composers, such as Wagner, Hartmann maintains that its one-sided emphasis on the unconscious, but blind, Will or impulse without regard for the unconscious intellect, the region of thought and feeling, had made it impossible for him to understand fully the real nature of musical beauty: "The Will in itself, irrespective of its object, can exhibit no other differences than those of intensity, and can, therefore, at best only contribute towards the explanation of the sublime, whereas the whole region of characteristic and formal beauty can only be explained through an ideal content. Schopenhauer's peculiar theory of music is therefore unable to introduce any other aesthetical principle than that of the aesthetical idea. . . . The combination of the emotions with the will has therefore borne with Schopenhauer the wrong fruit; in order to produce the right fruit it would have been necessary that he should have admitted the unconscious Thought together with the unconscious Will, and that he should have brought the emotions as much into contact with the former as with the latter. But as his system knows nothing of unconscious thought, he was incapable of taking this fundamental step, and it is a brilliant testimony to his divinatory insight that he nevertheless suspected a connection of musical feeling with unconscious thought, and expressed it at least in a simile, for he says that the composer expresses the deepest wisdom in a language which his intellect does not understand, just as a magnetic somnambulist tells about things of which waking she has no notion. . . . On this point Richard Wagner has attained greater definiteness than his philosophical leader. According to his view the orchestra expresses through its instruments clearly and intelligibly what is inexpressible through intellect and language, and indeed not only as something that is thought but as something actual and sensuous, &c., &c. . . . Whoever does not admit the unconsciously of the intellectual content can neither admit that the composer whose objective creation is further removed from conscious intentions than that of any other artist desires unconsciously to embody in tone-images an unconscious content, nor that his hearers unconsciously comprehend it. Nothing remains, then, but to deny to music all ideal content, &c., &c." ('Deutsche Aesthetik,' p. 488 sqq.). It is also suggested that through this one-sided view Schopenhauer failed to appreciate that combination of instrumental with vocal music of which Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony' was the first brilliant example, and which was carried to such perfection especially in Wagner's operas.
idealistic philosophies; but he lays stress upon what he calls the concrete side of the idealistic view. According to him the Beautiful consists in the sensible appearance of the Idea. In his history of modern Æsthetics in Germany he accordingly divides the idealistic writers on the Beautiful into two classes. The first represent concrete idealism, the principal representative being Hegel; the second represent abstract idealism, the principal representatives being Schelling, Solger, and Weisse.1

1 A concise summary of his critical account will be found at the end of the first book of his ‘Deutsche Aesthetik seit Kant’ (1886), pp. 357-362. This work contains—as do likewise several of Hartmann’s later writings, such notably as his ‘Treatise on the Categories’ and his ‘Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness’—an enormous mass of historical information, and does justice to the writings of many authors, unnoticed or forgotten, who nevertheless advanced the discussion of the subject on more or less important lines. He is unjust only when he criticises thinkers whose fundamental principles put his own entirely out of court, such, e.g., as Weisse and Lotze in their distinctly theistic tendency, which he wrongly regards as mere accommodation to current but nevertheless obsolete beliefs. The constructive part of his æsthetics (‘Philosophie des Schönen,’ 1887), though its aim is to show the importance of his fundamental doctrine of the Unconscious in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful and of Art, contains, nevertheless, lucid chapters which may be read with advantage even by those who do not appreciate his fundamental doctrine. Such are notably the passage on “the Beautiful as Mystery” (pp. 197-199), and still more the chapter on “Beauty and Truth” (pp. 434-444), from which I have freely quoted in the text. One more quotation is characteristic: ‘The word Mystery does not mean anything else but that the decisive point of the æsthetical process lies in the Unconscious, and the increase of the feeling for the strength and depth of this mystery is equivalent to the increasing anticipation that the essence of the beautiful lies in the unconscious perception of an immanent content unconscious in æsthetical appearance. Higher beauty does indeed give more matter for reflection also to discursive thought than the lower; but proportionally to the inexplicable mysterious remainder the conceptual part of the beautiful becomes smaller, the higher the beautiful stands; and—still more—the conceptual part becomes in proportion to the mysterious ever less important and, taken æsthetically, more indifferent. Not only does the ideal kernel of the beautiful become broader and larger, also it becomes more weighty and important, the nearer the individual idea stands to the absolute world-ground. That the increase of the mystery is at the same time an increase of the unconscious logic of the Beautiful is seen only in the highest modifications of
These latter thinkers, according to Hartmann, do not fully recognise the indispensable character of the Beautiful — viz., that it must appear in the region of the sensuous. For them the Beautiful is something transcendent; beautiful things are, as it were, merely the reflection of the essentially and supersensually beautiful.

Hartmann agrees with Schelling in considering that philosophy is deeply rooted in poetry. "In the same degree as beauty is opposed to science with its realistic truth, in the same also it is the parent of philosophy with its metaphysical truth. Beauty remains, through its innermost activity, the prophet of ideal truth in an age which has no faith, which detests metaphysics, and which sees no value in anything that is not realistic." Truth, as represented in the Beautiful, lacks the method and the strictness of philosophical truth. It leaps from the subjective appearance to the ideal essence. But against this it carries with it fascination and the force of conviction which belongs to intuition (or sight) alone, but never to the mediate and gradual process of reflection. The higher philosophy ascends, the less it is distinguished from Art. The latter has the wisdom to start on the journey to the ideal world without burdening itself with the weight of unessential and indifferent things. The Unconscious is inherent or immanent in the Beautiful. By means of the Unconscious is brought about intellectual intuition, or intuitive intelligence. Inasmuch as the Beautiful pushes its roots into the unconscious ground

the individually beautiful, as in the comic, the tragic, and the humorous, since in these the conflict of the logical with the unlogical and the conquest of the latter by the former becomes distinctly the content of the Beautiful" (p. 199).
of everything it is a mystery; with the disappearance of this mystery, of the mystical element, beauty would disappear likewise.

There are two points in which the philosophy of Hartmann claims our attention in connection with the problem of the Beautiful. The first point refers to the mystical element which is strongly urged by him. In his first important work he has a long and appreciative chapter on the Mystical, which he considers to be an important factor and phase in the life and history of the mind. Through this side of his philosophy he has contributed largely to bring out one of the main tendencies of the later thought of the century. I shall have to revert to this when, in the concluding chapter of this portion of my history, I shall try to characterise more definitely the outstanding problems of philosophical thought and the main drift of philosophical reasoning. The second point which interests us is the view that Hartmann holds as to the function of art in modern society and culture. In this respect he approaches to a conception which is shared by several thinkers abroad.

It is true that Hartmann, as well as Hegel, assigns to Art and the Beautiful not the highest position which the human mind can attain to. Both thinkers aim at elaborating a philosophical creed; the object of their search is attained only in a preliminary way and in transient and, as it were, casual glimpses, whenever and wherever nature or art unveils to us the Beautiful. But that the Beautiful in nature and art reveals to us the Ideal is a conception which plays an important part with both these thinkers. It can be traced back in
various forms in modern philosophical thought in Germany, to the writings of Schiller and Lessing. It received an extreme and one-sided expression in the philosophy of Fr. Albert Lange. It is expounded at the end of his well-known work, 'The History of Materialism,' which appeared in 1865 and ran through many editions. Lange is looked upon as one of the main representatives, if not the originator, of Neo-Kantianism in Germany. He considers that the attempts of idealism to solve the metaphysical problem of reality and to arrive at a philosophical creed have failed, but not less so the materialistic systems which for a moment occupied the position in public estimation which the idealistic systems had occupied before. To prove this Lange wrote his great historical work. Having thus shown that neither idealism nor materialism had succeeded in solving the problem it had set itself, he asks at the end of his history: How are the higher aspirations of human nature to be satisfied? The answer to the question is: By the culture of the "Ideal" and its creations. Everywhere the "Ideal" interposes in our work, be it in science or in art or in life. All attempts, even those of the materialist, to bring his knowledge into a system, to show its unity in one harmonious conception, are dictated by the Ideal. In art and poetry the Ideal is not tied to the data of empirical knowledge, as it is in science, but is free to create its own world. Philosophical speculation occupies an intermediate position between science and poetry. In speculation the formal element gains the upper hand over the material element—i.e., over the mass of facts, events,
and interests which it desires to harmonise. In poetry and art the material is completely mastered by the form. "The poet creates by the free play of his mind a world, according to his pleasure, in order to impress the easily moulded material with a form which has its value and meaning outside the tasks of knowledge. . . . The same principle which reigns supreme in the realms of the Beautiful in art and poetry appears in the realm of action as the true ethical rule, the foundation of all moral principles; and it appears in the region of knowledge as the formative factor of our world-view."

All these activities are the outcome of a process of bringing together or of synthesis; the freer this synthesis is, the more poetical will be our view of things and the more ethically elevating its reaction on our doings and strivings in this world. Not only poetry but speculation itself has an essentially æsthetical, and through the educational power of the Beautiful, an ethical intent.

The expositions of Lange remind us of Lessing and Herder, of Schiller and Fichte. Lange himself quotes Schiller and Fichte; indeed, all that he says is more impressively stated in the prose and poetry of these earlier thinkers, for their works contain an element which is characteristic with them but which is wanting in Lange: this is the element of faith or hope. They believed—or at least had a firm hope—that their Ideal was somewhere realised; the Ideal, in fact, was to them the truly Real. With Lange this assurance seems to have vanished.\footnote{The relevant passages in Lange's work will be found in the last chapter of the first book, which deals with the "Reaction against Materialism in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century,"} The element of doubt and resignation .
has crept in, disappointment through the failure of efforts in the past plays a greater part than confidence in the success of efforts in the future; but the latter was just the characteristic temper, the governing feature with the thinkers and poets of the age of the Revolution.¹

and treats of the influence of Spinoza; and again in the last chapter of the whole work, which deals with a similar reaction setting in in more recent times. Whereas in the former period the constructive metaphysical philosophy of Spinoza, assimilated as we have seen (supra, vol. iii, p. 119 sqq.) by Goethe, led the reaction in philosophy and poetry, the reaction which again set in against the renewed materialism after the lapse of a century, dropped the speculative confidence and hope contained in Spinozism and its more recent pantheistic and theistic developments and returned, not to Spinoza, but to the destructive criticism initiated by Kant and revived by the Neo-Kantians. The difference is significant. In the former instance philosophy, which included science, was considered capable of reaching the highest content, or the Absolute, through methodical thought. Art also and poetry were considered to be a distinct expression of the Divine. In the later reaction both philosophy and art were considered to be incapable of attaining to these heights. Nevertheless, scientific or realistic thought remained, and the creations of art, the work of imagination, remained; but the former was limited to mere appearance, unable to grasp the truly real, and the latter were not considered to represent the idea as the truly real. This position was not that of Hartmann, although it was only a short step to take from the Unconscious to the Unknowable. The difference then, so far as beauty, art, and the Ideal is concerned, may be stated in this wise. For Lessing, Winckelmann, Schiller, and others, as likewise for Schelling and Hartmann, the Ideal was a revelation, though a transient and momentary one, of the truly Real; for Lange and his followers the Ideal was not a revelation but a product of the human imagination, which by some mysterious impulse—biologically explained as a necessary propelling force in the struggle for existence—invected the fanciful world of beauty and the beautiful. In the former case the Beautiful was a revelation of the truly Real; in the latter, a mere invention, a cunning device, of the human soul.¹

¹ Towards the end of the century the view expressed by Lange has been more or less adopted by many thinkers, and quite recently (1911) there has appeared a remarkable Treatise by Prof. H. Vaihinger, a friend and disciple of Lange's. It bears the title, 'Die Philosophie des Als Ob,' and is explained on the title-page as a "system of the theoretical, practical, and religious fictions of mankind founded upon an idealistic Positivism," and it introduces itself by a motto (being one of the last utterances of Lange himself): "I am convinced that the point herein dwelt on will some day become a corner-stone of philosophical epistemology." The work has an author as well as an editor
This leads us to an understanding of the importance of Lange's view,—a view which is, consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, shared by many thoughtful minds in Germany at the present day. I have had occasion to point out in an earlier portion of this chapter, as likewise on former occasions, how the aspirations of German poetry and the courageous efforts of German speculation, at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth, were a reflection of the new interests and the youthful ideals of the age—an expression of the general hope that a new era had dawned for human history and human culture; also, how this universal and widespread feeling received an extreme expression through the French Revolution; and, lastly, how the disenchantment which followed upon its exaggerations and excesses led to two

in the same person; Vaihinger having written the book more than thirty years ago (1875-1878), but allowed it to remain unpublished, as it seemed to him that the age was not ripe for its reception. During the generation, however, which followed the publication of Lange's 'History' and the composition of his own work, he recognises that Lange's ideas have been more and more assimilated by other thinkers. Of these he gives a long list in his Preface as the author, pointing especially to the similarity of his views to such popular philosophies of modern times as those of the Pragmatists in this country and of Fr. Nietzsche in Germany. His relation to Henri Bergson, which has been pointed out (see Dr K. Oesterreich in 'Deutsche Literaturzeitung,' 1913, p. 199), is less evident, inasmuch as the final drift of M. Bergson's speculations is not yet clear. Although the main title of the work is repellent to common-sense, it is of value to the historian of thought to see it clearly expressed in the sub-title that according to this tendency in philosophy all progress in culture and society seems to be based on fictions or on inventions of the human mind, without any underlying conviction that they are, if not the expression, yet at least a reflection of the truly Real—in fact, the latter seems to vanish altogether out of existence. It will be evident to my readers that the whole tendency which I desire to bring out in this History is exactly the opposite of what Prof. Vaihinger considers to be the drift of recent thought; but it is of advantage for both sides that through the use of the word "fiction" this contrast should be distinctly defined and emphasised.
independent currents of thought and endeavour. The first consisted in a reaction, in an effort to stem the tide; the second and more important movement consisted in a universal resolve to do better, more methodically and in a more orderly manner, what had been done in storm and haste in the earlier stage of the great revolutionary movement. This was to be achieved by deeper thinking, more extensive learning, by popular education, as well as by higher academic teaching. At the same time, especially in Germany, a novel conception of the ideals of art and poetry, a fresh spiritual impulse, produced a great mass of poetical and artistic creation. The two points in which the new light was collected, the foei from which it spread into far regions, are the life and work of Goethe and the divine creations of Beethoven.

When Lange wrote, the Ideal which had guided poets and thinkers half a century earlier appeared unrealisable, not only through speculation but also through science. But the expression which that Ideal had found in poetry and art had not perished; it was realised and perpetuated for all time in the artistic productions of that age. If the faith and hope which had animated the earlier generation had disappeared, the great creations had not disappeared; they stood there as lasting monuments of the workings of a deeper spirit. Hence it was not unnatural that many deeper-seeking and thinking minds should turn for refreshment and spiritual support to those great creations. This explains the very widespread interest which has more recently been taken in the works and personality of Goethe; how it is that his
philosophy of life has become, in many instances, the philosophical creed of a later generation. This also explains the prominent part which music, elevated and deepened in the compositions of Beethoven and his followers, plays in the spiritual life of large numbers among the German people.

To trace this more in detail would mean to penetrate deeper into the poetic and religious thought of the century, into that region where scientific and philosophical forms and methods avail little or nothing, but which is nevertheless the spontaneous and creative source out of which all other mental efforts flow, notably in which all new movements of philosophical no less than of scientific thought have their origin and beginnings. But as this would belong to a different portion of this history, I must at present drop the subject with the single remark that the philosophical study of the Beautiful has led thinkers to the limits of speculation, to the recognition that beyond these limits lies a deeper and more productive region of thought.

Similar reasons prevent me from entering at present upon an appreciation of that range of ideas which have been more unconsciously active than philosophically defined, in the writings and deliverances of English art-critics during the second half of the nineteenth century. The great stimulus to this original and spontaneous—though unsystematic—expression of thought was undoubtedly given by the publication of the first volume of John Ruskin's 'Modern Painters' in 1843. It was not a philosophical interest which produced this highly original work, but it has been significantly pointed out
that it appeared in the same year as John Stuart Mill's 'Logic.' It may therefore be permitted to bring it into a line with that reaction to which I referred at the end of the last chapter, the probably unconscious reaction against what we may now term the mechanical view of nature, the attempt to limit the study of nature to the recognition of certain recurring uniformities, such uniformities being primarily conceived as comprised in the formula of cause and effect, but latterly more and more reduced to a mere repetition of successions in time. The earlier upholders of the scientific study of nature, when they desired to do more than accumulate and arrange facts and observations, laid stress, consciously or unconsciously, on that side of the conception of cause which in their minds was not purely mechanical. This implied that the effect was not purely mechanical either, but shared in the ideal or spiritual nature of the cause from which it ultimately sprang: it exhibited a definite end or a purpose. These

1 This remark is only fully correct if we look at the mathematical or exact sciences, and does not apply to the organic or biological sciences. The latter utilised for the purposes of classification and arrangement the conception of plan or archetype. To have destroyed this latter idea, replacing it by a conception of change or evolution mechanically proceeding, and by doing so to have converted some of the natural sciences into exact sciences, is one of the great achievements of the Darwinian revolution of Thought. It should, however, not be overlooked that purely deductive reasoning from definite beginnings is not possible: such beginnings must always be a matter of hypothesis or invention. They are hypothetical in all the sciences which deal with a variety of molar and molecular, and still more in those that deal with organic, phenomena; and they are a matter of invention or choice in dealing with purely mathematical configurations. This has been more and more recognised in the course of the nineteenth century, and has resulted in a comparatively recent science,—the mathematics of arrangement as distinguished from the mathematics of quantity. This I tried to show in the last chapter of the first section of this History.
ideal or spiritual attributes, which once clung even to the scientific use of the words cause and effect, and which common-sense still retains, were gradually stripped from the formula by a lengthened process of logical analysis which, in this country at least, started with Mill's 'Logic.'

It was therefore highly significant and valuable that at the same time a line of reasoning on things natural should be started which aimed at pointing out and analysing the artistic as distinguished from the scientific aspect and representation. This analysis was in the main inductively carried out through a study of the numerous works of the new school of landscape painters which had sprung up in this country in the first half of the century. There does not seem to exist any well-defined historical connection between discussions on the Beautiful in the writings of Ruskin and those of the German Idealists a generation before him. But it has been pointed out in the only comprehensive history of Æsthetics which British thought has produced that an

1 We have seen (supra, vol. iii. p. 378 sqq.) that Mill himself felt the necessity of counteracting what we should now term the purely mechanical view of the world and life by a poetical view which he, with remarkable insight, found impressively contained in the poetry of Wordsworth. I am not aware that Mill took special or adequate notice of the writings of Ruskin, which probably were for his taste deficient in an understanding and appreciation of the scientific spirit. I can, however, remember no trace in Mill's writings of a view of poetry and art akin to that of Lange or Vaihinger. The emotional side of human nature was to Mill, as it was also to Renouvier, a definite reality, though it does not appear as if he ever clearly defined to himself the implications which such a view carries with it.

2 Bernard Bosanquet, 'History of Æsthetic' (2nd ed., 1904). A very useful and lucid historical account of the various theories of the Beautiful in ancient and modern times, and prominently also in literatures which the present History of Thought has been obliged to exclude from its survey, is to be found in Prof. Wm. Knight's 'Philosophy of the Beautiful' (1st
idea, much dwelt upon by the latter, received a fuller expression in Ruskin's expositions than it had received in Goethe, Hegel, or Schelling. This is the idea of the characteristic in nature. In both cases the aim was to penetrate to the underlying thought which enlivens genuine artistic creation—*i.e.*, the creation of the artistic or poetical genius. Now, both schools of art criticism—that surrounding Goethe in Germany, and that centred in Ruskin in England—founded their analysis and deductions largely, though not wholly, upon the creations of contemporary art. Of the two, the great world of

part), 'Outlines of the History of Aesthetics' (1891). In contradistinction to the work of Prof. Bosanquet and the critical history of modern aesthetics, which forms the larger portion of Signor Croce's work referred to above (p. 15), Prof. Knight treats at greater length of aesthetics in France and Britain than of aesthetics in Germany. The fact that he comprises under the term Aesthetics not only the philosophical discussion of the problem of beauty and the Beautiful, but emphasises with Jouffroy (p. 114) the existence of a science of the Beautiful as distinguished from the philosophy, and that he includes in his account much that is quite unsystematic, belonging to what the French term Critique and English writers Criticism, gives to his Manual a special value. It may counteract a partiality for the exclusively metaphysical treatment of the subject, which starts with a definition of beauty or of art, and it may open the eyes of students especially in Germany, where Aesthetics has frequently been considered to be peculiarly a German science—to the enormous mass of valuable thought on subjects of beauty and the beautiful which is scattered in the general polite literatures of modern times all over Europe. And in this respect his Manual has not become superfluous through the publication of Bosanquet's larger work, as he himself modestly suggests it might. For those who, like myself, search for the beginnings of philosophical thought in the general literature, the poetry, and the spiritual writings of individual, and frequently secluded, thinkers, Knight's Manual would prove a very useful guide on their paths of exploration.

1 It is well to remark that German Aesthetics, with the exception of Kant, started by a study of the classic in Winckelmann, enlarging its field of view by taking in the art of the Renaissance, that of Shakespeare and that of other periods and nations, gradually recognising the originality and peculiar breadth and depth of Goethe's creations. On the other side, we learn from the biographer of Ruskin that the æsthetical and historical interest of Ruskin began, as it were, with what was near at hand, and underwent considerable change and enlargement in the
OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

art which centred in Goethe was probably the more comprehensive; but in spite of its comprehensiveness, it was—probably with the single exception of Goethe himself—wanting in detailed and faithful studies of nature. The whole artistic interest of that age centred in the problem of mind, be it divine or human, in the individual. Thus the principal illustrations of such æsthetical theories as those of Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, are drawn from poetry or from the plastic arts of classical antiquity; the "characteristic" is to be found, according to a passage quoted above from Schelling's 'Address,' in an individual moment of perfection. With this stands in marked contrast the new world of artistic creation which Ruskin made the object of his study. "It is," says Professor Bosanquet,¹ "this point of view that we owe to Mr Ruskin's unwearied justification of the art of Turner, and it is not too much to say that he, like Winckelmann, has given the mind a new organ for the appreciation of beauty. The characteristic in nature as a whole, though a point of view imperatively demanded by the theory of Hegel, Goethe, and Schelling,

course of his literary career. The social importance of art took in Ruskin a more practical shape than it did in Schiller's writings or, more recently, in those of J. M. Guyau in France.

¹ Loc. cit., p. 448 sqq. "The true question is, in the first instance, as to the range and vigour of beauty itself. Now, in one aspect of this question we owe something like a revolution to the English art and criticism of this century. This aspect is our appreciation of external nature in the form of landscape scenery." It is somewhat surprising that in this connection Prof. Bosanquet did not also mention Wordsworth and Tennyson, nor refer to the great influence which amateur naturalists, beginning with White of Selborne, had on the growing appreciation of natural beauty. In general, we may also note the development of this side of artistic taste among amateur sketchers; and the wealth in picturing the life and beauty of nature in what may probably be considered the best in the verse of the minor English poets of the day.
was a region in which we found them weak. They thought more of the individual formation, the crystal, the plant, the animal, while the co-operating laws and larger combinations of phenomena were scarcely within the range of the characteristic as they understood it. But fully in the spirit of science, Mr Ruskin has pointed out with loving appreciation the value and import of variable curves, graduated colours, and the nature and stratification of earth and rock, so that to the nature-lover versed in this expressiveness, the hills and plains, the cliffs and river-courses, are able to tell their story like a human face."

All this, however, is mentioned here only in passing, and to show again how the problem of the Beautiful was studied independently of the great philosophical movement and outside of the systems of the school, as a special branch of art-criticism. At a somewhat later period than that which produced the earlier writings of Carlyle and Ruskin, the desire began to make itself felt, also in this country, to elaborate a philosophical creed. As I have repeatedly pointed out, this demand had existed abroad ever since the middle of the seventeenth century. Under its influence the great philosophical problems were formulated, latest among them probably that of the Beautiful. In this country these problems, so far as they were recognised at all, arose in a loose and disconnected manner through other influences and interests, among which social questions were probably the most important and pressing. We find this specific English characteristic strongly marked also in many of the prom-
inent literary and art critics, such as Carlyle, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, and William Morris. Apart from these, but agreeing with them in his lively interest in social problems, stands the lonely figure of Herbert Spencer: he alone made a serious attempt to elaborate a reasoned philosophical creed, to formulate and solve the World-problem. In the course of his various and laborious expositions he was led also to deal with æsthetical questions. But apart from marking his adherence to the play-theory of art, his psychological analysis does not contain anything very suggestive or original. He has no idea of the Beautiful as constituting a World-problem, such as it appeared to Plato in antiquity and again to Schelling in Germany, such also as it is declaring itself in spite of the absence of any special love for method and system, in literary and art criticism in the modern literatures of France and England. Of Spencer, Signor Benedetto Croce, the latest historian of Æsthetics, says: "If one desires to determine somehow the philosophical position of Spencer, one is obliged to say that he oscillates between sensationalism and moralism, and has never any idea of art in its character as art."1

This quotation reminds me that, in dealing with the philosophical problem of the Beautiful, no mention has been made, so far, of the psychological treatment of the subject and, only indirectly, of the connection of Æsthetics and Ethics. Yet these two sides of the question are probably those which receive, at the present

1 B. Croce, 'Esthétique' (1904), p. 389.
moment, most, if not exclusive, attention in Germany, where the metaphysical or essentially philosophical treatment has wellnigh died out.¹

This fundamental change may be traced back to the influence of the writings of Herbart. Herbart himself has not devoted any larger treatise² to æsthetics.

¹ This becomes very evident if we compare with the historical works of Schasler, Lotze, and Bosanquet, referred to in the text, such recent statements as are contained in the two representative works frequently referred to already in earlier chapters, the 'Festschrift' in honour of Kuno Fischer, and the volume entitled 'Systematische Philosophie.' The former contains an article on "Æsthetics" by Prof. Karl Groos. He distinguishes between a metaphysical, a critical, and a psychological treatment of æsthetical problems, finds that the first survives mostly only in the influence of Schopenhauer's speculation, but that the latter defines the position of the majority of recent philosophical writers on Æsthetics, defining the latter as a "psychology of æsthetical enjoyment and artistic creation" (quoted from Külpe, vol. ii. p. 138). He then enters on an interesting discussion of the question whether psychology is able to deal with the highest problems of æsthetical judgment or value which the critical treatment puts in the foreground, and comes to the conclusion that psychologists might do well if they left out the reference to value, especially if it were possible to arrive through a critical analysis at absolute standards, which he, however, considers to be doubtful (p. 149). The author then deals at some length with a conception which pervades recent æsthetics, notably in Germany, and which has received through R. Vischer a special designation—namely, the term Einfühlung. It means that æsthetical contemplation and enjoyment is based upon the possibility of "feeling yourself into" the object you contemplate. This view is also that of another prominent representative of modern German æsthetics, Prof. Theodor Lipps, who makes it the principal subject of his article on "Æsthetics" in the other volume mentioned above, and enlarges it by the conception of æsthetical sympathy; his definition of the sensation of the beautiful being "the feeling of a positive living activity which I experience in a sensuous object" (Lipps' 'Grundlegung der Æsthetik,' 1903, p. 140). In the interest of the history of Thought it is gratifying to see that both authors trace the beginning of this conception to the writings of Lotze in his 'History' as well as in his 'Microcosmus.' An interesting account of recent German æsthetics from this special point of view "which at present governs it" ('Systematische Philosophie,' p. 385) will be found in a valuable article by Vernon Lee on "Recent Æsthetics" in the April number of 'The Quarterly Review,' 1904, to which I desire especially to direct the attention of my readers.

² The principal passages in Herbart's Works which refer to this subject will be found in his 'Introduction to Philosophy' (1813), reprinted in the first vol. of the 'Collected Works,' ed. by Harten-
Nevertheless he stimulated in his disciples a genuine interest in æsthetical problems from the psychological point of view, and this not only through his untiring and strenuous opposition to the metaphysical treatment, but quite as much by pointing out how æsthetical, as well as ethical, interests originate in and come under one and the same psychological principle. This is the principle of approval or disapproval with which we contemplate things as well as human actions. Thus Herbart puts at the entry of his practical philosophy the conception of value. Judgments or estimates as to the value of things, phenomena, events or actions, are termed by Herbart æsthetical, and are distinguished from those referring to truth or correctness. Āesthetical judgments, again, divide themselves into those which refer merely to the approval which we experience in contemplation—these are the æsthetical judgments in

stein; further, in the sixth and following chapters of the 'Encyclopaedia' (1831), 'Works,' vol. ii. The best exposition of the whole of Herbart's philosophy, and also especially of his Æsthetics, will be found in Lotze's writings. That referring to the general principles and the originality of his position is given in the Lecture Syllabus on the 'History of German Philosophy since Kant' (1882), chap. 6; that on his Ontology in a long critical article (1843) reprinted in the first volume of the 'Kleine Schriften' (p. 109); that referring to his Æsthetics in the 'History of Æsthetics in Germany' (pp. 225-246). Considering that Lotze does not agree with Herbart in his fundamental treatment of Æsthetics, he is remarkably just and appreciative of Herbart's merit in having for the first time clearly introduced into philosophical discussions the distinct idea and helpful term of Value or Worth, as more expressive and serviceable than the term Purpose used by Kant. Lotze's own position is best understood if we note how he from the beginning (cf. his 'Metaphysik,' 1841) introduces this term, and how he retains it and enlarges its meaning in all his subsequent writings. It is surprising that the philosopher who first, after Lotze, made this idea of Value one of the central points of his speculation, H. Höfödting, has not referred on this point to Lotze in his somewhat unsympathetic account of the latter. (See 'History of Philosophy,' vol. ii. p. 508; see also a short Tract by Otto Ritschl, 'Ueber Werthurtheile,' 1895.)
the narrower sense—and those which are inevitably accompanied by the feeling of obligation, namely, the ethical judgments.

From this we see that Herbart does not approve of the divisions and definitions which were introduced by Kant. Kant had employed the practical principle, which he termed the Categorical Imperative, to define for practical if not for theoretical purposes the essence of the truly Real. This had been further elaborated by Fichte, who placed the active principle at the entrance of his system. Combined with Kant's doctrine that all empirical knowledge refers only to appearance and not to the truly Real, this meant that the principle of action or the rule of practice would necessarily turn out to be a purely formal and abstract precept without any intelligible sense or meaning through which this abstract principle recommends itself to our approval. Against this Herbart maintains that the practical—i.e., the æsthetical and the ethical—has our approval not through its form but through its content, inasmuch as it contains something which is valuable in our estimation.

The æsthetical view of Herbart has been stigmatised as formal ¹ in opposition to the metaphysical conception

¹ Herbart proposed to investigate both æsthetical and moral questions by a combined process of analysis and synthesis not unlike, and no doubt influenced by, similar discussions which abound in the philosophical literature of this country since the time of Shaftesbury. Considering that the epithet of the Beautiful belongs only to the relations of single sensuous elements which, in themselves, do not deserve this epithet, Herbart aimed at discovering those fundamental relations which call forth æsthetical approval, and which in their combination produce the very complex works of nature and art forming the world of the Beautiful. His æsthetics, therefore, proposed to take, what Fechner ("Vorschule der Æsthetik," introduction) more emphatically urged, a way "from below" in contradistinction to the metaphysical way "from above." The latter starting from a compre-
elaborated by the idealists and the purely psychological analysis of the older schools and of that of the psychophysical school represented in Germany mainly by Fechner. There is, however, no need to dwell on Herbart's views at any length so far as the problem of the Beautiful is concerned, except to notice that he considered æsthetical judgments as referring to relations and not to the elementary sensations or perceptions between which these relations exist. His disciples took up this idea and attempted to define more closely in what these relations consist, reducing them to a limited number of definite fundamental relations. With

hensive or synoptic view of the whole realm of the Beautiful, wherever it might appear, tried to give to this view a definite expression or interpretation in connection with a general creed as to the nature and essence of what was conceived to be the truly Real, tracing this subsequently through all the numerous single instances and scattered appearances in the actual world of nature or the creations of art and life; hence the task of æsthetics consisted in interpreting the world of the Beautiful in the light of the supreme Thought, the Ideal. For Herbart and his followers, on the other side, the task of æsthetics was to determine the elemental relations, and to show how through their manifold combination and according to rules which the science of æsthetics had to establish, the beauty of any larger complex was produced. There seems no doubt that Herbart was somewhat misled by his more exclusive acquaintance with music and poetry to desire to establish everywhere definite rules such as have guided musical and, in a lesser degree, poetical, compositions with their well-defined elementary notions of rhythm, harmony, melody, &c.; he desired a similar schooling in the elements of the Beautiful, in the fine arts. On the other side, thinkers such as Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and Schelling approached the Beautiful by contemplating and studying the existing great productions of the antique and the renaissance, of Shakespeare and other ancient and modern poets, and tried to get hold of that essential Something to which they owed their objective excellence. Herbartian æsthetics are mainly represented by Robert Zimmermann and elaborately criticised by Fr. Theod. Vischer, the most celebrated representative of the idealistic School. He criticised with equal candour his own great work (\textquoteleft Esthetik,\textquoteright 1846-1857) in his \textquoteleft Kritische Gänge,\textquoteright Neue Folge, No. 5, pp. 1-224; No. 6, pp. 1-166 (1866, 1873). These articles are most interesting, showing, \textit{inter alia}, how prominent disciples of Hegel were gradually abandoning the logic and metaphysics of their master.
this view Herbart himself combined a distinct aversion towards that endeavour so prominent among the idealists —the endeavour, viz., to see in works of art the expression of something extraneous though higher, to reduce them to symbols of something else. Much more important than in the directions just mentioned is the influence of Herbart in two other directions, although this is not shown pre-eminently in his treatment of the æstheti
cal problem. I mention it here because it offers a convenient transition from the subject of this chapter to that of the following. It has been stated that Herbart's views are, to a large extent, foreshadowed in those of Kant. Nevertheless he introduced certain modifications in the expression of these views which have become important. Kant had introduced the idea of purpose in order to explain the Beautiful, which, as he put it, appears to us purposeful without having a definite end or purpose extraneous to itself. It had, in fact, its purpose within itself. This correct idea received a more adequate expression when Herbart put in the place of the term purpose or end the term value or worth. In doing so he emphasised the truth already expressed by Kant, that in pronouncing æsthetical judgments we do not reflect upon the usefulness of the thing we judge, but recognise its end or purpose to lie in itself. At the same time, this way of putting the matter points to the subjective side of æsthetical judgments, inasmuch as we can only speak of the value or worth of anything if we personally realise or experience the same. It also allows us to bring together æsthetical and ethical judg-
ments, and to look upon either of the two as comprised within the other.

The consequences of the introduction of the terms value and worth are most clearly seen in the philosophy of Lotze, who employs them to make more intelligible—more accessible to the human understanding—the essence of that which in the speculations of Schelling and Hegel had figured as the Idea, the essence of the truly Real, which to the human soul presents itself as that which has intrinsic value or worth, which deserves to exist for its own sake. Accordingly Lotze, as I have stated on several occasions, starts in his philosophy from the empirical fact that the phenomenal world, the world also of common-sense, consists of three intermingled regions—the world or region of Things, the world or region of Laws, and the world or region of Values or Worths.

In quite recent times this conception has found a restatement in the writings of Professor Höfding, who divides the great philosophical problem into the three distinct problems—the problem of existence, the problem of knowledge, and the problem of value. It must, however, be at once remarked that the ultimate formula, through which Lotze tries to bring the three regions of thought into harmony, has not proved satisfactory to Höfding.

The second point through which Herbart has influenced æsthetical theory lies in this, that he has brought æsthetics and ethics into a closer connection than they had in the system of Kant. If in æsthetics
as well as in ethics the idea of value is made the start-
ing-point, we cannot get rid of the question what it is
that gives value to anything, be it a natural object,
a creation of art, or an act of the human Will. Kant
had not made the idea of value the starting-point of his
practical philosophy, though it had served him under the
name of purpose to define the Beautiful. In ethics he
had made the idea of obligation or duty in the form of
the Categorical Imperative, the starting-point and domi-
ning conception. Had he attempted to explain psycho-
logically why the highest moral law meets with our
approval he would have, to some extent at least, bridged
over the distance which separates the good from the
beautiful. This was done by that line of reasoning
which begins with Herbart. Now although in the
sequel very different views have been taken by different
thinkers on the relation of aesthetics to ethics, or of the
beautiful to the good, there is an unmistakable tendency
manifested among the later philosophers of the nineteenth
century to emphasise the ethical, educational, and socio-
logical importance of art, and this has frequently
happened with those thinkers who have recognised and
painfully experienced the decline of the religious factor
in modern civilisation. To their view art has in propor-
tion gained in importance, the beautiful has appeared as
a kind of receptacle of those truths which formerly pre-
sented themselves more naturally in the form of religious
beliefs; the vanishing ideals of earlier phases of culture
are to be preserved in the works of art and in the region
of the beautiful. I have already pointed out how this
aspect found expression in the writings of Lange, and
OF THE BEAUTIFUL. 109

how, notably in Germany, the emotional side of life has, with many persons, taken refuge, and found expression and satisfaction, in the musical compositions of the great masters of earlier and of recent times.

A tendency, not unlike the one just mentioned,—a tendency to take art more seriously,—is to be found in the writings of one of the most original philosophical thinkers during the last quarter of the century in France. I refer to Jean Marie Guyau (1854 to 1888). It may be said that in him the conception of evolution has been applied to a solution of the problem of the Beautiful. The question had already been discussed by the philosopher of evolution, by Herbert Spencer, as likewise by some of his followers. But in the hands of Guyau the evolutionary view acquires quite a different aspect. Herbert Spencer had, as I have had occasion to mention before, revived the play-theory of Schiller, without distinctly referring to Schiller. Now the play-theory of Schiller had its origin at a time when Kant's ethical rigorism had acquired a strong hold on German thought.

1 The principal works of Guyau in which his æsthetical ideas are developed are: 'Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine' (1884); 'L'Art au point de vue Sociologique' (1889). Both these works have run through several editions. A very interesting volume upon Guyau ('La Morale, l'Art et la Religion'), giving much prominence to his poetical, artistic, and æsthetical mind and thought, was published by Alfred Fouillée, who was his guardian, teacher, and subsequently his stepfather. It contains a biographical notice of Guyau's short life and profound studies. Chapters iii. and iv. on 'Guyau's Æsthetics' are largely interspersed with original poetry. Guyau had during his lifetime published a volume with the title 'Vers d'un Philosophe' (1881). The most important, however, of Guyau's philosophical attempts was to find a basis for morality after, as he considered, the traditional foundations of ethics and religion had been destroyed through the doctrine of evolution. Together with Fouillée himself he may be considered to be a leader in that specifically French philosophical tendency—the idealisation of the philosophy of evolution.
The inexorable law of duty, the Categorical Imperative, had been made by Kant not only the basis of practical philosophy, but as it were also the expression of the truly Real, the only and the sufficient means of insight afforded to us human beings into the ultimate ground and essence of the existing world. In this conception, support had also been found for the belief in God, in Freedom, and in Immortality. Art and the Beautiful were not required for the solution of the moral problem; they were looked upon by Schiller as ornaments, as the adornment of life, as the introduction to the sterner demands of reason and duty. When, a century later, Guyau approached the problems of the Spirit, the Good and the Beautiful,—which, according to Lotze's terminology, constitute the region of values or worths,—the independent foundations of religious faith and of moral doctrine had been profoundly shaken by the scientific and historical criticism of the century; notably the supreme obligation contained in the moral law, as it was understood by Kant, and the sanction derived from religious or metaphysical convictions, appeared doubtful. Yet Guyau was not a pessimist or a materialist; the teachings of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann did not satisfy him, nor did he share in the despair with which both Lange and Strauss took refuge in the ideals that had found expression in art and poetry, in literature and music. Guyau was animated by a great faith and hope which amounted almost to inspiration. Like Schelling, eighty years earlier, he was both a philosopher and a poet; he had, more than Schelling, something of the prophet in him—he lived in
the future. He had not abandoned the belief in progress, in the perfectibility of the human race, proclaimed a century earlier by his countryman Condorcet and the intellectual leaders of the French Revolution.

We may then ask: Whence did Guyau derive his faith and his hope? It came to him through the philosophy of evolution which had found in France an idealistic interpretation in the writings of Alfred Fouillé. According to Guyau the world contains a propelling principle: this he identifies with Life, which is not only a propelling but also an expanding principle; it is the principle not only of development but also of growth and enlargement. His views on this subject are taken from Biology. We live in an age when a larger idea of life is gradually, but inevitably, forcing itself upon us. Life hitherto has been mainly concerned with the individual, the unit; but biology has taught us that the highest form of individual life, man himself, is, like all other organisms, composed of a multitude of separate units, that the individual organism is an assemblage of cells, a society as it were. But on the other side we have human society, an assemblage of human beings in the totality of the social organism. This conception has been forced upon us by the theory of evolution; the great outstanding problem of the nineteenth century, toward which all other problems converge, is the problem of society,—the growth, the development, and the future of Society. The next object of human progress and human development is, to bring about a solidarity, a unity of human interests through co-operation or combined energy—what Guyau calls "synergie sociale." To

61. Evolutionary view.
bring about this combined energy, this unity of interests and of life in human society, is the task of the future and the ideal of Guyau. It is this which he sees realised in the future; it is this that gives him faith and hope. Inasmuch as his writings and speculations are inspired by this faith and hope, by the prophetic view of the future, his philosophy contains that element which existed in a high degree in German idealism in the beginning of the century, giving it a propelling force and animating it with life and vigour. It is interesting also to note that, as the German idealists attached themselves closely to the poetical and artistic creations of their age and drew inspiration from them, so likewise Guyau stands in immediate contact with the great literary forces of his country, notably with Victor Hugo, in whose poetical creations he finds many conscious or unconscious confirmations of his ideas, the poetical fore-shadowing of his doctrine.

I shall have occasion to refer again to the fundamental conception which pervades all Guyau's writings. At present what interests us is, not so much his ethics and his religious philosophy, as his views on Art and the Beautiful. Next to Plato and the German idealists Guyau is the most important name in the philosophy of the Beautiful. His Æsthetics do not deal only with questions of taste, with psychological analysis and literary criticism, to which they have been confined in this country and latterly also in Germany; they deal also and pre-eminently with the larger question regarding the nature and essence of the Beautiful and the place which has to be assigned to the Beautiful and to Art in any
comprehensive system of thought or life. Accordingly it has been not incorrectly remarked by some French critics, that with Guyau a new epoch begins in the history of æsthetics. The first epoch began with Plato: his æsthetics are the æsthetics of the Ideal; the second began with Kant: his æsthetics are the æsthetics of Perception; the third starts with Guyau: his æsthetics are the æsthetics of social sympathy.\(^1\) Having destroyed, in two separate works, the sociological value of religion as well as of morals in the generally accepted sense of the terms, Guyau exalts the importance of the Beautiful and of Art inasmuch as it creates social sympathy and produces a community of feeling and sentiment. Without art the *synergie sociale* would be incomplete; we might have a community of ideas, an intellectual alliance of human beings—this being the object of metaphysics of which religion is merely a figurative and imaginative form; or we might have a unity of practical aims and efforts—this is the task and object of morality; but we should not have a community of feeling and sentiment. To give the latter is the aim of art; it adds to the *synergie sociale* the *sympathie sociale*. Thus the education of the intellect through science and philosophy, the education of the will through morals, and the education of the feelings through art, go hand in hand, furthering the same end—viz., co-operation and harmony in human society.

In the same degree as the doctrinal religion of the churches and the ethical code of moral rigorists are destroyed, the importance of Art and of the Beautiful

\(^1\) See B. Croce, *‘Esthétique,*' p. 399.
increases. We have seen above how Kuno Fischer pointed out the dilemma in which Schiller entangled himself in his "Letters on the Æsthetical Education of Humanity," inasmuch as he could not reconcile the sternness of Kant's Ethics with his æsthetical view of the Ideal of Humanity. This dilemma does not exist for Guyau; he has destroyed the rigour of morality; its highest principle is not a command, it is merely the growth and enlargement of life; duty is an overflowing of life which desires to be used and to give itself up, duty does not arise through an external law of necessity, duty is only the expression of superabundant power. The Beautiful is not opposed to reality, is not a matter of play and fiction, but it is an enlargement of life. Wherever, in nature or in the creations of art, we are made to see this larger life, we have the sensation of the Beautiful. Through this conception Guyau is enabled to attach greater value to the beauty in nature than to the beauty in art, whereas we saw that the idealistic school awakened only tardily to an adequate appreciation of natural beauty.

At the same time Guyau's conception of the Beautiful reminds us of Lotze's views. Both Lotze and Guyau have before their minds an ideal condition, both dream of a harmony which does not exist in the actual state of things and of life which surrounds us. For Lotze, the ultimate harmony and solution of the world-problem would consist in the unity of things, laws and values; for Guyau it would consist in the harmonious life of human society, in the larger social life of the universe. Both recognise that the Beautiful affords us a glimpse,
or suggests the realisation, of the ideal state of things. Lotze would see the complete realisation if a view of the totality of things were given to us; Guyau sees it in the process of evolution in time.

Guyau is one of the last original writers on æsthetics who have attempted to solve the philosophical problem of the Beautiful. He has tried to give an answer to the two main philosophical questions: What is the essence of the Beautiful, be it in nature or in art? and further: What position does the Beautiful occupy in the complete scheme of human interests? How is it related to truth (the problem of Knowledge), to the actual (the problem of Reality), and to that which ought to be (the problem of the Good)? He has also made an attempt to reduce these different aspects to a common term, to unite them in one fundamental conception. This fundamental conception with Guyau is the principle of life: but life in a spiritual, not in a merely physical sense. It is an expression for the same immanent power which, in the idealistic school of thought, goes variously under other terms, such as mind, thought, or idea. We may therefore say that he has approached the solution of the highest philosophical problem, the problem of Reality. To this I shall revert again, in a later chapter, which will deal with the problem of the Spirit.

Being an evolutionist, Guyau tries to arrive at an understanding of the highest manifestations of the propelling force or power which pervades everything by fastening upon a phenomenon which we see everywhere in nature, and of which we know something by actual observation, by outer and inner experience: the familiar
phenomenon of life. To him the entire unfolding of life is the key to the world-process; through this view he shows himself to be the child of his age, of the age which revolutionised Biology and placed it on an entirely novel foundation. The idealistic school in the beginning of the nineteenth century was no less the child of its time, an offspring of the movement of ideas which were characteristic of the end of the eighteenth. During that period a great revolution had likewise taken place in the world of thought. This was most prominent and most complete in Germany. It was the reconstruction of what are there termed the mental sciences (Geisteswissenschafiten), which, in this country, were at that time frequently termed the Humanities. In the course of this history I have marked the distinction by using the two expressions of scientific thought and philosophical thought. The age which brought forth the idealistic philosophies in Germany was not the age which revolutionised the mathematical and mechanical sciences—this had been done in France and England during the eighteenth century; nor was it the age which revolutionised the natural and biological sciences—this was done later by the combined labours of France, Germany, and England; and the revolution centred in Darwin.

What the term life now means to the philosopher of evolution, what it conveys to him as an expressive term for the underlying essence and power in the world, the same meaning and function belonged, during the idealistic period, to the word mind and its many synonyms. It was therefore as natural for the idealist thinker to bring unity and harmony into his speculations by re-
ferring to the activity and presence of mind everywhere and in everything, as it is natural for the evolutionist philosopher at the end of the century to refer to the presence of life everywhere and in everything. Both schools of thought assume, tacitly and unconsciously, that the terms they use awaken in the minds of their readers familiar conceptions, the meaning of which is readily admitted. They both appeal to an immediate knowledge which the mind of every educated person is supposed to possess intuitively in a more or less distinct and living form. It is perhaps needless to remark that neither of the two terms has appeared, as time has gone on, quite satisfactory to the critical spirit which, before permitting the use of either of them, would require a definition; also, that as soon as this desire makes itself generally felt any philosophy based upon such conceptions will appear unsatisfactory, demanding further investigation: this may, in its turn, either confirm it and place it on a surer foundation or prove the whole superstructure to have been illusory and, at best, of only temporary value.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century we have had occasion to notice a growing reluctance to deal with metaphysical questions. This reluctance has shown itself also in the treatment of aesthetical problems. The purely philosophical aspect of the problem of the Beautiful has given way to the psychological interest or to purely literary criticism. We have also seen that in psychology as well as in criticism important changes of view have taken place. Psychology has developed in the direction of psycho-physics, and literary and artistic criticism has assumed an historical bias. The former change is the
result of the growth of biological and physiological knowledge, based upon observation, scientific theories, and experiment; the latter is a result of historical studies, of an increasing knowledge of the life of other nations and the mental labours of other civilisations. Although, therefore, theories of the Beautiful and of Art, from a comprehensive or philosophical point of view, have seemingly lost in interest and attractiveness, works on Æsthetics, from the scientific, the psychological, and the historical point of view have increased in number and in bulk. It would not serve my present purpose to do more than refer to this growing literature which deals mainly with special problems of psychology, criticism, or taste. They are referred to, though hardly in sufficient completeness, in several comprehensive works on the history of Æsthetics which have appeared in the course of the last thirty years in all the three countries under review. Most of these works are written from definite philosophical points of view, from aspects derived from one or the other among those systematic attempts which have occupied us in this chapter.

Among these various historical treatises I confine myself to the mention of one which does not belong to any of the three literatures to which this history is, in the main, limited. I refer to the treatise on Æsthetics by Signor Benedetto Croce. It was published in 1902 at Palermo; a second edition appeared in the following year. Of this a translation has been brought out in French by M. Henri Bigot. In this connection I refer to this work, of which the larger portion is historical and critical, not because other works on the history of
Æsthetics are not equally, or perhaps more, important, but for two special reasons.

It is always difficult for a writer who deals with the mental labours of several nations, to one of which he himself belongs, to exercise that impartiality which his exposition naturally aims at. In the present chapter we have been almost exclusively occupied with speculations which belong to Germany and originated there. To some of my readers this may have appeared one-sided. I therefore desire to justify my treatment of the subject by quoting what Signor Croce, who occupies an extraneous position, says: “The philosophical movement in Germany during the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, in spite of its numerous and great faults, which, in the sequel, inevitably provoked a rude reaction, is nevertheless remarkable and imposing enough in its aggregate to rightly predominate in the history of European thought of that period, relegating to the second or the third planes, and to an inferior importance, the contemporary philosophical productions of other nations. This is true, more even than for philosophy in general, for æsthetics in particular. France, still a prey to the sensationalism of Condillac and his school, was, in the beginning of the century, not in a position adequately to appreciate the creative function of art.¹ . . . In England the Association-Psychology continued, as it indeed never had been interrupted: incapable of rising really beyond sensationalism and of understanding imagination.”²

The second reason which prompts me to draw atten-

tion to Signor Croce's work is of more importance. Having for himself elaborated an independent conception of the task of aesthetics, of the nature of art and the essence of the Beautiful, he proceeds critically to review aesthetical theories from their beginning down to the end of the nineteenth century. Inasmuch, however, as his point of view differs very widely from that taken up by well-known thinkers in ancient and modern times, he has been led to draw special attention to several writers who have been commonly overlooked or misunderstood by other historians of aesthetics. These are the writers who bring art into a closer connection with Language.

According to Signor Croce, human knowledge is possessed of two distinct forms, or, as it were, mental elements. These are images (things) and concepts (the relations of things); the first are seen by the mind or perceived, the second are thought or conceived. The knowledge referring to the first is intuitive (through sight), the knowledge of the second is logical (through thought). But intuitions or images cannot remain in the form of sensations or impressions, they demand expression. This expression is called language in the larger sense of the word. It need not be merely language of words: any form of expression, lines, colours, or sounds, is a sort of language in the wider sense. 

Æsthetics is the science of language in the largest signification: it is "general linguistic." Art is the expression of impressions, of intuitions; science is a further form of expression; the concept, or general thought as distinguished from the individual, follows
upon the latter. It cannot exist without expression, but expression can exist without logical or conceptual thought. "The relation between intuitive knowledge (or expression) and intellectual knowledge (or conception), between art and science, between poetry and prose, cannot be otherwise defined than by saying: it is a relation of a twofold degree. The first degree is expression, the second is conception: the first can exist without the second, the second cannot exist without the first. There may be poetry without prose, but there is no prose without poetry. Expression is in fact the first affirmation of human activity. Poetry is the mother tongue of the human race: the first men were naturally sublime poets. This is recognised in a different way by those who have noticed that the passage from the Psyche to the Spirit, from the sensibility of the animal to the activity of man, is effected by means of language, we might say by intuition, or expression in general. . . . Man who expresses himself rises, no doubt suddenly, from the natural state, but he rises out of it: he does not remain half in it and half outside of it."¹ Beauty is defined, under this view, as "successful expression, or rather expression pure and simple and nothing more, for expression which is not successful is not expression at all."² The ugly, on the other side, is defective expression.

It is not necessary for my present purpose to pass an opinion on the value of this theory; but we must be grateful to Signor Croce for having, from his point of view, recognised the value of the contributions to

¹ B. Croce, 'Esthétique,' p. 27.  
² Ibid., p. 77.
æsthetical theory in the writings of such thinkers as Schleiermacher, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Steinthal, and other pioneers in the general science of Language.

He sees the merit of Schleiermacher in exactly those points of which other historians disapprove. "Schleiermacher," he says, "distinguishes a form of thought which is different from logical thought; he has given æsthetics a non-metaphysical, a purely anthropological character; he destroys the conception of the Beautiful in order to replace it by that of artistic perfection, going even so far as to maintain that a small work of art and a large one, if each is perfect in its own line, are æsthetically equal; he has considered the æsthetical phenomenon as an exclusively human activity; and so forth. . . . In the midst of the metaphysical orgy of his age, in the construction and destruction of systems more or less arbitrary, the theologian Schleiermacher, as a true philosopher, has directed a penetrating glance on what is truly characteristic in the æsthetical phenomenon. . . . By pointing to the obscure region of immediate consciousness as that belonging to the æsthetical process, he seems to be saying to his bewildered contemporaries: Hie Rhodus hic salta."¹ Further on, Signor Croce points to the fact that, at the very time when Schleiermacher's meditations remained unrecognised, a fundamentally novel aspect was gradually being gained by German thinkers as to the nature of language. He shows how Wilhelm von Humboldt regards language "not as a piece of work, an ergon, but as an activity, an energy, being the eternally repeated labour of the mind to render

¹ B. Croce, 'Esthétique,' p. 322 sqq.
articulated sound capable of the expression of thought,"¹ and although Humboldt does not penetrate to the really correct view which identifies language and art, he nevertheless approaches that idea. Humboldt's pupil, Steinthal, notices clearly the linguistic as distinguished from the logical process, maintaining that language produces its forms independently of logic, and that the problem of the origin of language is identical with that of the nature of language. There is no "real difference between the original creation of language and that which repeats itself daily." But Signor Croce also notices how more recent writers on the philosophy of language, "confounding the historical appearance with the nature and internal genesis of language, fail to recognise the spiritual nature both of language and art." ²

As this conception of art as a larger language has not so far held a prominent position in philosophical thought, and as it discards altogether the metaphysical problem of the Beautiful, with which we have been occupied in this chapter, it seems sufficient to have drawn attention to its gradual appearance, implicitly rather than explicitly, in the writings of Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and others. So far as the metaphysical problem itself is concerned, we may now try to sum up and answer the question: What has been its fate in the course of the nineteenth century?

The first answer we have to give to this question is that the philosophical problem of the Beautiful—i.e., the question regarding its essence and that regarding its

¹ Quoted from Humboldt's tract, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues,' p. 327. ² Ibid., p. 331.
place in a comprehensive scheme of human interests—first presented itself in modern times with the revival of philosophy and general literature in Germany during the latter half of the eighteenth century; that a series of attempts to answer these questions was there made in the course of the period which begins with Lessing and Winckelmann, and ends in Germany with Lotze and von Hartmann; that after the latter period the interest in these higher metaphysical questions has gradually disappeared, giving way to details of psychological or psychophysical inquiry, and to attempts in criticism and matters of taste such as had been dispersed through English and French literature previous to, and outside of, the metaphysical movement. Hand in hand with this descent from the high philosophical platform has gone a greater appreciation in Germany for the unsystematic writings of French and especially of English authors.¹

Whilst Germany has thus abandoned the metaphysical

1 Both the philosophy and the science of the Beautiful have, wherever either or both existed during the nineteenth century, preserved distinctive national colourings. Not only has Aesthetics been in Germany pre-eminently metaphysical, in England psychological, and in France sociological, but the relevant literature of the subject has in none of the three countries taken due notice of that of the others. At the end of the century this comparative exclusiveness seems to be making way for mutual appreciation, stimulated in England, notably by the appearance of Bosanquet’s ‘History,’ and in Germany through several influences, among which that of the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey is being more and more felt. Also the growing interest abroad in the works of Ruskin tends in this direction, and yet Vernon Lee, as late as 1904, can still complain that the Aesthetics of M. Souriau, “a most suggestive psychologist, would have been extraordinarily valuable if only he had added a knowledge of contemporary German thought to his own investigations on the subject” (loc. cit., p. 432). Still more than in general philosophy, as noted before, German historians of Aesthetics, like Lotze, Schasler, and von Hartmann, take no notice whatever of contemporary foreign literature. Höfling in the former and Croce in the latter are still unique examples.
interest, we see the same springing up in France, notably in the writings of Guyau.

The reasons why the speculations with which this chapter has been mainly concerned have come to an end in Germany, or have at least been temporarily pushed into the background, may be traced to the circumstance that it is impossible to treat these higher problems of Æsthetics without an openly admitted, or tacitly implied, reference to two other philosophical problems. For to begin with, we cannot hope to answer the question regarding the essence and the meaning of the Beautiful without having previously settled the metaphysical question: What is the truly Real? This implies the necessity of a settled philosophical or religious creed, and that is what all thinkers who occupied themselves with these higher questions were either in search of or had tacitly accepted; the latter was the case with Coleridge, Carlyle, and Ruskin, who stood firm in the belief of the Divine government of the World; the former was the case with the Idealistic thinkers in Germany who aimed at establishing a philosophical creed.

But, secondly, even if we abandon this reference to the problem of Reality, and proceed merely on the lines indicated by Herbart, and adopted to some extent likewise by Lotze and more fully developed in quite recent times, and consider Æsthetical questions merely as psychological phenomena, or bring them under the larger conception of value, thus reducing Æsthetics to a chapter in psychology, or to one in a general theory of Value, we are at once face to face with a larger problem. This is the Ethical problem—the problem of the Good. This
Ethical problem was for a long time in modern philosophy almost a monopoly of English thinkers. It was, indeed, taken up in an original manner by Kant and Fichte in Germany, but it was never adequately treated in the enormous philosophical literature which centred in Schelling and Hegel: their systems were founded on æsthetical or poetical rather than upon Ethical justice.

However, since the extravagances among the after-growth of the Idealistic Movement, such as sprang up in the Romantic School and in the writings of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, have become sufficiently alarming, serious thinkers have turned their attention to the Ethical problem.

In doing so, they have joined hands not only with Kant but likewise also with the strenuous workers in this field who have always stood foremost in this country. Their main object is to find and establish a firm and independent foundation for Ethics. What has been achieved in this direction will occupy us in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE GOOD.

I.

The province of philosophical thought with which I propose to deal in this chapter, is one which, more perhaps than any other, has been cultivated by thinkers of this country. If any philosophical science may claim to be called pre-eminently a British science, it is the Science of Ethics; or—as it used to be more generally termed—Morality, in its theoretical and applied aspects. It is even more so than Political Economy, which, owing mainly to the great name of Adam Smith, is usually considered to have its birthplace and home in this country. But political philosophy or economics formed an important subject of discussion and independent research in France during the age which in Britain produced the works of Hume and Adam Smith. Yet, whereas in France political economy was limited mainly to the discussion of problems suggested by the economic condition of the country, political economy in this country started as a province or a sister science of moral philosophy. It may therefore be said that up
to quite recent times, British philosophy was pre-
eminently moral philosophy. Even the highly important
investigations of Locke, which inaugurated the modern
Theory of Knowledge and the more recent researches in
Psychology, were originally prompted by a desire to
prepare the ground for the discussion and solution of
ethical problems. And down to quite recent times,
there is a well-marked inclination in English thought,
again and again to revert to the discussion of ethical
rather than metaphysical questions. Metaphysics, on
the other hand, which on the Continent forms the
unbroken thread connecting the philosophical systems
from Descartes to Lotze, has never continuously and
consistently formed the subject of British thought.
This has, since the time of Bacon, prided itself
rather on finding its way out of metaphysics and
reverting to common-sense. And, so far as the theory
of knowledge is concerned, it has more than once ended
in scepticism or agnosticism, for which maladies the
cure had to be found equally in an assertion of the
evidence of common-sense. If moral philosophy is
thus peculiarly an English province of thought, it is also
that department in which English thought has been least
affected by foreign thinkers, even less than psychology,
in which the now widespread influence of the physio-
logical and physical sciences has been mainly imported
from abroad.

At the end of the nineteenth century, however, Ethics
has become the leading subject of philosophical discussion
not only in this country but likewise in Germany and
France. In Germany indeed, it had received a great
stimulus at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth through Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, but it had fallen into the background during the exclusive sway of the metaphysical systems of Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart. When the spell of these systems was broken and the disintegration of philosophical thought had set in, two distinct interests asserted themselves: the Theory of Knowledge, on the one side, which reverted to Kant, and Practical Philosophy, or Ethics, on the other, which, to a great extent, abandoned the Kantian position and came under the influence of foreign, notably of English, thought. An attempt was then made to gain for Ethics a new foundation, independent alike of metaphysics and religious doctrine. In France, moral philosophy as such had practically no independent existence during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and it is only within the last quarter that its problems have been taken up afresh; but since then, that country can claim to have produced some of the most remarkable and original works on the subject.

Moral philosophy, being thus much older in this country than abroad, grew up also in an entirely different atmosphere and environment, and this accounts for some of the traits which are peculiar to its growth and development. It will be of interest to realise how this environment differed from the conditions existing in the two other countries in which we are specially interested. There is one word which characterises the surroundings in which thinkers of this country have lived and worked ever since the Restoration, and

3. Different atmosphere of moral philosophy in this country.
which has happily continued to characterise them—though not in the same degree—up to recent times; this word is Order, or more definitely the security afforded by a constitutional Government.¹

Even allowing for the Civil War and the Revolution of 1688 there has, within the last three hundred years, never existed in this country that fundamental subversion of order of which the French Revolution has become the typical instance abroad. A regard for the powers that be, for social and political Law and Order,

¹ That security and settlement are the first and indispensable requisites for national prosperity, for civilisation and progress, forms the keynote of the whole of the philosophy of Hobbes (1588-1679), which preached the necessity of an absolute Government, be this monarchical or democratic, as the only means of preventing a relapse into the original state of nature, the bellum omnium contra omnes. Other characteristics of Hobbes' system, the only English system of philosophy before Herbert Spencer, do not interest us in this connection. As Croom Robertson ('Hobbes,' Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1886) has clearly shown, the systematic foundation of Hobbes' system belongs to a later phase of Hobbism, and was, to a large extent, a tribute to the mechanical philosophy, the real mathematical principles of which Hobbes understood as little as his predecessor Francis Bacon. A panic similar to that which the premonitory symptoms of the Civil War created in Hobbes' mind, prompted, one hundred and fifty years later, Edmund Burke's celebrated denunciation of the French Revolution; though Burke's reaction was largely sentimental, while that of Hobbes was rationalistic. The interval between these two periods, the century which began with the Restoration, has been termed by historians the Century of the English Revolution. But it was, on the whole, a peaceful Revolution, an age during which the English Constitution gradually "broadened down from precedent to precedent." J. R. Green, in his 'History of the English People,' introduces his eighth book, bearing the title, 'The Revolution 1660-1760,' with the following words (vol. iii. p. 327):

"From the moment of the Restoration we find ourselves all at once among the great currents of thought and activity which have gone on widening and deepening from that time to this. The England around us becomes our own England, an England whose chief forces are industry and science, the love of popular freedom and of law, an England which presses steadily forward to a larger social justice and equality, and which tends more and more to bring every custom and tradition, religious, intellectual, and political, to the test of pure reason. Between modern thought, on some at least of its more important sides, and the thought of men before the Restoration, there is a great gulf fixed."
has existed almost universally in this country through all the changes in Church, State, and Society, which have taken place. This universal and tacit respect for Order which underlay the many reform movements and never permitted the outbreak of a storm such as was witnessed abroad, has been accompanied, in most of the thoughtful minds of this country, by the tacit or openly avowed conviction that there exists a natural, moral, social, or divine order of the world. English Ethics have interested themselves in answering the questions of the nature, origin, and maintenance of this Law and Order, but they have never been, to any important extent, occupied with laying absolutely new foundations, with building afresh the edifice of State and Society, and only quite recently and tentatively with the formation of a philosophical or purely reasoned Creed. If we now contrast the conditions which surrounded thinkers in France at the end of the eighteenth century, we find that they were confronted by one of the greatest social and political experiments which history has ever witnessed. The Revolution had swept away all social and religious landmarks and changed the entire political aspect. The shallow ethical theories which

1 "That such a revolution must one day come, every observer who had compared the state of Europe with that of England had long seen to be inevitable. So far as England was concerned, the Puritan resistance of the seventeenth century had in the end succeeded in checking the general tendency of the time to religious and political despotism. Since the Revolution of 1688 freedom of conscience and the people's right to govern itself through its representatives in Parliament had been practically established. Social equality had begun long before. Every man from the highest to the lowest was subject to, and protected by, the same law. The English aristocracy, though exercising a powerful influence on Government, were possessed of few social privileges, and hindered from forming a separate class in the nation by the legal and social tradition which
had prevailed in the philosophical schools anterior to the Revolution, the refined hedonism of Helvetius and Holbach, with no feeling of reverence for a higher or a Divine order, nor even a real belief in the dignity of man, did not contain the germs of a new development. On the other side the sentimental belief of Rousseau and his disciples among the leaders of the Revolution—the doctrine of the natural goodness of man—had been falsified when, in the breaking up of all social restraints, a general warfare set in. The work of the restoration of society was much more important than the thoughtful investigation of the deeper ethical questions. Thus a reaction set in which reverted to older and obsolete forms and, alongside of it, a somewhat superficial eclecticism, an importation of foreign theories, many of which were ill adapted to the existing wants.¹ The
counted all save the eldest son of
                        a noble house as commoners. No
                        impassable line parted the gentry
                        from the commercial classes, and
                        these again possessed no privileges
                        which could part them from the
                        lower classes of the community.
Public opinion, the general sense
                        of educated Englishmen, had estab-
                        lished itself after a short struggle
                        as the dominant element in English
                        government. But in all the other
                        great states of Europe the wars of
                        religion had left only the name of
                        freedom. Government tended to
                        a pure despotism. Privilege was
                        supreme in religion, in politics, in
                        society. Society itself rested on a
                        rigid division of classes from one
                        another, which refused to the people
                        at large any equal rights of justice
                        or of industry." (J. R. Green, loc.
                        cit., vol. iv. p. 296.)
¹ We find all through the eigh-
teenth century in England and at
the turn of the centuries in France,
the marks of the influence which
the progress of the natural sciences
and natural philosophy had upon
the minds of the foremost thinkers.
English thought, however, gradu-
ally liberated itself from the re-
peated attempts or suggestions to
conduct ethical inquiries
nuore geometrico vel mathematico
and adopted the more fruitful method of
the natural sciences which led to
the cultivation of psychology. In
France, on the other hand, it was
exclusively the purely mathemat-
ical — called there geometrical —
methods which impressed thinkers
like Condorcet, Laplace, and, later
on, some of the extreme radical
socialistic thinkers, and really stood
in the way of psychology, of which
Maine de Biran was the only genuine
representative. Comte later on
recognised, in the course of the
development of his positive philo-
few beginnings which were made in the direction of national and independent thought, such as are to be found in the writings of Maine de Biran, remained unpublished or unnoticed, to be taken up and studied at a much later period. It was the age that produced the reactionary writings of de Bonald and de Maistre and the extreme socialistic theories of Fourier and Saint Simon. None of these extreme systems rested on any well-reasoned philosophical, historical, or psychological basis, they contributed nothing to moral philosophy proper, they did not really face and try to solve the problem of the Good.

If we now turn to Germany and look at the conditions which existed there in the latter part of the eighteenth century, we find that they neither resemble those existing in this country nor those existing in France. In the case of Britain we were able to recognise the presence of, and the universal respect for, an existing law and order of things, and, as a background for ethical speculation, the conception of this order as natural, political, moral or divine, according to the various individual leanings and predilections of different thinkers or schools of thought. This order was, however, rather taken for granted than intellectually demonstrated. On the other side we find that in Germany a strong desire had made itself felt to throw the light of reason upon these fundamental presuppositions of any and every moral system. The sanction of the Church and of tradition had, through the Protestant reform movement

| 6. Different conditions in Germany. |

...
and the growth of the classical and critical spirit, become loosened or had in many instances faded away. The spirit of Free Inquiry, which in this country had shown itself hesitatingly and sporadically, had supervened and become the leading and stimulating agency in German thought. It formed, however, quite as much a contrast to the spirit of scepticism, indifference, and flippancy, which characterised the writings of many of the foremost thinkers in France, before and at the time of the Revolution. It assimilated the hopeful sentimentalism of Rousseau, from which it derived, to a large extent, the interest and belief in a universal popular education based upon the foundation of a plain and simple Christian morality. In fact the educational movement, as I have had repeated occasion to explain, in its two independent branches of popular and academic education, was the principal direction in which the new spirit of faith and hope in human progress found an outlet. We must, however, not

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1 An interesting account of the uncertain position taken up by thinking members of a younger society towards religious subjects in the end of the third quarter of the eighteenth century is given by Goethe in the eighth book of 'Dichtung und Wahrheit,' which deals with his student days in Leipsic: "The Christian religion," he tells us, "oscillated between its own historical positivism and a pure Deism which, based upon morality, should on its part form a foundation for the same. The difference of character and opinion showed itself here in infinite gradations, especially as a further difference intruded as to the question: What part reason, on the one side, and sentiment on the other, could and ought to have in such convictions? Some very intelligent and brilliant men appeared, in this respect, like butterflies which, quite oblivious of their chrysalis state, throw away the covering in which they have grown to their organic maturity. Others, more faithful and more modest, could be compared with flowers which, though developing into beautiful blossoms, do not leave the root nor separate themselves from the mother stem, but rather through this connection bring the hoped-for fruit to ripeness." (Weimar ed., vol. 27, p. 192.)
forget that in the many larger and smaller German States much was done by enlightened Rulers, as well as Ministers of State, to improve the economic and social condition of the people, not so much by sweeping reforms such as were carried later on by men like Stein in Prussia, as by faithful attention to detail in more restricted areas.¹

So far as ethical thought is concerned, the spirit of free inquiry—variously termed Rationalism, Aufklärung, or Enlightenment—went down to the metaphysical foundations and presuppositions of morality, mostly in a way that was friendly to the traditional religious doctrines, desiring to throw upon them the light of Reason and to conceive of Revelation as a process not confined to a single historical fact, but as a necessary force in the progress and education of humanity. To this must be added the belief in an underlying harmony that was inherited from the philosophy of Leibniz² and the spirit of compromise and mutual concession among various forms of religious faith which sprang from it. The

¹ Interesting information on this point will be found in Cl. Th. Perthes' 'Politische Zustände und Personen in Deutschland, zur Zeit der Französischen Herrschaft,' 1862. This volume refers to the South and West of Germany. A second volume referring to Austria was published posthumously in 1869. Especially as to popular education consult the third and fourth volumes of Karl Schmidt's 'Geschichte der Pädagogik' (3rd and 4th ed. by W. Lange, 1876 and 1883); and for higher education, F. Paulsen's well-known work referred to supra, vol. iii., note, p. 116.

² In this direction the influence of Shaftesbury on German thinkers was probably quite as important as that of Leibniz, as is clearly shown in the writings of Herder, who attached a translation of Shaftesbury's 'Hymn' to one of his theological writings, and planned a treatise which should exhibit the three thinkers, Spinoza, Shaftesbury, and Leibniz in parallel, considering that Shaftesbury's rhapsody "contains the Spinozistic-Leibnizian philosophy in the most beautiful and select extract." See R. Haym, 'Herder,' vol. ii. p. 269.
extremers forms of materialism and scepticism with their virulent attacks, their uncontrolled animosity towards traditional beliefs, for which Germany has gained an unfortunate reputation in the course of the nineteenth century, did not then exist in the best literature of the country. It was, so far as it was imported through French literature, distinctly distasteful to the humanistic spirit of such leaders of popular thought in Germany as Lessing, Mendelssohn, Herder, and Goethe.

Thus, looking at European thought as a whole, in so far as it occupied itself at the beginning of the nineteenth century with ethical questions, or with the problem of the Good, we find that the three countries contributed independent aspects: the conception of an existing moral order in this country, the overthrow of all existing order in France, and the spirit of free and unfettered inquiry in Germany. There followed from these different aspects a hasty reconstruction in France disregarding the fundamental questions altogether, an extreme love

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1 On this point also see what Goethe says in the eleventh book of 'Dichtung und Wahrheit,' writing then of his Strassburg days and under the influence of Herder, who had introduced him to Goldsmith, and was then already occupied with his studies in folk-lore and folksong. Criticising French literature, in particular the flippancy and bad faith of Voltaire, but recognising a cognate spirit in Diderot—of whom he, inter alia, says that he was "in all that the French blame in him, a true German"—he turns, with a contemptuous estimate of the 'Système de la Nature' as a "quintessence of senility," away from French literature in the following words: "Thus, living on the confines of France we at once got free and clear of all French ways. We found their manner of life too precise and too elegant, their poetry frigid, their criticism destructive, their philosophy abstruse and yet insufficient, so that we were on the point of abandoning ourselves, at least tentatively, to crude nature, were it not that another influence had for some time already prepared us for higher and freer views and enjoyments equally true and poetical; secretly at first and moderately, it dominated us ever more distinctly and powerfully. I need hardly say that I mean Shakespeare, and, after having said this, a further explanation is not necessary" (loc. cit., vol. 28, p. 70).
for metaphysical inquiry in Germany, and, in this country alone, the endeavour to solve practical ethical questions as they presented themselves in the changing and complicated circumstances of a prosperous people. But though England thus offered more favourable conditions for the study of theory and practice in ethics than the Continental countries, it was nevertheless deficient in one important aspect which was common both to France and Germany; one important idea was wanting which in different ways then already guided both French and German thought, but entered only much later into the thought of this country. Here, however, it then assumed that expression through which it again powerfully reacted upon Continental thought, changing its entire character, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century rendering obsolete a very large part of all previous speculation. This is the idea of Development, announced by Leibniz a century earlier and independently developed by Lessing and Herder, by Schelling and Hegel in Germany, by Condorcet and Auguste Comte in France.

Leaving out this important contribution to philosophical thought which is now acknowledged, if not exaggerated, in all three countries alike, and which in this country has become a leading force in popular philosophical reasoning through the canons and watchwords of the doctrine of Evolution, it must be admitted that, at the beginning of the century, ethical speculation was in this country already in full possession of an elaborate ethical vocabulary, testifying to the fact that British thought had recognised the ethical problem, the
problem of the Good, in all its different aspects, having many times turned over the several individual and distinct problems which together constitute that supreme inquiry. Nor had the study of these various problems in this country neglected what had been done by the great thinkers of classical antiquity or by the foremost writers among the schoolmen. The influence of Plato and Aristotle, of Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, even—though to a lesser extent—that of Descartes and Spinoza, has been active in the development of ethical doctrine in this country.¹ The criteria of morality, the nature of obligation, the question of higher or lower and of ultimate sanctions, the connection of virtue and happiness, of the utility and beauty of goodness, the problem of sin and evil, the controversies of determinism and freewill, the phenomena of conscience and moral sense; all these questions, and many others of a more practical application, had been propounded and discussed

¹ According to Henry Sidgwick in his 'Outlines of the History of Ethics' (1st ed. 1886 and many following editions), the only two contemporary Continental thinkers who, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, had any direct influence on British ethics, were Puffendorf and Helvetius (1715-1771). The 'Law of Nature' of Puffendorf, "in which the general view of Grotius was restated with modifications—partly designed to effect a compromise with the new doctrine of Hobbes—seems to have been a good deal read at Oxford and elsewhere. Locke includes it among the books necessary to the complete education of a gentleman." Only in the derivation of Benthamism do we find that an important element is supplied by the works of a French writer, Helvetius; as Bentham himself was fully conscious. It was from Helvetius that he learned that, men being universally and solely governed by self-love, the so-called moral judgments are really the common judgments of any society as to its common interests; that it is, therefore, futile on the one hand to propose any standard of virtue, except that of conduciveness to general happiness, and, on the other hand, useless merely to lecture men on duty and scold them for vice; that the moralist's proper function is rather to exhibit the coincidence of virtue with private happiness." (pp. 267 and 270).
many times over by men representing all the different shades of the intellect of the nation, in and out of the Church, the Schools, and the Universities, with a practical or a theoretical bias and in a systematic as well as a controversial spirit. As much cannot be found in the literature of any other modern country, perhaps not even at the present day.

But though the ground was thus fairly covered, a great additional impetus was given to ethical speculation towards the end of the eighteenth century by a thinker whose interest was not pre-eminently and exclusively ethical, but who succeeded in bringing morals into immediate connection with practical legislation: this was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). It is interesting to note that in Germany an equally important stimulus was given about the same time to ethical theory by an individual mind of quite a different order and in a totally different direction — namely, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).\(^1\)

In order to understand the nature and the causes of the great influence which the writings of Bentham and his disciples have exerted, we may dwell on two main points. The first was that Bentham formed, as it were, an exception to the general tone which prevailed among the better-known British writers on ethical subjects. He did not share — or shared only

\[^1\text{It may be noted that the three most original thinkers— Kant, Bentham, and Goethe— whose works appeared about the same time, and who in different directions influenced European thought most profoundly towards the end of the eighteenth century, were quite unknown to each other, a circumstance which contrasts markedly with the state of intellectual intercourse a century later.}\]
to a much smaller extent—that respect for the prevailing order of things; he therefore did not favour that compromise which, if not in theory yet doubtless in practice, the best-known thinkers of very different schools had nearly always in the end resorted to. It is true that he did not propose to alter the moral code of civilised humanity, but he attacked its application in one very important department,—in the department of the legislation of his country. He was the first to show that the existing laws of the country could not claim from enlightened and thinking minds that respect with which they were conventionally treated. But instead of resorting, as was the custom on the Continent, to the legal deliverances of the Roman Jurists codified when the Roman Empire was approaching its decline, he made a bold attempt to deal with the foundations of law through the principles of moral philosophy. His work did not result in a new and complete code such as was elaborated during the reign and at the suggestion of the first Napoleon in France, nor did he initiate that philosophical and historical study of Roman law which, for a whole century, constituted a large and important part of the labours of a brilliant succession of Jurists in Germany.  

1 And yet, this great school of what are called "Romanists" in Germany traces one of its sources to an English scholar. It was about the year 1785 that the Göttingen Professor, Gustav Hugo, began his Lecture Course on "Roman Law," taking as a text-book the celebrated 44th chapter of Gibbon's "History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." And when John Austin (1790-1859) attempted, as Professor of Jurisprudence at the newly established University of London, to introduce the philosophical study of Law, he prepared himself by resorting to the University of Bonn, where some of the most eminent Romanists were then lecturing.
glaring abuses and inconsistencies which existed in English law, and by doing so have greatly influenced the legislation of the country ever since. "Who," says John Stuart Mill," before Bentham, dared to speak disrespectfully in express terms of the British Constitution or the English Law? He did so; and his arguments and his example together encouraged others. We do not mean that his writings caused the Reform Bill, or that the Appropriation Clause owns him as its parent: the changes which have been made, and the greater changes which will be made, in our institutions, are not the work of philosophers, but of the interests and instincts of large portions of society recently grown into strength. But Bentham gave voice to those interests and instincts; until he spoke out, those who found our institutions unsuited to them did not dare to say so, did not dare consciously to think so; they had never heard the excellence of those in-

1 J. S. Mill, 'Dissertations and Discussions,' vol. i. p. 332.
2 And yet Mill says in the same essay of Bentham and Coleridge, whom he considers as "the two great seminal minds of England in their age; they were destined to renew a lesson given to mankind by every age, and always disregarded—to show that speculative philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every other influence save those which it must itself obey. The writers of whom we speak have never been read by the multitude; except for the more slight of their works, their readers have been few: but they have been the teachers of the teachers" (p. 350). A similar reflection is contained in Kant's closing words in the second 'Critique': "Science (critically sought and methodically introduced) is the strait gate which leads to the theory of wisdom; if by this is not only meant what one ought to do but what ought to furnish an indication to teachers how to mark, well and distinctly, that road to wisdom which every one should take and to guard others from wrong ways; a science of which philosophy must always be the custodian, in the subtler researches of which the public has no part, but only in its doctrines thus cleared up" ('Werke,' vol. viii. p. 315).
stitutions questioned by cultivated men, by men of acknowledged intellect: and it is not in the nature of uninstructed minds to resist the united authority of the instructed. Bentham broke the spell. It was not Bentham by his own writings; it was Bentham through the minds and pens which those writings fed—through the men in more direct contact with the world, into whom his spirit passed."

The second point which is important is this, that Bentham found it necessary, and had the courage, to select a moral principle whereon to base the legal reforms which he had in view. This principle was selected from the existing vocabulary and ideas of the ethics of his century, solely for the reason that it would work: this means that with its aid the correctness of special existing laws could be tested and the desired change and reform brought about. The moral principle itself, the principle of utility and the definition of utility in this connection as meaning that which is conducive to happiness—the greatest happiness of the greatest number—is not an invention of Bentham’s, nor exclusively characteristic of his system. Ethical writers of very different shades of opinion regarding the deeper philosophical problems of the Good, had before him used almost identical expressions\(^1\) with Adam Smith in the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow), Leslie Stephen says that he “appears to have been the first person to proclaim the celebrated formula, the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number.’” Hutcheson’s use of the phrase occurs in the ‘Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil’ (sec. iii. § 8), “in the

\(^{1}\) That the utilitarian aspect, or more definitely the “greatest happiness” principle, worked itself to the front in most of the ethical writings of the eighteenth century, is shown by Leslie Stephen in the 9th chapter of his ‘History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century’ (1876). Notably of Hutcheson (1694-1747, a predecessor of
regard to utility and happiness; but through Bentham and his disciples the vocabulary of the utilitarian school became fixed, crystallised in certain watchwords and offered for the use of practical moralists, legislators, and social reformers. In this respect Bentham was a pioneer in the application of definite moral axioms, abstracted from the consensus of thinking persons without special respect for traditional beliefs or prejudices. Before him Adam Smith had already applied ethical speculation to one special problem of practical life — to the Industrial Problem. Instead, however, of combining his principles of morality with those of social welfare or wealth, in the same way as Bentham did those of morals and legislation, Adam Smith separated the two problems; he did not force the deeper moral problem on the attention of practical thinkers in the same way as Bentham did in his own special subject. Bentham forced political philosophers to think about the ethical meaning, the morality of their doctrines; Adam Smith hardly considered the morality or immorality of industrialism. This only became an important ethical problem a century after the appearance of the 'Wealth of Nations.' With Adam Smith and many of his followers it was and remained a psychological, an anthropological problem.

It will be well now to contrast with the movement associated in England with the name of Bentham, that same manner the moral evil or vice is as the degree of misery and number of sufferers; so that that action is best which accomplishes the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.'" After referring to passages from Priestley and Beccaria, Leslie Stephen concludes: "Hutcheson has clearly the right of priority whatever the value of the thing claimed" (loc. cit., vol. ii. p. 61).
movement which on the continent of Europe is associated with the name of Kant. Almost in every respect it marks just the opposite tendency of thought. It originated about the time when Bentham published the most comprehensive of his writings—the 'Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.' This was printed in 1780 and first published in 1789. Kant's ethical doctrine was given to the world in successive writings, the most important being the 'Metaphysik der Sitten' (1785) and the second 'Critique' (1788), but in their entirety his views on ethics in connection with religion were not known till after the publication of his 'Religious Philosophy' (1793) and various other writings closing with the year 1798. It is important to note that Kant approached the ethical problem after he had exhaustively dealt with the theoretical problems, the problems of Knowledge and of Reality, in his 'Critique of Pure Reason,' which was published in 1781. Bentham's publications dealt mostly with separate points of law and government. He relates how he met with the ethical principle which was to systematise his speculations in the writings of Helvetius. It is characteristic of Bentham that he thus early met with a unifying principle which was in his mind comprehensive enough, and from which

1 Without entering into the details of the respective philosophical principles, this contrast may be generally defined by saying: "What Bentham did was ... to stimulate the belief in the possibility of basing a moral theory upon observation" (Leslie Stephen, loc. cit., p. 126). For Kant "it seemed imperatively necessary for once to elaborate a pure philosophy of morals ... which is completely cleared of all that is merely empirical and, as such, belonging to anthropology" ('Metaphysik der Sitten,' preface, 'Werke,' ed. Rosenkranz, vol. viii. p. 5).
he did not materially depart in the long course of his later writings. On the other side we find Kant, who was twenty-four years older than Bentham, arriving much later in life at the consummation of his philosophical system. Before that period he went through various phases, being influenced, much more than Bentham was, by antecedent and contemporary thinkers. Of the latter, two seem to have decisively influenced him: these were David Hume, so far as theoretical philosophy was concerned, and Rousseau in practical or ethical philosophy.¹ We may incidentally remark

1 Professor Sorley has pointed out to me, as an interesting coincidence with Kant, that Bentham, too, says (in a note to the 'Fragment on Government') that it was reading Hume that "made the scales fall from his eyes." The influence of Rousseau on Kant has been more and more brought out by historians of philosophy, beginning with Kuno Fischer ('Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' vol. iii.), and more recently by Jodl (loc. cit., vol. ii. p. 10 sqq.), Windelband ('Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' vol. ii. p. 27 sqq.), and fully by Höfling in his valuable articles ('Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,' vol. vii.) on the "Continuity of the Development of Kant's Philosophy": "It is well known how greatly Rousseau's writings interested Kant. When he received the 'Émile' it kept him from his customary walk. Had, however, Kant's annotated copy of the 'Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime' not been rescued, at the last moment, from the waste paper of a grocer, we would not have known how deeply personal this influence was. In Kant it produced quite a new foundation for his estimate of man and human relations. Up to that time Kant was an optimist, regarded the intellectual development as the highest, and saw progress dependent on it. From Rousseau he learned another way of measuring human worth which was to a certain degree independent of intellectual development. He now learned that the masses are not to be despised merely because they are ignorant. He 'learned to honour men,' and he praises Rousseau because he had brought out the nature of man hidden, only too often, under the forms of civilization. . . . But it is the same with Rousseau's influence as with that of Hume: were it not established through external testimony we should not find in Kant's writings any cogent reason for assuming it. Judging only from Kant's line of thought as it was developed in 1762 and the following years, we should be able to understand that he would have had to come to that distinction between theory and practice which from that time — i.e., long before he fixed it in his 'Critiques' — came to be of such importance to him"
that these two thinkers for whom Kant had so great an appreciation had come personally into close contact without ever having been able mutually to understand each other. Nor is it generally admitted that Kant himself succeeded in bringing into harmony the two sides of his thought which he himself associated with those names.

Dropping for the moment the special philosophical terms in which Kant clothed his Metaphysics and his Ethics, we may say that, following on the one side the criticism of Hume, Kant arrived at his special conception of the human Intellect or Reason as a form-giving principle in human knowledge; and that, following on the other side the suggestions of Rousseau, he arrived at his conception of the human Will as that principle which gave to the human mind its content and essential reality. On the one side he conceived the contribution of the human intellect towards knowledge as a mere form which had to be filled with content through the impressions of the senses. On the other side he conceived of all true morality as purely formal, receiving its true meaning and reality, its value and worth, only through a mental principle, and this principle was the Good Will. He is convinced "that the moral value of man springs from an original source of our nature which is independent of all intellectual culture, of all progress in science and knowledge, that the latter are not capable of making men good, that a man may
possess, in a low and uncivilised state, that which neither science nor knowledge can supply."

Thus we find in Kant's Ethics what we found already in his theoretical philosophy or Metaphysics, the conception of two kinds of reality, the phenomenal, practical, or everyday reality which surrounds us, and a higher reality which lies above or behind the other. In his theoretical philosophy he had suggested already that this higher reality, which he there termed the Thing in itself or the Noumenon, was known to us only in the single instance of our own will, and he had based upon this idea his conception of the Freedom of the Will, or as he termed it, of the intelligible, as opposed to the phenomenal, character of the human self. Accordingly, what in everyday life appeared to be most real, the things that surround us and the actions of men, would, from this higher metaphysical, ethical, or religious point of view, appear as comparatively unimportant and unreal; over and above it we find, within our own consciousness, a higher and more important reality. This view, he maintained, coincides with the general verdict of common-sense, which, under the names of conscience, moral sense, feeling of duty and obligation, moral and religious sanction, refers all human action to a higher standard, placing it under the dictates of a supreme law. This is usually expressed in the term: the autonomy of the human Will, its self-restrained or self-regulated freedom: the Good Will in fact is and has its own law.

The same dualism which in Kant's philosophy appears as two different worlds, as two realities, found, as we
have had frequent occasion to remark, its first expression in the philosophy of Plato, from which it has descended in various forms into all the more important subsequent systems of thought. And it is only to superficial observers and readers that it does not appear as prominently in the writings of many moralists in this country. As a matter of fact it existed, as I stated above, almost without exception in the minds of most British moralists as an underlying conviction, not always explicitly stated, of the existence of a natural, moral, or divine order. The reason why it is more explicitly dwelt on in those schools of thought which had their origin in the speculations of Kant, has to be looked for in two circumstances. First, all these thinkers felt, that owing to the spirit of scepticism and flippancy as well as through social anarchy and subversion, the higher or spiritual view was in danger of being lost, that an effort must be made to preserve or restore it. The second was, the contemporary appearance in Germany of a creative spirit in the realms of literature, poetry, and art, opening as it were, the view into a higher world. This was reflected in the philosophical thought of the period.¹

1 It is interesting to see how similar considerations led J. S. Mill to modify to a considerable extent the democratic principles with which he started and which are usually stigmatised as those of the philosophical Radicals. This later phase of his own thought has found expression in what he himself declared the most carefully written of all his treatises, 'On Liberty,' 1859. He 'had become heretical . . .; he had been alarmed by the brutality and ignorance of the lowest classes, and had come to doubt whether liberty, as understood by his masters, could not mean the despotic rule of the ignorant. The doubts which he felt were shared by many who had set out with the same political creed' (Leslie Stephen: 'The English Utilitarians,' vol. iii. p. 246). And Mill goes on to deplore, perhaps in an exaggerated way, the absence, in his time, of that in-
In the further elaboration of his ethical doctrine, Kant was, however, hardly more successful than he had been in his metaphysics. The 'Thing in itself,' the Noumenon, had there remained as an empty abstraction, useless for the purpose of any philosophy which desired to understand existing things or phenomena. The supreme idea of his ethics, the idea of the self-restraining freedom of the Good Will, remained likewise an empty conception. It had indeed a character of its own, a peculiarity which separated it from every other reality: and that was, that it points to something which ought to be, in opposition to that which is. It finds its expression in language in the imperative mood, the voice of command. Thus Kant termed it the Categorical Imperative. And Kant went a step further, he conceived it as a law binding on all rational beings without regard for persons or circumstances. This constitutes its universality, and he expressed it in the well-known formula: "Act so that the maxims of your actions may be universally applicable for others as well as for yourself."

It has frequently been pointed out that the formula of Kant may do very well as a regulative principle, as a formal rule of conduct, but that it does not really define what is intrinsically good, that it does not deal
with the *sumnum bonum* or Highest Good. It might, at best, signify the aim at rationality of conduct, at a perfect reign of reason, but it contains nothing through which it recommends itself to our emotional nature, stirs our feelings, or engages our interest. Yet without this Kant saw quite well that practical morality would be impossible.

It may be well now to point out that the supreme ethical problem, the problem of the Good, has presented itself, in the course of the history of philosophy, with increasing clearness and definiteness, as involving two entirely separate questions.\(^1\) The first question refers to that which we call morally good in the actions of other men, as well as in reviewing our own conduct. This has usually been termed the problem of the Criterion of Morality. It corresponds to the definition of the beautiful in Ästhetics, and has not unfrequently been termed the Morally Beautiful. That in our judgment we distinguish between good and bad, is quite as certain as that we distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly. In both cases the one is the subject of approbation and pleasure, while the other is the subject

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\(^1\) It may be incidentally remarked that among modern moralists no one has more clearly pointed out the difference of these two distinct problems than Sir James Mackintosh in his well-known Dissertation published in the introductory volume to the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica' (1829) and several times re-edited (by Whewell), most recently in 1873. Through its one-sided treatment of both Hobbes and Bentham it roused the indignation of James Mill and prompted his 'Fragment on Mackintosh,' which was suppressed owing to the death of Mackintosh and published only after the death of James Mill himself in 1836. Up to the appearance of Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics' the treatise remained the leading historical account of English moral philosophy, characterised as much by the absence of all reference to German philosophy as by the commendation of Butler as the foremost exponent of the best and also the most popular form of British moral philosophy.
of disapproval and displeasure. This correspondence or parallelism between the beautiful and the good fails, however, when we recognise that the contemplation of the good brings with it the sense of obligation, when the terms good and bad are changed into right and wrong, duty and neglect; in fact the morally beautiful does not remain merely a thing of disinterested pleasure, but becomes an obligation presenting itself in the form of duties which we have to perform. If the first question be answered, if we have arrived at a definition of what is good, or, in the highest sense, of the Good, we have only solved one half of the ethical problem; we have still to show that, and how, this highest good becomes or is to become a motive in our actions, how and why it attains a controlling power over our Will. Practical moralists, those interested mainly in the study of existing moral and social relations, in the maintenance or reform of the existing order of things, have usually started with the first problem and have solved the second by the appeal to some existing natural, moral, social or divine law or system of laws. Metaphysicians, on the other hand, have usually started with an analysis of the psychological fact that all men as rational beings experience, in a greater or lesser degree, a sense of obligation, a feeling of duty, that they listen to the voice of conscience, that they are possessed of a moral sense. The difficulty then has been to define more closely and for practical purposes what this sense of duty really means, to evolve a code of morality which may become of practical use and guidance.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Bentham
and Kant figure as representatives of the two main ways of approaching the ethical problem, the problem of the Good. It cannot, however, be said that either of them has been more successful than the other in bringing the two main questions of ethics together, in finding a principle which would lead to the solution of both. And thus we find that each of these thinkers stimulated inquiries which had for their object to complete the work which was left undone, or only partially done, in their respective systems.

The disciple or follower of Bentham who attempted to give to Benthamism logical consistency and a psychological foundation was John Stuart Mill. The resources which he brought to bear upon the solution of the ethical problem in its various aspects were much greater than those possessed by Bentham. Though he was occupied, early in life already, with ethical problems, he did not attempt to bring the system of morality which through him has become current under the name of Utilitarianism into a focus, and to defend it against its enemies and critics, before he had matured his views by looking all round.

Mill was born in 1806. His 'Utilitarianism' appeared in 1861, after he had published his more im-

1 In 'Fraser's Magazine,' re-printed in separate form in 1863, Mill explains (p. 9) that "he did not invent the word 'Utilitarian,' but that he believed himself to be the first person who brought it into use"; that he "adopted it from a passing expression in Galt's 'Annals of the Parish.' After using it as a designation for several years he and others abandoned it from a growing dislike to anything resembling a badge or watchword of sectarian distinction. But as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions—to denote the recognition of utility as a standard—not any particular way of applying it, the term supplies a want in the language." As a matter of fact, it had been used by Bentham himself.
portant works on 'Logic' in 1843, on 'Political Economy' in 1848, and the first two volumes of his 'Dissertations and Discussions' in 1859. His Ethical treatise was accordingly a matured exposition and defence of his ethical views. Mill has himself, in his Autobiography, given expression to his high appreciation of Bentham's teachings, of the influence they had on him, as well as of various other influences, unknown or disregarded by Bentham, but which assisted to mould his own opinions. He was an early student of the ancient philosophers, notably of the writings of Plato; he recognised that an entirely different spirit breathed in them from that of the current philosophy which surrounded him in his own country. Of the latter, he assimilated the psychological views first propounded by David Hartley, but made more accessible by his father James Mill in his well-known 'Analysis of the Human Mind.' Through this channel he acquired the habit of regarding mental states, moral emotions and feelings, as complex phenomena, formed by the combination of simpler elements under the influence of various forms of association. Thus he regarded mental characters, such as sympathy, benevolence, moral sense, &c., not as prime factors of men's moral constitution in the way that many representatives of religious, common-sense, or intuitional ethics had

1 See supra, vol. iii. p. 313, note 2.
2 See supra, vol. iii. p. 216, note 1 sqq.
3 Nevertheless Mill betrays some suspicion that analysis into, and synthesis of, elements is not sufficient to explain the "concrete whole" which cannot be exhausted by these processes. See his remarks on Happiness, p. 55 of 'Utilitarianism.' Also the passage (p. 2) in which he explains that the relation of first principles to a science "is not that of foundations to an edifice, but of roots to a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be never dug down to and exposed to light."
done. With the aid of this psychological instrument, the dissecting analysis of the Association-psychology, he approached the principles of utility, happiness, and pleasure, upon which the morality of Benthamism was founded. These terms, under his treatment, acquired a larger and higher meaning. In this way he also departed from the exclusively quantitative estimate of pleasure which was adopted by Bentham. Thus he added to the different sources of obligation or sanctions, as Bentham termed them, one of which the latter omitted to take note,—man's feeling of unity with his fellow-creatures. He admits that in most individuals this feeling is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings and is often wanting altogether, but it presents itself to the minds of those who have it "as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without"; and "this conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest-happiness" principle in morality.

Mill further came under the influence also of Auguste Comte, who gave prominence to this latter sentiment under the name of Altruism, which he opposed to Egoism.

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1 Professor Sorley, however, remarks that Bentham did mention what he called the "sympathetic sanction." See Works by Bowring, iii. 290; cf. Halévy, 'Le Formalisme du Radicalisme philosophique,' i. 284.

2 'Utilitarianism,' p. 49.

3 "If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and the practice of it, I think that no one, who can realise this conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality. To any ethical student who finds the realisation difficult I recommend, as a means of facilitating it, the second of M. Comte's two principal Works, 'Traité de Politique Positive'" (ibid., p. 48). Here, however, as well as in the Tract 'On Liberty,' Mill expresses "the strongest objections to the system of politics and morals set forth in that Treatise."
The influence of Comte as well as his own studies led Mill, moreover, a step further in the direction of modern ethics. He arrived at the recognition of progress, not only in public morality under the influence of law and society, but likewise in the individual moral character. This marks the intrusion of the idea of development even in that province where other thinkers or systems of morality have been wont to set up the doctrine of unalterable standards of good and right.¹

Instead of following the further course which ethical thought took in this country after Mill, it will for the moment be more interesting to glance at the development which Kant's ideas underwent in Germany. This development was at that time, and for more than a generation after, quite independent of what took place in the neighbouring countries. For though the prominent thinkers in Germany up to and including Kant had come under the influence of contemporary English and French thought, this influence for the time being ceased completely with Kant on the one side, and with the original productive power which showed itself in general literature and criticism on the other. Kant succeeded in giving to philosophical thought in general, and to ethical speculation in particular, quite a new character. But this came out fully and clearly only as Kantian

¹A very important passage in Mill's 'Utilitarianism' is that in which he speaks of the interest in a state of security; "to every one's feelings the most vital of all interests . . . this most indispensable of all necessaries after physical nutriment cannot be had, unless the machinery for providing it is kept uninterruptedly in active play" ('Utilitarianism,' pp. 79, 80). Compare what was said above at the beginning of this chapter on the existence and maintenance of order and the accompanying sense of security in this country as compared with the Continent (supra, pp. 129 sqq).
ideas were taken up, assimilated, and transformed, in the minds of other original thinkers, and this not always in the true Kantian spirit. But through this Kant became, on the continent of Europe, a far greater reformer than Bentham had been in England; for whereas Bentham devoted himself to practical and applied philosophy, Kant attacked the fundamentals, the inner sources of all our thoughts. Nor was it the Kantian school in the narrower sense of the word, comprising those who, like Reinhold, attempted to explain and popularise the Kantian philosophy, that brought about the great change in philosophical thought; this was rather effected by original intellects, by reformers and poets who had started on their career before they had become acquainted with Kant's teaching and who were in a state of ferment and unrest, which had its origin in quite different quarters.

The first of these who was deeply stirred by Kant's doctrine, especially by his ethical views, was the poet Schiller. To this I have had occasion to draw attention, in the last chapter, in treating of Schiller's Aesthetical theories;¹ there I also emphasised the fact that Schiller had given utterance to his views in important poetical and prose writings before he became acquainted with Kant's philosophy. He had then already come under the influence of what may be termed the Hellenic or Classical ideal, the ideal of humanity expressed in the harmony of the Beautiful and the Good. He had conceived of Art as the great portal through which humanity rises out of a purely physical material existence,

¹ See supra, p. 16 sqq.
into the higher region of culture, refinement, and social order. Impressed with this Hellenic ideal of culture as the union of the Beautiful and the Good, he became acquainted with Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy or Self-restraining Freedom of the human Will, and at once hailed it as an expression of a truth which had lain dormant in his own mind and in the minds of many other contemporary thinkers.

It was not, however, the purely practical or moral side of Kant's teaching, as contained in the second of his 'Critiques,' through which Schiller gained an entry into the world of Kant's ideas. It was first of all through some smaller and more popular writings of Kant, upon the methods of writing universal history, that the historian, Schiller, was attracted towards his thought. It was next Kant's third 'Critique,' which dealt with the æsthetical problem, through which Schiller found himself at one with Kant. And it was lastly Kant's theological treatise, entitled 'Religion within the limits of Mere Reason,' which stimulated Schiller to original speculation: he not only assimilated, he completed a line of thought taken up by Kant. Kuno Fischer has eloquently pointed out the common ground on which both thinkers stood, as well as the direction in which Schiller's original contributions lay. "What he had long carried about within himself, and what he had so often experienced in his imagination, he found here (i.e., in the third of Kant's 'Critiques') for the first time explained and illuminated out of the depths of human reason. His mental disposition, his way of thinking, had an inborn direction towards the higher, it was attracted by the
great and the powerful, in one word, it possessed the character of the Sublime. It was to him the greatest delight, internally to elevate himself and to see everything that was mean and little far below himself. This desire, this powerful impulse, constituted the natural pulse, the poetical throb of his whole being. . . . Now Kant had for the first time revealed to the world wherein the essence of the Sublime consists, that really nothing is sublime but our own elevation, the elevation of our supersensuous, free, moral self above our limited, sensuous, and small self. . . . Without these two human natures, without their connection and their contest, there is no elevation of the one above the other, of the higher above the lower, there exists nothing that is sublime. The words in which Goethe's 'Faust' describes how he felt in the presence of the earth-spirit are the most concise expression, the formula of all sublime sensations: 'I felt so small, so great.'"

Kuno Fischer further shows us how Schiller had already, in the character of the Marquis Posa in his 'Don Carlos;' personified his conception of the manner in which the idea of freedom and human dignity in thought and action constitutes the sublime character. Thus he saw in Kant's theory of the Sublime the light of his own aspirations and poetical creations. A series of æsthetical essays followed this discovery of the resemblance between his own and Kant's views. But he soon found himself driven to a further generalisation which was not in the spirit of Kant's philosophy, and which was repudiated by Kant himself in an appreciative criticism of Schiller's essay. Schiller's mind, filled with admiration for the
Hellenic ideal, the unity of the Beautiful and the Good, the harmonious fusion of the sensuous and spiritual elements of human personality, could not rest satisfied with the rigid contrast in which Kant had placed the moral sense of obligation to the natural inclinations of the human soul. Schiller arrived at the artistic conception of the Beautiful Soul. The beautiful soul, or the beautiful disposition, is characterised by the union of duty and desire, and there exists a moral grace which is the expression of the beautiful soul. This conception is characteristic of Schiller's combined ethical and aesthetic speculation.

Schiller's opposition to Kant's rigorism came out still more clearly when he read the last-mentioned treatise of Kant, that on 'Religion within the limits of Mere Reason.' He was deeply moved by it, but also repelled; he could not agree with Kant's conception of evil and sin. His whole nature revolted against Kant's theory of a radical base element contained in human nature. Although he declared himself incapable of refuting Kant's arguments, he could not reconcile Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Good Will with this radical leaning towards evil. Should the latter really exist, then it seemed to him that the Autonomy, the self-restrained Freedom of the Will, would have to be given up, but with the freedom one would also have to sacrifice the possibility of its phenomenal appearance, the possibility of beauty and grace combined, the conception of the beautiful soul. He accompanied Kant a long way in his ethical expositions, he agreed thoroughly with him in expelling from Ethics everything connected with utility, happiness, or inclina-
tion, all utilitarianism, all endaemonism or hedonism; morality was solely based upon duty and acted on principle. But Schiller in his essay on 'Grace and Dignity' conceived the union of duty and disposition in the graceful. Whereas Kant gave, in questions of morality, a voice solely to duty, Schiller desired that grace should say to duty, "I will obey you, but you must allow me to love you," but Kant would not allow this. To him it seemed that Schiller had sacrificed the majesty of duty by allying grace with dignity, and by changing morality into beauty, by establishing a friendship between the Rational and the Sensuous: wherever a question of duty presents itself the graces must stand aside. In this way Kant repudiated in the second edition of his tract, the compromise of Schiller.¹

The next thinker of the first order who came under the influence of Kant's ethical doctrine, who felt the necessity of giving it a deeper metaphysical foundation, was Fichte. But Fichte developed also an entirely different element which was contained in Kant's theoretical philosophy. He took up that peculiar method introduced for the first time by Kant into philosophical speculation, the critical or transcendental method. As I have stated on an earlier occasion, Kant had found a new formula for attacking philosophical problems which had been pronounced insoluble by his predecessors such as Hume and others. Assuming that we could not psychologically explain how scientific knowledge originated and was maintained, that we were not able to describe the genesis of knowledge in the human mind,

¹ On all this see supra, p. 35.
OF THE GOOD.

161

we might nevertheless ask the question: granting that human knowledge does exist as a fact, what conception have we to form of the constitution of the human mind in order to explain this fact? In the same way we can treat the ethical problem: granted that morality, i.e., conduct regulated by the sense of obligation, does exist, what conception have we to form of human nature so that this fact may become intelligible to us?

This way of putting the question, of formulating metaphysical problems, opens the door to a peculiar and novel form of speculation; it invites the thinking mind to go as it were behind the ultimate data of consciousness, to construe, so to speak, an ideal ground or process, lying beneath or behind consciousness, through and out of which the ultimate

1 The unique and original manner in which Fichte approaches the question of knowledge as well as that of activity is much more clearly and intelligibly explained in the Introduction to his most perfect work, the 'System der Sittenlehre' (1798). A great deal of the obscurity contained in his earlier Treatises on 'Wissenschaftslehre' is here removed and the fundamental problem stated very clearly.

"How something that is objective can become subjective, how something existing for itself can become a presentation—to take up the problem of philosophy at this well-known end—how I say this remarkable change can take place nobody will ever explain, who does not find a point in which what is objective and subjective is indeed not differentiated but one and the same. Such a point our system establishes and starts from it. Selfhood (Ichheit), intellect, reason—or however we may name it—is this point. This absolute identity of subject and object in the Self can only be inferred, cannot be shown to be an immediate fact of actual consciousness. As soon as an actual consciousness arises, even if it is only the consciousness of ourself, the differentiation follows. Only in so far as I distinguish myself, the conscious, from myself, the object of this consciousness, am I conscious of myself. On the various aspects of this differentiation of the subjective and objective, and again of the reunion of both, depends the whole mechanism of consciousness" (Fichte's 'Werke,' vol. iv. p. 1).

"As theoretical philosophy has to expound the system of necessary thought implied in the fact that our presentations correspond with something existing, so also has practical philosophy to show exhaustively that way of thinking which is necessary to explain how something existing can correspond to our presentations and follow from them" (p. 2).

2 What Fichte terms a Pragmatic Psychology.
phenomena of empirical consciousness can be brought within the conceptions of our intellect. The door is again opened for constructive, as opposed to purely descriptive, thought, for metaphysics as opposed to mere psychology. If we join to this peculiar and novel attitude, to the critical or transcendental point of view introduced by Kant, the dualism inherent in his system which jarred upon his disciples and followers, we arrive at the root, at the elemental forces, which prompted Fichte's speculation, and carried it on through the whole idealistic school, notably through Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher.

Fichte saw clearly and demonstrated with great force, that the empirical or individual self as revealed by introspection, always implies a Not-self, that it lives in an environment of other similar selves. In order to arrive at a unifying principle or aspect, we are bound to conceive, though we can never demonstrate, a condition anterior to and beneath the differentiation of Self and Not-self, of subject and object, and also what we may term a universal self in which the different individual selves are, as it were, united. He thus boldly grappled with the two great problems with which the nineteenth century has been occupied ever since. Popularly expressed, they are the problem of the soul in relation to the body, of mind in relation to nature—_die Seelenfrage_—on the one side, and the problem of humanity or society, the relation of the individual to the social mind—_die sociale Frage_—on the other. Unfortunately his earlier writings do not express his conception of the philosophical problem, which to him was not split up into
several problems as it was with Kant, in language free from possible misconstruction. He always spoke of the I, the Ego or the Self, meaning not only as Kant had meant, the individual mind as revealed to every one of us by introspection, but the universal Ego or Self, the universal mind which underlay and created the difference of subject and object, as well as the multiplicity of many individual minds.\(^1\) It was therefore not before Hegel had dropped the terminology of Fichte and boldly placed the universal or absolute mind at the beginning of his speculation, that the real drift of much that Fichte had said before him became generally intelligible as a leading principle in philosophy, as a

\(^1\) Fichte specially refers to the Bewusstseyn \(\text{\text{"uberhaupt.}\)}\) I suppose this is something similar to what in modern English philosophy would be called the "concrete universal" of consciousness as such. "The presupposition is that it [the conception of our activity] is implied in consciousness as such and is necessarily posited with it. We therefore start with the form of consciousness as such, and make deductions from it, and our investigation is finished if in the course of our deductions we come back again to the conception of a sensuous activity" (ibid., p. 4). It may incidentally be remarked that if Fichte had taken the psychological view and not, as Kant already objected, the purely logical, he might have brought out more clearly what is implied in the whole of his argumentation. Indeed, we may see in the latter foreshadowed what in the course of the nineteenth century has been more clearly brought out by such thinkers as Renouvier (see supra, vol. iii. p. 206, n.) and by Jas. Ward in his doctrine of the (sensory and motor) presentation-continuum (see supra, vol. iii. p. 230, n., 291). In fact, Fichte would have urged, more emphatically than he did, the fundamental synopsis in the development of the phenomena of consciousness. As it is, he, in many passages, insists upon \(\text{\text{"Auschau-ung, i.e., \text{"seeing,' 'sight,' or 'feeling,' as the fundamental fact of consciousness. This term has been unfortunately translated by \text{"intuition,' which suggests more than an immediate \text{"awareness" (see supra, vol. iii. p. 612, n.). There is also no doubt that Fichte felt increasingly the necessity of a deeper psychological justification of his whole system, as is clearly seen from the latest work which he prepared for publication, the \text{"That-sachen des Bewusstseyns.' The late Prof. Adamson in his \text{"Introduction' to Fichte's Philosophy ('Fichte,' Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1881) remarks that much of Fichte's penetrating analysis reminds one of similar work among British psychologists.}
guiding idea in most of the philosophical and historical sciences ever since.

This obscurity Fichte removed to a great extent in his later writings where he adopted a phraseology which was more in harmony with common-sense. But already in his earlier deliverances his great enthusiasm, exhibited in a powerful personality and a fervid oratory, compelled the assent and admiration even of those of his disciples to whom his written word and doctrine must have presented insuperable difficulties. The governing thought which runs through all his elaborate expositions is that the character of the underlying source and principle of everything, of the Self before it is differentiated into Self and Not-self and into many individual selves, is Activity. It is in fact the autonomous Will which is the unifying principle before and beneath everything else.

Although, therefore, the whole of Fichte's earlier writings appear *prima facie* as very little occupied with specific questions of moral philosophy such as had been elaborately discussed from all possible points of view by thinkers in this country, nevertheless the root and inspiration of all his thought is an ethical idea, the Kantian conception of an autonomous, *i.e.*, self-restraining Will or active power. And the whole tenor and object of his philosophy is to impress his age with a supreme reverence for duty and a confident self-reliance. To inculcate this he laboured unremittingly all his life, expounding his views in ever new and more intelligible expression and illustration. His was just the personality to teach what was then most wanted to raise thoughtful
young minds out of the state of depression and degradation into which Germany had been plunged through all the disintegrating agencies which had been at work for two centuries alike in politics, society, thought, and literature, but out of which also a new world of faith and hope was then springing up. And the success of Fichte's endeavour became evident by the fact that the closing years of the eighteenth century witnessed under his influence at Jena, that reform of German student life with its ideal of academic freedom which has become such an important power for good all through the nineteenth century and a characteristic trait in German culture.

In addition to this deeper personal and moral influence which Fichte exerted, his doctrine acquired popular notoriety through its bearings on the religious question, which were pushed into the foreground through the polemics and controversies in which Fichte was entangled during that period, and which ended in his removal from Jena. With his departure the moral rigorism, the severity peculiar to Kant's and—though to a smaller extent—to his own ethical views, gave way, at Jena, at Jen...

1 This was the notorious Atheismus-Streit.

2 Kant had, especially in his later writings, included the doctrine of a radical evil propensity in human nature—a doctrine which we have seen was repellent to Schiller, though he did not feel able to disprove it. With Fichte this propensity acquires a different meaning; he liberates himself from the inherited theological view which has been pointed out as still lurking in Kant's ethical system. Fichte, though a stern and uncompromising character, was, after all, much more a man of general culture, and had moved in very different circles and come under the influence of many interests which stirred that age but which did not touch Kant. Probably even greater than the influence of the poetical surroundings in Jena and Weimar was that of Jacobi and Spinoza. It was Spinozism which formed the intellectual bond, if such existed at all, between him and Goethe, and gave to the whole of his speculation a direction quite different from that
to a more artistic and poetical view of life and culture, to a speculation more in harmony with the artistic spirit which permeated Goethe's and Schiller's creations.

In Fichte's successor, Schelling, the ethical was gradually replaced by the æsthetical ideal, leading with some of his friends and disciples to the vagueness and moral laxity of the romantic movement. The ethical problem as such fell into the background, making way for the æsthetical problem on the one side and the spiritual problem on the other.

The controversies alluded to referred to the relation of morality and religion. I have already mentioned that all through the period which preceded the new philosophical movement, a tendency had grown up to rationalise the existing doctrine of the Church, the traditional articles of Christian faith, to establish a reasoned philosophical creed, not in opposition to, but in harmony with, the deeper sense and meaning of the teachings contained in the New as well as the Old Testament, the Mosaic and Christian revelation. The fundamental idea of these endeavours was the conviction that the Divine spirit revealed itself primarily to mankind in the recesses of the moral consciousness and of the Kantian philosophy. Thus the evil tendency presents itself in Fichte's ethical system merely as a retarding influence: it is the vis inertiae of all natural beings which has to be overcome by the propelling strength of the ennobling power of human character. "In this way," he says, "Kant's view receives greater clearness—viz., that the radical evil in man is inborn and that it has nevertheless its origin in freedom. It is quite conceivable that man should remain for some time, or perhaps during his whole life, upon a lower stage, inasmuch as nothing would propel him upward... But it is not necessary that he should remain there... It is just as possible for him to place himself at once at the highest point, and if he has not done so this comes from his not having made use of his freedom." ('Werke,' iv. p. 182.)
through the light of reason; these two sides of human nature had been brought together in the philosophy of Kant, and more perfectly in that of Fichte. Moreover, Fichte's doctrine gave a more satisfactory definition and explanation of the moral conscience which Kant had taken as an ultimate fact or datum. This explanation was traced in Fichte's system to the harmony between the empirical or individual and the underlying universal self. This harmony or unity afforded a special kind of assurance, the certainty of conscience, a guide for conduct. In his popular expositions Fichte termed this underlying or universal self, the Moral Order. With this conception he approached the position taken up by Spinoza, who conceived it pantheistically; but he was also not very far removed from the position taken up by many moral philosophers in this country, some of whom, with Shaftesbury, took this as the ultimate datum of their ethical system, whilst others, like Bishop Butler, went a step further in conceiving that this moral order had its centre in a personal Deity.

Thus it was quite possible to give to Fichte's exposition a twofold interpretation and development. It could either be construed pantheistically — indeed, as some said, atheistically — being as such opposed to the existing orthodox belief; or it could, on further reflection, lead to a belief in the existence of a Divine personality in the commonly accepted terms of the Christian faith. Thus we find, in the sequel, two opposite schools of ethical thought attaching themselves to Fichte as a leader in their speculation: the school of speculative
theology, more in harmony, as they would have it, with the later versions of Fichte's own doctrine, and the recent school of ethics in Germany, which aims at giving to practical morality a foundation independent of religious belief, and in doing so attaches itself more closely to the earlier phase or version of Fichte's philosophy.\(^1\)

This latter interpretation of Fichte's ethical views

\(^1\) The school of Speculative Theology had its main philosophical representative in Immanuel Hermann Fichte, the son; he was one of the first to define the principal problem involved, that of the idea of Personality. His earliest deliverance on the subject belongs to the year 1834: a second edition of his Tract appeared in 1855. The subject itself has an enormous literature, and is represented by the 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Speculative Theologie,' founded in 1837, and edited by I. H. Fichte himself; the principal contributors belonging not only to the Hegelian school, but also to that of Schleiermacher. In the mind of the editor himself the subject was more intimately connected with the ethical problem, and, as such, with the development which the same took in the later writings of his father, after Schelling and Hegel had started on a different course. It is also to be noted that he was the first among German philosophers of the nineteenth century to take in hand a historical and systematic study of Ethics ('System der Ethik,' 1850-1853). This led him on, as it has done more recent thinkers, to anthropology, and brought him into contact with Lotze, who addressed to him a polemical pamphlet. The problem of the Divine Personality belongs more properly to the next chapter, which will deal with the religious problem. I shall there refer to the extensive literature in Germany and also to a later and independent discussion of the subject in this country which was also, through T. H. Green, Bradley, and their opponents, intimately connected with the ethical problem. The best expression of the opposite or naturalistic view of ethics in recent German philosophy will be found in the writings of Prof. Jodl, to whose 'History of Ethics in Modern Philosophy' I am greatly indebted. Though the author closes the first edition of his work with what may be termed the Positivist Ethics of Feuerbach in Germany, Comte in France, and J. S. Mill in England, in whose writings he sees a firm foundation for the ethics of the future, one is still in hopes that the forthcoming second edition of the second volume will recognise that the teaching of these three representatives of Positivist or Naturalistic Ethics is now really antiquated, and that, pre-eminentiy in this country, but also in France, a new era of philosophical thought has been entered. It was opened in this country by the ethical treatises of Henry Sidgwick and F. H. Bradley, of whom more in the sequel. In connection with the elder Fichte's ethics the following closing passage from Jodl's discussion of the subject is characteristic of his own view as well as of his interpretation of the final phase of Fichte's system: 'which more than any other has directed
was not popular at the time when the controversy arose as to the drift of Fichte's speculation. Moral philosophy had not then descended to the level of utilitarianism and naturalism. In abandoning to a large extent the formalities of the reigning orthodox belief, the enlightened thought of the age did not tend towards irreligion. It was rather deeply religious and spiritual, it did not aim at destroying the intimate connection of religion and morality, it regarded religion as the necessary metaphysic of ethics. Thus Fichte declared that: "From the beginning of the world down to the present day, religion, whatever form it may have assumed, has been essentially metaphysic: and he who despises and derides metaphysic —i.e., everything a priori—either knows not what he does or else he despises and derides religion." 1

man to his own independence, and has made the self-assurance of his own reasoning self the corner-stone of all his convictions, affording, at the same time, the view of a mysterious connection which values the individual with all the highest and best that it may succeed in only as a member in a series, only as an instrument in the development of an infinite life. The realm of reason and of moral autonomy is at the same time a kingdom of grace: herein Fichte's system mirrors the twin aspects of all moral experience, the last word of all the deepest thought on the ground of the world-process, and it does so more truly than any other system. We feel ourselves free and at the same time bound, we may and must trust our own power, and must, if we desire to be honest, regard with wonder as a mysterious gift this power itself which leads us towards success; we know that whatever exists in the way of reason, clarity, goodness, and beauty on this earth is our work and cannot be any one else's, and should still not know how to create reason and beauty were it not that something in our nature which we have not given to ourselves lends us its wizard's mantle. It is possible to understand mankind and its historical labour perfectly, as Positivism does, without having always in view that mysterious connection which joins it to the deepest root of reality; but something remains unexpressed in the background which no inclusive world-formula can well do without. Nothing can happen in this world that is not prepared and grounded in its innermost essence: and a world in which a realm of conscious reason is possible must count amongst its ultimate constituents reason itself." (F. Jodl, 'Geschichte der Ethik,' vol. ii., 1889, pp. 87 sqq.).

The philosophy of the day thus aimed at basing ethics upon a religious foundation. But this religious foundation was not to be a mere blind and thoughtless repetition of the ruling theological dogmas, it was to be the spirit and not the letter of Christian faith, and this spirit was to be reached, the deeper understanding was to be attained, through a moral interpretation. If we desire to define the position of ethical thought of that age and school in terms which have become current in this country, we may say that Kant's and Fichte's ethics were intuitional. As such they were quite as far removed from the utilitarian ethics of the present day as they were from the dry formalism which prevailed in the theological schools, rationalistic and orthodox alike. But it was from the latter that the opposition first made itself felt.

The customary teachings of the Church were closely bound up with existing governments and state rule. The Church, with its catechism, was then, as it has been many times before and since, a powerful ally of bureaucracy and political intolerance. Fichte had shown that he stood on the side of social and political freedom. Though he held up the moral law as the highest revelation, as a sacred command, he held and preached enlightened views on social, legal, and political questions. The great success of his academic teaching, his personal influence on younger minds, had aroused many jealousies. Being moreover an assertive nature, he had made many enemies. In the more advanced universities of Germany 'Lern- und Lehr-Freiheit' was then the order of the day; nowhere more so than at
Jena under the enlightened rule of Karl August and Goethe. Fichte's enemies did not dare to attack him in his academic freedom; but when, in the literary journal with which he was connected, articles appeared by him and followers of his which touched somewhat incautiously upon religious subjects, a cry was raised anonymously, fastening the stigma of atheism upon his philosophy. The whole controversy was maliciously handled on the one side, impatiently on the other. It resulted in Fichte's dismissal from Jena, and, as I stated above, in a decided change of the philosophy which was taught at that centre. The specifically ethical character disappeared in the systems of Fichte's successors, Schelling and Hegel, making room for the aesthetical and metaphysical.

II.

The third important thinker who was stirred to an original development of Kant's ideas was Schleiermacher. It is only quite recently, and after the idealistic as well as the materialistic schools of thought in Germany have run their course, that the importance of Schleiermacher not only as a theologian but as a philosopher has gradually come to be recognised. As an instance of this I have already had occasion to refer to the belated appreciation of his aesthetical speculations. But Schleiermacher occupied in every way a unique position. Although his mind was cast in an entirely different

1 See supra, p. 122.
mould from that of Leibniz, he resembled him more than any other modern thinker did in occupying a central position, living in touch with many and opposite schools of thought. Thus he was unique also in being a representative alike of philosophy and theology. He was one of the first to study critically the writings of the ancient philosophers, and he was one of the founders of Biblical criticism. With Fichte and Schelling he came under the influence of Spinoza no less than under that of Kant and Plato. He was brought up in, and remained in touch with, that peculiar spiritual form of Christian belief and religious life which in Germany was confined to some of the smaller and secluded sects within the Protestant Church. He did not, like Fichte — and others before and after — step out of theology into philosophy; he remained all through his life an active religious teacher, a famous preacher,

1 See *supra*, vol. iii. p. 162.

2 All the many influences which contributed to develop the individuality, originality, and many-sidedness of Schleiermacher's literary character and activity, are brought out in a masterly manner in Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Leben Schleiermachers,' a unique work, unparalleled, so far as I know, in any literature ancient or modern, and the only defect of which is that it has not been completed; alongside of it should be consulted the valuable account of Schleiermacher by the same author in the 'Dictionary of German National Biography.' The only volume which has appeared of the larger work, and which is now unprociable, takes us into the first years of the nineteenth century and deals fully with Schleiermacher's childhood and youth, the religious atmosphere in which he was brought up, both in his family and in the Moravian Brotherhood, and then deals with the period of the gradual formation of his philosophical creed (1796-1802). Of literary productions it analyses exhaustively the 'Addresses on Religion,' the 'Monologues,' and the 'Letters' on Fr. Schlegel's unfortunate and notorious novel 'Lucinde.'

3 Such as Reinhold, Strauss, Zeller, Leopold Schmidt (1808-1869, Archbishop-elect of Mainz, but repudiated by the Roman See, afterwards Prof. of Philosophy at Giessen), Wilhelm Bender (1845-1901, author of an excellent work on 'The Theology of Schleiermacher,' latterly Prof. of Philosophy at Bonn), and others.
within the established Church of his country. And lastly, he assimilated many of the artistic and poetical conceptions and ideals of the romantic school, going the length even of defending one of their more doubtful productions. It is therefore not surprising that in the domain of ethics he developed original ideas: further, that with so many conflicting interests, his thought and his writings should exhibit a dualism similar to that which characterises many of Leibniz's speculations.

As was the case with Fichte, Schleiermacher's philosophical views underwent considerable changes in the

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1 The 'Confidential Letters on Fr. Schlegel's Lucinde,' published anonymously, form one of the most extraordinary incidents in literary and philosophical history, and Schleiermacher's biographers have found it difficult to explain how, prompted by a feeling of magnanimity to his much-reviled friend, Schleiermacher could write and publish these Letters. In the novel itself the libertinism which followed in the wake of the French Revolution was combined with the moral laxity which characterised the age of the Italian Renaissance. It treated in an extreme, not to say atrocious manner, of the relation of the sexes and of free love, and we are reminded of the somewhat later, but much less offensive, treatment of this subject in the circle to which Shelley belonged in England. Dilthey has said all that can be said—not in defence of the novel, which is indefensible, but in explanation of Schleiermacher's Letters. With many other literary productions of that period it forms a historically interesting episode, testifying to the violent ferment which was then working in philosophical, literary, and aesthetic circles in Germany and notably in Berlin. It is well summed up in a letter written by Henrik Steffens, thirteen years later, to Ludwig Tieck (quoted by Dilthey, loc. cit., p. 509): "However true it is that the age in which Goethe and Fichte and Schelling and the Schlegels, the Novalis, Ritter, and I myself felt ourselves united, was rich in germs of a manifold nature, there lay nevertheless in the whole something audacious. An intellectual Tower of Babel was to be erected which all minds should recognise from afar. But the confusion of tongues buried this work of vainglory in its own ruins. Are you the same with whom I dreamt to be at one? I no more recognise your features, your words are unintelligible to me. And every one separated into opposite directions—most of them with the insane idea of completing nevertheless the Tower of Babel after his own fashion."
course of his career as a writer and teacher. Thus we have in his earlier period an abstract philosophical or psychological conception of religion, approaching Spinoza on the one side, but assigning to religion on the other a special province in the human soul, conceiving it to be neither thought nor practice, but a matter of feeling, of intuition, an elevating tone of the whole mind. And on the other side we have, in his later writings, a definite appreciation for the historical or positive religions and their consummation in Christianity. So also he developed two independent views of ethics—a system of philosophical ethics in his earlier phase, and a system of Christian ethics in the later. In some of his earlier writings he coincides largely with Fichte, but he eventually separates himself from him, taking up, what we may term, the programme of Schelling, which—we may say in passing—the latter never carried out.¹ He did more than any other to realise what Schelling had put forward in one of his earliest essays when he was still under the paramount influence of Fichte. He there conceived the necessity of looking upon the moral law in its relation to the

¹ This is well brought out by Jodl, whose fairness in representing thinkers such as Schleiermacher, from whom he differs in principle, cannot be sufficiently appreciated. In his 'History' (vol. ii. p. 161) he explains the absence of an independent appreciation of Schelling as an ethical philosopher by the fact "that Schelling always slips away from this [the ethical] problem: it is first the interest in the theory of knowledge, then that in philosophy of nature which comes to the fore; and even where he deals with ethical questions he does not attain to real independence. Appearing first as an interpreter of Fichte, he later, after developing the system of identity, comes completely under the spell of Spinoza, reproducing luminously the main ideas of the 'Ethics,' but again without developing an independent theory." In a later chapter Jodl deals with the influence of Baader on Schelling. See specially note 2 to chap. iii. p. 511 sq.
individual self (or Ego) in the same light as we consider the natural law in its relation to the universal or absolute self. "We may say that the aim of the individual self should be to change the laws of its own freedom into natural laws and to change the laws of nature into freedom, to produce in the individual, nature, and in nature, individuality."¹

But Schleiermacher's historical sense led him to conceive of the process of development in a more modern and realistic fashion than Schelling conceived of it in his various poetical, rather than genetic, expositions of the different stages, powers, or potencies, in the unfolding of the absolute mind. And through this historical conception Schleiermacher was induced to give a more concrete interpretation to the abstract scheme laid down in Schelling's somewhat fanciful deliverances.

There are three leading aspects peculiar to Schleiermacher's Ethics, through which the study of his writings still remains of great value. These three aspects are: the idea of Individuality, his doctrine of the Highest Good, and the relation of philosophical or abstract to positive or Christian Ethics. The philosophical systems which immediately preceded Schleiermacher had failed to attach due importance to the idea of human personality, to individuality of character.²

¹ Schelling's 'Werke,' vol. i. p. 198.
² This important point was referred to, supra, vol. iii. p. 255. Although Fichte's philosophy centred in the notion of selfhood, and as such gave great prominence to the conception of individuality, there was always a danger of dealing only with the general, abstract, or universal self, and of slipping back into the conception of the one or absolute self, there was not a sufficient interest in the actual existence of different individualities. From a psycho-
All purely abstract morality or ethics, dominated by the idea of duty, must fail to give due weight to the individual differences of human beings, to conceive of duty as something different for every rational being. These systems emphasise only what should be common to all, the universal law, whether of thought or of conduct, be it Natural, Moral, or Divine. Against this view Schleiermacher assimilates, from the monadology of Leibniz, the idea that the individual is, in every instance, an independent mirror of the whole universe, capable of reflecting in itself and destined to reflect the whole from an individual point of view, to realise in an individual example the common ideal.

In connection with this appreciation of individuality and personality, Schleiermacher attaches, in his ethical treatises, more importance to what the moral life should from another. The connecting link of the pure and empirical lies in this, that a rational being must feel to be an individual but not necessarily this or that one; that any one is this or that individual is accidental and of empirical origin. The empirical is the will, the understanding, and the body. The object of the moral law is distinctly nothing individual but reason in general" [Vernunft überhaupt]. "... The absolute annihilation of the individual and merger of the same in absolute pure reason or in God, is indeed the last aim of finite reason; only this is not possible in time." Dilthey communicates (Appendix, p. 123) a passage from Schleiermacher's 'Diary' as probably bearing upon this: "That one cannot have individuality without personality is the elegiac theme of true mysticism."
represent and realise than to the ultimate source and form of morality: the content, the realisable result of morality, is to him more interesting than the form. Thus he cultivates a chapter in Ethics which had been overlooked or forgotten, which in Kant's ethics notably had been treated as an appendix and of secondary consideration, the chapter of moral goods or of The Good, the *sumnum bonum* of ancient philosophers. This permits him to give much more attention, and to do much more justice, to the various creations and products of culture and civilisation, such as the Family, Society, the State, the Church, Science, Art, and the historical Religions. Many of the existing institutions, of the vehicles of culture, morality, and refinement, he looks upon as possessed of an individual character, as personalities. His idea of personality and individuality permits him to appreciate individual differences. In no one individual, in no one institution, can the whole essence and meaning of the absolute be realised, only in many individuals and individual creations and in their historical succession. The absolute is spread out, is realised in space and time. And here he takes up and appreciates, more completely than some of his forerunners, the idea of progress, the infinite process of realisation in history. This view leads him to a special understanding of positive religion as the complement, the fulfilment of abstract or philosophical religion.

Philosophical religion, the reasoned creed which the philosophy of his age was trying to find and establish, remained too abstract. Something more concrete was wanted for the practical religious teacher, something
more even than the conception of religion as an independent power in the life of the human soul, something more also than the feeling of absolute dependence, the definition with which his philosophical ethics started. The bringing together of reason and nature, of the divine and human, presented itself as an endless process, as an ideal, undefinable and realisable only in the infinite progress of human history, in the distant future of humanity. But this, which for the natural man would be an infinitely distant and not clearly defined aim and end, has been brought near and definitely fixed or revealed in the Christian doctrine and the person of its Founder. In spite of the endless process, of the infinite duration of human history, as the goal of which the union of the divine and human appears in the form of an ideal, we are in possession, through the historical Christian dispensation, of a living presentation of this union, of this ideal, in Christ. To Schleiermacher it is inconceivable that the Christian Church and Christian life could ever go beyond what was revealed in and through its founder.¹ In this way

¹ The principal passage in which this view is stated is to be found in a posthumous work published by L. Jonas (1843) from a manuscript left by Schleiermacher and notes taken of his lectures. In this work ("Die Christliche Sitte nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt"), as the title shows, and especially also the standard passage (2nd ed., 1884, p. 72), two points are clearly brought out. First, the importance of taking note of an historically existing practical code of ethics as distinguished from philosophical ethics; and secondly, the fact that the principle of progress or development in ethical theory and practice is compatible only with the Protestant (or as the title says evangelical) conception of the Christian Church, and that this notion of a development is not compatible with the point of view of Roman Catholicism. "In the Catholic Church there can be no question of progress in the meaning we attach to it, as she does not believe in a development of her own ordinances, which she considers to be unchangeable,
Schleiermacher is enabled not only to interpret symbolically, as Kant and Hegel had done, but to adopt practically the positive or historical as the fulfilment, the consummation of philosophical religion and ethics.

Schleiermacher lived and taught at the same time and at the same university as Hegel. With him he never cultivated an intimate friendship. It was impossible to bring into harmony these two entirely different natures or the philosophies which sprang from them. Hegel’s system was the final, and for a time triumphant, consummation of a great philosophical movement, of the attempt to make reason the supreme arbiter, the ruling power in the whole domain of human interests, to see in it the Divine spirit; in fact, to establish a completely reasoned creed. In it all other human aspirations were to be absorbed. Philosophy was the highest product of the human intellect, and but only in a development in the exposition of them. So that it is evident that the same Christian morality can as little exist for different organically co-ordinated Christian communities as that it could exist for all periods of the Church. For the specially Protestant view of the Christian Church it is essential that we consider the same as a movable totality, as one capable of progress and development, only with this restriction, without which Christianity would collapse, that we can never imagine that in the Christian Church a state of perfection could be aimed at or realised which transcends that given in Christ, but that all progress can be nothing else than a more correct understanding and a more perfect assimilation of what is laid down in Christ.” And in an earlier passage (p. 70) he says: “Progress in the community of the faithful cannot be conceived in any other way than that first in single minds a purer conception and realisation of the Christian idea is formed which in the sequel is communicated to others.” It must suffice in this connection to give this distinctive utterance of Schleiermacher, whose religious philosophy will be more fully dealt with in the next chapter. It need only be mentioned here that the difference between theoretical (philosophical or abstract) and practical (actually existing) ethics has been variously dealt with by thinkers of very different shades of opinion in recent times; compare, e.g., Herbert Spencer’s characteristic view on this point.
the intellect was the highest faculty of the human mind, through which the partial and lower realms and activities of thought, as well as of the will and the emotions, were to be comprehended and appreciated in their true meaning. Schleiermacher did not believe in this supreme and unique power of the intellectual or logical faculty in the human mind. Compared with the Monism of Hegel, his thought must have appeared dualistic.\(^1\) In opposition to Hegel, who invited his hearers and readers to enter into a well-planned and strongly-built edifice of thought and knowledge, Schleiermacher would seem rather to detain them in the winding paths of an intricate dialectic, out of the labyrinth of which no clearly marked path led to a highest point from which a supreme and comprehensive outlook could

\(^1\) Nevertheless Schleiermacher may be looked upon as one of the earliest representatives in recent philosophy of that tendency of thought which I have frequently referred to as the Synoptic. Especially in his earlier writings his antipathy to the atomistic dualism of the Kant-Fichtean philosophy is, as Wilhelm Bender (‘Die Theologie Schleiermachers,’ pp. 98 and 99) says, very clearly marked: “It may be regarded as an epoch-making event in the history of modern ethics, that Schleiermacher, in the ‘Monologues,’ as also in the later Lectures on the subject, through his enthusiastic proclamation of the unity of soul and body as also of mind and nature, has put an end to the dividing of man into a rational and a sensuous being. The ethical aspect considers the single individual always as a whole, as intricately interwoven in the whole of humanity, indeed of the world in general... In urging the importance of individuality lies the real progress of Schleiermacher’s ethics beyond Fichte; in the consideration of the moral activity of the individual in the totality of the moral task of mankind lies his progress beyond Kant. This moral task is defined as, first, the organising of nature, and, through this, secondly, the realising and perfecting of humanity in its infinite individualisations.” If Hegel’s philosophy aimed at monism of a logical order, Schleiermacher’s speculations rested upon a primary synopsis of what, in the actual world, appeared so often divided and broken up into apparent opposites: “The tendency to bring into sight, through moral doing and thinking, an artistic whole Schleiermacher expressed in the idea of the Highest Good” (ibid., p. 101).
be gained. His philosophy was similar to that of Socrates, a method rather than a result, a search rather than a finding; whereas Hegel's system was more like the elaborate structures which Plato and Aristotle had reared upon the basis of Socratic teaching.

It was therefore natural that many young and ardent minds who flocked to the University of Berlin to imbibe the new philosophy, should turn from Schleiermacher to Hegel, if they had not, to begin with, already gone straight to the latter. But the cautious, searching, and less assertive character of Schleiermacher's thought was sure to be appreciated when once it had become evident to many that Hegel had promised more than he could fulfil. During his lifetime Schleiermacher attracted principally students of theology, among philosophers only a small number of select minds of a high order,¹ who took a special interest in the religious problem.

When, in a subsequent chapter, I shall deal with the latter, I shall come back to Schleiermacher as the most important figure in the whole of that province of modern philosophical thought. His philosophical contributions to the solution of what I shall then term the problem of the Spirit, formed a centre which gathered up many lines of thought from which as many have issued forth. Nor do I think it necessary for the moment to say much in connection with the ethical problem about Hegel's own teaching. For ethical problems, especially such as have occupied thinkers in this country, did not occupy

¹ Such as the pioneers in the study of the History of Philosophy, H. Ritter (1791-1860) and Chr. A. Brandis (1792-1873).
Hegel to any great extent. It was more by those who were inspired by the general tenor and tendency of his thought, than by himself, that the necessity was felt to tackle ethical problems specifically. And this has been even more marked among his followers in this country than it has been abroad. We shall therefore have to revert to him later on, when we shall try to understand some of the more recent ethical speculations peculiar to English thought. It will now be more interesting to cast a glance at that system of thought which in France—unknown for a long time to German thinkers—was slowly preparing the opposite forces which should gradually drive into the background that official philosophy which called itself Spiritualism and was largely indebted, notably through its great representative Cousin, to the teachings of Schelling and Hegel in Germany. This was the spirit of Positivism reduced for the first time to a philosophical creed by Auguste Comte.

In order to understand this independent counter-movement which was not confined to French thought, though it there received both a name and an ambitious systematic treatment, it will be of advantage to look upon the ethical problem from a somewhat different point of view. This suggested itself naturally in a country which had witnessed in succession the temporary downfall of two traditional powers, Religion and the State. The former had lost its spiritual centre and meaning, through the attacks of the prominent representatives of sensationalism and scepticism who dominated French literature during the second half of the
eighteenth century. Its collapse was followed by a temporary destruction of the other institution, the existing order of the State and Society, during the Revolution. Thus the two powers which hold human beings together, the common faith and the social order, had for a moment disappeared; human society had become disintegrated or atomised.

Now, we may look upon the ethical problem as the endeavour to get beyond the individual Self, beyond the human being as the atom or unit of humanity, to arrive at an aspect deeper and broader than that afforded by the study of the Self alone and its selfish interests. There are two ways of getting out of the Self, of transcending or enlarging it.

The first is the attempt made by German idealism, to look upon the individual Self as rooted in a deeper, a universal Self; this may be variously conceived as the Natural, Moral, or Divine Order, with a more or less clearly defined intellectual or spiritual centre. This view suggested itself under the still surviving influence of the traditional religious doctrine of the Church, which it desired to understand, to make more living and active.

But where, as in France, this friendly feeling towards the traditional faith had been destroyed, another way had to be found out of the narrowness of the individual mind with its purely selfish interests. This was found by the revolutionary thinkers in France, in the historical phenomenon of human society, widened to the idea of mankind or humanity.

Expressed in different words, the first movement
sought and found its supreme object of veneration in the God of the historical religion, which it philosophically conceived as the Absolute. The second sought and found its object of veneration in Humanity, in mankind at large and as a whole. The former was, as all popular and metaphysical religions have been, transcendental, opposing to the limited and lower world which surrounds us on this earth, the unlimited and higher region of heaven; this idea being expressed in the most varying forms, from the narrowest sectarian to the largest and deepest intellectual, religious, and poetical view of the Divine, and vice versa, from the vaguest and most abstract definition of the Absolute, to the most concrete and living Christian belief in a Heavenly Father. The other view naturally opposes all transcendentalism, destroys both the religious and the metaphysical aspects: it seeks and finds the object of its thought, and the region of its practice, on this Earth, within the conditions which surround us here in time and space.

This view had at the time received a great reinforcement and new resources through the idea of historical progress recently introduced into philosophical literature by some of the prominent thinkers in France. There then happened, what has happened before and after in dealing with smaller or larger problems: what had seemed insoluble, if one regards only the Here and the Now, acquired the appearance at least of being intelligible if traced into a remote past or projected into a distant future: in one word, if one adopts the dynamical, as opposed to the statical view. This attitude is in reality the same as that which Christian theology assumed
in the explanation of Evil and Sin; the same also as that adopted by the modern theories of Evolution when dealing with the problem of Life. A prolonged study, a deeper comprehension has, in every case, shown that the problem was not solved, but only for a time moved away from the centre of the field of reflection; the pressure was relieved, but this relief has proved to be only temporary.

These remarks will lead us to understand easily the characteristic and original features of Comte's philosophy, of the positive view as distinguished from the metaphysical view of German Idealism, but also as distinguished from the psychological view peculiar to English thought. We can at once recognise that it is diametrically opposed to the former; but that, though different, it is not opposed, but complementary to the latter. And so it has also proved to be historically; in as much as it was first adequately understood in England where an amalgamation of the older psychology with Comtian ideas and the more recent theory of descent have led to the modern doctrine of Evolution. On the contrary, in Germany Comte got no hearing till long after the classical era of Idealism, and then only through the writings of English thinkers, notably of John Stuart Mill. This happened just at the time when, under the influence of Kant's and Hegel's writings, a counter-movement arose in England in opposition to Positivism in its various forms such as Utilitarianism, Naturalism, and Agnosticism.

Considering now more closely the contribution of Comte's philosophy to the definition and the solution of
the ethical problem, we find that the whole tenor of his thought is more akin to that of the German idealists than to that of Kant or of English psychology or common-sense. His philosophy is dogmatic in the sense of being uncritical, forming thus an opposition to Kant's method, and his method is synthetic or constructive in opposition to the analytic method represented in English thought pre-eminently by the two Mills and by Alexander Bain. It also resembles the speculations of Schelling and Hegel¹ in this, that it has a profound

¹ Nothing is more striking than the similarity which exists in many respects between such opposite systems as those of Comte and Hegel. Not only the dogmatic, the architectonic, and the profound historical spirit are common to both, but even the abstract notions and the vocabulary of the idealistic system may be easily translated into those of the positivist. This has in fact been done already without any knowledge of Comte's writings, to a large extent by Ludwig Feuerbach in the expressive formula: homo homini Deus. And so far as Ethics is concerned the two systems agree in this, that their spirit is essentially ethical in the deepest sense of the term, but that, on the other side, the more specific problems of ethical science, as treated by ancient thinkers, by philosophers in this country and, quite recently, in all the three countries alike, receive in the two systems which represent two leading tendencies of modern thought no systematic treatment. We look there in vain for strict definition of such notions as the Good, Virtue, Duty and their relations. The ethical views of Hegel as well as those of Comte have to be collected from different passages and periods of their respective writings. But Hegel's philosophy sprang, as did that of Kant and Fichte, from the same root of a strong moral conviction regarding the task which philosophy, as the intellectual training and discipline of the mind, was destined to perform in his age and country. A similar intellectualism, joined to a deep moral conviction, is likewise characteristic of Comte. In both cases the intellectual principle, a definite theory of reality, being gained, the application to detailed problems such as those of religion and ethics, had to follow. The application was made by those who came after. In connection with Hegel's philosophy the religious problem was taken up in Germany and, a generation later, the ethical problem in England. Comte himself turned only quite late, as stated in the text, to Ethics, confining himself mainly to the development of the religion of humanity. Though this has been practically abandoned in this country, an important school of positivist ethical doctrine has sprung up with an increasing influence on French thought. Quite independent of the idealist and positivist conception of ethics the influence of Kant is also increasingly felt both in Germany and in France. It may also here be remarked that, as in so many other
ethical tone and bearing, though it does not, any more than they did, occupy itself specifically with the ethical problem in its various aspects as they had been elaborately defined and discussed by thinkers in this country.

Whereas the latter had clearly established, on new foundations and enriched with new matter, two philosophical sciences, the science of Psychology and the science of Ethics, the system of Comte disregards these sciences altogether. Certainly it does so in its earlier phase, though it appears as if, on more mature consideration and in the later stages of his thought, Comte had felt the necessity of making good to some extent what in the beginning of his career he had left undone. On the other side he not only gave to a large school of philosophical thought the special name and the distinctive character of Positivism, but he was also the founder of the modern science or doctrine of Sociology. He was so pre-eminently in virtue of the fact that the phenomenon which he studied was human society, humanity in its aggregate, human beings in their "together" and not isolated. From this as a datum he did certainly advance towards a conception of human nature as such; but he did not follow English thinkers by beginning with the study and analysis of the individual human mind, of the inner self, and by moving onward from the combination of psychology and ethics, so prominent with thinkers in this country, especially in so original a work as the 'Methods of Ethics' of Henry Sidgwick, is tending in the direction of a new metaphysic and a philosophy of religion.
this to an understanding of the nature and life of society, *i.e.*, of a community of rational beings. In fact Comte opposed the sensational and analytic philosophy current in France before his time, which had grown up under the influence of English thought.

Two main influences assisted in the moulding of Comte's ideas: he lived during the age of the great French mathematicians who brought about the consummation of the Newtonian system of mechanics applied to cosmic molar and latterly also to molecular phenomena. He lived also in the age when the biological sciences had been reformed by such intellects as Cuvier, de Blainville, and Bichat. But he also came under the influence of historical philosophers such as Turgot and Condorcet, and of social reformers such as Saint Simon. The former influences taught him what he considered to be the final and correct method of thought, the mathematical or exact method; they also taught him the great difference between the phenomena of inanimate and animated nature. The latter directed his attention to the problems of the regeneration of society. This he looked upon as a phenomenon to be studied biologically and historically. As biology had been added to physics, so sociology had to be added to biology.

Comte did not accept the theory of descent then vaguely conceived by Geoffroy and fancifully elaborated by Lamarck, but he adopted the law of progress and of the perfectibility of the human race as put forward with eloquence and fervour by Condorcet. In looking for an explanation of this characteristic of the human as dis-
OF THE GOOD.

189

tinguished from the animal species, he fastened upon two traits of human nature, the selfish and the opposed instinct, Egoism and Altruism, the personal and the social factor.

Beyond this statement, which recalls to some extent Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments, Comte does not seem to have made any real contribution to Ethics, for he neither discusses the conception of duty and responsibility nor troubles himself to define the end and aim of moral conduct, be this conceived as consisting in virtue or in happiness. He does not seem to realise that moral goods or The Good can in reality only exist and be realised in individual minds by persons who, though forming a community or society, must nevertheless be possessed of an inner life and enjoy individual freedom. Discarding altogether introspection as a means of studying human nature, he directs all his attention to the external phenomena and events of history. It is in and through a review of this that he hopes to gain a knowledge of human nature. In fact he discards entirely the individual and regards exclusively the collective aspect. Society is an organism, and as little as we can study the phenomena of life if we lose sight of the fact of organisation, just as little can we study the human species if we lose sight of its existence in the aggregate of society and its historical development.

Two volumes of the first and most important of his larger works are thus taken up by a historical survey, by a philosophy of history. This he conceives to consist in the gradual ascendancy of the specifically human
over the purely animal attributes of human nature. As
the highest among the former he counts benevolence, the
habit of living for others: his moral ideal consists thus
in complete self-devotion in which all personal or selfish
considerations disappear. In addition to this Comte
aims at a definite Order of society, based upon a philo-
sophical creed and manifested in a hierarchy not unlike
that which prevailed in the middle ages during the un-
disputed sway of the Roman Catholic Church. But the
power which builds up and pervades this new Order is
not the faith of the old religion, but the scientific spirit,
the supreme control of the intellect which is to gain the
same undisputed sway in the social as it has gained in
the natural and especially the mathematical sciences
and their applications.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Referring again to what was stated (supra, p. 186, note), the sim-
ilarity or parallelism between an idealistic and a positivist attitude
towards the ethical problem is strikingly brought out by Professor
Jodl in treating of a thinker who
may be looked upon as an extreme
representative of the former school.
This was Karl Chr. Fr. Krause
(1781-1832) the propounder of a
system termed Panentheism, the
attempt to combine the pantheistic
and theistic conceptions of the
nature of the Absolute. His vol-
uminous writings, of which only a
few were published during his life-
time, had only a small influence on
European thought, notable only in
the philosophy of law through one
of his disciples, H. Ahrens (1808-
1874, Professor at Brussels and
Leipzig). The passage is striking
and instructive and worth quoting: "In
voluntarily these views of Krause
suggest a comparison with Auguste
Comte. The ethics of both tend
towards the proclamation of a re-
ligion of humanity which appears
here in a metaphysical, there in a
positivist clothing; confining itself
there to the given world and the
knowable connection of things, but
extending here in bold flight the
thoughts and deeds of man beyond
the limits of the universe. The
contrast of aspects which is here
evident is in its innermost essence
insoluble, as both sides are equally
given in experience. . . . Human
consciousness is not self-creative,
it rests on a foundation which
it has not made itself and which
we may with equal justice call un-
conscious or superconscious. The
positivist need not further con-
sider it, it being for him a given
fact, but he cannot wish to deny
it; but this feeling of dependence
upon vast mysterious powers . . .
marks exactly that point of empiri-
cal certitude from which the specu-
lative and religious aspect did, and
will always, start. Disregarding
It seems thus as if Comte is aiming at bringing about a generally recognised and accepted Order of things as the first requisite of further progress. As I stated above, the existence of such an order seems to have been tacitly or openly admitted by all moral philosophers in this country, forming as it were the background of their speculations and the object of their reforms. Comte thus aimed at providing by philosophical reasoning and instruction what in this country had unconsciously grown up under the automatic play of historical forces.

In the later phase of his philosophical speculations, which were much influenced by the peculiar conditions of his private life, he seems to have devoted all his powers to this scheme of social reconstruction and organisation, reviewing at the same time the principal points of his earlier doctrine as contained in the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive': the important change or addition, so far as the subject of this chapter is concerned, being this,—that he saw the necessity of adding to the six sciences classified in his earlier scheme, a seventh, that of morals, which is to follow the science of Sociology, this metaphysical difference through which the Gottinnigkeit of Krause becomes meaningless for Comte, being replaced by Menschkeittinnig-keit, the similarity of the ethical temper and the intellectual attitude of the two thinkers is striking. Vivre pour autrui and Vivre au grand jour; these are the two precepts in which the founder of positivism sums up his ethics. 'You ought to further the perfection of all beings with all your might: and this intercourse should be such as it would be if we could contemplate each other directly as spirits': this may be said to be the kernel of the humane ethics of Krause. And not only in the belief in moral progress . . . but also in many externalities can we trace this analogy; the predilection for the didactic form of a catechism, for the elaboration of principles in the smallest detail, the repellently dry terminology surcharged with newly created technicalities. Both feel themselves to be prophets in this world, &c., &c." ('Geschichte der Ethik,' vol. ii. pp. 102, 103.)
forming the highest step of the ladder. The remark suggests itself that Comte, at the end of his career, thus arrived at a truth which unconsciously formed the background of all ethical speculation in this country, and this is that profitable discussion of the principles of Morality and of their application can only be carried on where a more or less settled order of society, an organisation, already exists. As this, according to Comte, did not exist in his country at the time, all his later efforts seem to have been concentrated on devising a scheme for the reorganisation of society upon the basis of the positive philosophy. He really never got beyond this; he neither clearly describes by what means the great change has to be brought about, nor seriously makes an attempt to establish the principles of morality. Had he done so he would have been forced to bestow more attention and appreciation upon the labours of contemporary thinkers in this country.

The study of history formed the leading thought in Auguste Comte's philosophy, and it has been admitted even by those who do not agree with the latter, that his view of the historical development of modern civilisation contains many profound and many brilliant expositions. Somewhat earlier than Comte, Hegel had already in Germany given prominence to the study of history and incorporated this study as an integral part of his system. It is interesting to see to what this independent movement towards historical research conducted Hegel and his followers.

The interest with which Hegel approached the historical problem was not ethical in the narrower sense nor
even sociological, it was rather metaphysical. This enterprise was an attempt to see in the different stages of human culture, in the great civilisations of the East, of classical antiquity, of the middle ages and of modern times, the working of that larger and deeper intelligence which underlies and manifests itself in all that is living and moving. He did not therefore look at the events and phenomena of history from the outside; he did not study the life of mankind like that of an organism, as Comte did. He started with the conviction that the intellectual agency termed the Absolute, and ultimately identified with the Divine Spirit, was unfolding or realising itself not only in the minds of individual men (the Self of Fichte), nor yet only in the regions of nature and mind as two complementary opposites (as Schelling held), but that it manifests itself also and pre-eminently in historical creations such as the State, Society, the Church, Art, Religion, and Science: the last in its highest forms he identified with Philosophy.

Thus Hegel's first great work was a combination of psychology and history, throwing light into the recesses of the individual human mind as well as upon the life of humanity, of the objective mind. It was an interpretation of the facts of the mental life of man and mankind. Where Comte saw only the contest of two organic forces, Egoism and Altruism, not further to be explained, Hegel saw the manifestations of an underlying reality revealed and known to man primarily within his own self-consciousness: the life of the Absolute. From this point of view he wrote his Phenomenology of the Mind, and later on the different parts of his compre-
hensive System, all testifying to the same fundamental idea.

Now although, as I stated above, Hegel's philosophy did not deal with the Ethical problem in the stricter sense of the word, its fundamental aspects guided his followers into two diametrically opposite channels of thought, and these, in the sequel, led to important ethical theories. There is no doubt that Hegel himself adhered to the frequently expressed conviction that philosophy was the real and true Theodicy, the vindication of the ways of God to man; that conviction was the very soul of his teaching, it gave life and interest to his frequently abstruse and difficult expositions, it was this idea also which inspired the thought and research of many who carried the spirit, though not the letter, of his teaching into other regions of inquiry.

But there were two other aspects of his thought which tended to start an entirely different line of reasoning and to nurse an opposition which was not in harmony with the origin and real tendencies of his doctrine.

The first was the direction which his teaching adopted in the last period of his career and in the only one of his larger treatises which dealt with a practical problem, a problem which may be considered as belonging to Practical Ethics — namely, the Theory of the State.¹

Although the whole of Hegel's philosophy sprang from

¹ This was the 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse.' It was published in 1821 with a memorable Preface dated 1820.
the idea of freedom, it latterly, under the stress of political circumstances, emphasised the further thesis that freedom must stand under the control of reason and obey the commands of the intellect. For it was the intellect itself which was to supersede and control the other powers of the human mind, as that factor had moulded all human institutions, and, as it were, precipitated its very essence in the various forms of culture, among these, in the State and the Church. In the monarchical form of government, with the Sovereign as the head or personification of the State, with the union of the Church and the State, in its foundations and structure, Hegel saw the incorporation of the human intellect and carried on a virulent polemic against political and religious libertinism, against the fanciful and immature theories of freedom which, as a sequel of the revolutionary movement, were springing up all over the continent of Europe. The different governments of Germany looked upon the latter with suspicion, if not with horror, and embraced a reactionary policy which nevertheless—in a remarkable manner not easily understood by foreigners—permitted and even included a very high degree of intellectual freedom especially within university circles and in university teaching. This state of things which obtained in its purest form in the newly organised state of Prussia, popular sentiment characterised by terms such as: "Der Intelligenzstaat" or "der Polizeistaat." It is easily seen how many of the watchwords of German philosophy since Kant, such as the Supremacy of the Practical Reason, the Autonomy of the Will, the Rule of the Intellect, &c., could be
twisted into a form convenient in the eyes of the leaders of reaction, and how, under the guise of the culture of the Intellect, an intellectual tyranny with all the accompanying evils of bureaucracy, officialism, and later on of militarism, could find a sort of philosophical support and speculative sanction. It would be unjust to accuse Hegel himself of using the watchwords and formulæ of his philosophy in this unphilosophical sense, but it cannot be denied that his teaching, precisely because it seemed to do this, found favour with some of the leaders of the reactionary movement in Berlin, and that in the same degree it was looked upon with disfavour by many youthful and ardent minds who were moved by ideals of political and religious liberty and of the intellectual enfranchisement of the human mind from religious and political bondage.

Some of the latter were then not slow to discover that the formulæ of the Hegelian philosophy could just as easily be used in an opposite direction, that instead of leading to conservatism in Church and State, supporting orthodoxy in religion and absolutism in politics, they could readily be employed to support religious and political radicalism. This conviction forced itself gradually upon many who really started as orthodox believers, but had imbibed, through the study of philosophy, that very tendency which, as I have shown, constitutes the abiding feature in all German philosophical thought during the last century, the spirit of criticism and free inquiry.

Hegel himself, though not a critic in the narrower sense of the word, and impatient of the detailed verifica-
tion of his profound generalisations, had nevertheless from the beginning of his academic activity encouraged the scheme of a critical review and discussion of contemporary thought and literature, and had latterly suggested the foundation of a philosophical and critical journal fortified by official support and authority from high quarters. Though this scheme, which would have characterised Hegelianism as the official philosophy in Prussia in like manner as "Eclecticism" became the official philosophy of the period of Louis Philippe in France, was not carried out, some of Hegel's disciples and friends started in the year 1827 a critical Review, which for a series of years was edited with great ability, but for want of the co-operation of other forces soon became the organ of a philosophical party. As soon, however, as this critical discussion by minds of very different stamp was once started, even within the school itself it could not fail to reveal great differences of opinion; this led to a secession of; the more liberal-minded members, who in the year 1838 founded a new journal which was published at the neighbouring university town of Halle. Though it began as an organ of the centre party in the Hegelian school, it soon moved away, taking up with a new abode and a new title in the year 1841 a distinctly radical and anti-Prussian position.

This movement towards what is usually termed the left side or wing of the party was promoted by various ideas supplied in Hegel's writings themselves. Among these there is one which is very prominent and, in the light of the subsequent course of European thought, of great importance, and may be considered as the second
leading aspect to which I referred above. It is the idea of Development, which underlies, as much as that of Freedom, the whole of Hegel's philosophy, and really unfit it in the eyes both of friend and foe to become the support of an immovable orthodoxy in religious, social, and political questions alike. This principle of development has, as I have had frequent occasion to remark, assumed many forms and appeared in many versions. In Hegel's philosophy it appeared as the movement and development of human thought itself, which was identified with the world-process. There can be no doubt that, to Hegel himself, it meant the movement of the Divine Spirit in the life of the individual and of humanity. But critical thinkers soon discovered that no logical proof existed for this interpretation, but that the idea that human thought in the individual or the race was expressive or symbolical of something underlying, was itself a purely human idea, a creation or fiction of the human intellect. The formula of Hegel, that philosophy was the true Theodicy, was therefore reversed, and it was taught that, on the contrary, the theological interpretation was merely an exaltation and idolising, an apotheosis of human thought itself.

These two opposite interpretations of Hegel's system were given to the world, the former in 1832, within a year from Hegel's death; the latter not long after, in the year 1835. The former, representing the orthodox and conservative interpretation, was by K. Fr. Göschel, with the title 'The Monism of Thought,' the latter by David Friedrich Strauss in his 'Life of Jesus.' But the thinker who applied the Hegelian idea of development not only to a special question, that of the origin
of Christianity, but in general to a discussion of the religious problem, was Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), who, in a series of writings, but notably in his 'Essence of Christianity' (1840), took up and established the anthropological view of the movement of thought in opposition to the theological. According to this view all development centres and is intelligible to us only within the limits of human experience,¹ be it physical or spiritual. This limit or circle we cannot transcend. All philosophy and all science is therefore doomed to be immanent and not transcendent; the centre is man and not God. The great influence of Feuerbach's earlier writings is not least to be attributed to the fact that he was the first² among German philosophers in recent times who expounded his ideas

¹ Anticipating what I have termed the "synoptic" view, he maintained that the object of thought must at the same time be an object of "sight." He does not use this term, but the word Esthetic, taking it no doubt in the sense in which it was used by Kant in his First Critique. He maintained that you can convince man of a truth only if you change it from "a thing of reason, an Eis rationis, to a thing of sense." (Pref. to vol. i. of 'Collected Works,' 1846, p. viii.)

² This remark is hardly correct if we consider that Schopenhauer's great work, written in a splendid style, was published twenty years earlier. Remaining, however, quite unknown, it had no influence on German philosophical thought till much later. Feuerbach's earlier writings are mostly historical, on Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Bayle. They were published between the years 1833 and 1835. They show, as he himself, in the Preface to the first volume of his 'Collected Works' (1846), points out, the gradual development of his own views from a pantheistic, through an individualistic, to a purely anthropological or naturalistic creed. He himself admits that in these works he developed, "under other names, his own ideas." He also confesses that the political state of Germany had "a great but by no means commendable influence" on his writing. This latter influence became still more striking when, at the request of his friend Arnold Ruge (1802-1880), he joined the staff of the Hallesche Jahrbücher, the journal which had been started in opposition to the Berliner Jahrbücher, and became the leading contributor. His earliest contributions, reprinted in the first volume of his 'Collected Works,' refer mostly to religious subjects and the Hegelian philosophy, and show how he adopted and perfected the pamphleteering style referred to in the text.
in an unacademic style, intelligible to the general reader; but also it is to be attributed to less commendable qualities—the pamphleteering, or as it has been termed, the 'Feuilleton-style.' The same had been introduced into political journalism by Börne, and had been adopted and perfected by Heinrich Heine. It unfortunately found its way into the discussion of philosophical subjects in the above-mentioned Review through prominent writers, among whom Feuerbach was the most original. It was adopted also by Schopenhauer in his later polemical writings, by E. von Hartmann, and in the most extreme form in recent times, by Friedrich Nietzsche; it has done incalculable harm, and disturbed the calm judiciousness of philosophic discussion, by introducing the element of personal abuse, invective, and irritation.¹

Nevertheless it must be admitted that Feuerbach did great service to German thought by lucidly presenting to thinking readers the anthropological, as against the theological standpoint in all philosophical problems, and this as a possible conclusion to be drawn from the

¹ On this subject a great deal has been written by German historians such as G. G. Gervinus in the 8th volume of his 'Geschichte des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts' (1866, p. 180 sqq.), where he contrasts the political and literary satire in Börne's and Heine's writings with that contained in those of Lord Byron, who, as he shows, had an enormous influence on the Continent. See also on the political side of the Hegelian philosophy and the deterioration of literary style through Reviews, pamphlets, and Feuilletons, the pretty exhaustive treatment in the 3rd volume (pp. 714 sqq.) and 4th volume ('Das Junge Deutschland,' pp. 407 sqq.) of H. von Treitschke's 'Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert' (1885 and 1889). Also Richard Meyer's 'Die Deutsche Litteratur des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts' (1900, pp. 52 sqq.) To an English reader these and many other utterances and criticisms of eminent German historians will lose some of their effect through an unfortunate admixture of a more or less patent spirit of anti-semitism.
premises of the Hegelian philosophy. In him a conclusion or consummation of a certain line of thought was attained similar to that which Auguste Comte had reached about the same time and from quite different beginnings in France. What Feuerbach did not see as clearly as Comte did, was the necessity of establishing, on this new anthropocentric foundation, the whole edifice not only of theoretical but also of practical philosophy. For this purpose his writings contain only hints but no attempt towards systematic completeness. He was too much a child of the age of the German Revolution; this was characteristically much less a political than an intellectual revolution; for in the same degree as the former was incomplete and abortive, the latter has turned out to be consummate and radical, a complete subversion of the older foundations, a "revaluation," as it has been termed, of all existing values. And this has been popularly brought about not so much by a slow process of critical sifting and mental discipline such as always had its home in the German universities, as by the hasty steps and brilliant flashes of an extra-academic literature, by writers who addressed mature as well as immature intellects, and did not feel the responsibilities imposed upon the teachers and educators of young and impressionable minds. Thus we find that a large portion of the philosophical labours within the universities has, during the last third of the century, been directed against the pernicious effects of a popular philosophy influenced and inspired by otherwise, and deservedly, celebrated names, such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Haeckel.
I have pointed out in an earlier chapter how the disintegration of philosophical systems, the contradictory conclusions which were drawn from apparently identical premises, led to an abandonment of the central philosophical problems, to a distaste for metaphysics: further, how a new line of research and study took its place under the name of the Theory of Knowledge or Epistemology—a genuine outcome of the critical spirit as it lived in Kant's philosophy. We have now to note a still more important consequence of this disintegration of systems, of this collapse of metaphysics. This was the gradual revival of ethical studies in the narrower and more practical sense of the word. As in antiquity the larger and more comprehensive metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle were followed by the ethical speculations of the Stoics and Epicureans where the problem of the Good, of the *summum bonum*, was pushed into the foreground, so it has again happened in recent times that when the foundations of knowledge became shaken, the principles of action attracted once more the attention of foremost thinkers. With this difference however: that whereas during the decline of classical culture the problem seemed to be how, amidst the disturbance of external political and social events, the secluded thinker could preserve his moral dignity and philosophic calm, in modern times the teachers of philosophy have more and more realised that, amidst the collapse of creeds and systems it must be their task to provide a firm foundation, not so much for private morality as for the reconstruction of society and the enlightenment of the masses.
I have also pointed out, on several occasions, that the great forward movement which began in Germany during the second half of the eighteenth century and has continued up to recent times, started from two independent beginnings, which we may define as the higher educational movement emanating mainly from the north of Germany with its ideal of classical and humanistic studies and culture, and the popular educational movement which started in Switzerland under the influence of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and their followers. Its foundation was not classical studies, but a simple and enlightened Christian belief which allied itself with realistic rather than classical teaching.

When, in the course of the nineteenth century, owing to the critical spirit on the one side and to political and ecclesiastical controversies on the other, the religious foundation of popular education became shaken, it was felt by many that moral teaching and discipline not only among the higher, but also among the lower classes, should be placed on an independent basis, that the ideas of right and wrong, of justice and of moral dignity, must be saved from a dis-integration and internal conflict such as had been the fate of religious and intellectual creeds alike. And to force this still more strongly upon the teachers of the younger generation, a real danger seemed to present itself in the growing influence of that extramural philosophy to which I referred above. For there had crept in, mainly through the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the spirit of pessimism. The optimism which formed so distinguishing a feature of German philosophy since
the time of Leibniz, and had been heightened by the productiveness of art and literature during the classical period and the enthusiasm of the anti-Napoleonic revolt, had been followed by widespread discouragement and indifference which prepared many youthful minds for a pessimistic view of life and its goods. This view found a speculative formula and brilliant exposition in the systems of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. The writings of the former had been before the world for more than forty years. The time seemed now to have arrived for an appreciation of ideas which were quite foreign to the spirit of the classical period, but which were not unfamiliar to the leaders of a section of the opposition literature, such as had sprung up, all over Europe, as a consequence of the Revolution and the subsequent reaction, with the celebrated names of Byron in England, de Musset in France, Leopardi in Italy, and Heinrich Heine in Germany.

Feuerbach had already clearly recognised that it was the practical and not the metaphysical problem which was most pressing,—questions which interested the masses even more than the educated classes. But his whole literary activity moved too much on the purely destructive side and, like a great deal of the literature of the day, was too easily satisfied with mere outlines, with sketchy programmes of the creed of the future, to yield any positive gain. Consistent constructive efforts dealing with the many difficulties in the working out of the various schemes were to be found chiefly among writers who still maintained the ground of traditional belief. Of the latter, who belong mostly to the school
OF THE GOOD.

of Schleiermacher, I shall have to say more in the sequel.

Of philosophers who stood upon independent or, as it is frequently termed, purely scientific ground, there are before the middle of the century only two or at most three names to be mentioned who seriously and systematically attacked the problems of moral philosophy; these were Fries, Beneke, but more than any other, Herbart. We need not linger over Fries, although he formed to a certain extent a school of his own, nor over Beneke, though he was the first who possessed and introduced an adequate knowledge of the labours of English psychologists and moral philosophers. His writings had little influence at the time and received due appreciation much later. Herbart is a much more important name in what we may term the reform of ethical philosophy in Germany. He had the merit of introducing into German philosophical thought a line of reasoning which was not unfamiliar to some of the moralists in this country, but for which he was the first to coin a distinctive term, through which this special way of attacking the moral problem has found currency in recent ethical treatises, not only in Germany, but also in England and other countries. He maintained that ethics had to deal with judgments of value, not with judgments of fact. In doing this, he perpetuated, though in a different form, the dualism which existed already in Kant's philosophy between theoretical and practical reason. He separated ethics completely from metaphysics, and opposed all attempts, suggested by Kant himself, and still more by his
successors, to give to morality a metaphysical foundation, to absorb ethics in metaphysics, or to neglect it altogether, which, as it seemed to him, meant to misunderstand fundamentally the ethical problem.

Herbart did not do much to elaborate this fruitful and, to a considerable extent, novel aspect. It was elaborated by a thinker who for some time was counted among the disciples of Herbart, but who distinctly repudiated this honour, though much of his thought recalls the influence both of Herbart and Leibniz. This thinker was Hermann Lotze, in whose system the conception of value or worth assumed a commanding position and received a definite expression. To this I have had occasion to refer already in the last chapter, in dealing with the problem of the Beautiful. Lotze did not confine himself, as Herbart did, to a registration of our æsthetical or ethical judgments of value, he gave to the conception of value a place in his metaphysical system, differing in this fundamentally from Herbart; he maintained that by the human mind the actual world is comprehended by contemplating it from three logically independent aspects, which in experience and practice are intricately interwoven: the world of facts or things, the world of laws or relations, and the world of values or worths. Although subsequent speculation has not, either in Germany or in this country, adopted verbatim this formula of Lotze's, there is no doubt that, as in many other respects, modern thought in both countries is knowingly or unknowingly indebted to Lotze for a special expression and revival of the

1 See supra, p. 64 sqq.
Platonic idea: that there exists an independent and higher reality which may be most adequately defined as the region of values, the realm of Goods or of 'The Good.'

In his earliest writings, Lotze had already made the idea of the Good the ultimate thought of his metaphysics; not, however, as if it were a logical outcome of metaphysical reasoning, but rather as the necessary presupposition, as the prior which we must place at the entrance and uphold as the background of all speculation. It not only, according to him, denotes the end towards which the world-process tends; it also forms the only conception through which we can, to some extent, comprehend and interpret this process itself,—it comes even before Truth. "Truth is not the prior, but depends upon this, that the realm of the Good produces it as a necessary condition alike in its existence and its definition."\(^1\) The key to the world of things that are, is the conception of that which ought to be. Thus the beginning of metaphysics does not lie in metaphysics itself, but in Ethics.\(^2\) This view expressed in the year 1841 was repeated by Lotze nearly forty years later, in the second part of his system. Students of Lotze's philosophy must regret that he was prevented from writing the concluding volume. There they might have hoped to find what indeed is missing—

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1 'Metaphysik' (1841, p. 328).
2 Ibid. (p. 329). It is significant that in this connection Lotze points to a task which has always been prominently before thinkers in this country, and which is characteristic of some of their most recent work.

Excusing the aphoristic statement of his views he maintains "that psychology with its mystery of the Self and the unity of its movements must lead to more perfect clearing up."
viz., a more detailed definition of what this ethical conception, the Good, really is: for it is not philosophically satisfactory to be merely referred, for the solution of all the higher problems, to a conception expressed by a word which has so many unreconciled meanings: not even in the face of the fact that it has served as an ideal which has governed through thousands of years the speculations of thinkers and the efforts of practical reformers alike, without ever having received a clear definition. This latter task is exactly what thinkers not only in Germany but still more in this country, and latterly also in France, have set themselves to perform, and this not only as a scientific problem but as a growing practical desideratum of the thought and culture of the age. To this age with its more practical tendencies Lotze did not belong; he still remained with one foot in the purely speculative, or as Germans would say, the purely scientific age of philosophical thought, and spent many years of his life, partly in refuting the errors of scientific materialism, partly in saving from complete loss the great inheritance of the idealistic systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The moral danger to society which lurked not so much in scientific as in commercial materialism and in pessimism became glaringly visible only when Lotze was half through his academic career. After the death of Schopenhauer in the year 1860 the writings of this thinker and those of Hartmann and later of Nietzsche became for a time the all-absorbing subject of popular philosophical interest. This explains why the philosophy of Lotze has remained more in the
background than that of many other recent thinkers who, though much inferior to him in subtlety and originality of thought, have more directly and straightforwardly attacked the burning problems of the age. The history of philosophical thought, however, must recognise in his many-sided speculations and discussions, not only the first comprehensive application of the critical principle to all the great and abiding philosophical problems, but also the first distinct evidence of that philosophical tendency of our age which has, under the modern watchwords of voluntarism and pragmatism, notified its break with the more contemplative and abstract philosophy of the past. Modern thought is fully realising what was only suggested by Lotze, that Ethics must precede Metaphysics, that the practical problem is more important than the theoretical, that it has in fact been solved to a large extent by anticipation in the existing codes of practical morality. The genesis and history of these must, according to one largely prevailing notion, be made the basis of all theoretical reasoning on the subject; a definite ethical creed or conviction must, according to another view, stand at the entry of all useful speculation.

This conviction that Practical Reason or the Will, as Kant had already stated and Fichte more strongly urged, is the primary factor, not only in human culture, but likewise in abstract thought, was put forward also by Schopenhauer, though from a different point of view and with very different logical consequences. There is also no doubt that Schopenhauer's philosophy was much influenced by Fichte, although he himself would
not fully admit this. But the fact that Schopenhauer in the title of his principal work placed the Will before the Intellect, shows his antagonism to the one-sided intellectualism or panlogism of Hegel, and marks an important feature in the change which has come over philosophical speculation during the last fifty years, a change which may be defined as the temporary abandonment of metaphysics and the disintegration of systematic philosophy in favour of separate pursuits, which, under the names of Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, Ethics, and Anthropology, are tending to establish themselves as independent sciences, attacking by separate methods the various problems into which the great world-problem has been broken up. Among these, Anthropology has received great attention through another influence which made itself felt about the time when the "Will-philosophy" of Schopenhauer, with its special pessimistic inferences, first attracted popular attention. And in general it may be admitted that this new and suggestive line of research, opened out from an entirely unexpected quarter, did much good in counteracting the unhealthy and unfruitful attitude which the philosophy of pessimism would have still more largely produced, if it had been alone in the field. These remarks refer mainly to Germany, as it is only in that country that in recent times pessimism has commanded much attention and exerted a widespread influence on national thought. A similar danger hardly exists either in France or in England. In the former country it was not pessimism, but for a time indifferentism, that blighted philosophical speculation, whereas in this
country the philosophic mind has always restored its vigour by returning to the datum-line of common-sense.

The influence I refer to is the special expression and exact definition which the idea of development, long familiar to German thinkers, acquired through Darwin’s ‘Origin of Species,’ and the support it received in Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of Evolution. The principle of natural selection, suggested to Darwin by Malthus’ ‘Essay on the Principles of Population,’ joined to the facts of variation and inheritance, was the spark which was to illuminate and give life to Spencer’s long prepared system; it was to convert in Germany the vague indications contained in the writings of Leibniz, of Lessing and Herder, of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel, into useful formulae which could guide research as much in the fields of nature as in those of history; it furnished a constructive principle and broke the one-sided and depressing rule of the purely critical spirit which was becoming more and more negative and unpromising. Thinkers in Germany who coined the name of Darwinism, with Ernst Haeckel at their head, infused a spirit of hopefulness and cheery confidence into German thought, and this operated in many instances as a wholesome and effective antidote to the deadening ravages of scepticism and pessimism; in fact it worked, though in a one-sided way, a restoration of faith in the powers of the human mind to attack afresh the eternal problems.

There were three principal features in Darwinism which influenced philosophical thought in Germany. The first was the study of the genesis of natural
things. It is true that in the sequel this turned out to be more a study of genealogies than of origins, of historical development than of beginnings. The second important feature was that phenomena were studied not in their isolation but in their 'Together,' great stress being laid upon environment. These two aspects through which—as I have shown in an earlier part of this work—Darwinism revolutionised the natural, and especially the biological sciences, were now pushed into the foreground in philosophical studies likewise; they had already characterised, though in a less defined manner, German philosophical thought, the historical view mainly under the influence of Hegel's philosophy, the notion of environment ever since Herder published his 'Ideas towards a History of Mankind.' Lotze had taken up this study in the most popular of his works, the 'Microcosmus,' significantly adding to the word History in the title of Herder's book, the word 'Natural' history. A third feature of Darwinism had a still more direct bearing upon ethical questions. Not only were human ideas conceived as having a history and development in time, further as being largely influenced by environment, but man was brought into a closer relation with the rest of animated nature. This was the third important point of view urged by the Darwinians.

A considerable literature, all tending in the direction of Anthropology as complementary or opposed to Psychology, sprang up in the middle of the century in association with the names of I. H. Fichte, Waitz, Lazarus and Steinthal, Wundt, &c. About the same
time there also appeared in this country the important works of Tylor and Lubbock, which soon became known in Germany. The sense of perplexity which had come over students of the ethical problem seemed for a time relieved when a much larger field of research was opened out through these anthropological studies. To these was joined the new science of Sociology, created by Comte in France, the study of humanity or human society, in opposition to Psychology, the study of the individual human mind.

The general tendency of all these studies was to give a more emphatic meaning to the dictum of Hegel, that the Real is the Rational. But it had the further effect of toning down the rigour, of relaxing the discipline which had found expression in the Categorical Imperative of Kantian Ethics. In fact it became more and more difficult to explain, from the historical point of view, according to which everything was in a state of flux, the sense of duty, the facts of the moral conscience; still more the inviolability of a supreme moral law and order which could be followed or otherwise, constituting the difference between Good and Evil. Into the place of the sanctity and holiness of a moral order which could be realised or violated but not altered by free agents, there tended to slip the idea of a purely natural law and order, which could not be broken, and left no room for distinction and choice between good and evil. This meant the ultimate destruction of the conception of human freedom and human responsibility. Thus for the philosopher who would still uphold these conceptions there arose the task: to build up a
system of morality on an independent basis, reconcilable with a purely biological, anthropological, or naturalistic point of view.

III.

The only consistent and comprehensive scheme which professed to solve this problem does not belong to German philosophy, but is the work of Herbert Spencer, who, prompted by social and political interests, made an attempt to work out the idea of evolution or development through all the different regions of nature and mind, of intellectual and moral life. To this task he brought uncommon power of penetration, of description and analysis, but also a remarkable self-reliance which permitted him to pursue the line of thought he had chosen without being disturbed by the arguments of other contemporary or earlier thinkers, most of whom he entirely neglected and refused to understand. It is not necessary here to dwell on the fundamental formulae of his philosophy such as the persistence of force, the transition from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, his special doctrine of the unknowable, &c. All these would, to a large section of thinking readers, appear even more obscure and unintelligible than the fundamental conceptions of the Hegelian system, were it not for an abundance of illustrations and analogies drawn mostly from the biological sciences which, mainly through Darwin, were then flourishing with new vigour. On the other side,
poetical, artistic, and purely literary productiveness, by which Hegel's abstractions had been suggested and supported, had for the time being fallen into the background in this country as well as on the continent of Europe.

The fact that Herbert Spencer, as well as his forerunner John Stuart Mill, had been led from the study of social problems to that of Metaphysics and Ethics, was not only in harmony with the traditional spirit of English philosophy, but it also reacted powerfully upon moral philosophy itself. The latter has, as we have had ample opportunity to observe, always been a favourite and independent subject of speculation. At the same time another influence made itself felt in English thought: the influence of those very systems of German idealism which sprang from Kant, but which had apparently been abandoned by German thinkers. Several works written in an incisive spirit appeared about the time when Herbert Spencer was publishing the foundations of his system. Among these, two gave a great impetus to philosophical thought—namely, Mansel's Bampton Lectures on 'The Limits of Religious Thought' (1858), and Hutchison Stirling's 'The Secret of Hegel' (1865). The former renewed attention to the philosophy of Kant which had so far affected English thought mainly in the interpretation of Sir William Hamilton; the latter inaugurated an appreciative and long-continued study of Hegel's writings at a time when they were wellnigh forgotten in Germany.

It was recognised by some of the foremost thinkers
of the day in this country that the philosophy of Kant as well as that of Hegel deserved to be appreciatively studied, and that no progress could be expected in philosophical speculation without understanding, assimilating or disposing of, the position taken up by these two thinkers who formed the beginning and the consummation of a special line of criticism and construction. Little attention was given to the intermediary stages of thought represented by Fichte and Schelling, nor did Schopenhauer’s writings attract any attention in this country before they had produced abroad that elaborate literature of pessimism which was a prominent but perhaps not the most important outcome of his philosophy.

The thinkers to whom we are most indebted for an independent and stimulating account of Kant and Hegel are Thomas Hill Green, who published his Introduction to Hume’s ‘Treatise of Human Nature’ in 1874, and Edward Caird, who brought out his first work on Kant in 1877 (it was followed by a larger work in two volumes in 1889). To followers of Green we are also indebted for translations and expositions of most of the principal works of Hegel.\(^1\) It is characteristic of Green that his principal work, posthumously published in 1883, the ‘Prolegomena to Ethics,’ betrays again

\(^1\) In 1874 there appeared the ‘Logic’ of Hegel, translated by William Wallace; a new edition in two volumes included ‘Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel’ (1892-94). From 1886 dates ‘Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Fine Art,’ by Bernard Bosanquet. The ‘History of Philosophy’ was translated by Miss E. S. Haldane in 1892. Other works are: Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Mind,’ with introductory Essays by Wallace (1894); Hegel’s Lectures on ‘Philosophy of Religion,’ translated by Spiers and Sanderson (3 vols., 1895); Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right,’ translated by Dyde (1896); firstly, the ‘Phenomenology of Mind,’ translated by Baillie (2 vols., 1910).
the ethical interest prominent in all the best English thought.

Students of Lotze's philosophy, when taking up the writings of Green, will be struck by a certain resemblance, especially in the metaphysical section of the 'Prolegomena.' This resemblance exists also as regards certain forms of expression used by both writers—such, for instance, as the definition of Reality as a system of relations.1 To what extent—if at all—Green was in-

1 Three thinkers, though probably none of them of the very first order, have nevertheless the merit of having thrown into the mass of philosophical thought, which in their time had become somewhat stagnant, a ferment which produced new life. All three belong to what we may term the transition period of nineteenth-century thought, or, borrowing a term of Niebuhr's, to the vorbereitende Zeit. They are Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) in Germany, Jules Lachelier (1832-1875) in France, and Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) at Oxford. Of these, only Lotze has attained to what may be termed a European reputation, having produced, as we have seen, some standard works; but in personal influence on a large number of gifted disciples Lachelier and Green far surpassed Lotze, whose attitude was extremely reserved and whose influence has only slowly and gradually grown. All three have certain traits of resemblance; to begin with, they take up the same position to the Kantian philosophy, they discard the doctrine of the 'Thing in itself' or the Noumenon as put forward by Kant and in a cruder form by the earlier Kantian school. With Lotze and Lachelier this means an approximation to the position of Leibniz; with Green an approximation to that of Berkeley. All three are conspicuous in reviving or perpetuating the study of metaphysics in an age and in surroundings which discouraged and denounced it; but in Lotze and Green this metaphysical tendency has a distinct connection with the ethical interest, with this difference, however, that apparently for Lotze an ethical conviction should precede metaphysics; whereas for Green the ethical problem cannot be solved without a preliminary metaphysical discussion. The ethical bearing of the metaphysical position taken up by all three alike is not to be found in Lachelier's own scanty writings (see supra, vol. iii. p. 620); but those who followed or were influenced by him have, in more recent times, devoted increasing attention to the ethical problem. With Green and Lotze alike there is in addition a distinctly religious interest, taking this term in a broad and liberal sense. They both relied on convictions gained early in life and maintained in all their later utterances. This in Lotze's case is very evident from the personal explanations contained in his 'Streitschriften' (1857); and, as to Green, it is clearly brought out by R. L. Nettleship's valuable 'Memoir' prefixed to the third volume of Green's 'Collected
influenced by Lotze has not been cleared up by his critics and biographers. It is, however, more likely that both thinkers were influenced by the same study, that of the writings of Kant and Hegel,—that in fact Green arrived independently at certain conclusions through which the apparent resemblance with Lotze was brought about. The resemblance moreover which is, *prima vista*, so striking turns out to be somewhat external as soon as we become more intimately acquainted with the whole tenor of Green's thought, with the genesis as well as with the purport of his speculations. His whole position in distinction from that of Lotze may, it seems to me, be expressed as follows: Green was one of the first thinkers in this country who felt the necessity of arriving at a reasoned creed at a time

Works' (1891). Instead of dwelling further upon the resemblance of Lotze and Green in this respect, I confine myself to translating a passage from Lotze (*loc. cit.*, p. 57) which, it seems to me, might be applicable likewise to Green's frame of thought: "I know only one content of the Highest, and this, expressed in the form of human thought, is the complex of our moral ideas joined to an enjoyment of their worth: the combined conception of holiness and blessedness. I know only one form of existence which is adequate to this content; that of a personal Deity from the clear image of which I should like carefully to remove every mystery, the interest of which would attach merely to its obscurity. Out of the content of this conception alone I should desire to deduce also that formal necessity of a general and absolutely valid complex of laws which governs the world, not as a limit imposed upon the activity of God . . . but as His self-chosen and eternal foundation for the manifestation of His essence in finite form; . . . giving to His activity an unalterable law of inner consistency."

1 Both thinkers were also confronted with the philosophy of naturalism: Lotze in the earlier form which it presented in the writings of German materialists, Green in the later and more modern form which it assumed notably in the writings of Herbert Spencer. The formula with which the materialism combated by Lotze worked was purely mechanical and chemical; matter and force and the transformation of energy. The naturalism which Green combated was that which he conceived to have been more logically stated long before in the writings of Hume.
when thinkers of an entirely different school, such as Spencer and Lewes, realised the same want. It is highly interesting and significant to see how this growing want was experienced not only by thinkers who, like Mill, Spencer, and Lewes, had been early liberated from the influence of the existing religious solution of the world-problem, but also by a thinker like Green, who, as it appears, never seriously doubted the truth of what we may call Christian metaphysics, but revolted only against the intolerant and uncompromising manner in which they were expressed in orthodox literature. He recognised that a time was coming when even the genuine believer would desire that his religious convictions be brought into harmony with the results gained by independent and unfettered research in the regions of science and history.

Now I have had frequent occasion to remark that this necessity had been felt on the Continent ever since the time of the Reformation, also that the great systems of German idealism never actually broke with the Christian doctrine but only desired to interpret it philosophically, to arrive at its real purport and deeper meaning. It is therefore natural that Green found himself attracted by prominent thinkers of that school, notably by Kant and Hegel, and that he searched, with

1 "We hardly need to read between the lines in order to see the prominence of the moral interest in all that Green wrote; and it was after he had shown the inadequacy of the empirical method, in the hands of Hume, to give any criterion or ideal for conduct, that he made his significant appeal to the 'Englishmen under five-and-twenty' to leave the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent amongst us and take up the 'study of Kant and Hegel.' His call to speculation has been widely responded to." (W. R. Sorley, 'Recent Tendencies in Ethics,' 1904, p. 123.)
their help and guidance, after a metaphysical foundation for his religious and moral convictions. Thus we find that he started, as Kant did, with the study and refutation of Hume's doubts, and that, in the 'Prolegomena,' he founded the solution of the ethical problem on a metaphysical basis.

If we now look at Lotze's attitude we find externally some similarity, inasmuch as Lotze published various treatises on Metaphysics, Logic, and Psychology before he ventured on a treatment of the central philosophical problem which to him presented itself as the problem of the "Connection of Things," not as the specially ethical problem, which, in fact, was never adequately discussed by him. But if we regard more closely Lotze's position, we really find that he had advanced a step beyond the position taken up by German idealism, that he had in fact arrived at the conviction suggested already by Kant and still more by Fichte, that a firm moral conviction must precede metaphysical inquiry, that Ethics or a moral conviction is not a conclusion to be drawn from theory, but that it is the *sine qua non* of such a theory itself that, as he expresses it, the world that *is* must find its interpretation, its *raison d'etre*, in the world that *ought* to be. I need only further point out that a similar step beyond the position of Green has been taken up in English speculation since his time.¹

¹ "There is one thing which all reasoning about morality assumes and must assume, and that is morality itself. The moral concept—whether described as Worth, or as duty or as goodness—cannot be distilled out of any knowledge about the laws of existence or of occurrence. Nor will speculation about the real conditions of experience yield it unless adequate recognition be first of all given to the fact that the experience which is the subject-matter of philosophy is not merely a sensuous and thinking, but also a moral, experience.
Green’s writings, though not voluminous, gave a great stimulus to philosophical thought in this country, especially to Ethical studies, in fact they formed for a time quite as important a feature as Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of Evolution. Both were to the English mind thoroughly original and modern: they were modern in this respect, that they both assimilated and gave a distinctive expression to the idea of development. Both systems had also this in common, that they attacked the burning problems of the age and that they stimulated their disciples to take a prominent part in the furtherance of practical aims and ends; both thinkers had abandoned the purely contemplative position occupied by some of the leading thinkers on the Continent, neither of them had any appreciation for the quietism, still less for the pessimism, which was then becoming a prominent feature of philosophical thought in Germany. The difference between the two English schools, represented by Green on the one side and Spencer on the other, was this, that the Ethical problem was identified by the former with the progress of the individual, the idea of consciousness or personality being the central and leading idea of its metaphysics as well as of its

The approval of the good, the disapproval of the evil, and the preference of the better; these would seem to be basal facts for an adequate philosophical theory.” (Sorley, loc. cit., p. 131.)

1 One of the earliest fruits of the new spirit was F. H. Bradley’s ‘Ethical Studies’ (1876), in which the definition of morality, as equivalent to self-realisation, also used by Green, is prominently put forward in comparison with other definitions. These brilliant Essays, though the teaching contained therein differs materially from the author’s later doctrine, are nevertheless a landmark in modern British ethical philosophy second only in importance and in the interest they created to Sidgwick’s ‘Methods of Ethics,’ the first edition of which appeared in 1874.
ethics. On the other hand, the central idea with Spencer as with Comte and the utilitarians before him, was the welfare of human society, its progress towards a greater common good or general happiness and the obligations which this end imposed upon individual members; though Spencer also insisted on the rights of the individual, which with him remained prior to the society of which it is the unit. If with the latter school the dominant thought was the end to be attained which the study of nature and history alike helps us to define, the great event which casts its shadow before; with the former it was the perfect personality of the Divine Spirit which stood at the beginning; it was the sustaining ground of everything, the principle which was realising itself by an endless process in the gradual development of finite human minds towards fuller consciousness and more perfect personality. The idealists were, at the same time, too much interested and impressed by the social and political reforms which had emanated from the utilitarian school to confine themselves as much to individual ethics as had been the case with many of the leading German thinkers; this circumstance may explain why they were specially attracted by Hegel, whose ethics, though not embracing sociology, moved more in the region of objective morality (culture, society, and the State), and why the writings of Lotze, in which this interest never made itself prominently felt, did not fully satisfy the speculative need of his English readers. These might perhaps have found what they looked for in the writings of Fichte and Schleiermacher, had it not
been that these two eminent thinkers were too much enveloped, the first in the political, the second in the literary and ecclesiastical atmosphere of their age and country,—conditions which have never been adequately understood in England. A similar fate, for similar reasons, has fallen vice versa upon the works of Butler in Germany.

The defect of the utilitarian school, that it attached a one-sided importance to social ethics, neglecting somewhat the problem of the individual moral character, was, however, soon to be exposed and to some extent remedied by the appearance of a treatise which may be considered as marking an era in ethical thought. It not only attracted the attention of thinkers of the most different schools in this country, but likewise that of thinkers abroad. It is perhaps not too much to say that next to the 'Critique' of Kant, it is the most important ethical treatise of modern times, and that no student of this subject can afford to ignore it. This is Henry Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics.' It appeared in 1874, and has run in twenty-seven years through six large editions, marked by important additions and modifications. It took some time before the contents of this book were sufficiently understood, before representatives of the various schools were able to take up a definite position to it or to answer for themselves the different questions which it put before them. For it was less by any constructive effort towards solution than by dividing the ethical problem into its different aspects and clearly defining them, that it has secured and maintained its
influence on British thought and that its importance is also being gradually recognised on the Continent.  

While recognising the importance of the 'Methods of Ethics' for English thought, those of us who know about Continental philosophy cannot help being again struck by the similarity of the position of Lotze's writings in German thought; bearing in mind, however, the characteristic difference, that German thought, in spite of temporary fluctuations, always gravitates towards the metaphysical problem, whereas English thought always gravitates towards the ethical problem. But both

1 The 'Methods of Ethics' presents as much difficulty to the beginner as Kant's First Critique must have presented a hundred years earlier, but for very different reasons. Sidgwick's Treatise is infinitely superior to Kant's in point of style and clarity of exposition. Every sentence is clear in itself and leaves little room for doubt as to the author's exact meaning. Yet it is difficult to arrive at a definite final conclusion, as indeed the author himself admits that the conclusion is not to him satisfactory but requires a further discussion. But he 'published nothing expressly treating of the ultimate problems which always occupied his mind. He perhaps felt that he had no definite help to give to the solution of the final difficulty suggested in the conclusion of the 'Ethics,' or hoped that he might be able to utter his convictions more fully . . . if not by offering a full answer to his doubts, yet by indicating the best method of approximating to such a result' (Leslie Stephen in 'Mind,' N.S., vol. x. p. 16). As to Kant, it is not too much to say that most sentences in the First Critique require to be read over and over again, and that even then many remain hopelessly obscure. But on the other side he crystallised his views in certain watchwords easily caught up by his disciples and strung together in an impressive manner though by no means always expressive of the deeper meaning of the master. The 'Methods of Ethics,' however, have become in course of years much more accessible through friendly and opposed criticism, through the Prefaces to the later editions, notably through the 'Brief History of the development in his thought of the ethical view which he [Sidgwick] has set forth,' published by Miss E. E. C. Jones in the Preface to the 6th (posthumous) edition, 1901. I may also refer to Leslie Stephen's Obituary Notice just quoted, and Prof. Jas. Seth's Article in the same volume of 'Mind' (p. 172 sqq.) A very useful treatise on Sidgwick's 'Ethical Philosophy' has been published by F. H. Hayward (1901). It contains a complete literature of what had been published by Sidgwick himself or by his critics up to that date.
thinkers—Lotze a generation earlier than Sidgwick—recognised the necessity of a minute investigation of the existing and frequently conflicting trains of reasoning supplied by different schools of thought as well as by common-sense. Both thinkers, though not sceptics in the current sense of the term, were sceptical in so far as they entertained but small faith in the capacities of the human mind to solve the fundamental philosophical problem as this presented itself to them.\(^1\) Both attached much value to faithfulness in detail and to appreciative criticism: both also agreed in this, that they opposed the exaggerated pretensions of the historical and critical schools of philosophy; that to them an account of the history, genesis or origin of existing notions, even if it could be correctly given, furnished no clue for deciding the correctness or otherwise of such notions; for in fact statements of being and becoming cannot furnish reasons for that which ought to be. Lotze on his side, as we have seen, found the key to the understanding of what is and has been, in that which ought to be; whereas Sidgwick maintains that it is quite illegitimate to infer that a moral judgment is valid because it exists, because it is original or innate in the individual, or to discredit it because it is evolved. Thus he maintained that we cannot get behind our ultimate intuitions; something among these must be accepted though unproved. From their respective positions both thinkers likewise object to the main drift of the critical philosophy—viz., that before starting to reason, the

\(^1\) "On the whole I harbour only very modest expectations as to the power of human thought to solve these problems completely" (Lotze. 'Streitschriften,' 1857, p. 58).
mind should investigate the extent and validity of its own reasoning powers. To get out of the dilemma, Lotze reverts to a conviction of the ultimate truth underlying the whole of the idealistic philosophy of Germany, the reality of Spirit to which he gives, with Plato, the ethical character of the Good. Sidgwick on the other side inclines more towards the position of common-sense, of experience, a position taken up before him both by Reid and Butler.¹

There is a third point upon which we find an agreement between Lotze and Sidgwick, though the idea is differently expressed. Lotze cannot conceive the beginning and centre of all human action to be anything else than something which affects the individual soul, filling it with interest and joy or the reverse. Sidgwick's criticism of different ethical theories leads him back to the Self, to what must still be called Hedonism, but a Hedonism made "universalistic" as distinguished from "egoistic" by the intuition that its being achieved by this rather than that person makes no difference to the value of the end in itself: the moral process seeming to consist in removing the centre of interest from the narrow field of the moment and the individual, to a prospective and wider field of social interests. Through this reconciliation of the intui-

¹ But Prof. Seth points out that Sidgwick's "attitude to common-sense must be carefully distinguished from that of the Scottish School, which refuses to go behind the explicit statements of common-sense or to systematise these statements by reducing them to their ultimate presuppositions. In Sidgwick's own terminology, the true attitude to the intuitions of the ordinary conscience is not the dogmatic, but the philosophical attitude" (loc. cit., p. 175). This reminds one of Lotze's definition of the formal task of philosophy as quoted at length, supra, vol. i. p. 65, n., and frequently referred to in subsequent passages of this History.
tional and utilitarian positions Sidgwick seems to have criticised, as well as done justice to, two distinct and important lines of ethical thought in this country, which before him appeared to be irreconcilable,—the intuitional or personal and the utilitarian or social systems.

Both Lotze and Sidgwick, consistently with the limited importance they attach to the historical method for the solution of fundamental philosophical problems, do not show in their writings that extreme appreciation of the theory of Evolution, especially in its Darwinian form, which has become popular in Germany as well as in England; both thinkers may therefore be termed pre-evolutionary. Although Lotze lived and wrote for twenty years after the appearance of the 'Origin of Species,' it cannot be said that he did full justice to the philosophical ideas contained in it, or that he realised the important part which these ideas were going to play in modern thought. Sidgwick's main treatise was published fifteen years after the appearance of Darwin's work, but it was only in preparing the second edition that he became aware of not having taken sufficient note of the importance of the theory of Evolution. We therefore look in vain for a full statement and adequate criticism of the Ethics of Evolution either in Lotze or in Sidgwick. So far as the former is concerned, the very fact that he never dealt adequately either with the ethical problem in detail, or with the most recent version of ethics, explains to a great extent why his writings have fallen temporarily into the background and behind the interests of the age. On the other side, Sidgwick's
Philosophical Thought.

treatise certainly stimulated the followers of Evolution to elaborate more fully the ethical bearings of their creed, whilst opponents prepared a fuller criticism of what they termed the Ethics of Naturalism, meaning by this denomination the peculiar development and amplification which utilitarian Ethics had received by assimilating the aspect of Evolution. The first or constructive task was performed on a large scale by the philosopher of Evolution himself, Herbert Spencer; the second or critical task has been taken in hand by several thinkers who came under the direct personal influence of Sidgwick as well as of his writings. Their work is by no means completed; I confine myself to mentioning Professor Sorley's 'Ethics of Naturalism' (1885, second edition 1904).  

1 To this must be added three Lectures delivered by Professor Sorley at Cambridge in 1904, entitled 'Recent Tendencies in Ethics,' dealing mainly with the ethical views of Nietzsche in Germany, of Darwin and Spencer and of Green and Bradley in this country. A significant remark is made in the introductory pages of the first Lecture. Contrasting the ethical question of to-day with the same ethical question as conceived by earlier thinkers in the course of the nineteenth century especially in this country, Prof. Sorley lays it down as a fact "that the ethical question is no longer so purely an academic question as it was some years ago" (p. 13). As I have had occasion to state repeatedly in this and former chapters, the idealistic philosophers in Germany had no intention to combat or change the existing ethical and religious doctrines traditionally handed down, but rather to understand, to rationalise, or to spiritualise them. So also Prof. Sorley refers to "the large amount of agreement between the two [earlier prevailing] schools regarding the content of morality. The Utilitarians no more than the Intuitionists were opponents of the traditional—as we may call it—the Christian morality of modern civilisation" (p. 7). The change is shown by a growing alarm, abroad even more than in this country, that practical morality itself is really in danger. This apprehension is certainly most distinctly alive in France, as I shall have opportunity to show later on. It contrasts markedly with what, as late as 1878, Mr Balfour stated—but could hardly repeat to-day: "Ethics is a subject which has suffered a somewhat singular fate; for whereas on its practical side there has been a more perfect agreement about it than about any other important branch of human knowledge, on its speculative side it has been, and still is, the centre of apparently endless controversy—the subject of every species of confusion" ("Mind," vol. iii., 1878,
and Professor James Ward's "Gifford Lectures" ('Naturalism and Agnosticism,' 1899).  

The positive outcome of Herbert Spencer's application of the canons of the Philosophy of Evolution to the ethical problem is characteristically and candidly expressed by himself when he confesses that Evolution has not furnished for Ethics the results which he had hoped.  

A similar failure of the mechanical theory to explain the phenomena of life was admitted by him after the revision of his 'Principles of Biology' and referred to in a characteristic statement.  

p. 67). And about the same time Huxley ('Nineteenth Century,' vol. i., 1877, p. 539) could state: "For my part I do not for one moment admit that morality is not strong enough to hold its own. But if it is demonstrated to me that I am wrong, and that without this or that theological dogma the human race will lapse into bipedal cattle, more brutal than the beasts by the measure of their greater cleverness, my next question is to ask for the proof of the truth of the dogma. If this proof is forthcoming, it is my conviction that no drowning sailor ever clutched a hencoop more tenaciously than mankind will hold by such dogma, whatever it may be. But if not, then I verily believe that the human race will go its evil way; and my only consolation lies in the reflection that, however bad our posterity may become, so long as they hold by the plain rule of not pretending to believe what they have no reason to believe because it may be to their advantage so to pretend, they will not have reached the lowest depths of immorality."

1 A second series, less critical and more constructive, has appeared in 1911, under the title 'Pluralism and Theism.' I shall have an opportunity of referring to these Lectures, which are not exclusively occupied with the ethical problem, in a later chapter which will deal with recent attempts in the direction of systematic philosophy.  

2 'Principles of Ethics' (vol. ii., 1893, Pref.): "Right regulation of the axioms of so complex a being as man, living under conditions so complex as those presented by Society, evidently forms a subject-matter unlikely to admit of definite conclusions throughout its entire range." Prof. Sorley in quoting this passage remarks that "the lack of confidence which the author [Spencer] himself felt . . . there is good reason to extend to the whole structure of evolutionary ethics" (Recent Tendencies, &c., p. 123).

3 Referring to Prof. Japp's and Pasteur's opinions on 'Stereo-Chemistry and Vitalism,' discussed in 'Nature' (Oct. 1898), Herbert Spencer concludes his remarks: "My own belief is that neither interpretation [the physico-chemical or that of Prof. Japp] is adequate. A recently issued, revised, and enlarged edition of the first volume of the 'Principles of Biology' con-
also indications in the writings of Mill as well as in those of Spencer, that he was not unaware of the insufficiency of what we may now term the purely naturalistic or mechanical view of things; both thinkers somewhat vaguely recognised the existence of an agency for which they could find no room or no name in their systems, an agency which thinkers of a different school regard as fundamental, and introduce from the start under the designation of Mind, Spirit, or some cognate expression. What Spencer merely hints at is more clearly stated by Professor Sorley in the concluding pages of his book, as a result of a careful analysis and criticism of the older utilitarian and the more recent evolutionist forms of the Ethics of Naturalism. The great advance which the latter form marks in comparison with its predecessor is that it puts in the place of statical or fixed conceptions the dynamical conditions and conceptions of progress and development, thus giving in many ways a better account of the movements in nature and human society. But this advantage of being better able to understand the changes which have taken place and are still taking place around us, is to a great extent balanced by the inability of all evolutionary theories to arrive at a definite standard, be it for our estimation of human action or for the definition of the *summum bonum*, the Good. We may perhaps look on with indifference or with resignation at the destruction of the hope and faith in some ultimate truth which animated

tains a chapter on the "Dynamical Element in Life," in which I have contended that the theory of a vital principle fails and that the physico-chemical theory also fails; the corollary being that in its ultimate nature Life is incomprehensible" ("Nature," 20th Oct. 1898).
the earlier philosophies, both of Nature and of Mind, admitting that research in both regions can neither find a beginning nor define an end which is not subject to doubt, that its correctness is merely a question of method; we may be able to lower the ideal of truth, from being a definite axiom with which we start, or an end which we reach, to that of being merely a correct process of thought; but we cannot, without the risk of losing all hold and support, give up the belief in the existence of a supreme and unalterable moral standard, from which we are able to judge the value of actions, the motives as well as the aims of human conduct. It seems contrary to human nature to rest content in the region of practice with a fluctuating and merely temporary rule, however much modern science and modern philosophy have combined in shaking our faith in the capacities of the human intellect to arrive at any permanently truthful statement of ultimate facts. The modern definition of scientific or philosophical truth, as consisting merely in the correct method or in the logical consistency of ideas, has in fact made science, in the wider sense of the word, apparently incapable of affording a foundation for morality, of formulating a creed that can deal adequately with the principles of action. To express it in other words, we may say that science in the larger sense of the term has gained, in the course of the nineteenth century, very largely in ideas and aspects, in canons and methods of thought, but that it has, in proportion, lost its older axioms as well as its ideals: the fixed foundation on which to build and the fixed end to be kept in view. But these two data form
the *sine qua non* of morality, of ethics and all practical philosophy.

So far as the ethics of naturalism are concerned, the processes of nature, as conceived by the older utilitarian school, were condemned already by Mill as ethically insufficient; and as conceived by the modern evolutionist school they have been still more drastically condemned by Huxley, who says: "The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. . . . The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it;" 1 or, as Huxley's position has been paraphrased by Sorley: "The cosmic order has nothing to say to the moral order, except that, somehow or other, it has given it birth; the moral order has nothing to say to the cosmic order, except that it is certainly bad." 2

Professor Sorley has, at the end of his 'Ethics of Naturalism,' suggested that the facts brought out by the sciences of natural as well as of mental evolution, leave room for, though they may not demonstrate, an idealistic interpretation, seeing in the history of nature as well as in that of mind the existence of a definite purpose. He does not attempt a justification of such a view, but merely remarks "that it enables us to avoid both the fruitless efforts of the naturalists to derive an ethical doctrine from the history of development, and the an-

1 Huxley in the "Romanes Lecture" (1893), "Evolution and Sorley, 'Recent Tendencies in 'Collecte...
agonistic view, urged by Huxley, that the cosmic and moral orders are in hopeless conflict. It avoids the latter view because it regards the moral ideas and institutions of man as part of the complete process, as factors in the movement which leads in time from nature to spirit. And it avoids the former view because it holds that the ethical element which is manifested latest in the temporal process, is presupposed from the first and necessary to the understanding of the whole. The ideal of goodness may contribute towards the interpretation of evolution, but its own explanation must be sought by another method.\(^1\)

Attempts to arrive at a synthesis of idealism and naturalism have formed the characteristic feature of French philosophy in quite recent times. Forty years ago it looked as if France had lost for a time its international influence on philosophical thought, the philosophy of Comte having been its last contribution. In a similar way the philosophy of Germany had already before that time, with the collapse of Hegelianism in its own country, ceased to exercise a leading European influence. In both countries philosophical thought seemed to have spent its creative power. Being at home fully occupied with criticising, assimilating, and modifying the new matter and novel ideas contained in those two great systems, it could not settle down and concentrate itself upon any definite and commanding idea. Each of these two systems had also bequeathed to the age that followed them a definite task which planned out the work for many minds and many years. This task was

\(^1\) Sorley, 'Ethics of Naturalism' (2nd ed., 1904, p. 332).
suggested by the historical spirit and interest in Hegel and by the social spirit and interest that dominated Comte’s system. In other respects the two systems which we are now accustomed to consider as respectively and specially characteristic of German and of French thought, acted differently upon the generation that followed them. Hegelianism suffered under a reaction, produced by the spirit of exact research, the scientific spirit; Comtism, itself a bastard child of this scientific spirit, made its influence felt first of all in England and only later in its own country, where, reimported under the name of Positivism—rather than Comtism—it has now become a generally accepted and stable trait of French thought.

In distinction from Hegel, Comte never professed to arrive at a monistic view. He always moves closer to facts, remains more in harmony with actual experience, and retains many of the dualisms which abound in the latter. Thus he emphasises the inherent difference of the mathematical and the biological sciences, he bases his sociological theory upon the existence of two distinct tendencies in human character, the egoistic and altruistic. Still more glaring are the contradictions which seem to exist between the earlier and the later phases of his philosophy, which prompted his followers and admirers, in several instances, to accept the one and reject the other, although the germs of the later developments in the ‘Politique Positive’ have been traced by attentive students in the earlier ‘Philosophie Positive.’ The existence of these dualisms in Comte’s philosophy induced his disciples to embark upon a search for a
unifying principle which would allow the phenomena of life to be mechanically explained and altruism to be deduced from egoism. To do this they had recourse to the principle of transformism, the potency of which had not been recognised by Comte himself. This led them to study more closely the philosophy of Evolution as it had been elaborated in this country by Darwin and Spencer.

The disciple of Comte who went the greatest length in this direction was Littré; but it was also much strengthened on one side by several eminent leaders in the natural and medical sciences, and on the other by two of the most brilliant writers of the last generation—Ernest Renan and Hippolyte Taine. They introduced the positive spirit into history, aesthetics, and general literature, cultivating fields of research such as Psychology and \( \text{Aesthetics} \), which had met with very insufficient attention in Comte’s own writings. They emancipated positivism from Comtism, from the letter and canons of its founder’s system, and it is doubtful how many of those who now so glibly use the term have ever read a line of the ‘Philosophie Positive.’

But for philosophical thought in their country, Renan and Taine did more than this: they were quite as much students of Hegelianism as of Positivism; they combined

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1 "Hippolyte Taine, encore dominé, à vrai dire, par des théories métaphysiques, telles que le monisme logique de Spinoza ou de Hegel, après être descendu analytiquement des signes aux images, des images aux sensations et de celles-ci à leurs éléments constitutifs, qu'il trouvait dans des sensations élémentaires, homogènes et imperceptibles, correspondant à des ensembles de réflexes du système nerveux, essayait, à partir de la sensation ainsi conçue, de reconstruire synthétiquement, sans rien emprunter qu'à l'expérience, tout le mécanisme de la connaissance." E. Boutroux in "La Philosophie en France"; ‘Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale’ (1908, p. 690).
in their personal, though unsystematic, creeds the three different forms of evolution, the more narrowly positive as it existed already in Comte, the naturalistic as it existed in Darwin and Spencer, and above and behind both, the larger spirit of development as we meet with it in Hegel. The latter they had learnt in the eclectic school of Victor Cousin, from which they retained the interest for historical studies, though they opposed its vague and rhetorical spiritualism. This school of historical and critical studies, extending over oriental as well as classical culture and literature, was likewise that which trained the later generation of thinkers in France, who infused into philosophy a new spirit and new interests, attempting to effect a fusion of idealism and naturalism through a larger conception of the evolutionary idea.

The three names of this later generation which have become, or are daily becoming, influential in moulding contemporary philosophical thought in Europe are: Alfred Fouillée (1838-1912), Jean Marie Guyau (1854-1888), and Henri Bergson. The two former come especially under the heading of this chapter, as their interest is centred in the ethical problem, which rises with them, as it had only tardily risen with Comte, out of the larger sociological problem. Comte recognised only late and incompletely the existence of Ethics as an independent science, and never that of Psychology as it had been cultivated by the introspective school in this country, and as it lay hidden as one of the most characteristic features in modern French poetry and fiction. But the strength of the two contemporary thinkers I
refer to lies just in this, that they base Ethics on Psychology, and that they depart still further from Comte in finding it necessary to seek for a foundation of Sociology, Ethics, and Psychology alike, in the reconstruction of Metaphysics. Both Fouillée and Guyau began their career with the study of ancient philosophy, Fouillée characteristically with that of Plato’s ideology, for which he retained a lasting appreciation, Guyau with that of Epicureanism in its ancient and modern expressions. The former never lost an idealism nourished by his early studies; the latter does not conceal the sceptical trait which pervades the eudæmonistic as distinguished from the stoical outrunners of the post-classical philosophy of the old world.

The principal novel conception which pervades Fouillée’s philosophy is this, that the ideas of the human mind (using the word idea in the larger sense of Locke and Berkeley) are centres of force, active elements. For these he had coined the term “Idées-forces.” With this conception he combats many of the older theories both in psychology and ethics. That the ethical problem is with him the central problem is shown by two of his earlier works, the treatise ‘La Liberté et le Déterminisme’ (first edition, 1872) and his ‘Critique des Systèmes de Morale Contemporains’ (first edition, 1883): both have run through many editions. The theory of the “idées-forces” or of the activity of ideas is the formula in which Fouillée gave expression to the conviction he had early arrived at, that the ideas of the human mind are not merely epiphenomena, passive reflexions of the physical process in the organism, as
they appear, *e.g.*, in the system of Spencer, but that from them proceeds an initiative, not only in the inner, but also in the outer life of the human mind. He further maintains that all psychical states, be they sensations, thoughts, emotions, or desires, are intimately connected, that they cannot be isolated and treated as independent elements of the inner life. He thus opposes likewise the older psychological atomism, maintaining that we feel, think, and react in every instant of our conscious inner life; only it may happen that, in this fundamental and united function, either feelings and emotions, or definite thoughts, or activities of the will, step into the foreground. In fact, "every state of consciousness, by reason of its proper intensity or of its force, tends to determine movements more or less intensive and extensive." Thinking, feeling, and willing are therefore always connected with some movement, and this is both an internal change and an external motion. The partial separation of thinking and motion, of thought and action, is acquired under the influence of education and culture both of the individual and the race. With children and savages this distinct separation is rare or altogether absent. Further, "every idea is an image and in consequence a 'Together' of recalled sensations and movements."  

Fouilleé begins his criticism of the Ethics of Natural-

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1 As already stated there is no equivalent in English for the word *ensemble*. Fouilleé is one of the most prominent representatives of the tendency of thought repeatedly referred to in these volumes, a tendency which I have defined as "the synoptic aspect of reality," and of which I have treated separately in two papers published respectively in the 3rd and 5th vols. of the 'Proceedings of the University of Durham Philosophical Society,' 1910 and 1913.
ism by showing that the systems both of evolution and of positivism are in need of a psychological complement. The earlier positivist view he identifies with the names of Littré and Taine, and characterises it in the following graphic manner: "Not to be surprised at anything, not to be indignant at anything, to understand everything; then when we have understood it to put the knowledge of laws to good use in order to control the phenomena; to guard ourselves against the return of harmful acts, as we guard ourselves against fire and water; to secure on the other side the return of useful acts as we prepare that of harvests which are to feed mankind; to realise, first of all, principles, in order to secure results, and, if these do not answer our expectation, not to blame the results themselves—things or men,—but to attack the causes and modify them; thus to reject the unchangeable Good of the philosophers, to be content with the true as wise men, and to be persuaded that the great Evil is error or ignorance; to reach the useful with the help of the true and to profit thereby; to enjoy at the same time the beautiful in the order of habit and custom as well as in the order of visible forms; to turn away from the ugly, to shelter ourselves from brutality and ferocity without hate or anger; to say to oneself that every being is that which it can be, that the tiger is according to the saying of a French positivist, 'a stomach which has much demand for flesh,' the drunkard a 'stomach which has much want of alcohol,' the criminal a 'brain which is infused with blood'; in the face of everything to preserve the calm of positive science, which accepts phenomena without abusing them, which classifies without con-
denning them, which does not know in mathematics propitious or fatal numbers, in astronomy, friendly or unfriendly stars, in meteorology, element or inclement skies; lastly, to steep our active power in the calm of contemplation, which is not indifference, and remember that, if the wise man observes, compares, experiments, this is not only in order to know but also to act,—this is the attitude which, according to French positivists as well as English evolutionists, man has to preserve in the face of nature and in the face also of humanity, if he wishes to know and put to profit reality, instead of following phantoms of abstract metaphysic or of blind mysticism.¹

In order to get beyond this purely contemplative, dispassionate, utilitarian or prudential point of view which reduces everything to necessity and leaves no room for free action, naturalism according to M. Fouillée requires a complement both psychological and cosmological. It has to recognise that this necessary process of evolution itself produces a new beginning, new centres of action, as soon as out of the chaos of inanimate and unconscious existence there emerges the world of ideas, of new moving forces. The ethical problem thus demands a psychological and metaphysical inquiry. M. Fouillée supplies this in his Psychology and Metaphysics of the Idées-forces.² These prepare the ground for the

² "L'idéal moral n'est pas une pure chimère si je parviens à lui donner une existence, d'abord dans ma pensée, puis dans mes actions, qui ne sont que ma pensée continue à travers mes organes et se propageant dans le monde extérieur. L'idée, étant l'action commencée, est efficace et productrice ; la pensée humaine peut devenir par elle, au sein du déterminisme même, créatrice d'un monde nouveau. Un disciple de Descartes et de Platon..."
ethics of the idées-forces, the subject of his latest publication.¹ Long before M. Fouillée returned again to the ethical problem which prompted his original speculations, another thinker of great originality, influenced by and connected with M. Fouillée himself, took up the ethical problem in a series of writings which combine originality and depth of thought with a marvellous power of literary
tout ensemble a dit: 'Dieu ne pense pas les choses parce qu'elles sont, mais elles sont parce que Dieu les pense'; à l'homme on peut appliquer cette parole' ('Critique des Systèmes de Morale,' p. xiv.)

¹ 'Morale des Idées-Forces' (2nd ed., 1903). The leading ideas of his ethics had been already expounded in a series of works, systematic, critical, and historical, of which the principal are the following: 'L'Évolutionisme des idées-forces,' 1890; 'La Psychologie des idées-forces' (2 vols., 1893); 'Le Mouvement Positiviste,' 1896; 'Le Mouvement Idéaliste,' 1896; all of which have appeared in several editions. In the preface to his latest work (p. iii.) mentioned in the text, he defines very clearly the position of his ethics as follows: "Ces théories peuvent se résumer, quoique d'une manière bien insuffisante, en quatre propositions essentielles: 1. l'idée-force de moralité est liée à la primauté de la conscience de soi: Je pense, donc j'ai une valeur morale; 2. l'idée-force de moralité crée des valeurs objectives et les classe: Je pense, donc j'évalue les objets; 3. l'idée-force de moralité s'actualise en se concevant: Je pense, donc je réalise l'idéal; 4. l'idée-force de moralité fonde la vraie société: Je pense, donc je commence à croire, dans et par la société humaine, la société universelle des consciences." Fouillée is well aware of the practical importance at the present day of a new and solid foundation of morality where all the older foundations are crumbling away: "Il est facile de prêcher la morale, a dit Schopenhauer, difficile d'en établir les fondements. La crise actuelle de la morale en est la preuve. Tout est remis en question: aucun principe ne parait encore solide-ment établi ou du moins à lui seul suffisant, ni celui de l'intérêt personnel, ni celui de l'utilité générale, ni celui de l'évolution universelle, ni l'altruisme des positivistes, ni la pitié et le nouveau nirvāna des pessimistes, ni l'impératif des Kantiens, ni le bien en soi et transcendant des spiritualistes; la morale du libre arbitre et de l'obligation semble près de disparaitre pour faire place à la 'physique des mœurs,' soit individuelle, soit sociale. On a écrit jadis des pages émouvantes pour montrer comment les dogmes religieux finissent: on pourrait en écrire aujourd'hui de plus émouvantes encore sur une question bien plus vitale: Comment les dogmes moraux finissent. Le devoir même sous la forme suprême de l'impératif catégorique, serait-il donc un dernier dogme, fondement caché de tous les autres, qui s'ébranle après que tout ce qu'il soutenait s'est écroulé?" (Preface to 'Critique des Systèmes de Morale Contemporains,' p. i.)
exposition enriched by a vein of genuine poetry: this was Jean Marie Guyau (1854-88). Like Fouillée, but some years before him, he began his studies in contemporary ethics with a criticism of the English school (1879). His first constructive effort which followed is characteristically an aesthetical treatise, with which we have already become acquainted in the last chapter, which dealt with the problem of the Beautiful.¹ He there treats of art from the ethical and social point of view. This treatise, which appeared in 1884, was immediately followed by a treatise on Ethics (1885), and then by one on the Philosophy of Religion (1887).²

In spite of the critical position he took up to the Ethics of Naturalism as developed in this country, Guyau was much influenced by the writings of this school. He has notably recognised the great difficulties which beset all naturalistic ethics—viz., that they fail to explain the facts of obligation and sanction, of 'the Ought' as distinguished from that which is. Similarly he recognises in all religious philosophy the difficulty of explaining or justifying the existence of a definite religion, with creed and dogmas, as the outcome of the religious temper or spirit. His method of meeting these difficulties, of solving the antinomies and dilemmas, the dualisms and paradoxes, is a much shorter one than that of Alfred Fouillée. It consists in eliminating them; he does not want to destroy morality or faith; he wishes to

¹ See supra, p. 113 sqq.
² The ethical works of Guyau are: 'La Morale d'Épicure et ses Rapports avec les Doctrines Contemporaines' (1878); 'La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine' (1879); 'Esquisse d'une Morale sans obligation ni sanction' (1885); 'L'Irréligion de l'avenir' (1887). All these works have appeared in many editions.
establish a morality without obligation and sanction, and to preserve the religious spirit without a positive religion; he proclaims, not the absence of religion or anti-religion, but Irreligion, the absence of a dogmatic or mystical religion, as the faith of the future.

The conception which Guyau places in the centre of his speculation is, as I have had occasion to state in the last chapter, the idea of Life. It is with him a moving and expanding principle. Ethics becomes with him the doctrine of the ways and means adopted of necessity by nature herself, in order to secure the growth, the greatest development of life. Moral conduct becomes with him identical with that kind of activity which furthers the expansion of life to its fullest extent. It is thus opposed to every narrowing conception, such as Egoism, and culminates in a highest virtue which is generosity. But in the same way as with Fouillée, for whom the active principle is inherent in the world of ideas, itself a product of natural development, so with Guyau, the active or propelling force is the principle of life, which rises out of the unconscious into the region of consciousness. Both thinkers thus reduce the process of evolution to the existence of a moving principle, inherent in the inanimate as well as the animated world, in the unconscious as well as the conscious regions of existence. While they emphasise the active side of the mind in opposition to the purely intellectual or contemplative, they are unable to offer an explanation of the difference of value which the human mind attaches to certain developments, such as the Beautiful
and the Good, as distinguished from their opposites. They have no definition of the highest Good, which seems to consist only in a process, be this set going by the motive power of the world of ideas or the propelling force of the principle of life. Both end by appealing to an ideal or 'the Ideal,' of which they can nevertheless give neither a definition nor an interpretation. With this view they come near to the position of other thinkers, such as F. A. Lange in Germany, or T. H. Green in England; perhaps without recognising that they entangle themselves in the same difficulties and dilemmas which we meet with in those other speculations.

The fact that there are psychological data involved in moral judgments and crystallised in certain current words and phrases which we continually use in everyday life, and can as little dispense with in the philosophy of mind as we can find room for them in the philosophy of nature, has prompted a school of thinkers in Germany to take up a purely descriptive or analytical position in Ethics, combining this frequently with historical studies: they propose to give a phenomenology of the moral consciousness in the individual as well as in the race. The beginnings of this, as I have already had occasion to mention, are to be found in the writings of Herbart and Beneke, which are accordingly now more frequently referred to. This school studies pre-eminently what it calls judgments of value as distinguished from judgments of fact, norms of conduct as distinguished from norms of thought, prescriptive laws of what ought to be, as opposed to constitutive laws of what is.
What is peculiar to the school is, however, the limitation to the purely psychological or anthropological aspect, the metaphysical being discarded. It is owing to this circumstance, to their distrust of metaphysics, that these thinkers show little sympathy with, and little appreciation of, the system of Lotze, which they mostly ignore. To Lotze, nevertheless, is due the merit of having for the first time clearly distinguished between the three seemingly independent, but interwoven, aspects which the world presents to the contemplating mind: the world of things or facts, the world of relations or laws, and the world of values or worths. Lotze is at the same time the first thinker who has coined a fairly comprehensive vocabulary wherein to express the doctrines of a science of value, or, as it has been more recently termed, of Axiology.

Although this school has opened out and is cultivating a new region in Psychology—a region in which individual and social interests, the ethics of morality and of legality meet—and has thus enlarged the aspect of one side of moral philosophy, it has not so far succeeded in establishing any new conceptions regarding the central ethical problems: the problem of Good and Evil, the problem of Duty and Obligation, the problem of Virtue and Happiness, the problem of Ends and Motives of conduct; nor is it likely that the purely descriptive, analytical, or historical method will take us any further as regards those fundamental questions. It is therefore not surprising that another direction of thought has sprung up which shows little appreciation for these purely descriptive, analytical, and historical
researches conducted in the dispassionate spirit of the natural sciences, extending though they do the meaning of the word nature so as to comprise the phenomena of the individual as well as those of the collective mind in society and history. This opposition to the Ethics of naturalism in the widest sense of the word, to the systematic as well as critical studies within the schools, has been vehemently proclaimed by a thinker whose teachings attained popular influence and renown long before historians and professors of philosophy condescended to take serious note of his writings. In fact the increasing attention latterly bestowed upon them is largely due, as was formerly the case with the writings of Schopenhauer, to this: that their influence, especially on young minds, has become clearly pernicious and alarming.

The thinker referred to, though we can hardly call him a philosopher,¹ is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-

¹ The influence of Nietzsche on European thought is quite as important as that of Schopenhauer, and more so than that of von Hartmann, but it cannot be satisfactorily dealt with in the History of philosophical thought; it belongs to that larger and deeper-lying region of what I have variously termed subjective, individual, or spontaneous thought, which is not reduced to any system or subjected to scientific, critical, or logical methods. The treatment of this region of thought should, according to the programme of this History, form the third and concluding section in which such names as Herder and Goethe in Germany, Victor Hugo and some of the great novelists in France, Scott, Wordsworth, Carlyle, and Ruskin in England, would stand out prominently, their works containing or revealing the origin of the characteristic traits of philosophical, and, in some instances, even of scientific, thought in recent times. To this class of thinkers Nietzsche likewise belonged; not least on account of the excellence of his style, which gives him a place in the general literature of the age and in the history of literary taste. So far as the strictly philosophical value of his writings is concerned, it seems to lie especially in this, that he has demonstrated the necessity of arriving at a definite creed or basal conviction on ethical and religious questions before a philosophical systematisation and application to separate philosophical problems can be
1900), who stands in a certain historical connection with Schopenhauer. From him he adopted the habit of unmeasured denunciation of the views and persons which he opposes, and a fundamental dislike for all that is traditional, conventional, and generally accepted. But whereas the line of Schopenhauer's thought found its consummation and end in his own teaching, beyond which no important step could be taken without abandoning the master's central position, the writings of Nietzsche, through their very absence of consistent reasoning and logical conclusiveness, have acted greatly as stimulants, and certainly have tended to reveal and make plain to ordinary readers the unsatisfactory and lifeless condition of the current philosophy of the day. Moreover Nietzsche has succeeded more than any other contemporary thinker in coining for his ideas watch-words and incisive expressions which have become attempted. That he had arrived at this, the sine qua non of all useful speculation, can hardly be maintained even by his greatest admirers, but he was in search of it. He belongs to that line of thinkers during the nineteenth century, beginning with Schopenhauer and represented, in the middle of the century, by Feuerbach in Germany, by Comte in France, and by Mill and Spencer in England, who had completely broken with that body of traditional Christian thought which lay in the background of the great idealistic systems, and contains still, in its core, the basal conceptions of the transcendental and spiritualistic schools, wherever they are to be found. In this quest for a new faith and a firm but novel foundation Nietzsche's writings deserve to be fully appreciated as a characteristic sign of the times. From being extolled mainly by ardent young minds, whom he not infrequently unsettled, and denounced by mature thinkers, he has risen to the position of being considered by some as worthy to be placed in the company of the small number of great original thinkers of modern times from which others, such as Lotze, Schleiermacher, and Spencer, have been excluded; thus, e.g., by E. von Aster in the important collection of essays entitled 'Grosse Denker' (vol. ii.). This contains an excellent characteristic of Nietzsche's thought, by Prof. A. Pfänder, dwelling mainly upon the successive stages in his mental development.
incorporated not only in German, but also in the languages of other European countries, rousing, especially young minds, to individual thought and action. He has tried to impress his age and the youth of his country with the conviction that something radically new is going to happen or is already happening, and that an understanding of, as well as a participation in, this new movement is a matter of individual effort, of ruthlessly sweeping away, not of patiently enduring, the evils of the day as well as the generally accepted methods for combating them. Thus it is not the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but the favouring of the selected few, which is to be of importance and value; not the elevation of the masses, which would end only in a general levelling down to mediocrity, but the existence and encouragement of exceptional ability and force, constituting what has been termed the "overman," which is to be the gospel of the future; in fact an accentuation and encouragement of the struggle for existence and the supremacy of the individual over the masses.

In coining and scattering broadcast these incisive phrases, Nietzsche not only showed his radicalism but also embodied ideas and tendencies which surrounded him, some of which were especially characteristic of his country and its recent history. Thus the alliance of radical and—as it seems to many—ruthless activity with essentially conservative and aristocratic leanings was to be found in Bismarck, the hero of the day: a real type of the overman. The impotence of democracy and of philosophical radicalism with its
socialistic proclivities to bring about what the German nation had written and sung about for two generations —the unity of the German empire—appeared in glaring contrast to the success of the policy of blood and iron; whilst the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, proclaimed by the Darwinians, found a ready response in the exaltation not only of individual talent, of the military virtues of courage and self-control, but also of individual ferocity and aggressiveness.

Thus we have two distinct and novel developments in the ethical province of philosophical thought in Germany, characteristic of academic and extra-academic, of professional and non-professional thinking: a differentiation which has made itself felt in German philosophical thought much more than in that of any other country in modern times. On the one side we have a new field of research, the general theory of value, a practical acknowledgment and appreciation of Lotze's idea of an independent realm of values or

1 "Nietzsche is most convincing when the *Uebermensch* is left undefined. Imagined as ideal Man, *i.e.*, as morality depicts him, he becomes intelligible; imagined as Nietzsche describes him, he reels back into the beast, and that distinction which chiefly separates man from the animal world out of which he has emerged, viz., his unique power of self-consciousness and self-criticism is obliterated" (H. H. Williams, Article, "Ethics," *Encyclop. Brit.*, 11th ed., 1910, vol. ix. p. 842). Besides drawing the extreme conclusions of a theory of natural selection which prompted T. H. Green on the other side to seek for a not merely "natural" explanation of the facts of morality, Nietzsche has the merit of taking special note of the difference of individual ability and occupation and of facing the question of practical morality. Once swept away the idea of equality of all men before a Higher Tribunal and the greater part of moral theory which deals with human nature in general and not with human nature as existing in different classes of society, in different peoples, nationalities, and races of mankind, becomes purely academic, particularistic, or parochial, and a relapse into the ancient difference of *Herrenmoral* and *Sklavenmoral* becomes almost inevitable.
Two theories of the Good: ends and duties.

worths; on the other we have a brilliant and emphatic proclamation of the claims of individuality and personality, of a phenomenon which in many modern scientific and economic theories has been pushed into the background and lost sight of. But neither of these two interesting lines of thought has really done much to attack the central ethical problem—the problem of the Good. This still stands before us in its two-faced aspect: first, the Good as a thing to possess or to strive for (Güterlehre); and secondly, Good as a predicate of human will and conduct (Tugend- und Pflichtenlehre) and of everything connected therewith: on the one side the purpose, on the other side the character of human activity. It is, however, perhaps not too much to say that this dualism, this twofold aspect of the moral problem, has been more clearly defined in recent ethical literature in Germany as well as in this country; it has been brought more closely home to the philosophical consciousness of the age. In this country the task has been performed, as I stated above, by Henry Sidgwick in his 'Methods of Ethics,'

1 During the last years of the century and since that time a large number of treatises on the subject of ethics have appeared in all the three countries, testifying quite as much to the interest taken in the subject as to its intricacy and to the inherent, as it seems to many, wellnigh insoluble paradoxes and dilemmas which reveal themselves to closer critical study such as has been started in this country by Sidgwick in the 'Methods of Ethics' and by Bradley in 'Ethical Studies.' The psychology of the moral sense is not so simple as it appeared before these two thinkers took up the subject, nor even as Paulsen has put it in the article referred to in the text. This must become abundantly evident to readers of German ethical literature in the important work of Prof. Geo. Simmel, whose 'Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft' (2 vols., 1892-1893) may be singled out among a great many other publications mostly belonging to the present century. Indeed there is perhaps a danger of casuistry forming too prominent a chapter of ethical theory.
and by some of those influenced by him, among whom I have specially noticed the lucid expositions of Professor Sorley.

Similar good work in clearing the atmosphere and bringing home to thinking readers of a larger class the ethical problems of the day, has been performed in Germany by several writers of eminence—by none better, as it seems to me, than by the late Professor Friedrich Paulsen of Berlin. Although more explicit than the two English authors just mentioned in the enunciation of his own ethical standpoint, which he has in fact expounded in a 'System of Ethics,' he nevertheless shows a very clear and impartial understanding of the two positions open to the ethical philosopher of to-day. Of this he has given proof in the latest of his writings: the chapter on Ethics contained in a volume entitled 'Systematic Philosophy,' which forms a section of a large encyclopaedic work with the general title of 'The Culture of the Present Age' (1907). In this short but well-filled chapter Paulsen shows that ethical philosophy, what I have termed the systematic treatment of the problem of the Good, may start from two independent facts—the fact of the Will, which strives to attain something; and the fact of the Ought, the obligation or duty imposed upon human action. The former beginning leads us to define the Good as the end of our actions, and in a more detailed treatise the Good would divide itself up into a number of separate goods or good things, corresponding to the many-sided nature of human

activity; the latter refers to an impelling or prompting force through which good actions are produced and regulated, the source out of which they flow: this is usually termed the feeling of duty or the moral conscience. Coherent systems of ethics can be constructed from either of the two beginnings; both have special difficulties to solve. The philosopher who starts with the contemplation of the end or ends to be realised by human action, must define these ends, and must further explain how it comes that they recommend themselves to the individual human will and become obligatory: the dicta of conscience. On the other side, the systematic thinker who starts with the facts of duty and conscience will have to explain not only what dutiful conduct consists in and what it leads us to, but he will also be confronted with the difficult task of assigning to the fundamental fact of moral conscience its meaning and origin, especially as it seems confined to the narrow region of human consciousness, which forms, after all, but a small, an almost infinitesimal part of the great visible world, the Cosmos.

The two positions thus clearly indicated by Paulsen have found representatives in modern German thought. Paulsen himself declares unmistakably for the former. According to him, Ethics is Güterlehre. He also explains that in the history of philosophy this is the older of the two, having found its first systematic exposition in the 'Nicomachean Ethics' of Aristotle. Paulsen also explains how what was originally the theory of the Good or of Goods, as the ends to be secured by moral conduct,
has in recent philosophy, under the influence of a deeper and wider view of the phenomena of Life, been developed into a teleological and energetic conception of the moral problem. This conception has received in Germany the name of Voluntarism. In this country it has, under the further influence of Professor William James, reacted upon the theory of knowing and being (Epistemology and Metaphysics), producing a special school of thought termed Pragmatism. The opposite school of ethical thought which starts from the sense of obligation and the conception of duty (Pflichtenlehre) has, according to Paulsen, its beginning—so far as European civilisation is concerned—in the Mosaic Decalogue. It has been deepened and enlarged in the moral code of Christianity, and has found its most adequate philosophical expression in the Kantian Ethics, or what is generally called the Critical school of Ethics. Accordingly we find that its representatives all more or less go back to Kant, who has elaborated the philosophical conceptions and fixed the vocabulary for this form of modern ethical thought.

In another recent German publication which aims at giving a view of the position of philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century, connecting itself with the celebrated name of the first comprehensive historian of modern philosophy, Kuno Fischer, a recent thinker, Bruno Bauch, deals with the ethical problem from a somewhat different point of view. He takes more note than Paulsen does of the subjective or individualistic tendency which threatens in Germany to destroy or subvert the traditional morality of common-sense, putting
in its place not the fatalism and indifferentism of a purely naturalistic teaching, but the extreme self-assertion of human personality culminating in what he terms the 'Immoralism' of Nietzsche. Both these tendencies, the naturalistic and the immoralistic, have—so we are told—to be combated by a critical examination of the data of the existing ethical consciousness. Such an antidote is to be found in the Ethics of Kant which start from the fact of obligation: the Categorical Imperative and the autonomous, i.e., self-restraining character of the human Will. It is interesting to note that Paulsen's Ethics are largely influenced by the conception of life, by a biological conception; whereas the representatives of the other school rest more upon historical studies such as have emanated from the idealistic philosophies of Germany. An intermediate position which aims at doing justice to the spirit of the natural as well as to that of the historical sciences, is taken up by Professor Wundt, so that the representatives of both schools in Germany are able to refer with approbation to his treatise on Ethics as a standard work.\footnote{Wilhelm Wundt, 'Ethik' \cite{Wundt1886} (trans. by Titchener, 1897).}

Professor Wundt is a foremost representative of voluntarism in Ethics as well as in general philosophy. He has moreover introduced into Psychology and Ethics a valuable idea which deserves special recognition and attention. As I have already had repeated occasion to remark in former chapters,\footnote{See vol. ii. p. 526, n., and vol. (1886; trans. by Titchener, 1897).} he makes the difference between psychical and physical phenomena this: that the latter consist only in a rearrangement of an unalter-
able amount of material, but that the former are characterised by what he terms a creative synthesis; the psychical or inner world is continually growing, whereas the physical world is ruled by the conservation of matter and energy or of what other primary elements we may assume. This conception, extended into the field of moral life, appears there as the "Law of the Heterogony of Ends," which signifies that acts of the Will produce effects which greatly extend beyond the impulses or motives that prompt them, creating hereby new values, an increasing manifold of the phenomena of moral life or of moral goods. Through this process there is created an objective world of morality or of ethical goods which themselves again react upon the individual consciousness. 1 By this conception and from this point of view the ethical philosopher is driven on to a study of the universal or collective mind as distinguished from the individual. A similar tendency existed, as we have had occasion to note, in the Hegelian philosophy: to seek and find the realisation of the ideal or spiritual forces in the historical creations of culture and civilisation. Similarly Wundt has been driven, by an independent course of thought, to the study of mankind, combining the interest in the more advanced products of culture with that for more primitive and elementary forms: the history of advanced societies and their culture with that of primitive peoples and their customs: Sociology and Anthropology in the widest sense of the word. In attaching great importance to these anthropological studies, the

1 Compare with this Fouillé's theory of the Idées-forces and Guyau's conception of Life as an expanding principle referred to above (pp. 257 sqq.)
ethics of voluntarism unite with the ethics of naturalism as represented notably by the later speculations and labours of Herbert Spencer and his disciples.

Neither is the opposite or the critical school in Germany content with founding Ethics on purely psychological data, on the intuitive facts of consciousness such as the feeling of duty and the moral conscience. Though this school holds firmly to the undeniable existence of these data, holding sometimes with Kant that they form a sufficient basis for the construction and maintenance of practical morality, it nevertheless desires to utilise these facts for the construction of a reasoned Creed or theory of the general Connection of Things, which should justify the conviction familiar to common-sense and confirmed by exponents of almost every school of thought, that the moral Ideal or the Good is not only the greatest concern of man and mankind, but that it also somehow reveals to us the nature of the truly Real, the spiritual Power which underlies and sustains everything. The ethics of the critical school thus lead to a religious conception; they did so with Kant and with most of his followers, though in very varied forms and versions.  

It may be well here to refer to the important work of Charles Renonvier in France, notably to his 'Science de la Morale' (2 vols., 1869), which is in the main a development of Kantian ideas attempting to lead out of the pure formalism of Kant's individualistic ethics to a practical system of morality by insisting on the fact that the moral idea is only possible in a community of free agents, i.e., in human society. In quite recent times, since the secularisation of public instruction and the foundation of the Écoles laïques, the teaching of morals has become a difficult problem; teachers in the primary and notably in the higher normal schools are face to face with the question: on what foundation moral teaching is to be placed, recourse to religious sanctions being discarded, or even prohibited? There remain then, as it seems, two distinct lines of thought, the one pointing to historical development of human culture in the spirit of Comte enlivened by the doctrine of evolution: the law of...
There is thus one trait common to both schools of ethical thought: both see the necessity of going beyond the limits of Ethics in the narrower sense as the doctrine of private morality; both seek a wider horizon, a larger or deeper view beyond that of the individual mind, its nature and interests. The great thing for systematic as for practical morality is, after all, to overcome, to lead out of, the Self. Anything less than this would, in the opinion of either school, hardly deserve the name of the Good, be it in theory or in practice. This way out of the self the naturalistic and evolutionist schools of Ethics find in the study and interests of Humanity, of the civitas humana, the human city; the critical and introspective schools attempt a further step: they hold that the real root of human good and goods is their spiritual nature, that the human is rooted in the Divine, the civitas humana in the civitas Dei.

We are then face to face with the two new problems of going beyond pure ethics.

progress is, as it were, that of a mathematical curve, or of a sidereal orbit, the future tracings of which have to be deduced from a formula or law established by past experience, Comte's idea of altruism gaining, with the aid of the intellect, the upper hand over egoism. Fouillée's doctrine of the increasing sway of ideal forces, and Guyau's doctrine of life as a propelling and expanding principle, represent various forms of evolutionist ethics. On the other side, we have the growing recognition of the necessity of referring to some ultimate and supreme moral law as the source and centre of appeal for righteous conduct. Kantian rigorism, as explained through Renouvier, is gaining increased attention, a new edition of his treatise having become necessary in 1908. Foremost thinkers in France, however, no less now than in time past, do not rest content with detaching morality from a religious or metaphysical creed. This is shown very emphatically in Renouvier's own later writings, it remaining doubtful, however, whether the somewhat fantastic character of his latest philosophy termed "Personalism," with its cosmological speculation, has not temporarily obscured the importance of his really great moral Treatise referred to. The earnest spirit which permeates so many articles in the 'Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale' testifies also to the felt necessity of spiritualising the moral teaching in the present age.
which have grown out of the problem of the Good and which lead back to it: the problem of Humanity or human society on the one side, the problem of the spiritual world, or the Spirit, on the other. The latter is the older of the two; for although the problems of human society have always been before the minds of law-givers, statesmen, and reformers, it is only since the nineteenth century began that the sciences of Sociology and Anthropology have received special attention and been placed upon an independent basis. The other problem, that of the Spirit, or as we may also call it, the religious problem, is, as has been said, much older, at least so far as its systematic and philosophical treatment is concerned. In fact it has been observed with some justice, that an exclusive occupation with things of another world, with transcendent problems, has at times unduly diverted the attention of foremost thinkers from the important questions which lie immediately in front of them; the solution of these having frequently been left in the hands of casual and untrained thinkers who, through premature conclusions, through startling, plausible theories, attained popular favour and passing notoriety. It is only since the great popular movement, which began with the Reformation and culminated in the French Revolution, has brought into the foreground the rights, the demands, and the interests of the masses, as against those of the aristocracy on the one side, and the literary and learned on the other, that a systematic attempt has been made to understand, to define, and to solve the social problem. In the two following chapters I shall accordingly deal with these two distinct problems, first with the older, and, as it seems to
many, the fundamental and more important problem: the problem of the Spirit. After we have learnt how philosophical thought in the nineteenth century has dealt with this problem, we shall be better prepared to deal with the second problem: the problem of human Society. For this has been considered by some thinkers to be soluble only after the former problem has been satisfactorily dealt with, whilst another and growing school of thought is labouring to place it upon an independent foundation as an inquiry to be carried on inductively by the combined methods of the natural and the historical sciences.
CHAPTER IX.

OF THE SPIRIT.

I.

Throughout this history it has been my endeavour to look at European thought from an international or cosmopolitan point of view. I have first tried to show how Scientific Thought has become more and more a subject of general and world-wide interest, national differences gradually disappearing, or, where they existed, contributing nevertheless to that universal body of thought which, at the end of the century, had become the property of all civilised nations. I have secondly shown how, to a lesser extent, though still very markedly so, Philosophical Thought during the nineteenth century emerged from the narrower limits of national or local interests or of special schools and became a subject of universal importance; the speculative interest being everywhere centred in the same definite problems. That this is so is not only the consequence of the increased facilities for intercourse and communication: it has been mainly brought about through the working of two marked tendencies.
which have, as we have seen, dominated scientific thought on the one side and philosophical thought on the other. These tendencies are the mathematical spirit and the critical spirit: there the exact methods of counting, measuring, and calculating; here the general canons of logical, philological, and historical criticism.

Nevertheless it is well to remark that this characteristic of universality, of cosmopolitan interest, has become less conspicuous as we have progressed in our review of the different problems which have engaged philosophical as distinguished from scientific thought. These problems have indeed been recognised everywhere as of paramount importance, but the recognition even of their existence has come about slowly and gradually in the instance of some of them, and still more slowly and gradually has the right manner of treating them been recognised. Thus, for instance, the problems of the soul, of knowledge and of the good, have all through the century occupied thinkers in all the three countries to which our survey is mainly limited; whereas the problem of reality and the philosophical problems of nature as a whole, and of the beautiful, have only quite recently become everywhere objects of systematic and methodical reflection. And further, if we have to note that it is only within the last generation that some of these problems have been everywhere admitted into philosophical treatises and systems, we are still more interested to see how much more the methods and points of view adopted by prominent thinkers belonging to the three nations vary with regard to some of the problems than they do with regard to others.
To begin with, Psychology, the science which deals with the problem of the soul, is now quite international, the contributions of European and American thinkers being speedily and easily absorbed everywhere; the Theory of Knowledge also is now studied and discussed much on the same lines, exhibiting everywhere similar differences or contrasts of view; English, French, and German thinkers have contributed equally to a correct understanding of the methods of the natural sciences and especially of their limits. In Ethics also the theological and anthropological views are represented everywhere. But when we come to Metaphysics and Aesthetics we find that much greater differences characterise the philosophical literatures of the three countries. Metaphysics has almost disappeared in Germany, its doubtful revival being of quite recent date; whereas Great Britain, and latterly France, can in recent times boast of an increasing and original metaphysical literature. On the other side aesthetics, as a philosophical discipline, is hardly as yet domiciled either in Great Britain or in France.

Coming now to the problem which will occupy us especially in the present chapter, the problem of the spirit, we find that national and local influences have here more than anywhere kept the philosophical literatures apart. The very name of the philosophical discipline which deals with this subject—viz., Philosophy of Religion—has only quite recently become current in French and English literature: in Germany it formed the central and most important subject of philosophical thought during the earlier half of the century. Even at the present moment it is considered diffi-
cult, and by some impossible, for thinkers of different nationalities to understand each other thoroughly in this innermost region of speculation. That this is so can be shown in various ways and explained through various causes. Among these it will be useful to take special notice of two, leaving out other and minor influences which have worked in the same direction. Of the two points I wish to refer to, the first concerns the words and terms of the language, the philosophical vocabulary in which the speculations I am now dealing with have found expression. The second is not concerned with the medium through which philosophical thoughts have to be communicated: it has to do with the actual historical interests which, in the three different countries, have formulated the problem in question. To give at least a preliminary definition of what I mean, and to help us to fix our ideas, I may say that what I refer to is the relation which, in each of the three countries, has existed between Philosophy and Theology, between traditional belief and free inquiry.¹

Now so far as the philosophical terms are concerned through which in the three languages and literatures I am dealing with, religious speculation has found expression, we have first of all to note that the word "spirit" has no complete equivalent either in the French or in the German language. The word "Geist" in German is used both in the sense conveyed by the word "mind" and in that conveyed by the word "spirit" in English. Thus Hegel’s use of the word in his system has been variously translated by the two English synonyms.

¹ See supra, vol. iii. p. 466 n.
The two German adjectives derived from the noun, "geistig" and "geistlich" correspond somewhat to the English "intellectual" and "spiritual"; "geistlich" being opposed to "weltlich" as "spiritual" is to "worldly." But the fact that the German noun refers equally to the intellectual and spiritual sphere of ideas is one of the reasons why religious (spiritual) and philosophical (intellectual) interests have not been kept strictly apart in German literature. This has led to much confusion and to misunderstandings, especially for foreign students.

It would lead too far were I to dwell with any completeness on these verbal differences; it may suffice to point out that they not only create a difficulty for the general point of view which I am everywhere trying to introduce, but indicate also an important difference in the positions taken up by German and English thinkers with regard to the problem we have in view. I will for the moment leave out of consideration the terms used in French philosophical literature when dealing with the present subject: this for reasons which will become clearer later on. And also in dealing with the second point mentioned above, the relation of philosophy and theology, we will confine ourselves for the moment to this country and Germany; for it can hardly be maintained that there has existed in France, during the nineteenth century, any prominent school of theology outside the confines of Roman Catholicism. Now, as far as this country is concerned, we have to note that there has not existed a science of theology as comprehensive and self-contained as we find in Germany ever since the end of the eighteenth
century. This does not mean that the religious literature in both countries has not been equally important and equally original, nor does it mean that there has not existed in both countries an equally original philosophical literature in which religious questions have been discussed. But owing to the fact that, till quite recently, theological as well as philosophical literature in Germany emanated from the universities, with their separate faculties, theological and philosophical studies were kept apart; with the result that the same subject, the problem of the spirit, or the religious problem, has been attacked from two distinct points of view and discussed in two distinct interests,—in the interest of the Church and in the interest of free inquiry. Accordingly we find in Germany two distinct literatures, a theological and a philosophical literature, both dealing more or less with the same problem,—the religious problem. In general, and until quite recently, these two literatures have marched separately and been cultivated without sufficient mutual recognition. We find that many theological works on Dogmatics treat of the same subjects as philosophical works under the title of Philosophy of Religion; we also find in German literature the remarkable fact that histories of philosophy for a long time took little or no notice of important philosophical speculations simply because they emanated from professional theologians and not from professional philosophers. Thus many important and

\footnote{Nor as it has existed in the Roman Church since the middle ages, having been systematised in the 'Summa Theologica,' and revived under the name of "Thomism" in Belgium, France, and Germany in the course of the nineteenth century.}
standard works on the history of philosophy at one time scarcely mentions the name of Schleiermacher, still less that of Rothe or of Ritschl, although each of these authors developed an independent and original principle in dealing with religious or spiritual phenomena. On the other side we find the religious speculations of Schelling, Baader, Weisse, and Lotze more or less exhaustively dealt with, though their knowledge of certain important regions of religious life and thought was much less comprehensive and thorough than that of the others. It is as well to remark that this particularistic spirit was not displayed only in this department of philosophic thought, but that it existed also in other

1 The progress towards a more general conception of the philosophical interest is nowhere more conspicuous than in the changes which have been introduced into the subsequent editions of that most indispensable historical work, the 'Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,' founded by Fr. Ueberweg (1862-1866), and re-edited on a broad basis and large principles by Dr Max Heinze. The fourth volume, containing the 'History of Philosophy since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century,' reached, in 1896, the tenth edition. The names mentioned in the text, together with many others formerly omitted, are now introduced, and their works adequately referred to. The more rigid division of the subject which kept philosophy and theology apart during the earlier portion of the century was probably largely owing to two distinct causes: first, to an opposition to the popular philosophy of the eighteenth century, and to a desire to introduce a strict method and logical discipline into the philosophical teaching at the universities; and, secondly, later on to a secret tendency nursed in the school of Hegel to transform theological into philosophical dogmatics, also to look upon the line of reasoning which runs through the idealistic systems as the true backbone of all philosophy, compared with which other speculations, naturalistic on the one side, theological on the other, have only collateral, but no truly systematic, importance. The latter tendency is probably most distinctly evident in Kuno Fischer's great History. It was, however, considerably mitigated in the later editions, and is, so far as one can see at present, gradually disappearing among those numerous scholars whom he inspired with a truly historical spirit. My friend, Pastor O. Zuckenschwerdt (Glasgow), remarks, however, that in Württemberg (Tübingen) philosophical and theological studies were always cultivated together.
departments, as shown, e.g., in the attitude which professional philosophers for a long time took up to the natural sciences. There also an opinion once prevailed that the speculations of professional naturalists were of little or no philosophical value, and might be disregarded. In the philosophy of nature, however, this attitude has entirely disappeared; some of the best philosophical contributions to the subject have of late admittedly come from the pen of physicists and naturalists; and even the more superficial speculations of the materialists in the middle of the century, and of Haeckel in recent times, now find a place in hand-books of the history of philosophy. Still more recently we find that professionally theological speculation is receiving more adequate recognition from professional philosophers. This more generous tendency goes hand in hand with the breaking down of that exclusively professional spirit which marks the strength as well as the weakness of German academic learning, and which, for a long time, prevented German philosophers from recognising, inter alia, the importance and originality of modern philosophy in foreign countries, especially those in which the academic system is less developed.

Of the great number of writers who have treated the religious problem in Germany during the nineteenth century there is only one who was equally equipped by disposition and learning on the theological and on

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1 A prominent example of this has already been given (supra, vol. iii. p. 519 n.). I refer to the philosophical writings of Fechner, who was not taken au sérieux by philosophers, except perhaps by Lotze, till his ideas fructified in the writings of Wundt and Paulsen, and his system was expounded by Lasswitz.
the philosophical side, who had, in fact, given as much attention to the religious problem, viewed from the side of the religious teacher, as he had given to it viewed from the side of the philosophic thinker. This was Schleiermacher. But the very fact that even he thought it necessary to keep the two aspects separate, as, e.g., in his Philosophical and Christian Ethics, did much to confirm that dual position in the treatment of the religious problem which is such a characteristic feature of religious philosophy in Germany. With this we may contrast the position of religious speculation in this country: here we find that fully one-half of those thinkers who have moulded the philosophical thought of their age and country were theologians. At the head of all stands George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, perhaps the greatest speculative genius which this country has produced; and only second to him in importance come names like Bishop Butler, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Reid, Dean Mansel, and James Martineau. No such array of important theologians exercising decisive influence upon philosophical thought can be shown in Germany, in spite of the very much larger number of original thinkers—both religious and philosophical—which that country can boast of. The theological profession has in this country never stood in the way of recognition of genuine and unbiased philosophical thought,¹ and it is perhaps not too much to say that the religious problem will never be ade-

¹ "En Angleterre... la théologie naturelle est une science chrétienne, qui sans elle languirait," classique qui n'est pas négligée (Charles de Rémusat, 'Philosophie un instant. Elle y est regardée Religieuse,' 1864, p. 4.)
quately appreciated and treated by thinkers who stand intentionally outside of the practical religious interest and life of their day and country. In this respect we only claim for such religious life and work the same recognition which we claim in other departments, denying—e.g., the right of discussing philosophically mathematical or legal problems to any one who has not moved to some extent in the sphere of these respective interests. This may make the task of the philosopher more difficult, but it is no reason to argue against the correctness of the observation.

For the development of philosophical thought the divisions which all along existed in Germany, the somewhat rigidly defined landmarks of the sciences and their sub-sections, have, however, been of considerable advantage. As human thought, be it scientific or philosophical, can only methodically advance through definitions and limitations, always running the risk of forgetting or losing the unity of its subject and the more comprehensive or synoptic view, we find that more progress has been made in Germany in dealing with our problem than either in France or in England. In the former country, till quite recently, the religious problem was, for political reasons, identified with the interests of the Roman

\[1 \text{ "En France, par exemple, la politique dispose en grande partie de la religion et de la philosophie; l'une ou l'autre est en crédit suivant que la politique est à l'espérance ou au découragement. De la vicissitudes des choses éternelles." (Rémusat, loc. cit., p. 3.)} \]

The influence of the political interest referred to in this passage is quite as evident at the present day, but shows itself in a different direction. The political secularisation of the whole of instruction in the graded schools of the country has provoked by contrast an enormous literature dealing specially with the ethical and the religious problem, and this as much by thinkers who aim at keeping the two interests apart as by others who think them inseparable.
Catholic Church. This position, whatever its defects may be, has at least this advantage, that it deals with a compact phenomenon, with an organised and unified body of thought.

In this country, on the one side, the religious problem has been attacked and treated by writers of all shades of opinion, possessing all possible qualifications; but none of their theories or discussions have combined in distinct schools of thought centred around prominent names. Each writer has generally been content to state his view independently, disregarding usually historical continuity and the opinions of friends as well as opponents. The historical and critical treatment of the problem has thus been very inadequate. To note that this is to a large extent owing to the preponderance of extra-academic thought and learning is only to repeat what I have had frequent occasion to mention in other fields of thought and research.

In trying, therefore, to attain to some clearness as to the progress of philosophic thought on religious matters one is almost compelled to follow the better defined lines on which such thought has marched in Germany. These

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1 This is fully confirmed, even in stronger terms, by the author of, so far as I know, the only history of our subject written in the English language: "The century now behind us has teemed with new ideas and fresh methods, and in some quarters it is closing in a mood of depression through our failure to secure a commanding and dominant result for Philosophy of Religion after so much mental activity has been applied to it. A survey of the past and a comparison of the methods which compete for our acceptance in the present may be the remedy needed by the tendency to Agnosticism, on the one hand, and the apparently chaotic advocacy of incompatible systems on the other." (Alfred Caldecott, 'The Philosophy of Religion in England and America,' 1901. Preface.) A glance at the body of the work and at the number of separate headings under which the different writers are classed is the most impressive proof of the correctness of the contention.
lines have been to some extent indicated already in the preceding chapters of the second part of this history. I will now enumerate them with special reference to the problem before us.

The first, and perhaps the most prominent, point of view from which the religious problem or the problem of the spirit has been studied during the nineteenth century may be termed the metaphysical point of view; it deals with certain truths commonly called spiritual truths; they have been formulated by dogmatic theology, and are termed spiritual truths to distinguish them from the truths of nature. They are, therefore, also termed supernatural truths. They are three in number—God, Freedom, and Immortality; to these must be added the fact of Revelation and the problem of Sin and Redemption. All philosophical speculation on these truths and facts has centred in Germany during the nineteenth century in the teaching of Kant, which other thinkers have either adopted, rejected, or modified. This teaching is based upon the peculiar position which Kant occupies in his critical and metaphysical writings.

The second point of view may be called the psychological; it deals with the manner in which the human mind approaches spiritual truths. It was provoked through opposition to Kant's doctrine, and may be, in its origin, identified with the names of Herder, Jacobi, and Fries, but it really centres, so far as all subsequent thought is concerned, in the teaching of Schleiermacher. It is remarkable that the first great contribution of German thought in the nineteenth century to the province of psychology was the doctrine of the independence of faith
or religious belief as a peculiar side of the inner life. This point of view deals not so much with spiritual truths as with the nature and essence of religion and spiritual life as subjective mental phenomena.

These two prominent positions, identified with the names of Kant and Schleiermacher, were taken up before the historical spirit and philological criticism had attained that great hold upon German research and learning which has been such a characteristic feature of them during the later and greater part of the nineteenth century. When this influence had been firmly established, a third point of view was gained from which to study religious and spiritual phenomena. From this point of view was conducted that enormous volume of research into the history of religion and of religious

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1 These two aspects of the religious problem may be identified respectively with the two terms Religious Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion. The distinction implied is analogous to that in ethics, which may be considered either as the exposition of a code of morality or as a doctrine and theory of the moral sense, the feeling of obligation. If, with Kant and others, we define the moral sense as the sense of obligation, and with Schleiermacher the religious sense as the feeling of absolute dependence, then a further question arises in both instances. In the first, the question would be: To whom or to what are we under the sense of obligation? in the second, on whom or on what are we absolutely dependent? And this question leads in both cases to a systematic or metaphysical treatment, whereas the investigation of the moral and of the religious sense is mainly psychological. In both cases we have a further and more recent development: the historical account of the moral and of the religious consciousness of mankind, and, following out of this, a tendency, rightly or wrongly, to decide as to the validity and value of moral and religious doctrine through an investigation of their origin and beginnings. It seems that in France Philosophy of Religion, as distinguished from Religious Philosophy, is of quite recent date, almost synchronous with the existence of the 'Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.' Earlier writings, such as de Remusat's little treatise on 'Religious Philosophy in France and England,' quoted above, identified religious philosophy with what is otherwise termed Natural Religion or Natural Theology, a philosophical treatment of fundamental religious beliefs.
institutions. Whereas the second view dealt mainly with the phenomena of individual and subjective belief, this new view deals with religions as objective phenomena in the life of civilised as well as savage nations and in the progress of culture; it deals with the spiritual life of humanity on a large scale. In this country these studies, since the time of Max Müller, have been known as Science of Religion.

These historical studies have been conducted from many sides and by adherents of very different and opposite schools of thought. All schools agree in maintaining that historical facts in great number and on a large scale must first be collected and correctly established, before any valuable inferences can be drawn. But in spite of proclaiming this purely inductive position, they have, without exception, had to start with certain preconceptions gained by theory or imported from other fields of research. Philosophical criticism has latterly been much occupied in showing both that such preconceptions have here as elsewhere existed, and what they have been. This produced a tendency to admit frankly that some principles and general points of view are required, and should be clearly stated and not tacitly or surreptitiously introduced. Thus has been brought about a reversion from the so-called historical method to logical, metaphysical, and psychological positions, with the desire to gain from them some basis or some well-defined lines on which the enormous accumulation of historical facts and details can be arranged and their significance estimated.

This tendency has gone hand in hand with other influences, and has led back to a study of the position
taken up by Kant. His philosophy—as we have had repeated occasion to observe—had a dual aspect: a purely intellectual and a pronounced ethical side. The latter had been forcibly and independently urged by Fichte with very definite practical results, but I have had occasion to show in former chapters how this practical and moral interest was pushed into the background by the intellectual or æsthetical interests which for a time supervened and dominated philosophical speculation during the first third of the century. It ended and in a manner collapsed with the romantic movement.

The greatest example we have of a re-establishment of the stricter ethical view in dealing with the religious problem in opposition to the purely logical and the freer æsthetical aspects, is to be found in Schleiermacher's later treatment of the subject as compared with the earlier, which is contained in the celebrated 'Reden über die Religion.'

All this indicates a fourth point of view, which we may call the ethical, gained by a union of the positions of Kant and Schleiermacher.

To this we must add a fifth aspect which has been urged from the side of psychology, but not of that older psychology which was known and familiar to Kant and Schleiermacher, the introspective analysis of the human mind. It has been urged from the side of that other and modern psychology which calls itself an exact or a natural science. Herbart started it in Germany in opposition to Kant, but it received its great development from the twofold influence of English psychology on the one side and of the mathematical and physio-
logical studies of Fechner and Wundt on the other. What this school has to say regarding religious life and phenomena is introduced through the conception of value. The fundamental psychological fact upon which ethical and æsthetical judgments depend is the value which the contemplating mind attaches to certain things and processes of nature, and still more emphatically to certain forms of human conduct. This conception admits of a spiritual as well as a naturalistic interpretation. It can be enlarged into the conception of a world of values or worths, of things which are valuable in themselves and deserve to exist as such. They may be conceived either—in the spirit of Plato—as ideals, as things of supreme worth which human beings have to accept as standards of judgment and aims of conduct, or, they may consist merely in norms or rules of conduct to be consciously or unconsciously abstracted out of the natural development of the human race and human society, in the same way as what we call laws of nature are gained by reflection and abstraction from the region of observed phenomena.

The former, the ideal or spiritual, view was in recent times distinctly proclaimed by Lotze, and has from him been introduced through Albrecht Ritschl into theological literature. The latter, or naturalistic interpretation of the ideas of value, forms a characteristic side of Positivism, and still more so of that recent school of ethics which has adopted the modern canons of development as established by the theories of descent and the philosophy of evolution.

We must now trace somewhat more in detail the
arguments and speculations which have been put forth from these different and distinct sides. They comprise the philosophical treatment of the problem of the spirit or the religious problem.

Recent studies in Kantian philosophy, notably those of the late Professor Paulsen of Berlin, have emphasised the fact that Kant's primary interest in the whole of his philosophy was a religious interest, the reconciliation of faith and knowledge, of religion and science.¹ This is acknowledged, as Paulsen has shown, not only by those who with him esteem the labours of Kant, but also by those who condemn him, be it that they, with Haeckel, consider that Kant has sacrificed the philosophical to the religious, or, with Willmann, that he has sacrificed the religious to the philosophical interest.² The religious interest for Kant

¹ See supra, vol. iii. pp. 340-342, and especially the quotations given in the notes.
² The following extract from Paulsen's Introduction ('Immanuel Kant,' 4th ed., 1904, p. 8 sqq.) is interesting, and may serve in the place of fuller references to the two writers named in the text: 'The negative dogmatism or naturalism with its verdict on Kant is represented in our times by E. Haeckel. In his 'Welträtsel' Kant appears as the genuine representative of a retrograde academic philosophy which coquettes with the supernaturalism of an obsolete clerical belief; depending upon the latter in order to find in the dark regions of transcendental philosophy a hiding-place from the intruding natural sciences, the ultimate compelling motive being found in a regard for the 'powers that be,' who see in pure truth, as naturalistic monism teaches it, a danger for the State or for their own governing position; 'the fear of the Lord,' not of the Heavenly One, is considered to be the original source of a favoured 'dualism'; as also Kant is said to have been brought, in his later days, to reintroduce the three main spectres—God, Freedom, and Immortality—after having, in his younger days, already recognised the truth of 'Monism.'... Not less contemptuous is the verdict of positive dogmatism. Especially scholastic philosophy, roused again into a semblance of life, directs its many-voiced chorus of attack against the critical philosophy as the root of unbelief and of all evil. Criticism as the fundamental form of subjective, erroneous, and destructive idealism is contrasted with Thomism as the fundamental form of constructive idealism.
reduced itself immediately to a philosophical interpretation of the three verities of the traditional Protestant religion of his age, the existence of the Divine Being, the Freedom of the Human Will, and the Immortality of the Soul. Although Kant did not enter upon a psychological analysis of the difference between the way in which material and supernatural truths are known to us, he instinctively appreciated that these entered a twofold order of ideas distinguished by him as empirical and transcendental. The former had its origin entirely in the world of the senses, the latter in the original constitution of the reflecting mind, the former supplying the material, the latter the form of knowledge. By this formula Kant acknowledged the correspondence of Locke's position, as well as of that of Hume.

Thus goes nearly to William in the third volume of his History of Idealism. The history of philosophy is there represented according to the following scheme. From the ascending branch from Plato to St. Thomas, we have an ever newer and deeper development of pure idealism which counts these ideas as the separate constructive principles of reality. What Thomas assumes the mind is gained. Then comes with the invasion of narration the descending development, followed by the fall of the Reformation which made Turner on an Anglicizing and Romishing. In the philosophy of Kant the spirit of negation has found a most perfect expression in forming the opposite pole of Thomism. On it the idealism hinged its last consequences and the subjectivity of all real principles. The

This page seems to be cut out and fragmented, making it difficult to read.
In the well-known dictum of the latter, in which he opposed Locke, we have the first terse and pregnant expression of a truth of common-sense which is continually overlooked in science as well as in everyday life—viz., that one cannot have a spectacle without a spectator.

The interests of science as well as those of common life are frequently better served by regarding only one side of the dualism, or by regarding the two sides alternately; but it is the object of philosophy, *inter alia*, ever and again to remind us that in reality the two sides are always present, that the twofold order of things inherent in the human constitution is indissolubly intertwined. It is perhaps not too much to say that the whole of nineteenth century philosophy is an attempt to give a clearer expression to the fact that this twofold order exists, and further to support the conviction that this dualism is resolved and has its source in some initial and underlying unity.

In the first of his three 'Critiques' Kant lays bare the intellectual process, showing that sensuous knowledge is alone constitutive, and that the transcendental element only comes in as a unifying and regulative principle. But what is a matter of mere order and arrangement in the intellectual process of the human mind becomes a constitutive principle in the sphere of action and moral conduct. In this sphere the transcendental or higher order asserts itself, not only as the rule or formula of existence, but as a distinct command or law: what Kant termed the categorical imperative, the fact or sense of moral obligation.
It was the latter part of Kant's doctrine which not only attracted a large number of his followers and disciples, but also gave it special value in the eyes of Schiller and Fichte, who were the first to attempt a further development of Kant's teaching on original lines. Unfortunately, however, Kant had not put the dualism which is inherent in the human aspect of things quite in the right light. This dualism, in the course of further criticism, especially through psychological analysis, has been more correctly expressed than Kant was able to express it.

We now understand that the twofold aspect is owing to the difference of what may be termed external sensations and the inner sense of a combining unity. Now, although this distinction, which has been much more rigidly adhered to in British philosophy, was recognised by Kant, it was unfortunately mixed up with another distinction which tends to obliterate it, and to shift the whole problem on to a different ground.

This second formula was introduced into Kantian philosophy from the Leibniz-Wolffian school. It is the supposed difference between a sensible and an intelligible world or, as Kant expresses it, between the phenomenal and the noumenal order of things. This distinction implies that there are things of which we can become immediately cognisant through our senses, and that there are other things which we know of only mediately through thought, and it was accompanied by the tacit assumption that the former things constitute, as it were, a lower order as compared with the others which constitute the higher order of things; thus in-
Introducing a difference of subordination in the place of that of co-ordination. In the course of subsequent thought and analysis it has become gradually clear that the difference is not one of higher and lower, nor of more or less certainty, but that the difference is one of exactness or of definition.

Some of our sensations appear to be localised in space, and are accordingly capable of greater definition and exactness. They form a large portion of what we term the experience of our outer or bodily senses. Compared with these, the remainder of our experience of the outer or bodily senses, as well as the whole of the experience of our inner sense, is less defined and less permanent, but all experiences are equally immediate and self-evident: in fact, they together form our world of experience or the phenomenal world; all that we know of reality. Neither of the two, neither the defined nor the undefined, ever occurs alone: they are continually inter-mixed, forming, as it were, the warp and woof of our mental structure; and it is only for very special purposes that we pluck them asunder.

The object of science and philosophy being to make things clearer, more definite and communicable, progress depends to a large extent upon eliminating, in our picture of the world, those traits which are not capable of exact definition, reducing the actually knowable more and more to a small number of exact and well-defined differences.¹

¹ It is a process of selection which begins in our infancy with the aid of memory, attention, and intersubjective intercourse. These break up what James Ward terms "the original continuum of presentations" (sensory and motor), and William James the "stream of
This process was first introduced in the mathematical and dynamical sciences, and in the more or less successful attempts to reduce other branches of natural science such as acoustics, optics, thermotics, electrics, chemistry, and biology, to a study of mechanical processes, which possess merely quantitative (easily measurable) in the place of qualitative differences. It went hand in hand, in the region of psychology, with the distinction of primary and secondary qualities: the former, such as size, figure, and resistance being measurable, more permanent and objective, as compared with the latter, such as colour, sound, and heat, which are subjective and difficult to fix. Being objective, i.e., the same or similar to different observers, the former acquire the character of greater reality, whereas they only possess, in the world of our experience, more definiteness, more stability, and more permanence; they can also be easily reproduced in diagrams and models and recalled by the powers of memory. All these advantages make them more thinkable or intelligible, for they do not disappear so easily out of our mental field of vision as the sensations of colour, heat, taste, smell, or the numerous and ever-changing inner sensations, such as those of effort and emotion.

Thus it came about that the so-called primary quali-

thought." With most persons this breaking up of the original synoptic aspect, the primary self, is carried as far as intersubjective communication with other persons through the aid of language, and the interests of life and practical work make it necessary. Science only carries this process a step further through what is termed "analysis and synthesis" of ideas, using ideas in the sense of Hume. This process of analysis or synthesis reaches perfection only in the notions of number and space, and in the sciences that work with these notions.
ties were looked upon as the true characteristics of an objective and real world, whereas the secondary qualities were looked upon as the evanescent, changing, and subjective appearance of this real world. Now for those who believed in spiritual realities, i.e., in a higher super-sensuous region of things, it became necessary in some way or other to explain the relation of this super-sensuous world to the actual world with which mathematics and mechanics are concerned.

As Paulsen has clearly shown, two views existed when Kant approached the problem—the view of the mathematicians, headed by Newton and more or less adopted by English philosophers, and the view of the metaphysicians, headed by Leibniz.

The first view considers time and space (these being the quantities with which mathematics and dynamics operate) to be the actual receptacle of things. The second view looks upon time and space, not as actual things, but only as relations between things. This latter view is intolerable to the scientific mind; but it allows us to reduce reality to something quite different beneath and beyond the apparent forms of existence, and this may, in thought, be identified with the supernatural. It thus saves the great spiritual verities, relegating them to an order of things which we can think but not directly experience.

The other, or mathematical view, made natural theology impossible, or reduced the theistic conception of the Divine Being to a sort of pantheism, which collapsed before the scepticism of Hume.

1 'Immanuel Kant' (4th ed., 1904, p. 171 sqq.).
These being the two views which Kant found current in the philosophy of his predecessors, he set to work to reconcile them, his object being to vindicate the belief in the supernatural (or what he terms the transcendent) whilst at the same time admitting the correctness of the mechanical or mathematical view. The reconciliation is attempted by the celebrated doctrine of the ideality of time and space, i.e., the view that time and space are the necessary forms inherent in the human intellect in and through which it arranges and conceives the manifold data of the senses. Being inherent in the human mind, the science which deals with the forms of time and space is a necessary science; necessary to us thinking beings and inseparable from our knowledge of external things which we see only in and through them. At the same time this view, which implies the subjectivity or unreality likewise of the primary qualities, leaves over, as the real but unexplained kernel of reality, the conception of a something which we can only think but not describe: the “thing in itself,” the celebrated X of Kantian philosophy.

This conception of a “thing in itself,” incorrectly

1 "The two discarded views are those through which Kant himself had passed. . . . He stood originally in the position of German metaphysics: space an empirical conception, abstracted from the relations of external things. He then went over to the second view (Newton-Clarke): space the pre-existing form of the physical world. This view, which he still distinctly defends in 1768, he suddenly drops, evidently as metaphysically insupportable, and places himself in the new position: space and time are a priori forms of the physical world (as Newton has it), but, together with the physical world, existent only in the sensuous aspect, which was really also Leibniz' opinion, as Kant himself remarks." (Paulsen, loc. cit., p. 172 n.)
extended to the conception of "things in themselves," has dominated a large portion of German speculation ever since Kant. It has never been really accepted as a workable view either in England or in France. It has indeed cropped up in English philosophy in the "Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer, where it was arrived at by a different line of reasoning, but—be it noted—likewise in an attempt to reconcile science and religion.

Many of the arguments directed against Spencer's position are merely reproductions of the polemics directed nearly a century earlier against Kant. There are, accordingly, some opponents who maintain that it is illogical to speak of the existence of an unknown thing if you really know nothing whatever about it, for its existence can only be known to you through some kind of property or relation. There are others who maintain that this underlying ground or kernel of reality, though unknown so far as the outer world is concerned, is not unknown to us so far as our own subjective or inner world is concerned; for we ourselves are not only a succession of sensations, but are conscious of the connection, unity, and continuity of that succession. This view (which for a moment would pass through an impracticable and untenable solipsism) is at once expanded into the conception of a larger consciousness which embraces other minds besides our own; as we exist and think to a large extent only in, through, and with them.

A third class of thinkers deny the correctness of the whole reasoning, be it the older of Kant or the
more modern of Spencer, and think it necessary to revert to a deeper psychological analysis. The last is probably the position now most generally accepted, but it was not the position which found favour in the great systems of philosophy which succeeded Kant in Germany. There, the second way out of the difficulty was taken in two characteristic attempts to get out of the dilemma which had been created by Kant. In both instances a direct answer is given to the question: What is the "thing in itself," the kernel of all reality? But this answer is not arrived at by a logical process or by demonstration, nor is it maintained that such a demonstration is possible. The answer is gained by what Lotze has termed a resolution of the character, by a moral or an intellectual effort.

Fichte expressed this clearly when he said that the choice of any man's philosophy depends upon what kind of man he is. Thus it is with him an intellectual intuition.

With Schopenhauer, who was certainly much influenced by Fichte, it becomes a scientific hypothesis. In stating boldly that the principle of reality is "the will," he professes to have taken the last and only step which is possible when one has once gained the Kantian position.

The whole of Schopenhauer's philosophy becomes then an illustration or a series of illustrations through which the hypothetical answer he has given is made plausible, brought home to his readers, and after the nature of any and every scientific hypothesis, made useful in explaining the manifold phenomena of
physical, mental, and moral life and the creative activity exhibited in poetry, the fine arts, and music. It is certainly an irony of fate that the thought of Schopenhauer, which reduces all reality to will and effort, was doomed to lead to a purely contemplative system, ending in quietism, pessimism, inaction, and despair; whereas the intellectual intuition of Fichte and Schelling was further on developed into the great intellectual system of Hegel which, be it tenable or not, has certainly been most fruitful in suggesting, promoting, and guiding an enormous volume of strenuous mental labour and research, with far-reaching consequences in practical life.

We must now ask, How did the religious problem, the problem of the spirit, fare in this intellectual revolution which centred in Kant? If we view the peculiar development of religious speculation in Germany from an English point of view, we may divide it, as I have hinted above, into two separate lines of thought promoted by different interests — the theological and the philosophical interest. The movements coincided in two points, they both strove after an independent scientific expression, a systematic and teachable body of doctrine, and they both aimed at a spiritual deepening. But, corresponding to the two meanings which the German equivalent for "spirit" has, this deepening was attempted in two ways. On the one side we find an effort towards what one would term in English a spiritual revival, corresponding somewhat to the religious revival which took place in this
OF THE SPIRIT.

country on a large scale through John Wesley in the latter half of the eighteenth century and somewhat earlier, on a smaller scale, through the rise of Quakerism, with its peculiar doctrine of the inner light.

But as a spiritual revival in Germany meant not only what it means in this country, but also something else, we have a second and independent movement. In the eyes of a great many of its protagonists abroad it meant an intellectual and poetical (not a specifically spiritual) deepening, and this corresponds on a very much larger scale to what was attempted in this country in the course of the nineteenth century, mainly under the influence of Coleridge; earlier beginnings, such as the Cambridge Platonists and the Noetic school of Oxford, having had little permanent effect.

These two movements, both directed against the shallow, dried up, prosaic formalism of popular philosophy and theology alike, had independent origins, and marched almost completely apart till they were united in the personality of Schleiermacher who, as already stated, formed the centre of all religious speculation in Germany after the decline of the Hegelian influence.

In time the intellectual revival was earlier; it was certainly much more conspicuous; it covered a much larger ground, absorbed influences from many quarters, from England and France, from Holland and Switzerland, from Italy and Spain, as also from the East, and found an expression not only in philosophical but also in other lines of teaching, being represented not only by academic learning, but also in the poetical literature.
of the nation. It has been called by some the romantic \(^1\) movement on the larger scale.

The different cross-currents which made up this very complex movement may be distinguished by referring to the different extraneous influences which bore in upon German thought during the period of its awakening to independence after the end of the religious and political wars which had devastated the country and decimated the population during the two centuries that followed the Reformation.

There was, first of all, the mechanical view which tended to look upon nature, including the human organism, as a mere machine; this view had to be combated by an opposite view which looked upon nature and life as a divine unfolding; it was propounded in many variations and was accepted in different forms, but it found its most congenial philosophical expression in the philosophy of Spinoza, which came to be studied through the influence of Lessing and Jacobi and Herder. It was a view which lent itself not only to philosophical but also to poetical interpretation, and was thus wide-

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\(^1\) This use of the term "Romantic" in the larger sense is characteristic of the view we meet with in 'The Periods of European Literature' (edited by Prof. Saintsbury), and is explained there by Prof. Vaughan in the Introduction to the very excellent tenth volume entitled 'The Romantic Revolt.' The "Period" begins with the deaths of Voltaire and Rousseau, 1778, and ends in the eleventh volume (by Mr Oman, 'The Romantic Triumph') with the middle of the nineteenth century. For Continental students of the history of literature, this broadening of the term so as to comprise, not only some very unromantic writers, but notably also the whole of what is termed the Classical School in Germany, is most inconvenient and misleading, as it obliterates what is there considered to be the principal trait of romanticism. I have, therefore, confined the use of the term in these volumes to the narrower sense. (See \textit{ante}, vol. i. p. 84 n.)
spread, especially among the creative intellects which regenerated German literature and art. For some of these it marks probably only a passing, though an important, phase of their mental development. The pantheism of Spinoza lends itself readily to a poetical interpretation; it stands on a higher level than the mechanical view which represents the Divine Being, at most, as an artificer who stands outside of his creation; but it has no room for the ideas of personality, individuality, and freedom, and still less has it an understanding for the facts of sin and redemption: it harmonises with the classical but hardly with the Christian ideal. It taught the immanence of the Divine Spirit in the whole of creation and, as such, inspired poets and thinkers alike, but it had no comprehension for the transcendence of the Divine personality, and yet this was ingrained in the thought of the age through the historical religion with its Divine Founder and the conception of the moral law as a divine revelation.

The many attempts which were made under the influence of Spinozism to establish a monistic view yielded again and again to the deep-seated conviction, characteristic of Christian thought, that for us human beings there exists a twofold order of things: the natural and the spiritual or moral order; that the divine is revealed to humanity not only in nature but independently also through the immediate working of the spirit in the individual and historical life of man.

Thus we find that for various reasons thinkers like Fichte, Schelling, and still more Schleiermacher, in their later speculations, emancipated themselves from the all-
absorbing influence of the pantheism of Spinoza. In many instances this led to a renewed appreciation of the philosophy of Leibniz which recognised the twofold order of things, the truths of nature as well as those of grace, and ever strove for a reconciliation.

Thus we may point to a second and independent influence which made itself felt apart from that of Spinoza and which was akin to the spirit of Leibniz’ philosophy,—this was the historical interest, the idea of development. The philosophical system in which this was most intimately combined with the monistic and pantheistic spirit of Spinozism was the system of Hegel. His most original work, ‘The Phenomenology of the Mind,’ is hardly intelligible if we conceive the spiritual element merely as a divine order in the manner of Fichte’s earlier writings, still less if we conceive it as an indifferent identity or absolute in the manner of Schelling in his earlier speculations; we are bound to conceive this spiritual factor as a personal self-conscious activity, and to combine with the pantheistic idea of the Absolute the theistic conception of a personal Deity. But the difficulties inherent in Hegel’s style and exposition are much enhanced by the fact that the word “Geist” can be understood in an impersonal as well as in a personal sense; and indeed, in the further developments of his philosophical principle, both sides, the personal and the impersonal, are continually interchanged and employed for the explanation of the conscious processes of the individual mind on the one side and of the unconscious workings of the objective mind on the other.
A third influence which made itself felt alongside and independently of the abstract intellectualism and the refined aestheticism of the leaders of German thought after Kant, was the movement in the direction of popular education, which had independent beginnings. It came into Germany from Switzerland, where the educational spirit of the Reformed Church was as strongly marked as it was in Scotland, while, in Switzerland, it had been enlivened and tempered by the love of nature and the sympathy with the common people so characteristic of Rousseau's writings. The great exponent of this realistic spirit was Pestalozzi.

A distinct movement actuated by a similar popular spirit had already existed for the greater part of the eighteenth century in North Germany: it was that started in Halle through the labours of Spener and Francke and in the educational establishments which they founded. It grew up in the bosom of the Lutheran Church, and was identified with the evangelical section termed Pietists.

Later in the eighteenth century there spread from the same neighbourhood a realistic educational movement under the name of Philanthropinism. Though its founder, Basedow, was an eccentric person, the movement soon counted a large number of important educationalists: it produced, as did likewise the school of Pestalozzi, a large and important educational literature.

All these three movements combined together in a general reform, a deepening and uplifting of popular education. They were at one in their practical and moral tendencies. They all three breathed a genuine
religious spirit, though this was, in the school of Pestalozzi, more spiritual and sympathetic, in that of Basedow more practically ethical. The great representatives of all the different shades of this movement disliked the formalism of clerical teaching and the tyranny of priesthood, to which they opposed the warmth of true religious feeling as well as a practical and moral good sense. But they were also distinctly averse from evaporating the simple truths of Christianity in an abstract intellectualism or a refined aestheticism. They stood outside of the learned schools, and their classical ideals; in their appreciation of the new philosophy they did not go beyond Kant's ethical and Fichte's popular writings. Thus, in the general literature of the age, they probably found themselves in more agreement with Lessing, Herder, and Jean Paul than with Goethe and the philosophical writings of Schiller; but they had not only an important poetical literature after their own taste, with such names as Gellert, Claudius, and Hebel; they assimilated also a truly artistic element through the great importance which was everywhere attached to musical instruction, to a thorough acquaintance with the large German hymnology and the great compositions for the organ,—in fact, sacred music was for them a great educational instrument.

Compared with the practical solution which this widespread school of popular educationalists gave to the religious problem, the metaphysical treatment which the latter received in Kant's transcendentalism and in the systems of his followers appeared abstract and uncongenial, deficient in warmth and emotion, appealing
to the understanding and imagination rather than to the feelings and the heart. Being as such useless for the purposes of popular education, it brought about a widespread but fatal tendency to regard the religion of the more highly educated and academic classes as something different from the religion of the people. As the whole of the religious teaching of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel amounted in reality to little more than an interpretation or a metaphysical paraphrase of the Christian verities, which were accepted in a symbolical or metaphorical sense, it was inevitable that one of the principal articles of Christianity—viz., that it is a religion for all men alike, the high and the low, the poor and the rich, the learned and the simple—was in danger of being lost. It meant the sacrifice of the true catholicity of Christian faith and doctrine as it lived in its Founder and His Apostles.

This view found a philosophical formula in Hegel's 'Philosophy of Religion': there the view was distinctly upheld that religion was a necessary and important, but not the highest, stage of mental or spiritual development; that the latter had to be sought and found in philosophy. At the close of his lectures on the 'History of Philosophy,' Hegel himself says:

"The highest aim and interest of philosophy is to reconcile thought, the idea, with reality. Philosophy is the veritable theodicy, compared with art and religion and their sentiments,—the reconciliation of the mind, indeed of that mind which has grasped itself in the freedom and wealth of its reality. It is easy otherwise to find satisfaction in subordinate regions of intuition and feeling."
This abstract position which Hegel's philosophy took up in dealing with the religious problem was further emphasised by two characteristics of his system. That system started, indeed, with the idea of showing how everything was the working of the Divine Spirit, which unfolds itself in a great variety of forms in nature, mind, and history. *Prima facie*, therefore, it supported an eminently spiritual or religious view of things, and there is no doubt that it attracted for a time many young and ardent minds, who were tired of the formality and prose of the traditional teaching of rationalists and of orthodox alike. It seemed to be the veritable solution of the problem of the spirit. It must also have been considered as a great advantage that this spiritualising and deepening process of thought was carried out by a definite teachable method, the dialectical method. This first impression was strengthened through the personal influence which Hegel's Lectures had upon his hearers. They witnessed the wrestlings of a powerful intellect with the highest problems which the human mind can set to itself; they were shown the solution — or at least the road to the solution—of the supreme difficulties which had in that age again begun to trouble and harass thinking and believing persons; they met with a promise that the real truth of the Christian dispensation, the aspirations of the Reformation and the Revolution, should be intelligibly explained, confirmed, and harmonised. To this must be added the fascination created by the mystical element which pervaded all Hegel's writings and the prophetic tone of his oral teaching. When,
however, after Hegel's death, a younger generation began to criticise and examine more closely the actual structure of the system and the method of its dialectic, it was found that the latter was a purely logical process, operating with the most abstract categories of thought, and enlivened only by side glances at, and interesting excursions into, the large expanse of real life which Hegel's encyclopedic mind had always in view and at its command. Under the hands of many of his disciples and followers the dialectical process was reduced to a dry logical scheme, to a monotonous repetition of a soulless rhythm; whereas real fruits and results were harvested by those who, dropping the logical skeleton, threw themselves into historical research and the study of facts, where they gradually forgot the abstract formulae with which they had started. This purely logical substructure of the system became more prominent through a further characteristic defect: the absence of a specifically ethical teaching, of an adequate treatment of the moral problem which had been such a marked characteristic in Kant's philosophy, and also in that of Fichte. All this had the result of creating a reaction against the purely logical tone, the panlogism of Hegel, in favour of a more realistic and sympathetic, if also less imaginative and fanciful, treatment of the great philosophical problems, notably of the moral and religious problems. The reaction was assisted by that great volume of critical and historical, of psychological and anthropological research to which disciples and opponents of Hegel contributed equally.

The earliest opposition to the purely intellectual and
metaphysical treatment\(^1\) of the spiritual problem was started by F. H. Jacobi soon after the publication of Kant's first "Critique." In his "Letters on the

\(^1\) Considering the enormous influence which Kant's teaching had, not only in philosophy but also in general literature, and especially in theology proper, it may appear as if sufficient had not been said in the text about Kant's actual philosophy of religion. For this there are two reasons. The first is that Kant's peculiar attitude to the religious problem belongs entirely to the eighteenth century, and loses much of its importance with the beginning of the nineteenth, quite a new aspect having been established in the last year of the eighteenth century through the appearance of Schleiermacher's "Addresses." And, secondly, it may even be held that a philosophy of religion only begins with the latter work, though it was prepared by such writers as Jacobi, Hamann, and Herder. The difference may be better understood if we distinguish three aspects of the religious problem by the terms: Religious Philosophy, Philosophical Religion, and Philosophy of Religion. Before the nineteenth century, and even in Kant's works, there did not really exist a philosophy of religion at all—\(i.e.,\) a philosophical (methodical as distinguished from popular or poetical) discussion of religious Experience. What existed was: First, a religious philosophy—\(i.e.,\) a theory of the world and life written in a religious spirit, embodying the currently accepted spiritual truths, be they those of natural or of revealed religion. Such a philosophy is represented in the writings of very different thinkers, such as the Deists in England and some of their opponents, Rousseau and even Voltaire in France, Mendelssohn and Jacobi in Germany, and a host of others. Secondly, there existed the great works of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, which contained and propounded a philosophical religion, a reasoned creed, with more or less of a desire to understand or paraphrase existing religious teaching, expressing in philosophical language what various forms of existing religious teaching expressed in their own way. It was an attempt to interpret, to show the deeper meaning of existing dogmas, retaining or discarding them as they could or could not be brought into a consistent well-thought-out system. Of the latter class Kant was by far the most critical as well as the most reassuring exponent. He was critical and destructive in his First Critique, in which he showed that the ideas of human reason, such as God, Freedom, and Immortality, were not capable of any rigid demonstration. They existed as Noumena: things thought of but really unknowable in the sense of what we term Knowledge in the phenomenal world. But Kant developed the reassuring side of his doctrine in his Second Critique, in which he established these verities as necessary postulates of the moral consciousness; the undeniable existence of a moral law, and the possibility of following it, rendering it necessary for the human mind to assume and believe in the existence of a Law-giver, of human freedom to follow His law, and of a larger life in which duty and happiness, existing combined as the highest Good, could be finally realised.
Philosophy of Spinoza,' and his 'Criticism of David Hume,' as well as in his subsequent writings and correspondence, he strongly urged the fact that belief lies at the bottom of all our knowledge. He attacks especially the doctrine of the "thing in itself," the unknown X of Kant's philosophy. He maintained that, according to Kant, the human intellect hovers or oscillates indefinitely in a region between the unknown reality of an external world and the equally unknown essence of an inner world, in the empty cloud-land of time and space; that sensation has nothing behind it and the understanding nothing in front of it, and that, in consequence, the whole process must end inevitably in pure scepticism. This transcendental ignorance Jacobi confronts with his 'Realism of Belief.' All truth consists in the knowledge of reality, such knowledge is immediate and not mediated, a matter of feeling. Compared

we may term the religious teaching was, in these earlier works, metaphysical on the one side and ethical on the other. In the Third Critique a reconciliation of this twofold aspect was attempted, and the way indicated for the speculations of his successors. Late in life Kant wrote a special Treatise ('Religion within the limits of mere Reason,' 1793), and several smaller Tracts, the latest being on the 'Conflict of the Faculties' (1798), the main purport of which was a philosophical interpretation or paraphrase of the existing religious doctrine of the Christian Churches. The outcome of this is concisely given by Paulsen (loc. cit., p. 393) as follows: "Put into formule, the religious teaching of Kant can be laid down in the following points: 1. The essence of religion is not the belief in supernatural beings which eventually affect nature and human life, but a belief in God, an all-pervading Will for the Good, which realises itself in nature and history. 2. The proof of religion does not consist in historical facts (miracles, revelation), but in the moral law or the good will in us, aiming at the highest Good. 3. The object of religion is not the subjection of the will or the understanding under any powers, Here or Beyond, but solely the strengthening in us of the will for the Good." Paulsen concludes by saying "that these formule may even now be made the foundation of religious philosophy."
with this all the reasoning processes are merely trains of thought without a beginning or an end, an endless succession of the "Conditioned" without any access to the "Unconditioned." All demonstrable knowledge is, therefore, as Jacobi says, Spinozism, the doctrine of the mechanical necessity of the finite. Jacobi foresaw and expressed clearly what has been more and more realised in the course of the nineteenth century, that it is in the interest of science that there be no god; in fact, that a Deity who could be known would not be God in the sense of the faithful believer. But such scientific knowledge is only mediate; all true knowledge is immediate, rests on a conviction of certainty which cannot be proved but only accepted; such is given through our senses in the lower or sensuous region of things and through what Jacobi terms reason in the higher or spiritual region of things. He thus proclaims a supernatural sensationalism in which the great spiritual verities, God, Freedom, The Good, and Immortality are revealed to us. Jacobi thus asserts, though in a different manner, the existence of a twofold order of things; but, instead of defining with Kant this twofold order as the opposition of the sensible and the intelligible, he makes it the co-ordination of two realities which are reached by a lower and by a higher sense, both resting upon a feeling of immediate certainty, or, as others might be inclined to say, on sight. With this view Jacobi gives access to the more popular manner in which spiritual things are usually treated. In fact, he always remained with one foot firmly placed in the popular philosophy of his age; and if, as it has been
said, he ventured to place the other beyond the line in
that free land of speculation discovered by the Idealists,
he immediately drew it back again into its former posi-
tion; he never crossed the Rubicon and settled in the
transcendental philosophy, which was loudly proclaimed
at that time as the new and promised land in which the
dilemmas of former systems of thought and of common-
sense were to disappear. His writings had a great
influence, and did much to stem the tide of abstract
speculation; his language also was that of the best
literature of his age, and he did not indulge in that novel
and uncouth terminology introduced by Kant and further
developed by some of his successors.1

1 The position of Jacobi in the
history of philosophical, and especi-
ally of religious, thought is ex-
tremely interesting and well worth
studying in the present day when
the subject of religious experience
is so much discussed. Although
in systematic philosophy Jacobi's
writings are of subordinate and
mostly only of critical importance,
he himself was, as Goethe said, one
of the most interesting figures in
an extraordinary age. Talking to
Eckermann ( 'Conversations with
Goethe,' 11th April 1827), Goethe
said that he had been reading the
Letters of Jacobi and his friends and
found it a most remarkable book,
not because one could learn some-
thing from it, but in order to get
an insight into the culture and
literature of the time, of which
even then one had no conception.
'One sees a number, as it were, of
important persons, but not a trace
of the same direction or of a com-
mon interest, rather every one
self-contained and marching his
own way, without in the least
taking any part in the endeavours
of the others. They appear to me
like billiard balls which run blindly
about on the green cloth without
knowing anything of each other,
and which, as soon as they touch,
only diverge so much more.'
Goethe then proceeds to explain
that Jacobi loved him personally
without taking any part in his
endeavours or perhaps even ap-
proving of them; that it required
friendship to keep them together
whereas it was just the opposite
between him and Schiller. And,
confirming this, Jacobi had written
about Goethe, whom he first met
in the year 1774: 'Goethe is like
a man possessed, to whom it is in
no case permitted to act arbitrarily.
It is only necessary to be an hour
with him in order to find it in the
highest degree ludicrous to expect
from him that he should think
and act otherwise than he really
thinks and acts. Hereby I do
not wish to suggest that no change
for the more beautiful and better
is possible to him; but it is not
otherwise possible than as the
flower unfolds itself, the seed
An opposition somewhat akin to that of Jacobi was

ripened, and the tree grows up and blossoms" (quoted by Bielschowsky, 'Life of Goethe,' 7th German edition, 1905, vol. i. p. 6). The estrangement between the two friends began with Goethe's disapproval of Jacobi's exposition and interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine, which represented the latter as atheism, whereas Goethe considered him a most godly (theissimus) thinker, and became still more pronounced when Jacobi published in 1811 his tract, 'Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung,' which also brought as its consequence his complete rupture with Schelling. The opposite development is represented in the relations of Hegel to Jacobi, and it is interesting to see how the divergence of their opinions grew less in the course of time and led to personal esteem and appreciation. In one of his earliest essays (1802, reprinted 'Werke,' vol. i. p. 1), contributed to the 'Critical Journal,' which he edited together with Schelling, Hegel reviewed the different philosophies which had sprung up as continuations, modifications, or corrections of the Kantian philosophy, and among these he deals also with Jacobi's polemics, in which the latter developed his Glaubensphilosophie and represented Spinozism as the misleading principle in Fichte's philosophy which necessarily would lead to atheism. To Jacobi's representation of Fichte's philosophy as the necessary outcome of the Kantian position Hegel strongly objects, notably also to that of both Spinoza and Kant, and classes him somewhat contemptuously with other thinkers of the period, including Schleiermacher, as representing the subjective philosophy of feeling and reflection to which the real philosophy, represented by Schelling and himself, forms a contrast. In the sequel, however, and after Hegel had become personally acquainted with Jacobi at Heidelberg, he considerably modified his opinion of Jacobi's teaching. To this maturer estimate he gave expression in his reviews of Jacobi's 'Collected Works' (1816-1817, reprinted in vols. xvi. and xvii. of the 'Werke'), representing the same as an important phase in the development of idealism, maintaining also that, inspired by the fundamental truth of Spinozism, Jacobi had paved the way for a speculative development of the philosophy of the Absolute, though remaining himself in the position of simply asserting, without logically substantiating, the conviction that the Absolute is Spirit. At that time the divergence between Schelling and Hegel had become quite apparent, and the fact that Schelling himself had very severely and unjustly attacked Jacobi in a review of the latest work of the latter may have induced Hegel to state emphatically that Jacobi represented an important though only an intermediate phase in recent philosophy. Also in the latest (1825-1826) manuscript of his lectures on the 'History of Philosophy,' published posthumously ('Werke,' vol. xv. p. 608), Hegel inserted a special paragraph about Jacobi, whom he no longer throws together with those other thinkers (Krug, Fries, &c.), whom he persists in treating with scant respect. These critical notices by Hegel, written at a time when his own system was matured, are of great importance, as also is the review of Hamann's works (1828, 'Werke,' vol. xvii. p. 38). Hegel shows towards these two remarkable and — insomuch as they both stood outside the systematic
OF THE SPIRIT.

also maintained by Hamann¹ and Herder, a friend and a
development of the new philosophy—eccentric thinkers a great appreci-
ation of the personal element which forms the foundation and
attractiveness of their somewhat casual, aphoristic, but frequently
brilliant writings; holding that
what they are leaving in the twi-
light of individual and emotional
thought, his own philosophy is aim-
ing at drawing into the clear
daylight of reason. He also points
out how Jacobi's polemics, against
Spinoza and Fichte in particular,
do not touch the deep per-
personal regard which he expresses
for both thinkers. In a celebrated
letter, published in his 'Collected
Works,' Jacobi says to Fichte that
he does not take him personally to
be an atheist or a godless man,
though he has felt obliged to call his
doctrine, as also that of Spinoza,
aetheistic. And towards the latter
he had indeed shown his real
veneration in an apostrophe written
earlier: "Be blessed you great and
holy Benedictus! However you
may philosophise and err in words
regarding the nature of the Highest
Being, His truth was in your soul
and His love was your life."

¹ Johann Georg Hamann (1730-
1788) was an extraordinary figure
in that phase of German thought
which led out of the clear but dry
and thin atmosphere of the Auf-
klärung, through much mist and
confusion, to the poetry and depth
of idealism and romanticism. He
himself is perhaps most promi-
nent representative in the moment
of confusion. That, in spite of
this, he had a great personal influ-
ence on other thinkers is by no one
better brought out than by Hegel
himself, who, in the height of his
literary career and fame (1828),
thought the subject important
enough to write a lengthy review
('Werke,' vol. xvii. pp. 38-110) of
Hamann's 'Collected Works'; and
for the student of to-day no better
characterisation of the man, his
works, and his personal influence
can be found than this review of Hegel's.
He shows there Hamann's simi-
arity to Rousseau inasmuch as he
created an extraordinary personal
interest, differing, however, from
Rousseau in this, that his works
were as unreadable, fragmentary,
and unfinished as Rousseau's were
the very reverse. He interested,
repelled, and fascinated a large
number of persons who thought
him in possession of some mystery
which they were in search of.
This search after some hidden
treasure, the expectancy of the age
that some formula or truth was on
the point of being revealed, made
thinking as well as emotional
natures ready to listen to true as
well as to false prophets; indeed,
the oracular style, backed by a real
or supposed inspiration, was com-
mon to many writers, and, begin-
ning with Hamann, is characteristic
not only of the great poetry of
Goethe but also of some of the
greatest writings of Schelling and
Hegel, and ministered for a time to
their attractiveness. Hegel shows,
inter alia, how the problem of belief
acquired in Hamann that larger
meaning which it possesses in
Jacobi's writings. Speaking of
Hamann's first well-known work,
entitled 'Socratic Memorabilia,'
Hegel says: "Whilst towards the
public the semblance of an objective
content is given to it, the meaning,
content, and aim of this work are
personal to a degree in which his
other writings are not; yet in all
there is more or less contained the
interest and the sense of the per-
sonal. Also what is said about
belief is similarly taken primarily
from Christian belief, but is ex-
panded to a wider meaning; that
disciple of Kant. In their writings an important point is emphasised which has also been brought out with increasing clearness in the course of the last century. It refers to the part which language plays in our mental development. For them language is the instrument through which what would otherwise remain separated in the human soul, the sensuous and the super-sensuous, is brought together and unified. But this idea is little more than an aperçu, a fruitful suggestion which even at the present day has hardly been sufficiently followed up.

None of these three opponents of Kant's systematic philosophy were academic teachers who felt the call to expound their philosophical theories in a methodical form to younger minds. Their teaching was therefore fragmentary and incomplete. It brought out certain points with great clearness, and urged them with much literary skill, but it resembled the greater part of the philosophical writing in this country, inasmuch as it lacked either method or completeness of thought or both. Through this fragmentary but more elegant treatment of important philosophical problems these writers had great influence upon the popular thought of their age, but they stood outside the systematic and methodical development of the new ideas which were contained in Kant's philosophy. Nevertheless,
they had a not inconsiderable influence upon the philosophy of the schools,—an influence which made itself felt later on when the logical consequences of the transcendental position had been clearly stated and its possibilities for a time exhausted. In the meantime, though remaining in the background, attempts were made to put these ideas of the opposition into a more methodical form and to use them in the construction of coherent systems of thought. Among these the system of Fries\(^1\) was probably the most original and suggestive, while the writings of Krug were the most popular. Fries came to philosophy with a genuine religious interest, having been educated in a sect which cultivated an inner religious life in contrast to the more external clerical religion of the age. With this interest, he appreciated the crude endeavours of Jacobi to vindicate for religious belief a separate province in the human mind, but he marks an advance upon Jacobi, inasmuch as he was not content merely to assert this independence but saw the necessity of supporting its assertion by a correcter and fuller statement of psychological facts. This interest in psychology he combined with a more thorough acquaintance with the mathematical sciences and their development in the direction of mathematical physics. He also saw the necessity of extending psychology beyond the study of the individual soul into that of the collective mind and its natural history, laying much stress upon anthropology. Through these special interests his

\(^1\) About Fries and his writings see the note to p. 258 of the 3rd vol. of this history.
teaching acquired a unique position, bringing it into fruitful contact with the realistic spirit of the popular educationalists and their practical religious teaching, and he founded, in a narrower sphere, an independent philosophical school which counted eminent representatives such as Schleiden the botanist on the one side and de Wette the theologian on the other. Fries summed up his psychology of religion in the formula: "phenomena are known to us, the truly real we believe in, through the former (knowledge) we gain a presentiment of the latter (the objects of "faith"). But Fries was not, any more than Jacobi or Krug, a theologian, and, though his religious

1 A popular exposition of this view is given by Fries in 'Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung' (1805). The word Ahndung has a double meaning in the German language, and, in the meaning which Fries gives it, it is therefore frequently spelt Ahnung. In this sense and in the verbal form (Ahnen) it has no equivalent in the English language. The best rendering seems to be, to have a presentiment or a (spiritual) foretaste, viz., of the higher truth or the truly real. The formula can be explained in two relations. The belief in the truly real as distinguished from the merely apparent may be considered solely as a negation of the latter. In this light Jacobi considered Kant's 'Thing in itself.' But it can also be considered as arising from a special aspect, the poetical or aesthetical aspect, which throws upon phenomena a light which they do not in reality possess: "The close relationship of this poetical religion with the identification of religion and poetry which prevailed in the Romantic School is quite apparent; the nearest counterpart of Fries' religio-aesthetical conception is to be found in Novalis' poetico-religious idealism, only that the latter is not content with the merely aesthetical world-view, but attributes to the ideal enthusiasm the power of a magical world-construction, whereas Fries retains, with sober reasonableness, the dividing line between reality and the ideal." O. Pfeiderer, from whose 'Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie' (3rd ed., 1893, p. 474) this quotation is taken, makes the pertinent remark that such a religion could never become popular, and that Fries shares this exclusively aristocratic attitude in religion with the Romanticists, having betrayed this trait in the motto of his 'Religionsphilosophie' (1832): "Odi profanum vulgus et arceo," which contrasts strikingly with the words of our Saviour, "Come to me all ye that labour and are heavy laden."
training created in him a special appreciation of the religious problem, he stood outside of any special religious organisation and did not extend his interest in this problem to an understanding of the positive historical religion and its manifestation in a community of believers—i.e., in the Christian Church.

II.

The first step to an understanding of this, the most important phenomenon of modern history, was taken by one who alone among the great thinkers of modern Germany has been able to hold the balance between a genuine theological and an equally genuine philosophical interest. Schleiermacher¹ was one of those rare minds

¹ The most important work on Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is the 'Life' by Wilhelm Dilthey (vol. i., 1870). It does not reach beyond the year 1802, but deals fully with the 'Reden über die Religion,' by far the most important of Schleiermacher's Works from a philosophical point of view; but the main value of Dilthey's book (542 pages of small type and 145 pages of valuable documents referring to the inner development of Schleiermacher) does not lie in the biographical details, nor even in the penetrating analysis of his earlier works, but rather in the interesting picture which he draws of the state of the higher mental life—literary, philosophical, and poetical—which characterised the Berlin circle of eminent writers, thinkers, and scholars at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For the moment it must be regretted that the book has been long out of print and that the continuation is wanting. That the eminent author who will, as time goes on, probably stand out more and more as one of the most original thinkers in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, was able to appreciate many other sides and systems of mental culture, to the study of which he devoted his life, is shown by his other writings, notably by his very penetrating analysis of the early development of Hegel (quoted above, vol. iii. p. 250 n.), who, alongside of Schleiermacher, shone as a centre of intellectual light and life in the north of Germany during the twenty years from 1815 to 1835. Considering the enormous literature, biographical, epistolary, and critical, which forms the source of information from which Dilthey drew his materials,
in whom very different, seemingly antagonistic, currents of thought come together, influencing each other and leading to a deeper, a more comprehensive view. He came from a religious stock on the side of both his parents; in his family many religious conflicts had taken place, both internal and external. He himself passed his school days in the seclusion of the sect of

we must be thankful to possess such a unique work as his on Schleiermacher, which forms a veritable encyclopaedia of information for the student of that age, with its many problems, its attempted solutions, and its equally numerous failures. The study of this work is indispensable, but it also makes it unnecessary for all, except specialists, to traverse themselves the many volumes referred to by Dilthey as the source of his information. This book should be specially recommended to foreigners, for whom, even more than for German readers, it remains true that, "in the innermost life, thinking and feeling of Schleiermacher there is something totally strange to the present generation. He, his age, his friends: all are separated from the present day through a change in sentiments, ideas, and endeavours, more drastic than perhaps any that has ever taken place. For this day has lost its direct relationship to the great epoch to which Schleiermacher belonged" (Dilthey, p. v.). Next to Dilthey's unfinished work must be mentioned as of real value W. Bender's work on the theology of Schleiermacher ('Schleiermacher's Theologie, mit ihren Philosophischen Grundlagen,' 2 parts, 1876-78). Its importance lies in the fact that it contains one of the fullest discus-
the Moravian Brotherhood, who kept themselves aloof from the ecclesiastical conflicts of the day and cultivated a religious life in some respects not unlike that peculiar to the Society of Friends in this country; differing, however, from the latter inasmuch as they did not take a similar prominent part in any great philanthropic movements such as, in this country, began with the great work of William Penn in the middle of the seventeenth century. The narrowness of this secluded and sectarian life drove Schleiermacher away from the Brotherhood for which he, nevertheless, retained a lifelong affection. From it he was thrown into the midst of the spirit of enlightenment, at a moment when it was being deepened and idealised by the original poetical genius of the age as well as by the stirring effect of Kant's philosophy; at the same time he came under the influence of the classical and critical spirit as it lived in its great representative F. A. Wolf. Through Jacobi he became acquainted with the writings of Spinoza as he had become acquainted, through Wolf, with those of Plato. In both he admired that higher mysticism which was so different from the narrow inwardness of the Brotherhood. But he was not attracted so much by the logical as by the emotional pantheism of Spinoza. Influenced by him, he introduced into the philosophy of religion the idea that one of the sources and characteristics of religious inspiration is the feeling of oneness between the Individual and the All, what more recently has been termed "cosmic emotion"; the conviction, which has lived in some of the foremost teachers of mankind, that their individual and subjective self
was in immediate contact—that it was at one—with the Infinite and the Eternal. But Schleiermacher never lost himself so completely in this spiritual or cosmic pantheism as some other contemporary thinkers, at least transiently, did; for he had an equal sense for the value of individual existence, for the importance of personal independence and individuality of development. In this respect his view was more akin to that of Leibniz who, in his 'Monadology,' opposed the pantheism of Spinoza. Schleiermacher thus early elaborated a special expression in which the oneness of the Individual and the All could be combined with a distinct subjective feeling; this he described as the feeling of absolute dependence as far as the individual, the finite self is concerned. In the two most original of his earlier writings—in his 'Addresses,' 1799, and his 'Monologues,' 1801,—he emphasises what he considers to be equally important manifestations of the religious sentiment—viz., the feeling of being one with the All, and at the same time of being individually, though absolutely, dependent upon it. To give and to find oneself, to be equally distant from the egotism of the lower self and from an exaltation of the logical idea; that is, for Schleiermacher, the essence of the religious sentiment or pious feeling: in it, whoever loses his own self in the Universal, at the same time gains the intrinsic joy of this absorption or devotion. Religion is accordingly neither knowledge nor action but a state of feeling, the sentiment of an all-embracing and all-absorbing life. Religious doctrines or dogmas result from a reflection upon this religious sentiment. They are,
therefore, neither an extension of ordinary knowledge nor purely ethical precepts or moral commands. Thus Schleiermacher stands between the purely metaphysical treatment of the religious problem by Hegel and the purely ethical by Kant; having an appreciation for both. This assertion, by Schleiermacher, of the independence of the spiritual life in relation both to the intellectual and the ethical, though forming the ultimate basis of both and reacting on them, led in the sequel of his own speculations, and still more in the further course of nineteenth century thought, to two distinct developments, to two very different conceptions of the religious life and of the solution of the religious problem, of the problem of the spirit. These two independent developments were combined in Schleiermacher's personality, but since his time they have gone far asunder. They may, for our present purpose, be defined as the aesthetical and the social conception of religion and its importance.¹

¹ The peculiarity and originality of Schleiermacher's genius can be best grasped by contrasting him with other great thinkers who surrounded him. Among these no one played a greater part in bringing out Schleiermacher's characteristic conceptions than Fichte, and it is to the latter that we are most indebted for unknowingly stimulating Schleiermacher to the expression of his own views, to the production and publication of some of his most striking earlier writings. The contrast to Fichte is summed up by Dilthey in a quotation taken from Schleiermacher's Correspondence (1800): "Philosophy and life are with him [Fichte], as he also theoretically maintains, quite separate; his natural way of thinking has nothing extraordinary, and thus there is wanting in him, so long as he sticks to the ordinary point of view, everything that could make him interesting to me. Before he arrived I had an idea of conversing with him about his philosophy and opening out to him my opinion that I could not very well put up with his way of separating the common-sense from the philosophical point of view. But I soon pulled in my sails." Dilthey adds that "personal intercourse, conferences over many common interests, the respective scientific developments, resulted with Schleiermacher only in an accentuation of this impression" (loc. cit., p.
It was characteristic of the age that witnessed the publication of Schleiermacher's first deliverances, and especially of the surroundings in which he lived, that the aesthetical interpretation should have found earlier and more general recognition, and this in two distinct forms: first, in that cosmic pantheism which we find permeating the poetical and prose works of Goethe during that period and which formed the fundamental view in Schelling's earlier 'Philosophy of

347). In a recent, very interesting, study of the early development of Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher ('Vom Werden dreier Denker,' 1904), E. Fuchs enters very fully into the question of the occasion which the 'Atheismusstreit' of Fichte gave Schleiermacher for the production of his 'Addresses.' This celebrated controversy, which brought about Fichte's removal from Jena to Berlin, turned upon the question, forced upon thinkers through the study of Spinoza, whether Spinozism and the religious conceptions contained therein admitted of the belief in a personal Deity as distinguished from a Divine Order. Fichte had, in one phase of his development, taken up the position that the belief in a Divine—i.e., a moral—Order, was the necessary but also the sufficient foundation of religion, and this had led to his being accused of atheism. This occurrence threw into the philosophical world a great and stirring subject of discussion: ' Whilst many drew back from Fichte, a hitherto unknown man stood courageous with him. True, the little book appeared anonymously, . . . but its author could not and did not remain hidden. This valiant one was Schleiermacher, then a preacher at the 'Charité,' and his book the 'Addresses on Religion.' These are accordingly a document in the 'Atheismusstreit,' and this explains to a large extent why they met with such universal recognition. General attention had been created; but that they had such a remarkable success, that philosophical and theological thinking, and above all, religious sentiment, were revived through them, that was only possible by reason of their intrinsic value. Through it Schleiermacher became the author whom German thought, in the following years, strove and wrestled to understand. With bold freedom the little book places itself by the side of Fichte, and this in the name of religion. The very same who profess to defend religion against Fichte in reality spoil and destroy it. They defend their religious notions and destroy, through an absolute want of understanding, the roots in the human soul from which they have sprung' (p. 286). And Fuchs goes on to quote that remarkable passage in the Address in which Schleiermacher traces religion back to a presentiment, secret and uncomprehended, in youthful souls, which drives them beyond the riches of this world to seek for the supernatural.
Nature.' Both these harmonised with the pantheistic side of Schleiermacher's effusions, with his Spinozism. But secondly, the subjective and individualising current of thought which forms the other side of these same writings found an eager response in the subjectivism and the phantasies of the romantic school of which Schleiermacher's personal friends, the brothers Schlegel, formed the centre. However, neither the one nor the other exhausted Schleiermacher's conception, and, as the sequel has shown, both are in danger of losing the truly religious interest and elaborating an æsthetical substitute for it. The principal defect of the former, the religion of pantheism with its impersonal deity, is that it has no understanding for the existence of sin and evil. The two greatest exponents of this view, in their later poetical and philosophical speculations, realised this defect. Goethe did so, when in the later years of his life he completed and carried out that greatest conception of his poetical genius which accompanied him through the whole of his long poetic career; when he wrote the last acts of the second part of "Faust." No such consummation was vouchsafed to the philosopher Schelling, but we know how he, during the last forty years of his life, laboured incessantly at this, the supreme problem of human existence. The defect of the opposite æsthetical school, of the romanticists, was their extreme subjectivism in which they imperceptibly abandoned all regard for the science and morals of common-sense, losing in consequence, in spite of brilliant creations, all power of contributing permanently to that intellectual and moral regeneration.
of the age which formed, starting from Fichte, their original programme.

In his later activity, both as an eminent preacher in the Established Church of his country and as an ardent promoter of the union of the two Protestant Churches; in his philosophical and theological works; and, lastly, in his influential position as an academic teacher, Schleiermacher brought out more clearly the differences which separated him as much from the pantheism of Spinoza as from the subjectivism of the romanticists, and also from the ethical rigorism and formalism of Kant. Apart from the marked originality of his genius and unique personality, it was no doubt the fact that he was a practical teacher and preacher within an existing religious community which gave to his religious and ethical speculations a distinct and well-defined character. For although, as already stated, religion was not, by Schleiermacher, identified with ethics, and could not in his view be built upon a foundation of purely

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1 "On the 27th September 1817 the King explained to the Consistories that he would, on the centenary of the Reformation, attend the Communion Service together with the Lutherans, expressed the hope that this would find a response with his subjects, and left it to the wisdom of the clergy, the synods, and the Consistories to find the form for such a union. Schleiermacher was the President of the first United Berlin Synod and the author of the Declaration in which the latter expressed itself to the communities regarding the intended common Communion Service on the occasion of the festival of the Reformation. According to this the celebration was to lead to neither liturgical nor dogmatic uniformity. On the 31st of October, in the Church of St Nicholas, sixty-three of the Berlin clergy, all the theological doctors and professors of the University, and many high officials, partook together of the Communion; before the altar the theological colleagues, Schleiermacher, the Reformed, and Marheinecke, the Lutheran, joined hands. And Schleiermacher, in the sequel, conducted also the literary defence of the Union." (Dilthey, Art. Schleiermacher, 'Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,' vol. xxxi. p. 442.)
ethical principles as with Kant, yet no doubt the ethical is the more important side in his religious philosophy. In this regard he brought out as the central idea of his ethical conception that of the "highest good," of a "world of (spiritual) goods" which have to be realised through and in human conduct. Thus, neither the purely formal sense of moral obligation—the categorical imperative of Kant—nor the utilitarian conception of happiness formed the starting-point and central idea of Schleiermacher's ethics. The central idea was that of the "highest good" or (spiritual) "goods" which have to be realised, the conception of the establishment, through the combined individual effort of human beings in human society and its historical development, of a different and higher order of things than the existing natural or lower order. This ethical ideal was indeed not sufficiently and clearly defined by Schleiermacher. The necessity for such a definition is, to a great extent, removed as soon as we cease to restrict ourselves like Kant to a purely logical and systematic construction of an ethical code, and point to history and to the actual realisation which moral and religious ideas have so far attained in the society of which we are members. There it was, in the Christian community in which and for which he lived and worked, that Schleiermacher looked for the practical solution of the problem. But he not only found in the Christian Church the gradual realisation of the divine order of things, of the Civitas Dei; he found in it also an ideal of conduct and of life in the person of its Founder. Whoever recognises in Him the beginning and the end, the origin and the
realisation of the moral ideal, so far as it is revealed to, and can be grasped by, the human mind, can dispense with all further philosophical definitions of the "highest good"; and this was eminently the case in Schleiermacher's theology. His efforts were therefore latterly more directed towards the systematic statement of the main points of Christian faith and Christian duty, than to an independent deduction of purely philosophical principles.\(^1\) In fact, we cannot understand Schleier-

\(^1\) Before we leave Schleiermacher the theologian, in which aspect he was indeed for a long time exclusively considered by philosophical writers, it is well to note that his earlier speculations, in particular the 'Addresses' (1799) and the 'Monologues' (1801), contain really the beginnings of a much deeper psychology than Kant, Fichte, or Schelling possessed. In fact, if we adopt the conceptions and the terminology established by the recent—notably the English introspective—school of psychology, we are able to put in a much clearer light Schleiermacher's religious and ethical ideas, and to show how they mark a really great advance upon those of contemporary thinkers, foreshadowing what has only quite recently been more clearly brought out. This is to a large extent implied in Dilthey's book. It forms the introductory conception in Bender's 'Exposition' (loc. cit., p. 6), and still more in Fuchs' study of Schleiermacher, in which he contrasts his empirical psychology, his introspective method, which does not sacrifice its observations to a unique principle, with Fichte in his contemporary writings, though it must be admitted that the latter, later on in his career, recognized the necessity of a deeper and broader psychology. This is very marked in the posthumously published Lectures on 'The Data of Consciousness.' There are, to mention only a few points, two recent ideas which are implicitly contained in Schleiermacher's earliest speculations, as they have been published by Dilthey in the invaluable appendix to his 'Life of Schleiermacher.' To these, as well as to the 'Monologues,' both fragmentary productions, full of remarkable glimpses into the recesses of the human mind, Fuchs has largely resorted as forming, together with the 'Addresses,' the material for his study of the development of Schleiermacher's mind. In the first Schleiermacher takes what I have repeatedly termed the "Synoptic" view, relying not only upon Sight (Anschauung), i.e., direct inner experience, but putting it emphatically also that this must be always comprehensive, grasping a whole, and not single parts of the object in view. The second point is that we cannot read Schleiermacher's observations without seeing clearly that the difficulties in the speculations of that age can be traced mainly to two points: the unfortunate "Thing in itself" of Kant and the ambiguity which attaches to the conception of Self under whatever term — Consciousness, Ego, &c.—
macher's philosophy without his theology. The historical process, the actually existing religion, is the practical solution of the theoretical problem.

Nevertheless, the posthumous publication of Schleiermacher's Lectures, which range over a large field, comprising dialectics, aesthetics, psychology, ethics, history of philosophy, &c., gave abundant proof that he strove to the end to give also a broader and deeper theoretical foundation to his theological teaching, that he was working at the main philosophical problem, the psychological foundation of religion, the problem of the Spirit. It is interesting to inquire how it has come about that this truly philosophical side of Schleiermacher's teaching, notably his quite original treatment of psychology, has been so little noticed, and has had, till quite recently,¹

It may be spoken of. Is it the individual self, or the Bewusstsein überhaupt, or the collective Self? Is it an individual thing or a logical abstraction, or is it the concrete universal? This point is never cleared up. But Schleiermacher anticipates, though only implicitly, the recent doctrine of the two selves, the subjective and the social self. The first a "mirror of the Universe," to use the Leibnizian term; the second only a unit among a great many other units or persons, distinguished from them and other surrounding things. I cannot help thinking that English psychologists, working on the lines marked out so clearly by Prof. Jas. Ward, would do well to study and interpret Schleiermacher's earlier writings and bring out the psychology which is hidden in them. In a paper "On the Synoptic Aspect of Reality," published in the 'Proceedings of the University of Durham Philosophical Society' (vol. v, pp. 45-61), I have traced a little more fully the direction of this line of reasoning. It is only since I wrote this, and four years after the text of this chapter was written, that I have become acquainted with the interesting study of E. Fuchs, and I am much gratified to find how helpful his analysis of Schleiermacher's early speculations is towards an adequate psychology of religion as a personal and a social factor in human life.

¹ It seems to me to be a principal merit of Beder's work that he has drawn attention to Schleiermacher's psychology in opposition to a conception prevalent at the time that the foundation of Schleiermacher's religious speculation was essentially metaphysical. "That the individual comes to life only in the whole and the whole only in individuals—these are the two poles around which, from the beginning, Schleiermacher's sphere of thought
seemingly so little influence on the course of German speculation. The cause for this seems to me to be two-fold: first, general; second, personal.

The general cause may be found in the fact that, under the influence of the poetical genius of the age which found its highest expression in Goethe's and Schiller's classical creations, nearly all the leading thinkers of the idealistic school indulged in poetical and rhetorical writing, frequently also in figurative and oracular language, that the message which they had to deliver presented itself, not in the sober form of methodical thought, but more frequently in the form of aphorisms, rhapsodies, and appeals to the imagination. This form of expression had, under the necessities of academic teaching, to be replaced by, or interpreted in, sober and logical prose; it had to accommodate itself to the needs of the student and the demands of the scholar; it had to formulate and to deal with special defined problems in sober diction. Accordingly, those thinkers who revolve. They remain so to the end. . . Though Schelling and Spinoza may have intruded, the 'Addresses' and the 'Monologues,' with their marvellous mixture of acute empirical reflection and divining mysticism, prove sufficiently that the later programme of his many-sided speculation rests upon original conceptions in which he thought to have found the solution of the riddle of his own innermost life. These fundamental conceptions which, in accordance with the rhetorical purpose of those writings, could not be further developed are, in the sequel, taken up by Schleiermacher's psychology in order to receive their scientific formulation and proof. . . I hope to show that Schleiermacher's metaphysic is best explained through his psychology and not vice versa” ('Schleiermacher’s Theologie,' p. 5 sqq.) Had the revival of psychology in Germany followed the course adopted by Beneke and Fries, of whom the former stands nearest to Schleiermacher; had it, in fact, developed the introspective aspect, there is no doubt that Schleiermacher’s psychology would have found greater appreciation. But this revival came, as we know, from the natural sciences, and has, even in the present day, hardly risen to an appreciation of the work of the introspective school, though Mach’s 'Analysis of Sensations' seems to pave the way in that direction.
succeeded in formulating a definite method absorbed gradually the attention of learners and teachers, whilst others, though possibly not less original, fell into neglect. Only two among the leading thinkers of the age stood out prominently in this respect. They were Hegel and Herbart. Both published Treatises in which method and system were conspicuous. Schleiermacher was not one of these so far as his published philosophical Works were concerned. The groundwork of his philosophy was elaborated in his Lectures, which became generally known only in a posthumous publication at a time when the interest in abstract philosophy had waned. Fichte never arrived at a definite exposition of *Wissenschaftslehre*, and as to Schelling he kept the public in uncertainty and expectancy, having retired from academic teaching, his only methodical Treatise being an ethical tract highly commended by Schopenhauer.¹ When, after his call to Berlin in 1841, he re-entered the Lecture Room, literary and scholarly tastes had, under the influence of the critical and of the exact scientific spirit—powerfully represented in Berlin through Wolf’s school and

¹ This treatise is entitled ‘Philosophical Discussions on the Nature of Human Freedom and connected Subjects’; it appeared in the year 1809. In it Schelling broke with Jacobi and with Spinoza as represented by Jacobi. He himself says that it is one of the most important of his writings, that it represents the entire ideal side of his system “in which together with the immanence of things in God, Freedom, Life, Individuality, as well as Good and Evil, co-exist” (see ‘Aus Schelling’s Leben in Briefen’ vol. ii. p. 156). Kuno Fischer considers it as the transition to the latest, the theosophical, phase of his philosophy, but says: “If we count among the characteristics of Theosophy a dim and unclear depth, we cannot apply this to Schelling’s Tract on Freedom; for it is precisely in the definition and explication of this most difficult of all problem a masterpiece of clearness and depth” (‘Geschichte der Neueren Philosophie,’ vol. vi., 1872, p. 894).
Humboldt's championship of the natural sciences—entirely changed. The expectancy which up to that time had characterised the attitude of all younger and ardent spirits, the waiting for the new light, after having suffered a first shock through Strauss and Feuerbach, was, for the last time, roused into prominence when Schelling delivered his inaugural lecture (15th Nov. 1841) before a crowded audience. Only for a short time did this eager expectancy last. His brilliant audience included many of the intellectual leaders of the age. There they sat: "one more learned than the other and they understood—nothing."¹

To this has to be added the second or personal circumstance that Schleiermacher was by profession a religious teacher,² and that it was generally understood that he had no sympathy with the metaphysical treatment of the religious problem as it had found expression in Hegel's system, and that even less sympathy existed on the part of Hegel and his followers with Schleier-

¹ Ernst Curtius in a Letter dated Jan. 1842 (see his 'Letters' published by Friedrich Curtius, Berlin, 1903, p. 283). On the whole dramatic interest (equalled in modern times probably only by M. Bergson's Lectures at the Sorbonne and elsewhere) see Kuno Fischer, loc. cit., p. 343, sqq.; further, K. A. Varnhagen von Ense, 'Tagebücher,' vols. i. and ii., 1861, in which also the gradual waning of this interest and the growing disillusion and reaction are reported by a critical onlooker.

² A somewhat similar fate has befallen the philosophical writings of James Martineau in this country. Whereas in Scotland and some of the leading teachers came to philosophy out of the Church, the English Unitarian, Martineau, was debarred from filling the important position of a philosophical teacher at University College, which had been promoted as a non-sectarian centre of higher teaching and scholarship mainly by representatives of that school of emancipated thought which centred in Bentham and James Mill. There is no doubt that Martineau's philosophy, with such an opportunity of leading younger minds, would have occupied, much earlier, the prominent place in British thought which it intrinsically merits.
macher's conception of religion as a matter of feeling, as the spiritual sensation of absolute dependence. Students of theology, such as Strauss and Zeller, who sat under Hegel as well as under Schleiermacher, did not acquire from the latter the genuine and deeper psychological interest, but were stirred by another original element in Schleiermacher's teaching. For, as I have had occasion to state already, Schleiermacher was one of the first brilliant representatives of the critical school of biblical research, as he was also one of the first critical students of ancient philosophy. And, indeed, it was mainly in the direction of historical studies that Schleiermacher's influence made itself felt in philosophical circles: the two pioneers in the history of philosophy, Heinrich Ritter and Chr. A. Brandis, coming from his school.

Be this as it may, it is not doubtful that in the history of philosophic thought the first beginnings of a more adequate treatment of the religious problem are to be found in Schleiermacher's writings.

In these were combined three distinct conceptions which have since been worked out with greater clearness and from many sides. First, the conception of a divine or moral as distinct from the existing natural order; second, the conviction that this can only be reached and realised through the combined work of individual minds in human society; and third, that it is being historically accomplished in the Christian community or church with its Founder as its centre and as its realised ideal of perfect goodness.

In the further development of religious philosophy

1 See supra, vol. iii, pp. 166, 168 n.
in Germany we may take these three definite points as guiding aspects. Thus we have in Albrecht Ritschl's theology a clear and distinct, almost an extreme, statement of the first point. Ritschl\(^1\) starts from the

\(^1\) Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) was the founder of a school of theology quite as prominent as the school of classical philology founded by his illustrious cousin, Friedrich Ritschl (see *supra*, vol. iii. pp. 136 sqq.). They both came, like so many others of the foremost thinkers and scholars in Germany, out of a Protestant pastor's family. Very unlike in their otherwise equally great personal influence they remind us of an earlier age, of the great classical scholar of the Renaissance, Jos. Justus Scaliger, with whom Friedrich Ritschl claimed, through Richard Bentley, a continuity of thought. The theologian Ritschl reminds us, in his valiant and forceful defence of the inherent truth of the Protestant faith, of the greatest figure of the Reformation—of Martin Luther himself; whose spirit he similarly claimed to represent in its original purity. It may surprise some of my readers that so much attention should be given to Albrecht Ritschl in the history of philosophic thought, his name hardly occurring in the leading histories of philosophy which have so far been written. The justification of this lies in the following consideration. As stated before (see p. 272 n.), there are two distinct problems involved in the philosophical problem of religion. The first is the psychological problem as to the nature and origin of faith—*i.e.*, of religious certainty; the second is the problem of theology as a definite science of religion. These two problems are analogous to the two problems dealt with in the theory of knowledge. The latter, following the mode of statement customary since the time of Hume and Kant, are—First: How is knowledge or experience possible? Second: How is scientific, *i.e.*, methodical systematic, knowledge possible? The two analogous problems referring to religious knowledge or faith were thrown into clearer prominence by Schleiermacher; they have since his time and through his influence formed the main subject of a philosophy of religion, as distinguished from religious philosophy or the various endeavours to formulate a reasoned (philosophical or scientific) creed. As the latter centre in Hegel, so the two former problems centre in Schleiermacher, who abandons the metaphysical problem and considers the subject of theology as a science to be the systematic development, the coordination and harmonising of religious beliefs as contained in historical, more especially in the Christian, religion. Of these two problems, Ritschl as a theologian has devoted his main attention to the second. The first of the two, the psychological one, does not receive adequate treatment; the philosophical interest was, with him, less prominent than with Schleiermacher. The latter lived in a philosophic age and surroundings; Ritschl, in the earlier part of his career, met the Hegelian spirit only in its extreme, and to him repellent, logical formulation, in its one-sidedly negative conclusions, its analytic and dissecting tendencies. The modern conception of philosophy as standing 'in the middle' between
faith of the Christian community, from the revelation of Jesus, as an axiomatic foundation, and does not consider it necessary or fruitful to enter into any philosophical interpretation of this religious faith. Upon it he builds his theological system. He discards all religious philosophy—not only the natural religion of the Deists, but especially also such as had been attempted by Hegel, and in many forms and variations by the right wing of his followers. In this way he does not even admit as much philosophy of religion as Schleiermacher did; but he sympathetically incorporates the second and third points just mentioned, inasmuch as he attaches great importance to the religious life of the community or Church, and he follows Schleiermacher in emphasising likewise the personal factor. This latter point is brought out most clearly by him in the exalted and unique position which he assigns to Jesus Christ. It is He who announced and founded the divine order, the Kingdom of God, as differing from, but to be realised in, human society, or the kingdom of this world. Through the forceful manner in which scientiﬁc and religious thought, which is that of Lotze, attracted Ritschl’s attention much later, and he has, unfortunately, not made full use of its possibilities, though his later writings testify to the inﬂuence of Lotze; but the latter’s religious interests were not extended to theology as a science. In addition to this, Ritschl is one of the foremost representatives of what I have termed the “synoptic view,” and this is, so far as his theology is concerned, expressed in his dictum that “the scholastic saying, qui bene distinguít, bene docet, brings out only one side of the subject we have in view. In order to be fully correct it must be supplemented as follows: qui bene distinguít et bene comprehendít bene docet.” . . . “His main strength lay in the comprehensive activity of his mind, which drove him always to look at the whole, and at the particular only as contained in a totality” (Albrecht Ritschl’s ‘Leben,’ by Otto Ritschl, 1896, vol. ii. p. 168).
Ritschl has urged this view as the only one which secures a firm foundation for a science of theology, for a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine and a practical realisation of Christian ideals, he has imparted quite a new life to German theology; ¹ but he

¹ It must be clearly understood that what is said in the text about Ritschl, as well as about Schleiermacher, does not attempt or imply any critical opinion as to the value of their theological systems. We have here again the analogy of natural science to make the position clearer. If, e.g., dynamics, physics, chemistry, &c., start with certain principles such as the principle of inertia, or the principle of least action, or the law of gravitation, or the atomic theory, or the principle of energy, it becomes a philosophical problem to state and to define these principles as they are used in the course of scientific research and explanation. But it is not the object of philosophy to follow this application into its details, or even to decide to what extent and within what limits each of these principles is useful in affording an explanation, a coherent picture of the existing things of nature which surround us; this is entirely a matter for the scientific enquirer, and must always be based on, and verified by, observation and experiment. In a similar way, the positions of philosophical theologians like Schleiermacher and Ritschl are subject to philosophical enquiry, to definition and discussion; but the modes in which, on these fundamental positions, the structure of theological science, or even of religious belief, is raised, are entirely different problems, and must depend upon religious experience and historical study. And these, and not philosophical theories, must decide as to their value and correctness. From the latter point of view there have appeared in this country two essays on Ritschl's theology, in answer to the competition for the Norrisian Prize (1908), both of which I recommend to English readers as a good introduction to the difficult study of what has been termed Ritschlianism. They are by E. A. Edghill ("Faith and Hope," 1910) and by J. K. Mozley ("Ritschlianism," 1909). The very fact that the word Ritschlianism has been coined, and that it is said to represent an attitude of theological reasoning which is widespread and not the exclusive characteristic of Ritschl's theology, shows that it forms an important chapter in a general history of thought during the second half of the nineteenth century. The principal works of Ritschl, in which the points that are of philosophical interest must be studied, comprise first his great work on "Justification and Reconciliation" (3 vols., 1870-1875). It underwent a thorough revision by Ritschl himself in two following editions, in which many of the fundamental positions are further modified and developed. Next to this his tract on "Theology and Metaphysics" (1881) is of special interest as showing the marked influence of Lotze's philosophy in addition to that of Kant and Schleiermacher. But, as stated already, Ritschl's philosophical foundations underwent a marked change as he wrote and worked during the transition period of German phil-
has not contributed anything fundamentally new to the outstanding philosophical problem of the spirit. This was much more clearly understood by Schleiermacher than by Ritschl, for, even if we gratefully accept Ritschl's position and admit that theological speculation requires to start, like every other science, from an axiomatic foundation, with a definite principle, there still remain two questions for the philosopher to answer. The first is the psychological question, clearly put by Jacobi, Fries, and Schleiermacher. It is the question concerning the essence of the religious feeling or sentiment. How does this originate in the human soul? Kant had put the question regarding exact or mathematical knowledge in this way: How have we to conceive the constitution of the human mind so as to explain the existence of exact science? Similarly we can put the religious problem in this form: How are we to conceive the constitution of the human soul so as to explain the existence of religious faith, the immediate, not mediated, certainty and conviction of the believing soul? What Ritschl has done to solve this problem is, to say the least, fragmentary and incomplete.

A further problem remains outstanding for philosophy of religion: granted that there is a twofold order of things, a natural order and a spiritual order,—the latter finding its practical expression in the moral and religious society: we shall wish to form some idea of the relation of these two different orders; we shall

osophy, of which Lotze is the greatest representative. He himself confesses to having been a learner up to the end, and we can detect strong external influences during the various periods of his remarkable career.
desire them to be harmonised in some philosophical theory which explains their mutual relation and interdependence. In this respect Ritschl also leaves us in the dark, but his appreciation of Lotze's philosophy reminds us that it is there that we may hope to find an indication how to deal with this problem. I have had repeated occasion to refer to the manner in which Lotze defines and presents the whole philosophical problem.

But in referring to Albrecht Ritschl and his relation to Lotze's views I am somewhat anticipating the course of religious speculation in Germany. This was for a long time, before Ritschl's larger works appeared and before Lotze's views became more generally known and accessible, occupied with a criticism of what Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher had done towards a definition and solution of the problem of the Spirit. Let us recall the fact that Kant had given an essentially ethical conception of religion, that Hegel's was an essentially metaphysical and Schleiermacher's an essentially psychological interpretation; the two latter philosophers having, though from entirely different points of view, taken in also the historical aspect which was neglected by Kant. These three distinct treatments of the religious problem exhibit interesting contrasts as well as coincidences. To begin with, both Hegel and Schleiermacher opposed the dualism inherent in Kant's system, but, in doing so, did not arrive at such an emphatic definition of good and evil and of the fact of moral obligation as Kant had done. On the other side, both Kant and Schleiermacher treated religion more as a psychological or anthropological phenomenon, denying
alike the possibility of arriving at any logical or metaphysical certainty regarding the transcendent truths or verities of the Christian religion; whereas Hegel, whose whole argument ran in the direction of leading the thinking mind up to the recognition of the highest metaphysical truth, the idea of the absolute, as the beginning and foundation of all philosophical insight, claimed to have really established the highest verities on a firmer basis than they had in popular religious teaching. Again, Schleiermacher stood alone against Kant as well as Hegel in claiming for feeling—i.e., for immediate or intuitive knowledge—a distinct function and province in the human soul. Schleiermacher also introduced the twofold treatment of the religious problem—viz., the philosophical and the specifically theological treatment, and, in so doing, gave the impulse to a large number of philosophical treatises within the confines of Protestant theology, treatises which were as a rule not considered and appreciated as to their purely philosophical value and importance. This remark refers especially to such a work as Richard Rothe's \(^1\) 'Ethik'; in fact, as I

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\(^1\) Richard Rothe (1799-1867) is a unique figure in philosophical and theological thought. His influence was to a large extent personal, and his elaborate philosophical system ('Theologische Ethik,' 1845-1848; 2nd ed., much enlarged and revised, 1867-1871), has probably exerted little or no influence on philosophy proper. We are indebted to the late Prof. Holtzmann for a concise and very readable account of Rothe's speculative system ('R. Rothe's Speculative System,' 1899), published on the occasion of the anniversary of Rothe's birth. He remarks that the correct title of the book would have been 'Speculative Theology,' but that, as the author arrived at the conviction that a moral conception was the dominating principle of any theory of the universe, the whole scheme received its title from the most important section and was termed 'theological ethics.' Holtzmann closes his Preface by appropriating the telling dictum of Lotze, that in Rothe's speculative system, as in the whole of German idealism, we acquire not a logical understanding but rather an ideal interpretation of the phenomenal world.
stated above, not only such works as this one, but even Schleiermacher's own theological writings found, for a long time, no place in the many histories of philosophy which began to appear after the death of Hegel, and which were no doubt very generally stimulated by Hegel's own great work on the subject.

In quite recent times, when the philosophy of religion has again, together with the related metaphysical problems, attracted serious attention not only in Germany but everywhere in European and American literature, the opinion has been expressed that no real progress has been made in the subject since the time of Hegel and Schleiermacher; the many later writings on it being fragmentary, preliminary, and only preparative to some coming greater performance.¹ In the face of Lotze's philosophy of religion this view is hardly tenable,

¹ There is a very interesting Review of the position of the philosophy of Religion at the end of the nineteenth century by Prof. Ernst Trötsch in the Memorial Volume dedicated to Kuno Fischer and frequently quoted in this history. He there says (vol. i. p. 109): "The position of the doctrine [philosophy of religion] in the present time cannot be described as showing any unity. It is only possible to exhibit the different main elements which contribute to the formation of such a doctrine. . . . These can be divided into five groups. In the first line there are the influences which philosophical creeds have upon the conception of religion. . . . Next comes the contribution of theology which operates with the conception of revelation, and further, that of comparative history of religion. Then follows epistemology and psychology of religion. The conclusion is formed by the tradition of the classical modern philosophy of religion." The "classics" are, according to Trötsch, Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling. The two former have been largely followed and exploited, but the truth contained in Schelling's later philosophy awaits a deeper comprehension. "In the meantime only Richard Rothe has ingeniouly and thoughtfully taken up Schelling's bequest, bringing out still more strongly Schelling's tendency towards an exclusive supernaturalism" (p. 158). It is interesting to note that, in the Review by this eminent scholar, the names of Ritschl, Lotze, and Weisse, so prominent in our text, do not occur.
and this not only because Lotze lectured regularly on the subject throughout his long academic career, but mainly because his teaching has gradually and almost imperceptibly influenced theological literature in Germany as well as in England and America. It is true that Lotze had no genuinely theological interest. He does not seem to have been much influenced by Schleiermacher; his interest in the problem of the Spirit came through the teachings of Weisse, and it does not appear that he ever entered sympathetically into Schleiermacher's peculiar line of reasoning. His estimate of Schleiermacher's æsthetics betrays also a want of appreciation of ideas which otherwise frequently resembled his own speculations.

The main contribution of Lotze to the problem of the Spirit or the religious problem is his exhaustive and repeated analysis of the idea of personality. With this analysis he follows in the footsteps of Weisse, who, though a disciple and admirer of Hegel, was nevertheless influenced by the lifelong and strenuous opposition which Schelling, in his later writings and his lectures in Berlin, offered to Hegel's position. With Schelling this opposition expressed itself in the formula that Hegel's was a negative philosophy which ought to find its consummation in a positive philosophy: this, in analogy with the natural sciences, was to be founded upon a definite but higher experience. This higher experience acquires in Schelling's conception the character of a Revelation which, in the individual as well as in the collective human soul, affords assurance for the existence of a supernatural and personal Supreme Being, the Deity of
the higher and especially of the Christian religion. Schelling, in the quest of a satisfactory statement of this conviction which dominated the whole of the second half of his speculations, came under the influence of the mystical writings of Jacob Boehme. It seems that he was also much influenced through his personal relations with Franz von Baader, who has been correctly called a pupil as well as a teacher of Schelling. But Schelling never arrived at any finality in these his later speculations, in which the task of reconciling the omnipotence and all-goodness of a Divine Creator with the freedom of his creatures to choose between good and evil presented insurmountable difficulties. Yet it cannot be denied that Schelling correctly pointed to the great defect of Hegel's system, in which no proper place existed for the conception of personality and which attempted no solution of the ethical paradox. Hence it came about that on these two points the whole scheme of Hegel's philosophy had to be either abandoned or amended. The former was accomplished by what is termed the "left" wing of Hegel's School. They solved the problem of personality by reducing the applicability of this idea to human beings and by transforming the theological into a purely anthropological treatment of the ethical problem. On the other side, the "right" wing of Hegel's School, of which Weisse was the most prominent and original representative, undertook to carry further and think out or rather to amend what seemed to them on the whole the correct line of reasoning on which Hegel had embarked. To this end Hegel's scheme itself seemed to offer a fruitful indication. For it seemed that the
original scheme of Hegel,—to show how the Absolute revealed itself to the thinking human mind by its gradual ascent from purely subjective and finite sensation through the forms of logical thought and their objectivation in nature, history, art, science, life, and philosophy,—had been prematurely brought to an end, inasmuch as what was there called the absolute mind was really only the highest manifestation of the objective mind, and that it would have been necessary finally to show "that the absolute mind as the third and last stage of development would return again in greater depth and fulness to that form of Being which it possessed in the first stage as personal, though there only in the form of finite, individual minds."  

Accordingly Weisse undertook\(^2\) to introduce again the conception of a personal Deity; but his speculations received comparatively little attention, though already before him Krause had made a similar attempt, and had designated his system as Panentheism to distinguish it from the Pantheism of Hegel.

Lotze himself has said that he received from Weisse — rather than from Herbart, with whom his critics had associated him—an original grounding which he had found no occasion or desire to abandon in all his subsequent speculations, however little they might manifest that influence. His later writings, notably his 'Microcosmus,' had the object, after a lengthy detour through the realms of natural phenomena and historical evolu-

\(^1\) See Lotze 'Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie seit Kant' — Lecture Notes 1882, p. 71.
\(^2\) In his larger work: 'Philos.-sophische Dogmatik oder Philosophie des Christenthums' (3 vols., 1855-1862).
tion, to give a more definite expression to his underlying conviction that the highest form of existence can be satisfactorily represented to the human soul only in that of Personality. On many occasions in his writings and lectures he recurs to this thesis, trying to defend it against criticisms which had been variously applied to it. These criticisms can all be brought back to the dictum of Spinoza, that individuation is identical with limitation. This idea had been introduced and more emphatically urged in idealistic philosophy by Fichte, who put in the place of the Divine Person, as the centre and ruler of the universe, the idea of a Divine Order which he considered to be a higher and nobler conception than that of a Personal Deity as represented in the narrow anthropomorphising theology of his day. Though admiring the elevation and purity of Fichte's conception, Lotze does not agree with him in denying to the Absolute the highest epithet of personality. According to him, the attributes by which we try to describe the essence of the Divine spring from two distinct sources: "Metaphysical attributes such as unity, eternity, omnipresence, and omnipotence determine the Divine as the ground of all reality in the finite; ethical attributes such as wisdom, justice, and holiness satisfy our desire to find in the highest Reality that also which possesses the greatest value for us. . . . The desire of the soul to conceive as real that which it is permitted to regard as the highest cannot be satisfied by any other form of existence than that of personality."¹

¹ See Lotze 'Microcosmus,' 1st ed., vol. iii. p. 559. The defence of the notion of Personality constitutes one of the main efforts of
OF THE SPIRIT.

And here we must remove the ancient prejudice that the predicate of personality can only be vouchsafed to a being which exists through its difference from, and

Lotze's speculation. Again and again he recurs to it. Not only does the discussion in the 4th chapter of the last book of the 'Microcosmus' turn on this important subject, but it also formed one of the principal points for treatment in his lectures on 'Philosophy of Religion' (see 'Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie,' 1882, secs. 30-36). The classical passage in the 'Microcosmus' is the following: (vol. iii. p. 573; English transl. by Hamilton and Jones, vol. ii. p. 685 sqq.) "The ordinary doubts as to the possibility of the personal existence of the Infinite have not shaken our conviction. But in seeking to refute them, we have had the feeling that we were occupying a position which only the most extraordinary perversion of all natural relations could have brought about. The course of development of philosophic thought has forced us into the attitude of having to show that the conditions of personality which we meet with in finite things are not lacking to the Infinite; the natural position of the matter should rather have led us to show that of the full personality, possible only in the Infinite, a faint reflection is vouchsafed likewise to the finite; for not producing conditions, but hindrances in the way of the development of self-existence are the peculiarities of the finite; to these we wrongly attach its claim to personal existence. The finite being acts everywhere by means of forces which it has not given to itself and according to laws which it has not made—that is to say, by means of a mental organisation which exists not only in itself but likewise in innumerable of its equals. Hence in reflecting on self, it may easily seem to it as if in it were an obscure and unknown substance, on which rested as on a support all personal life. Hence those never completely silenced questionings: What then we ourselves are? What our souls? What that dark, unintelligible, never thoroughly conscious self which works in our emotions and passions? That these questions can arise is a proof how little personality is developed in us to the extent which its idea permits and requires. It can perfectly only exist in the Infinite Being who in reviewing all its phases and actions nowhere meets with a feature in its passive or active life, the meaning and origin of which were not quite transparent and explicable out of its own nature. The position of the finite mind, tied as it is to a special place in the general order of things, is the cause why its inner life is gradually wakened by external stimuli, why it flows on according to the laws of a psychical mechanism, which orders single ideas, feelings, and desires to chase and expel each other. Hence there is never a concentration of the whole self in one moment, our consciousness never presents to us a picture of our whole self, neither of its co-existent states nor even less of the unity of its development in time. To ourselves we ever appear from a partial point of view which discloses only a portion of our being; roused by external touches we react with this partial consciousness; only in a limited sense can we truly say that we act; rather, in most cases something happens
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

opposition to, other beings—i.e., through its finite nature and limitation. Against this Lotze maintains that this process of division, of opposing the Self to a not-self, is indeed a necessary and inevitable event in the life and development of finite existences who live, act, and react in a world consisting of many other beings similar to themselves, but that the fuller idea of personality is gained rather through the mental process of continually referring our own past experiences to the unity of our own consciousness. Hence the fuller and larger personality would not require continual stimulants from outside through which it differentiates its own self and then becomes again conscious of it. This fuller—and, a fortiori, a complete and perfect—personality would find within the sphere of its own existence endless inducements for creating and maintaining its spiritual life and activity, and would certainly not be condemned to that state of inactivity and eternal quiescence which form the inevitable characteristics of all pantheistic conceptions of the world-ground. For Lotze, therefore, the position exactly reverses itself. Instead of having less within us through that complex of ideas or feelings to which the psychical mechanism has, for the moment, given a preponderating influence. Still less do we exist in time ever wholly for ourselves. For memory loses much, but most of all the record of our own gradually waning individual moods. Many trains of thought familiar to us in our younger days appear to us in advanced years as alien events; powerless to find a road back to sentiments in which we once revelled we hardly behold a faint afterglow indicating the power which they once possessed over us. Aspirations which once seemed to constitute the most inalienable kernel of ourself appear to us on the other paths along which life has led us as inexplicable mistakes for which we have long since forgotten the incentives. Indeed, we have little reason to speak of the personality of finite beings; it is an ideal which like all ideals is, in its fulness, possessed only by the Infinite, but bestowed upon us, like all good things, only conditionally and imperfectly."
or no personality, the Absolute or Infinite is the home and abode rather of the only full personality; finite human beings, on the other side, possess of this highest form of spiritual life only a small allowance, the reflex only of the full, pure, and perfect light.

From the point of view reached in Lotze's writings we may look back upon the ideas developed on this subject in the preceding systems of philosophy, notably in those of Hegel and Schleiermacher. And perhaps the difference in the treatment of it by those two leading thinkers may best be described by saying that the system of Hegel did not do justice to the problem of personality, be this finite or infinite, but that Schleiermacher had a full appreciation of the importance of finite personality. In other words, Schleiermacher introduced into his system the full and clear conception of individuality, meaning by this term finite personality; whereas, in Hegel's system even the finite forms of personality appear to receive as little attention as they do in Kant's system. It was one of the main objections which Schleiermacher's mind harboured against the ethics of Kant, that the latter founded morality upon a purely formal and inflexible principle which appeared empty and left no room for individual modes of conduct, and it was just in these that Schleiermacher himself recognised one of the main characteristics of man and mankind. But it has been repeatedly urged that Schleiermacher's conception of religion as the relation to the Infinite, as the feeling of absolute dependence of the finite, gives ample room for the endless variety of finite lives and aspirations, but concentrates the whole conception of the
other term of the relation into the idea of Unity, of the One and All. Nevertheless, in the sequel of his ethical speculations, the idea of individuality or of finite personality leads him at least so far as to recognise in the Person of Christ the perfect realisation of the moral ideal beyond which no advance is conceivable or possible. With this concession, which may not suffice to carry him to the full conception of a Personal Deity nor of a Revelation in the orthodox sense of the word, he nevertheless introduces an idea foreign to the Hegelian system. It is that of Discontinuity, of an interruption in the continuous flow and change which the idea of development has introduced into modern thought. In this way Schleiermacher finds, as it were, a resting-place, a central point, towards which all psychological and metaphysical as well as all ethical and historical speculation converges, and by doing so he re-introduces into philosophy an idea which is foreign to the idealistic as well as to the naturalistic systems of nineteenth century thought. This is the idea of the Miraculous.

With this idea of the miraculous or supernatural we come upon the second important attribute which attaches to the essence of spirituality; in fact, it is quite impossible to form in any way an adequate idea of the Spiritual if we confine ourselves to that conception of Order, be this mechanical or logical, with which we operate—and are forced to operate—in all detailed research, whether this be carried on in the region of purely physical or in that of mental or of historical phenomena. Accordingly we find that all trains of

1 See the quotation given in the last chapter, p. 178 n.
thought which seek for knowledge, truth, and insight through the patient accumulation of detailed research by the combined analytic and synthetic methods have, in one form or other, rejected this idea of the miraculous, seeing in it a break in the continuity and uniformity of existence and development which forms the openly or tacitly assumed postulate of all their reasoning.

The question of the supernatural or miraculous has been discussed from many points of view since David Hume wrote his celebrated 'Essay on Miracles.' But the argument has considerably changed in the course of the nineteenth century: as much through the influence of philosophic as through that of scientific thought. In Hume's time there did not exist any clear and definite doctrine which set forth the nature and limits of scientific or exact reasoning. The conception also of laws of nature was not clearly fixed. At that time even the laws of motion and of gravitation were still subjects of discussion not only among philosophers but also among scientific authorities. Accordingly the point which Hume mainly discusses is that

1 Forming the 10th section of 'An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding,' first published (1748) anonymously with the title 'Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding.' This publication which the author desired should "alone be regarded as containing his philosophical principles and sentiments," remained, as he himself complained, obscure while the subject leapt into prominence through the "ferment on account of Dr Middleton's 'free enquiry into the miraculous powers which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church from the earliest ages through several successive centuries'" (1748-1749). Hume's biographer, John Hill Burton, tells us ('Life, &c., of David Hume,' vol. i., 1846, p. 272) that though neglected in this country, "it will be found correctly set forth in a German biographical work, infinitely superior to any we possess in this country: Adelung's Supplement to 'Jöchers Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon.'"
regarding the possibility of historical evidence for the occurrence of definite miracles, notably the miracles recorded in the New Testament. Miracles are looked upon mainly as events which differ from, or break through, the usual and customary order of things as testified by the accumulated evidence of living and trustworthy historical witnesses. There is indeed underlying the argument of Hume, in whose philosophy the idea of custom plays an important part, the conception of a universal, unalterable order without the assumption of which all human argument on things and events is impossible. But it has not been sufficiently pointed out either by Hume or by any of his successors, except in quite recent times, that this universal and unalterable order may possibly refer only to that restricted though increasing array of facts and events upon which our thoughts can profitably and usefully dwell in detail, and which form the object of such of our active mental enquiry as we can put to useful purpose in the regulation of the details of individual and social life. We are apt to overlook the much larger and wider array of facts and events in the face of which we must assume a merely contemplative and receptive attitude. In the age of Hume philosophers had only just begun to be impressed by the extraordinary fruitfulness which the knowledge of a few well-established relations in the region of physical science promised to have for the progress of human thought and culture. Since that age this knowledge has been enormously increased by the discovery of an additional small number of similar relations, by
a seemingly almost endless application of these relations or so-called laws of nature, and latterly by a successful unification of apparently quite disparate scientific aspects. The argument against the supernatural has therefore been strengthened not only in the direction of historical evidence against isolated miraculous events, but also—and this is much more important—by arriving at a clearer definition of what this unalterable order really consists in, an order in which Hume, and still more his predecessors in ancient philosophy, had only a general and axiomatic belief. The human mind, even in its most exalted and far-seeing representatives, can only take in a very small portion of reality. It is apt to be unduly impressed with the importance of such arguments and lines of reasoning as form the region and the subject of its own spontaneous thoughts. Accordingly scientific authorities, notably those who deal with the most abstract and most clearly defined sequences of thought, are apt to attach an importance to them which is unduly exaggerated if they be regarded from that universal position which is the only one that becomes the philosophic, as distinguished from the scientific, mind. The latter has reached the highest only when it has been able to demonstrate the truth or applicability of one principle, or at most, of a very small number of detached principles. The philosophic mind, on the other hand, has always attained its highest when it was able to demonstrate the limitation of any single principle and to rise to the idea that some point of view must exist which is much higher than all or any of those
aspects which have as yet singly presented themselves to the human intellect. Expressed in other words, it will always be the tendency of the philosophic mind to take transcendental views, to look at things as Spinoza said, "sub specie aeternitatis," whereas it is the characteristic of the scientific mind to look at everything "sub specie uniformitatis," bringing as it were everything to the same level and under the same rule and measure. What to the philosopher is transcendental becomes to the scientific mind immanent and must become so if it is to be a fruitful idea. Thinkers like Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel have established the transcendental point of view, but they or their successors have usually failed when they attempted to bring it down to the level of a useful rule or principle of thought; or they have succeeded only by losing hold of its transcendency. This has notably been the case in the Hegelian school, in which the transcendentalists have not succeeded in carrying further or even in maintaining the lofty speculation of their master; whereas the opposed section have, in the course of their varied researches, gradually lost sight of Hegel's central idea: the gradual unfolding of the Absolute, or the Divine Spirit. Now it is characteristic of nineteenth century thought that, in its scientific development, it for a time strengthened the belief that a purely mechanical formula would suffice for the gradual, though possibly very remote, comprehension of all the facts and phenomena of experi-

1 D. F. Strauss, the celebrated author of the 'Life of Jesus,' who started from the Hegelian point of view, wrote, in his later life, facetiously to a friend that Hegelianism had become to him, after all, little more than "a shaky double tooth."
Expression has been given to this belief in the self-confident and even triumphant teachings of materialism from the time of the French encyclopædists

1 In the present connection as referring to the problem of the Spirit it may suffice to select out of an enormous literature on the subject a few outstanding pronouncements. Among leading intellects who have exerted great influence upon current philosophical thought, especially in Germany, no one has more emphatically and uncompromisingly rejected the conception of the miraculous than Eduard Zeller. In this regard his 'Poemis with Albrecht Ritschl' are well worth reading. In an anonymous and highly interesting article, contributed in the year 1860 to the 4th volume of Sybel's 'Historische Zeitschrift' (p. 50, sqq.), Zeller reviewed the principal distinctive features of the Tübingen historical school of which Ferd. Chr. Baur (1792-1860) was the head and centre. Of these the first was expressed as follows: "Of the two presuppositions of the older supernaturial theology, that we possess in the biblical records firstly, plain history, and secondly, a supernatural event not governed by the general laws of historical happening — of these two presuppositions Baur dropped the second, the first he did dare, in the main, to meddle with. Thus there arose for him the task of showing that it was only necessary to understand rightly the biblical reports in order to find in them, instead of supposed miracles, only natural and fully intelligible events" (reprinted in Zeller's 'Vorträge und Abhandlungen,' vol. i., 2nd ed., p. 297). Incidentally the author refers (p. 302) to Schleiermacher's and Hegel's views on this subject: "Schleiermacher as critic and exegete took up to the writings of the New Testament mainly a rationalistic position, whilst, indeed, in his Glaubenslehre with the fundamental miracle of the ideally perfect Christ he opened the door to all other miracles. ... Hegel also, to begin with, took up a rationalistic position to positive religion. ... In the sequel, when the reconciliation of faith and knowledge became the watchword of his philosophy of Religion, he explained that the historical side was immaterial for the believer as it only depended upon the idea contained therein: and thus he expresses himself so vaguely that the most opposite views could appeal to him with equal justice." Further on Zeller gives a very clear definition of his objection to the miraculous: "A miracle is an event which stands in contradiction to the analogy of all other experience, and this is, indeed, the essence and the notion of a miracle" (p. 304). He then goes on to repeat in substance what David Hume had already said in his Essay on Miracles a century before.

To these expositions of Zeller Albrecht Ritschl replied in a paper published in the 'Jahrbücher fur Deutsche Theologie' (1861) on the Historical method of investigating early Christianity (vol. vi. pp. 429-459). This reply, as well as the article of Zeller which provoked it, are important as showing how Ritschl, in following Schleiermacher, approaches the sacred histories from a position which differs completely from that of science or metaphysics. The substance of his argument is that the authors of
through the German school of materialism in the middle of the century down to the present age which has witnessed the popularity of Haeckel's later writings. A deeper philosophic insight has meanwhile gained ground, and is slowly but surely passing away from these ambitious and over-confident theories; notably the inability to lay down any mechanical device or scheme which explains the phenomena of life from its lowest forms up to the highest, such as consciousness or individuality, has led to the tacit or open avowal that the mechanical order is permeated by some other principle for which science can find no definite expression but which becomes revealed and known, though not defined, to us in our own self-consciousness and in that of our fellow-men. But this is exactly what the transcendentalists place at the head and beginning of their systems, calling it by various names, such as the Absolute, the Spirit, or the Divine. This means that we are forced to maintain that the higher principle

the sacred records were impressed with an entirely novel view of the world and human life, and that they reported to the best of their understanding—to which modern scientific views were quite alien—how this new faith had been borne in upon them. A summary statement of the controversy is given in 'Ritschl's Life' (vol. i. p. 393 sqq.) Two aspects of the subject seem to be not clearly separated in this controversy. If a miracle is defined as a unique event it is impossible to judge it by analogy with other events without denying its unique character, and as such both Schleiermacher and Ritschl considered the whole of the Christian dispensation. If, on the other side, a miracle is defined as a breach in the continuity or uniformity of natural events—or, as it is termed, a break of the laws of nature—the decision in any single instance will depend not only on a complete historical record, if such were possible, but also on an assurance that our knowledge of the laws or the uniformity of nature is final and complete. These two considerations, as in the controversy just mentioned, so also in many similar ones, have not been clearly separated. The attempt at their clear separation belongs to a more recent phase of thought.
is not purely transcendent but is at the same time immanent in the world as we know it. As we have seen on a former occasion,\(^1\) the materialists of the school of Büchner and Vogt unknowingly admitted this point by using the terms "matter" and "force" in a sense which was not purely mechanical, and Haeckel, on his part, concedes the same point by endowing his underlying substance with mental, \(i.e.,\) non-mechanical attributes or properties; not to speak of other systems which take refuge in such indefinite principles as the Unconscious, the Sub-conscious, the Unknowable, or the Incognoscible.

The effect of this open or covert admission of a transcendent spiritual principle into the region of sensuous phenomena has been to alter and widen the conception of nature or of the natural order. Nature is now no more, even to the scientific thinker, a mechanical contrivance like a complicated and highly ingenious engine coming, more or less perfect, from the hands of its maker, as it was alike to the supernaturalists and rationalists of the eighteenth century. Nature is—what it always has been to the common-sense view—a texture in which the mechanical warp is shot through everywhere by the spiritual woof.

The term supernatural has therefore lost its meaning in the eyes of many modern thinkers. The spiritual principle is not above nature but everywhere permeates it. Notably the highest phenomenon which nature presents to us, the phenomenon of consciousness, our subjective experience of an inner unity of thought

\(^1\) See supra, vol. iii. p. 565, 601, \(sqq.\)
and personality—Kant's unity of apperception—is as much as anything else a natural and everyday phenomenon, though it is not purely mechanical. The spiritual, in fact, is not supernatural in the older sense of the word, but is rather intra-mechanical—i.e., it permeates or underlies everywhere the mechanical connection of things. And if we designate by the term miraculous simply that which is contrary to the uniform and customary experience of men, then the spiritual as it reveals itself daily in the life and action of human beings, in the events of past and present history, and, to a lesser degree, in the animated creation, possibly also, as the underlying and sustaining power in the cosmic world—i.e., in the universe—is not identical with the miraculous.

This conception of the intimate intertwining of the mechanical and spiritual had been brought out with considerable clearness already by Kant in his third "Critique," where the indication at least of a view is given in which the dualism of the first two Critiques is superseded by a monistic view. It was accordingly the ideas thrown out, rather than elaborated, by Kant in this the latest of his great works which formed the starting-point for the monistic speculations of Schelling, and in which Goethe likewise welcomed a congenial suggestion. Then came a period in philosophic thought in which the spiritual factor of experience was unduly emphasised with little knowledge and still less appreciation of the importance of the mechanical; and when, on the other side, the mechanical relations were exclusively studied with a corresponding neglect of all spiritual phenomena.
The balance was, however, restored to a great extent in the systematic writings of Lotze,\(^1\) and in the less systematic, though equally original, speculations of his friend Lotze's writings may be best expressed by the term used in the text, and suggested by one of the many felicitous and illuminating dicta of the late William James. That small portion of the universe which is accessible to our experience and observation is in Lotze's sense a texture in which mechanism is the warp, the threads of which are everywhere to be seen or looked for, whereas the spiritual is, as it were, the woof which weaves into the system of mechanical threads the actual pattern or living image. His earlier writings, destined to bring clearness into the reasoning of the biological sciences, emphasise the first of the two factors, the all-pervading mechanism. It was not recognised that the enlivening principle was really that for which Lotze felt the greater interest. This he clearly unfolded in the second period of his literary labours to which the 'Microcosmus' belongs. In the meantime the actual tracing of the mechanical lines and connections, visible or hidden, in the texture of the existing world, had become so promising an undertaking, not only in natural but also in historical research, that the spiritual came to be regarded as an epi-phenomenon, or even as a fiction, as something which for the scientific understanding of phenomena could be disregarded. Thus the line of thought taken by Lange and the Neokantians was favoured by thinkers (such, e.g., as Strauss and Zeller), who, starting from historical studies, came in later life under the influence of prominent leaders in the mechanical and biological sciences, such as Helmholtz, Kirchhoff, and du Bois Reymond. These, on their part, however, were either much more reticent as to the spiritual side of things or professed a much greater Agnosticism than the philosophers whom they influenced. This influence prevented the latter from recognising how much juster and fairer a view was being prepared by Lotze's penetrating, though sometimes over-cautious and hesitating, investigations. Notably, as regards the question before us, the existence of the miraculous, neither Zeller nor Lange nor Strauss can have read or appreciated what Lotze said in the second volume of the 'Microcosmus' (p. 51 sqq.) But the controversy on the miraculous as carried on by Zeller and Ritschl without regard to Lotze's reflections is interesting as revealing that growing tendency of thought to which I have had repeated occasion to refer. This I have termed the synoptic aspect (the rue d'ensemble), contrasting it with the combined synthetic and analytic methods. Ritschl, following Schleiermacher, emphatically takes up the former. They start from religion in its individual and historic appearance as a totality, a comprehensive attitude of the mind to the whole of nature and life: notably the Christian view and the Christian history imply a comprehensive order of things quite different from that revealed by the modern methods in scientific research and historical criticism. Now, Zeller was a foremost representative of the latter and, influenced by his academic surroundings an admirer of, though not an adept in, the former. The feature com-
and contemporary, G. T. Fechner. The peculiarity of Lotze's system is, first of all, his elaborate demonstration that even the mechanical connection of things in time and space—what the human mind calls the relations of things or the laws of nature—cannot be grasped in human thought otherwise than by assuming an underlying unity of existence called by him the universal substance. Of this we have an immediate knowledge only in the experience of the unity of our own thought and consciousness.

But Lotze goes a step further, though he never arrived at a systematic elaboration of this portion of his system, but rather postulated its results in the form of an underlying conviction which prompted and sustained the whole of his reasoning. This consists in defining the essence

mon to these is to search for the elemental facts and build up complex phenomena by a plausible and intelligible synthesis of these. The time had not yet arrived when the truth, fully seen by Lotze, was to become more generally accepted, that no complex phenomenon can be reconstructed and thoroughly understood by such a process. The original synoptical whole, if once dissected into its elements, cannot again be regained by synthesis: either through complexity or through a loss of the uniting bond, the true reality, the actual life is lost. But we have in recent times, as explained more fully in the text, more and more learnt that this remark does not refer only to such stupendous events as the appearance, origin, and history of the Christian religion, but that it applies also to occurrences which happen daily under our very eyes, such notably as the phenomena of life, consciousness and freewill, which have not infrequently been termed miracles, and which, if we attempt to dissect and explain them scientifically, present to us something seemingly incommensurable or irrational. The foremost representative of this view among thinkers seems to me to be the late Prof. Wilhelm Dilthey, in whose speculation Erlebniss (living experience) forms a central conception. 1 See on this subject the very interesting Review by Lotze ('Kleine Schriften,' vol. iii. p. 396-437). It refers to Strauss' 'Der alte und der neue Glaube' (1872), and Fechner's 'Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht' (1879). Lotze expresses himself as unable to accept the "new creed" of Strauss, and deplores that the latter had met the over hasty conclusions of naturalists with a readiness of belief which he otherwise "denied to everything which did not justify itself to his own subjective understanding."
of the underlying spiritual unity as that which is, to us human beings, of supreme interest or value, affording the highest form of intellectual and spiritual pleasure or joy, and which presents itself as alone meriting existence for its own sake, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. And religion begins for Lotze with the further conviction arrived at by a personal effort or resolution of the character that this valuable content is actually realised in the holy personality of a living God, the supreme Being. For without the reference to a person, those highest conceptions of Justice, Beauty, and Goodness lose all reality and become empty abstractions.

It might thus seem as if in Lotze's conception of the two worlds, the mechanical and the spiritual, the world of things and the world of values and their unity, which is partially realised in finite personalities but completed only in the infinite personality of the Deity, a position was gained from which the dualism inherent in other systems of philosophy was overcome, or where a solution is at least indicated. This, however, is not the case. The very fact that Lotze maintains that it is only by a definite struggle, by a moral effort, and not by a purely logical process, that this position can be reached is a proof to us that there is another difficulty to be overcome, a difficulty which cannot be explained away even if the antiquated contrasts of the natural and the supernatural, of the outer and the inner, of efficient and final causes, were overcome. This difficulty is the existence of Evil in the world; comprising under the term not only the human phenomena of sin and guilt but also the widespread suffering in animated nature in which
we cannot recognise the existence of any scheme of retribution. With the admission of this highest problem of philosophy and its ultimate insolubility for the human intellect,¹ Lotze reminds us of the many in

¹ The principal passages in Lotze’s writings which refer to this subject are to be found, first, in the Lecture Course on Philosophy of Religion (§§ 75-83) where the grave problems are pointed out “which arise out of the actual existence of evil, for the order of things it corresponds to, the ideal of God [as metaphysically explained], would have to be the faultless realisation of the highest Good. All answers which are wont to be given in the form of a Theodicy are quite inadequate.” These answers attempt first to deny or minimise evil, but the real evil, according to Lotze, does not consist in the absence of a good but in the pain which this absence creates. It is equally useless to call evil merely relative, and to maintain that from the Divine point of view the existing disharmony disappears, for to finite beings the sorrow of this disharmony would not equally disappear; and “lastly, it is incorrect to consider physical evil merely as something accidental or accessory. It is not only intercurrent, but the whole existence of the animal kingdom is systematically founded upon the destruction of one by the other, and this with a cruelty which is anticipated in the natural impulses of the different kinds.” Other attempts to solve the problem are criticised, and the whole discussion summed up in the following words: “The results of our reflection constitute exactly the ground on which at all times pessimistic views have grown up; these may eventually admit what might theoretically be established regarding the one comprehensive Power which we must assume in order to make the course of things intelligible, but they, on the other hand, deny our right to transform this conception of power through the predicate of goodness into that of the Deity; they rather see in the course of things nothing but the blind unfolding of a primordial ground which does not work for the realisation of happiness, but which, in individual minds, becomes conscious of its misfortune, and leaves nothing but the longing for annihilation. One may see in this an extreme exaggeration, a complete ignoring of the good things which, after all, reality presents along with the evil ones; but it must be admitted that theoretically it is impossible whilst discarding pessimism to prove that optimism which follows consistently from our religious conception of God. . . . If, in the face of this and fully renouncing every theoretical proof, we are nevertheless convinced of the truth of the religious belief, we consider this conviction as a resolution of the character. And religion really begins for us with this theoretically indemonstrable but nevertheless actually admitted sense of obligation, of being controlled by that Infinite Reality, the truth of which we cannot theoretically demonstrate.” The second important passage will be found in the fifth chapter of the 9th Book of the ‘Microcosmus,’ in which Lotze desires to “lay stress upon the decisive and altogether insurmountable difficulty which stands in the way of his [highest philosophic] Belief being carried out scientifically — i.e., upon the existence of evil and sin in nature and history.”
effectual attempts which Schelling had made to grapple with it; and it requires only one step more to designate it as the seeming Irrationality of Existence; the solution, if such be possible, as something in the true sense of the word, supernatural or miraculous. It may indeed be of some help to gain through the examples of the goodness and saintliness of human character which it may have been our good fortune to witness in rare instances, an outlook into a higher region in which the clouds have disappeared and the light of the highest truth has for a moment shone brightly; but such individual experience, in the opinion of many of us, cannot suffice to permanently dispel the doubts which ever and again crowd in upon us. This, if at all possible, could be effected by nothing less than an absolute miracle, by an event or a series of events so remarkable in themselves and so different from anything presented in ordinary life and experience, that it has not only succeeded in altering the course of human history, but still succeeds in endowing individual souls with that strength of character which creates and sustains the "Will to Believe."

But this is exactly what religious persons term a Revelation. Lotze has not dealt fully with this subject, nor is it perhaps the duty of the philosopher to do more than he has done; leading his readers through a variety of discussions, in which many difficulties have been removed and many minor problems solved, on to a recognition of that highest problem which is insoluble for the human intellect. To this undertaking theology—or religious thought in a more restricted sense of the word
—would form a kind of counterpart or complement in which he who believes in the existence of a revelation such as philosophy may indicate or postulate but cannot prove, starts from it as a given historical fact and practical experience. But what would then be comprised in such a further exposition would not come into the region of philosophical but would belong to that of religious thought.

It seems to me that the philosophical importance of Albrecht Ritschl’s theology lies not in a psychological or logical analysis, such as was attempted by Schleiermacher, but in a straightforward declaration of the independence of religious beliefs, as distinguished from philosophical creeds, and this not only for the individual, but emphatically also for the community of individuals, the brotherhood of men.¹ In the course of the

¹ It may be surprising to some of my readers that in a history of philosophical thought so much prominence should be given to the doctrine of Albrecht Ritschl, since none of the existing excellent histories of recent philosophy do more than just mention Ritschl’s name in connection with the revival of Kantian studies in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century. But the very fact that the term “Ritschlianism” has been coined and used especially in this country is a sign that we have to do not merely with an individual doctrine but with a tendency of thought which exists not only in Germany, and not only in theological schools, but is of wider and general interest. Ritschl has succeeded in giving to the problem of faith and knowledge or—as it presented itself to him—of metaphysics and theology, a new aspect, resulting in a very extensive literature. He has not, indeed, in any way settled the question, but he has thrown a ferment into philosophical, theological, and general thought which has not yet spent its force. This has been admitted not only by admirers and followers but also by opponents. "For the interest of the subject reaches entirely beyond the limits of theological and philosophical speculation. It concerns, and vitally concerns, all those who think about the relation of Christian faith to modern thought and knowledge. It concerns them in two ways. Ritschlianism is both influential and typical. As an influence it has reached far, and is present in many places where it is not named or recognised. One who does not know the influence at its source will deal clumsily with its results. But it is also typical. Many minds in the last few decades have been
development of Ritschl's theological convictions we have to mark two important stages: the first, when he freed himself from the fetters of the Hegelian philosophy which assigned to religion an important but a subordinate position in mental development; the second, when he, through his historical and biblical studies, became so deeply impressed with the personality of Christ and His work that he recognised in it an absolutely new content and beginning of spiritual life, and undertook to found the whole of his theology upon this discovery as an independent and original source.

Independent of Ritschl, Lotze was then already admitting in his lectures on the Philosophy of Religion the possibility of new beginnings and origins in the midst of a uniform system of mechanical relations, provided—as he was wont to express it—that the ultimate purpose implied in the general scheme of existence, which is unknown to us, warranted the departure from, what we call, the ordinary and uniform course of events. He had also recognised that a partial reconciliation of the mechanical and spiritual was to be found in the existence of human personalities. It was, therefore, not a new idea, but one which forced itself in many ways upon philosophical and religious thinkers, that if the highest problem admitted of any solution at all, such could

Ritschlian without knowing it. If there had been no Ritschl there would have been someone else very like him." These are the words in which Dr Talbot introduces a recent publication by Mr E. A. Edghill, being an essay which divided with that of Mr J. K. Mozley, the Norrisian prize of 1908 at Cambridge; and these two recent critics of Ritschlianism have shown its affinity to, or influence on, other recent movements in religious and philosophical thought, such as that represented by Sabatier in France, by "Modernism" among Roman Catholics, and by "Pragmatism" in English-speaking countries.
only be found in some personality exalted enough to force upon human minds the conviction that the supreme moral law, the voice of conscience, was a Divine Revelation, and to give to it such an expression as would, for all times and for all practical purposes, supersede the perplexing speculations or quibbles of contending philosophical systems and prevent it from falling to the level of a purely conventional moral code. This higher sanction and deeper expression is to be found in the person of Jesus Christ, and in His teaching that "God is Love," and that the highest moral law is the rule or kingdom of Love, the Divine Order. It may be that a glimpse of this view had already casually been caught by prophets, lawgivers, and thinkers in pre-Christian times; but it was not proclaimed, as it were, from the house-tops and forced upon the attention and recognition of a large number of persons who lived and worked among men of all grades and stations of life and in very different nationalities. That such has nevertheless been done constitutes a unique fact of history, a fact so important in its results that it has become the point of reference for all subsequent developments, the centre of civilisation ever since.

To study this remarkable phenomenon forms the task of theology proper which should unfold our knowledge of the Divine, as science unfolds that of the Natural Order of Things. It has thus acquired an independent foundation, whereas without it all moral or spiritual teaching must, according to this view, necessarily in the end become merely a doubtful chapter of philosophical speculation, or an equally doubtful and merely tem-
porary theory of science. An insistence upon this radical distinction of religious from philosophical and scientific thought has, in one form or other, been the theme of religious philosophy in Germany ever since the time of Ritschl, who has thus emphasised the most important side of Schleiermacher's teaching. Nothing essentially new has been added, though the variations in which this theme has been elaborated are numerous and interesting.¹

¹ We have seen in earlier chapters of this History how in the course of the second half of the century clearer ideas were gained as to the independence of scientific research in relation to philosophical discussions. We have seen how a few clearly-defined principles have become the foundations of large regions of natural knowledge; such principles had to justify themselves through experience; for scientific purposes this has proved sufficient. The scientific interest was satisfied if such principles were clearly stated, and could be usefully applied in describing, measuring, and foretelling natural phenomena. A similar demarcation of interests has been attempted in quite a different region. Religious Thought has striven in a similar way to vindicate its independence of philosophical considerations by similarly justifying itself before an independent tribunal, this being religious (including moral) experience. To have helped in this direction is probably the principal merit of Ritschl's doctrine, and as this point is equally important to the liberal and the conservative schools of religious thought, Ritschl has, in a sense, brought these two schools together. Neither of them may have, in the sequel, adopted, in its integrity, the view he took, but that he made them consider the logical and psychological foundations of their respective systems, assures to him a permanent place in the history of recent theology from whichever side it may be written. This is very clearly shown by the enormous literature dealing with Ritschl's theology, and especially with the point referred to. I confine myself to mentioning the 'History of Recent Theology in Germany,' by Fr. H. R. von Frank (revised and continued by Grützmacher, 4th edition, 1908), which devotes 76 out of 376 pages to Ritschl's theology and the movement created by it. The author belonged to the conservative 'Erlangen School,' and is on the whole, though not without sympathetic understanding, opposed to Ritschlianism. It will also be quite clear to my readers that the history of philosophic thought has no concern with the structures which religious thought, be it doctrinal or practical, has reared upon the foundations laid down, just as little as it has been our concern to follow admitted scientific principles into the rapidly increasing and changing details of natural knowledge and natural philosophy in themselves.
But a question of considerable importance has arisen in reference to that body of doctrine which during the last two hundred years has sprung up and been cultivated under various names—such as Natural Religion, Deism, or Rationalism. This doctrine professes to be based upon the ordinary and common experience of thinking persons, assisted in various ways by scientific reasoning and the outcome of historical research. It professes to collect, contain, and substantiate the principal and most important tenets of Christian ethics, but to dispense with the assistance of any special revelation other than that afforded by common-sense, philosophical reasoning, and the natural feeling of obligation commonly termed the voice of conscience. This body of doctrine was elaborated with more or less fulness and consistency in the eighteenth century, and found many adherents, especially among the cultured classes, among literary and scientific persons in England, France, and latterly also in Germany. It called itself Deism or, later, Theism—the difference in general being that the former believes only in what is called a Divine or moral Order, whereas the latter considers this Divine Order to culminate in and be dependent on a personal Deity. Recent speculation in Germany, notably in the school of Ritschl, does not admit that such a natural religion can be satisfactorily elaborated and maintained; it holds, further, that whatever may be correct and spiritually helpful in such a doctrine, requires some higher sanction which will prevent it from succumbing on the one side to the attacks of logical criticism, and on the other to the selfish interests of human beings: it must,
in fact, be what Carlyle called "a great heaven-high Un-questionability, encompassing, interpenetrating the whole of Life."¹ Moreover, the various teachings of Ration-alistic Thought, be they popular or metaphysical, in prose or in poetry, have not succeeded in bringing out any important point which is not to be found incorporated already in Christian doctrine. And a reasonable suspicion exists that the various elevating ideas which are to be found in this extensive class of literature have been imported, consciously or uncon-sciously, from out of the body of beliefs contained in the existing historical religions.

In fact, it may be held that no one who nowadays thinks or speculates on such subjects can escape the influence of the surrounding intellectual and spiritual atmosphere in which he or his teachers have been brought up, and that the elaboration of any creed what-ever, without bias and preconceptions, is a sheer impos-sibility. But admitting even that there exist certain ideals—such as Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and the doctrine of universal brotherhood or Love—which, how-\[see 'Past and Present,' Carlyle's Works, Library Edition, | vol. xiii. p. 76.\]ever they may have been discovered, exist and are upheld by a general consensus and incorporated in all civilised speech; it seems, nevertheless, impossible that they can, without some higher command or sanction, become sufficiently real and powerful to keep in subjection and ultimately conquer the Spirit of Evil. It may indeed be possible for individual persons living in seclusion and apart from the ways and interests of the

masses of mankind, for poetical minds who live above the ordinary level of existence, or for thinkers who enjoy the luxury of the sapientum templo serena, to frame for themselves some abstract view of the world and life which satisfies their spiritual needs. But such existences are only hothouse plants, the choice fruits of a spiritual atmosphere, the product of a general culture and civilisation which has grown up and is maintained through the influence of quite different and more powerful moral forces; they would gradually and inevitably disappear if those moral forces themselves ceased to exist or were not continually renovated. To maintain a belief in these underlying spiritual forces, to cultivate the sense of Reverence, the conviction that there is something which remains intact and unchangeable in and amidst the fluctuations of opinion, the extremes of theory, the struggles towards reform and the storms of revolution, something that constitutes a secure foundation and an abiding centre of reference and appeal, something, in fact, which in our minds deserves the name of the All-Holy; this seems to be an indispensable requisite to our individual and still more to our social welfare and happiness. And the education and preservation of this sentiment appears to be the most important, but also the most difficult, task for those to whom the guidance and instruction of coming generations is entrusted. Now to many of us it does not seem possible to divest this sentiment of reverence of its personal character; inasmuch as it implies a relation between individuals or persons, and grows up and is maintained during the earlier period of our lives through the personal relations
of the family, relations which in the later school of life acquire larger dimensions and a deeper significance, but are in danger of being lost where and whenever the sense of a higher obligation of mutual and collective responsibility and dependence becomes obliterated or even materially weakened.

It is an extraordinary phenomenon in modern literature, especially in the higher intellectual literature of Germany, that this view was strongly urged by one who stood outside systematic thought, but who nevertheless absorbed all the best influences of modern science and culture, who had early liberated himself from the fetters of purely conventional and traditional doctrine, and who stands out as the greatest representative of what has been called the doctrine or gospel of Inner Freedom: by one who, although his life reached only into the first third of the century, may perhaps be considered as the greatest representative of Nineteenth Century thought, of its aspirations as much as of some of the most important of its later developments; exhibiting in his own large view of the world and life, its strength as well as its shortcomings and limitations. This was Goethe, who in one of the most philosophical of his imaginative creations laid it down as the highest duty of the teacher and educator to cultivate the spirit of reverence and worship.\(^1\)

1 See Wilhelm Meister's *Wanderjahre* in Thomas Carlyle's 'Translations from the German' (vol. ii. p. 220). "Wilhelm could have wished to gain some previous knowledge of these sacred things, but his companion answered: 'The Three will doubtless, in return for the confidence you show in leaving us your son, disclose to you in their wisdom and fairness what is most needful for you to learn. The visible objects of reverence, which I named sacred things, are collected in this separate circle; are mixed with nothing, interfered with by
partially successful but mostly quite unsuccessful older or modern schemes and attempts towards the establishment of a new Order of society, it is striking to see what importance they have attached to the foundation and maintenance of some form of cult or worship in which the feeling of duty and obligation could be incorporated and find some definite expression; how they have sought and how little they have been able to find this centre of reference and appeal, any Highest, truly real, object of Reverence. This has notably been the case in the later developments of Comte's Positivism as contained in the 'Politique Positive' and in the institutions of some of his disciples. But this is not of special interest to us in the present connection, as we have to do not with practical applications but with the purely philosophical aspect of the problem of the Spirit, the religious problem.

III.

The mention of the illustrious names of Goethe and Carlyle affords us a welcome opportunity for passing away from German speculation on this problem to what

nothing; at certain seasons of the year only are our pupils admitted here, to be taught in their various degrees of culture, &c. . . . Well-formed, healthy children bring much into the world along with them! Nature has given to each whatever he requires for time and duration; to unfold this is our duty: often it unfolds better of its own accord. One thing there is, however, which no child brings into the world with him; and yet it is on this one thing that all depends for making man in every point a man. If you can discover it yourself, speak it out!' Wilhelm thought a little while, then shook his head. The Three, after a suitable pause, exclaimed: Reverence! Wilhelm seemed to hesitate. Reverence, cried they a second time. All want it, perhaps you yourself...
has been done in a less systematic manner in other countries, and, in the first instance, in this country. It is a very significant fact that it was the literary creations and the personality of Goethe himself which first gave to one of the foremost thinkers in this country a deeper insight into, and a real understanding of, the originality and importance of German thought. It is still more remarkable and noteworthy that among those who created this interest in German thought Thomas Carlyle stands out as by far the most impressive and powerful writer; a man who had been brought up within the narrowest and hardest form of Scotch puritanism, who for a moment was in danger of losing his deeper hold of the Spiritual, but who, after a violent struggle with unbelief, passed from the "Everlasting No" through the centre of indifference to the "Everlasting Yea," and laid down in a series of writings, which are unique, and have become classical in English literature, the story of his doubts and the restoration of his belief. \[1\] And among his numerous essays none is more remarkable than the one in which he introduces to his readers that very work of Goethe which deals with the religious problem in Education. \[2\]

\[1\] A very interesting study of this subject is to be found in a tract by J. H. Wilhelmi, entitled 'Th. Carlyle und Fr. Nietzsche, Wie sie Gott suchten, und, war fur einen Gott sie fanden' (1897). It draws a parallel between Carlyle and Nietzsche as having encountered the same doubts and difficulties, and contrasts the direction and result of their respective solutions; admitting at the same time that Nietzsche's solution was probably not final, as his philosophical development was prematurely cut short.

\[2\] It is a remarkable fact that Carlyle's appreciation of Goethe written during the lifetime of the poet still ranks amongst the best utterances on the subject, containing not only a full and true estimate of Goethe's genius and personality, but also a very adequate appreciation of his influence, both on German and more generally on European thought and literature.
country these writings have formed a turning point in their mental development, imparting to their life and thought a stedfastness and tone which has never been forgotten, but has made it unnecessary for them to peruse or assimilate the voluminous abstract and systematic literature in which German philosophers have, as we have seen, grappled with the spiritual problem.

In the attempt to characterise the difference which exists in the treatment of this problem in the two countries we may perhaps be allowed to state that, speaking broadly, that very spirit which Goethe found it so necessary to impart, and which he made the highest object of his educational system, the spirit of Reverence, has all through retained a greater hold on the British mind than either on the French or the German mind. In France the writings of Voltaire had, even before the Revolution, added a tone of flippancy and insincerity to that of impurity; and the Revolution itself had finally destroyed, among a large section of the middle and higher classes, the respect not only

This remarkable essay appeared as the introduction to a book called 'German Romance,' published in Edinburgh in 1827. It is reprinted in the 6th volume of the collected works (p. 366 sqq.), filling only a few pages. In these, the few lines (p. 375) containing the characterisation of Goethe, have probably not yet been surpassed, even in the enormous pertinent literature, German and foreign, which has appeared during this last eighty years since the death of Goethe, and which has had the advantage of much wider knowledge of the subject than Carlyle could possibly possess. Especially in this country the appearance of Lewes' 'Life of Goethe' (1st ed., 1855), though adding no doubt very largely to the popular interest of the subject, has rather spoiled the impression afforded by Carlyle's characterisation as it dwelt much more upon the romance of Goethe's life than on the seriousness of his mind and the intrinsic value of his works and his thought.
for persons and institutions but also for the spiritual agencies of which they were—or should have been—the representatives and guardians. This spirit of flippancy and impurity in morals and literature was in process of spreading into the neighbouring countries, and had, in fact, already made considerable progress both in England and Germany when the violent scenes and excesses of the Revolution gave additional strength to a timely reaction which had already set in. It remains the immortal glory of Walter Scott and Wordsworth to have stemmed and broken this tide of impurity and flippancy in the literature of their country, and to have prevented the spread of that irreverent tone to which we have become accustomed in some of the best and most elegant of French writers, which, after the age of Classicism in art and poetry, has gradually taken hold likewise of a large portion of German literature. For a long time it had there been kept in check by the powerful influence of Goethe's sovereign mind.

This characteristic of the English mind, which in its best form is the Spirit of Reverence, has, of course, likewise its less favourable side. For in many cases it is no more than an inherent dislike to break with that which is traditional and conventional: this has been called the conservatism of the English people. To foreigners who have tried to understand the peculiarities of English thinking it has not infrequently presented itself as a servile submission to the powers that be whether for good or for evil—nay, even so far as religious questions are concerned,
as hypocrisy and cant. Such may, indeed, exist to some extent, perhaps to a greater extent than in neighbouring continental countries, but it would be unjust not to recognise that this characteristic quality has its ground in the peculiar form of what may be called the popular logic of the English race. This logic requires always a large and well-established mass of facts wherewith to begin and whereon to rest its arguments. To what extent this sense for the factual and historical owes its existence and convincing power to the absence of any break in the continuity of the nation's history for a period of many centuries, combined with the insular compactness of social life and progress, may be difficult, if not impossible, to decide. There is, however, no doubt that it is distasteful to many thoughtful minds in this country to leave the region and level of clear facts in quest of the underlying causes and beginnings, or to abstract and vaporise them in favour of some supposed systematic construction. English thought, and notably English philosophical thought, is, therefore, intrinsically neither radical nor systematic. It has not developed that interest in either the substructures or the superstructures of reality which is so common among continental thinkers; with Descartes and Kant as representatives on the one side, with Hegel and Schopenhauer on the other.

Neither the English nor the Scotch intellect will trust itself to the guidance of purely logical formulæ, or venture more than a few steps up or down the ladder of syllogism; for it is always in fear of losing in such ventures the grasp of that which constitutes the essence
and interest of reality. No English thinker has ever honestly believed or maintained that the Truly Real can be fathomed or exhausted by the thinking process; nor has any English thinker ever unwaveringly believed in the complete unification of knowledge. For most English thinkers, even for the greatest, there has therefore remained a larger or smaller undissolved residue of facts and interests which they have not touched, be it that this has consciously presented itself to them as the Unknowable, or that it has tacitly remained in the background of their speculations as a not clearly defined conviction from which they have nevertheless derived a feeling of strength and security. With no thinker has this been more clearly the case than with Francis Bacon, who, to many Englishmen, is still a kind of philosophical model, and, more than any other among English heroes of thought, marks them off in type from continental nations.

A third characteristic of English thought is its want of continuity, its individualism. We have here no long array of systems following one out of the other either by direct contrast and reaction or by slow development, no lengthy trains of reasoning such as Descartes started in France, Leibniz and after him Kant in Germany, and Spinoza for the general community of continental thinkers. If such trains of reasoning have been started by thinkers in this country, as Locke, Hume, and Darwin, they have usually been consistently followed up, not here, but abroad, where no hesitation has existed to admit and express the most extreme and daring of ultimate logical consequences. From these
the British mind has always recoiled with a characteristic confidence in the dicta of common-sense, but also with a feeling of reserve and of reverence for differing individual convictions. We do not meet in this country with that cheery and light-hearted philosophy which runs through many of the classical writings of the French encyclopædists and naturalists, nor with that profound and imposing sense of serious inner conviction which impressed Hegel's audience and Schopenhauer's readers, contributing so much to the success of their teaching; nor, lastly, with that oracular announcement of secret and hidden truths which was peculiar to Schelling and his disciples. The three just named characteristics of English philosophical thought: the absence of radicalism, of system, and of continuity, joined to undoubted originality in individual instances, are reflected more than anywhere else in those detached and sporadic discussions of the religious problem: the problem of the Spirit. Whereas, on the Continent, notably in Germany, this problem forms, as I have tried to show, the important centre of the entire philosophical movement, it can hardly be maintained that this country has, up to quite recent times, done more than contribute fragments to the discussion.¹ But a few of these frag-

¹ We are impressed very forcibly with the fragmentary and inconclusive nature of British thought on the subject before us by a glance at the table of contents of a recent work by Professor Alfred Caldecott, 'The Philosophy of Religion in England and America' (1901). It is, so far as I know, the only attempt to present in a compact and readable form the sporadic meditations on our subject which are scattered through English literature. The number of names —some of the very first importance—is not less impressive than the number of types under which their very varying contributions are marshalled. Of these types the author finds no less than thirteen. The contributions come from all departments of literature, from purely
ments, as already stated, are of first-rate importance, forming centres around which an enormous controversial literature has sprung up, the chief characteristic of which, however, as of these fragments themselves, has invariably been its inconclusiveness.

Leaving out Carlyle's earlier writings as hardly belonging to philosophical literature and to be thoroughly ap-

scientific writers to such as live on the borderland of prose and poetry, and the list might have been profitably extended by drawing even more fully on imaginative writers, such notably as Tennyson and Robert Browning, who have, together with Wordsworth, perhaps more than any other writers, not only supplied thoughtful minds in this country with as much philosophy of religion as they required or could assimilate, but exhibit more than any others those specific characteristics of British thought which are so difficult for the foreigner to get hold of. Most of the writers mentioned in Caldecott's work do not come within the region of philosophic thought as it is conceived in this history. This claims to be first of all methodical, and though not necessarily, it is usually systematic. But outside of this region, which, so far as the problem before us is concerned, is somewhat limited in English literature, there is a large volume of religious thought which is purely subjective and individual, exhibiting frequently merely the doubts, difficulties, or conclusions which intellects of high order have encountered or arrived at. Thus very few of the writers reviewed in the work mentioned take sufficient note of what others have said before them on their subject. The subjectivity which makes the works of some of them peculiarly fresh and interesting, but for a historical review difficult and perplexing, through unavoidable repetition of similar points of view, contrasts very forcibly with the methodical manner in which the foremost thinkers in Germany have dealt with the subject, clustering mostly around a few prominent names and a few leading ideas. This we see very clearly in such a work as that of Professor O. Pfleiderer, quoted already (ante, p. 304 n.); whereas in the English work among the names mentioned there is only a small number of philosophers, in the narrowest sense of the word, but a very large number of writers who have become famous in other branches of literature. The bulk of the German history is occupied with representatives of philosophy proper, and a comparatively small amount of space is given to unsystematic writers who have dealt casually with the subject. All this testifies to that individualism so peculiar to the English mind, and leads us to anticipate that the last and completing section of a History of Thought, which should deal with individual, poetical, and religious thought, will find this region much more extensively and originally cultivated in this country than abroad. To repeat and sum up, we may say that certainly in recent times France is the home and centre of scientific, Germany of philosophic, and Great Britain of spontaneous individual thought.
precated only in the light of subsequent developments, we may probably exhaust what is important in British contributions to our subject by referring to three or four names in the course of the last one hundred and fifty years. There are, first and foremost—and by no means out of date—Hume's writings, which deal sceptically from various points of view with the religious problem. In addition to the 'Essay on Miracles' already referred to, we have repeated treatment of the subject: in the 'Inquiry' (1748, section xi.); in the 'Natural History of Religion' (1757); and, lastly, in the 'Dialogues concerning Natural Religion' (posthumously published 1779, but written before 1751). The subject was no doubt of great interest to Hume, as is testified not only by these writings but also by his private correspondence; the latter also shows that the author was as much aware of the inconclusiveness of his arguments as his biographers and numerous critics have been, who have found it difficult to decide what definite position, if any, Hume really arrived at. Perhaps he did not feel as keenly as thinkers since his

1 The best account of Hume's pertinent speculations is to be found in Huxley's volume, 'Hume' (John Morley's 'English Men of Letters,' 1902). Fully one-third of the little volume is devoted to the religious and ethical problems, and of this a very large portion consists merely of extracts from Hume's works, very judiciously selected and commentated. Huxley seems to endorse in general what Hume said of the two opposing 'hypotheses' — Spinozism and Orthodoxy. 'I am deafened with the noise of a hundred voices that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great a partiality, and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible, and that, as far as we can understand them, they are so much alike that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity in one which is not common to both of them.' (Hume's Works, 'Treatise of Human Nature.')
time have done, the practical importance of the subject, as is shown by the fact that he turned away from metaphysics and philosophical criticism to economics and historical research.

Equally inconclusive and fragmentary is the contribution which appeared a century later and was also posthumously published, John Stuart Mill's 'Three Essays on Religion' (1874). Both Hume and Mill state clearly the difficulties and objections in the way of upholding existing traditional beliefs. With both the negative portion of the argument forms the most important and stimulating contribution. Neither of them ventures to pronounce against religion altogether, and this not from want of moral courage, but probably from two distinct and honourable motives: first, the respect—nay, even the reverence—which they have for opposite opinions if honestly held; and, second, possibly a lurking suspicion that they have themselves not succeeded in thoroughly grasping and fathoming the problem. Having adduced various arguments, mostly of a negative bearing, they leave their readers to form their own final judgment, if not to remain in a state of doubt, perplexity, and confusion.¹

¹ The difficulty of arriving at a just view of Mill's own position was much accentuated by the passage with which he concludes his third essay. It is there (p. 255) maintained that "to the conception of the rational sceptic it remains a possibility that Christ actually was what he supposed himself to be ... a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue"; and, Mill continues, "the influences of religion on the character which will remain after rational criticism has done its utmost against the evidences of religion, are well worth preserving, and that which they lack in direct strength as compared with those of a firmer belief, is more than compensated by the greater truth and rectitude of the morality they sanction." The fairest comment upon Mill's attitude as revealed in this
A much more emphatic statement of the problem with a much more definite, though not less embarrassing conclusion, appeared in the middle of the century, and

and other passages in the last of his writings is probably that of Mr W. L. Courtney ('Life of John Stuart Mill,' 1889), in which he bids "us remind ourselves that Mill had acknowledged as his chief office in the realm of thought to see the truth in the views of opponents, and to put the adversary's case better than the adversary could have put it" (p. 172). This is in reference to Lord Morley's essay, 'Mr Mill on Religion.' It is reprinted in the 1st edition of 'Critical Miscellanies,' 2nd series, 1877, but has been omitted in the later editions of this collection. For the historian of thought it forms one of the most important documents, as it touches with remarkable clearness on the different aspects which the religious problem presents for philosophical enquiry. The following quatrains from Fitzgerald's 'Omar Khayyam' express very strikingly the sentiment of perplexity produced by such discussions, and have been frequently quoted:—

"Why, all the Saints and Sages who discussed
Of the Two Worlds so wisely—they were thrust
Like foolish Prophets forth; their Words to Scorn
Are scatter'd, and their Mouths are Stopt with Dust.

Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by the same door where in I went."

They remind us of well-known passages in the first part of "Faust." As to the arguments contained in Mill's Essays, they must even at that time have appeared meagre and antiquated to readers acquainted with Lotze's or even Renouvier's fuller and profounder expositions and criticisms; and it has been doubted whether Mill had ever read Hume's 'Dialogues.' It is noteworthy evidence of the insularity of British thought, that even in the third quarter of the nineteenth century so incomplete an exposition could come from the pen of one who was at the time a foremost exponent of philosophical thought. The subject dealt with is divided into three portions, of which the first and last dealt with the respective moral and intellectual arguments for or against the existence of a Divine Being as contained in Christian Doctrine. The second deals with the necessity or utility of religion, and suggests that a "Religion of Humanity" would meet the desired end. In the former or theoretical portion the most pressing scientific problem of the age, the conception of vital force, is not touched upon, and in consequence no clear definition of force and matter (to which it led in Lotze's case) is given. The use of these latter terms is very much the same as in the writings of the earlier Materialists in Germany, a use which was finally discarded through the influence, inter alia, of Lotze's writings both in philosophical and scientific discussions; also the notion of substance is introduced as if neither Kant nor Hume had written; a needlessness repeated not only in Herbert Spencer's writings, but even in our days by so famous a naturalist as Ernst Haeckel. It is interesting to see
before Mill's Essays were published, though probably not before two at least of them were written. This was Mansel's "Bampton Lectures" (1858) on 'The Limits of Religious Thought.' Mansel reverts to the position taken up by Francis Bacon, the separation of Reason and Religion. As since the time of Bacon two great schools of philosophy had invaded the domain of thought, the Critical and the Idealist movements, Mansel's argument really forms a discussion as to how much the position had been altered through those non-empirical lines of reasoning, and he comes to the conclusion that neither the critical position taken up by Kant, who founded religion on a purely ethical principle, nor the reasoning of the Idealists, who tried to reach the Absolute by a logical process, was really of any avail. The attack was conducted from two points of view—the purely theoretical and a practical one; the former is an outcome and extreme statement of the position taken up by Sir William Hamilton in his 'Philosophy of the Conditioned': the assertion that the Unconditioned or Absolute cannot be reached by the thinking process, of and in which it denotes merely a limiting conception: it is the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge. The other motive in Mansel's expositions is a practical one, the feeling of alarm, shared

how in Hume and Mill similar interests, and a similar turn of mind, took almost the opposite course in their respective mental development. Hume started with the discussion of fundamental notions and terms, and finding the problem insoluble betook himself to practical problems moral and economical and the study of historical facts. Mill started with questions of social and political interest, was driven on to the study of inductive logic, and ultimately to that of fundamental metaphysical notions and terms without arriving at finality any more than Hume did.
with many other conservative English thinkers of the day, lest the disastrous consequences of Hegel's Philosophy, such as had been arrived at in Germany by Feuerbach in theoretical and by Strauss and Baur in their historical studies pertaining to religion, should spread also and be accepted in this country.

Over and against the purely negative philosophical movement then prevalent in German thought Mansel sets a positive assertion; in fact, he resorts to Revelation in a much more decisive and emphatic manner than Hamilton or Bacon had done before him. Thus he took a very short way towards that position which Schelling, in the latest phase of his philosophy, tried to reach through a complicated and mystical process of reasoning. The Bampton Lectures created a great impression, but the argument was discarded both by believers and sceptics—by F. D. Maurice, who made a strong attack on it, as well as by J. S. Mill, who loathed it.\footnote{Those of Maurice and Mill are only two among the many important criticisms which appeared at the time, but I have chosen them because they indicate the two directions in which the religious problem has been treated in subsequent philosophic literature in this country, not without influence from continental thought. Both recognised the necessity of getting beyond the agnostic position which became clearly defined immediately after the appearance of the Bampton Lectures. The answer given by Mill in company with prominent thinkers abroad is Idealism. "The Ideal" becomes in some way or other the expression of the Highest, a guiding principle, and eventually an object of reverence; with some it is supposed to be reached by a process of logical thought. The answer given by Maurice is more on the lines adopted by Schleiermacher. It is not idealistic but spiritualistic. Its subject cannot be reached but only interpreted by philosophic thought; its central idea is the spirit, what Renouvier termed the "Category of Personality," and it rests upon a larger and fuller psychology, a broader mental experience. Maurice seems to have had a clear view of this when he wrote: "True esthetics [using this term in the Kantian sense] must have actually nothing}
reasoning in philosophical writings now in vogue is probably confined to the Introduction to Herbert Spencer's 'First Principles,' which was written in 1860, shortly after the appearance of Mansel's Lectures. The outcome there is the doctrine of the Unknowable, what Huxley termed Agnosticism.

There is no doubt that both Schelling and Mansel were right in holding that the intellectual process alone does not suffice to gain a firm position in fundamental questions, that the conviction which is to be of practical value is reached—and must be reached—by some other process. The same result has forced itself upon many other contemporary and later thinkers. Kant had anticipated this when he based the whole of his practical philosophy, the theory of life, upon something that is categorical and actual, not conditional and hypothetical. Lotze had already, at the time when the Bampton Lectures were published, arrived at the conclusion that, in the midst of contradictory and unsatisfactory arguments which present themselves to the

to do with notions or ideas. Kant's great merit, I fancy, was in perceiving this, in thoroughly distinguishing the sensual from the logical and intellectual region, and then in using his logic to show under what conditions we use our senses. Mill, it seems to me, with all his clearness, can never escape from a perpetual confusion between these two regions. If he did I should not despair of his ascending into the higher ideal region—the purely spiritual—which is so much more analogous to the sensual than to the intermediate one” ('Life of F. D. Maurice,' by his Son, 1884, vol. II. p. 598).

As to Schleiermacher, and Maurice's opinion of him, and the damage that was done to his reputation in England by Thirlwall's translation of his book on St Luke, see loc. cit., vol. I. p. 452.

It must, however, in justice be mentioned that Mansel recognised that psychology should form the foundation both of metaphysics and ethics; that the "facts of consciousness [are] the criterion of philosophy."—See his 'Inaugural Lecture,' 1855 (reprinted in 'Letters, Lectures, and Reviews,' ed. H. W. Chandler, 1873; also his 'Metaphysics, or the Philosophy of Consciousness,' 1860).
human intellect, no theoretical verdict but only a practical resolve of the will and character can avail. Towards this assertion a large amount of recent philosophical writing converges from many different sides.

Mansel's Lectures, though the argument is now discarded as too crude and unphilosophical, did, however, a great deal to draw attention to those very writings against the influence of which Mansel himself desired to warn religious thinkers in England. A school of philosophy sprang up later in Oxford, mainly under the leadership of Thomas Hill Green. He took up in earnest the study of Hegel's philosophy, which, before his time, had in this country been almost the monopoly of a solitary thinker, James Hutchison Stirling, who in his 'Secret of Hegel' (1865) had attempted to open the eyes of the English philosophical public to the importance of the greatest among German idealistic systems. In the same year there appeared also J. S. Mill's 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,' in which many of the lines of reasoning are criticised which had been taken over from Kant: to these works must be added a third very important publication, the 'Translation of the Dialogues of Plato with Introductory Essays,' by Benjamin Jowett. This began to appear in 1871; in it the translator took the opportunity of discussing many of the theories of modern German idealism in their relation to ancient Greek speculation. Green undertook to bring the idealistic argument into connection with the fundamental critical problem, as it had been suggested, but not solved, by David Hume; and Edward
Caird prepared the way to an understanding of Hegel's Philosophy by his original expositions of Kant's Critiques. Around these important and original contributions to the history and Criticism of modern German idealism there sprang up a large literature which has been variously termed Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian. It contains all the more important contributions towards a philosophy which stands in distinct opposition to the purely empirical, naturalistic, and agnostic school of thought, of which Herbert Spencer is the centre and main representative, and which is frequently called Positivism.

The main thesis of the idealistic school in this country may be stated to be the Reality of Spirit, but the word *Spirit* is not taken to denote an exclusively intellectual principle or process, which constituted the danger of the Hegelian statement of this conception in Germany. In fact, the Hegelian principle or *Geist* is to the English school not Mind or Reason only, but Spirit as including also the regions of Will, Feeling, and Emotion. These speculations start, therefore, from a broader basis than that upon which Hegel stood in the beginning of the century—a basis prepared not only by a reconsideration of the fundamental problem as stated by Hume, but assimilating also what had been independently done by psychologists and moral philosophers in this country. Green himself correctly defined the task which stood before him, and fixed the programme of his school, when he said that Hegel's work would have to be undertaken and done over again.

1 On this literature see *supra*, vol. iii. p. 532.
Viewed in this light, the more important works of English philosophers, leaving out those which cluster around the name of Herbert Spencer, may be said to be occupied with the problem of the Spirit, with establishing the spiritual view of things. But, as already stated, this whole tendency had not at the end of the century resulted in any great consummation; it has not succeeded in concentrating its teaching in definite ideas, expressed in appropriate language, such as can compel the attention of a large number of thinking persons, giving a definite direction to the thought of the age and something substantially new whereon and wherewith to construct a reasoned creed. Such formulae and watchwords, without which no current of thought ever flows in great volume and with decisive force, have rather been the intellectual product of the Positivist and Naturalistic schools of thought which, notably under the banner of evolution—with a distinctly mechanical interpretation—still held at the end of our period the first place in popular esteem. The idealistic, or rather the spiritualistic, tendencies form, in opposition to this, a deep undercurrent which may in the near future gain the upper hand, but which, at the moment, is still doing preparatory work; partly by destructive criticism of the opposite view, partly by isolated contributions of a more constructive character. Among the latter we find in this country the discussion turning around the same

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1 An indication of what has been done about and since the end of the century, in the direction of more constructive work, will be attempted in the final chapter of this volume.
separate problems as occupied German thinkers somewhat earlier in the century. Thus we have, first of all, the discussion of the problem of Personality from different points of view, prominently the question to what extent a scheme such as that of Hegel's admits or rejects the conception of Personality. Among many other writings I mention as typical Professor Pringle Pattison's Lectures entitled, 'Hegelianism and Personality' (1887), and the lengthy discussions carried on in English and American philosophical reviews around this question.

A second point was urged by Green himself, who discussed at some length the difference of empirical and transcendental consciousness, of a natural and supernatural order. And here we meet again with various shades of opinion, according as the higher or universal order is considered to be transcendent to, or immanent in, the natural order of things: discussions which remind us of much that we have read in Lotze's writings.

The third important single problem included in the larger problem of the Spirit, which we meet with in continental speculations, the ethical problem, has likewise occupied thinkers of the idealistic school in this country. But here it has in general taken a more practical turn; it is not so much the metaphysical difficulty of the existence of evil which troubled the mind of Schelling, which also Lotze declares to be intellectually insoluble; it is rather the relation of practical morality and religion that has been pushed
into the foreground by English thinkers of very various shades of opinion. In this regard it is interesting to read the discussion which was started in the second number of the first volume of the most prominent and original of modern English Reviews, 'The Nineteenth Century' (April 1877). This Review, which formed during the last generation the arena of intellectual combat, with champions from all sides, was characteristically started with a prefatory poem by Tennyson.¹

The discussion I referred to deals with "the influence upon morality of a decline in religious belief." It was termed "A Modern Symposium" (evidently after the Attic Symposium of Plato), and was started by Sir James Stephen. Some of the foremost thinkers belonging to very different schools took up the question. The most masterly piece of writing was by James Martineau (1805-1900), a thinker who had independently worked for many years at the higher philosophical problems, notably the ethical and religious problems, and whose writings, the more important and systematic of which, however, only began to appear five years later,² might have had a greater influence upon the thought of his countrymen had it not been for two reasons. The first was that he occupied a position as a religious minister and a theological teacher. This disqualified his philosophy in the eyes of a party

¹ Quoted already, in a former chapter, see supra, vol. iii. p. 530, where the date was erroneously given as 1875.
² 'Types of Ethical Theory,' 2 vols., 1882. 'A Study of Religion,' 2 vols., 1888. 'The Seat of Authority in Religion,' 1890. All three works have appeared in new editions.
who, in the interest of free academic teaching, opposed all religious tests;¹ whilst the fact that he belonged to one of the smaller Nonconformist sects stigmatised his teaching as opposed to the prevalent religious philosophy both in England and Scotland. He therefore gained full hearing and appreciation neither from those who took a purely philosophical interest nor from those who were brought up in the older universities. It is, however, quite possible that his speculations, which were em-

¹ This became strikingly manifest when, in the year 1866, the chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at University College, London, became vacant. "A discussion arose as to the true interpretation of the principle of religious neutrality avowedly adopted by the college. One party held that it should exclude Mr James Martineau, who, as a Unitarian minister, was pledged to maintain the creed of a particular sect. De Morgan [the eminent mathematician], on the other hand, held that any consideration of a candidate's ecclesiastical position or religious creed was inconsistent with the principle. He thought that the refusal to appoint Mr Martineau was in reality an act of intolerance dictated by a dislike to the candidate's religious philosophy. De Morgan had always been exceedingly sensitive upon this question of religious neutrality. . . . He now resigned his office in a letter dated 10th November 1866." Sometime after, De Morgan said, "Our old college no longer exists. It lived only so long as it refused all religious disqualifications" (see article "De Morgan," by Leslie Stephen, 'Dictionary of National Biography'). From the 'Life of Martineau' (Estlin Carpenter, 1905, p. 432) it appears that at the meeting of the Senate the votes for and against Martineau as candidate were equal, but the casting vote was given by the chairman against the candidate. In a letter to F. W. Newman, one of the professors of the college, Martineau says, inter alia: "In a curious letter to me, J. S. Mill avows that his preference for Mr Robertson [the other candidate] arises from his desire to plant a thorough-going disciple in a seat of influence, and not from any consideration of superior personal qualifications. He excuses this sort of philosophical sectarianism by saying that it is a necessary retaliation on the exclusion of his opinions from places of authoritative instruction." The designation as a thorough-going disciple of Mill is curious and not consistent with the impression which friends of Croom Robertson formed of his philosophical position. Nothing was more marked than his wide sympathies, which enabled Martineau himself to include him in the circle of his friends; and his fairness and impartiality, in addition to his learning, qualified him to render a great service to the culture of philosophical studies in this country as editor of the first English philosophical Review, 'Mind.'
bodied in language of unusual beauty and refinement, would have, in due time, directed a new line of thought had it not been that he came too late, when the empirical school of higher thought had already been strenuously and successfully attacked by what I called above the Oxford Idealist School. In this respect his reputation and influence have suffered similarly to those of Lotze in Germany, whose doctrine came too late to rank among the classical idealistic systems of his country, and too early to start a new movement, inasmuch as the reaction against metaphysics and all systematic philosophy had not yet spent its force.¹

¹ Students of Lotze's and Martineau's writings will not fail to find many important points of agreement in the two thinkers, and it is remarkable that they should have remained unknown to each other. With Lotze this is hardly surprising, as he took no notice of contemporary thought outside of his own country; but this cannot be said of Martineau, who himself confesses to have "passed through a kind of second education in Germany... under... Trendelenburg" (1848-9; 'Types of Ethical Theory,' vol. i. p. 12). It is difficult to assign the right place to Martineau in a history of European Thought. He had a large number of admirers, many of whom were attracted by his impressive personality or by the brilliancy of his style, which forms as unique a specimen of English prose as does that of Dr Newman with quite a different character. A history of recent British philosophy, especially of religious philosophy, would have to contain a long and exhaustive chapter on Martineau's teaching, and already in the work of Prof. Caldecott (pp. 343-353) referred to more space is devoted to Martineau than to any other individual modern thinker except Newman. But in the present History the absence of an influence on continental thought, added to the reasons stated in the text, must suffice to excuse a very inadequate and passing reference to Martineau's systematic works. Among his own admirers and disciples we meet with very different verdicts on this point. Dr Upton places Martineau alongside of Hegel and Lotze as founder of one of "the three philosophical systems most likely to mould religious philosophy in the twentieth century"; whilst R. H. Hutton wrote, "we doubt whether the historian of English thought of our time will credit Martineau with any distinct modification of the theological and philosophical opinions of this age. It was something that went below opinion; it was a revelation of spiritual character and power"; see Pringle-Pattison's article in 'The Hibbert Journal,' vol. i. p. 435. I, myself, am unable to find amongst the abundance of illustrations and suggestions with which
OF THE SPIRIT.

Reverting, however, to the subject before us, it may be said that the discussion in 'The Nineteenth Century' presented a variety of views and raised a number of special questions which have occupied thinkers in this country ever since. Some of these it may be useful to

Martineau truly overwhems us, any distinctive or original idea thrown by him into the fermenting mass of religious thought, and I regret this so much more as it was through some of his writings that I first became acquainted with the deeper currents of modern British thought at a time when my knowledge of German philosophy was quite in its infancy. This early admiration for Martineau came through my father's friendship with the Rev. J. J. Taylor, who "during all his long life was remarkable for his enlarged ideas and practice of Christian Association, apart from doctrinal subscription" (Words spoken by R. D. Darbishire), and it had the wholesome effect of making me look out for other courses in recent philosophy besides those represented in Germany. In a sense we may say that Martineau combines some prominent traits peculiar in German thought to Schleiermacher on the one side and to Lotze on the other, to whose works, however, his own writings contain merely the scantiest reference. He was a great personality like Schleiermacher and the very opposite of Lotze, who was extremely reserved. He was supposed to be one of the most distinguished members of the "Metaphysical Society," in which thinkers of the most opposite views met in friendly debate; a form of utterance quite foreign to Lotze's habits, who elaborated his system in solitary thought, and of whose influence many younger minds only became aware or appreciative when personal intercourse was no longer possible. But Martineau was in England as valiant as Lotze was in Germany in combating the materialistic as well as the pantheistic tendencies of his age. With both religious beliefs were, as they actually avowed, what might be termed of the good old-fashioned kind. The existence of a personal Deity and a spiritual centre was a settled conviction, not to say a postulate, and their philosophy consisted to a great extent in defining and defending the Christian doctrine by arguments drawn from two independent sources, the one metaphysical, the other ethical. Hence both thinkers have been charged with dualism, but in both cases a closer study of their works reveals an underlying monism, taking this term in its actual and not in its modern perverted sense. See Caldecott, loc. cit., p. 357: the "course we adopt" is "to say that Martineau is incorrect in describing his method of Theism as only twofold, causality and morality, and to bring out that his scheme includes a quite different feature, namely, an Intuitive apprehension of the Divine Being." The objection, perhaps we may say the prejudice, against mysticism, because of its tendency to absorb the human in the Divine, a strenuous effort towards clearness of thought, was common to both thinkers. (See the quotation from Lotze, supra, p. 331.)
specify in greater detail. First of all it emphasised the distinction between Religion and Theology; most of the writers agreeing that religious beliefs of some kind were essential and necessary, whilst most of them objected to a special theological setting. At the same time even a religious teacher like Martineau maintains that morality can exist without religion, which is not the foundation but the highest consummation of morality; ¹ whilst, on the other side, Sir James Stephen concludes "that the question of truth must precede the question of goodness and cannot be determined by any answer which may be given to the latter question." We thus have a distinct statement that morality and the moral law are something innate or intuitive to the human soul, a view which had found its classical expression in Kant's 'Categorical Imperative,' and, on the other side, we have an equally emphatic declaration "that the knowledge of the good must depend upon a knowledge of what is true and real."

A second position, brought out clearly by Mr Frederic Harrison, is the Comtian principle that "acknowledges

¹ This conception of the relation of Ethics and Religion was worked out in great fulness in Martineau's larger Works mentioned above. He there says: "Ethics must be treated before Religion: not that they are an absolute condition of its beginning: not that they always involve it as their end; but that they implicitly contain the resources whence Religion, in the higher form which alone we can practically care to test, derives its availing characteristics, its difficulties and its glories" ('A Study of Religion,' vol. i. p. 19). This passage indicates clearly what is more fully developed in the larger work, that the term Religion cannot be smoothed or levelled down to a belief in or, if such were possible, a worship of, mere ideals; a view of its nature defended in a masterly way and in striking language by Sir J. R. Seeley in his anonymously published treatise 'Natural Religion' (1882). Accordingly a criticism of this much-admired volume forms for Martineau the Introduction to his 'Study of Religion.'
a religion of which the creed shall be science; of which the Faith, Hope, Charity, shall be real, not transcendental, earthly, not heavenly—a religion, in a word, which is entirely human, in its evidences, in its purposes, in its sanctions and appeals.” Such religion professes to be science, the science of this world, of humanity, and it is opposed to theology which is represented as dealing with non-human realities and resting on non-human hypotheses.

As a third important point Dean Church lays stress upon the fact that we live in a surrounding of definite moral ideas which have historically grown up parallel with, and supported by, Christian Faith, and that it is impossible to remove these from their historical setting, and judge them independently and in the abstract. And lastly, we have an indication at least of a pessimistic outlook into the future in Huxley’s words:

“For my part I do not for one moment admit that morality is not strong enough to hold its own. But if it is demonstrated to me that I am wrong, and that without this or that theological dogma the human race will lapse into bipedal cattle, more brutal than the beasts by the measure of their greater cleverness, my next question is to ask for the proof of the truth of the dogma.”

But the whole discussion raises fundamental questions which at that time had, in this country, only begun to be treated in that critical spirit which abroad is classi-

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1 The passage with the ethical mind of the writer is given in full reflection which it suggests to the (supra, p. 232).
Can there be an independent morality? It had, indeed, been started already by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but it had found its answer here in a reversion to common-sense and not in any deeper investigation. How much such an investigation was required can be seen if we, for instance, look somewhat more closely at the passage just quoted from Huxley's contribution to the 'Symposium.' He there maintains his unproved conviction that morality is strong enough to hold its own. As to this, the question may be asked, Does he mean by morality simply the sense of obligation to some rule of conduct, or does he mean by it a special, and if so, what rule? He further, at least, indicates that some dogma or highest truth may be required whereby and whereon to settle the definition of morality or of the Good, and he desires that this be proved; but he does not stop to indicate what kind of proof would be satisfactory to him.

It is needless after what we have learned in the present and former chapters of this history to remind the reader that these are some of the questions which have been discussed at great length by continental, especially German, philosophers during the nineteenth century. The necessity to discuss them did not seem to be recognised in this country till quite two generations later, for reasons which I have repeatedly indicated. Notably the practically most important of these questions, the ethical problem,—as I showed in the foregoing chapter,—received quite a new start and interest through Henry Sidgwick's 'Methods of Ethics,' the first edition of which appeared three years before the 'Symposium,'
and the importance of which seems hardly to have been recognised by the several contributors to that discussion. Indeed it took a good many years before what we may term the new schools of Metaphysics and Ethics, which date respectively from Green in Oxford and Sidgwick in Cambridge, had sufficiently illuminated the old problems by a new light to allow of a kind of summing-up such as the literature of this country has from time to time been destined to give on important points of controversy; a summing-up which, however, has in this case remained inconclusive, as similar attempts had done before.

In the year 1895 there appeared Mr A. J. Balfour's discussion of the religious problem under the title 'The Foundations of Belief: being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology.'

1 This work was preceded by two other important works, one by the same author entitled 'A Defence of Philosophic Doubt: being an Essay on the Foundations of Belief' (1879). It was much read and had undoubtedly a great—perhaps also a perplexing—influence on many younger minds at the Universities; inasmuch, however, as the reasoning contained therein was absorbed and carried further in the later treatise, I have confined myself to a discussion of the latter. But equally important, and in its way perhaps even more original as coming from an entirely different quarter, was John Henry Newman's much earlier treatise with the title 'An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent' (1870). As the attention given to it by Prof. Caldecott (loc. cit., pp. 258-268) shows, this work deserves to be classed alongside of Martineau's two larger treatises as the most comprehensive treatise on the philosophy of religion in modern English literature. The treatment of the religious problem from a philosophical point of view by these two thinkers may be considered complementary in a way similar to its treatment by Schleiermacher and Lotze respectively in Germany. Schleiermacher, and after him Newman, are original in the psychological treatment of religious belief; in both, however, the dialectics are unsatisfactory. Lotze, and after him Martineau, are original and impressive in the dialectical presentation of the arguments, metaphysical and ethical, by which they try to define or vindicate the attributes of the Divine Being. But neither Lotze nor Martineau has a really satisfactory psychology of religion and religious belief. The teaching of Newman, however, is a very dis-
of this concise statement we meet with a discussion of
the problem which, about the same time, had been forced
afresh on the attention of German thinkers through
the novel and decisive position which Albrecht Ritschl
had taken up in his theological system and teaching.

Mr Balfour's criticisms apply mainly to the meta-
physics of Kant, to what he terms the philosophy of
naturalism, and to that special form of idealism which,
under the lead of T. H. Green and E. Caird, then
dominated a large section of English philosophic
thought. He does not refer to other important schools
of thought which in Germany had for half a century
assumed towards Kantianism, Idealism, and Materialism an
tinct and very early expression of
that tendency of thought which I
have termed the Synoptic. Cer-
tainty is a matter of immediate
apprehension gained by a union of
complex experiences grasped in
their totality or combined presenta-
tion in the mind. Many passages
might be quoted from Newman.
The religious sense is not a special
faculty at all, but an activity in
which the whole character is con-
cerned. It "passes from point to
point gaining one by some indica-
tion; another on a probability;
then availing itself of an associa-
tion; then falling back on some
received law; next seizing on testi-
mony; then committing ourselves
to some popular impression, or
some inward instinct, or some
obscure memory; and thus it
makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick
eye, prompt hand, and firm foot,
ascends, how he knows not himself,
by personal endowments and long
practice rather than by rule, leav-
ing no track behind him and unable
to teach another. It is not too
much to say that the stepping by
which great geniuses scale the
mountains of truth is as unsafe
and precarious to men in general as
the ascent of a skilful mountaineer
up a literal crag. It is a way
which they alone can take; and its
justification lies in their success."
(See the Sermon on 'Implicit and
Explicit Reason' preached in Ox-
ford 1840, and reprinted together
with other Oxford Sermons in the
year 1871, with an important Pre-
face from which it appears that the
'Grammar of Assent' was a fuller
treatment of the psychology of
reason and faith contained in these
Sermons.) It is not uninteresting
to compare the development in
Newman's treatment of the prob-
lem of religious belief with that
which took place in the mind of
Schleiermacher forty years earlier,
as contained in the 'Reden' (1799)
and in 'der Christliche Glaube'
(1821). The interval in Schlei-
ermacher's case brought about a
definite acceptance of the Evan-
gelical (Protestant), in Newman of
the Roman Catholic, position.
independent and critical attitude not unlike that which he was now taking up in this country. Accordingly we find that in the writings of some continental thinkers who, at the time, were less known in England, many of the arguments had been anticipated and much of the position occupied which Mr Balfour puts forward in an original manner from his own special point of view. The writings I refer to are notably those of Lotze, and, to a lesser extent, of Schleiermacher. Both these thinkers had been influential in laying the philosophical foundations of Ritschl’s theology.

One of the contentions of Schleiermacher was that religion occupies an independent region in the life of the human soul, that it answers to a special need or demand. This Schleiermacher characteristically defines, in his earlier writings, as the sense of the All, and later on as a feeling of absolute dependence; Ritschl more than half a century later adopts Schleiermacher’s position to this extent, that he shows that the whole body of detailed scientific research leads nowhere to a comprehensive view of the essence and significance of reality as a whole. Scientific, including also historical research, leads more and more into detail and does not find its way back again to an all-embracing conception. In opposition to such critical detail Ritschl gains a more comprehensive aspect upon which he bases the whole of his theology. This is the existence of an historical religion or system of beliefs which has found its embodiment in the religious community, the Christian Church; it aims at realising a different order of things, the Divine Order, as the consummation of the natural order,
the latter having in and by itself no conceivable unity or purpose. Theology has the task of studying the historical beginnings, the actual development and the essential features of this unique historical fact and social phenomenon; and Ritschl reverts to the position clearly indicated by Kant, that in the whole of the history and system of the Christian dispensation is to be found the solution of the ethical problem, as defined by Kant himself, the existence in the human soul of a sense of obligation, of a moral postulate.

Mr Balfour did not write like Ritschl as a theologian, but as a philosopher, finding himself face to face with two more or less consistent and compact systems of doctrine: the teachings of science on the one side and the system of religious beliefs on the other. In the earlier work mentioned above he had taken up a sceptical position as to the ultimate cogency of the purely logical structure of either of the two systems. In the later work he advances a step further, and seeks for a foundation of belief in employing avowedly an argument similar to that on which Kant himself built up a religious faith. The argument is that it

1 See supra, p. 381 n.

2 "The question is . . . suggested . . . whether, and, if so, under what limitations, we can argue from the existence of an ethical need to the reality of the conditions under which alone it would be satisfied. Can we, for example, argue from the need for some complete correspondence between virtue and felicity, to the reality of another world than this, where such a correspondence will be completely effected? A great ethical philosopher has, in substance, asserted that we can. He held that the reality of the Moral Law implied the reality of a sphere where it could for ever be obeyed, under conditions satisfactory to the 'Practical Reason'; and it was thus that he found a place in his system for Freedom, for Immortality, and for God. The metaphysical machinery, indeed, by which Kant endeavoured to secure these results is of a kind which we cannot employ" ('Foundations of Belief,' 9th impression, 1906, p. 331).
OF THE SPIRIT.

answers to a moral or spiritual demand, giving satisfaction to a need or postulate of the human soul.

It has been pointed out by some of Mr Balfour's critics that he also arrives at what we may call the Hegelian position—viz., that Reason in a higher sense of the word underlies everything, and is the ground of all existing reality; but that he does so by an argument very different from that of Hegel—an argument which could not possibly have been used in Hegel's time. The difference lies in this, that Hegel attempted to show how the process of human reasoning in its different stages corresponds to the process of development of reality as we know it. But the region of reality which mainly attracted his attention was that in which human life, human interests, and human creations played a prominent part; in fact, the products of civilisation, such as Society, the State, systems of Law and Morality, Art, Literature, and Philosophy. He had considerable difficulty, and his scheme practically failed, when he attempted also to carry it through in the region of external animated and inanimate nature. When Mr Balfour wrote, two generations of progress and research had shifted the attention of thinkers from the comparatively small region, where mental forces are at work, to that incomparably wider field where purely mechanical or natural forces have their apparently unchecked dominion. The idea of development which has governed modern thought since the time of Leibniz had moved away from the scene of conscious human life on to that of unconscious inanimate forces; and one of the most original and unanswerable points of Mr
Balfour's argument is this, that the reasoning of science as well as that of religion, the two comprehensive systems of modern thought, which he terms respectively the naturalistic and the theological, are based upon and produced by non-rational agencies — i.e., assumptions which cannot be logically proved but which are the products of various influences, such as custom and habit, the large body of existing beliefs, be they scientific, ethical or religious (which he termed Authority), or the satisfaction which they afford to some practical want or spiritual need. This assertion leads, however, to a further reflection, that if it is by some non-rational, mechanical or unconscious process that valuable systems of thought are evolved, this is intelligible only on the further assumption that rationality or Reason must lie at the bottom, must form the ground-work of the whole scheme, although, in the actual course of events, it has only shown itself at a late stage of development.¹

There are other statements of great interest and importance brought out by Mr Balfour in language at once original and convincing, which remind us of the leading ideas of Lotze's philosophy: the two realities with which the thinking mind finds itself confronted, the world of Things or the contingent on the one side,

¹ "We may ... say that, unless we borrow something from Theology, a philosophy of Science is impossible. The perplexities in which we become involved if we accept the naturalistic dogma that all beliefs ultimately trace their descent to non-rational causes, have emerged again and again in the course of the preceding argument. Such a doctrine cuts down any theory of knowledge to the root. It can end in nothing but the most impotent scepticism. Science, therefore, is, at least as much as Theology, compelled to postulate a Rational Ground or Cause of the world who made it intelligible, and us, in some faint degree, able to understand" (loc. cit., p. 393).
and the world of spiritual necessities demanding satisfaction on the other. Such satisfaction is found, according to Lotze's view, in the higher realities of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, or in the comprehensive conception of the Holy. This world Lotze terms the world of Values or Worths, inasmuch as that only possesses for us value or worth which answers to a specific demand of our nature. And Mr Balfour must be credited with bringing out, more convincingly perhaps than Lotze, the fact that for the modern thinker at least there exists a third world of apparent reality, the world of relations, of the so-called laws of nature which are looked upon as the detailed expression or description of the Uniformity of Nature. But—and this is the main contention—this world is merely artificially created by the human mind, it nowhere exists as such, but is an abstract, an instrument invented for the purpose of scientific research. Ever since it has been applied, it has created a structure so formidable and imposing that, compared with it, every other scheme of human thought seems frail and in danger of collapsing. It might have been added that by far the most powerful argument in favour of the reality of this recent creation of the human mind, which acquires more and more the character of mathematical certainty, lies in this that, by the use of it, not only enormous regions of the existing world have been laid bare which without it would have remained for ever unseen and unknown, but also an ever increasing complex of artificial relations has been brought into existence, which, in the
form of industry, commerce, and mechanical appliances, now forms a large and absorbing region of human work and interests: as it were a new Reality.

As the stability and progress of civilised society depend to a very large extent on providing work for willing hands and active brains, these modern regions of thought and life which were unknown three hundred years ago, viz., the field of scientific research and the field of industrial and technical application, have absorbed an increasing proportion of workers, compared with whose occupations those of earlier times are gradually becoming—at least in highly-civilised countries—of much less interest, though certainly not of less importance. The former employments, theoretical and practical, have for intelligent minds the further advantage that in both success depends upon the use of definite methods which can be taught and learned, and through which large numbers of persons can become efficient workers, who without this training would hold very inferior positions. Whereas in former times such cooperation was almost entirely limited to the military profession, we have now, besides the military, a scientific and an industrial army, the rank and file of which becomes every day more numerous and more highly trained. All this is a creation of the modern scientific spirit. To this must be added a further characteristic feature in modern civilisation pointed out in an earlier chapter. It may be shortly described as the separation of Education and Instruction. As shown at length in the first volume of this History,¹ this

¹ See supra, vol. i. p. 258 sqq., n.
OF THE SPIRIT.

idea was first introduced at the time of the French Revolution. It has ever since and in various forms permeated and led educational developments in all civilised countries. Many are the causes which have brought about the demand for a secularisation of teaching. The tyranny of the "Syllabus" in Roman Catholic countries such as France and Italy; the conflict of the Churches in countries where Roman Catholics and Protestants live professedly on equal terms, as in Germany and Austria; the jealousy created by Sectarianism and Nonconformity in Protestant countries such as Great Britain,—have all tended gradually but surely in the direction of creating a desire to liberate instruction in the higher, in secondary, and even in the popular schools from the clerical influence. But here has arisen a difficulty. So long as education was in the hands of one Power, say the State Church, the training of the intellect and that of the character went hand-in-hand, knowledge and morality being of equal importance, and, as it were, supporting each other in the guidance and the purposes of the teachers. But now that the cry for secularisation has arisen, it becomes a question how the "Moral Lesson" has to be conducted in purely secular schools, which, being under the supervision of the State, can alone secure compulsory attendance. The large, and, as it seems, the increasing number of those who consider that the sense of Obligation cannot be divorced from the sense of Reverence, and that the latter demands a supreme Object, see with alarm the tendency to base morality on purely utilitarian principles, or, at best, upon intel-
lectual or æsthetical ideals which appeal only to a very small number of persons; and they are strengthened in their alarm by the widespread influence which some recent schools of thought have had, notably on the Continent, where Free Thought and Free Inquiry have become watchwords in the teaching of the higher schools. Religion has been termed the Metaphysics of the Masses. This metaphysical interest cannot be destroyed, and if traditional beliefs are excluded from the authorised programme of instruction, the metaphysical interest, the demand for an interpretation of Reality, will seek satisfaction in other directions. This explains how it comes about that some modern philosophies have attained such widespread and alarming influence. Since the middle of the century two new gospels have been preached by distinguished thinkers who have collected around them many admirers, and have compelled opponents into thoughtful reflection. It is not so much the gospel of unbelief which has invaded modern popular philosophy: this can never be consistently elaborated. It is the gospel of Pessimism or Despair on the one side, and following on the heels of it—as a last resort—the gospel of extreme Individualism or Selfishness.

These two phases of modern thought may be identified with the names of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both thinkers stand outside of the general development of philosophic thought in Germany, and were for a long time ignored by the academic teachers of philosophy; but in different ways they have contributed to overcome the one-sidedness
of the ruling philosophy of their age and country. We owe it to them, notably to Schopenhauer, that philosophical style has been greatly improved and clarified, that philosophical questions have been made interesting to the general reader, and that the centre of gravity of philosophical reasoning has been moved from the intellectual to the ethical problem, the problem, indeed, which already in the eyes of Kant and Fichte was the most important problem of philosophy. And so far as the special problem of this chapter is concerned, they may be said to have again pushed into the foreground as the most important question, the spiritual or religious problem, the problem of Good and Evil, and of Redemption. As Mr Whittaker says: The spirit of Schopenhauer's philosophy "is different from that of European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way is the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the East, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's philosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name of Pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading, though it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he explained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine coincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or their elect, at deliverance from this 'evil world.' . . . For Schopenhauer the desire for speculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of philosophical enquiries. On one side of his complex character he had more resemblance to the men who turn from the world to
religion, like St Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker represented pre-eminently by Aristotle. . . . He saw in the world what he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire which give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming predominant, determined, not, indeed, all the ideas of his philosophy, but its general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'¹

Schopenhauer's philosophy stood in opposition to his own private life; it was purely objective. He did not attempt to practise what he taught. He stood outside the world of active and striving persons; he contemplated it as a spectator, comfortably seated in a stall, looks on at a theatrical performance, and unravels the plot without entangling himself in its successive Scenes and Acts. The conclusion he arrives at is, that there is more evil than good, that the principle of action, the human Will, is the source of this evil, and that in the negation of all desire in a complete quietism, similar to the Nirvana of the Buddhist, is to be found the redemption from evil.

Quite different from the solution of the problem which Schopenhauer offers to others, but does not follow himself, is that of Nietzsche. With him, the teaching is purely subjective: a reflection of the state of his own mind, of the unrest and unsatisfied striving of his own nature. If Schopenhauer prescribes to others resignation, the negation of desire, and preaches as the highest virtue that of compassion, Nietzsche preaches the doctrine of uncontrolled energy, of self-

¹ 'Schopenhauer,' by Thos. Whittaker; Constable's Series, 1909 (p. 1 sqq.).
assertion, of disregard of all existing dogmas and authorities, and of the attainment of a higher and more satisfactory life and being by rising beyond the level of prevailing morality to a position above and beyond the present level of existence. This is the well-known doctrine of the Super-man who sacrifices everything and everybody to the attainment of his own ideal, to his own personal self-elevation. While Schopenhauer is systematic, and bases the whole of his practical philosophy upon a theoretical groundwork in immediate connection with the whole course of intellectual philosophy from Descartes to Kant, Nietzsche disdains all systems and opposes all great thinkers, beginning with Socrates.

Although both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche take up a hostile position to traditional beliefs, especially in their clerical form, it must be admitted that they have aroused a renewed interest in the religious problem, and that their teachings absorb important elements of Christian doctrine—Schopenhauer by emphasising what have been termed the Christian Virtues as distinguished from those of later antiquity, Nietzsche by pointing to the supreme value of individuality, of the personal element. Both also recognise that the ethical problem must be solved through the belief in and the realisation of a new order of things. This new order may, indeed, as they define it, appear paradoxical, a mere caricature, still it cannot be denied that they extol a spirit of other-worldliness. It is, therefore, quite correct and significant when modern historians of religion and philosophy attach considerable importance to these latest creations of philosophical speculation abroad, even if these do little
more than reduce earlier philosophical arguments *ad absurdum*, revealing the dilemmas and paradoxes in which such arguments ultimately entangle themselves. More even than of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche may this be said of E. von Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' which boldly faces the burning religious questions of the day.

Philosophical thought in this country has not produced any elaborate system of Pessimism such as that of Schopenhauer, nor any extravagant doctrine of Individualism such as that of Nietzsche, though the writings of both these thinkers have received due attention both in translations and in expository and critical writings. But the whole practical question of the relation of religion to morality and of the ground of belief was forced upon thoughtful readers in a series of articles by Mr W. H. Mallock, which followed immediately (1877 and following years) upon the 'Symposium' contained in the first volume of 'The Nineteenth Century,' and already referred to in the last and earlier chapters. A history of philosophic thought, as distinguished from that

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1 Schopenhauer's principal work, 'The World as Will and Idea,' has been translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (3 vols., 1883-86); the smaller works by T. B. Saunders, 1891, &c.; Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' by W. C. Coupland (3 vols., 1884). A critical exposition of pessimism is contained in Prof. Jas. Sully's 'Pessimism: A History and a Criticism' (1877). A translation of Nietzsche's complete works is now in course of publication. A concise summary of Schopenhauer's philosophy is to be found in Mr Whittaker's little volume, quoted above, and Prof. W. R. Sorley treats of the 'New Morality' of Nietzsche in the first of his three lectures 'On Recent Tendencies in Ethics.' But the English literature dealing with these two thinkers is enormous and still growing.

2 The whole of the discussion is brought together in a very readable volume, entitled 'Religion as a Credible Doctrine: A Study of the Fundamental Difficulty' (1903).
of systematic philosophy, is bound to take note of these remarkable articles, though the sensational title, 'Is Life Worth Living?' by which the subject was introduced, and the direct appeal to Revelation, from a distinctly Roman Catholic point of view, as containing the solution of the difficulty, may have prevented philosophers by profession from taking sufficient note of them. There is, however, no doubt that the foundations of scientific reasoning and the nature of scientific certainty are here lucidly discussed and brought in a forcible manner before the thoughtful reader, and this by arguments which have become quite familiar in the course of the last thirty years.  

1 The purely philosophical interest which attaches to the writings of Schleiermacher and Ritschl in Germany, of Newman and Mallock, of Martineau and Balfour in England, has, in the opinion of many persons, been somewhat obscured by the fact that all these thinkers occupy special theological positions which they desire to defend. Schleiermacher occupies the position of the "Evangelical" (Protestant) Church, Ritschl that of the Primitive Lutheran, Martineau writes as a Unitarian, Newman as a Roman Catholic, and Mr Balfour represents "that species of Christian theology which is approximately defined by the Anglican tradition of the last two centuries, and (one may guess if not distinctly infer) by that variety which commends itself to the modern school of moderate High Churchmen." (Sir F. Pollock in 'Mind,' 1895, p. 377). Philosophical students are apt to turn away from some of these writings, wrongly believing them to be ex parte statements. For them Mr Balfour's earlier work would appear more purely philosophical, and, accordingly, possibly more important. Yet it must not be forgotten that no discussion of the philosophical foundations of religious beliefs can be profitably carried on by one who has no partiality for any of them. Some fundamental conviction must exist, and this is admitted even by such thinkers as Lotze, who halt with their philosophical arguments at the threshold of a definite religious doctrine, and whose philosophy of religion is not identical with a specific religious philosophy. The uncertainty of the ground on which a philosophy of religion as distinguished from a religious philosophy can be built up is shown by the fact that historical surveys of the subject are apt to leave out prominent and important works in which the subject is dealt with. Thus, the well-known work of O. Pfleiderer takes no note of Cardinal Newman, Mallock, and Balfour in England, of de Lamennais and Guyau in France, and even the
Now if we look at European thought as a whole, and do not lose ourselves in the particular sequences which such thought has exhibited in separate schools and countries, we make what to some may be a startling discovery—viz., that many, if not the whole, of the arguments which have been lucidly put forward on the religious problem by philosophical thinkers in this country during the last generation had already been used, or at least suggested, by French thinkers in the earlier part of the nineteenth century. That the impression they then made was purely national and did not attain to European importance is explained by various circumstances. One of these was similar to that just mentioned in connection with Mr Mallock's writings:

A long list of writings analysed and discussed by Prof. Caldecott takes no notice of Mallock. In fact, philosophy of Religion was still, at the end of the nineteenth century, somewhat in the same position as philosophy of Nature was in the beginning. At that time the only thinker who went to natural philosophy itself in order to build up a philosophy of nature was Fries. Not to speak of the Idealists, even Herbart, the leader in "exact" philosophy, had a very imperfect knowledge of the principles of scientific research. And it was not till Lotze that a professional student of the mechanical and biological sciences, an expert in the handling of their methods, undertook to deal with the problems involved in scientific as well as religious thought. Since his time a number of philosophers, especially in Germany, have come from the ranks of scientific experts, and have met with increasing attention and appreciation. The names of Helmholtz, du Bois Reymond, Kirchhoff, Wundt, Ostwald, Mach, and Haeckel, and their writings, are now familiar to students of philosophy. Yet the same fair treatment is not, in general, awarded to thinkers who come from the opposite region of human thought which we may term the religious, or with Mr Baillou, the theological. Whereas professional students of nature are not any longer considered to be, as such, disqualified to treat philosophical problems, many thinkers with distinct religious convictions are looked upon with suspicion and as intruders in the domain of pure thought. The dread of the scientific bias has disappeared, but not, in the same degree, that of the theological bias; and we meet still with a discussion of religious questions by philosophers who, so far as one can learn, occupy no definite religious position whatever, nor take any part in the religious work of human society.
the general impression that such arguments were dictated by party interest, by the spirit of reaction which had, during the period of the Restoration, got the upper hand in French literature, and which was at that time opposed alike to the liberal empiricism which prevailed in this country, and to the yet more liberal intellectualism which prevailed in Germany.

This explains also, to a large extent, why religious philosophy in France took its own course and has not, till quite recently, contributed much to the international treatment of the subject. What was original in it seemed so much bound up with ecclesiastical polemics, with the interests of the Roman Catholic Church, with the political question of the relation of Church and State, that the free development of philosophical thought in the Protestant countries took little interest in it; on the other side, the development of free enquiry in matters of belief in France either assimilated in an eclectic spirit the ideas of German transcendentalism, or was occupied under the combined influence of the spirit of exact research and of the sensational-philosophy of the eighteenth century in elaborating that system of Positive Thought through which at a later date France once more entered the arena of European speculation. Thus it comes that the religious philosophy of such thinkers as de Bonald, de Maistre, and de Lamennais has hardly found a place in the history of the subject.

1 A notable exception to this general practice is to be found in the second volume of M. Ferraz's 'History of Philosophy in France during the Nineteenth Century' (1880), which deals with "Tradi-tionalism" and "Ultramontanism." In the Preface the author thinks it necessary to justify the inclusion of these currents of thought in a
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

though it contains valuable points of view which have later been taken up by more recent thinkers. Reasons similar to those which prevented for a long time the recognition of the merits of Schleiermacher as a philo-

...complete History of Philosophy, and correctly remarks that neither Ravaissont nor Taine takes due notice of them. He considers that what is termed "pure" thought, the "study of the great Truths of the moral order by the sole aid of individual reasoning," does not comprise the whole of philosophy, though such has been the avowed intention of the foremost philosophers since the time of Socrates, as even such recent thinkers as Bossuet and Fénelon, following Descartes, have found the criterion of certitude in the clearness of ideas—i.e., in a purely rational principle. Against this he points to what he terms a "mixed" philosophy as represented, inter alia, by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St Augustine, and the Fathers of the Church, who tried to reconcile the speculations of Greek philosophy with theological conceptions. It may be remarked that "pure" rationalism has never been characteristic of the leading philosophies in this country, which have been nearly always allied, either with natural knowledge on the one side, or with some form of traditional belief on the other; further, that the position taken up by Lotze in Germany, according to which the formal task of philosophy consists in imparting unity and harmony to the frequently confused and contradictory body of thought furnished by science on the one side, by common-sense and practical reasoning on the other, at once opposes the attempt to build up a philosophical system upon a purely rational principle. And a similar endeavour at a reconciliation of apparently opposed regions of thought seems to underlie also such very different philosophical schemes as those of Herbert Spencer and Mr Balfour.

Two points may be specially referred to: they were in a crude way insisted on in the traditional school of thought. The first is the influence of tradition upon the formation of ideas and convictions. All the modern theories of environment, of inheritance, and of the social atmosphere tend in the direction of maintaining that abstract notions have, like other intellectual data, a conscious or unconscious ancestry depending upon acknowledged or unacknowledged tradition under the influence of surrounding or antecedent conditions. The other interesting point is notably the importance which de Bonald (1754-1840) attaches to language as an instrument of the mind which creates thought instead of being created by it. He even goes the length of maintaining that language and words are a Divine Revelation. Subsequent theories of the relation of language and thought, such as those of Max Müller, the psychological importance of intersubjective communion (James Ward), and the extension of the term language to all forms of expression (the "general linguistic" of B. Croce), all tend to emphasise the important part which language has played, not only in the undiscovered origins of civilisation and culture, but also as the principal Revelation, as the moment of awakening, in the early life of every rational human being.
sopher in Germany, prevented also the important arguments contained in the earlier writings of de Lamennais from receiving due recognition. Theology was considered, in France as in Germany, to disqualify a thinker for the pursuit of genuine speculation. We know, however, as has already been stated, that there existed, at least in Germany, for a considerable time a similar prejudice against those who cultivated exclusively the exact and empirical sciences. In the latter respect France was the first country which emancipated itself from this spirit of extreme rationalism; it was the first country which attempted to raise an edifice of philosophical thought upon the principles of exact research; and it was also there that some of the leading ideas of recent religious speculation were first introduced or suggested. As I have remarked before, the separation of exact science on the one side and of theology on the other from philosophical thought has never existed in the same extreme way in this country.

Though French philosophical thought does not exhibit that close and consecutive development on definite lines which is characteristic of German thought, and to a lesser extent of the thought of this country, it contains a few prominent examples in which definite and recurring aspects of thought have found, as it were, classical expression. Not to speak of Descartes, we have, in some of the writings of the encyclopædists, a typical enunciation of the tenets of materialism, to which the later writings of Büchner in Germany, or even of Haeckel in our days, have hardly added anything which

1 See ante, p. 267 n.
is either new in principle or expressed with the same lucidity and elegance. We may, in fact, say what has been said of one of the philosophers of the Restoration, that French thought is prophetic; giving in rare instances, emphatic and seemingly premature expression to arguments which have taken a long time to become popularly understood. This is eminently the case with two of the points urged by de Lamennais in his celebrated 'Essai sur l'Indifférence en matière de Religion.'

Disregarding, for our present purpose, the local and temporal circumstances which caused its great reputation, we find that the author emphasised two important points which have since occupied religious thinkers everywhere. The first point dealt with by de Lamennais in his first volume was the growing spirit, not of unbelief, but of indifference towards religious questions. He foretold that religious thought was tending towards indifference. The other point with which he dealt in the second volume was the problem of certitude, the question

1 Paul Janet, in 'La Philosophie de Lamennais' (1890, pp. 2 and 3), sees in de Lamennais (1782-1854) one of the great problems of the century condensed in a single mind and a unique moment. It is the transition from the idea of authority to that of revolution. "D'autres que lui, sans doute, ont passé aussi de la cause de l'autorité à celle de la révolution: Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Chateaubriand lui-même, malgré sa fidélité d'office à la légitimité; mais aucun d'eux n'était prêtre, apôtre, prophète; aucun n'avait pris parti avec tant de violence et d'exagération en faveur des doctrines du passé. C'est pourquoi la vie de Lamennais est un drame dans lequel se concentre tout un siècle... De même que, dans les tragédies, l'intérêt, pour être dramatique, doit se concentrer dans une action unique; de même le combat du siècle entre le passé et l'avenir, pour apparaître dans toute sa grandeur, a dû se condenser dans une seule âme et en un moment unique. Tel est le haut et persistant intérêt que présente la vie de Lamennais, et qui donne à tous ses écrits et aux phases diverses de sa philosophie un caractère si émouvant."

2 Vol. i., 1817; vol. ii., 1820; vols. iii. and iv., 1823.
as to the ultimate authority to which we appeal in matters of knowledge and faith.

It will now be generally admitted that through many influences, some of which were clearly pointed out by de Lamennais, a spirit of indifference under various names, such as Agnosticism, Irreligion, Immoralism, or Probabilism has found its way into the thoughtful literature of Western Europe. And, further, we are struck by the fact that prominent thinkers in this country, such as Mr Balfour, and before him James Martineau, have made the question of the seat of authority or the court of appeal in matters of knowledge and belief the subject of special study.

It is a matter of historical interest that a similar problem presented itself, in the early part of the century, from an entirely different point of view and in different surroundings, to de Lamennais,—the problem of certitude in matters of belief. The fact that a tendency to indifference was slowly growing out of the Protestant principle of Toleration did not then strike either German or British thinkers; and this is easily explained if we realise that in Germany, at the time when the 'Essay on Indifference' appeared, there existed just the opposite, a spirit of hope and genuine trust in the promises of idealistic speculation which was not to supersede, but to put the verities of Christian religion upon a securer intellectual foundation; further, that in England a quite different but not less hopeful spirit had become diffused through poetry, literature, and art since the beginning of the century, and that this
was followed by, and in some instances associated with, the later religious revival which centred in the Oxford movement.

The era of German idealism, with its genuine but unfulfilled aspirations, was—as had been the case half a century earlier in France—to be destroyed by Materialism and Industrialism, and the resources of the new spirit in English literature had to exhaust themselves, before thinking minds in both countries could realise how much truth was contained in the dictum of Renan that we live on reminiscences of the past, on the "Shadows of a shadow," and how much insight in his query: "What will those after us live on?"

After having dealt with the phenomenon of indifference in matters of religion, de Lamennais investigates the foundations of certitude, and he finds them in the dicta of common-sense. Common-sense, or the generally accepted axioms and beliefs, are the authority to which we ultimately appeal in questions of importance. He thus reminds us not only of the rôle which custom and habit played in Hume's philosophy, but also of the common-sense philosophy of Reid and the Scottish school which appeared as an answer to Hume's doubts. In passing, we may note how a prominent English philosopher and critic, the late Henry Sidgwick, in one of the last of his Essays, spoke approvingly of Reid's common-sense philosophy. But with de Lamennais common-sense meant something different, something wider and more comprehensive than the common-sense of Reid; the latter appealed rather to the unsophisticated convictions of thinking persons when they re-
flected upon the plain evidences within their own consciousness; it was an appeal to every individual thinking person. With de Lamennais it meant rather an appeal to what was common to all persons whether this consensus be established by reflection or unconsciously adopted and admitted in practice. In fact, in the term "common-sense," we may say that Reid's school laid emphasis on the word "sense," on immediate evidence, de Lamennais on the word "common"—i.e., on that which is possessed by or belongs to every one. It is a reversion to the standard of the more comprehensive mind of the classical period of Christendom; *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*

In this formula of the appeal to common-sense we have the beginning of a doctrine which has, since the time of de Lamennais, been introduced from many sides into the discussion of this question. We may express this by saying that the authority appealed to is not that of a single person, of a single truth, or of an isolated argument, however imposing or convincing such may at times appear, but that it is an appeal to a body of beliefs or of thought which through universality, coherence, and stability commands our respect and assent. As such, this view opposes everything that is detached, isolated, and purely individual; it appeals to the community of men and the continuity of opinions, not to individual thinkers or subjective convictions however rigid and acute the logic of the latter may seemingly be. In fact, de Lamennais maintains that individualism and self-reliance in matters of knowledge and faith must lead ultimately to scepticism, uncertainty, and indifference.
We also recognise, what is not of special interest in this connection, how this argument of de Lamennais brings him very close to some of the doctrines of Democracy and Socialism of which he, later on, became a prominent political exponent.

When Mr Balfour, towards the end of the century, again discussed the question of authority, of the centre of appeal in matters of scientific and religious doctrine, he had at his disposal the result of fully sixty years of philosophical criticism. The epistemological discussions raised by J. S. Mill as to the nature of inductive proof had gradually made it clear that the strictest and best established scientific theories rested upon a system of axioms which were generally accepted, and the truth of which itself rested on cumulative evidence, on coherence, and on practical success; and the same, he could argue, obtained in matters of belief. In addition to this epistemological argument which, since the appearance of Mr Balfour's 'Foundations of Belief,' has received further support through such eminent thinkers as Ernst Mach in Germany and M. Poincaré in France, as well as through the pragmatist movement in this country, we have the arguments drawn from the scientific doctrines of environment, of evolution, and of inheritance, all of which, applied to mental phenomena, teach us that nothing, not even the best-defined logical conception in the clearest of individual minds, can be understood if detached from its surroundings or removed out of the historical sequence in which it has been generated. Thus religious beliefs, as well as scientific truths, rest equally upon large and comprehensive bodies of doctrine
or systems of belief, and receive their convincing power over individual minds only to a very small extent from the temporary and subjective evidence upon which they are fallaciously supposed to rest. It is further interest-
ing to see how de Lamennais and latterly Mr Balfour, both of whom appeal to existing authorities,—i.e., to generally admitted bodies of doctrine as against individual and isolated ratiocination—are ultimately driven to the confession that this whole scheme is intelligible and workable only by the assumption of an underlying universal reason, or of the intrinsic and ultimate ration-
ality of existence,—a doctrine which comes very near to the position taken up in Hegel's philosophy.¹

But here we come upon the point where the religious thought of to-day discards the Hegelian scheme, an

¹ De Lamennais, after seeing his endeavours to vindicate the truth of the Roman Catholic system condemned by the Pope himself—in the Encyclical against "Les Paroles d'un Croyant," July 1834—whose authority he wished to support, took to political and speculative philosophy, influenced in the latter to some extent by Schelling. His writings in this direction had little influence on philosophical thought, the history of which is more interested in his earlier works. With a true insight into the difference between the courses of philosophical thought and special and isolated philosophi-
cal systems, M. Ferraz has defined the position of de Lamennais as follows: "Nous avons cru devoir étudier en détail la doctrine de Lamennais, moins à cause de sa valeur propre, bien qu'elle soit réelle, qu'à cause de l'influence qu'elle a exercée sur le mouvement religieux de notre époque. Avant lui, le parti ultramontain, malgré les appels réitérés de J. de Maistre, ne s'était point encore constitué et n'avait pas même encore une ombre d'existence. C'est Lamennais qui l'a créé, qui l'a organisé et qui lui a donné la force qu'il possède en ce moment. . . . Mais, si Lamennais a produit, à une certaine date, le catholicisme ultramontain, qui domine aujourd'hui avec tant d'empire, il a produit un peu plus tard ce catholicisme libéral, qui a rallié longtemps un certain nombre de natures généreuses, de sorte que les deux grands courants d'idées qui se sont déroulés de nos jours au sein de l'Eglise, ont eu également en lui leur principe et leur source. Le rationaliste ne s'est pas accusé chez lui avec moins de force que le catholique ultramontain et que le catholique libéral, bien qu'il n'ait pas exercé la même influence sur ses contemporains" (loc. cit., p. 268).
opposition which was prepared by Kant, to which Schleiermacher gave special expression, and which is perhaps most clearly brought out in Albrecht Ritschl's theology. The system of reason which Hegel attempted to elaborate was not that of ordinary logic, of the formal logic of the rationalist, or the inductive logic of the empirical school; it was, as it were, a higher reasonableness that Hegel attempted to demonstrate, a rationality which embraces not only formal and exact ways of thinking but also the higher trains of poetical, religious, and metaphysical thought, what had before him been distinguished from the other under various names, such as the Transcendental (Kant), Intellectual Intuition (Fichte and Schelling), or Religious Faith (Jacobi and Fries). In the sequel, however, it became clear that these higher forms of thought cannot be fused into one common logic with the precepts of exact and empirical thought. As the latter were more closely investigated and better understood it became evident that there exists a radical difference in the manner in which science on the one side, art, ethics, and religion on the other, deal with their subject; the principal difference being that science depends upon definition of detail, and that this inevitably leads to abstraction, to the elaboration of an artificial system of knowledge which only partially and transiently corresponds to that which is actual and real: it leads to a mosaic of thought, to a mechanical aggregate, not to a comprehensive and synoptic view of a living totality. It never attains to a view of the Whole, still less to that of the inherent and essential
significance of the All. Now the latter is just what the higher regions of thought desire to grasp from the beginning and to place in the centre of their reasoning. If then Reason lies at the bottom and forms the groundwork of everything, it cannot be identified with the rationale of exact and scientific knowledge which leads ever more into detail and makes no distinction between what is of higher and what is of lower value. Yet we cannot look upon the world around us without introducing these aspects, which are essentially foreign to scientific research or, should they exist, are brought into it in its relation to an end or aim by purely utilitarian and commercial considerations. This has been recognised even by those thinkers who do not despair of reaching an understanding of the highest moral phenomena by employing purely scientific—*i.e.*, exact canons and methods. They are then confronted with two definite problems.

The first is: to find in the empirical and phenomenal world which surrounds us a principle which, so to speak, destroys the monotony of things and disturbs the impartiality of the purely scientific observer, introducing a standard of value, a means of judging between the higher and lower. Such a principle they find in the phenomenon of progress, and ultimately, under various denominations, in the mechanically undefinable principle of Life. The second difficulty lies in this, that even assuming the rationality of things could be reached through the principles and defined in the vocabulary of science, we have then to resolve the still remaining great irrationality of human existence—that of Evil and Sin. These
are the two main difficulties with which any system of naturalism has to deal, and it is significant and interesting to note that the most comprehensive attempt in recent times to deal with these difficulties, from a purely anthropological point of view, is to be found in French literature, and especially in the remarkable writings of Jean Marie Guyau.

We have already, in the two foregoing chapters, dealt with the positive side of Guyau’s teaching, with his philosophy of the Beautiful and his Ethics; and we shall have to revert to it when in the following chapter we deal with the problem of Society. At present it is rather the negative side which I desire to dwell on. With him the spiritual view of things and of life does not coincide with traditional religion and morality, the main positions of which he rejects. He teaches a peculiar kind of Irreligion and Immoralism, or rather he desires to rise beyond the conventional standards of morality and the traditional dogmas of religion. He has thus, in a remarkable study by M. Alfred Fouillée, been correctly and significantly compared with Nietzsche in Germany.¹ Now the two main positions in the

¹ ‘Nietzsche et L’Immoralisme,’ by Alfred Fouillée (2nd ed., 1902). From the Introduction to this work we learn that Nietzsche was well acquainted with Guyau’s principal works, his own copies of which are covered with marginal notes of approval and criticism, but that neither Guyau nor Fouillée himself knew Nietzsche personally, though they lived for some time at the same places on the Riviera. M. Fouillée expresses his comparative estimate of the two thinkers, whose names have been brought together in several critical notices by French and German writers, as follows: “Les œuvres de Guyau et de Nietzsche ont ainsi éveillé de toutes parts des échos plus ou moins discordants. Quant à nous, il nous semble que l’individualisme de Nietzsche a besoin d’être corrigé par le point de vue social de Guyau. Aussi avons-nous cru nécessaire, tout en insistant sur Nietzsche, de le comparer à son devancier français. Les théories du penseur allemand
current systems of moral and religious thought which he combats and rejects are, so far as morality is concerned, the sense of obligation and the demand for a higher sanction; and, so far as religion is concerned, the existence of a special doctrine or of a body of dogma. He aims at a morality "without obligation and sanction," and at a religion without dogma; the former position is new and original to him; the latter was not an unknown conception with several German thinkers already in the middle of the century, who talked of the religious spirit without a definite religion or, as they termed it, of "religiosity without religion." In this manner Guyau opposes what the whole of religious philosophy and all practical morals and religion have considered indispensable—viz., a definite and obligatory moral law and a simple or elaborate, but, in any case, a definite system of beliefs. In proportion as the conviction has forced itself upon thinkers from many sides that reality and certitude, so far as the human mind is concerned, can be attained, not by any single assertion, but only by a more or less consistent, coherent, and stable system or order of ideas; further, that the system of ideas and conceptions elaborated by science has no centre and no finality; it has become increasingly clear to many that, to satisfy the higher needs of the human soul, there must exist another and a higher order, and that

sont en partie une déviation de plusieurs des doctrines que Guyau avait déjà soutenues; il importe donc au plus haut point de rétablir le vrai et le normal sous certaines altérations pathologiques qui, grâce au génie littéraire de Nietzsche, peuvent séduire tant de simples ou tant de raffinés à la recherche du neuf." (p. ii.)
this higher order must have a definite centre to make it stable and comprehensive. Practical religion will always demand a system of beliefs or of doctrine in which its conception of the higher order of things finds expression, and a supreme law of conduct in which it is centred.

According to the intuitional school, the latter is an indestructible postulate of human nature, the categorical imperative of Kant, for which systems of theoretical and practical morality are forced to find definite though possibly changing expression. The former—i.e., the more or less elaborate system of doctrine and belief in which the higher moral or spiritual order finds expression—has been elaborated by the human race, in its progressive history and culture, as its Religion. The problem of the spirit according to this view finds its solution from two definite beginnings, the sense of obligation which exists as an original endowment or revelation in the human mind, and the historical religion which has been such an important factor throughout the course of civilisation. Upon these two data, the first, a definite central point, the second, a wide circumference of facts and events, it is the task of theology or of systematic religious thought to build its edifice; the first is a psychological, the second a historical study. Both lead us beyond the region of purely philosophical thought.

This view discards the scheme which has found its most elaborate and, at the same time, most poetical expression in Guyau's writings: the latter appears vague and impracticable, and, in consequence, unrealisable. This verdict is strengthened by a further and last con-
sideration. Guyau's aim of establishing a religion or a spiritual view of things without recourse to any definite doctrine or dogma, though it naturally sprang up in a country and among surroundings which have witnessed the tyranny of the Church, the frightful deeds of religious persecution, and the abuse of dogma, cannot consistently be carried through. For—after the destruction of all traditional beliefs, of all rigid dogmas, and of all moral compulsion—it will yet leave standing one last and solitary dogma, which consistently it should not hesitate ultimately and finally to destroy. This "last dogma" is morality itself, the sense of Duty, and the distinction of Good and Evil.

It is interesting to see how, in modern literature, this conviction that morality itself must fall as a "last dogma" before the logical consequences of a purely naturalistic view is gradually gaining ground and finding definite expression. This is considered by one class of thinkers to be a reductio ad absurdum of the naturalistic position; by another class as an indication that utilitarian systems of morality rest upon an illogical introduction of a principle alien to the purely naturalistic view. Such a principle, which in the end is introduced in order to combat the purely selfish and individualistic view, is found, by Comte, simply in Altruism; by Guyau, in the expansive principle of Life; by Fouillée, in the "force of ideas"; by Lange and others, in Ideals; and ultimately by all these and other thinkers,

1 One of the earliest discussions of this subject will be found in three articles by M. Delboeuf in the 'Revue Philosophique,' vols. xiii. and xiv. (1882).
including Spencer, in the organisation, the demands, and the authority of human society. But it must be remarked that naturalism is not, in our present stage of knowledge, identical with mechanism, and that the extreme view mentioned above implies the assertion that the phenomena of life, individual and social, and those of consciousness can be explained on purely mechanical principles. This is, at the present moment, impossible, and naturalists such as du Bois Reymond, Herbert Spencer, and Haeckel have been, perhaps reluctantly, forced to admit this; whereas, on the other side, thinkers whose own original work was confined to purely mechanical reasoning, have either, with Lord Kelvin, distinctly asserted the impossibility of understanding the phenomena of living matter on purely mechanical principles, or have, with Clifford, invented a theory of "mind-stuff."

1 An interesting article dealing with this subject will be found in the American 'Philosophical Review' (1896), with the title "Morality the last of Dogmas," by Antonio Llano. The author identifies the naturalistic with the purely mechanical point of view—in fact, he practically accepts what du Bois Reymond termed the "Laplacian world-formula." This position is, to say the least, premature, and the contention that "naturalistic and utilitarian philosophers; who—strange to say—establish the premises as indispensable, shrink before their logical consequences," is not correct if applied to such thinkers as the author deals with. But assuming that it were possible to reduce everything in human life and conduct to purely mechanical sequences, and that the author's conclusions were established "that morality with its machinery of obligation, conscience, and duty, being based on feelings originated in superstition and slavery; and in an inadequate and unscientific conception of the world in general, and of man in particular, is doomed to vanish under the pressure of enlightened reason, which will cease to consider it either necessary or profitable," we may ask the question, What is to take the place of morality? The author is very definite on this, saying that "the evolution (I might better say the dissolution) of morality is from 'duty' towards 'right,' the former diminishing as the latter increases." Now this suggests a very important distinction. The word "right" has several meanings, and the use
OF THE SPIRIT. 413

For those who refuse to deduce the feeling of duty and obligation either psychologically or historically from non-moral elements, and consider it, with Kant, to be the starting-point, centre, and foundation of any and every higher or spiritual view of things, there will always exist the further task of interpreting this unique and remarkable experience through some reasoned creed, as well as of showing its purport and working throughout the whole region of practical life. The fundamental assertion or postulate will have to be followed by a more or less elaborate ontology (theory of being) and a system of morality (theory of conduct). Long before philosophers had professedly done so, the common-sense of mankind had attempted this interpretation and expansion of the moral postulate in the various historical religions and moralities of the different nations and ages of the world.

It is with a true insight into the connection of ideas that Guyau and others have pointed out that if the spirit of toleration makes it desirable that religious
dogma be done away with and the dogmatic spirit destroyed, this will ultimately and necessarily be followed by a negation, not only of religious dogmas, but likewise of the sense of duty, and finally of moral distinctions themselves. Here it is difficult not to ask the question whether there is not a still more fundamental assumption, postulate, or axiom—whatever we call it—which will follow in the wake of this general collapse, viz., Truth. As a matter of fact, this question has been asked and discussed in the recent literature and controversies of Pragmatism. With this we shall have to deal on a later occasion, as it has, so far, not directly treated the religious problem or the problem of the Spirit.

The theological view which seeks the foundation of ethics in the belief in a higher, transcendental, or spiritual order of things (the "civitas Dei") which it confronts with the purely anthropological order (the "civitas humana")—though it admits that the two existing orders are, from our point of view, interwoven like the warp and woof in the texture of a garment—has, in the course of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, been enlarged and strengthened by adding to the purely psychological view, taken by Kant, the historical study of religion. But the undoubted gain which has resulted from these studies, through giving breadth of view and wealth of detail, has not been secured without corresponding difficulties. The opposite or naturalistic view has not been slow to detect these. The modern "study of religions" has made it difficult to assign to any one of the historical
religions a unique position, especially as it has been shown, with more or less success, that what, for instance, were considered at one time to be doctrines and precepts peculiar to Christianity have—perhaps without exception—existed outside and before the era of the Christian dispensation in other Oriental or European religions. It does not come within the province of philosophical thought, which deals only with matters of principle, to settle these purely historical problems on which a final opinion does not, and perhaps never will, exist. In this connection it is only important to notice that, if on the one side historical research has made it more difficult to define the unique character of any one religious system, it has, on the other side, especially under the influence of the theory of evolution, also suggested an answer to the problem it has created. According to this view the spiritual element or principle shows an analogy with the phenomena of Life. I have had occasion, in the earlier part of this History, to point out that, although modern thought has not arrived at any satisfactory definition of Life, three distinct features have been established: Life is a unique, a continuous, and a ubiquitous phenomenon. We are now approaching an analogous view so far as the spiritual principle is concerned; we are taught to look upon it as a unique, a continuous, and a ubiquitous historical phenomenon in the development of man and mankind.

As little, however, as the various forms of Life ex-

1 See supra, vol. ii., chap. x., pp. 462 sqq.
hibit each the inherent principle in its purity or fulness, or in that perfection which we see before us in single specimens of the human race,—showing rather endless varieties and possibilities of arrested or degraded development, in a profusion of beautiful, grotesque, or even hideous examples in the lower and higher forms of vegetable, animate, and intelligent nature,—just as little do we find the spiritual principle everywhere equally active and clear in its historical life and development. On the contrary, we find the spiritual principle also branching off sometimes into a one-sided growth, not without rising, in single instances and under favourable conditions, to rare beauty and sublimity, exhibiting often also the grotesque, the degrading, and the repulsive. And yet, as we have learned, through biology, to connect all living forms together from the lowest to the highest, and to recognise in them the luxuriations of one and the same principle, the principle of Life, so also we recognise in the whole religious life of mankind the working of one and the same principle which we term the Spirit. And there are still other lessons which we may learn from this analogy. The highest, purest, and fullest development of the principle of life, that which gives us also the only clue we possess to its intrinsic value and meaning, is to be found, for us human observers, in single specimens of the human race, in the highest examples of personality. It seems as if the vital principle has attained to a kind of finality in such instances and on the occasion of such creations. Similarly the spiritual view of things seems to recognise a kind of finality in the Christian conception of Love as the ground and the
highest rule conceivable for us human beings in the Divine Order of things. And again, if we turn to the result of recent biological enquiry, we are struck—as great authorities have told us—by the practical impossibility of predicting phenomena and events in the living portion of creation with anything approaching that accuracy with which exact science has taught us to predict the workings of inanimate or mechanical forces. This may be owing to the complexity which governs every individual instance or to the undefinable nature of the living principle itself: we meet everywhere the unexpected, the unforeseen, the incalculable, that which is contingent, individual, and unique. This circumstance—as I stated on a former occasion—forces us continually to resort from the scientific exact and mechanical view of nature to a poetical and artistic interpretation, which seems to bring us much nearer

1 The comparative history of religion, after having been confined mostly to learned treatises on the subject which have accumulated an enormous amount of detail has, in recent times, been introduced more and more into general literature and made accessible to thoughtful readers. I should like to mention as especially interesting and helpful as an introduction to this large subject the writings of Dr F. B. Jevons; and besides a larger work referred to above (vol. iii. p. 163, n.), his small treatise entitled 'Comparative Religion,' in the "Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature" (1913); see especially what is there said on the Christian conception of Love (p. 136 sqq.)


3 As already stated on various occasions, the things in nature—notably those in the living and animated world—cannot be thoroughly understood if torn out of their surroundings, and still less if dissected and analysed into their constituent parts. Both these abstracting processes, so essential and so indispensable to scientific research, must be supplemented by ever and again recurring to the vue d'ensemble. And this refers equally to such historical growths as the religions of the world. A process of abstraction and of analysis, followed by ever so ingenious a synthesis and reconstruction, misses their real nature and significance. This reveals itself only to the synoptic glance.

VOL. IV.
to the real essence and meaning of Life. Now, such is still more the case if we deal with the phenomena and workings of the spirit, if we attempt to trace the hidden lines of the inwoven spiritual or Divine Order with the same accuracy and confidence with which we have learnt to trace those of the natural order of things. Here, even less than in the region of the biologist, does uniformity obtain; our formulæ and analogies forsake us; every spiritual phenomenon, like every living thing, is unique; the unexpected, the marvellous—nay, even the miraculous and seemingly irrational—continually happens, and will seem to many to denote the very essence and character of the Spiritual. This is what naturally follows from the twofold order, the dualism, which the theological view of things upholds and which it considers to be inherent in the constitution, in the nature and position of us human beings who do not, as Lotze somewhere says, dwell at the root of the tree of knowledge, nor survey the whole of it from an outside position, but are modestly lodged somewhere in its branches. To infer from this that the whole scheme is irrational would be legitimate only if we limit rationality to those trains of reasoning which are common to formal logic and fully applicable and fruitful only in an abstract geometrical world. But if we extend the meaning of the term Reason so that it embraces also the spiritual and transcendent, then, even what may now appear to be miraculous, paradoxical, or irrational, will dissolve in that higher reasonableness which was the ideal of Hegel's system, and which, though never
fulfilled, will ever remain and recur as the undying aspiration of the human intellect.

The interest which the human mind takes in the spiritual view of things, in the Divine Order, lies ultimately in this, that it interprets and supports the moral ideals of our race, and that it leads beyond the purely subjective, selfish, or utilitarian interpretation and conception of the voice of duty. As we saw, at the end of the last chapter, both schools of ethics — the theological and the anthropological — recognise the necessity of getting beyond the subjective or selfish point of view; both seek to place the motives of human action upon a broader basis and on a deeper foundation. The anthropological or naturalistic school do so by introducing and developing the idea of Humanity, of human society or of the human race as a whole. They do not think it necessary to introduce, or possible to maintain, any other principle than what they find in human experience individually and collectively; they are equally serious in recognising the necessity of interpreting and following the call to duty. The activity of this school has been very great during the nineteenth century; its teaching is much more recent and perhaps more original than the teaching of the other, the theological school. The writings of the former bulk very largely in nineteenth-century philosophy. In the following chapter I propose to take up this side of the moral problem. It will, accordingly, deal with the growth and diffusion of the idea or Ideal of Humanity.
CHAPTER X.

OF SOCIETY.

I.

Many influences and interests have combined in the course of the nineteenth century to define and push into the foreground a problem which in its present comprehensive form did not occupy earlier philosophic thought. This is the social problem, the problem of human society, or, if we take it in the widest sense, the problem of the human race or humanity. Earlier philosophies, among which those of Plato and Aristotle in ancient times stand out prominently, have furnished contributions to the treatment of the problem; so have, in later centuries, from special points of view, such thinkers as St Augustine, Hobbes, Spinoza, Grotius, and others. But that the problem is a much larger one, and that its solution must be based on a natural and civil history, combined with a philosophy of the collective life of man, this does not seem to have been recognised before the latter half of the eighteenth century. Earlier writers dealt with special aspects of the great subject, starting from historical data or from dogmatic
conceptions, in the interest of government, of civil or religious legislation, of political, commercial, or industrial progress, sometimes only with a view of opposing conventional theories and bringing about much-needed reforms. But impartially to gather together data descriptive of the origin, the organisation, and the development of the collective life of man, to analyse his dependence on natural environment, on the growing complexity of his inner life, to understand the stages of historical development, the rise, culmination, and decline of nationalities and races, to forecast the future and to form some idea of the constitution of what has been termed the liberal state, and of the larger international and social organisation of mankind—the civitas humana,—all these various problems seem to have received conscious recognition only in the course of the last hundred and fifty years, and this again only since original thinkers have ventured to discard altogether existing conditions and to build a fresh fabric of human society upon rational and moral principles. No opportunity 1 to do this with full con-

1 See, however, infra, p. 428 n. The philosophical writers who had most direct influence upon the drawing up both of the American and the French constitution seem to be Locke (following upon Hobbes) and Rousseau; the formulae made familiar through them being the 'Rights of Man' and the 'Social Contract.' Montesquieu's inaccurate analysis of the English constitution played also an important part. Mr Whittaker refers to the following recent accounts of the subject for fuller information: 'Cambridge Modern History' (vol. vii. p. 174; vol. viii. pp. 19, 20, 177-178); 'Encyclop. Brit.' 11th ed. (vol. xiv.; 'Declaration of Independence'), and remarks: 'What Rousseau had to give was compact form and a certain emotional effect. Carlyle's and Burke's prejudices (not the same but telling in the same direction) seem to affect most English writers; even those who see that the Revolution was inevitable think they are bound to make light of such 'formulæ' as unrealities. Without the formulæ, which might be talked by declaimers but were the result of a long process of thinking, it seems to me that the Revolution must have remained 'without form and void,'—a mere 'general overturn'
sciousness and responsibility arose before the American struggle for independence and the consequent constitution based upon the declaration of rights. What was then done was fifteen years later repeated and modified in the French constitution of the year 1791, after the Revolution had swept away a great part of the older institutions and landmarks. It is not likely that European thinkers of the foremost order would all of a sudden have given so much attention to what is now termed the social problem 1 had it not been for the

ending in renewal of the old state of things; for in the absence of such expressions as 'rights,' 'social contract,' &c., everybody would have been unable to think in any but terms of 'status' (as Maine expresses the underlying conception of the old order)."

1 This term is commonly used to denote some problem or problems which are at the moment of special practical importance. In this sense the problem is one of practical or applied philosophy and does not come into the programme of this History. Both in this narrower and in the wider sense the term forms the title of a comprehensive work by Dr Ludwig Stein: 'Die Soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie' (2nd ed., 1903), which, as we learn from the Preface, has met with a large circulation on the Continent, having been translated into French and other foreign languages. I desire to recommend this work as giving the reader a wide view of the enormous modern literature and the complexity of the subject, and to express my indebtedness to the author. At the same time, his use of the term is not quite identical with the plan of the present chapter. This might perhaps be more adequately described as the anthropological problem: the study of man as a member of an aggregate called Society and in his relations with external nature. And this as the introduction and foundation, not only of the phenomena of collective life, but also of psychology as the science of the individual mind. This is another instance how, in recent times, the study of phenomena in their isolation is more and more giving way to a preliminary study of such phenomena in their "Together," what I have termed the "synoptic" aspect. We have one of the most instructive examples of this development of thought in the life-work of so eminent a thinker as Prof. Wundt in Germany, who has crowned his philosophical researches—which started with a very special problem of physiological psychology—by his great work on anthropo-

logy: 'Volkerpsychologie.' From this point of view, with all acknowledgment of Dr Stein's valuable and encyclopedic work, I miss the due appreciation of such writings as Lotze's 'Microcosmus,' though we may perhaps be forced to consider this important work to be no more than a first approximation for the solution of the great problem. This problem is defined by Lotze in the question: "What significance have man and human life
much greater revolution of ideas which accompanied and followed in the wake of that political upheaval.

If in the literature of the second half of the eighteenth century we look for the thinker who had the fullest and most modern conception of the problem before us, it is undoubtedly Herder; nor is it without significance for his comprehension of the vastness and intricacy of this problem to note that he published only ‘Ideas towards a History of Mankind,’ a programme which, under the widening and deepening influences of subsequent thought, assumed a larger expression on the title-page of Lotze’s ‘Microcosmus’ as ‘Ideas towards a Natural History and History of Mankind.’ From a practical point of view the problem was, however, brought under notice some time before Herder wrote by several thinkers, notably by Rousseau in France, who denounced the artificiality of modern life and proclaimed a return to nature, but whose lasting contribution to the solution of the social problem consists probably in his profound influence on popular education in Switzerland and Germany. Some signs that the problem was independently before the minds of thinkers are to be found in the literature of other countries—for instance, in the earlier writings of Vico

1  in Italy, of

with its constant phenomena, and the changing course of history; in the great whole of nature, to the steady influence of which the results of modern science have made us feel more than ever in subjection?” (Introduction to ‘Microcosmus,’ Eng. transl., vol. i. p. xvi.) Robert Flint, in his ‘Philosophy of History in France and Germany,’ has correctly characterised Lotze’s
great work in this larger spirit: “Its subject is man, not merely in his historical development but in all his relationships” (p. 588).

1 We are indebted to J. Michelet in France and still more to Robert Flint in this country for having made the writings of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) better known to modern students; the former through a translation of the
Vico, Kames, and Monboddo.

Kames and Monboddo in this country. The latter was known to Herder, but the class of researches which he initiated was not taken up in his own country till much later. More important and still less recognised were the original speculations of Vico during the earlier half of the eighteenth century: they have only in our day met with the appreciation they deserve.

Herder did more than any other writer to place 'Scienza Nuova' (1827), and a free version of his smaller works ('Enavres Choisies de Vico,' 1835), the latter through his works on the 'Philosophy of History' (1874 and 1893), and his interesting volume on 'Vico' in 'Blackwood's Philosophical Classics' (1884). Flint compares the absence of appreciation of Vico's writings in this country and of Butler's writings abroad, explaining this by the fact that the former was as specific a representative of Italian thought as Butler is of British thought. The editor of Hegel's Lectures "On the Philosophy of History," and one of his foremost disciples, Eduard Gans, mentions Vico as a forerunner of Herder, but gives probably the correct reason for the neglect of Vico's work in Germany, the fact that he is too much occupied with the history of Greece and Rome and that he does not mention the modern comprehension of Christian truth which dates from the Reformation, a criticism which he applies still more pointedly to Fr. v. Schlegel's 'Philosophy of History.'

1 These two writers, Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782); James Burnett, Lord Monboddo (1714-1799), of whom the latter was looked upon as a kind of curiosity in his time, have also more recently attracted merited attention, the former ('Essay on Criticism') c. g., in the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey in Germany, the latter through Professor William Knight ('Lord Monboddo and some of his Contemporaries,' 1900). It is, however, interesting to note that whilst Monboddo "remained an isolated being, anointing himself according to the fashion of the ancients, growling at the degeneracy of mankind and regarded by them as a semi-lunatic" (Leslie Stephen, 'English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,' vol. i. p. 69), Herder in Germany was so much impressed by him that he promoted the translation of his work, "Of the Origin and Progress of Language," wrote an appreciative preface to it, designating the author as the foremost thinker on the subject—in contrast to Lord Kames—and this in spite of the fact that he himself did not agree with the theory propounded in that work. (See R. Haym, 'Herder,' vol. ii. p. 224; also Herder's 'Werke'; 'Zur Philosophie und Geschichte' (1827, vol. ii. p. 163 ssq.; vol. viii. p. 117.)

The writer of the article "Monboddo," in the 9th ed. of the 'Encyclopedia Britannica,' has pointed out not only that the Neokantian position towards Locke's philosophy is anticipated by Monboddo, but that Monboddo was also one of the early propounders of the modern Darwinian doctrine of the descent of man.
before his age the idea of humanity. This has been correctly considered as embodying the ideals which lived in the minds of all the great representatives of the classical period of German literature. It found its most perfect realisation in the person, the life, and the works of Goethe. Though Herder himself did not attain, either in his personal or literary activity, to that elevated expression of his ideal which lived in his contemporaries, Goethe, Kant, and Schiller, and was bequeathed through them to a large circle of poets and thinkers, he has the merit of having formed the conception of a 'History of the Human Race' as a development of the 'Idea of Humanity,' and this in a truly philosophical spirit, with no other practical and ulterior motive than that of the education and elevation of mankind. But other and

1 Considering the important part which Herder's 'Ideen' played in German literature, it is remarkable that his name is so little familiar to English writers, among whom Flint was probably the first to do full justice to him. Even Carlyle, to whom two generations of English readers were probably mainly indebted for their knowledge of German literature, has little to say about Herder, referring only to his relations with Goethe and quoting a characteristic passage from Jean Paul on the spirit of Herder's style (Miscellanies, 'Works,' vol. viii. p. 61). The main reason of the neglect which Herder's writings experienced in this, and for a time also in his own, country is probably to be found in the fact that he fell foul of the metaphysical interests and tendencies of his age which sprang up just after his principal work had created, for the time, a great sensation. But there is another reason which is indicated by Haym ('Herder,' vol. ii. p. 336). It is not in his larger unfinished work that Herder excelled but in the several collections of his smaller pieces, which, as Haym says, give us little gems, not all equally important, but each attractive in itself and together of the most beautiful effect. To express it in terms now familiar to the reader of this History, we may say that Herder's mind took a comprehensive "synoptic" view, that he lacked the power of the great artist to give full expression to the same, but that out of it he was able to elaborate smaller studies of great beauty and value. Thus it is that many of his younger contemporaries were stimulated through him to researches which, though much more limited, led to more definite results, whilst, with a comprehensive and a synoptic view of the world and life, Herder remained himself as Haym says, "always fragmentary." In addition to this, Herder
more practical interests were at work at the same time. These were more intimately connected with the political and social revolutions of the age.

Quite a separate succession of thinkers arose in France, and has continued there during the greater part of the nineteenth century. We may with some propriety characterise the difference of thought which ran through the whole of their writings as compared with that which animated the contemporaneous succession of German thinkers and scholars by saying that the former was always brought history into connection with psychology, a study which the metaphysical interest of the age had pushed into the background (see ante, vol. ii. p. 531 sqq.). But before leaving Herder we must note that he was the pioneer in another and most important branch of literature, which has given so much light and so much interest to the early history of living and bygone nationalities, and links the study of pre-historic times with the most recent and some of the most perfect creations of modern poetry, art, and composition. Herder is truly the centre of the researches into poetry and song of the early peoples, and of that stratum of a healthy population which lives in immediate contact with nature, and out of which the higher, more intellectual, and more cultivated classes always recruit themselves. In his 'Stimmen der Völker' we find one of those beautiful garlands of flowers and gems to which Haym refers, and which has been followed by innumerable subsequent collections, and led to valuable discoveries and the restoration and preservation of legends and stories which would otherwise have been forgotten. The history of this unique product in the classical literature of Ger-
animated by the spirit of Voltaire, whereas the latter was largely indebted to Rousseau. Whilst Rousseau, and after him Herder, had recourse to the elemental forces of nature and mind, studied the origin of things, and favoured a poetical and romantic interpretation of nature, pointing always to unexplored regions, and drawing inspiration from the half-illuminated storehouse of subconscious thought, Voltaire and the encyclopaedists lived in the clear daylight of scientific reasoning, of logical analysis, of methodical definition and construction, denouncing everything outside of it as mere sentiment or illusion. Whilst the former were Christian humanitarians, the latter were critical sceptics and freethinkers. That both lines of thought were working at the same problem, that, earlier or later, they both elaborated a similar ideal,—using even the same term "humanity" to define it,—is indeed a significant fact, as is likewise the circumstance that the scientific conception led in its greatest representative, Comte, to a fantastic and romantic elaboration, whereas the Christian humanitarian line of thought in Germany ended with Feuerbach and Strauss in a sort of scientific materialism not unlike the earlier materialism of Helvetius and Condillac in France, though much less elegantly expressed.

A more modest, though, in the end, a more lasting contribution to the treatment of the problem of human society came during the same age from this country. Thinkers here had also been profoundly stirred by the political events in America and in France; neither were there wanting solitary minds who treated single aspects of the social problem from a
larger, more abstract, and more philosophical point of view. For centuries past English philosophers had been occupied with theories of government and social order, of popular representation, of freedom of thought and religious toleration. Nor had the spirit of romance and fiction been slow to embody these liberal ideas in fanciful pictures of a human society reconstituted according to rational principles. Of these the 'Republic' of Plato was the great forerunner and model. Such were in the classical literature of this country the 'New Atlantis' of Bacon (1624), the 'Oceana' of Harrington (1656), and, earliest and foremost of all, the 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More (1516). Single attempts were also made to carry them out in practice, some of them highly successful, such as the life-work of William Penn, others fantastic and unrealisable like the earlier scheme of Bishop Berkeley or the later of Coleridge.

1 In 1670 an attempt was made in the colony of North Carolina to introduce a new system of government and form of social order called the "Fundamental Constitution," drawn up by John Locke at the request of the lords proprietors; but this and several subsequent attempts were so stoutly resisted by the colonists that the absurd and tyrannous scheme was formally abandoned. (See 'Encyclop. Brit.,' 9th ed., vol. xvii. p. 562). "The grant of the extensive territory called Pennsylvania, made by Charles II. in 1681 to William Penn, carried with it full proprietorship and dominion, saving only the king's sovereignty. Penn at once created a quick market for lands by publishing in England and on the Continent his liberal scheme of government and his intention to try the 'holy experiment' of 'a free colony for all mankind.' . . . The desire to escape from spiritual and temporal despotisms and the chance of acquiring rich lands in a salubrious climate on easy terms, drew thousands of immigrants; English Quakers, Scottish and Irish Presbyterians, German Mennonites, French Huguenots, men of all religions were alike welcome. . . . In December 1682 Penn summoned delegates . . . to confer about government; . . . in March following representatives chosen by the people . . . agreed on a constitution based upon popular suffrage and guaranteeing liberty of conscience." "This constitution, savouring strongly of Harrington's 'Oceana,' . . . was democratical in the purest sense." "Such a con-
None of these, however, contributed much to the philosophical treatment of the social problem. What this country did contribute consists not so much, or perhaps not at all, in looking at the larger question in a comprehensive spirit, but rather in isolating certain definite and restricted questions which were suggested by the political and industrial progress of the country. Among these was the Economic Problem defined by Adam Smith as that of the 'Wealth of Nations,' and later on some problems of legislation defined by Bentham. Bentham's influence became more important and generally recognised through the labours of James and John Stuart Mill, who sought for a deeper foundation for political and economic theory in the study of psychology and logic. In addition to the psychological and logical studies of the Mills and their school this country has contributed valuable material for the study of the natural and civil history of mankind by a series of works upon Primitive Culture, among which those of Tylor and Lubbock stand out prominently. They are more purely anthropological or ethnological.

We have thus, in the three countries, three tolerably distinct and for some time independent courses of thought which ultimately came together and are more or less absorbed in the larger problem with which I am now dealing—the problem of human society. The distinctive features of the thought of the three nations which I have had frequent occasion to point out, and which were more marked in the first half of the

9. Special problems, Adam Smith and Bentham.

10. James and J. S. Mill.
century than they are in our day, can be traced also in the way they consciously or unconsciously attacked this problem. French thinkers, who were probably the first in modern times to approach the subject, did so in a scientific spirit and upon the basis of a few simple generalisations which they attempted to work out logically; German thinkers progressed in a more speculative manner with a deeper appreciation of the vastness of the subject, which required, in their opinion, extensive research as well as speculative construction. English thought in the last instance was not as revolutionary as French thought nor as speculative as that of Germany, but it made the earliest successful attempts to deal patiently and elaborately with single restricted problems as they presented themselves through the work of the age and pressed for practical solution. These differences more or less disappeared in the course of the century, a term being introduced which enabled the various contributions of separate schools or isolated thinkers to crystallise into a definite problem. As a result of this a distinct science has sprung up under the name of sociology: this term was introduced by Comte in France. Though frequently found fault with, it has nevertheless now been accepted in the language and literature of all civilised countries. From being in the beginning a stranger and newcomer among the different members of the philosophical body, sociology has gradually usurped the central and leading position, and this under the influence of additional causes which it is important to explain somewhat more closely.

The first of these causes may be termed a theoretical
one, and can be traced to a habit or tendency of thought which has made itself felt in the course of the second half of the century. This tendency shows itself in the treatment of nearly every one of the great philosophic problems, and is likewise prominent in scientific thought. Many words suggest themselves by which this tendency may be characterised, but no term exists at present which is generally accepted and would be intelligible without much explanation. It is more con-

1 I have allowed this passage, which was written more than four years ago, to stand, though since that time and in course of the revision of the present section of this history some progress has been made in more clearly defining and naming the tendency of thought referred to in the text. The fact that practically the whole of this history has so far been written without the use of a comprehensive term wherewith to characterise the more recent thought of the century may be a proof to my readers that it has not been written from any preconceived point of view or with the object of proving some distinctive generalisation. The latter emerged only at the end of the composition of the text as a very broad induction resting upon a large amount of detail, and has, during the revision, been referred to on various occasions, for the most part only in the notes. As explained in two Papers read before the "University of Durham Philosophical Society" in May 1910 and in February 1913; "On a General Tendency of Thought during the second half of the Nineteenth Century," and "On the Synoptic Aspect of Reality," the tendency referred to had been already defined by Comte in an early tract as the vue d'ensemble in contrast to the vue de détail, and by various German writers, but notably by Wilhelm Dilthey, as the Gesammtanschauung, and I also explained there as I have done supra, vol. iii. p. 193 n., that in correspondence with Prof. Sorley of Cambridge I have fixed on the term the "synoptic view or aspect," contrasting synopsis with the combined process of analysis and synthesis; the former taking in at a glance the totality of a complex subject, the latter dissecting the same into its parts and then attempting to bring them together again to a united whole. For instances of the working of these different processes see various passages in this section, notably vol. iii. 192 sqq., 240, 350, 395 sqq., 415, 465, 608, 612 n. It seems to me that a similar view must have been before the minds of many thinkers on many occasions; I refer only to one example which casually caught my eye quite recently. In an Article entitled "A Sketch of a Philosophy of Order" ('Minô,' 1913, pp. 197 and 198), Prof. J. S. Mackenzie writes: "The modes of unity are not something foreign to the material which they build up but are rather contained in it from the very beginning. . . To use one of Kant's own antitheses we
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

convenient to define what I mean by its contrast with a habit of thought which prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century, mainly, but not solely, under the influence of the scientific spirit. This latter tendency may be defined by calling it the atomising tendency of thought.

Great progress had been made in the course of the eighteenth century by a division of scientific labour, by a process of isolation of special problems, by studying such things and phenomena in the world of nature and of mind as could be neatly separated and defined. Thus, physical astronomy and mechanical physics had made enormous strides through the treatment of the single property of gravitation or of attraction. Following upon astronomy, chemistry had become an exact science through being founded by Lavoisier upon the property of weight, and subsequently upon that of the atomic weights of a limited number of elements and their combination in fixed proportions. Other sciences followed with the study of definite and distinct properties or species of things natural, such as the forms of crystals or the types of animated beings. A similar process of isolation was at work in some of the mental sciences—e.g., in the earlier "faculty-psychology" as well as in the later doctrine of the "association of

need no synthesis but only a synopsis. We need only to look and see what is contained in the material that comes before us. . . . When we recognise that atomism is untrue from the outset, we recognise that order is involved in our experience all the way through. The term 'order' seems to me on the whole the most satisfactory that we can use to cover all the modes of unity that are contained in our experience. . . . No doubt there is a good deal of difference between different types of order, . . . but they are all alike as being the modes in which the plurality of the content of our experience reveals itself as being at the same time a unity."
ideas,” which was indeed significantly termed a mental chemistry. It is not necessary to labour this point any further. The reader will, from a perusal of earlier portions of this history, recollect many other instances in which scientific progress or philosophical thought was stimulated into increased activity by the discovery and description of phenomena or features which could be clearly defined, which allowed themselves to be examined in their isolation from a large surrounding mass of confusing detail. The enormous labour and ingenuity which have been spent over producing pure substances in chemistry or analysing with the microscope complicated tissues into their component parts are representative of this atomising tendency of scientific as well as of philosophical thought during the greater portion of the nineteenth century. In the course, however, of the long and successful career of this tendency of thought a conviction has gradually crept in that it grasps only one side of the things and phenomena which it undertook to study, and this for two reasons.

First, it became increasingly evident that by this process of atomising, of resolving the complex into its component parts, a something was lost, some important feature or principle seemed to drop out or disappear, a something which could not be recovered again in the subsequent synthesis or putting together of the elements which had been laboriously separated; something which was indeed undefinable but nevertheless equally real, something which—as in the processes of life and mind—marked the very character of their special reality. The atomising process failed to grasp it.
Secondly, this process of analysing, so prominent in the mechanical and chemical sciences, was in the beginning supposed to have some finality. In the sequel, however, it was found to lead further and further away from the starting-point, to be in fact interminable. Molecules were analysed into atoms, and these again enormously subdivided into electrons or particles. The cell, the unit of organic structure, was found to be a very complicated system, and even the nucleus or kernel with its nucleolus in the cell presented itself as a microcosm, an assemblage of an enormous number of units, which, being far beyond the powers of the microscope, are indeed most hypothetical and have received fanciful names, of which a whole catalogue might easily be written down.

For these two reasons the atomising process of scientific thought proved ultimately to be quite as endless in its application as it was hopeless in its capability of ever grasping the reality of things. Promising on the one side unlimited discovery of new facts and many practical results, it discouraged on the other side all hope that by and through it any comprehensive view could ever be attained. Thus it has come about that a contrary tendency of thought has made itself increasingly felt, the tendency to look at things in their together, not in their isolation: in their complexity and not in their simplicity. This was recognised, first of all, in the biological sciences. It was seen that things

1 There are, however, notable instances in which the same tendency showed itself also in the purely physical and mathematical sciences. Among these, two may be mentioned. How little the new methods fell in with the prevalent trend of ideas in their respective
435

OF SOCIETY.

natural cannot be understood by separating, dissecting,
or

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only in company with others of similar or different
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points and equations in the analytical fashion, but operated with
them as wholes, moving them
about, projecting them, and bringing them into various relations.
Allied to this was the study of the

mathematics of Order which may
be termed "tactics" in contradistinction from "quantics." The
enormous development of mathematical science through the later
combination of the analytical and
what was termed "synthetical"
methods has been dwelt on at
length in the last chapter of the
first section of this History (notThe second
ably pp. 441 sqq.)
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slowly appreciated and led to the
great modern development of electrical science, has been shown in
chapters ii. and iii. (notably pp.
That
201, 266) of the first section.
the "synoptic" view leads to the
discovery of new relations which
can again be studied in their isolation, and, in consequence, always
stimulates the analytical methods,
making them

more

fruitful

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leading them into new channels
of research, is shown clearly everywhere, notablj"^ also in the influence of the Darwinian conception
of the continuity of organic forms.

The more we study Continuity
nature the more the existence

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Discontinuities is forced upon us.
The discontinuous may disappear
and be smoothed down at one
point, but only to reappear again
in a more mysterious manner at
other points.


has enriched our language, and testifies to the fact that this tendency has permeated not only all scientific and philosophical, but also the popular literature of our age. We may call it the spirit of comprehension in opposition to that of definition.

I may, later on, have an opportunity of dwelling more fully upon this change of thought in the course of the nineteenth century; at present it will suffice to point out that no subject of philosophical or scientific interest has been more profoundly affected by it than the study of man in his individual and collective existence. Formerly all the sciences which have to do with this subject started from the study of the individual organism or the individual mind, frequently disregarding altogether the environment or collective life of man or reaching this only by slow and uncertain steps. Latterly, however, not only has the collective life of man attracted more attention than the individual, it has become rather the fashion to place society, in some form or other, in the foreground, to start with some definition of the social "Together," of the collective life of human beings, and to approach in this way not only the study of humanity or mankind at large, but also, through it, to get a better understanding of the nature and life of the individual mind itself. It is not long since we have been told that the individual mind must be considered as exhibiting two sides which may be appropriately termed the subjective and the social self; nor is it unlikely that from this point of view much of earlier and later psychology may be
profitably rewritten.\textsuperscript{1} All this simply means that sociology has become not only as the study of the collective interests of society and mankind, but also in its bearing upon other philosophical and scientific problems, an important and leading doctrine.

But there is a second and far more serious cause which has been operative in the course of the last fifty years in pushing into the foreground the problem of human society and the study of sociology. This, in

\textsuperscript{1} The clearest indication of this doctrine, which we may term the doctrine of the two selves—the Self as Consciousness, containing the whole world-picture in the mirror of an individual mind (the firmament of the Soul), and the Self as one among a great many other selves, a unit in the society of other units and in the environment of many things—seems to me to be given in some articles of Josiah Royce contained in vols. iii. and iv. of 'The American Philosophical Review' (1894-95). "Just as there is no conscious Egoism without some distinctly social reference, so there is, on the whole, in us men, no self-consciousness apart from some more or less derived form of the social consciousness. I am in relation to some sort of a non-Ego. And, as a fact, the non-Ego that I am accustomed to deal with when I think and act, is primarily some real or ideal finite fellow-being, in actual or possible social relations with me, and this social non-Ego, real or ideal, is only secondarily to be turned into anything else, as, for example, into a natural object that I regard as a mere dead thing. . . . As it is not true that we are primarily and in unsocial abstraction merely egoistic, just so it is not true that we primarily know merely our own inner life as individuals, apart from an essentially social contrast with other minds" (\textit{loc. cit.}, vol. iv. p. 470). In the sequel of these Articles, the writer dwells on Memory, Anticipation, and Imitation as the fundamental functions of the infant mind in leading it, as it were, out of itself and conceiving itself as one among others. It seems to me that sufficient importance is not attached to language or intersubjective communication, and the same criticism seems to me to apply likewise to James Ward's doctrine of the "presentation continuum." As stated already (see vol. iii., chap. 3, p. 291), the doctrine of the "presentation continuum," as well as William James' conception of the "stream of thought," marks a real advance in psychology; but a new problem suggests itself: How is the continuum or the steady flow broken up into discontinuities? a problem analogous to that in physical science, given that the universe is a plenum, a continuum, How are we to conceive of those discontinuities in it without the existence of which nothing would happen?
distinction from the first cause which I have termed theoretical, marks a practical interest. It is the interest of morality itself, the ethical problem, that problem through the study of which I have, in the course of this history, led up to the subject of the present chapter.\(^1\) We have seen how morality, whether it be treated from the naturalistic or the spiritual point of view, inevitably suggests and demands some deeper foundation and support. Some fact or interest must be discovered and acknowledged which gives to the ideal world of what *ought* to be an independent existence and meaning, which enables it to superimpose itself upon the world of things that *are* as something more than an illusion or a fancy, in fact, as that which to human reason — be this the common-sense of the ordinary man or the speculation of the philosopher — reveals itself as a thing of supreme reality and worth. Some view of the world of things must be gained which not only defines the good, the end and aim of all human effort, but in addition explains and confirms the sense of obligation through which it imperatively demands our recognition. Without entering upon a philosophical definition or criticism of the earlier systems of morality which prevailed in modern times before the era of critical thought which dates from the middle of the eighteenth century, it will here suffice to say that the older morality as taught in the schools and supported by prevailing religious doctrine rested upon two distinct commandments: they form the substance and essence of Christian morality: they are the very simple com-

\(^1\) See *supra*, chap. viii. end.
mandments of the New Testament, "Love your Maker" and "Love your Brother." Isolated thinkers may in single instances have emancipated themselves from the stricter interpretation of those precepts, theological systems may have surrounded them with all kinds of doctrinal and much irrelevant matter; but it cannot be held that any popular teaching or even any largely influential system of philosophy of modern times and up to the middle of the eighteenth century openly disregarded either or both of these simple but solemn injunctions. And this statement is not invalidated by the admission that the existing practical morality both of the Church and the World rarely upheld those sacred injunctions in their purity but had frequent recourse to awkward compromises. On these I need not dwell at present.

The eighteenth century for the first time produced in France a widespread and influential school of thought in which the first of those two supreme commandments was discarded. What brought this about was probably, in the first instance, the spirit of tyranny, intolerance, and cruelty which stigmatised a large section of the priesthood as one of the most unchristian organisations that ever existed. Through its alliance with political absolutism it brought about an impossible state of society. It was against this that Voltaire raised the battle-cry on behalf of freedom and humanity—i.e., of those interests of which the Church and the State should have been the supreme guardians. It was not the spirit of purely intellectual rationalism and scepticism such as spread from this country under the leader-
ship of Locke and Hume, that really furthered the
general spirit of unbelief. Hume himself said to an
assembly of twenty-six encyclopædistists in Paris that
he had never met a speculative atheist, to which he
received the reply: "Sir, you have twenty-six in this
room." What is significant for our present purpose
is to note that whilst the French freethinkers, in
the latter half of the eighteenth century, discarded
as untenable the first of those two supreme commands,
they only so much more firmly and seriously upheld the
second, some of them were veritable enthusiasts in the
cause of humanity. In the age of the Revolution this
found characteristic expression in the popular cry for
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," and some more
practical, though very partial, recognition in the Articles
of the Constitution and the Statutes of the Civil Code.
What was not recognised at that time, but has be-
come more and more evident in the course of the last
one hundred and fifty years, is this, that in maintaining
the principle of universal brotherhood as independent
of religious piety and not necessarily relying upon
the belief in a Divine Ruler, not only the first article of
Christian morality was cancelled, but the second article
was deprived of that sanction and authority through
which it rises to the dignity of being, for every member
of human society, an obligation and a duty. It may
indeed be said that the whole history of purely humani-
tarian Ethics ever since has been a search—and as it
seems to some, a fruitless search—for a new sanction, a
new authority to take the place of that which had been
destroyed. The older systems of morality started with a command or with what has been termed the form of morality, and followed this up with a simple definition of the substance or essence of morality: the spirit of love. Recent systems of morality start with a definition of what the essence of morality or the supreme good is—agreeing mainly on this point with the second half of Christian ethics—and then follow this up with an attempt to show how and why the ideal expressed therein assumes the form of a command, and how its realisation becomes a duty.

We see then how in this movement of thought there is inevitably involved a transition from what we may call the theological and theocratic to the anthropological and democratic point of view. The latter has in recent times received a philosophical name as the sociological. Formerly the centre of gravity of the ethical system was the Personal Deity, the Creator, Ruler, and Law-giver of the Universe; latterly, in the naturalistic schools of thought, the centre of gravity in the system of morals is Society, some social organisation, let us call it the liberal state. The anchorage used to be a firm belief in the Divine Being, it is now more and more being sought in a belief in humanity. So much have these two ideas changed places that in the later phase of Comte's philosophy Humanity receives the name of the Grand-Être. In moving from the one to the other pole of thought there is an intermediate stage, an attempt to base the moral system upon the individual human reason, upon an intuition or an axiom. This was practic-
ally attempted for a moment during the French Revolution when Reason was exalted to the position of a goddess.  

In philosophical thought this intermediate phase is

1 "L’État seul reste debout, et offre seul un point d’attache; tous ces lieux rampants vont s’enlacer en un seul faisceau autour du grand pilier central. Ne leur permettons pas de s’égarer, conduisons-les, dirigeons les esprits et les âmes, et, pour cela, enveloppons l’homme de nos doctrines. Il lui faut des idées d’ensemble, avec les pratiques quotidiennes qui en dérivent; il a besoin d’une théorie qui lui explique l’origine et la nature des êtres, qui lui assigne sa place et son rôle dans le monde, qui lui enseigne ses devoirs, qui règle sa vie, qui lui fixe ses jours de travail et ses jours de repos, qui s’imprime en lui par des commémorations, des fêtes et des rites, par un catéchisme et un calendrier. Jusqu’ici la puissance chargée de cet emploi a été la Religion, interprétée et servie par l’Eglise; à présent ce sera la Raison, interprétée et servie par l’État.—Là-dessus, plusieurs des nôtres, disciples des encyclopédistes, font de la Raison une divinité et lui rendent un culte; mais, manifestement, ils personnifient une abstraction; leur déesse improvisée n’est qu’un fantôme allégorique; aucun d’eux ne voit en elle la cause intelligente du monde; au fond du cœur, ils nient cette cause suprême, et leur prétendue religion n’est que l’irreligion affichée ou déguisée.—Nous écartons l’athéisme, non seulement comme faux, mais encore et surtout comme dissolvant et nuisible. Nous voulons une religion effective, consolante et fortifiante, c’est la religion naturelle, qui est sociale autant que vraie. Sans elle, comme l’a dit Jean-Jacques, il est impossible d’être bon citoyen. L’existence de la Divinité, la vie à venir, la sainteté du contrat social et des lois, voilà tous ses dogmes; on ne peut obliger personne à les croire; mais celui qui ose dire qu’il ne les croit pas se lève contre le peuple français, le genre humain et la nature. En conséquence, nous décrétons que le peuple français reconnaît l’existence de l’Être suprême et l’immortalité de l’âme.—Cette religion toute philosophique, il importe maintenant de l’implanter dans les cœurs. Nous l’introduisons dans l’état civil, nous ôtons le calendrier à l’Église, nous le purgeons de toutes les images chrétiennes, nous faisons commencer l’ère nouvelle à l’avènement de la République... nous substituons partout les réalités de la raison aux visions de l’ignorance, les vérités de la nature au prestige sacrévalot?" In this passage, containing quotations from contemporary documents, H. Taine paraphrases the Jacobin programme for a new religion (see ‘Les Origines de la France Contemporaine—La Révolution,’ vol. iii, pp. 109, 110). Carlyle, in his ‘French Revolution,’ gives a graphic account of the new religion and the ceremonies at the Feast of the ‘Être Suprême’ on the 8th June 1794, in the National (Tuileries) Garden (see ‘Collected Works,’ vol. iv, pp. 282-333). Similar ceremonies were performed all through the provincial towns of France.
represented by the philosophy of Kant in which the practical reason, with its supreme command—the categorical imperative—is elevated to the highest position in the world of thought, theoretical reason having been found incapable of affording the necessary foundation. The position taken up by Kant proved, however, to be unstable. Not only did Kant himself demonstrate how, in its further elaboration, his fundamental ethical conception necessarily implied the beliefs of the older theological system, but the term reason itself lost, in the subsequent idealistic systems of German philosophy, its individualistic and subjective meaning, becoming identified in Fichte with the Divine Order, in Schelling with the Absolute, and in Hegel with the World-Spirit.

Through the whole of this movement German philosophy, down to Feuerbach, stands in distinct opposition to French as well as to English philosophy. It was essentially theological, whereas French and English philosophy developed, in all their more original representatives, a distinctly sociological interest. There is, however, a marked difference between sociological speculation in France and England in the earlier half of the nineteenth century, as has been clearly pointed out by J. S. Mill, the greatest figure in the sociological movement of that period. As Mr Whittaker says,¹ "he and Comte started equally clear of theology from boyhood. Comte indeed was brought up as a Catholic; but he was thrown at school into the intellectual atmosphere of post-revolutionary France; and he himself relates that

¹ "Comte and Mill," by Thos. Whittaker, in Constable's 'Philosophy Ancient and Modern' (pp. 7, 8).
at thirteen he had rejected all historic religion, including Theism. James Mill brought up his son in the conviction that 'concerning the origin of things nothing whatever can be known.' Christianity, he held with the school of Bentham in general, is not only false but pernicious, the God of orthodoxy being 'the most perfect conception of wickedness which the human mind can devise.' . . . But, as J. S. Mill observes, during the period in which he grew up, opinion in England on religion was more compressed than it has been earlier or later. If the Utilitarians were not to throw away all chance of influence they must observe a rule of strict reticence in public; though, as a matter of fact, their real opinions were well understood. Comte was more fortunately situated in this respect. Even under the restored monarchy he could speak as he liked in lectures as in writing; and he never left any doubt that he regarded every form of theology, including the Christian, as superseded, to use his own expression, for all minds at the level of their age."¹

The school of ethics which was represented in France by Comte, in this country by Mill and later on by Spencer, has been variously termed naturalistic or positivist, though Spencer refuses to be considered as influenced by the positivism of Comte. For our present purposes we may more conveniently term it the sociological school, inasmuch as it is distinguished from the earlier theological ethics which had its anchorage in a

¹ Nevertheless Comte was at one with the Jacobin programme in imitating in his later positive pol- ity the hierarchical system of the Roman Catholic Church, though emptying it of its specifically Christian content.
Divine order and command by the endeavour to cast its anchor into the ground of a social order and command. The transition from the earlier to the later position took place in this country, and still earlier in France, without passing through the intermediate stage which I referred to above. Following a terminology introduced by Comte we may term the latter the metaphysical stage. It is represented in Germany by the successive phases of idealism. As I have stated on a former occasion, these aimed at supporting or replacing the traditional and historical religious beliefs by a philosophical or reasoned creed. It may be said that for the greater part of a whole century the majority of serious-minded persons in Germany believed that such a philosophical or reasoned creed was a feasible achievement of the human intellect, and expected its realisation. In the same degree as this expectation was destroyed the transition to the positive stage has become more and more accentuated. With it, German thought has taken up the sociological point of view. The problem of society and humanity has been pushed into the foreground and is there studied with quite as much ardour as it was studied in England and France fifty or a hundred years earlier; and this in the clearly established interest of morality, of the solution of the ethical problem. Not only have societies and periodicals been founded to serve the purposes of "ethical culture," but sociology, in the largest sense of the word, as the study of humanity, is represented by an enormous and still increasing literature. German thought has in this instance as in so

1 See infra, p. 483.
many others the advantage of being based upon a much broader foundation, inasmuch as, quite independent of the ethical and practical interest which now rules supreme, historical and anthropological as well as juridical and economic studies had independently prepared the ground for a larger and more comprehensive treatment.

In consequence of these various interests and influences the problem before us has not only been raised to a position of great importance but has also become extremely complex, so much so that it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to do justice to all its sides, or to give any tolerably concise survey of the many lines of thought which in the region of sociology have come into action or into conflict. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this History, some disposition of the large material must be attempted. I will try to put it in order by making use of the different points of view which these introductory remarks have so far disclosed.

The philosophy of human society may conveniently be divided into the discussion of three main questions. These are: the Constitution of Society, the Work of Society, and the History of Society. The first of these may be termed the Social problem par excellence, or in the narrower sense of the term. The second may be termed the Economic problem, and the last has, till quite recently, been termed the Philosophy of History.

During the greater part of the Nineteenth Century each of the three countries with which I am dealing has, in a fairly distinct manner, taken the lead in one of the three directions mentioned, and this for reasons which are historically easily understood. The fundamental
question, that of the foundation, government, and constitution of society, has been treated in the most radical manner in France, where the existing historical foundations were most profoundly shaken, and where thinking minds were naturally invited to give their attention to the work of re-constitution and re-organisation.

Before the great Revolution French thinkers had attacked both the social and the economic problem in an independent and original manner, but the fact that the edifice of the State was shaken in its very groundwork through the great cataclysm made it necessary to attend more to the work of laying new foundations or restoring the old ones than to the internal economic arrangements of the structure. The Revolution did not materially shake the foundations of society in this country. The Constitution was sufficiently broad and elastic to weather the storm; also sufficiently liberal to allow of internal adjustments. Peace at home combined with enterprise abroad had enabled industry and commerce to develop in a degree quite unparalleled in any other country of the modern world. Great Britain had taken the leading position, which had before that time been occupied by other nations, but lost through internal or external warfare. The conditions, therefore, existed here for a patient study of the problem of the peaceful Work of Society: the economic problem.

And, lastly, if we look to Germany, we find that the numerous existing states into which it was divided were neither so fundamentally shaken as was the case in France, nor did peaceful conditions and constitutional government exist together as they did in England.
Neither the social question, in the narrower sense of the word, nor the economic question demanded, therefore, that special attention which they respectively enjoyed in France and England.

Germany, however, possessed through her universities and educational system great liberty of thought and a great organisation for intellectual work, which, in the absence of more practical problems, furthered philosophical speculation on the one side, historical learning and research on the other. It was therefore natural that the third special problem, that of the origins and history of Society, should be there taken up as worthy subjects for academic teaching and study.

In spite, however, of this partial but tolerably well-marked division of labour connected with the sociological problem, it is well to recognise that the centre from which the great impetus emanated, both so far as practical and theoretical treatment are concerned, was undoubtedly France, and that her politics as well as her literature have during the last one hundred and fifty years exerted an enormous, perhaps the leading, influence over the whole region of sociology, and this not only in Germany and England, which we are specially interested in, but also over other European countries and in the United States of America.

During the second half of the Eighteenth Century the philosophical literature of France brought into prominence two very different but equally stimulating conceptions, both of which exerted great influence on the thought of the neighbouring countries, though in very different directions. The first was the idea of
a return to nature, a revolt against the artificiality of the existing state of society. Of this idea Rousseau was the great champion, the extreme and passionate exponent. The second was the idea of the perfectibility of the human race, a not less "passionate faith in the illimitable possibilities of human progress. Nothing short of a general overthrow of the planet could, in the eyes of the best minds of the latter half of the Eighteenth Century, stay the ever upward movement of human perfectibility." 1

As already mentioned above, the latter conception was connected with the growth and diffusion of the scientific spirit, which owed much to Voltaire, though he himself was in this respect only a populariser. Although, in the long run, this scientific spirit has got the upper hand, and probably a greater hold of

1 "They differed as to the details of the philosophy of government which they deduced from this philosophy of society, but the conviction that the golden era of tolerance, enlightenment, and material prosperity was close at hand, belonged to them all. Rousseau set his face the other way. For him the golden era had passed away from our globe many centuries ago. Simplicity had fled from the earth. Wisdom and heroism had vanished from out of the minds of leaders. The spirit of citizenship had gone from those who should have upheld the social union in brotherly accord. The dream of human perfectibility which nerved men like Condorcet, was to Rousseau a sour and fantastic mockery. The utmost that men could do was to turn their eyes to the past, to obliterate the interval, to try to walk for a space in the track of the ancient societies. They would hardly succeed, but endeavour might at least do something to stay the plague of universal degeneracy. Hence the fatality of his system. It placed the centre of social activity elsewhere than in careful and rational examination of social conditions, and in careful and rational effort to modify them. . . . It substituted a retrograde aspiration for direction, and emotion for the discovery of law. We can hardly wonder when we think of the intense exaltation of spirit produced both by the Perfectibilitarians and the followers of Rousseau, and at the same time of the political degradation and material disorder of France, that so violent a contrast between the ideal and the actual led to a great volcanic outbreak." (See Lord Morley's 'Rousseau,' 1883, pp. 306-307.)
the French mind than of that of any other nation, it was for the time being thrown into the background and superseded by the thoroughly unscientific and unmethodical denunciations of Rousseau. The latter gained his great influence on French, Swiss, and German thought mainly through two works, 'The Social Contract,' and his educational treatise, 'Emile.' The former was the gospel of many of the leaders in the excesses of the French Revolution, the latter, as I stated above, inspired Swiss and German educationalists. Both dealt with great social problems.

Rousseau looked upon the existing organisations of society and the fabric of the State as mechanical contrivances, deliberately formed by contract or convention. He looked upon them not as the natural outcome of the social instincts of human beings, but as an inevitable contrivance through which a much better state of things, the state of nature, has been artificially modelled and controlled. Instead, however, of setting patiently to work trying to improve the existing machine of society, the treatise lays much more stress upon the desirable return to nature which, nevertheless, is admitted to be impossible. So far as any attempt is made towards construction, the treatise is full of contradictions and inconsistencies, accompanied by historical allusions frequently incorrect or misapplied; nevertheless it preached successfully the gospel of Fraternity and of the sovereignty of the People, a doctrine which was not new, which had been promulgated by Locke in this country, and had entered into the democratic spirit of the small republic of Geneva, Rousseau's native place.
OF SOCIETY.

Combined with this doctrine of the sovereignty of the People there is, with Rousseau, a patriotic sentiment and, even more than that, a humanitarian spirit, a love of the common people in their country homes, their interests, their pleasures, as well as their sufferings and their sorrows. This latter was thoroughly genuine with its author, who had himself risen from the lower ranks, and loved the free air and charms of country life as opposed to the life of large and congested cities. Through insisting upon these, among many other points, the teaching of Rousseau had a beneficial literary influence in other European countries, especially Switzerland and Germany, but was dangerously employed in France itself by those who led the way towards an overthrow, but not towards a reconstitution and reform, of contemporary society.

The teaching of Rousseau acted as a great ferment thrown into the seething mass of the thought of continental Europe, then striving to liberate itself and develop in many new ways. These ways were not clearly indicated by Rousseau himself, but suggested themselves spontaneously to those original minds who felt themselves liberated, stimulated, and elevated by his teaching. Accordingly, this influence was chiefly individual and temporary, and is now—except for the literary qualities and elegance of Rousseau’s style—to a great extent forgotten. The case is quite different with the other and opposite school of social philosophy which flourished in France at the same time. It has left its mark upon the subsequent development of systematic thought on social problems. In this already
we can notice a great difference. Whereas Rousseau stood alone, the other and opposite school numbered many representatives, enunciated definite principles, and received a generic name. Central figures in this school were Quesnay¹ and Turgot,² who in the earlier part of

¹ François Quesnay (1694-1774) is not the only example of a prominent French physician who, after publishing important medical and surgical treatises, turned his attention to other equally important subjects. From 1756 onward he wrote original articles in the 'Encyclopédie,' the last in 1768, ending his literary activity with mathematical studies. His works were first collected by Du Pont de Nemours with the title 'Physiocratie, ou Constitution Naturelle du Gouvernement le plus avantageux au genre Humain' (2 vols., 1767-1768). Quesnay did not invent the theory, but collected the elements contained in previous and contemporary writers, out of which he formed the system and gave it cohesion and rigour, and, by adding new traits, produced something original and effective: "L'analyse du droit naturel comme principe d'une science générale de la politique et de l'économie, la subordination de tous les éléments économiques à l'élément agraire, la théorie du produit net et de l'impôt direct sur les propriétaires, le libre échange, la théorie du gouvernement despotique éclairé, en un mot tout ce qu'il y a d'essentiel et de fondamental dans la doctrine des physiocrates est dû à Quesnay. Son influence personnelle a été très grande, sa place dans l'histoire de l'économie politique est considérable." (H. Bourgin in 'Grande Encyclopédie,' article "Quesnay").

² Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) was a younger contemporary of Quesnay. Before entering on his short but illustrious career as one of the great statesmen of the period preceding the Revolution, he had an opportunity of applying, as Intendant of the Généralité of Limoges, the physiocratic principles of Quesnay and Gournay to the improvement of a poor and neglected agricultural district, introducing many economic reforms and taking a large view of the social problem. He has, in virtue of his 'Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses' (1766, ten years before Adam Smith), been considered by some writers to be the real founder of Political Economy, sharing, however, this title of distinction with his elder contemporaries Quesnay and Jean Claude Gournay (1712-1759). The latter added to the agricultural factor in wealth, exclusively dealt with by Quesnay and Turgot, that of industry and commerce. Both Turgot and Gournay had an extensive practical training and experience, the former through his administrative work, first as Intendant and then as Comptroller-General of Finance (see on this especially Lord Morley's Essay on Turgot in 'Critical Miscellanies,' vol. ii.); the latter through his residence and business travels in Spain, Hamburg, Holland, and England. "Gournay a fourni aux physiocrates leur principe fondamental, le laissez faire, laissez passer. Il a emprunté le principe aux mouvements du commerce international qu'il a très bien suivis et observés. Mais il n'a pas accepté le second principe des physiocrates: la terre est le seul élément de la richesse. Il se sépare
OF SOCIETY.

the second half of the eighteenth century laid down the principal articles of a social philosophy which, by the editor of Quesnay’s Works (Du Pont de Nemours), was termed the school of the “physiocrats,” from the principle upon which the theory of production is based. This principle is that of nature, the soil of the country. By its attaching paramount importance to the cultivation and the cultivators of the land, we see that this line of thought connects itself with that of Rousseau. Both turn to nature itself as the foundation of Society, but the treatment and the results diverge into different paths. Rousseau, full of poetry and sentiment, inspired his disciples and followers with a true interest in the welfare of the uneducated masses of the people; they cultivated the human rather than the natural soil, kindling that enthusiasm for popular education which spread over the central countries of Europe greatly under the leadership of Pestalozzi. Disciples of the other school looked more at the economic side of nature. They studied the natural conditions under which its resources could be profitably developed, attacking the existing forms of government and administration which had failed to utilise them. In doing so they indeed went to an extreme. In opposing the mercantile system they went the length of denouncing as unproductive all industry and commerce. Those engaged

par là de Quesnay et de Turgot pour se rapprocher d’Adam Smith et de l’école anglaise. Il ne lui était pas possible, après avoir manipulé toute sa vie les produits de l’industrie, de leur refuser ainsi qu’au commerce d’être un facteur puissant de la richesse.” (‘Grande Encyclopédie,’ article “Gournay.”)
in the latter pursuits were termed the "sterile class," as distinguished from the tillers of the soil who were the productive class. But Quesnay and his school were emphatic upholders of free trade, of free competition, and of free international exchange. They combated all the impediments and restrictions which the mercantile system had imposed.

Although this school of social doctrine has become known outside of France mainly by its economic theories, being also termed the school of the agriculturists in opposition to the mercantilists, it gave attention to other social factors and interests. Among these, through the original influence of Rousseau, the problem of education occupied a prominent position, being intimately connected with the belief in the illimitable perfectibility of the human race. In the sequel, however, some of the leading representatives narrowed the meaning of education very considerably, and prepared the way for that conception of the educational problem which for a long time ruled supreme in French administration, and, by confining it to mere instruction, distinguished it unfavourably as compared with the great strides which were made in the direction of popular education and lifting-up of the masses in Switzerland and Germany, and—we may add—Scotland during the same period.¹

¹ See supra, vol. i. p. 112, 258 n. We have in French official literature on education, during three-quarters of a century, an example of the almost absolute disappearance of the word "education." In the place of it, we hear only of "instruction" and "enseignement," of schools, primary, secondary, and superior, of colleges and lycées, of academies and the great university of France. "Chose étrange, c'est l'instruction seule qui a pris depuis un demi-siècle, chez un grand peuple, le nom et la place de l'éducation." (Dupanloup, "De
The most important contribution which the physiocrats made towards social philosophy was, however, their influence upon economic theory in this country as manifested conspicuously in the writings of Adam Smith. It marks one of several instances in which French thought transplanted upon foreign soil has showing that both thinkers advance beyond the static views of Vico and Montesquieu according to which history presents a cycle and human affairs move in a constant and self-repeating orbit, introducing instead a dynamical theory of unlimited progress, he says of Turgot that his "conception of progress regards it mainly, if not entirely, as a gradual dawn and diffusion of light, the spreading abroad of the rays of knowledge. He does not assert, as some moderns have crudely asserted, that morality is of the nature of a fixed quantity; still he hints at something of the kind. . . . And because he could not perceive there to be any new growths in moral science, he left out from a front place among the forces that have given strength and ripeness to the human mind, the superior capacity of some men for kindling by word and example the glowing love and devout practice of morality in the breasts of many generations of their fellows."—('Miscellanies,' ii. p. 106, 107.) And of Condorcet he says: "The freedom of the reason was so dear to him that he counted it an abuse for a parent to instil his own convictions into the defenceless minds of his young children. This was the natural outcome of Condorcet's mode of viewing history as the record of intellectual emancipation, while to Comte its deepest interest was as a record of moral and emotional cultivation." (Ibid., p. 554.)
there become enriched, and has returned to its own country with increased vigour.¹

It is, however, well to note that David Hume, the other great forerunner of Adam Smith, began to publish his political essays in the year 1741, seven years before the appearance of Montesquieu's 'Esprit des Lois,' and fifteen years before Quesnay's first articles. In these he lucidly criticised some of the favourite doctrines of the mercantile system, pointing to the difference between wealth and money, and to the advantages of free trade. He has, therefore, been rightly considered as the more original though less consistent enunciator of the new doctrine, for which he paved the way through a series of brilliant essays, though without attempting any systematic treatment. The latter was left to his friend and disciple Adam Smith, who was as much influenced by him as by the new school of economists in France.

In three main directions Adam Smith (1723-1790) made a great advance upon his predecessors, to whom he ungrudgingly admits his indebtedness. First, as an academic teacher he was charged with delivering lectures on various branches of practical philosophy, his teaching embracing four distinct subjects. They formed the four parts of his Course. The first embraced Natural Theology, the second Ethics, the third the Principles of Jurisprudence, and the fourth the nature of Political Institutions. The second part was published as the 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' in 1759, the fourth was

¹ Other important instances are the theory of Descent (see supra, vol. i. p. 201, vol. ii. 321 n., 426 n.), and the Dynamical theory of Heat (vol. ii. p. 57, 73 n., 102 n.), and not less also the positive philosophy of Comte.
published as 'The Wealth of Nations' in 1776. Through this combination of several subjects in his full Course he was obliged to place them in definite relations, and although his publications cover only one half of his whole Course, we have in Adam Smith the first instance of a clearly recognised distinction of the principles which should respectively form the basis of ethics and political economy.

Ethics is based by him upon a sentiment, that of sympathy. This is put forward at the beginning of his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments' as a psychological trait of human nature. On the other side his economic speculations are based upon a similarly distinct enunciation of the psychological principle expressed in the statement that there is a special instinct in human as distinguished from other living beings; which is probably developed by reason and speech. This is the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. No animal does this.

It is not correct either to identify the moral principle of Adam Smith, the sentiment of sympathy, with what Auguste Comte later on termed altruism, or to term the other simply egotism. Nevertheless, the view taken by Adam Smith draws attention to a dual interest which governs human conduct and action. But Adam Smith does not represent his two psychological principles or instincts as entering into a kind of contest, but interposes between them, as a regulative and higher principle, the principle of justice.¹

¹ The fact that Adam Smith, as well as several contemporary thinkers in this country such as Adam Ferguson, took a broad—we may say an anthropological—view of the problem of human society, was, till quite recently, overlooked by historians of philosophy; the
The second important advance which Adam Smith made in the treatment of the social problem was that he took a broader view of the real sources of economic prosperity than the French school had done. According to him the moving principle in social life is labour, the land being only one of the objects upon which labour is spent. By this he pushed into the foreground the interests of labour as distinct from those of property, and this foremost position labour has not lost but increasingly asserted ever since.

specially economic problems which he treated attracting, almost exclusively, the attention of thinkers and statesmen to his work. Recent historians of political economy have, however, drawn attention to the broader, if not deeper, philosophical setting of Adam Smith's doctrine. This was clearly indicated in a well-known passage at the end of the 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' in which the author promises to give "in another discourse . . . an account of the general principles of law and government and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of Society, not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law." And as J. K. Ingram says: "This shows how little it was Smith's habit to separate (except provisionally) in his conceptions of his researches the economic phenomena of Society from all the rest, . . . the words above quoted . . . containing an anticipation, wonderful for his period, of general sociology, both statical and dynamical, an anticipation which becomes still more remarkable when we learn from his literary executors that he had formed the plan of a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts, which must have added to the branches of social study already enumerated, a view of the intellectual progress of society. Though these large designs were never carried out in their integrity, as indeed at that period they could not have been adequately realised, it has resulted from them that though economic phenomena formed the special subject of the 'Wealth of Nations,' Smith yet incorporated into that work much that relates to the other social aspects, incurring thereby the censure of some of his followers, who insist with pedantic narrowness on the strict isolation of the economic domain."—('A History of Political Economy,' 1893, p. 89.) In fact, economic science fell, for a long time, under—and is only now gradually emerging from—the exclusive sway of the atomising spirit of thought. The peculiar connection of Adam Smith's ethical and economic philosophy, centring in his conception of justice as a harmonising tendency towards an equitable state of things not unlike the pleasing spectacle of a "well-arranged mechanism," is interestingly brought out by Dr Ludwig Stein in 'Die Soziale Frage' (2nd ed., p. 369).
And, lastly, Adam Smith did not confine the idea of property so exclusively to that of landed property as did the agriculturists, still less did he go back to the superficial and mistaken conception prevalent in the earlier commercial system, which made money—i.e., the precious metals—the main object of its interest, but he introduced a truer conception of capital or stock which, next to land and labour, formed the third important factor in his economic system.

So far as free trade is concerned, of which Adam Smith is frequently represented to be the first and greatest exponent, he was not original in attacking the mistakes of the protectionist and prohibitive systems which then prevailed all over Europe, though he probably did more than any other writer on the subject to influence practical reform and legislation in that direction.

Although the great work of Adam Smith laid stress upon certain philosophical principles, it was not systematic nor methodical, still less strictly deductive; it was full of illustrations and valuable reflections, and, in consequence, gave rise to an enormous literature which branched out in various directions, investigating special points of his doctrine, combating some of his theories, or attempting to bring more system and logical consistency into the exposition of the whole or special departments of the subject. In the latter respect David Ricardo (1772-1823) attained for a time great celebrity; but though he is fond of logical dialectic and deductive reasoning, it is now generally admitted that he did not introduce any very novel point of view, and, least of all, any philosophical principle which would be helpful in
dealing with the larger problems of social science. In relation to these his celebrated contemporary, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), is of much more importance, and this for several reasons. His well-known treatise on 'Population' directed the attention of social philosophers to a subject which has since become of increasing importance, and upon which most extreme and opposite views have sprung up.

At a time when economists all over Europe considered that economic prosperity went hand in hand with dense populations, when some of the leading countries of Europe were very thinly populated, and when Adam Smith's "Theory of Labour"—emphasised in a one-sided way by Ricardo—encouraged a natural desire to see populations grow, Malthus gave, for a time at least, an opposite turn to speculation on this subject. He did this by his well-known, though somewhat exaggerated, formula, that population tends to increase in a geometrical, while the means of subsistence increases only in an arithmetical, ratio. Malthus does not seem to have been stimulated by Adam Smith, but rather by opposition to views expressed by William Godwin, a direct disciple of Condorcet, on the one side, and by his own father, Daniel Malthus, who had been a personal friend of Rousseau's, on the other.

We thus trace through him the direct influence in this country of a special line of French thought of which Adam Smith took little or no notice. On the other side, Malthus points forward to a much more recent line of thought, which has made itself as acutely felt in sociology as it has done in other regions of philosophy.
and science. It is well known that Darwin, with his co-discoverer Wallace, as both have put on record, got from the work of Malthus the idea of a general struggle for existence, applied by Malthus himself only in relation to social competition. I shall come back to this point when dealing later on with the influence of biological ideas upon sociology.

The change which came over philosophical thought in this country during the last quarter of the Eighteenth, and gave it a specific character during the first half of the Nineteenth Century, was, as I stated above, largely owing to the influence of French pre-revolutionary thinkers. For a long time this influence seemed, indeed, confined to this country, for neither France itself nor Germany made any original contribution to this side of the subject. The French Revolution had produced a general unsettlement which was little favourable to the calm consideration of existing problems in France, but which was, on the other side, in Germany stimulating and productive of speculative theories for the most part far removed from the arena of practical economics and politics. Thus England had for nearly fifty years a monopoly in the domain of genuine social philosophy.

But the very different conditions which existed on the Continent had, inter alia, the effect of developing the other two principal departments of social philosophy which I mentioned above; that department, on the one side, which deals with the fundamental questions of the Constitution and Government of Society, and that, on the other side, which deals with the History of Societies. For the long period during which England's monopoly in
political science lasted, the latter confined itself almost exclusively to the economic question—i.e., to the discussion of the Work of Society, and more narrowly to that of a society possessing as much stability and liberty as that of Great Britain in the time of its enormous industrial development and of its dominant position in the trade of the world.

On the other side of the Channel we have during the same period two distinct movements, both dealing with the fundamental problems of the constitution of society and of the State. Forms of government, the relation of Church and State, and of the different classes of society, the security and tenure of property, the representation of the People,—these were some of the foremost questions which thinkers and practical men dealt with immediately after the Revolution had created a feeling of insecurity and unrest, and a sense of the need for some kind of Order, be it natural or artificial, new or old.¹ Thus we have two schools of thought which deal more precisely with

¹ It is interesting to see how thinkers on the question of the rehabilitation of social order, such as de Maistre (see infra, note to p. 464), put the question of the truth of any doctrine such as that of the infallibility of the Pope in the second order compared with the question as to the practical efficiency of such a doctrine. Their opponents, such as Saint-Simon and others (see infra, p. 466), consider that the human mind has got hold of some fundamental scientific truth—occasionally narrowed down to the law of gravitation—and that such affords a principle from which to construct a social order. Using the terminology now current in philosophical literature, we may say that the former are Pragmatists, the latter Rationalists. Since, in the course of the last thirty years, the belief in the certitude of scientific knowledge has gradually given way and is being replaced by that in its exactitude or definiteness, a tendency has arisen to see the value of any doctrine in its usefulness and applicability for the purpose of the increase of knowledge or as a power of organization. Such passages as that quoted from Huxley (see supra, p. 229 n.), as also that quoted later from Lord Morley (infra, p. 465 n.), would in the present state of philosophic doubt have to be reconsidered and rewritten.
what is now specifically termed the Social question, and we have also, as a result brought about by the influence of both sides, the distinct enunciation of a new and special science with a special name, that of Sociology; further, we have the first distinct declaration that it deals with the central and most important problem in philosophy.

The first of the two schools referred to may be termed the Reactionary school. It was the school which was favoured by the Restoration. Its philosophical exponents were de Bonald (1754-1840) and de Maistre (1754-1821). Both belonged to the aristocracy of France. The title of de Bonald's principal work, 'Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civilisée' [1796], indicates clearly the subject he is dealing with. For de Bonald the Order of Society is not a thing created by men, but is of Divine origin, not simply composed of individual units added together, but an association instituted by the Creator and organised by His law. This stands in direct opposition to the theory of the natural rights of man as proclaimed by the Revolution in 1789.1 The general conception, which has

1 And it also stands in direct opposition to that prominent phase in modern thought represented by such very different thinkers as Rousseau on the one side and Adam Smith on the other; the belief in the natural goodness of man and the assumption, not clearly brought out but implied, in Adam Smith's ethical and economic theories, of a natural justice, a jus naturae. "In his view nature has made provision for social wellbeing by the principle of the human constitution, which prompts every man to better his position; the individual aims only at his private gain, but in doing so 'is led by an invisible hand' to promote the public good, which was no part of his intention; human institutions, by interfering with the action of this principle in the name of the public interest, defeat their own end; but when all systems of preference or restraint are taken away, 'the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.' This theory is not explicitly presented by Smith as a foundation of his economic doctrines, but it is really the secret substratum on which they rest." (Ingram, loc. cit., p. 91).
been called Traditionalism, is worked out in detail and results in the dictum that law is the servant of morality and morality the servant of theology. Only Divine institution gives stability to any sovereignty, otherwise the latter would be exposed to continual change.

It is philosophically interesting to note that de Bonald finds the original and primitive instrument towards social order to be language, the spoken word, and that he considers this, together with the human intellect of which it is the first and most important function, to be a Divine revelation. We may incidentally note also that his contemporary in Germany, Herder, likewise looked upon the origin of language as one of the fundamental questions in the larger problem of humanity.

Still further in the direction of reaction proceeds de Maistre, who looks upon the whole revolutionary movement as a chastisement inflicted by Providence on the French nation. He does not believe in any form of government deliberately formed by human beings. Social order grows out of historical conditions, its best form is a monarchy, but above the monarch he places the religious Head, the worldly representative of God, the Pope, who has to act as a kind of supreme arbiter in case of international wars or of internal conflicts such as that between oppressors and oppressed. He believes in a general restoration of religion. His principal works appeared during the first twenty years of the century. He is considered to be the founder of what is now termed Ultramontanism.¹

¹ The phase in modern thought usually termed the Catholic reaction in the beginning of the century, and represented in France by de Bonald, de Maistre, and Chateaubriand (1768-1848), had
The social philosophy of the Reactionaries has some traits in common with that of their opponents, whom we may term the Socialists. The latter declared for an
been too little recognised in this country till Lord Morley drew attention to it in one of the most interesting and luminous of that series of Essays in which he, with unrivalled mastery, expounded to English readers the principal doctrines of French political philosophy from the middle of the eighteenth century down to Auguste Comte. His Essay on "Joseph de Maistre" ("Critical Miscellanea," vol. ii., 1836, pp. 257-338) is a masterpiece of exposition by one who belongs to the very opposite school of thought, and it amply suffices to impress upon the reader the strong points of de Maistre's position as well as the political and social surroundings among which his philosophy sprang up. This is shown to be an emphatic appeal to the restoration of Order in a state of social and political anarchy, maintaining that there must exist a supreme tribunal of appeal, which is to solve not only, and not in the first instance, questions of truth, but questions of law and order. The regulation of society under a Supreme Power which is recognised to be infallible is more important than the discussion of the proofs of such infallibility. The burning problem of the time was a practical not a theoretical one. The only power which after the great Revolution still existed, and which would be able to restore Order was, according to de Maistre, the organisation of the Roman Catholic Church with the Pope at its head; so he devoted his literary ability to preach the restoration of the Roman Catholic power in the most celebrated of his works ('Du Pape,' 1817), the enormous influence of which he did not live to witness himself. In this work he proved his thesis through an historical exposition of the work of the Church and a series of practical reflections tending to show that it was the only remaining power which could regenerate and tranquillise society. In discountenancing the modern scientific spirit proclaimed by the new school of thought as the salvation of humanity, de Maistre "had no selfish or official interest in taking away the keys of knowledge, entering not in himself, and them that would enter in hindering. The true reasons for his detestation of the eighteenth century philosophers, science and literature, are simple enough. Like every wise man, he felt that the end of all philosophy and science is emphatically social, the construction and maintenance and improvement of a fabric under which the communities of men may find shelter, and may secure all the conditions for living their lives with dignity and service. Then he held that no truth can be harmful to society. If he found any system of opinions, any given attitude of the mind, injurious to tranquillity and the public order, he hastily concluded that, however plausible they might seem when tested by logic and demonstration, they were fundamentally untrue and deceptive. What is logic compared with eternal salvation in the next world, and the practice of virtue in this? The recommendation of such a mind as de Maistre's is the intensity of its appreciation of order and social happiness. The obvious weakness of such a mind, and the curse inherent in its influence, is that it overlooks the prime condition of all; that social order

VOL. IV.

2G
entire reconstruction of society. They broke with the historical past and desired to institute a new Order on the foundation of the natural rights of man; but some of the representatives of this line of thought are inclined to consider the natural rights of man—which should form the laws of society in the same way as the natural properties of things form the laws of nature—to be of higher, of Divine origin. That identification of laws of nature and laws of society which has done so much mischief in both directions—i.e., in the philosophy of nature as well as in the philosophy of society—was familiar already to Montesquieu.

One of the principal leaders, and by far the most influential apostle of socialism during the first half of the nineteenth century, was the Count de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), of noble family descended from that Duke who left us the celebrated 'Mémoires.' After having quarrelled with his father and lost his fortune and elevated social position, he passed what the French call une jeunesse bien orageuse, during which scientific and commercial interests went hand in hand with a disorderly and cynical way of living. He combined with the philosophical and abstract interest, which he inherited from the philosophers of the eighteenth century, a practical knowledge of men and affairs. Science and humanity were his leading ideas, as they had been those of the encyclopädist; but he was less systematic and timid, more daring and practical than they had.

can never be established on a durable basis so long as the discoveries of scientific truth in all its departments are suppressed, or in-
correctly appreciated, or socially misapplied" (loc. cit., p. 301).

1 See supra, vol. iii. p. 572 sqq.
been. He was not without the genuine religious, even a mystical, turn, but his religion seemed to be satisfied with a Ruler of the Universe formed somewhat on the mistaken French interpretation of a well-known passage in Newton’s ‘Principia’ reminding us of the lines of Goethe—

What were a God who only pushed the world
And in a circle round His finger twirled?

In fact, the law of attraction or gravitation seemed to him the ultimate and sufficient law explaining the universal order of things;¹ this reminds us again of the well-known Treatise of Father Boscovich.²

Saint-Simon believes both in a spiritual power and in a temporal power in the State, but he proposes to transfer the former from the priests to the men of science and the latter from the nobles to the propertied class. These have therefore, as M. Ferraz says, not much to fear from this nascent socialism. To those who are not proprietors, he assigns the right and duty of electing the savants who have to wield the spiritual power. But the real savants are the astronomers and biologists, not the moralists and metaphysicians. “This means,” as M. Ferraz continues, “in unmistakable terms that the philosophical and moral sciences have no value, and count only from the day when they are founded upon the physical and natural sciences. This idea, which became the main principle

¹ “Je crois en Dieu. Je crois que Dieu a créé l’univers. Je crois que Dieu a soumis l’univers à la loi de la gravitation” (quoted from ‘Nouvelle Encyclopédie’ (1810) by Georges Weill in ‘Saint-Simon et son Œuvre’ (1894, p. 53).
of Positivism, is not quite so original as has been alleged. We find it everywhere during that age: with Vicq-d'Azyr, who makes of psychology a branch of physiology; with Destutt de Tracy, whose ideology is simply a chapter of zoology; with Volney, who gives to his 'Catechism of Natural Law' the sub-title, 'Physical Principles of Morality'; this is the last word of the sensationalism of that age as also of that of the present day.\(^1\)

The "physicism" of Saint-Simon is further distinguished by the constitution of his supreme council of twenty-one savants who have taken the place of the deposed Pope and Cardinals and are elected by the whole of humanity and presided over by a mathematician. They will build a mausoleum sacred to the memory of Newton. The principal mission of the great council will be to study gravitation, the only law to which the Universe is subjected, and to direct the peaceful labours of mankind; for all men will have to work either with their hands or their brains as belonging to one and the same workshop.

The opinions of Saint-Simon underwent material changes in the course of his life. These are significantly indicated by the titles of his writings. Thus we have in 1807 an 'Introduction to the Scientific Labours of the Nineteenth Century'; seven years later a 'Re-organisation of European Society'; seven years after that a treatise 'On the Industrial System'; and four

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\(^1\) 'Histoire de la Philosophie en France,' 1\(^{re}\) Partie, "Socialisme, etc.," 3 ed., p. 8.
years after that 'The New Christianity.' To these have to be added two periodicals entitled respectively 'L'Organisateur' (1819-20) and 'Le Producteur' (1825). These titles mark sufficiently the change and development of his ideas. From laying stress upon abstract science he proceeds to an appreciation of its practical results in industry and commerce, taking note of the various industrial problems, of the necessary organisation of labour as well as of finance, and latterly he realises that a unifying and spiritual principle is wanting, and thus is led to emphasise the Fine Arts as the guardians of the moral sentiments, pre-eminently of sympathy. And with this he is led to the problems of education. He ends, as a great many social reformers have done, with the re-assertion of many of the religious factors of society which his earlier theories had tended to undermine or to disregard. He passes in review the historical forms in which the Christian ideal has been embodied, that of Catholicism, of Protestantism and of other sects, and preaches the religion of Love; "in fact he thinks that a single principle must be held to be eternal and immutable, that which has emanated from a Divine source, and according to which we are bound to treat one another as brethren." 1 With this principle we advance from an individual to a social existence. "He remarks that the Christian principle, disengaged from superstitions which paralyse its efficiency, works already in many noble souls, if not among the priests who are absorbed in details of dogma and cult and

1 Loc. cit., p. 23.
have lost the sense of religion, at least among the laity who are passionately in earnest regarding the welfare of their fellow-men.”

There is no doubt that Saint-Simon acted as a great ferment, pushing the main social problem, the organisation of society, into the foreground, and treating it from many points of view, anticipating prophetically but frequently unconsciously much that has happened in social theory and practice since his time. Hardly any of the innumerable problems which now agitate social reformers over the whole world escaped his notice. Accordingly we find among his followers men of very different stamp and occupation all interested in the social problem, and concentrating their labours upon it. Under their influence the doctrine of the master, unstable, fragmentary, and inconclusive as it always was, underwent many changes, the most important of which were in the direction of an extreme Socialism or Communism, in which Saint-Simon himself certainly was not a believer. Thus we must distinguish between the doctrine of Saint-Simon himself and that of the Saint-Simonians.

Quite apart from this extreme development, one of his disciples became pre-eminent as having given systematic coherence and an important elaboration to some of the brilliant ideas which in Saint-Simon’s writings are buried among a mass of collateral, disturbing, and frequently contradictory reflections. The disciple I refer to is Auguste Comte, who worked into a system two conceptions which were familiar to Saint-Simon and which

are now considered as the main characteristics of Positivism. The first is that of the hierarchy of the sciences, and subsequently also of Social Order upon the foundation of the exact and the natural sciences. The second is one of the first great comprehensive, and to a large extent successful, attempts in the direction of a history of human thought and human society, of a philosophy of History. In working out this, as also by conceiving of sociology as a separate and distinct science, Comte has placed himself at the head of all those who have, before and after him, dealt with the social problem in its largest sense as the problem of Humanity.

But before treating more in detail the main points of Comte's teaching and the growth and diffusion of the positive philosophy—which indeed belonged to a much later period—it is well to note what was done in Germany at the end of the eighteenth and during the first third of the nineteenth century. There, as I stated above, Rousseau's gospel of the return to nature, including his natural religion as well as the proclamation of the 'natural rights of man, had created a great impression. But no sympathy was felt with the scientific or naturalistic interpretation which was given to these ideas in the school of the encyclopedists and of many of the French reformers during the Revolution. The word Nature was not narrowed down to mean merely the physical side of things. The term Nature as applied to human affairs was conceived in a much larger sense as including the intellectual, the moral and the spiritual, as well as the physical factors in the life of man and mankind. Social problems, so far as they were
considered at all, did not occupy in the realm of philosophy the first place, with the important exception perhaps of education, which, as I have had repeated occasion to point out, received great attention from two sides, in the direction of popular education and elevation of the masses and in the direction of academic and higher culture. Economic problems, in the narrower sense of the word, as studied methodically in England and in a summary and radical manner in France, were hardly treated at all by leading German thinkers, or if they were, only as corollaries and in the way of the application of abstract metaphysical principles. These were laid down and elaborated in the general systems of philosophic creeds. Neither did there exist in Germany any great practical need, any pronounced demand on the part of the existing governments and societies to deal with these more definite and circumscribed problems.

II.

Jules Michelet begins his 'History of the Nineteenth Century' by introducing three great Socialists, Babeuf (1760-1795), Saint-Simon, Fourier (1772-1835), who, with the end of Jacobinism, "emerge about the same time from the prisons of the Terror. Their ideas, to begin with, are in no wise discordant; they have the same point of departure: humanity, pity, the outlook on extreme misery. The burning centre was Lyons, on the one side, where Fourier lived; Picardy, on the other, the home of Babeuf; and the deep centre of the world,
the Commune of '93, where Chaumette, his apostle, received the Socialists of Picardy and of Lyons. The people were dying of hunger. Paper, laws, clubs, were not sufficient. Bread was wanted. . . . Whatever opinion one may form of the three famous Utopists, we must admit that their systems, even their eccentricities, sprang from an admirable emotion, from the rising of a most generous feeling. Babeuf . . . asks only for the division of deserted lands, abounding everywhere . . . in order to make them productive; Right is the single basis, the universal right of men to a sufficient living. Saint-Simon desires Progress. . . . Fourier raves for Harmony.”¹ “The state of France in '93 will never be understood, the crescendo of its miseries accumulated from century to century . . . so long as a terrible book has not been written which is wanting: the history of Hunger.”² Whether this picture of the causes of the downfall of the old régime in France is exaggerated or not does not concern us here. It is sufficient to say that such a picture could not have been drawn of the social state of things in Germany³ in the latter part of

¹ J. Michelet, ‘Histoire du XIXᵉ Siecle’ (vol. i. p. 1).
² Ibid. (p. 4).
³ A living picture of the beginnings of a more prosperous age in Germany, disturbed as it indeed was by the foreign invasions during the Seven Years' War, will be found in the 6th chapter of Gustav Freytag’s ‘Neue Bilder aus dem Leben des Deutschen Volkes’ (1862). It bears the title “Es wird Licht.” A fuller account of the state of ‘Germany in the Eighteenth Century’ is given in the large work of Biedermann bearing this title (3 vols. in four parts, 1854-1880). The earlier part of the period referred to is also covered by Goethe’s ‘Autobiography.’ Stimulating foreign influences on Germany were mainly in two very different directions. First, there was the influence of the age of Louis XIV., which showed itself in the field of literature and taste, and more doubtfully in the culture of the aristocracy and the many small courts. The second influence was in the province of Trade and Industry, through the immigration of
the eighteenth century. After the devastations of former centuries, after the ruin of national prosperity through the Wars of the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, and the Wars of the Succession, light had begun to dawn in the middle of the eighteenth century and an era of progress and comparative prosperity, and certainly of national hope and confidence, seemed to have set in, especially during the thirty years of peace which succeeded the Seven Years' War: the inspiring figure and hero of the age being Frederick the Great.1

This increasing tide of prosperity and hopefulness, under the influence of which were indited the well-known opening lines of Schiller's *Künstler* (1789),2 received a serious check during the greater part of twenty years through the Wars of the Revolution. It was the latter with its seemingly hopeful beginnings, not the social misery of the masses,3 which gave the

the Huguenots at the end of the seventeenth century. Late in the eighteenth century, as Biedermann shows, the influence of the more advanced state of England and Holland made itself felt in many directions, notably in Agriculture and some of the trades.

1 Inspiration came not only from his military renown, but quite as much, as Biedermann shows, from the reforms in many directions of legislature, administration, trade and industry in which, during the afternoon and evening of his life, he, first among German princes, led the way in the direction of popular progress. His literary tastes, on the other side, as is well known, were distinctly French. See also Carlyle's 'Friedrich II.', Book XXI., Introduction.

2 On these verses Kuno Fischer remarks: "The mastery of man over nature, the reign of culture which Bacon had proclaimed as the theme and aim of the modern age, is in full development. . . . The moment in which Schiller composes his 'Künstler' is one of 'eventful silence,' the last before a storm. The poem appeared in March 1789. Two months later and the Assembly of the French States General begins its session" ('Schiller als Philosoph,' vol. i., 2nd ed., p. 152).

3 That such misery existed in many parts of Germany at the time of the outbreak of the French Revolution there is no doubt, and more recent historians are inclined to insist on the fact that the revolt took place in France rather than in other European countries not because of the greater misery.
first and most powerful impetus to a discussion of the social problem by German thinkers. They realised quite as fully as did those of other countries that the age had great problems to solve, nor did they approach them in a less hopeful spirit, though it was a spirit at once less radical and subversive than that which ruled in France, less practical and commonsense than that which spread in England.

With French contemporary thought German thinkers had indeed in common that they believed in abstract constructions, in logical formulae. But whereas in France abstraction meant the methods of the exact sciences, the logical ideal being that of the mathematician, in Germany abstraction meant the lifting up out of the lower region of the ordinary interests of life into the higher realms of Poetry, Art, and Speculation, and logic meant a higher intellectual process which dealt not with the mechanical connection of things but with their meaning, interpretation, and value. It was in fact a great scheme of intellectualising and spiritualising, of looking at things from a higher point of view.

The first systematic attempt to carry out this ideal, which engrossed German thought for fully half a century, was, as we know, the philosophy of Kant, and in it the supreme position assigned by him to the moral law which he conceived to be, when thought of as command, the highest kind of Revelation. It was the task of the working classes in that country, but because they were more enlightened, because the hard rule of the landed proprietors was much relaxed in France as compared with the state of serfdom and bondage in which the peasant population still lived in the more eastern countries of Central Europe.
of the philosopher to define this highest law and to show its application and working in the whole region of practical morality, both individual and social. Whereas the French philosophers put in the foreground the natural rights of man and attached little or no importance to the ideas of obligation and duty except as necessary arrangements of convenience and expediency, the Kantian philosophy put in the foreground the idea of duty, of an obligation, and discussed the social order in the light of facilities bestowed and limitations imposed upon individual members of society so as to enable them to follow the highest command, "to order all their relations with freedom according to reason," as Fichte said; but the highest law of reason was the moral principle, the call to Duty.

During the various phases in which the philosophical ideal of German thought, which we may define as a spiritualised rationalism, found embodiment, we see how it came into closer and closer contact with the higher practical questions, notably those of society. This was inevitable, and was brought about through the personal positions which the several leading thinkers of the nation successively occupied.

Kant, who was the prime mover and gave the impetus to this whole course of thought, lived secluded in a small-out-of-the-way university town in the north-east of Germany. Fichte, originally destined to be a preacher, went from Saxony to Switzerland, from there to the classical centre of Germany, and finally settled in Berlin, where he helped to lay the foundation of what became in the course of the century the foremost German uni-
versity and perhaps the most important centre of modern German thought and learning. Schelling and Hegel came from Swabia, the home of German poetry. But, whereas Schelling lived more in the regions of Art and Literature, Hegel was early interested and active in political life, and had at the end of his career in Berlin a distinctly political influence. Finally, in Schleiermacher, the last great representative of German idealism, philosophy came into immediate contact with the practical problems of religion and the Church. In another way we may see what very different aspects social problems would present to these various thinkers in the course of the fifty years from 1780 to 1830.

Kant lived under a despotic government which, in one instance, censured him for stepping outside the legitimate sphere of his duties. His successors enjoyed greater academic freedom. They witnessed great changes of literary taste and sentiment, the birth of a new literature abounding in original creations of Poetry and Art. But more than this, they lived in an age of political and social unrest, of revolution and reaction, of humiliation and despair, followed by national regeneration with renewed confidence and success. No one was more alive to these stirring events and changes than Fichte. In spite of the very abstract and forbidding terminology which he invented and through which he introduced his theoretical philosophy, he was really a man of action much less contemplative and patiently critical than Kant was. He, more than any other of the great thinkers, felt the necessity of infusing into the rising generation an enthusiasm for ideal objects, for intel-
lectual and spiritual ends. This may be shown in many ways, but is interesting to us, in the present connection, mainly for the important part played by Fichte's political writings and addresses.

He had been deeply moved by the want of patriotic spirit during the invasion of Napoleon, in whom Hegel for a moment saw an embodiment of the World Spirit. But Fichte was powerful and successful in awakening

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1 The two sides of Fichte's activity, oscillating somewhat abruptly between highly abstract analysis and practical applications, are brought out in a most instructive article by Gustav Schmoller (1864-65, published in 1888, 'Zur Litteraturgeschichte der Staats und Socialwissenschaften,' pp. 28-101). He deals there at length with Fichte's Socialist Treatise, to which I shall revert later on. For his Socialism, in opposition to that of Saint-Simon, "originates in the solitary seclusion of the scholar, battles systematically with the moral evils of an egotistical age, attaches itself everywhere to the ultimate and highest reason of things, remains without immediate practical influence, nay, slumbers nearly half a century forgotten and unread. But the moral kernel which it contains still nevertheless bore its fruits: the practical force with which the idealism of Kant and Fichte reacted upon the life of the German nation was not less for the fact that its effects do not lie on the surface. German philosophy had by no means the smallest part in contributing . . . to maintain a healthy morality and to produce an equitable cultural development." (loc. cit., p. 80).

2 The admiration which Napoleon enjoyed for a time in Germany, especially in the western districts, is easily understood if we take note of the wretched political and social conditions which prevailed in many of the innumerable small states with their despotic governments, different legal systems, and the many petty restrictions and hindrances in the way of trade, commerce, and industrial life. There were, of course, brilliant exceptions among them, notably some of the smaller states of middle Germany; but to have swept away much of the obsolete institutions, to have introduced a simple and intelligible civil code and other improvements, was considered as the work of a true liberator. Whoever desires to understand this temporary phase of admiration for the foreign invader, which survived in the minds of many long after his real character as a selfish tyrant and oppressor had been revealed, should read the memoirs of K. N. von Lang, 'Aus der bösen alten Zeit' (1st ed. 1842, republished by Petersen in 2 vols., 1910). They deal mainly with the conditions which existed in the south-west of Germany and in Bavaria before, during, and after the Napoleonic invasion, and give also a graphic picture of the disenchantment and the reaction which set in and endeavoured to bring back many of the abuses of the old régime.
the spirit of patriotism and giving it a high tone and great aims.

Schelling took, among all these thinkers, the smallest interest in social problems, but he had a very high, perhaps an exaggerated, idea of the mission of Poetry and Art, agreeing on this point with Schiller, with whom he otherwise had little in common. But all these thinkers after Kant had a common interest in historical development, for they had come not only under the influence of Kant, but also, through Herder, under the influence of Leibniz and Lessing, and they combined to push into the foreground one side of the great social problem, the history of Culture or of Humanity. Herder had, as I stated before, made a beginning in this direction.

The contributions of Fichte originated in his desire to understand the age he lived in, to expose its weaknesses and shortcomings, and to educate a younger generation to a better comprehension of its tasks and duties. But neither Fichte nor Schiller possessed sufficient learning to deal adequately with the subject. In this respect Hegel was far superior to them. He had a true historical sense, and influenced a very large

Among the four great idealistic philosophers in Germany it is interesting to note how, with Kant and Hegel, the systematic arrangement and the respective dialectical methods emerge only after a lengthy period of preparation. The genesis and maturation of these final products of intense thought have accordingly formed special subjects of study with historians of philosophy. On the other side, both Fichte and Schelling start at once with more or less systematic attempts which they develop, modify and elaborate, as it were, before the eyes of the public. And this gradual development is really more interesting and important than the latest expositions which, with Fichte, remained unfinished, and with Schelling were distinctly disappointing. The Neokantian literature is rich in expositions of the different phases of Kantian thought prior to the publication of the
number of scholars who, during the greater part of the century, discovered, collected and arranged an enormous mass of historical detail which furnishes, in almost every department, the greater proportion of the material which is at the disposal of the historians of our day: and Hegel himself was, with the exception of Friedrich Schlegel, the only thinker who ventured upon the task of composing a philosophy of history. Into his treatment of this subject he introduced two prominent ideas, both of which are capable of very various interpretations, but which have through all these retained a permanent hold of the philosophical mind so far as it is interested in the study of history. These are, first, the conception of the whole progress of development in history as an enlarging of the notion of freedom from the notion that only one is free (Oriental despotism) to the notion that only some are free (Greeks and Romans), and from that again to the notion that all men are free. The second important conception is that embodied in the 'History of Philosophy,' in which Hegel tries to show how the progress of thought in the different stages of ancient

'Critiques.' Among these expositions the writings of Paulsen and of Hoffding, quoted on former occasions (see ante, vol. iii. pp. 28, 340 and 284, 317), are specially concise and luminous. The earlier biographies of Hegel, notably those of Rokoskranz (1844) and Haym (1857), already contained much information on Hegel's mental development prior to his Jena period. The most interesting study, however, is that of Dilthey, "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels," published in the 'Transactions' of the Berlin Academy (1905). Two subjects seem to have prominently occupied Hegel's mind. The first and more important was theological and historical, dealing with the Christian religion, its founders and its relation to philosophical or natural religion. But not less interesting is the fact that we possess two distinctly political treatises on the Constitution of Württemburg, his native country, and on the Constitution of Germany. This shows that Hegel was better prepared to deal with the political and historical sides of the social problem than any of his three distinguished predecessors.
and modern philosophy runs parallel with, and is intelligible through, the logical development of the abstract ideas or categories of speculative thought. This has been termed the dialectic of the world process as unfolded in the dialectic of the philosophical system.

About the time when Hegel's reputation and influence were at their height in Germany, an equally comprehensive, but very differently constituted, mind approached and dealt with the historical problem in France. This was Auguste Comte, who began to publish his original speculations with a Tract bearing upon the reorganisation of Society. He was then twenty-six years of age.

In some respects the personal history of the two philosophers shows a resemblance. Both Hegel and Comte were early influenced by thinkers of great originality and considerable daring, but similarly deficient in definiteness and consistency of thought. Both philosophers, in their first independent publications, broke away from the influence of their respective masters. Both maintained from that moment a more or less unfriendly attitude to the teaching which had at one time stimulated and inspired them. Both had, what their masters were deficient in, great powers of systematisation and the love of consistent and logical development of thought.

Hegel announced his opposition to Schelling in the Introduction to his first great work, 'The Phenomenology of the Mind,' where he promises to develop, patiently...
and consistently, ideas which were only vaguely adumbrated by Schelling. As Hegel considered that a new logic would have to precede and make possible the systematic exposition of a new spiritual gospel, which was then striving to liberate itself in the philosophical world, so Comte indicated in the original title of his Tract his conviction that the reorganisation of Society, which was the aim of Saint-Simon and the need of his age and country, must be preceded by a theoretical discussion which adopted and explained that line of thought which had throughout the changing phases of the Revolution, and the reaction of the negative and retrograde movements, proved to be safe and eminently fruitful. The true methods were the scientific, or, as Comte termed them, the positive methods, with which mathematical, mechanical, and biological research had been successfully carried on.

To express it in other words and to characterise the essential difference as well as the formal resemblance of Comte's and Hegel's work more clearly, we may say that Hegel was surrounded and impressed by the idealistic movement of thought which, in literature, poetry, and art, in the schools of classicism and romanticism, had completely revolutionised the intellectual life of Germany. The principle of this great, fruitful, and creative movement he desired to grasp in a new organon of logic, and to employ in the building up of a complete philosophical system. This was to embody and revive in a reasoned creed the ideal possession of humanity, on the point of being lost through orthodox formalism or materialistic unbelief.
OF SOCIETY.

On the other side Comte desired to lay bare and apply the approved logic of the exact and natural sciences, and to use it for the solution of practical problems which his master Saint-Simon and some of his disciples had attempted to solve by hasty generalisations. Neither the work of Hegel nor that of Comte, neither the logic of the idea nor that of science was so easily grasped as these two leaders of thought might perhaps imagine; but they have respectively defined problems which have not ceased to occupy the attention of critics and analysts ever since. Unconscious, perhaps, of the difficulty which equally besets both these tasks when treated in a purely theoretical manner, they nevertheless both resorted to an empirical method which was easier and certainly more interesting, namely, the historical method. Both founded a philosophy of history.

A study of history was, in both cases, to define as well as to exemplify the main principle or fundamental truth which each of these two thinkers respectively wished to establish; and accordingly the two chief works in which they embodied their main thesis are, to a large extent, historical. The result is more definite in Comte's work than it is in that of Hegel. Comte's main idea is that expressed in the celebrated 'Law of the Three States,' which in his earlier treatise he ex-

1 The 'Law of the Three States,' which Comte repeats endlessly throughout his writings, has been traced to other thinkers before him, and similarly the dialectical formula of Hegel—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—has been traced back to the writings of Fichte. So far as Comte is concerned, there is an interesting and instructive passage in Ravaiss' 'Rapport' (p. 54 sqq.), frequently quoted already. He traces it to Burdin, a medical friend of Saint-Simon's, who in 1813, in a conversation reported by the latter, remarked that all sciences had begun by being conjectural, and that they must end by being positive; adding that some sciences arrive earlier at this stage than
presses by saying, "From the nature of the human intellect each branch of knowledge in its development is necessarily obliged to pass through three different theoretical states: the Theological or fictitious state; the Meta-

others, and that philosophy must be the last. But Ravaisson goes on to remark that the first origin of these ideas, i.e., of the law in question and the hierarchy of the sciences, is to be found in the writings of a philosopher whom Comte, Saint-Simon, and Burdin looked upon as a visionary. This was Turgot, from whose 'Histoire des progrès de l'esprit humain.' Ravaisson quotes the following interesting passage: "Avant de connaitre la liaison des effets physiques entre eux, il n'y eut rien de plus naturel que de supposer qu'ils étaient produits par des êtres intelligents invisibles et semblables à nous. Car à quoi auraient-ils ressemblé? Tout ce qui arrivait sans que les hommes y eussent part eut son dieu . . . Quand les philosophes eurent reconnu l'absurdité de ces fables, sans avoir acquis néanmoins de vraies lumières sur l'histoire naturelle, ils imagi-nerent d'expliquer les causes des phénomènes par des expressions abstraites, comme essences et facultés, expressions qui, cependant, n'expliquaient rien et dont on raisonnait comme si elles eussent été des êtres de nouvelles divinités substituées aux anciennes. . . . Ce ne fut que bien tard, en observant l'action mécanique que les corps ont les uns sur les autres, qu'on tira de cette mécanique d'autres hypothèses, que les mathématiques purent développer et l'expérience vérifier" (p. 55).

It has not been quite as generally remarked that Comte, in the second period of his specula-
tions, actually reverses the formula which, as J. Stuart Mill said, was the backbone of his first great work. This took place somewhat on the lines which I have indicated in the Introduction to this section (vol. iii. p. 43 sqq.), and which Mr A. W. Benn (in a notice of that volume, 'Literary Guide,' June 1913) suggests as being exactly what Comte had in view. Renouvier has on this point made a relevant remark: "C'est que les illusions familières aux philosophes des écoles qui prétendent ramener les phénomènes supérieurs aux phénomènes inférieurs par l'emploi des catégories de cause ou de substance, ne vont pas en quelque sorte au plus profond de leur propre esprit, et leurs thèses de matérialité pure n'épuisent pas pour eux le concept de l'univers. It arrive que le matérialiste Cabanis est dans son œuvre posthume, un panthéiste stoïcien, que le matérialiste Brous-

To this list one is tempted to add the names of Büchner and Haeckel, inasmuch as Büchner conjoins the principle of Force with that of Matter, while Haeckel places behind the inert principle of substance the movable cosmic ether "as a creative deity," not unlike (as 'Überweg-Heinze,' 10th ed., pp. 282-3, re-
marks), "the stoical doctrine which likewise expands its monism into an apparent dualism."
physical or abstract state; lastly, the Scientific or positive state." And the correctness of this enunciation he proves by reference to the four fundamental sciences which had already at that time entered upon the last stage—viz., Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, and Physiology.

Turning, then, to Morals and Politics, he proceeds to show how the former "are conceived by some as the result of a continuous supernatural action; by others as incomprehensible results of the action of an abstract entity; and lastly, by others as connected with organic conditions susceptible of demonstration, and beyond which it is impossible to go." And so far as politics as a science is concerned, he looks upon the supernatural idea of Divine right as belonging to the Theological state of politics; the doctrine of the sovereignty of the People as expressing the Metaphysical condition of politics; while, lastly, the Scientific doctrine of politics "considers the social state in which the human race has always been found by observers as the necessary effect of its organisation." The aim of practical politics accordingly consists in facilitating natural tendencies when these have been sufficiently ascertained. And the main natural tendency of man he considers to be "to act upon nature in order to modify it for his own advantage."

Comte considers that politics could not before his age become a positive science for two reasons. First, because the science of politics, or what he later on termed Sociology, being the highest and most complex science, could not enter upon the last, *i.e.*, the positive stage, before the other sciences had attained that position;
and, secondly, because the two earlier forms of practical politics named above had first to be tried and found to be wanting before the last stage became possible or practical. The first remark leads him to a doctrine which holds an important position in his system, and which has, by some of his followers, been considered to rank as an important discovery. It is his classification or his doctrine of the "hierarchy of the sciences."  

1 These quotations are all taken from the reprint of the earlier Tract (1822), in the Appendix to the fourth volume (p. 547 sqq.) of the 'System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology.' (Eng. transl., London, 1875-77.) The object which Comte had in view in reprinting a collection of his earlier Tracts was, as he says, "to demonstrate the perfect harmony which exists between my youthful efforts and my matured conceptions" (General Appendix, p. 1) "... when reproducing ... the third Essay, published in May 1822, ... in 1824, ... I thought it right to add to its special title that of 'System of Positive Polity,'—a title premature indeed, but rightly indicating the scope of my labours" (p. 3). This is important as bearing upon the question to what extent Comte modified his philosophical creed in the latter part of his career. Two extreme views exist on this point, represented among others by Littré and Robinet, of whom the former discards everything that Comte published after the year 1842, whereas the latter considers the principal merit of Comte to consist in the foundation of a new religion, the Religion of Humanity. In spite of the extravagances of the later doctrine, which drew from Mill a strong condemnation, we are bound to look upon Comte's last practical effort as a highly instructive object-lesson. He recognised the necessity of establishing some authority or spiritual power which should guarantee a moral control, superior to the intellectual and practical spheres of social and political life and work, and which should keep in order the Intellectuals as well as the Industrials. It is well to note that the spiritual power is vested in those who have been drawn from the intellectual class, and who, as is more fully explained in the 'Politique Positive,' have learnt from history that the altruistic feelings more exactly defined as attachment or sympathy, reverence and benevolence, are on the way of gradually conquering the egoistic or animal tendencies inherent in human nature. With this is also connected the emphasis laid by Comte upon education, which he nowhere limits to instruction, as was at that time very common in his country. We may also note that he does not believe that the higher grades of positive knowledge can ever become general, and we infer that among the Industrials he also classes the Proletariat or the masses, of whom Mill complains that he does not take sufficient note in his political scheme.
It is interesting to see how this earlier Tract of Comte defines already with remarkable clearness the main points which his later voluminous systematic works were intended to bring out, prove, and illustrate in greater detail. This programme consisted in the main of two parts: the theory of Society or Sociology, and the new Order of Society or Polity. These two parts are represented in the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive' (6 vols., 1830-1842) and the 'Système de Politique Positive' (4 vols., 1851-1854). We now know, thanks, to a large extent, to Comte's own labours, that the phenomena of society must be approached from three sides: from the side of biology, from the side of history, and from the side of psychology. Unfortunately Comte did not admit the last, or if he, in his later work, included a psychological theory, he did so without distinctly admitting it; hence the psychological foundations of his system are incomplete and unsatisfactory. The two separate sciences which should have contributed their share to the theoretical portion of the work, psychology and ethics, did not find a place in the earlier work which constructed the hierarchy of the sciences, beginning with mathematics and ending with sociology, which was represented as a further development of biology. In dealing, in his later work, with moral, as distinguished from purely intellectual progress, he does indeed introduce a psychological distinction which has become of capital importance in the Positivist School. This is the recognition of a purely empirical fact or observation. He points out that human nature is possessed of two tendencies, of sym-
pathetic as well as of selfish emotion, and he notes that in human history the former, for which he has coined the word Altruism, gradually gains the upper hand over the latter, i.e., over Egoism. But he does not enter on any psychological or critical analysis of this remarkable compound of human nature, but takes for granted that what he considers to be an observed fact in human history, the growth of the altruistic feelings, is an indication of what ought to be, or rather of what will be.\(^1\) Consistent with his early announcement that all practical policy—including, of course, his later spiritual cult—can only consist in furthering and facilitating tendencies in human nature which have been historically discovered, he elevates the ethical principle of altruism into the position of a supreme moral precept or command: “live for others.” He thus introduces into the religion of humanity the great central idea of

\(^1\) Mill in his criticism of Comte’s scheme of reorganisation, notices a break in the continuity of Comte’s ideas, inasmuch as the “comprehensive view of the progress of human society in the past,” is not used as a “basis of practical recommendations” for the future. “... we fail to see any scientific connection between his theoretical explanation of the past progress of society and his proposals for future improvement.” (‘Auguste Comte and Positivism,’ 2nd ed., 1866, p. 118). It is however possible in the light of the more recent developments of Positivism to look upon this break of continuity in Comte’s speculation in a more favourable way. Comte saw clearly that ever so complete a knowledge of what is and has been, and ever so clear a foresight of the future (if such were possible), does not bring with it an obligation to promote or expedite by personal effort this natural process. It was the object of the later labours of Comte to emphasise the feeling of duty and obligation and to establish sanctions and a supreme authority. An exclusive acceptance of the earlier teaching of Comte such as Littré represents necessarily implies an extinction of the sense of moral obligation. Co-operation could be recommended merely as a means of more efficiently and more rapidly gaining the mastery over the natural forces, which is an important but not the highest aim of human progress. (See on this also supra, p. 485.)
Christian ethics. But, as already remarked, neither psychology nor ethics forms an integral part, or receives adequate recognition, in Comte's philosophy. As it was only at the end of his philosophical development that he came to assign to ethics an important position, so also it was only after having completed the greater of his two larger treatises that he liberated himself from the early conception, inherited from Cabanis, that psychology is merely a department or appendix of physiology. He came to see that the individual man is not merely a biological unit but is an object of special scientific study. Still the subordination of man as an individual to his existence as a social being remains; and with it the emphasis given to a truth which has played an increasingly important part in recent psychology and sociology.  

1 See also supra, p. 487.
2 This is well brought out by Mr Whittaker in his Tract on 'Comte and Mill' (Constable's 'Philosophies Ancient and Modern,' 1908), especially chapter v. "By the time he had completed the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive,' Comte perceived the necessity of a revision, as he told Mill in their correspondence. Hitherto the individual had not been explicitly considered at all except as a biological organism. . . . Individuality had seemed at first to be a mere biological notion, and then to be effaced under the conception of a social unity. From Comte's later point of view . . . there is a true science of man as individual; but it is posterior, not prior, to sociology. To this science Comte gave the name of Morality, making it the seventh in his hierarchy. . . . Theoretically, it must be noted that Comte's new science is properly not ethics, but psychology of the individual. . . . But he failed . . . to distinguish it from moral philosophy. . . . Just as he does not discuss philosophically the criterion of scientific knowledge, but takes it for granted, so he does not discuss the criterion of action, but supposes it to emerge as a matter of course from his theoretical 'moral science.'" (pp. 52 and 53).

3 As psychology, theory of knowledge, ontology and ethics, are all wanting in Comte's 'Positivism,' some have refused to call the latter a philosophy at all, regarding positivism merely as a general attitude of the philosophical mind, requiring to be scientifically defined but capable of very various interpretations and containing a number of aspects which have, since its proclamation, more and more
With the exception of this later addition to his original scheme, the early Tract—re-edited by Comte in 1854 as an appendix to his second great work in order, as already remarked, to prove how consistently he had carried out his original programme—contains all the main points of his doctrine, and, in addition, a great array of suggestive remarks which have since his time, and largely through the influence of the positivist school, received fuller treatment by writers on naturalistic ethics. It is useful to draw attention to a few of these remarks.

Although Comte urges so strongly what we may now call the exact methods of research, he sees a great difference between phenomena that can be treated by purely mathematical processes and those that cannot, and among the latter he mentions the phenomena peculiar to organised bodies. These, he says, are characterised by an extreme variability; a fortiori, this applies to moral and political phenomena. It is needless to point out how this remark anticipates, in various ways, truths which have been more clearly recognised governed philosophical thought. Thus Dr T. Ruyssen says pertinently: "L'influence diffuse d'A. Comte sur la génération des penseurs de la seconde moitié du siècle dépasse tout ce que l'on pouvait attendre d'un écrivain à peine connu de son vivant. Défiance à l'égard de toute métaphysique, culte de l'expérience, croyance à l'efficacité morale de la science, hiérarchie des sciences, notions de progrès et d'évolution, subordination naturelle de l'individu à la société, théorie des milieux, établissement de la morale sur la solidarité humaine, reconnaissance de la grandeur sociale du catholicisme et du moyen âge, enfin création d'une science nouvelle, la sociologie, telles sont les grandes idées qu'A. Comte a mises ou remises en circulation." (Article "Positivisme," "Grande Encyclopédie," vol. xvii. p. 407.)

This has been brought out against Littré and Mill, both by Hermann Gruber in Germany ("Auguste Comte," 1889), and very clearly by Whittaker in the Tract already mentioned.
in the progress of biological and philosophical thought since the time of Comte. The superior definiteness of conception also in the sciences capable of mathematical analysis is clearly pointed out by Comte, though he suggestively refuses to identify definiteness with certainty of knowledge: a difference which has since been more clearly brought out.

Further, in dwelling upon the necessity of getting hold of the natural co-ordination of biological as well as political phenomena through observation rather than by submitting them to mathematical analysis, he has anticipated the more recent reaction against the purely atomising tendency of thought. To this, which reigned supreme, notably in French science, under the influence of the school of Laplace, he opposes, or rather adds, the *esprit d'ensemble* as indicative of the right line of reasoning in the biological and social sciences. Laplace, as before him Condorcet, fancied he had found in the calculus of probabilities a valuable instrument for dealing, *inter alia*, with social phenomena. Whilst he condemns this we must note that Comte adopts and perpetuates Montesquieu's identification of the laws of nature with those of society, and that he commends Condorcet for his attempt to foretell the march of civilisation and give a picture of the future, and this in spite of his contention that it is impossible to give a definition of goodness.

Thinkers who belong to a different school consider that incalculable harm has been done by obliterating the essential difference that exists between natural laws as mere statements of existing actual regularities, and
moral laws as precepts of human conduct. And the attempt to foretell the future and define the ideal of social Happiness in any other way than through an appeal to the call of Duty has given rise to those visionary and impracticable constructions by which extreme socialists again and again strive to bring about the millennium, but in reality do a great deal to retard and impede the slow but sure march of human progress.

The philosophy of Comte which at the present day appears comparatively simple in its main features, and which contains so many germs of newer thought, was nevertheless not at the time appreciated by his countrymen. In this respect it contrasts very markedly with the philosophy of Hegel, which, in spite of its abstract ideas and difficult exposition, may be said to have almost exclusively governed, for the time being, the thought of Germany. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Hegel gave expression to the spirit of his age and country, which, frequently undefined and unconscious, lived in all the great minds who were his contemporaries. This spirit was striving to find a definite form, and the very fact that Hegel's language, both in his lectures and in his works, was so expressive of the wrestling of the mind with a deep and difficult subject of which it gave prophetic glimpses, alternating with felicitous and suggestive verbal definitions, made it attractive to hearers and learners who could bear anything but the triviality and prose of rationalism.

Hegel's works and lectures were a kind of rhapsody, a dithyrambus of the searching and aspiring soul in a poetical and creative age. Hegel caught up the pre-
vailing enthusiasm and gave just enough expression to it not to deprive it of its mystical depth and poetic colouring. We know that this was followed by a great disillusionment from which the nation has probably not yet recovered.

On the other side Comte lived, as he was well aware, in an age of complete mental and social anarchy, of a disintegration of thought and of political floundering. His task was that of a reformer and reorganiser. But he had to contend with two prevailing errors or maladies which surrounded him: the spirit of reaction on the one side and of extreme radicalism on the other. He was not less prophetic than Hegel, though much more definite and clear. He was full of enthusiasm, but not gifted with that persuasive eloquence without which constructive thinkers in his country rarely gain a hearing. He was not an orator who could charm or harangue large audiences. His writings did not appeal, in the earlier stages of his thought, to the emotions. In this respect his opponents, on all sides, had the advantage over him.

For in spite of the steady cultivation of the exact and natural sciences which had continued all through the Revolution and the Restoration, the age in which Comte lived was a literary, poetical, and rhetorical age. The three schools of thought which then prevailed were eloquently, though hardly methodically, represented by brilliant writers and orators; such were de Maistre and de Lammenais on the side of reaction—not to mention great preachers like Lacordaire—such were Fourier and Proudhon on the side of Socialism; and, above all, Victor Cousin, the eloquent exponent of spiritualism
and eclecticism. Moreover, all these, and many others among their associates and followers, were active politicians or popular lecturers commanding large and representative audiences. On the other side, Comte, though a founder of the science of politics, was not a politician, and was rather a teacher in a class-room than an elegant lecturer. The wave of poetry, romance, and oratory which then ran very high in his country, both in politics and literature, left him out of sight and unrecognised. He had to wait till it had spent its force or till others, largely inspired by him, added the charm of language and diction to the solid ideas which he had elaborated.

But the very absence of some of those qualities of style which are so prominent in the great models of French literature and thought and so seductive to the French public, was a recommendation in the eyes of such sober and methodical thinkers as then formed the utilitarian school of thought in this country, with John Stuart Mill as its principal exponent. The rhetorical side of French speculation has never appealed to the British mind. It is difficult to translate, being foreign to the idiom of the English language. If rendered in this it is apt to appear thin and trite or even ludicrous. Now it is, inter alia, a remarkable fact that the English translation of such writings of Comte as the early Tract referred to above exhibits few traces of its foreign origin, and reads much more like the exposition of an English writer, such as, for instance, Buckle. To these somewhat external qualities, through which no doubt Comte's writings found favour with
thinkers like Mill, Grote, and Lewes, we must add the much more important fact that Comte offered exactly that which Mill was occupied with and in search of, but for which Comte's own countrymen were not yet prepared, a patient and scientific analysis of the methods of the exact sciences and an examination as to how far these could, or could not, be employed in the treatment of political and social questions.

Mill had completed about two-thirds of his 'System of Logic'; he had at an earlier stage already become acquainted with Comte's writings when the latter was still classed as a disciple of Saint-Simon. Having for a time lost sight of him, he again fell in with him when the first two sociological volumes of the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive' were published. In them he found assistance in elaborating his theory of "the Inverse Deductive Method as the one chiefly applicable to the complicated subjects of History and Statistics." We know that Mill's logical studies were originally prompted by a similar desire to that of Comte—viz., to make the methods which had proved so fertile in natural philosophy useful and applicable in dealing with political, or what we now term social problems. The further development of Comte's ideas on the subject of social science had disappointed him, but his "enthusiasm was rekindled" when in the sociological volumes Comte expounded his 'Connected View of History' which contained his celebrated 'Law of the Three States.' Mill then carried on an interesting correspondence with Comte, which terminated when, as Mill says, "I found, and he probably

1 See 'Autobiography,' p. 209. 
found likewise, that I could do no good to his mind, and that all the good he could do to mine he did by his books."¹

Mill's later contributions to the solution of the social problem were various and important, but he never advanced to the conception of sociology as a whole as Comte had done, and this probably for two reasons. First, political economy had, since the time of Adam Smith, and greatly through the influence of James Mill and his friends, Malthus and Ricardo, become an independent science. Hence among social questions the economic question was mainly studied, while other equally important social questions received only scant attention. The existing political Order in this country with its enviable constitution,—considered by many foreign philosophers as a model of political organisation to be imitated by the aspiring peoples of the Continent,—relieved English thinkers from dealing with fundamentals or answering the abstract question of what society is or should be; and secondly, the comparative stability and constitutional order of English society and politics suggested a variety of practical problems in legislation and administration, and to these Mill applied himself with conspicuous success. But Mill himself was far from satisfied with the stagnant condition of the intellectual atmosphere which surrounded him;² he

¹ See 'Autobiography,' p. 211.
² "Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed, where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even
had a very clear perception that there were existing in this country, *inter alia*, two distinct needs which would have to be supplied before a great reorganisation could be attempted or hoped for.

The study of Comte's premature constructive efforts probably helped to convince him that there was needed, first, an effort towards the general education and enlightenment of the mass of the People; and secondly, a greater harmony among philosophers as to the main articles of a reasoned creed enabling them to become the intellectual leaders of society in the manner that Saint-Simon and Comte proposed and Mill essentially approved of. For Mill was one of those thinkers in this country who thought an adherence or a return to the traditionally accepted beliefs impossible.

The fact that these two needs had been felt on the Continent, and notably in Germany, long before they presented themselves clearly to the mind of Mill in this country, was probably one of the various causes which created here an interest in the intellectual life of Germany; directing the glance of many prominent persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of Germany during the Goethean and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearance have for some time indicated that all three impulses are wellnigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start until we again assert our mental freedom.” (Mill 'On Liberty,' pp. 62-63.)
leaders of thought towards that country and giving added importance to the literary movement which had originated in Coleridge and was carried on by Carlyle. In fact, Mill himself clearly recognised in English thought two distinct movements which he identified with the names of Bentham and Coleridge, and emphasised also in his appreciative Review of Carlyle's 'French Revolution.' It cannot be maintained that Mill himself was ever a sympathetic student of German transcendentalism. A taste for this sprang up in Oxford after Mill's great influence was there on the decline, but it is interesting to note that among the few leaders of German thought singled out by Mill for special notice there stand Pestalozzi, the father of the education of the People; Wilhelm von Humboldt, the leader of academic education and culture; Fichte, the independent exponent of Kant's ethics; and lastly, Goethe, who has been termed the apostle of inner freedom.

The need of a general system of popular education and uplifting of the Masses, and various attempts in the direction of a reasoned creed, have both increasingly occupied the attention of British legislators and thinkers since the time of Mill. Continental schools have been visited and reported on, and philosophical creeds have been formulated both in the direction suggested by Comte and in that suggested by Kant and Hegel. But what was done on the Continent, notably in Germany, cannot be imitated in this country. The work of

1 Even his knowledge of Kant seems to belong to the late period Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.
Pestalozzi and Humboldt and of the large array of those inspired by them, founded the educational system of their country at a time when a firm belief existed that the fundamental truths and precepts of the Christian religion, as put forward by the great reformers of the sixteenth century, could and would be supported and interpreted by philosophical reasoning that would, at the same time, destroy dogmatic formalism and sceptical unbelief. The somewhat prosaic spirit of the earlier Aufklärung was deepened and enlivened by its alliance with the classical and romantic spirit. This firm belief which lived in the great educationalists in the German-speaking countries and animated German schools and universities, has been materially shaken since the middle of the century when the outcome of the idealistic movement became doubtful. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, it has become doubtful whether the Positivist movement in France is capable of realising the hopes of Condorcet and Comte. In the absence of a generally accepted reasoned creed, which should supply a moral foundation, education has, in many instances and unawares, drifted into the channels of mere instruction. The educational problem has been to some extent solved, but only in one direction.

This is, however, merely an incidental remark which leads us away from the main subject now before us: the philosophical conception of human society and its problems. Having treated of Hegel and of Comte as instituting two original but very different systems, we must note that it took fully fifty years before the comprehensive problem of human society again attracted
the attention of foremost thinkers in all the civilised countries, and attempts were made to do more thoroughly and adequately what Hegel on the one side, Comte on the other, had only adumbrated. The interval was filled up by that large volume of research which both schemes needed and presupposed, but which neither could supply; this is the work of the historical school, or better, the historical schools, which started everywhere, sometimes consciously but mostly unconsciously, gathering and preparing the material for larger generalisations and the solution of the greater problem.

The true historical spirit lived both in Hegel and in Comte, exhibiting in each a distinct but very different character. It would be quite incorrect to classify historians by this distinction. There can, however, be no doubt that two distinct tendencies exist among those modern historians who desire to be more than mere annalists, that these tendencies appear sometimes apart, sometimes united, now clearly recognised, now only implied, and that they are in the abstract represented by Hegel and Comte. It will be of use if I try to put in words somewhat more clearly what these two tendencies are.

The first, and, in time, the earlier philosophical conception regarding the essence of human culture, civilisation and progress, is that this progress brings out and unfolds an ideal content. Ideas are the motive power in the history of the race. According to Schelling and Hegel not only human but also natural history, not only the living and thinking portion of creation but inanimate nature itself, is the playground of the Spirit
or, as Hegel said, the Idea. But in this whole region the development of the human mind in history is the most conspicuous and instructive instance of the working of the universal spirit. This conception, implying an apparent dualism between the living and active forces and the material substance, was not peculiar and original to Schelling and Hegel. It constituted a view which was very generally accepted, and ran through the whole of German literature and poetry ever since the time of Leibniz, Lessing, and Herder. It was the older form of the doctrine of evolution. Hegel attempted to put it into a systematic form, to give it a logical expression, and to invent a method which could be employed for tracing coherently and in definite detail what was indefinite but implied in the higher mental work of his age and country. Although in certain directions Hegel's attempt at defining the indefinite led to conspicuous success, notably in the history of philosophical and religious thought, as also in that of aesthetics, the extreme formalism peculiar to his writings, and still more conspicuous with some of his followers, led to a kind of revolt of the genuine historical school against what they considered to be a construction rather than an exposition of historical facts and events. On the whole this school, which had in Niebuhr and Ranke its greatest representatives, and acquired European fame and influence, disliked and turned away from the historical speculations of Hegel. It did not abandon the fundamental point of view from which that classical age looked upon history; the difference may rather be stated by saying
that the ideas which govern the culture and progress of humanity cannot be logically deduced from some highest conception but that they must be patiently searched for; that they disclose themselves only to the diligent and painstaking student of historical facts and detail, and that they reveal themselves not so much explicitly as in and through the course of historical narrative and portraiture, refusing to be put into definite terms and language. Other representatives of this view followed Hegel in the main conception, but instead of adopting the abstract and spiritual view which Hegel took, fastened upon certain definite restricted historical factors and agencies, the workings of which they attempted to trace in limited periods and narrower regions of historical development. Some of these produced works which likewise, though in a very different direction, acquired European reputation, exerting a far-reaching though one-sided influence. To these I will revert further on.

Quite different from the tendency in what we may term the idealistic school of German historians was that which I have identified with the name of Comte. Comte did not believe that what lay, as it were, behind historical events and facts—what we may term the hidden or ideal content—could be found out by the human intellect; he did not absolutely deny that such existed, but it constituted, in his opinion, a region inaccessible to the human mind.

In the place, however, of the search for the ideal element Comte put another method. This consisted in the search for the *consensus* or *ensemble* of historical
events and facts. The *esprit d'ensemble* was to guide the student of social life and progress in arriving at a co-ordination of facts in the same way as it must guide the biologist.\(^1\) In this respect Comte took up the same cue as Schelling had done before him. He was equally impressed by recent researches, which had raised the organic or biological sciences to such a high level, but he took a different view of the principle of this advance. In one respect also Comte resembled Hegel: both were animated by a universalistic tendency; both attempted to grasp the whole of history, not a restricted or limited development in a special period or country. And so it happened to Comte as it did to Hegel, that his followers benefited by the use of the method he had defined, but mostly discarded the first and grand application which he had made of it.

It took, as I stated above, a considerable time

\(^1\) This introduced an apparent dualism into Comte's system and led, in the sequel, to antagonism between two sides in the positive school not unlike the split which took place among Hegel's followers. This is clearly brought out in an important work by Dr Paul Barth which bears the title *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie* (1897): "In the sketch which we owe to Comte a closer scrutiny reveals a contradiction: the social series is a continuation of the animal but it is impossible to deduce it therefrom. From the properties of individuals—Comte frequently insists—the evolution of society cannot be deduced; sociology cannot be got out of physiology however much biology may form the foundation. The latter gives only certain general conceptions, of development, of specialisation of organs, of consensus or solidarity. The positive law of development is that of the three states, by no means a biological but a logical principle. Thus Comte is by no means a monist, for, with him, these two principles at least confront each other. It is therefore quite natural that among the students of sociology that follow, a division should take place. As the intellectual principle strongly predominates with Comte, so much so that it is by no means surprising that it led, in his subjective period, to a fantastic spiritualism, his disciples saw their task in an elaboration of the same. On the other side the natural sciences made, after Comte, great progress, so that it appeared enticing to cultivate the biological side of the system" (vol. i. p. 58).
before, in his own country, Comte's historical method was recognised or practised at all. It had to be explained and recommended by careful thinkers like Mill in England before it was, as it were, reintroduced into France in a more sober and practical form. But nothing contributed more to make Comte's esprit d'ensemble, or his co-ordinating process, popular than the special application of it which came from a quite unexpected quarter, but exactly from those sciences which had given Comte his original suggestion. This was the revolution which the biological sciences underwent through the publication of Darwin's great work in the year 1859, two years after Comte's death. This revolution has by historians of science and by the followers of Darwin been traced, in a one-sided way, to the discovery of what is called the law of natural selection. There is no doubt that this constituted the most startling among Darwin's discoveries: that it was, in fact, a signal instance of a co-ordination such as Comte desired to introduce into the study of biological as well as social phenomena. As a brilliant example of this more general process of reasoning, as a splendid fruit of a more universal method, it did, in a large realm of research, as much or more than Hegel's method had done in a very different region.1

But the discovery of Darwin, like other discoveries of his own and his followers, was really the outcome of that

1 As an example of the latter we may refer, e.g., to the celebrated work of David Strauss, the 'Life of Jesus,' which attempts to explain the main features of the sacred narrative as an outcome of an intellectual feature, the "mythenbildende Phantasie," or myth-forming propensity of the human imagination.
larger and wider spirit of research which, since the age of Comte, had been introduced by the great naturalists of France, Germany, and England. To this Comte had given a name: he called it the esprit d'ensemble. The essence of this method consists in the frequently unconscious habit of looking at things natural not in their isolation but in their "together" both in space and in time. This habit had been introduced by such naturalists as Comte himself reckoned among his fore-runners, by Lamarck and Blainville. It also lived in Humboldt and still more in von Baer. In England Lyell practised it with conspicuous success; it has resulted in—and been popularised by—the introduction into the scientific and literary vocabulary of such terms as the environment, the habitat, the milieu. This habit of thought which frequently replaced or compensated the one-sided spirit of analysis—the dissecting and atomising process of thought—was not fully appreciated in its fundamental importance before Darwin had made such brilliant use of it, but it was, in the sequel, nowhere appreciated more than in Comte's own country, where we meet with one of its greatest representatives in the region of historical writing. I refer to Hippolyte Taine.

No one did more than Taine to establish in his country the rule of Positivism. But this Positivism was only

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1 In the first section of this work this larger view, which led to such great advance in the natural as distinguished from the mechanical sciences, was treated in three chapters dealing respectively with the morphological (panoramic), the genetic (genealogical), and the vitalistic views of nature. All these views depend primarily on a comprehensive or synoptic, in contrast to an atomising and dissecting, habit of the mind, and this was much stimulated by extensive travels, as also by an artistic trait in the intellectual constitution of many of the great naturalists.
indirectly connected with that of Comte. In fact, what is now generally considered by French writers as characteristic of Positivism is a modification, at once an enlargement and a curtailment, of the original Positivism of Comte. It is a curtailment in so far as the later phase of Comte's speculation is discarded and forgotten. On the other side Comte's Positivism is enriched by the addition of a genuine psychological interest, and it is also enriched by a more definite conception of the "together" of things in time. Comte himself employs the word *evolution*. This term had already been used by Herder, but with both thinkers it remained vague and indefinite. It acquired greater precision through Herbert Spencer's earlier Essays, but still more through Darwin's 'Principle of Natural Selection' and subsequent popular phraseology, as the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest."

Taine's philosophical creed was formed under the influence of English thinkers like Mill, Bain, and Spencer, and through a study of English literature and the characteristics of English life, political and social. In one of his earlier works on the French philosophers of the nineteenth century he attacks—and, as it seemed to many—demolishes the conventional spiritualistic and eclectic philosophy which then ruled in his country under the leadership of Victor Cousin; but his attack was led from a position which he had gained through English psychology and English evolutionism. Probably it was only after he had imbibed the spirit of both that he came to recognise how much had been done already by Comte in marking out an opposite and more fruitful
line of philosophic thought. To this he drew attention in the above-named work upon French thinkers, and still more in the Introduction to his 'History of English Literature.' Like Comte, he connects psychology with physiology; but with him physiology no longer meant the vitalistic physiology of Bichat, but the experimental physiology of Claude Bernard. He did not share Comte's belief in phrenology, and yet he accepted a mechanical explanation of sensation and put it forward in his work, 'De l'Intelligence' (1870).

This work formed, as it were, a landmark in the history of French psychology,—the beginning of a new life of that science in France. 1 In it also he revives that connection which existed between the earlier French psychology of Cabanis and Broussais and the medical sciences, notably the study of pathological states. In fact, Taine's psychology has a pathological flavour. But so far as the subject of this chapter is concerned Taine's most important contribution is to be found in his attempt to explain and understand historic events and persons by looking at their surroundings. He has adopted and enlarged an idea thrown out by Comte, that of the milieu or environment. 2 To this he has added two other factors

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1 See ante, vol. iii. p. 270 n.
2 The word milieu is one of the terms by which Comte's influence has become perpetuated in the history of French thought, but he did not create it as he did the other two watchwords of his system—Sociology and Altruism. He took it over from biology, but thinks it necessary to defend the use and extend the meaning of the term: "Il serait superflu, j'espère, de motiver expressément l'usage fréquent que je ferai désormais, en biologie, du mot milieu, pour désigner spécialement, d'une manière nette et rapide, non seulement le fluide où l'organisme est plongé, mais, en général, l'ensemble total des circonstances extérieures, d'un genre quelconque, nécessaires à l'existence de chaque organisme déterminé. Ceux qui auront suffisamment médité sur le rôle capital que doit remplir, dans toute biologie positive, l'idée cor-
or agencies which mould "each distinct civilisation as the effect of a permanent force." They are race and epoch [moment, momentum]. Thus race, surroundings, and epoch are the three different sources which contribute to produce the whole moral and social constitution. "What we call the Race means the innate and hereditary dispositions which man brings with him into the world." But "man is not alone in the world; nature surrounds him and his fellow-men surround him." And there is yet a third series of causes; for, "with the forces within and without there is the work which they have already produced together, and this work contributes to produce that which follows. Besides the permanent impulse and the given surroundings there is the acquired momentum."

To illustrate this theory Taine wrote his 'History of English Literature,' seeking in it "for the psychology of a people," and the reason why he chose this special subject is because "there are few nations that have, during their whole existence, really thought and written." "Besides there is a peculiarity in this civilisation, that, apart from its spontaneous development, it presents a forced deviation, it has suffered the last and most effectual of all conquests, and the three grounds whence it has sprung, race, climate, the Norman invasion, may be observed in its remains with perfect exactness: so
that we may examine in this history the two most powerful springs of human transformation, natural bent and constraining force, and we may examine them without uncertainty or gap, in a series of authentic or unmutilated memorials.”

Attempts to understand the collective life of man, as distinguished from the individual life, were made, more or less independently of Comte, both in England and Germany. In the latter country Comte remained unknown long after his works had been studied and translated in England. But in England also one brilliant attempt was made to understand and define the

1 These quotations are all taken from the Introduction to the ‘History of English Literature’ (transl. by Van Laun, 1887, pp. 16 sqq.) Although Taine has done so much to impress upon his readers the importance of the milieu, taking this in the larger sense which he gave it, and has thus emphasised an important sociological principle, he has not received a prominent place among the great teachers and founders of sociology. Political historians, such as Lord Morley (‘Miscellanies,’ vol. iii. p. 265), have indeed pointed out that, e.g., his great work on the ‘Origins of Contemporary France’ belongs more to the region of sociology than to that of history. But on the other side Dr Barth (loc. cit., p. 58), though recurring frequently to Taine’s principle, remarks that he has not treated sociology as a whole. If we have to note in Comte’s writings an inherent dualism, we have, still more, from a philosophical point of view, to complain of the unreconciled ideas which we discover in Taine’s various writings. They comprise in a long series such very different but equally original treatises as the ‘History of English Literature’ (1863), the ‘Philosophie de l’Art’ (1865), the psychological treatise ‘De l’Intelligence’ (1870), and the ‘Origines de la France Contemporaine’ (1876-91). The fact is that Taine is much more of an artist than a philosopher or a scientific thinker, though he is both these to a certain extent. His works are more like great tableaux or outstanding portraits, and, like all works of art, self-contained and, to a great extent, mutually exclusive. In this respect he belongs more to the history of literature and poetry, and has in this capacity probably exerted a much wider though very varying influence upon the thought of his country. It is also interesting to note that though he did more than any other writer to develop one of Comte’s fruitful ideas and generally to fix the modern conception of French positivism, his allegiance to Comte is not very much dwelt on by himself or by his critics.
forces at work in historical development and progress. This was that of H. T. Buckle in his Introduction to the 'History of Civilisation in England' (2 vols., 1857-1867). Buckle does not stand so much under the influence of Comte as under that of the statistical school of which Quetelet in Belgium was the most celebrated representative. This school had developed the conception of the Homme Moyen, the "mean man," and the doctrine of the statistical regularity of moral not less than natural phenomena. Progress accordingly does not depend so much upon individuals as upon the average or collective mind. Buckle's special theories, which attracted great but short-lived attention, soon became antiquated for reasons which I shall presently refer to. How little he foresaw the coming developments and changes can be gathered, for instance, from the fact that he considers that intellectual progress, by which he means the power of the human mind over nature, is limited to Europe; for, as he says, outside of Europe the human mind is in subjection to nature. Buckle does not find any progress in the moral ideas. These, he maintains, remain always the same. Progress depends only upon knowledge, which has enabled the European nations to enter upon a progressive civilisation consisting mainly in combating two great evils—viz., War and Religious Persecution, establishing Peace and Tolerance. The two great tendencies which move the world are the desire for wealth and the desire for knowledge, but he does not enter into a detailed exposition of the first of these two tendencies, but really limits himself merely to the
intellectual factor which he considers the most important. This produces also what others may consider the higher products of culture, including the Fine Arts.¹

About the same time, and, as it appears, in entire ignorance of the writings of Comte and of the English school, two philosophers in Germany—Lazarus (1824–1903) and Steinthal (1823–1899)—started a new departure by founding a Review, which, by its title alone, indicates a new class and co-ordination of studies. It is entitled a 'Review for Ethnology and Science

¹ If we have to note in Comte a certain dualism, that of the biological (animal, egoistic) and the psychical (mental, altruistic) factors in the progress of society, we find in Buckle not one, but a great many unreconciled contradictions. In fact his work opens with emphatic statements which at the time must have appeared startling, but for that very reason attractive also, to the general reader; they formed the subject of a whole literature of criticism both in England and abroad. Unduly impressed by the progress of scientific ideas and scientific methods, he desired to initiate an entirely new method of writing history. His vivid style attracted the general public, and the one-sided use he made of certain scientific theories—notably those of Quetelet—compelled philosophers, frequently against their will, to take notice of his immature speculations. Like Schopenhauer, he created a great ferment among professional philosophers and historians, putting forward a number of startling theses which required special examination. His influence on German thought was probably quite as great as on that of his own country, and perhaps not so soon forgotten. Robert Flint, the greatest authority on philosophy of history in this country, has given a list of nine ideas, more or less detached and unreconciled, to be found in Buckle's History. They are: 1. The want of a science of history; 2. The statistical regularity of moral actions; 3. Influence of natural environment; 4. Unique character of European civilisation, owing to, 5. The increase of intellectual control over natural forces; 6. Use of the method of averages in contradistinction to the older metaphysical methods; 7. Stationary nature of moral as compared with intellectual agencies; 8. Depreciation of individual effort; 9. That the things generally called culture (religion, literature, and government) are the product, and not the cause, of civilisation (see 'Encyclop. Brit.,' 9th ed., article "Buckle"). All these points have been much discussed and his theories criticised, but they have furnished endless material for thought, and as a recent writer very truly remarks: "His book has marked an epoch in the life of readers all over the world, and gave an immense impetus to the sociological investigation of the past" (G. P. Gooch, 'History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century,' 1913, p. 585).
of Language.' The founders of this Review and of the studies which it represents came from the school which had carried on a long protest against the Hegelian philosophy. They were from the school of Herbart; the main interests of which had centred in psychology and the theory of education, meaning by education, not so much the higher academic culture of Wilhelm von Humboldt, as the endeavours towards a realistic and practical education represented by Pestalozzi and Fröbel.

Several followers of Herbart\(^1\) then created a new branch of philosophic research by widening the field of psychology in the direction of what we should now term social psychology. This they conceived to be the psychology of the collective mind, also termed the objective mind, not unlike the objective mind in Hegel's system; but not conceived, as with Hegel, in a metaphysical sense. The title of the Review which represented these studies and started in 1860 also shows that the study of the collective mind was to be conducted in connection with the science of language or comparative Philology. The latter science was then, likewise, a recent branch of research. Another disciple of Herbart, Theodor

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\(^1\) Herbart's own contributions to the problem before us are insignificant, yet there is a pertinent remark to be found in his 'Practical Philosophy' (1808, 'Collected Works,' vol. viii.) at the end of the first book (p. 101), which deals with the doctrine of Ideas. He there says: "When individuals are actuated by one spirit which no one considers as belonging, but no one also as foreign, to him; they may then consider it as a soul which lives amongst them all in their community. But if in truth this spirit is to count as more than a similar disposition which repeats itself in every one, it must, according to its nature, transcend individuality." He then proceeds to say that the spirit must show itself in judgment which "deposits its results in ideas. They alone can truly animate a society." And though they do not originate with, they are valid for, the individual.
Waitz, although brought up in classical studies, of the thoroughness of which he gave evidence in his excellent edition of the Aristotelian 'Organon,' started upon a similar line of study but, as far as he was concerned, not in connection with the science of language, but with elaborate and detailed researches into the life and history of what he termed "Natur-völker." These were the savage as distinguished from the civilised or historical Peoples and nations. The work of Lazarus and Steinthal was introduced by elaborate philosophical discussions as to the principles on which anthropological research was to be conducted, and it started a long controversy, not yet concluded, as to the definite meaning to be attached to such terms as the "Soul of the People," the "popular mind," the "social mind or self." Is this a definite and useful conception, or is it only a name for the average of individual characteristics, mental and moral, of an age or a country?

The work of Waitz approaches a region of research which had, for a long time, been neglected in Germany, though that country had one illustrious representative in the earlier part of the century, a naturalist of European celebrity, Blumenbach of Göttingen (1752-1840). After his time the term anthropology was used more in the philosophical sense as denoting a study of human nature from the psychological point of view, whereas in England and France it was used to denote the study of man as the highest product in the animal scale of creation. Anthropology became thus rather a branch of natural than of mental history. As such,
it was for a long time represented by the almost solitary researches of Dr J. C. Prichard (1786-1848), who is not incorrectly called the founder of Ethnology or Anthropology in England. His 'Researches into the Physical History of Man,' dedicated to Blumenbach, appeared in 1813 in two volumes (afterwards extended to five). He was one of the first who decided to proceed in the study of the primitive history of the human species not by any preconceived notion "but by the ordinary method of observation and experience." Although following Blumenbach and appreciated by Orientalists such as A. W. v. Schlegel in Germany, Prichard for a long time stood alone, little known outside of Britain, one of the many independent and isolated pioneers in research who were so numerous in this country.

It may be noted that Herder's writings contained already the idea of anthropology as a natural as well as mental science. But if we except the researches of Humboldt into the earlier civilisations of Peru and Mexico, the study of anthropology in Germany had, in the schools of Kant, Fries, and Herbart, established itself in alliance with the comparative study of languages rather as an extended psychology than as a natural science. In the latter direction it attracted much attention in the middle of the century in France, where Broca founded in 1859 the "Société d'Anthropologie de

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1 Although the author himself states that he was led into the inquiry by the diversity of races being alleged as a disproof of the Mosaic records, in argument he endeavoured nevertheless not to rely on theology, &c. See Encyclop. Brit., 9th ed., Article "Prichard."
Paris” after several earlier societies had already prepared the way.

But all these beginnings of a more comprehensive science of man, mankind, and human society—in their natural and prehistoric as well as in their civilised and historic conditions—remained isolated and disconnected up to the year 1860. In the previous year, when Broca had founded the anthropological society in Paris, there appeared the first great work of Darwin on the 'Origin of Species'—followed in 1871 by the 'Descent of Man'—which did so much to revolutionise biological science and bring it into contact with historical research. All previous researches in a very large region of natural and civil history became at once antiquated. The appearance of Buckle's 'History of Civilisation' had already, to some extent, eclipsed the work of Lazarus and Steinthal; but it was itself to be cast into the shade by the flood of light which emanated from the peculiar expression Darwin gave to those ideas of evolution and development which had from different beginnings already permeated German, French, and British thought. For it is doubtful whether even Spencer's comprehensive view of evolution, published before Darwin came on the scene, would have ever, without the latter, succeeded in that great unification of thought which from 1860 onward has brought together so many different and frequently distant lines of reasoning and research.

No problem of philosophic interest has benefited more by the suggestions contained in Darwin’s and Spencer's
writings than that with which we are at present occupied: the cluster of sciences which from various points of view had approached the social problem in the larger sense of the word. Merely to enumerate them would be to give a long catalogue; for we have not only the various biological researches which deal in one way or another with man and humanity; we have likewise psychology, the science of language, the history of culture and civilisation, and on another side economics, jurisprudence, the science of religion and theology. As from one point of view we may maintain that all these various researches have, during the last fifty years, co-operated in laying the foundation for a philosophy of society, so we may, on the other hand, hold that this combined service has been amply repaid by the reaction of social interests and studies upon these different researches themselves. I can here merely attempt to point out a few general ideas or tendencies of thought which have during this period gained the upper hand, dispelling earlier lines of reasoning or imparting to them new life and vigour.

The first, and perhaps the most important, among these more recent conceptions, is what we may term the biological view of society. This dates back to the founder of sociology, Auguste Comte himself. But the biological conceptions at his disposal were crude compared with those which stood at the disposal of Darwin or were introduced by him. Nor did Comte show much sagacity in appreciating the enormous progress which biology made during his lifetime. And it is probably owing largely to this fact, pointed out, e.g.,
by Huxley,¹ that it was not Comte himself but Positivism modified under the influence of Mill, Spencer, and Darwin which became such a prolific vein of thought in Comte's own country.

¹ The discussion of this subject by Huxley in two of his earlier Addresses (see 'Lay Sermons, &c.,' 1891, pp. 104, 123) is still of great interest in the history of philosophical thought as distinguished from that of science and philosophy themselves; for he has shown how a long list of flagrant mistakes of fact and theory in science, philosophy, and history, which he has collected from Comte's works, has not stood in the way of the marked and lasting influence which Comte's philosophy has had, first in this country and then on the Continent; so much so that the term Positivism and the spirit of positive research has outlived the many attacks made upon it. It is well worth while to inquire into the hidden causes of so remarkable a phenomenon in the history of Thought. So far as Huxley himself is concerned he sums up his opinion of Comte in the words: "I shall be sorry if what I have [said] should lead any to suppose that I think M. Comte's works are worthless; or that I do not heartily respect and sympathise with those who have been impelled by him to think deeply upon social problems and to strive nobly for social regeneration. It is the virtue of that impulse, I believe, which will save the name and fame of Auguste Comte from oblivion. As for his philosophy, I part with it by quoting his own words, reported to me by a quondam Comtist, M. Charles Robin: 'La Philosophie est une tentative incessante de l'esprit humain pour arriver au repos; mais elle se trouve incessamment aussi dérangée par les progrès continus de la science. De la vient pour le philosophe l'obligation de refaire chaque soir la synthèse de ses conceptions; et un jour viendra où l'homme raisonnable ne fera plus d'autre prière du soir.'" Incidentally it may be remarked that the earlier of the two Addresses referred to, that entitled "The Physical Basis of Life" (1868), contains two remarkable passages, the first emphasising the fact that even in the science of inanimate nature the atomising process consisting of analysis into parts and synthesis into compounds does not lead us back to the natural products we start with. "It is, in strictness, true that we know nothing about the composition of any body whatever, as it is. The statement that the crystal of calc spar consists of carbonate of lime is quite true, if we only mean that, by appropriate processes, it may be resolved into carbonic acid and quicklime. If you pass the same carbonic acid over the very quicklime thus obtained, you will obtain carbonate of lime again; but it will not be calc-spar nor anything like it" (p. 112). The other passage gives concisely what may be supposed to be Huxley's own philosophical creed: "It is necessary to be fully possessed of two beliefs: the first, that the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." (p. 126). On Comte's disregard of biological discoveries during his lifetime, such, e.g., as the cellular theory, see also Dr P. Barth, loc. cit., p. 90.
Before Darwin various important biological ideas and discoveries connected with the names of Oken, Schleiden, Schwann, Kölliker, Milne-Edwards, and others had completely revolutionised the earlier biology of Bichat; but there remained the perplexing problem of the different types or classes in the living creation and their origin. Darwin not only solved this by his idea of natural selection, but through it brought natural things and events into connection with each other in a way which had not been attempted before. This broadening of the basis of research was increased by the study of environment. Thus individual things and events were brought together and connected both in their temporal and spatial existence. No idea could be a more suitable example of Comte's esprit d'ensemble nor more welcome to the student of society, who had before that been troubled how to find the transition from the individual to the social unit. Accordingly we find a whole school taking up with more hope of success the idea, familiar already to Comte, that society is an organism, and we have the counterpart of this idea in Virchow's conception of the animal organism as a社会 of cells.

No thinker has done more to urge this analogy between the individual animal organism and society as the collective organism than Spencer himself, whose earlier

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1 An elaborate and very interesting exposition and criticism of this portion of Spencer's Sociology will be found in Dr Barth's work, pp. 100-115. In following up the rudiments laid down by Comte for a methodical study of social phenomena Dr Barth deals first with what he terms the classifying sociology represented in Comte's system by the hierarchical principle in the development of the sciences, and then proceeds to show how the other side of Comte's sociology, the biological conception of Society, was taken up and further developed. But he significantly remarks that Spencer, the most prominent
writings were already occupied with setting forth to what extent this analogy holds good, and how it may be used to understand the structure and the growth of the social organism. He also pointed to the essential difference which exists between the higher organisms and social organisations—the former having a centre of consciousness, whereas the consciousness of the latter resides only in the individual members of which it is composed. But it has been pointed out that in the sequel Spencer is by far more interested in elaborating those resemblances than in recognising this essential difference; and that he, in the end, entangles himself in a contradiction which becomes more evident as he introduces the principle of natural selection. This, according to Darwin, reigns supreme in the world of living things, which are subject to a much greater multiplication than the means

representative of this line of thought, misses or only very inadequately appreciates one important aspect which runs through the whole of Comte's biological and sociological philosophy; the insistence on proceeding from the whole to the parts, or what he terms the vue d'ensemble, the necessarily synoptic spirit which must always guide these sciences. It appears that in spite of the great prominence given by Spencer to organic or super-organic evolution, he never really breaks with the underlying conviction, fixed probably in his mind through his engineering education, that purely mechanical principles are sufficient to explain not only changes but also progress in nature, mind, and society. Comte was aware of the impossibility of this deduction from the beginning, and does not pretend that sociology is merely a sequel to biology, and his personal quarrels with some of the prominent geométricians of his time seem to have strengthened his early conviction that the purely analytical and synthetical methods of the abstract sciences are not sufficient for the comprehension of the actual phenomena of nature. There are many points in Spencer's 'First Principles' which might have suggested a similar scepticism. And quite independent of all this, we must note that Lotze already, during the fourth and fifth decades of the century, had very fully expounded the capabilities as well as the shortcomings of a purely mechanical construction, which he defined much more clearly than Spencer did, who remained entangled in the old-fashioned conception of "Force."
of subsistence everywhere can afford. This principle Spencer had already recognised in his earliest work, 'Social Statics' (1851). He terms it there the "discipline of nature," and he brings it home to his readers through a quotation from Shakespeare's "Winter's Tale":—

"Nature is made better by no mean,
But nature makes that mean: so, over that art
Which you say adds to nature, is an art
That nature makes."

The importance of this view probably grew upon him as the principle received a mechanical definition in the formula which Darwin found for it.

The question then arises, not only as to what are the units among which selection takes place, but, in the case of society, the further question: is this selection carried on for the benefit of the individual members or for that of the aggregate, the State? If the latter, then we come back to a view which prevailed among the classical nations of antiquity, where man was considered to be subordinate to the State; if the former, then we are led to that individualism, peculiar to Mill and Spencer, which manifests itself in the objections they urged against the revival of ancient and mediaeval absolutism in Comte's system of positive politics. It has also been pointed out, by English as well as by foreign critics, that in human society there exist forces of a different kind from those that are at work in nature. This existence of intellectual and moral forces, constituting the ideal element, which should govern, and has in an increasing degree governed, the collective life
of man, Spencer fails to define or to estimate according to its true importance—so much so that he does not arrive at an adequate conception on which to build up a system of ethics. And, indeed, the ultimate defect of this biological theory of the social organism is evident, inasmuch as it fails to explain not only moral progress as a form of purely natural evolution, but even the principles of life and consciousness themselves. It seems to some preferable and more practical to start, as Comte did, with the empirical dualism inherent in human nature, that of egoism and altruism, than to attempt to reduce both to one and the same principle.

With Spencer this aim at an extreme simplification and unification of thought goes hand in hand with the destruction of the idea of final causes—a doctrine which had been used in an extravagant way by philosophical naturalists of an earlier generation. Darwinism showed it to have merely heuristic value, as pointing to the purely mechanical teleology of the process of natural selection: the result of the struggle for existence is an indication not of what was, according to some pre-existing scheme, meant to survive, but merely of what actually is the outcome of the concourse of mechanical forces.

The biological view of society has found many advocates, not only among the numerous followers of Spencer in this country and America, but also on the continent of Europe. I limit myself in this connection to the mention of only two prominent representatives—one in the German-speaking countries and one in France. In the former the work of A. Schäffle, with the significant title, 'Structure and Life of the Social Body,' marks a
kind of epoch, and is one of the principal channels through
which Darwinian ideas and the English philosophy of
evolution, in the larger sense of the word, found entrance
into German philosophical literature. In some respects
he develops Spencerian ideas¹ in an independent manner.
Thus he points to the analogy between human and animal

¹ The first edition of Schäffle's
work was published in 4 vols.—
1875-1878. From the preface to
this it appears that the author is
less of a Spencerian than might be
supposed from the title of his
work. He came to sociology from
the side of economics, which taught
him the necessity of studying the
phenomenon of society by an
analytical process similar to that
which firmly established biology
upon the analytical labours of
histology, anatomy, and physiology.
These were to form the prelimin-
aries to larger generalisations, such
as had been attempted by Comte
and Spencer, both of whom were
imperfectly known to the author
when he started on his independent
researches. It is especially inter-
esting to note that his philosophical
view is largely influenced by Lotze,
from whose 'Microcosmus' — the
only comprehensive anthropological
work which at the time Germany
could place alongside of Comte in
France and Spencer in England—
he quotes extensive passages, inter-
alia, one in which the universal
but subordinate role which mech-
anism plays in the universe is
specially dwelt on. He also in
the Introduction (2nd condensed
edition in 2 vols., 1896), intro-
duces the Lotzian term Value as
indicating the element of free
mental intelligence not to be found
in the Metabolism of the animal
organism. And yet it does not
seem as if Schäffle had appreciated
the true Lotzian position, which
implies an inevitable dualism, for
he was evidently drawn away into
a movement which thought took
at the time in the Neo-Kantian
school headed by F. A. Lange, who
aimed at establishing a monistic
view, and who, like so many others,
had an understanding only for one
side of Lotze's speculations and
none for his metaphysics (see
supra, vol. iii. pp. 562, 563). The
result is that Schäffle, like so many
others, has a difficulty in intro-
ducing the spiritual or mental
factor into his sociological scheme.
As this was pointed out by some
of his critics, who seem to have
taken offence at the extreme em-
ployment of biological analogies,
he wrote in the Preface to the
second edition: "After all even
the first edition never operated for
the purposes of the social problem
with the notion of the organic,
always considering the social body
as a living connection not of
a physiological but of a higher
independent mental order which
raises itself above the organic and
inorganic existences." And as a
proof of this he refers to a special
point of his doctrine, the discovery
of the family as the sustaining and
mentally improving factor in the
social body, i.e., as the sociological
unit. We have accordingly here,
as indicated in the text, an analogy
with Herbert Spencer's search in
his data of biology for the physio-
logical unit as the characteristic
factor of the living as contrasted
with the inanimate creation.
OF SOCIETY.

societies. To the latter attention had been drawn in France by the writings of A. Espinas. Schäffle also takes a step in advance of Spencer, inasmuch as he does not look upon the individual man as the social unit in every respect. The social unit, to him, is the family, which is entrusted with the function of the increase, preservation, and procreation of the personal elements of society. We are here reminded of the fact that Spencer already in his biology saw himself obliged to adopt the conception of "physiological units," the origin of which could, as little as their structure, be clearly brought back to their physical or molecular constitution. We have here again in both cases a proof of the necessity of starting, both in biology and sociology, with some given ensemble or "together" as defining the units out of which and the basis on which an insight into complicated organisms may be attained.

In France a philosopher of a different stamp has devoted much attention to the analogy between the animal and the social organism; but A. Fouillée (1838-1912) conceives the word "organism" in a larger sense than Spencer. He looks upon society as an organism of a higher order than the animal organism. In it the process of organisation in nature has risen to a higher level. The social organism has more life than the physical organism; for, what has been considered to be the miracle of Life, the "conspiration" towards a common end, is more evident in the social organism, where the common end is not only instinctively pursued by the different members but has become a conscious aim. The social organism has not only the mechanism corresponding to the
nervous system; but it has also conscious ideas or ideals such as those of right and justice, or of nationality, upon which social life and political life are founded. The biological view of society is, in fact, with Fouillé only one side of the truth; for his social philosophy is essentially an outcome and application of a psychological doctrine developed originally under the influence of the Platonic ideology,¹ between which and the modern theory of evolution Fouillé desires to effect a reconciliation. He does so by introducing his conception of the idées-forces, the doctrine that ideas, when once generated in the human mind, become active or propelling forces, desires requiring realisation. Through ideas a new agency is introduced into the development and progress of life.

Applied to the social problem which deals with the origin, the nature, and the aims of society, the reconciliation is effected by bringing the contractual (idealistic) theory of Rousseau ² into relation with the biological

¹ See supra, vol. iii. p. 286.
² In his most important work on the subject (‘La Science Sociale Contemporaine,’ 5th ed., 1910), the author deals exhaustively with the criticisms of French sociology, and especially of Rousseau’s theory of the contrat social, which have come from German (Hegel, Strauss, Bluntschli), English (Mill, Spencer, Maine), and French (Comte, Taine, Renan) thinkers, maintaining at the outset that social science must study human society from a twofold point of view, in its ideal and in its reality. It is especially the idealist school of Rousseau which took up the former point of view: it preceded the naturalistic school of recent times (p. 3). He expresses surprise that in ridiculing Rousseau’s theory critics like Bluntschli, Maine, Litttré, Taine, and Renan should have been guilty of a misunderstanding of the real meaning of that theory. “Autre est l’origine historique, autre est le fondement rationnel de l’État. La théorie du contrat social, bien interprétée, ne considère pas l’État tel qu’il a été, mais tel qu’il peut et doit devenir. J’étudie, disait lui-même Rousseau, les hommes tels qu’ils sont et les lois telles qu’elles peuvent être. Sans doute Rousseau, cédant à l’illusion commune du xviiiᵉ siècle sur les beautés de l’état de nature et sur les mœurs des temps primitifs, a pu raconter l’histoire de l’avenir comme si elle
était celle du passé; mais d'abord il faut voir là une critique indirecte
du présent; tout en parlant beaucoup des ‘sauvages,’ les écrivains
d'alors se préoccupaient surtout des générations à venir et de la civilisation
future” (p. 6).

En résumé, on peut et on doit admettre que la société est un vaste
organisme physiologique sans admettre pour cela qu'elle soit une
vaste individualité psychologique. Nous proposons donc de reconnaître
trois sortes d’organismes: les uns où la conscience est à la fois confuse
et dispersée, comme les zoophytes et lesannelés; les autres où elle
est claire et centralisée, comme les vertébrés supérieurs; les autres où
elle est claire et dispersée, comme les sociétés humaines. Dans le
premier genre d’organisme, la conscience réfléchie et le moi n’existent
encore nulle part; dans le second, les éléments n’ont pas de moi, mais
l’organisme en a un; dans le

... So long, however, as differences of thinking and willing exist—and these will probably never disappear—so long also those
who are strong of mind and will
will rule over the weaker ones, and
that, indeed, in the real interest of
the latter. . . . Hence, as Wundt
says, ideal anarchism is a psycholo-
logically and morally impossible
order of things."
M. Fouillée also grapples, in an original way, with the question of the unity, or the whole of society, as a higher organism. This is not to be found in an independent existence, but resides really in the diverse members, so that the difference which Spencer had noted as existing between the animal and social organisms is considered by Fouillée to mark a higher development: the decentralisation and diffusion of the mental principle in the form of ideas. For the social organism does not exist only as a regulative principle, in the way that Spencer conceives of the nervous system; it exists also as a productive force through ideas and their realisation in Industry, Art, and other intellectual creations.

So far as Spencer himself is concerned, though he laid great stress upon the biological analogies, his treatment of the social problem, like that of other problems such as those of biology, psychology, and ethics, rests, in addition, upon a more abstract structure of fundamental principles. How he gradually arrived at this is explained by himself in his Autobiography. Unlike Hegel and Comte, Spencer did

1 See notably vol. ii. pp. 165-169, where he shows also how the gradual growth and development of his own philosophical scheme is itself an example of Evolution; "the changes passed through by the conception of Evolution themselves conformed to the law of Evolution." Two points may be noted referring to Spencer's philosophy. The first is this, that although trained as an engineer and thus practically dealing with exclusively mechanical conditions, his philosophy starts from conceptions gained through natural history and biology, joining to these sociological notions and arriving only much later at an incorporation of inorganic, purely mechanical, processes. In 1858 he wrote: "Another general law of force has occurred to me since I saw you—viz., the universality of rhythm; which is a necessary consequence of the antagonism of opposing forces. This holds equally in the undulations of the ethereal medium, and the actions and reactions of social life" (vol. ii. p. 19). And
not in his early years come under the dominating influence of other philosophical thinkers. His indebtedness to others, so far as his special formula of Evolution is concerned, was only slight. Mill’s logic and Hamilton’s discussions bearing upon the relativity of knowledge are almost the only philosophical writings which seem to have had an important influence upon Spencer. So much greater was the influence of the exact, and still more of the natural, sciences. But, with Mill, Spencer holds that the problem of society is the most important philosophical problem of the day. He and his friend G. H. Lewes were the first to experience and proclaim the necessity of elaborating a reasoned creed which should take the place of the religious creed then prevalent in slightly varying forms among Anglicans, Nonconformists, and the members of the Scottish Churches. Through this practical tendency he worked together with the Positivism of Comte. And, on the other side, he unconsciously went about the performance about the same time he, according to his own account, inserted into his scheme the purely mechanical principles of “the indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion, the rhythm of motion and the law of the direction of motion. It became clear that all the changes to be interpreted are consequences of the ceaseless redistribution of matter and motion everywhere going on, and must conform to those ultimate physical principles which regulate this redistribution” (p. 168). The second point is emphasised by Spencer himself. The general mechanical substructure of his system met with little or no appreciation. It was, as he tells us, the earlier, shorter, and purely preliminary portion of ‘First Principles,’ his Agnosticism, which attracted attention. “The general theory which the body of the book elaborates was passed over or but vaguely indicated. And during the five-and-twenty years which have since elapsed [1887] I have nowhere seen a brief exposition of this general theory.” In fact, Spencer’s influence on philosophical thought is very much limited to his biological conception of Society and his Agnosticism as to ultimate problems. The uniting principle, however, deserves special attention. I shall revert to it in the following chapter.
of his task in a spirit similar to that of Hegel: he constructed a general scheme which should comprise and explain natural as well as mental, cosmic as well as human, phenomena. Uninfluenced probably by Leibniz, who introduced the idea of development into modern philosophy, he put this idea into a definite shape. In his 'First Principles' he elaborated a general scheme which he—in a manner analogous to that of Hegel—applied to the special objects and problems of physics, biology, and philosophy.

But the formula he started with was not purely logical as it was with Hegel. It was derived by a process of incomplete induction from a large mass of observed facts, and then generalised as applicable to the whole of existing things. This formula, which occurs with wearisome iteration all through Spencer's writings, can be expressed as the doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous, the tendency of every aggregate of elements and things to progress from a homogeneous but unconnected assemblage of similar units to a complex system of definite, differentiated, but connected parts. There is a continuous play of the processes of differentiation and integration. This formula finds nowhere a more suitable material for its application than in the phenomena of human society; the historical development of which, past, present, and future, is accordingly passed in review. This general scheme of Spencer's philosophy benefited much by the growing anthropological literature of the age, which deals with primitive man and savage races, and it was still more powerfully assisted by the theories of Lamarck,
von Baer, and Darwin on the genealogy of species and the results of adaptation to surrounding circumstances, the theory of the environment.

We can at once see where lay the difficulty in carrying out such a view as compared with that which presented itself in Hegel’s system. In the latter the moving principle was intellectual or spiritual, and the difficulty was to find a way from the logical, intellectual, or spiritual conceptions into the world of material things and events which form the playground of these mental agencies. Hegel’s system had, however, the advantage of selecting a formula which defines correctly a very common experience; this is the inevitable and spontaneous movement of thought which is not a lifeless mode of motion, but continually applied for a definite end and purpose. On the other side the formula of Spencer enabled him to group a vast number of physical and biological phenomena and processes into an intelligible synthetical view, but it did not permit him clearly to bring out what is the distinguishing characteristic of progress as compared with mere change. The question of the deeper meaning of things, of the ideal or spiritual essence, which played such an important part in the many historical researches which were inspired by the Hegelian view, has no place and receives no answer in Spencer’s philosophy.

But Spencer’s formula opened out a very large region and many lines of research, as was clearly seen by himself, and has nowhere been better stated than in his own words:

"Setting out, then, with this general principle, that
the properties of the units determine the properties of the aggregate, we conclude that there must be a Social Science expressing the relations between the two, with as much definiteness as the nature of the phenomena permits. Beginning with types of men who form but small and incoherent social aggregates, such a science has to show in what ways the individual qualities, intellectual and emotional, negative further aggregation. It has to explain how slight modifications of individual nature, arising under modified conditions of life, make somewhat larger aggregates possible. It has to trace out, in aggregates of some size, the genesis of the social relations, regulative and operative, into which the members fall. It has to exhibit the stronger and more prolonged social influences which, by further modifying the characters of the units, facilitate further aggregation with consequent further complexity of social structure. Among societies of all orders and sizes, from the smallest and rudest up to the largest and most civilised, it has to ascertain what traits there are in common, determined by the common traits of human beings; what less-general traits, distinguishing certain groups of societies, result from traits distinguishing certain races of men; and what peculiarities in each society are traceable to the peculiarities of its members. In every case it has for its subject-matter the growth, development, structure, and functions of the social aggregate, as brought about by the mutual actions of individuals whose natures are partly like those of all men, partly like those of kindred races, partly distinctive. These phenomena of social evolution have, of course, to
be explained with due reference to the conditions each society is exposed to—the conditions furnished by its locality and by its relations to neighbouring societies."¹

This passage shows sufficiently how much more comprehensive and many-sided is the view which Spencer takes of the social problem than that of Comte; how his principle, consisting, like Hegel's, in a continual action and reaction of two elementary processes—that of differentiation and that of integration—affords a great variety of combinations, illustrating and explaining many social and historical phenomena. With Hegel the two processes were the logical processes of affirmation and negation and the union of both in a higher affirmation. But what marks by far the greatest advance of Spencer's principle upon that of Hegel as well as upon that of Comte, is the introduction of specifically Darwinian ideas into his scheme. These ideas centre in the conception of descent or inheritance which Spencer does not limit to accidental and unexplained variations (as the extreme followers of Darwin do), but extends also to acquired characters (as the followers of Lamarck do). By accepting this he is able to do justice to the marked difference which exists between living organisms and lifeless structures; a difference which Comte had already emphasised, but which, with him, is characterised rather by a statical arrangement than by a dynamical process.

By thus introducing into his sociology the Darwinian or genealogical principle, Spencer is able to give a plausible account of those moral tendencies in human

¹ 'The Study of Sociology' 11th ed., 1884, p. 52.
nature which, before his time, had been traced either to intuitions or to higher commands, or lastly, to utilitarian purposes. Being inherited by the individual through a long line of ancestral growth these moral sentiments are intuitive or innate so far as the individual man is concerned. To him whose memory covers only a portion of his own experience moral precepts appear as commands; the combined memory of the race, however, would reveal them to be natural expedients useful for the preservation, multiplication, and improvement of the race.

This plausible combination of the utilitarian with the intuitional aspect has made a lasting and deep impression on recent ethical theory, as it has likewise done in the theory of knowledge, giving in both cases a fresh meaning to the a priori or innate principle which plays such an important part, e.g., in Kant's mental and moral philosophy. Whilst the importance given to it through Darwinian speculation both in this country and abroad is undeniable, its value as a philosophical explanation has been much exaggerated. As little as Darwin's biological theory gives an account of the genesis of species, being really concerned only with their descent or genealogy, as little does the evolutionist theory of morality give a satisfactory explanation of its origin. This is thrown back into a remote and shadowy past. The older ethical theories which dealt primarily with the moral criterion or with the fundamental distinction of good and evil are superseded by a historical exposition, showing how moral ideas have in course of time been changed and upon what circumstances these
changes depend. The extreme rigidity of Kant's categorical imperative has been abandoned, giving rise to a tendency in the direction of indefiniteness in moral theory and leading inevitably—as it seems to many—to laxity in practice. Before dealing more fully with this important ethical tendency of modern sociology, it may be useful to summarise in a few words what the Nineteenth Century has, so far as we have seen, accomplished in dealing with the social problem.

And first, we may note that this has been treated in two distinct interests. The one is purely scientific, taking this term not in the sense in which it has been used in this country and in France, but in the wider sense prevalent in Germany, where it denotes investigations by any suitable method of any phenomenon with the sole object of ascertaining its nature. The other interest is practical, the object being to gain a basis for social reform; and this, either in the more limited sense of improving the laws and customs of an existing order of things—such was, in the main, the aim of the older school of English social and political philosophers—or with the more ambitious object of a fundamental reorganisation of the whole fabric of human society. With these two interests in view, placing either the one or the other in the foreground, we have three tolerably distinct sociological theories.

The first is that view which places the idea of humanity in the foreground, conceiving this as an intellectual and spiritual principle which lies at the foundation of culture and civilisation, permeating and gradually transforming the natural and cruder forms of
earlier societies. The beginnings of this view are to be found in the writings of Herder, but it has had its most influential exponent in Hegel. Though originally merely a speculation, it found both a theoretical and a practical application; the former in the philosophy of history and in the ideal treatment of the historical narrative; the latter through the position which Hegel took up to the political questions of the day, of the age and state in which he lived.

The second is the philosophy of Auguste Comte, in which sociology, as a special region of research, for the first time receives full recognition. It was prepared by the suggestive but abortive attempts in the direction of social reform which followed in the wake of the French Revolution. This sociological view has two distinct characteristics. It is based upon a philosophy of history, illustrating, in the main, an intellectual feature of human progress as expressed in the Law of the Three States; its second characteristic is, that it takes for granted, as an empirical fact, the existence of two tendencies in human nature, the egoistic and the altruistic, of which the latter, either naturally and unconsciously or assisted by intellectual knowledge and control, is gradually gaining the ascendancy over the former.

The third important contribution to the solution of the social problem is the philosophy of evolution usually identified with the name of Herbert Spencer, but probably more indebted to the introduction of Darwinian ideas than is usually admitted. This view regards social relations, following upon biological and
cosmical phenomena, as subject to one and the same rule of change. In it society is considered to be a higher organism. Explanations and illustrations of social conditions and of their past, present, and future changes, are mostly derived by analogy from biological phenomena. Professedly dealing with the origin of social conditions, among which the ethical receive most attention, it in reality deals only with their genealogy and descent, leaving their origin, as it does the origin of life and consciousness, unexplained.

These three sociological views, the ideal of Hegel, the positivist of Comte, and the evolutional of Spencer, have each, to some extent, a national character. They also agree in this, that they are based upon a close and minute study of empirical and historical phenomena, carried on in a methodical manner by secluded thinkers who devoted their lives to speculation, and came only slightly, or not at all, into contact with the actual ordering and the labours of the social organism.

III.

Whilst Hegel, Comte, and Spencer carried on their secluded speculations, forming important schools in social philosophy, a fourth movement had arisen and was rapidly gaining widespread influence. In contrast to the three movements just referred to, it was not national but international, and it was not theoretical and methodical but eminently practical. As Spencer had usurped and monopolised the larger term of Evolution (used already by
Herder and Comte) to denote a special form of mechanical development, so this new movement, on its part, professed to deal with the social problem *par excellence* and termed itself Socialism. Karl Marx (1818-1883, of Jewish descent) may be considered as the leader and centre of this movement. It initiated and led what we may term the Industrial Revolution in recent times. It has attained international importance; all the three countries in which we are mainly interested, together with most of the other European countries, have contributed to it.

For a long time the theories of Karl Marx received little attention from the academic leaders of philosophical thought in Germany. He was known only as an agitator, a demagogue and a revolutionary. Not till the ideas which he put forward had found their way into wide circles, including not only the middle but also the working classes, did the academic and learned class  

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1 The origin and growth of Socialism in Germany and the neglect with which it was treated by teachers of law as well as of economics at the Universities, is lucidly explained by Prof. Schmoller in an Essay on Fichte's social tract 'Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat,' to be more fully referred to hereafter (*see infra*, p. 547). Prof. Schmoller points to the abstract and rigid treatment of the two sciences, of the science of jurisprudence on the one side and of that of economics on the other, which, whilst attempting to construct logical systems, had lost touch with actual existing social conditions. The latter had in recent times changed and progressed enormously under the doctrines of the Revolution (France) on the one side and those of industrialism (England) on the other. "Towards these [movements] political economy and jurisprudence remained, so far as their foremost representatives were concerned, silent, unappreciative, and negative. This produced among philanthropists, in the face of the widespread misery of the masses, and latterly also among thinkers who recognised the deeper conditions of the modern age, a literary and political movement which, in opposition to the traditional, legal, and economic notions of the schools, aimed at a new social doctrine ... this new doctrine is what we call Socialism, which in the beginning launched out into erroneous excrescences in the same degree as it was removed from the existing sciences or ignored and despised
OF SOCIETY.

537

take notice of his writings. In this respect he was treated in the same way as other extramural thinkers, such as Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, v. Hartmann, and Nietzsche. Nevertheless, he is an intellectual offspring of the Hegelian school, and the fact that he found no place at the German universities contributed probably to the popularity and practical effect of his teaching, as he was both influenced by the French school of theoretical and by the English school of practical social reformers and philanthropists. He inherited some of Saint-Simon's ideas, and he learnt quite as much from theoretical and practical economists in this country.

The position of Karl Marx in the history of thought 1 by them" (loc. cit., p. 53). See also Schmoller's notice of the seventh posthumous edition of an important work of Friedrich List (1789-1846), who may be considered as one of the first among German economists to point to the newer and freer lines upon which economic questions would have to be treated (ibid., pp. 102-106); cf. also supra, p. 64 n.

1 It does not appear as if either Marx or Engels, or other famous representatives of socialist doctrines, such as Rodbertus (1805-1875) and Lasalle (1824-1864), have introduced any new conception into philosophical thought; and histories of philosophy, in consequence, take little or no note of their voluminous writings. There is, however, no doubt that latterly philosophers of distinction have found it necessary to subject their doctrines to methodical criticism, exhibiting the proportion of truth as well as the many exaggerations in their psychological and historical theories. A very full discussion of Marxism will be found in Dr Barth's volume, already quoted (pp. 303-364), and to this I wish specially to refer my readers. Particularly interesting for a history of Thought is the account, given by the author, of the origins of Marx's doctrine, at the end of his critical refutation of the same. He summarises the results of his inquiry under four heads. The first prominent influence which produced Marxism came from Capitalism, which ruled supreme at the time, especially in this country. The second point refers to the timely reaction against Hegelian idealism in Germany, represented prominently by Feuerbach's naturalism. The third point is the monistic tendency of thought inherited from the Hegelian school. In the place of an idealistic, a naturalistic principle was introduced; the prevailing economic interests are supposed to govern historical development exclusively. The fourth influence is purely political: "Marx and Engels were social democrats, i.e., they aimed at a constitution of Society in which universal equality should rule together with a common ownership of the means of production."
can thus only be estimated if we are acquainted with all the different aspects which the social problem presented towards the middle of the century, such as have come under review in the earlier portion of this chapter.

Of all the social philosophers and reformers of the last century he probably represents the most equal combination of theoretical with practical knowledge. He conceived of the social problem in one of its most important and most practical aspects, and he retains the German propensity for deductive and systematic reasoning. Thus, he believes in the dialectic both in nature and in history: but the former is not the dialectic of Schelling and Hegel, but the dialectic of the exact sciences; and the latter does not consist in the unfolding of a logical idea, but in the practical impulses and motives which live in the minds of acting personalities and of the masses. Like many others who inherited Hegel's dialectic habit of thought, he turned away from the abstract generalisations of Hegel. To define the principle of movement in nature or history as the Idea or Spirit, appeared to him too general. In its generality it indeed comprises everything and yet explains nothing. We must descend to definite notions if we wish to make any progress in any special department or to solve any special problem.

Thus Marx, in his social philosophy, takes up one definite aspect or idea as others have done in other regions of thought: and he, like others, exaggerates and pushes his principle to an extreme. What this principle is, which should explain to him the historical development of human society, and define, as well as
solve, the social problem of the age, he probably learnt in the school of Saint-Simon and by opposition to some of Saint-Simon's followers, notably to Proudhon. But he gained in precision by studying the works of Adam Smith, and notably those of his followers, Malthus and Ricardo. From Saint-Simon he took over the conception that the moving force in modern society is industrial and commercial. And the writings of Adam Smith and Ricardo taught him that among the industrial forces the leading force is,—not that of the capitalist—but the interests of labour. If Saint-Simon's social philosophy exalts the industrial middle class in opposition to the nobility and clergy, Marx goes a step further and urges the interests of the labouring class and the proletariat, i.e., of the fourth estate as against those of the third estate, the bourgeoisie. But Marx does not follow altogether in the footsteps of Saint-Simon or of most of his followers. He does not introduce into his social speculations that dualism which is so characteristic of Saint-Simon and after him of Comte.

In Saint-Simon we have indeed a clear recognition of the economic and industrial problems of the age; but we have also the distinct enunciation of what we may call the ideal factor in the history of progress and civilisation. Though he opposes the spiritual hierarchy and tyranny of former ages he proclaims a new Christianity and religion which is to control society.

In Comte we have not only a clear enunciation of the two principles which actuate human conduct, viz., egoism and altruism; but we have, especially in his
later writings and in his scheme of positive polity, the endeavour to re-establish an intellectual and spiritual control of human affairs. With this interest clearly before him he looks back with admiration on the Middle Ages, where such a control existed, and sympathises with the endeavours of the reactionary school of social politics, represented by de Maistre, to bring back again a spiritual hierarchy. Only with him the spiritual power is to be intellectual and based upon science, and not theocratic and based on revelation.

Marx came from the school of Hegel and inherited the monistic and systematic tendencies of that school. He came early under the influence of Feuerbach. From him he had learnt to look upon religion and the ideal forces in human nature and history as mere idealisations of natural or purely material processes, which have no independent existence and no influence except as logical abstractions. Coming, therefore, in contact with the French school of social philosophers he, following his monistic tendency of thought, discarded the ideal elements in social life as merely secondary and derived and fastened with so much the more tenacity on the naturalistic side. To him history, notably modern history, was entirely a product of the economic factors of progress. And this conception he was led to substantiate and develop further when, through his friend, Engels (1820-1895)—who had forestalled him in the study of British political economy,—he became acquainted with the writings of Adam Smith and his followers.

Now we have seen that with Adam Smith political economy formed only a province in the larger region
of mental and moral philosophy. There was no intention to exhaust the philosophical problem as a whole, nor even the social problem, by discussion of its purely economic and industrial aspects. In common with the whole of the Scottish school of philosophy Adam Smith accepted the common-sense view, that there exists in human affairs an over-ruling Providence and Divine guidance. In this great scheme the individual or selfish interest played an important part, and it was the aim of the 'Wealth of Nations' to investigate how this desire for self-improvement would and should act if liberated from the numerous fetters and restrictions to which it had, in the course of modern history, been artificially subjected. Some of Adam Smith's followers in England isolated the economic problem still further, and treated it as a special subject which could be dealt with apart from any regard for its intricate connection with other, notably the moral and religious, problems. They lived in an age and country that had achieved much in practical industry by the division of labour, and in science by an exclusive use of the analysing and dissecting, combined with the artificially synthesising, methods of thought. Looking only at the great successes which these methods had attained in physics and chemistry and neglecting the opposite tendency, that which Comte had significantly termed the esprit d'ensemble, the consideration of things in their natural "together," they furnished a good example of that "ignoble métaphysique which pretends to study the general laws of a material order by isolating it from every other order."

The two principal representatives of this school of
economics, generally considered as the founders of the "orthodox" political economy, are Malthus and Ricardo. They established what have been termed the iron laws of economic science. Notably through Malthus' "law of population," and still more through Ricardo's "theory of rent and wages," the conception of an inexorable fate governing the industrial conditions of society and pressing hard upon the labouring masses was introduced and widely adopted by the extreme school of political economists in this country.

As the statistical school elaborated the idea of the "homme moyen," so the economic school of Ricardo elaborated that of the "homme économique." In the former the human being was looked upon merely as a unit, in the latter merely as a machine. Economics were regarded merely as a theory of wealth, and the three factors upon which, according to Adam Smith, wealth depended—viz., rent, wages, and profit—were examined by Ricardo much to the disadvantage of labour, which nevertheless was admitted to lie at the foundation of the whole social fabric.

Though neither Malthus nor Ricardo was personally deficient in sympathy and kindly feeling towards others, the fact that they, especially the latter, attempted to reduce economics to the treatment of a few isolated problems, amenable to exact and deductive reasoning, provoked in those who took a larger and more generous view of the social problem, a violent opposition.

The "orthodox" political economy was already, during the lifetime of John Stuart Mill, who adopted it with certain mitigating qualifications, violently denounced in
the literary movement of which Carlyle was the great representative. But it was there denounced more in the interests of the old-fashioned ideals, of the eternal verities and the higher culture, than from the point of view of the suffering and labouring classes. A much more formidable protest "against such a picture of industrial life as a mere sordid struggle of conflicting interests" arose in the ranks of modern socialism of which Karl Marx was the centre, and it is accordingly quite natural that he should have fastened upon the Ricardian theories as the basis of his industrial philosophy. Admitting that these iron laws and this inexorable fate represent correctly the tyranny of modern society, notably in its most advanced in-

1 The merit of having from a philanthropic and humanitarian point of view opposed the orthodox political economy of Adam Smith's followers — notably of Ricardo (1772-1823) in this country and of Jean Baptiste Say (1767-1832) in France—belongs to the historian Sismondi (1773-1842). He asked the question which he put in conversation with Ricardo: "What! is wealth then everything? are men absolutely nothing?" He occupies an intermediate position between the laissez faire school which believed in an overruling natural or Divine justice and the modern 'school of self-help,' of which the Socialists are the extreme exponents, and he also forms the transition from the philosophical or mathematical treatment of economic problems (Ricardo) to the historical treatment which is the characteristic feature of scientific economics in Germany with Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) as the leader. Here it is interesting to remark that, though an historian himself, Sismondi did not adopt the historical method in his economic treatises. Historians of political economy, such as Ingram, and of sociology, such as Dr Ludwig Stein, both trace the change of aspect which begins with Sismondi's writings in France and those of List in Germany to an actually much deeper-going change of thought — namely, from the implied theological presuppositions of Adam Smith to the purely anthropological of the modern age. In Germany this change is strikingly brought out in Feuerbach's philosophy. Dr Stein, in an impressive passage ('Die Soziale Frage,' p. 320), describes as the characteristic of the present age the Soziale Welt-schmerz, the intense sorrow over the misery of the masses, and he maintains that this has become intensified since the customary belief in an overruling Divine Providence has more or less disappeared.
dustrial developments as they existed in this and threatened his own country, Karl Marx saw the remedy only in a complete political subversion of the existing order. With him the social became a political question. He did not examine, as others were beginning to do, whether the premises upon which Malthus and Ricardo based their deductions were correct. He took them as established; illustrating them merely by a philosophy of history which, though lacking entirely in originality, succeeded nevertheless in bringing home to the popular mind the necessity of a great industrial revolution.

While Marx did little or nothing to solve the philosophical problem of human society, he nevertheless influenced social philosophy in two directions. He worked into the hands of the historical school of political economy and jurisprudence, which in Germany had already collected much material wherewith to oppose the theoretical and deductive school which for a time ruled supreme in this country. And emanating, as it does, from the philosophy of Hegel, of which it forms a kind of materialistic paraphrase, the socialist doctrine of Marx is nevertheless the only sociological theory which has had important and far-reaching practical results, and this mainly because it is narrowly economic and industrial.

For we must recognise that the changes which have taken place in social ideas and in social order in all civilised countries in the course of the nineteenth century are enormous, and that the two main causes which have brought them about are the progress and applica-
tion of science on the one side and the growth of what we may term the popular spirit on the other; the interest taken in the life, the government, and the organisation of the masses. In most countries, not only in Europe but also in America and in the East, population has greatly increased, giving rise to discussions started in the beginning of the century by Malthus in his 'Theory of Population.' In all civilised countries, without exception, the progress of science and its application to the Arts and Industries has greatly changed the occupations of the masses, creating a large and increasing industrial, in the place of the agricultural, population which was predominant in former centuries. Society in consequence has acquired quite new and distinct features which either did not exist or were not conspicuous in former ages. Of all objects of research, of all natural phenomena, society is therefore the least stable. The new science of sociology, which professes to deal with its subject in the same way as other sciences have dealt with their subjects, is confronted by a difficulty which is quite peculiar to it. We need only name the subjects of the other sciences most nearly related to sociology, such as psychology and biology, in order to recognise that the latter have the advantage of dealing with organisms and phenomena which—at least during historic ages of which we possess written records—have not materially changed. They can accordingly point to some average standard, some mean around which individual variations, be they normal or pathological, oscillate. Such a normal mean or average
condition of things does not exist at present in any society.

Everywhere we find smaller or larger developments progressing slowly or rapidly, verging sometimes almost upon revolution and anarchy, but in every case presenting problems which claim immediate attention. Even where constitutional questions do not exist, or are at least not pressing, we have the great labour question in its many aspects, not to mention a variety of other problems, commercial, legal, fiscal, educational, &c. Confronted with this difficulty, the absence of any generally acknowledged normal condition or standard, it is not surprising that many social philosophers and reformers have thought it necessary to construct for themselves an ideal standard wherewith to measure or whereon to remodel existing social conditions.

In most cases such models of social organisation have not stood the test of criticism but have been speedily relegated to the region of romance and unreality. There are, nevertheless, a few examples of reasoning on such lines which have produced even in modern times a marked impression. More as samples than with any attempt towards completeness, I mention two of them—they both belong to the sociological or economic literature of Germany. The first came from that German thinker who, in the beginning of the century, had probably the greatest popular influence, and who, of all the leading German philosophers, took the greatest part in the national and political life of his country. This was Fichte.

It is indeed remarkable how Fichte combines through-
out his whole career as an academic and popular teacher an equal love for the most abstract reasoning and for the practical application of his ideas. The two subjects which evidently interested him most were the highest form of a science which should furnish the foundation and principles of all other scientific reasonings, a kind of first philosophy or organon of thought; and in the second place the foundation of practical philosophy which to him presents two distinct but equally important aspects, that of the Right and that of the Good. To both problems, the abstract one and the practical one, he continually recurs. Not only among German thinkers, but perhaps even among European thinkers, he is the first to grasp the practical problem in its full social meaning and gravity, and in the various aspects which it has since presented, the theoretical, the historical, and the actual. Also, what is still more remarkable considering the surroundings in which he lived, he recognised the importance of industrialism in the modern state. Among the long line of writings, of popular addresses and academic lectures, which he devotes to the social problem, there stands in the middle a short tract entitled 'The Closed Industrial State' [1800]. Of this title he gives a short preliminary explanation as follows: 1 "The juridical state is formed by a closed number of persons who live under the same laws and the same highest controlling power. This number of persons is now [i.e. in this tract] to be limited to mutual commerce and

1 The tract was published towards the end of the year 1800 as an appendix to the 'Rechtslehre,' and is reprinted in the 'Collected Works,' vol. iii. pp. 387-513. The extract given in the text is printed on the reverse side of the title-page.
industry among themselves, and every one who does not stand under the same rule and the same power is to be excluded from any part in that intercourse. They would then form an industrial state, and indeed a closed industrial state in the same way as they now form a closed juridical state."

He begins by distinguishing between the ideal and the real state, meaning by the former that which is constructed upon pure notions of right; by the latter such a state as is practicable under existing conditions. He also maintains that it is the object of politics and the task of politicians to convert gradually the actual and existing state into the ideal state; he proceeds to narrow down his task to the problem: to decide what rules should govern commercial intercourse in the ideal state, to compare with it the rules or customs in force at present, and to determine how these can be made to give place to the former. He closes the introduction with the remark that—"all good things of which man is destined to partake must be produced by his own art in conformity with science: this is his vocation. Nature provides him with nothing but the possibility to apply Art. In government as well as other-where; everything that can must be brought under clear conceptions; we must cease to leave anything that can be calculated to blind fate with a hope that this will turn out well."\(^1\)

It is to be noted that Fichte's speculations were much influenced by those of Rousseau, with whom he shares the opinion that society and the state depend upon a contract. But he also witnessed the extravagances

\(^1\) *Loc. cit.*, p. 398.
which, largely under the sanction of Rousseau's theories, were perpetrated by his followers during the succeeding phases of the French Revolution. He himself published nearly all his political writings at a time when Germany was threatened by the Napoleonic invasion, and when little opportunity was given to carry out in practice any of the theoretical schemes which he or others might be constructing. There is, however, one direction in which Fichte's activity found an outlet and through which he left a mark upon his generation and nation.

Discouraged by the restrictions which the French rule imposed upon every political activity, especially in Prussia, where he had found a new sphere of action after he had been expelled from Jena, he still saw one direction in which free development was permitted and possible. This was the great work of national education: its importance forms likewise the final conclusion at which he arrived in his systematic political writings. He had there stated that the new and better order of society which he had in view must be based upon a moral uplifting and intellectual enlightenment of the age; you must first create good men before you can create good citizens or a good order of society. He laid great stress not so much upon separate states and the principle of nationality, which has since played such a great part in the politics of Germany and of some other European countries, as upon that of the People; meaning by this term that aggregate of human beings which is held together by a common language. A People has, he says, an individual mind in so far as it has an individual language. Applied to the age
and country in which Fichte lived, this view gave to the German element in European history a wide, almost a cosmopolitan, meaning and destiny. It generates, what Fichte calls, a patriotism of a higher order, more generous and large-hearted than the ordinary civic love for existing laws and constitution. The latter might in ordinary times be sufficient, but in times of great danger such as Fichte himself witnessed, "one has to decide under conditions which have no precedent, and we feel then the need of an internal life which has its source within itself."¹

Though Fichte intended his Tract to be a specimen of a treatise on political science, which he proposed to publish, it had really no practical influence at the time. His influence became important and even phenomenal only when, in addition to the legal and the economic problems of practical politics, he devoted himself to the exposition of the cultural and educational functions of the State. But, as has been recognised by recent historians, Fichte's economic tract of 1800 contains really the true socialistic principle in contradistinction to the mistaken socialism which has become a popular cry in modern times. Both the genuine and the spurious socialism aim at a remedy of existing social evils, notably at an elevation and education of the masses and a juster distribution of happiness. But whilst the popular socialism of the day only too frequently considers happiness to mean enjoyment, the principle of Fichte's socialism is

¹ See 'Collected Works,' vol. vii., 'Reden an die deutsche Nation,' p. 336.
that of restless striving, as indeed the whole of his system is based upon the metaphysical and ethical principle that the true and ultimate reality is activity and not repose, an unlimited striving, not enjoyment and quietism, not a negation but an assertion of the good will. We may thus say that the principle of this genuine socialism is the sanctity of labour and the right to work, and not merely a pleasurable existence, whether this pleasure be found in the region of the physical (sensual) or of the higher (intellectual and aesthetic) enjoyments.¹

¹ I shall have another opportunity of referring to the prophetic character of Fichte's philosophy, and how this explains the renewed interest which has been taken in the works of this highly abstract philosopher by prominent thinkers at the present day. It must here suffice to associate his name in this respect with that of Goethe, and to quote the words with which Prof. Schmoller closes his Essay already referred to (loc. cit., p. 99 sqq.). "It is remarkable that another of the German intellectual heroes of that age, who otherwise differed so much from Fichte, trod very similar paths. This was Goethe in the 'Wanderjahre.' Here also an ideal society is depicted, an attempt is made to solve, from an ethical point of view, the great problems of labour, property, family, education, individuality, association, publicity, in the face of the egoism of the age. The great thinker and the great poet are alike impressed by problems—unsolved and scarcely dreamt of by professional science—which refer to new forms of the moral life, resulting from the great transformation, especially of economic conditions. Both see in moral education of the individual, in his partaking of the life of the community, in all forms of association, in culture and divided spheres of labour, in renunciation and devoted work, the necessary counterpart to economic developments. Both see in opposition to French socialism the foundations of social welfare in secure, though limited, personal property and in the sanctity of married life. It is hardly possible to imagine two more different personalities: here the stoical unbending thinker who in ideal flight bears in his bosom the fate of his age and nation; who, discarding the realities of the world, aspires to subject, from the depths of his sublime but austere character, his age to his high moral standard, creating the world and its philosophy with one sublime stroke of reasoning; there the sensitive realistic poet who knows how to follow the secret pulsations of life, who, as no other, has personally watched it in the cottage of the labourer, in the workshop of the tradesman, in the house of the citizen, and the palace of princes; who has himself often—
The abstract method which Fichte followed was adopted, though probably without any distinct and conscious connection, by a more practical thinker who has made a lasting impression upon one distinct side of political economy. This was J. H. von Thünen,\(^1\)

though unjustly—been accused of realistic epicureanism and egoistic exclusiveness. Both so different are yet at one in their comprehensive view of modern life: unclear in single things, full of error and ignorance in detail, their intuitive genius impels them to anticipate the great contrasts of our society, to enter a protest against narrow egoism, and to claim a moral foundation and renovation also of the economic structure. If the poet in his telling description in his 'Wanderjahre,' introduces the chase, fishery and agriculture, commerce and industry, art and science as a great organism; if he preaches the sanctity of landed property and of the family, a moral education, a fixed professional activity and free association, self-restraint and moral subordination, but as the crown of all, a free union for all interests of humanity—if he holds up this picture as an ethical mirror to his age, he is as wrong in single details as he is right in his fundamental conception, just like Fichte. We may say of both what Rosenkranz says of Goethe: the detail may be criticised without destroying its value; it is petty to stickle at the single oddities and contradictions and to overlook the general truth. Both stand in grand prophetic conception above the limited micrology of the professional science of their age. They rise beyond the dim oil lamps of common life like shining rockets, marking the future course in large strokes though the detail remains unclear; and this is the vocation of the genius who, with intuitive glance, understands his age and strides in front of it."

\(^1\) Died 1850. Von Thünen was one of the first agriculturalists in Germany, schooled first in the crude traditional, then in the rational methods of Thaer, and latterly scientifically at the University of Göttingen. A native of Oldenburg, he married a Mecklenburg lady, became tenant-farmer in 1806, and purchased in 1810 the estate of Tellow which, through his writings, has become famous. His biography has been written by Schuhmacher (1868). The historian of German economic science, Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894), has devoted an interesting chapter to von Thünen, who, like Liebig from a different point of view, may be considered a pioneer in modern German agriculture. Scientific economists have been proud to call themselves pupils of von Thünen, among them no one more so than the eminent professor of Economics, Heinrich von Helferich (died 1892: Göttingen and Munich). In this country Ingram has drawn attention to von Thünen's unique position: von Thünen was strongly impressed with "the danger of a violent conflict between the middle class and the proletariat, and studied earnestly the question of wages, which he was one of the first to regard habitually, not merely as the price of the commodity labour, but as the means
an independent landed proprietor, born in the north-west of Germany, and occupied during the greater part of his life with the management of an estate in Mecklenburg, one of the independent sovereign states of North Germany.

With a natural bent towards abstract and mathematical reasoning, and possessed of great practical experience and influence, he certainly carried out, more than Fichte himself did, the injunction of the latter not to leave things which could be calculated to a fatal hazard. Born in 1783, he published, after prolonged studies and experience, his principal work, with the characteristic title, 'The Isolated State with respect to Agriculture and Economics' (1826). The title further indicates that the book deals with the influence which price of corn, fertility of the soil, and taxes have upon agriculture. In order to investigate the relation and influence of these different factors he adopts a method similar to that used in the mechanical sciences, as, e.g., in physical astronomy, where the motion of cospherical bodies, subject to a definite law, is first calculated upon the supposed simplest arrangement, and then corrected by introducing perturbations such as are to be met with actually in nature.

of subsistence of the mass of the community. He arrived . . . at a formula which expresses the amount of natural wages . . . To this formula he attributed so much importance that . . . it led him to establish on his estate a system of participation by the labourers in the profits of farming, of which some account will be found in Mr Sedley Taylor's 'Profit-Sharing between Capital and Labour' (1884). Von Thünen deserves more attention than he has received in England; both as a man and as a writer he was eminently interesting and original, and there is much in his works that is awakening and suggestive.” (Ingram, 'History of Political Economy,' 1893, pp. 187-8.)
The historian of German economics, Wilhelm Roscher, characterises Thünen's method as follows: "Thünen's abstraction has really a great resemblance to the experiments of the natural philosopher. In actual practice every economical fact comes about by the co-operation of many and various factors. Thünen then isolates in his mind that factor the peculiar nature of which he desires to investigate. He considers all other factors to be for the time at rest and invariable, and he inquires how a change of more or less in the factor under examination would act. This procedure he considers to be the very kernel of his writings. The results may be incomplete, but they are never erroneous. Also they can be completed by gradually submitting all the other factors to the same process, which points to a number, indeed to an immeasurable number, of investigations; as when with the use of a more powerful telescope nebulous masses are resolved into groups of stars, revealing at the same time new nebulae."¹

Thünen has been compared with Ricardo in England, whose writings benefited similarly by his practical, but much more one-sided, experience as a banker. Both thinkers were influenced by the writings of Adam Smith, but Thünen does not seem to have been acquainted with Ricardo's writings till he had independently and from a different side arrived at a similar theory of rent.

The love of calculation and of mathematical formulæ in dealing with matters which can only in a forced

¹ Wilhelm Roscher, 'Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutsch-land' (München, 1874, p. 882).
manner be subjected to such treatment reminds us of the mathematical calculations in Herbart’s Psychology. It has been maintained that what is good both in Herbart’s Psychology and in Thünen’s Economics could probably have been arrived at without the abstract and frequently repellent formalism of their principal works.¹ In addition to making this general use of the mathematical method, Thünen has immortalised himself by attempting to give an algebraical formula for what he terms the “natural wages of labour.”

In order to arrive at this he eliminates one factor, that of rent, by moving the supposed farm in his isolated state to such a distance from the market, which is situated in the centre, that the carriage of the produce would be equal to the rent of land situated in the im-

¹ A similar criticism has been levelled by Ingram against two writers, both of much originality. The first is Augustin Cournot (mentioned already; supra, vol. iii. p. 385 n.), “who with competent knowledge of both subjects, endeavoured to apply mathematics to the treatment of economic questions. His treatise entitled ‘Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses’ was published in 1838. . . . Notwithstanding Cournot’s just reputation as a writer on mathematics, the ‘Recherches’ made little impression. . . . His pages abound in symbols representing unknown functions, the form of the function being left to be ascertained by observation of facts. . . . Cournot published in 1863, with the title ‘Principes de la Théorie des Richesses,’ a work of great ability,” in which “the mathematical method is abandoned. . . . The author admits that the public has always shown a repugnance to the use of mathematical symbols in economic discussion, and . . . he acknowledges that a grave danger attends their use. . . . His practical conclusion is that mathematical processes should be employed only with great precaution, or even not employed at all, if the public judgment is against them, for this judgment, he says, has its secret reasons almost always more sure than those which determine the opinions of individuals” (loc. cit., p. 180). The other writer is W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882). “The application of mathematics in the higher sense to economics must necessarily fail, and we do not think that it succeeded in Jevons’ hands . . . and the expectation of being able by means of it to subject economic doctrine to a mathematical method will be found illusory” (p. 233).
mediate neighbourhood of the market. He thus gets a condition under which the cost of production is composed of only two factors, that of labour and that of capital (or accumulated savings of labour). He then seeks a formula under which the wages of labour would stand in a compound ratio to the cost at which labour can be maintained and the value of the produce gained by this labour in conjunction with the use of capital (or savings of labour). He then calls the natural wage of labour that amount which is the geometrical mean of those two factors. Of this algebraical expression of a reasoning which is in general correct but can probably not be brought down to a rigid formula, he was nevertheless so proud that he ordered it to be inscribed upon his tombstone. According to his own statement it assisted him in arriving at most important conclusions; but he admits that to make his theory really satisfactory he would have to find the relation between the capital employed and the produce resulting from its employment, and he admits having laboured for twenty years in trying to find this but without success.

The pleasure which von Thünen derived from this algebraical formula reminds us again of Fechner's enthusiasm over his psycho-physical law. Though the latter is supported by experience in various directions more than the formula of Thünen, both are doubtless instances where the value of mathematical precision has been exaggerated.

I have mentioned Fichte's tract and Thünen's formula only as extreme examples of the application to social problems of an abstract method such as has been success-
fully used in the natural and especially the physical and mechanical sciences. Both through the use of such methods and still more by dealing with special features of social life, sociology has established itself as a separate and definite science in the same way as biology and psychology had done respectively in the beginning and the middle of the Nineteenth Century. The special investigations are extremely valuable and interesting, and have tended to attract a number of industrious and successful workers, but they do not contribute much, if anything, to the solution of the social problem as a whole. As little as physics, chemistry, or the theory of descent have enabled biologists to define the essence of life, though they have taught us much about known as well as previously unknown properties of living matter; as little as the discoveries in psycho-physics have brought us nearer to an answer to the question as to the essence of the soul or conscious principle; as little have these special investigations of social phenomena helped us to answer the question, What is the essence of human society? But here we have, as in biology, various attempts to define the whole phenomenon by laying undue stress upon one or other of its features. Some of these attempts are interesting and valuable.

Again, merely as a matter of example, but without any aim at completeness, I mention two of them.

1 The two thinkers in question are also representative of two opposite views in the treatment of social phenomena which we may term the psycho-physical and the psychological. In the concluding chapter of an interesting Essay by M. C. Bouglé, 'Les Sciences Sociales en Allemagne' (2nd ed., 1902), when contrasting French with German sociology, the author points to the suspicion with which, under the
which have attracted considerable attention; they both belong to French sociological literature. Though not so important as the theory of environment or milieu which, put forward already by Lamarck, was revived and applied to social problems by Taine, the investigations I refer to are nevertheless striking and original. They are "The Theory of Imitation" of Gabriel Tarde and "The Theory of the Division of Labour" of M. Durkheim.

Comte\(^1\) had already pointed to the importance of influence of Comte and in opposition to the Eclectic School, psychology was treated by French thinkers. At the same time he records that since psychology had been liberated from spiritualist metaphysics, a reaction had set in in favour of psychology, that it is recognised that spiritualism had rendered good service to sociology in showing that not all belonging to the mind could be explained by the motion of matter. "Ainsi de divers côtés, on travaille à rendre à la psychologie sa place au centre de la science de la société. Il semble, d'une façon générale, que les métaphores biologiques soient passées de mode et que la psychologie soit universellement regardée comme l'âme des sciences sociales" (p. 144).

\(^1\) In Leçons L. and LI. of the 'Philosophie Positive,' Comte deals at considerable length with the principle of the division or "repartition" of labour, referring to the Scottish School of thinkers (Ferguson, Adam Smith, and their French disciple, de Tracy) as having already emphasised this grand principle to which human society owes the most important attributes which distinguish it from other animal families. It is, however, to be noted that Comte takes a much wider view of this principle than did Adam Smith. Although the latter does use the term "co-operation," he does not lay the same stress upon it as Comte. The former regards it more as a means of securing greater efficiency and increasing the wealth of the community, whereas the latter considers the division of labour as a necessary condition for co-operation, producing what he terms "the solidarity of Society." The latter rests not on the sameness but on the diversity of the occupations of its units. Whilst the family represents these elementary units of society, they would remain only loosely connected, tending to break up, if through the diversity of occupations they did not become more and more dependent on each other. Thus it may be said that Comte anticipated, to a great extent, the importance of that cooperation which in the course of the nineteenth century has, in various forms, become such an important feature of social life. He has, at the same time, a very clear conception that such cooperation, or working together, is only possible and efficient under the guidance of superior intellects which rise above, and organise, the mediocre performances of the masses. The latter is a truth
the principle of the division of labour, "that great principle to which human society owes the most important attributes which raise it above such aggregates as we find in certain animal families." And he looked forward to a time when through "the condensation of our species and the ever-increasing competition in a given space the division of labour would be driven to such a point that each individual would be employed according to his special ability." This idea has been taken up and further developed by M. Durkheim with the assistance of the evolutionist ideas introduced by Darwin and Spencer.\(^1\) It acquires with him a higher

which the leaders of social reform are only tardily recognising. (See Ingram, *loc. cit.,* p. 227.) "It is quite singular how little... the function of the **entrepreneur** is taken into account. Bagehot objects to the phrase 'wages of superintendence' commonly used to express his reward, as suggesting altogether erroneous ideas of the nature of his work, and well describes the large and varied range of his activity and usefulness, and the rare combination of gifts and acquirements which go to make up the perfection of his equipment. It can scarcely be doubted that a foregone conclusion in favour of the system of [so-called] cooperation has sometimes led Economists to keep these important considerations in the background. They have been brought into due prominence of late in the treatises of Profs. Marshall and F. A. Walker, who, however, have scarcely made clear, and certainly have not justified, the principle on which the amount of the remuneration of the **entrepreneur** is determined."

\(^1\) Already long before the time of Darwin, the celebrated French zoologist, Henri Milne-Edwards, had (1827) stated the principle of the division of physiological labour, and shown that this division was the criterion of the degree of perfection of each species, and of the position it should occupy in the *Échelle des Étres.* This theory about the degree of perfection has been much exploited by French sociologists, though Comte himself took no notice of it. In general, the tendency to work with physiological and even mechanical analogies is very prominent, and nowhere more than with M. Durkheim. Dr Barth (*loc. cit.,* p. 290) remarks on this tendency, and shows how after all "this parallelism of the animal and sociological series could have been carried much further, and if this had been done, the limit of the applicability of this analogy would have shown itself." And he indicates his own view in the following passage: "The contrast of nature and mind arises in society as soon as mind or society itself becomes the subject of scientific thinking. This moment, however, does not wait for the appearance of a special
importance, inasmuch as he considers it to be not only a natural but a moral law, and this leads to a discussion on the nature of morality which he, in opposition to the view prevalent in the school of Kant and his successors, does not distinguish from law, but of which he rather considers law to be the authoritative expression. He works out a philosophy of history which recognises two distinct phases of what he calls social solidarity corresponding to two kinds of law. The first phase is homogeneous or mechanical; the second is organic. Resorting to analogies taken from biology, he shows how the change from the first to the second is brought about by the increasing volume and density of society necessitating a more intense struggle for existence and in consequence a partition of labour.

In the first form of society there is no individual, but only a common, consciousness. Only in the second or organic state of society does the individual consciousness acquire importance and a field of action, but it retains the impress of the original and fundamental unity, i.e., of the common consciousness; this shows itself in the existence of those altruistic tendencies which Comte took as facts, but which have been so puzzling to those who aimed at a monistic explanation of social phenomena. In the first form of society law is purely repressive; in the second it is restitutive.

The historical view which M. Durkheim takes of the science of society but comes already as soon as, at the dawn of history, the purely physical connection of human beings is replaced by an artificial connection based upon statutes” (p. 110). “This is the conscious mental influence of the governing class upon the whole of society, and with it the biological analogy ceases to be complete” (p. 292).
present heterogeneous as following upon the former homogeneous constitution of society through the pressure of increasing population and the battle for existence goes hand in hand with his objection to base sociology upon psychology. For inasmuch as the individuality of different minds is only a later product of the common social consciousness, so it is not possible to get any insight into the latter by starting with an investigation of the former by the introspective method. In a special work in which he deals with the 'Rules of the Sociological Method' he therefore confines sociological studies to what he terms "social representations" or "Institutions." These social facts or institutions cannot be reduced to individual representations, for they do not result from the latter but rather dominate them. The essential character of a social fact is that it controls or coerces the individual; the fact that the social consciousness has more reality than the individual consciousness ran M. Durkheim into that sort of scholastic realism of which his opponents accuse him. Among these the most prominent and original is M. Tarde.

1 The theory of M. Durkheim furnishes one of the most striking examples of that tendency of thought which I have termed the synoptic. This starts always from the consideration of a totality, a complex; considering this to be the prius and not a later product of the assemblage of its parts. And this the author lays down as a general principle applicable to the study of the phenomena of society no less than to those of life in general and even of inanimate phenomena. Thus he says in the Preface to the 2nd edition of his Treatise on Sociological Method, where he defends his principles against various criticisms of opponents: "La cellule vivante ne contient rien que des particules minérales, comme la société ne contient rien en dehors des individus; et pourtant il est, de toute évidence, impossible que les phénomènes caractéristiques de la vie résident dans des atomes d'hydrogène, d'oxygène, de carbone et d'azote. Car comment les mouvements vitaux pourraient-ils se produire au sein d'éléments non vivants? Comment, d'ailleurs, les propriétés
Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) approached the sociological problem from the side of jurisprudence. He was, at the same time, influenced by the modern school of psychology in France which attaches great importance to several psychical phenomena little studied by the older psychology either in England or in Germany. Among these is the phenomenon of suggestion; the mysterious and unexplained influence of one person on another; the "intercerebral \(^1\) relation of two minds, the

biologiques se répartiraient-elles entre ces éléments? Elles ne sauraient se retrouver également chez tous puisqu'ils ne sont pas de même nature; le carbone n'est pas l'azote et, par suite, ne peut revêtir les mêmes propriétés ni jouer le même rôle. Il n'est pas moins inadmissible que chaque aspect de la vie, chacun de ses caractères principaux s'incarne dans un groupe différent d'atomes. La vie ne saurait se décomposer ainsi; elle est une et, par conséquent, elle ne peut avoir pour siège que la substance vivante dans sa totalité. Elle est dans le tout, non dans les parties. Ce ne sont pas les particules non-vivantes de la cellule qui se nourrissent, se reproduisent, en un mot, qui vivent; c'est la cellule elle-même et elle seule. Et ce que nous disons de la vie pourrait se répéter de toutes les synthèses possibles. La dureté du bronze n'est ni dans le cuivre ni dans l'étain ni dans le plomb qui ont servi à le former et qui sont des corps mous ou flexibles; elle est dans leur mélange. La fluidité de l'eau, ses propriétés alimentaires et autres ne sont pas dans les deux gaz dont elle est composé, mais dans la substance complexe qu'ils forment par leur association. Appliquons ce principe à la sociologie, &c., &c." ("Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique,\(^\text{2}\)\textsuperscript{ne} éd., 1901, p. xiv.)

\(^1\) This refers to the fact emphasised by James Ward and termed by him "intersubjective intercourse." The latter seems to be, from the psychological point of view, a better term, for it does not introduce the physiological reference to the brain, of which, of course, the infant mind knows nothing. But the whole passage quoted from Tarde is psychologically most important. For the child's mind the beginnings of intersubjective intercourse mean simply the attention given to definite, often repeated, sensations which concentrate themselves as it were, and crystallise in the recognition of a person (the first glimpse of an external reality). And the fine distinctions which M. Tarde draws between the influence of one person and of a crowd of persons indicate a rare insight into the purely psychical and subjective development of the child's mind. Also M. Tarde draws attention to the fact of repetition as an essential requisite in this and all other mental developments, not without pointing out likewise how much memory has to do with this phenomenon of repetition (see e.g. "Les Lois Sociales," p. 8 sqq.; cf. also J. Ward, "Gifford Lectures," 1896-98, vol. ii. passim, but especially p. 175).
reflection of the one by the other." In this phenomenon M. Tarde finds the germ of the original social fact. He agrees with M. Durkheim in maintaining that the primitive fact of social life is some kind of control or coercion under which the individual is placed; but whilst M. Durkheim finds this in the coercive action of the "Collective" over the "Individual," M. Tarde goes a step further back and explains this by the influence of two individuals on each other. "It is not sufficient to recognise the imitative character of every social phenomenon. I maintain, moreover, that from the beginning this imitative relation has existed, not between one individual and a confused mass of persons as it exists very frequently later on, but between two individuals alone, of which the one, the infant, is born into the social life, and of which the other, the adult, socialised already long before, serves as an individual model. In advancing during life we frequently regulate ourselves on collective and impersonal models of which we are, at the same time, usually unconscious; but before speaking, thinking, acting, as we speak, think, or act in this world, we began to speak, think, and act as he or she speaks, thinks, and acts. And this he or she is one or the other among those familiar to us. If we look carefully we never find more than a certain number of he's or she's, which have become blurred and confused by multiplication. However simple this distinction may be, it is forgotten by those\(^1\) who, in any social institution or work, will not allow to individual initiative the creative rôle, but think they say something by stating, e.g.,

\(^1\) Referring evidently to M. Durkheim.
that languages and religions are collective works, that the masses, without any leader, have made Greek, Sanscrit, Hebrew, Buddhism, Christianity, and lastly, that it is by the coercive action of the 'collective' on the individual, small or large, yet always adjusted and utilised, but not at all by the suggestive and contagious action of chosen individuals, that the formations and transformations of societies can be explained. In reality such explanations are illusory; their authors do not perceive that by postulating such a collective force, a similitude of millions of persons, simultaneously under certain relations, they evade the major difficulty, the question of understanding how this general assimilation can have originated. The answer lies precisely in pushing the analysis as far as I have done, down to the intercerebral relation of two minds, to the reflection of one on the other, and it is only thus that we can explain those partial unanimitities, those conspirations of the hearts, those communions of the spirits, which, once formed and perpetuated by tradition and imitation of ancestors, exert a pressure often tyrannical, but more frequently salutary, upon the individual. It is to this relation that sociology must attach itself in the same way as astronomy attaches itself to the relation of two attracting and attracted masses; in it we must find the key to the social mystery, the formula for a few simple laws, universally true, which can be disentangled in the midst of the apparent chaos of human life and history."  

These simple laws which M. Tarde further develops are, as he terms them, the law of repetition, the law

\[1\] See Gabriel Tarde, 'Les Lois Sociales' (5\textsuperscript{me} ed., p. 39 \textit{sqq.})
of opposition and the law of adaptation. In the sequel he is led to oppose especially the fundamental conception of Herbert Spencer. Instead of finding with the latter the beginning of things social or natural in a homogeneous instability, he says "all that constitutes the visible universe, accessible to our observation, we know proceeds from the invisible and impenetrable, from an apparent 'Nothing,' out of which all reality rises inexhaustibly. If we reflect on this strange phenomenon, we are surprised at the power of a prejudice, at once popular and scientific, which makes every one—a Spencer not less than every first-comer—regard the infinitesimal as insignificant, i.e., as homogeneous, neutral, without character or spirit." 1

In his criticism of Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of things and processes in the monotony of an "unstable homogeneous" condition, 2 out of which through some unexplained influence the endless variety of phenomena arises, we are reminded of Hegel's criticism of the Absolute of Schelling which "is the night in which all cows are black." And as Hegel thought it imperative to start with a living and active principle, not with a mere identity or indifference, so M. Tarde sees the original fact in a creative process or a series of creative

1 Gabriel Tarde, loc. cit., p. 159.
2 "Je sais bien ce qu'on va m'objecter; la prétendue loi de l'instabilité de l'homogène. Mais elle est fausse, mais elle est arbitraire, mais elle a été imaginée tout exprès pour concilier avec le parti pris de croire indifférencié en soi l'indistinct à nos yeux, l'évidence des diversités phénoménales, des exubérantes variations vivantes, psychologiques et sociales. La vérité est que l'hétérogène seul est instable et que l'homogène est stable essentiellement. La stabilité des choses est en raison directe de leur homogénéité. La seule chose parfaitement homogène—ou paraissant telle—dans la Nature, c'est l'Espace géométrique, qui n'a point changé depuis Euclide" (loc. cit., p. 160 sqq.)
processes. And he opposes to the monotony and sameness of a purely atomistic condition—dependent only upon position, distance, and displacement—the world of monads conceived after the classical model of Leibniz; but he does not go the length of the latter who recognizes the Divine Being as the moving cause of all, but contents himself with leaving this ultimate fact unexplained: a mystery. His position is in fact purely psychological. After fixing upon imitation in the simplest form as a fundamental social fact he simply takes one step beyond and inquires, What is it that is imitated? The answer is: That which is new and unexpected, an invention or an innovation, the invention or innovation of a creative mind. The life of society is only a special case of the general rule of repetition which in nature is rhythm and undulation; in the organic world, heredity; in the social world, imitation. From this it follows that progress is brought about by inventive minds and consists in imitation, and that

1 "Quoi qu'on puisse penser de cette vue, il n'en reste pas moins inconcevable que dans l'hypothèse d'une substance homogène soumise depuis l'éternité à la discipline niveleuse et coordinatrice des lois scientifiques, un univers tel que le notre, éblouissant d'un si grand luxe de surprises et de caprices, ait jamais pu exister. Du parfaitement semblable et parfaitement réglé, qu'aurait-il pu naitre si ce n'est un monde éternellement et immensément plat? Aussi, à cette conception courante de l'univers comme formé d'une poussière infinie d'éléments tous semblables au fond, d'où la diversité aurait jailli on ne sait comment, je me permets d'opposer ma conception particulière qui le représente comme la réalisation d'une multitude de virtualités élémentaires, chacune caractérisée et ambitieuse, chacune portant en soi son univers distinct, son univers à soi et en rêve. Car il avorte infiniment plus de projets élémentaires qu'il ne s'en développe; et c'est entre les rêves concurrents, entre les programmes rivaux, bien plus qu'entre les êtres, que se livre la grande bataille pour la vie, éliminatrice des moins adaptés. En sorte que le sous-sol mystérieux du monde phénoménal serait tout aussi riche en diversités, mais en diversités autres, que l'étage des réalités superficielles" (loc. cit., p. 162 sqq.)
history is a record of these inventions, of their irradiation, expansion, and diffusion. The life of society is brought back to a psychological fact; the existence of the creative intellect, the genius, or the artist. This fact cannot be further explained or rationalised. Thus both M. Tarde and his opponent M. Durkheim seek and find some original fact or facts which may be termed the ultimate social phenomenon. For the one it consists in institutions which he terms "social things or objects," and sociology consists in studying them and the changes they undergo. The other finds it in an ultimate psychological phenomenon which he terms a logical arrangement; it takes place in the mind of an individual or individuals and spreads from them by a kind of emanation or radiation.

Both thinkers are opposed to the purely biological explanation of society as developed by Herbert Spencer and his followers. Instead of biology M. Tarde resorts to psychology,^{1} whereas M. Durkheim resorts to a view

^{1} The writings of M. Tarde are extremely original and suggestive, and they also remind us of recent tendencies of thought which have been developed with more or less clearness by other thinkers. Thus when we read sundry eloquent passages in M. Tarde’s principal works, ‘Les Lois de l’Imitation’ (1st ed., 1890) and ‘La Logique Sociale’ (1st ed., 1895), we are reminded of the principles of the “growth of mental energy” and of the “heterogony of ends” which play a prominent part in Wundt’s writings. We are also reminded of the élan vital of M. Bergson when we read the passages in which M. Tarde ascribes the origin of what is new in history to the desires and ideas of individual minds (see ‘Les Lois de l’Imitation, 6th ed., p. 157 sqq.). Also such modern problems as those of the “Unconscious” and the “Discontinuous” in the mental life of individuals and societies suggest themselves in passages like the following: “Au milieu de ce pâle-mêle incohérent des faits historiques, songe ou cauchemar énigmatique, la raison cherche en vain un ordre et ne le trouve pas, parce qu’elle refuse de le voir où il est. Parfois elle l’imagine, et, concevant l’histoire comme un poème dont un fragment ne saurait être intelligible sans le tout, elle nous renvoie pour l’intelligence de cette énigme au moment où les destinées finales de l’humanité seront accomplies et ses
of society and history which has been termed Collectivism. According to this view, which, for a time at least, has gained the upper hand in French thought, individual differences and personal interests sink into the background compared with the interests and movements of the masses, the influence of environment or milieu, and the pressure which these exert on individual human minds.

A somewhat similar controversy as to the correct way of looking at social and historical phenomena has independently arisen in Germany. But whereas in France the difference may be defined as that between individualism and collectivism, in Germany it may more properly be termed the transition from the idealistic to a realistic treatment of history.

origines les plus reculées parfaitement connues. Autant vaut répéter le fameux mot: Ignorabimus. Mais regardons par-dessous les noms et les dates, par-dessous les batailles et les révolutions, que voyons-nous? Des désirs spéciaux, provoqués ou surexcités par des inventions ou des initiatives pratiques dont chacune apparaît en un point et rayonne de là incessament comme une sphère lumineuse, s'entre-croisant harmonieusement avec des milliers d'ondulations analogues dont la multiplicité n'est jamais de la confusion; et aussi des croyances spéciales, apportées par des découvertes ou des conjectures théoriques, qui rayonnent semblablement avec une rapidité et dans des limites variables. L'ordre dans lequel écluent et se succèdent ces inventions et ces découvertes n'a rien de capricieux et d'accidentel dans une large mesure; mais, à la longue, par l'élimination inévitable de celles qui se contrarient (c'est-à-dire au fond qui se contredisent plus ou moins par quelque-unes de leurs propositions implicites), le groupe simultané qu'elles forment devient concert et cohésion. Considérée ainsi, comme une expansion d'ondes émanent de foyers distincts, et comme un arrangement logique de ces foyers et de leurs cortèges ondulatoires, une nation, une cité, le plus modeste épisode du solissant poème de l'histoire, devient un tout vivant et individuel, et un spectacle beau à contempler pour une rétine de philosophe? (p. 118 sqq.) M. Tarde also agrees with Schopenhauer in maintaining that desire, i.e., a willing activity, furnishes the beginning of mental development, but he would not limit this to desires but includes also ideas as generative forces, reminding us in this of M. Fouillée's theory of the idées-forces.
OF SOCIETY.

569

In France the two schools of sociology have existed side by side;¹ in Germany, on the other hand, the idealistic school is the older, the realistic a much younger development. And even more adequately than in France will it be permitted to identify the two schools of historical research in Germany with two great names, that of Leopold Ranke and that of Karl Lamprecht. Contrary to what one has been accustomed

¹ This is hardly admitted by Dr Barth, who says (see loc. cit., p. 213 sqq.): "Thus Tarde is diametrically opposed to that belief in the dominant power of the masses, but it does not appear that this controversy has as yet arrived in France at a higher conception, which should do justice to both opinions. It is, however, significant that Tarde, in spite of his doctrine of the dependance of the masses, nevertheless calls only those events historical which refer to the masses"; and Dr Barth refers to the following passage ('La Logique Sociale,' 3me éd., p. 497): "Dans les sciences, l'importance supérieure de la découverte vérifiée, de l'invention accréditée, est évidente et reconnue. Mais, partout ailleurs, dans l'ensemble de la vie sociale, elle est non moins certaine et cependant méconnue. L'important, c'est toujours, en histoire, l'équilibration et la majoration de masses de foi ou de forces de désir, et l'on doit nommer événement tout fait qui provoque ou produit une forme nouvelle, d'équilibre ou d'accroissement de ces masses ou de ces forces." And this induces Dr Barth to sum up by saying: "In this respect, as to the conception of history, it seems that in France the tendency has finally conquered which makes the life of society the main subject, a tendency which we may briefly term Collectivism. The controversy only turns on this, to what extent an individual influences this life of society. In Germany, on the other side, the conception of history has not yet been uniformly fixed in this direction. The single person, not only as an awakener of the whole of the society in which he lives, not only as a typical representative of the members which form society, but as a unique, not repeated, individual, is to be the subject of the historian's attention. With one exception [M. Lehmann] all earlier historians must be counted on the individualistic side. To these all those who look to the collective labour of nations, to their culture in the largest sense . . . stand in a necessary but unexpressed opposition." And according to Dr Barth this opposition has found a clear expression, for the first time, in two thinkers—namely, E. Bernheim in his 'Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode' (1st ed., 1889, latest, 6th ed., re-written 1908), and K. Lamprecht in his 'German History' (1891 sqq.): "They have consciously asserted the opposition to the older individualism. Especially the latter has used this term for the earlier tendency and at the same time has coined the term Collectivism for his own, and has taken great pains to establish its theoretical foundation."
to observe in the development of German thought in other regions, the theoretical principles which guide these two celebrated historians in their extensive labours were not clearly brought out till after they had been put into practice in the treatment of large historical subjects. Ranke himself never attempted a consistent exposition of his fundamental and guiding ideas. It is only from scattered indications, notably from the Introduction to some of the later of his works, that a younger generation of historians has attempted to fathom and define his historical method.

And so far as Lamprecht is concerned it is only after having published several works on the economic aspects of various historical periods, and after having written the greater part of his 'German History' that he has, in a series of polemical tracts, attempted to

1 Notably the following: (1) 'Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft' (1896). This contains a dissertation on historical method and a very valuable collection of extracts with the object of defining Ranke's 'Ideenlehre'; (2) 'Die Kulturhistorische Methode' (1900); (3) 'Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft' (5 Lectures, 1905). In the latter Lamprecht tries to define more clearly what he terms the sociopsychological method. He believes in a Sozialpsych, in the soul of society, and he maintains that the laws which govern the life and development of this social soul or mind must be found through the study of the psychology of the individual, referring to the recent development of psychology in Germany under the hands of such thinkers as Wundt, Ebbinghaus, and Lipps. Although the economic and physical foundations and conditions of national life are extremely important and are emphasised by Lamprecht, he does not fall in with Karl Marx's materialistic treatment of history. He seems to think that at certain moments the psychical influences gain the upper hand and become dominant. His views on this point, though characteristic of his whole position, are not sufficiently clear to afford a concise statement or criticism, but the following passage may give an indication to the reader of this interesting speculation, which, in the Lectures referred to, is especially applied to the psychological development in the history of Germany. "The latent possibilities of the soul in the direction of historical developments form an extensive region—let us say, the area of a circle. Within this circle external stimulants move into the
define the difference of his point of view as contrasted with that of his predecessors in Germany. It seems likely that coming into contact with the modern psychological school represented by Professor Wundt in Leipsic, he has been induced to define more clearly and systematically the psychological foundation of his eminently original treatment of history. He has latterly adopted the French term Collectivism as characteristic of his view in contrast to the older individualistic view: but, to an outside observer, it seems more helpful to adopt the definitions which he lays down in his tract on Ranke's 'Ideology' (1896).

He there collects from Ranke's works a pretty concise statement of Ranke's guiding ideas, of the hidden philosophy of that master. This turns mainly foreground, now these, now other segments, and determine in this way the history of a definite period. Thus what eventually becomes effectual does not in its origin depend on the social mind but on accidental, external stimulants: history is the kaleidoscope with a definite number of possible groupings of elemental psychical phenomena, and the various pictures contained in these possibilities are called forth by a purely external, mechanical impulse, now in this way, now in that" (p. 95). But Lamprecht goes on to say that whilst this view suffices for the consideration of a special limited period of civilisation, it is not sufficient to explain the course of successive periods of culture. "For then it becomes evident that these periods are by no means accidental and internally unconnected. Rather they follow the line of a continuous increase or decline of psychical force, &c., &c." (p. 96). The views of Lamprecht have been extensively and severely criticised. The literature of this subject is given with great completeness in Bernheim ('Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode,' 6th ed., 1908, p. 717), who also enters very fully into Lamprecht's ideas, and, though not agreeing with them, admits that much can still be learned from that tendency among recent historians which is prominently represented by Lamprecht, but which, existing already before him, dates back to Comte, and may be termed anti-individualistic. In recent French literature we have an interesting study of the subject by M. Ch. Ander in 'La Philosophie Allemande au XIXe Siècle' (1912, p. 205 sqq.). English readers will find a concise statement of the controversy in C. P. Gooch, 'History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century' (1913, p. 588 sqq.).
on the problem of the relation of the individual to the life of the community. In this relation is to be found the secret characteristic of any historical age, for "also in history, freedom and necessity are intermingled, and in conflict freedom appears mostly in personalities, necessity in the life of the community. But is it likely that the first is complete and the other unconditioned?"¹

From this Lamprecht infers that Ranke's point of view recognises the antinomy between freedom and necessity as practically existing. That this forms the central problem with Ranke, he shows further by collecting many scattered passages in which Ranke attempts to explain himself more in detail. He points out how, according to Ranke, every new mental development has emanated from imposing personalities through the conquering influence of new ideas. He considers the agencies which bring about historical progress to be a Divine secret. "Genius is an independent gift from God; but in order to unfold itself there is required the receptivity and the right sense in its contemporaries."² "Great men do not create their times, neither are they created by them. They are the original minds who independently take part in the conflict of ideas, who concentrate the most important among them, those upon which the future depends, who promote them and are supported by them." "The greatest individual life is only a moment in the tangle of universal life."³

Lamprecht shows further how this latent philosophy

¹ Quoted by Lamprecht in his Tract 'Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft,' 1896 (p. 27).
² Ibid., p. 28.
³ Ibid., p. 30.
in Ranke's writings is founded upon the philosophical and religious background of the age and the surroundings in which Ranke's genius matured, how he liberated himself from the systematising tendency of the philosophy as well as from the dogmatising tendency of the theology of his time, but how he nevertheless retains the spiritual aspect as it was contained, *e.g.*, in the writings of Fichte and still more in those of Luther. "Ranke was well aware that he possessed a kernel of solid convictions, but he never attempted a formally well-considered and detailed expression of this content; he never systematised it or tried to reconcile its possibly contradictory elements; he shrank from putting the innermost of his convictions into words. He ever goes only a certain length; the innermost remains undisclosed, like those groves in which the old Teutons considered the Deity to be directly active, and it is therefore similarly grasped only intuitively *sola reverentia*."

In this respect Ranke occupies a position similar to that of Goethe. Such natures are wronged whenever one tries to construct from their scattered expressions, by hook or by crook, a rounded philosophical system; we can ever attempt only an indefinite indication of the essence of their views. Nevertheless Lamprecht finds Ranke's historical thought gathered up in two characteristic points: the idealistic creed after the manner of the then ruling philosophy, and the universalistic conception of history after the manner of the cosmopolitan character of the classical literature of

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1 Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
Germany. Lamprecht gives us here the key to an understanding of the great change which has come over German thought not only in his special line of research but also generally in the treatment of all the larger problems. Idealism has given way to realism, the study of ideas to that of things; and cosmopolitanism, i.e., the world-wide view, to a national view. So far as the social problem in its widest sense is concerned, this transition was prepared in Germany by the progress of learning as much as by the political events during the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. To this I have had occasion to refer frequently in the foregoing chapters. Here it behoves us to recognise how the comprehensive idea of humanity which inspired German thought since the time of Lessing, Herder, and Goethe, was replaced, in the course of the Nineteenth Century, by a more closely defined expression of the aims and interests, not of humanity at large, but of the German people in their national existence and their central European position.

The idea of nationality which has stirred several European nations has nowhere been proclaimed with greater self-assertion than in Germany. This led primarily to a political view of history which superseded not only the philosophical view but also the universalistic of Ranke. Great historical works were written with the undisguised tendency of understanding better the drift of modern political events, such as the French Revolution, and the more remote beginnings as well as the more recent successes in the foundation of political and national unity. The universalistic and philosophical
treatment of history was succeeded by the political treatment of which von Sybel may be considered the greatest representative.

But the unification of Germany, which in the middle of the century was an aspiration and a dream, was realised by quite other means than by those which the earlier school of political historians were aiming at. When once accomplished it indeed formulated new tasks and established new views for the national historians. But the real political impulse was wanting, and with it there disappeared that immediate purpose which had given life and interest to von Sybel's historical view. A prominent representative of historical learning in Germany thus looks upon the younger generation of historians as placed in a kind of dilemma. So much has happened that was new and unexpected that there seems wanting a definite orientation among the historical writers of the day. Are they to return to the lofty classicism of Ranke, or is a new conception gradually pushing forward which will afford a better understanding of historical progress and development? The difference may be stated in various ways. Is the writing of history an art or a science? Has it to be inspired by a few great and supreme ideas, or has it to adapt itself to the realistic and naturalistic view of life which the progress of the exact sciences has introduced? Were it purely an abstract or academic question, the two ways of handling the historical problem, the artistic and the scientific, the idealistic and the naturalistic, might live and thrive peaceably alongside of each other. But in Germany, as well as in other countries, the
purely academic view has long been rendered untenable or antiquated. The deepest philosophy, the largest erudition, the most exact science are not enough. The causes of this change are, in the main, twofold. Notably in Germany the ideal view which ran through the whole of the great philosophical systems has lost its original ground; it had, after all, its anchorage in the evangelical conception of Christian Truth which was handed down from the Reformation. The attempt to rationalise this has destroyed its very essence. Those who nowadays still believe in the ideal treatment of history try to give their idealism a non-religious colouring.

As M. Tarde in France did not accept the theological ground and centre of Liebniz's monadology, in the same way we find that what formed the centre of Ranke's historical creed—the living Spirit of God and the world of living spirits which He has created—is not a guiding idea any more for those who still profess to belong to his school. Discarding the mystical and irrational element which characterises Ranke's great work as the product of a period of transition, the younger generation attempt to give to their ideas a much more definite and tangible character. Thus we have, e.g., the idea of nationality, the idea of race, the idea of centralisation, or perhaps, more recently, the imperialistic idea.

In the place of the great hold which religious truth—in a more or less philosophical interpretation—had during the earlier part of the nineteenth century on the leading minds of Germany, another power has come in and claims increasing recognition. This is the popular spirit, the social and economic interests of the large
masses of the people, whose position has been profoundly altered through the industrial much more than through the political developments of the age. If Germany surprised the whole civilised world by her military successes and her consequent political ascendancy in the year 1870, she has still more surprised the world by her industrial development ever since.

It is only natural that this industrial development which is still in full progress should exert its influence upon the conception of the national history; that an attempt should be made to understand the economic factors as they made themselves felt in the course of the social and political progress of the nation. Karl Marx had already urged this point of view in a one-sided and extreme conception of historical progress as a conflict of Capital and Labour. In his 'German History' Karl Lamprecht takes up this task more fully and methodically. His work marks an epoch in modern historiography as also in the philosophy of history. From the latter point of view, Lamprecht's position has been appreciated by Paul Barth in his important work on the 'Philosophy of History as Sociology' (1897). So far we have from this author only a critical survey of contemporary labours referring to this subject.

The most important and interesting question to which we hope to receive an answer is correctly defined by Paul Barth: to explain "how the ideas originate which influence the actions of a great personality. Does he draw them out of himself in opposition to his environment, or must they be strongly represented in the environment in order to become firmly located in him?"
believe that the latter is the case. An idea which germinates in an individual mind or is implanted by education is not in itself capable of guiding him steadily in his activity. If the whole environment is opposed to it in its thought, or mainly moving in a different direction, then a definite idea can, at the best, only generate an isolated activity; it will soon be extinguished by the weight of what is foreign to it. Our activity is determined not by that which passes transiently through our mind, but by that which is abiding and repeated in manifold connections. Herbart already recognised this so far as education is concerned. . . . But it obtains not only in young persons, but also with adults. . . . This is recognised, e.g., by F. A. Lange when he attributes not only our moral but likewise a great part of our intellectual progress to the quiet but persistent action of Christian ideas for the very reason that it has been persistent.”¹ And Barth shows that a similar view is taken by Spencer.

¹ Loc. cit. (pp. 217-218). “Education may, in the abstract, be capable of introducing isolated and new aspects into the mind of great individuals, but will, in the concrete, only have an effect if these ideals coincide with a strong and growing current of public opinion. . . . Thus education cannot implant a content which is totally foreign to the environment; it will only have success if it coincides with a large existing or growing movement. Through education the great personality is rooted in its surroundings. But how about the age of maturity and of independent activity? Is the hero, as Bourdeau seems to think and Spencer expressly says, an unimportant accidental cause which liberates an existing latent power, removing a small insignificant obstacle, or is he more, does he augment the existing force? Can he add something to it that nobody in the great masses could have given? I would affirm the latter. Nobody, not even Bourdeau and Spencer, deny that the hero stands a grade higher than his contemporaries. He sees more, feels more profoundly, judges more correctly than they. He can express better what moves in all of them. From this it follows that the hero exercises an accelerating momentum, that without him everything would have progressed more slowly” (p. 218). And Dr Barth goes on to
The cardinal question then seems to be to define the part that ideas play in the progress of society or in history. But still more important is the question as to the nature of these ideas themselves. The fact that every idea is a mental product leads us back to the study of psychology; and here we meet with two distinct schools of thought in modern German philosophy. Both schools attach the greatest importance to psychological studies, to those studies which were neglected by Comte, but revived by some of his followers, and largely cultivated in this country by Spencer and his predecessors.

In Germany we have seen how, in the school of which Professor Wundt is the centre, new methods and new interests were imported into psychological research. It is noteworthy that, in the sequel, this master of modern psychological method has devoted himself to a study of the psychology of the Collective Mind, to anthropological and ethnological studies.

But this represents only one side of the development which, in the interest of gaining a correcter view of historical progress and culture, psychology has taken in Germany. In that country there exists another school equally original though less known abroad, which does not attach so much importance to what we may term the psychology of the collective or social mind, but is rather intent upon fathoming the hidden depths of the individual mind as revealed in the life and work of the creative genius, the poet and the thinker. This is the appreciate the social power of | value it so highly as Tarde. imitation, though he does not |
peculiar direction of thought which has been given to historical, philosophical, and aesthetic studies by the late Professor Wilhelm Dilthey of Berlin. It is extremely difficult to give to an English reader any adequate idea of the drift of Dilthey's philosophical speculations. None of his works are translated into English, and many of his smaller but important deliverances are hidden away and inaccessible to the ordinary reader in the Transactions and Proceedings of the Berlin Academy.¹

¹ The first important work in which Dilthey introduced his special views, referring to the subject of this chapter, was his 'Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften,' of which only the first volume appeared in 1883. The sub-title defines it as an attempt to give a foundation for the study of society and history. This work had been preceded by the even more important first volume of his well-known 'Life of Schleiermacher' (1870). It must be a source of regret to all students of philosophy that these two highly original and suggestive works have been allowed to remain incomplete, and are, in addition, at present unprocurable. The later development of Schleiermacher's thought, both in the direction of theology and philosophy, is so interesting, so original, and so little known, even in Germany, that the further narrative and analysis in Dilthey's Biography would have been something like a revelation to the historian of German thought during the nineteenth century. And a still keener expectation is created when, after reading Dilthey's criticism and rejection of the naturalistic methods of thought as inadequate for the treatment of mental phenomena, we are led to wonder how, in the sequel of his book, the new foundation was to be laid. Whether a posthumous publication of Dilthey's own writings, which seems to be in view now, together with the work of his many disciples and admirers, will be able to satisfy, to some extent, the expectations which these writings must have awakened in every thoughtful reader, remains to be seen; it is, in any case, earnestly to be hoped for. What has been given to us so far in short summaries, such as that by B. Groethuysen (in 'La Philosophie Allemande au XIXe Siècle,' pp. 1-23), or by Prof. Anna Tumarkin (in 'Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,' xxv. pp. 143-153), does more to increase than to satisfy these expectations. Among the many Articles and Memoirs which are a sequel to the philosophical works just mentioned, one of the most important is a Memoir in the 'Berlin Academy of Sciences' (1910), 'Philosophisch-historische Classe,' pp. 1-123. Helpful for finding out the rationale of Dilthey's thought are also his own publications on the "Essence of Philosophy" in 'Systematische Philosophie' (1907), and still more so one of his latest publications in a volume entitled 'Weltan-
As every important new departure in philosophical thought has invented its own terminology in which it deposits its leading ideas, so we also find that Dilthey has his own vocabulary through which he introduces his subject and defines his method. To begin with, he considers philosophy to be an inner reflection or introspection, what he terms eine Selbstbesinnung; for only through introspection do we become aware of and experience that unity which we try to find and to grasp in the world as a whole. It is thus by introspection and psychological analysis through the inner sense that we reach, or at least approach, the foundation and ground. As it is the aim of scientific inquiry to discover regularities and uniformities in the outer world, so it is also the first task of psychology to trace such regularities in our inner or psychical life.

Schauung' (1911), which he introduces in an article on "Metaphysical Systems" (pp. 1-77). For the special subject of this chapter the best summary of Dilthey's views known to me is contained in Dr. Barth's frequently quoted work (pp. 364-377). This I would recommend specially to English readers, as it is written with as much appreciation of the important task defined by Dilthey as of the work done by representatives of other schools of thought mentioned in the foregoing pages, such as Comte, Wundt, and Lamprecht, and as the author aims at fulfilling himself, to some extent, that task. Professor Ludwig Stein has devoted a special chapter in his work entitled 'Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart' (1908), to Dilthey as the representative of what he terms Die Geisteswissenschaftliche Bewegung (pp. 243-270). He does not conceal his surprise that so learned an author as Robert Flint, in his well-known works on the philosophy of History, takes no note of Dilthey, though Flint's later work appeared ten years after Dilthey's 'Einleitung, &c.' And still more to be regretted is the absence of the name of Dilthey in a quite recent work by G. P. Gooch on 'History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century,' especially because Dilthey himself, in the Memoir of 1910 just mentioned, dilates in various passages very fully on the origin, growth, and characteristics of the historical school in Germany, referring also specially to contemporary historians in other countries, such as Tocqueville in France and Carlyle in England.
larities are, e.g., those presented by the processes of association, recollection, and apperception. But the inner processes are related in another manner; they are parts in the connection of an inner life. This innermost connection Dilthey terms the "psychical structure." It is the order according to which mental facts of very different kinds are connected to an inner living unity, and this connection is determined by the fact that all mental life is influenced by its environment or milieu, and that it reacts upon the latter in a purposeful manner. The factor of interest comes in which not only leads to judgments of value and appreciation, but stimulates also an activity of our will through which we alter our environment or adapt ourselves to it. The mental structure has accordingly a teleological character. Whenever the unity of the soul experiences, through joy or suffering, something that is of value to it, it reacts in attention, selection, and mental labour, seeking the means to pursue its own ends. It is only through continued experience that the individual person learns what is to him of abiding value. The principal work of life, in this respect, is to arrive, through manifold illusions, at a knowledge of that which is truly real and valuable. And through a recognition of the valuable things in life a third connection is established—that of practical activity in society, with its various manifestations of law, economy, administration, and the conquest of nature. All this points to a development of the inner life.

But not only has the individual inner life a structure; this is likewise the case with society. Social
life also not only manifests certain regularities and uniformities, but to the special structure of individual life there corresponds a similar structure of social life. This structure Dilthey finds in various and succeeding "cultural systems," and among these systems or products of culture philosophy occupies a special position. It is of interest to recognize what position philosophy occupies in the general economy of human society. This leads Dilthey to an investigation of the relation of philosophy to religion and art.¹

¹ The exposition in the text is mainly taken from the article on the "Essence of Philosophy" mentioned above (p. 31 sqq.). Dilthey's view is essentially synoptic, and at the same time essentially psychological or introspective. Looking at the outer world his glance is fixed upon the great systematic developments, the structures, as he calls them, in which the human mind has, in the course of history, embodied its own nature and life, and arrived at an understanding of the same. It is essentially a study of the objective mind, in the sense of Hegel, though Dilthey fully explains (Berlin Acad., 1910, p. 79 sqq.) that with him the term has an empirical, not a metaphysical, meaning, and is also used in a wider sense than by Hegel, including, indeed, what the latter conceived as stages in the development of the absolute mind, art, religion, and philosophy. On the other side he maintains that this comprehensive view of historical creations cannot be understood by the abstract and dissecting method of the natural sciences; that it can only be grasped by individual minds in whom it is reflected, in whom it has become actual and a living power. Through their individual grasp they become representative of their age in larger or narrower regions, which they at the same time reveal to the glance of their contemporaries, to the mass of mankind, acquiring in this way collective importance. Thus, as it seems, Dilthey's interest oscillates between two mutually complementary problems—the problem of society in its historical development and the problem of individual life as it appears in great personalities. With the latter interest is combined a delicate psychological insight into the life and development of artistic, poetical, and mystical natures. This is specially manifest not only in his larger works on Schleiermacher and Hegel, but also in his four psychological studies in a volume entitled 'Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung' (1866), in which he sympathetically enters into the innermost recesses of such delicate souls as those of Hölderlin and Novalis. We have also from his pen an interesting essay entitled 'The Imagination of the Poet,' with the sub-title 'Bausteine für eine Poetik,' in a jubilee volume of philosophical essays dedicated to Ed. Zeller (1887). On the relation of collective historical phenomena or cultural systems to individuals, see especially the explanations in the Memoir just quoted (p. 77 sqq.).
PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

It is thus that Dilthey attaches special importance to the study of the development of individual minds and of the great intellectual periods of history. As already stated, his earliest larger work consisted in a study of Schleiermacher, of that German philosopher who stood in the most intimate contact not only with the intellectual but also with the poetic and religious life of his age and country. This great work which promises, if finished, to be a unique biographical, literary, and philosophical monument, opens our eyes as does no other similar work to the innermost connections and relations between the workings of the poetical, religious, and speculative mind. But we have from his pen, in addition, studies of many other original figures in modern literature, and of several important phases in the historical development of modern culture. His main interest, however, seems to return always towards what he calls the mental sciences as distinguished from the natural sciences. Their peculiarity is that they treat of things which have a history, and the end and aim of his endeavours seems to be to arrive through psychological analysis at a peculiar logic or canon of thought.

Dilthey is particularly intent upon the essential difference of the methods employed in the natural sciences from those of the mental sciences—a difference which he has not succeeded in making convincing to some of his critics of the opposite school (see Barth, loc. cit., p. 371 sqq.), who consider that to give up the methods of the natural sciences is equivalent to giving up scientific treatment altogether. But Dilthey brings out an important point when he argues that in the analysis of physical phenomena the ultimate units out of which they are composed are unknown to us, and, as such, conjectural; whereas the units out of which mental, social, and historical phenomena are composed are known to us, being living experiences. "The primordial unit (Urzelle) of the historical world is the living experience of a subject through the interaction of its life and its milieu. This environment acts on the subject and receives reactions from it. It is a compound of physical and mental surroundings" (p. 93).
wherewith to comprehend historical phenomena. This is to be analogous to, but different from, the well-established logic of the exact or inductive sciences of nature. If Lamprecht finds the task of history to consist more in the description of circumstances, conditions, and institutions, Dilthey rather finds it in that of leading persons and minds in which an ideal content has become living and active.

Neither of these two schools of thought has as yet clearly told us what it understands under the somewhat vague term "ideas." Much of the best thought in Germany moves in what to thinkers with the logical mind of the French or the common-sense view of the English must appear vague and unsatisfactory. The causes which produce and maintain such a condition of philosophical thought in Germany more that in other countries are manifold, but the principal one is probably to be found in the different position which the Church and religion occupy in the three countries. In all three countries the conflict of belief and unbelief is making itself increasingly felt. It is most pronounced in France, being accentuated through the recent conflict between Church and State. Protestant thought has in that country never become a national force, and the secularisation of the schools has become the order of the day. Here, then, the logical sense of the Frenchman demands that the ideal factor in progress and culture should acquire a distinct and well-recognised influence in the great national work of popular and higher education. In Germany the religious teacher is still an important member of the educational staff. Religious instruction
with concurrent endowment is the order of the day. Those among the educated classes who have abandoned the traditional belief of their forefathers—and they form a large number—still cling to that ideal interpretation of nature and life which found such an original expression in the classical literature and in the creations of the great composers of their country. In fact, they live to a large extent on reminiscences. Only a small number of thinkers realise the absolute necessity of giving to their ideal conception a better defined expression in the shape of a reasoned creed which is at once elevating and fairly consistent, and which could—perhaps not at present but in the near future—be made the subject of instruction in the popular and higher schools of the country.

In England things are differently situated. The number of thinkers, and among them even of natural philosophers, who still embrace the main Articles of Christian Faith is considerable. To the greater part of the nation, be they members of the Established or of the Nonconformist Churches, the Bible forms still the foundation of all religious instruction. The necessity of constructing a reasoned creed has only recently made itself felt, and this principally only among a small number of advanced thinkers. The difference between believers and unbelievers does not come out so strongly as in Germany, nor is it sharpened into the contrast of clericals and anti-clericals as in France. There is, moreover, a strong feeling among the educated classes against any painful and laboured definition of, or minute inquiry into, personal beliefs. These are considered to be, if not a
mystery, at least a sacred personal possession into which it is not right or even useful to pry.

The consequence of the different position which the religious interest occupies in the three countries is reflected in their philosophical literature. The necessity of rescuing the higher ethical, as also the spiritual, view of life from the danger of being overlaid by the industrial and selfish interests of the age is most felt by foremost thinkers in France. In Germany we have two movements in recent philosophy, which we may term the theological and the purely intellectual or rationalistic. There is no country where religious philosophy is so much cultivated as in Germany. In England mental and moral philosophy have always existed as subjects of inquiry and of academic teaching. They stood formerly in distinct connection with traditional beliefs; more recently, in the writings of Mill, Spencer, and the Positivists, they have sought to acquire that independent position and treatment which they have, for a long time, enjoyed on the Continent.

But English and German thought have also come under the influence of another foreign movement. This originated in the United States of America, and finds its expression in several periodicals of which the 'Open Court' (1887) and the 'International Journal of Ethics' (1890) are the most important. Already in

1 See inter alia an important publication entitled 'La Crise Morale des Temps Nouveaux,' by Paul Bureau (1907). The author inclines towards Roman Catholicism, but the Preface, by M. Alfred Croiset, to whom the work is dedicated, shows that a difference of opinion as to the solution of the religious problem does not prevent these two thinkers from jointly emphasising the importance for society of the moral and social crisis through which the modern world is passing.
1867 a free religious association was formed, and in 1875 there arose several societies for ethical culture. These are all professedly anti-religious. Their object is to make ethics and morality independent of religion, or rather to construct a purely ethical, non-spiritual, and non-theistic religion. Although these societies have their branches also in England they seem to meet with more appreciation in Germany and Austria, where important thinkers are counted among their representatives. Among them the late Professor Georg von Gizycki held a prominent place, and did much through translations to popularise this branch of American literature. It cannot be said, however, that either in this country or in Germany this line of thought has acquired any great popular influence.

In this country morality as taught in the schools is still essentially religious and theistic. In Germany the necessity has not yet been felt of elaborating, for purposes of education, a purely secular code of morality, a moral catechism. And thus, if we leave out the United States of America, where every school of religious and moral teaching thrives alongside of others, France is the only country in Europe where a pronounced secularisation of morals and ethics has taken place. It is accordingly there that the most strenuous efforts have been made to place the theory and teaching of morality upon a purely philosophical basis. A periodical with the title 'Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale' was there started in the year 1893 by Xavier Léon, and testifies to the increasing interest which the subject of ethics in connection with metaphysics commands in that country.
Although the tendency of this Review is not religious in the older sense of the term, many of its contributors have latterly given great attention to the subject of religion, recognising that it is impossible to extinguish altogether the religious instinct, and aiming at the elaboration of a reasoned creed in harmony with the results of recent scientific and historical research. It is noteworthy that among these are not only professedly independent thinkers but also members of the Roman Catholic Church.

But in all the three countries the problem upon which philosophical thought seems to concentrate itself most is the social problem, though, for reasons just mentioned, the position of thinkers differs materially in the three countries; so much so that sociology exhibits in each country a well-marked national character. The most philosophical, if not abstract, treatment of the problem is to be found in Germany, where the greatest skill and ingenuity, with the assistance of science, criticism, and erudition, is directed to laying the foundations of a science of society, starting with an adequate and comprehensive definition of the conception of society. To the labours in this field of research, both logical and historical, the great work of Prof. Ludwig Stein gives ample testimony, but also to the fact that little agreement exists on the different separate questions into which the larger problem can be divided.

In England and France the social problem is treated more in connection with actual practical demands of the day. These are, in England, pre-eminently economical,
referring to the relation of Capital and Labour. In France the social problem seems, however, to have reached its greatest profundity; it has there become a religious question, a question as to the ultimate foundation upon which morality and a moral order can be established. And it is really in a clear conception of this relation that an understanding, not only of the social questions of the present time, but also of the meaning and tendencies of the historical life of man and mankind, will have to be found.
CHAPTER XI.

OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

I.

The history of philosophical thought, as I have endeavoured to trace it in the foregoing chapters, has consisted in an attempt to deal with the whole subject by breaking it up into a series of more or less independent parts. The great philosophical problem—that concerning the Order or Connection of Things—has been divided into a variety of special problems. The unity of the whole, if such has been at all conspicuous, has consisted mainly in the relation in which the different problems stand to each other. This mode of treatment, which is not entirely original to this Work but has been adopted by other recent historians, is dictated by various considerations of which the two following are the most important. To begin with, some among the problems of which I have treated have become in the course of the century of more general, indeed of popular, interest; marking in some instances burning questions of the present age. Others again have for the time being fallen into the
background and are almost forgotten. Among the former we may single out the sociological problem as by far the most important and generally attractive. Connected with it, as of hardly less importance, are the ethical and the religious questions. On the other hand, as belonging to the less attractive philosophical problems, we may name the philosophical problem of Nature and the problem of the Beautiful. To many thinking persons it may appear that there is no room for a philosophy of nature outside of the scientific treatment of the subject such as I have endeavoured to trace in the first volumes of this History. Similarly æsthetics, the philosophy of art and poetry, finds nowadays little favour, and a widespread opinion prevails that the philosophical treatment of these subjects has been of little, if of any, use at all. In both instances, as regards the philosophy of Nature as well as that of Art, what little interest still survives seems to be more readily satisfied by historical analysis, and this is either purely descriptive or critical; the standards of such criticism being fixed, not by abstract reasoning, but by a careful study of the creative work of the great masters of ancient and modern times.

There has been, secondly, as I have had repeated occasion to remark, a prevailing tendency, in all but the most recent thought of the last century, to deal only with definite and well-marked subjects, be they restricted regions of scientific and historical research or particular questions of practical interest. And although, as I have also had occasion to point out, a reaction against this specialising and atomising tendency
of thought has set in,—notably in the natural sciences and through the pressure of practical interests,—this has hardly made itself felt in the region of philosophical thought. Philosophy, though the parent of all the different natural and historical sciences, has nevertheless only tardily adopted the methods and points of view which have in the latter led to conspicuous success. Philosophical specialists have only sprung up long after scientific and historical specialisation had become the order of the day; and now it appears as if unification of thought on philosophical subjects may have to wait till such has been partially attained in other and more restricted regions. Thus the breaking up of the great philosophical problem into a variety of special questions is, to some extent, a tribute to the spirit of the age. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that this atomising process of thought is least of all satisfactory in dealing with philosophical questions, and that this is being more and more realised by philosophical writers of opposite schools and in different countries.\footnote{In the Retrospect at the end of the second volume of this History (vol. ii. pp. 741 sqq.), I pointed out that in the course of the last century Science, in the narrower sense of the word, as exact Knowledge based upon observation, definition, measurement, and calculation, has, by a general but tacit consent, abandoned the ambitious task of uniting natural knowledge into a comprehensive system; and further, that this task has been handed over as one of the principal inducements and interests of philosophical thought. It is obvious that the latter cannot similarly relieve itself of this highest responsibility—viz., to bring unity into thought and knowledge, and that though it may have found it necessary to break up the main problem into separate problems it cannot permanently shirk its main duty. This explains the necessity of adding to the foregoing chapters which deal with the separate philosophical problems, a chapter which answers the question: what has the century done in the direction of defining, understanding, or solving the main problem?}

The dictum of Herbert Spencer, that science is partially unified knowledge and
philosophy completely unified knowledge, is probably one of the least disputed and most generally accepted expressions of that thinker, and this in the present day when his own ways of arriving at this unification are almost as generally rejected or forgotten. Now, if we may say that the present age is marked by a desire to arrive at unity of thought, we are forced at the same time to confess that it is equally marked by the failure to attain or even to approach it. In this respect it presents a great contrast to the state of things which prevailed a hundred years ago.

Although the term introduced by Herbert Spencer—unification of knowledge and thought—is now generally adopted, it is only a new way of expressing what former ages said in different terms. They spoke of and produced systems of philosophy. The last generation has produced no original system. On the other hand, we hear and read a great deal of the monistic tendency of thought; popular periodicals and treatises have been published giving expression to this tendency. Thus we may define the character of the highest philosophical thought in the beginning of the nineteenth century by saying that it was essentially systematic; and again we may say that the tendency but not the character of philosophy at the end of the century is to a large extent monistic. An adoption of new terms and the discarding of old ones mark a change in philosophical thought itself which it will be of interest to examine more closely.

Limiting ourselves for the moment to a consideration of philosophical thought in Germany during the course
of the nineteenth century, we find there the most pronounced expression of that contrast which I have just named. At the beginning of the century we find a succession of philosophical systems. Kant's philosophy, though it never called itself a system, enjoyed still a foremost place in the philosophical world. Several thinkers were occupied in giving to it that systematic unity of which they thought it stood in need. Following the earliest attempt of Reinhold we find a variety of attempts, such as that of Krug and, somewhat later, that of Fries; then we have in rapid succession the professedly systematic work of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The latter probably marks the culmination of the systematic interest. This is less prominent, though still active, in Herbart and Schleiermacher, but it is revived again in an extreme form in Schopenhauer, whose system was complete forty years before it became generally known and appreciated. Simultaneously we can trace the breaking up of the systematic and comprehensive treatment of the philosophical problem in such writers as Beneke, who, influenced by Herbart, by English thought and by the empirical sciences alike, was the first important thinker in Germany who treated special philosophical problems, such as the psychological and the ethical problems, as separate and distinct branches in a way similar to that which prevailed in this country. The disintegration of systematic philosophy was further assisted in Germany by the introduction of other questions which had received little attention in the great philosophical systems, but which, nevertheless, demanded theoretical treatment.
Thus Fries and others introduced Anthropology, Schleiermacher religious and moral philosophy on a positive or Christian foundation; others, like Wilhelm von Humboldt, followed by philologists and philosophers alike, worked at the philosophy of language. Then again we have philosophy of law, political economy, and philosophy of the state and society, all treated more or less independently, with only a slight reference to and in only slender connection with the central problems of systematic thought; and lastly we have Psychophysics.

In consequence of these various influences and through this enlargement of philosophical interest, systematic philosophy became less and less possible unless the word "system" acquired an altered meaning. This altered meaning comes out fully and clearly for the first time in the philosophy of Lotze. It is characteristic of this stage of philosophical thought that the attempt to work out a system was the last of Lotze's performances. The systematisation of his ideas came at the end of his career and was never completed; whereas with Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer the principle and the method of the system are the first thing that we meet with, subsequent treatment being mostly in the form of illustration or application. The older conception of systematic treatment, such as we find in the celebrated work of Schopenhauer, was continued in the labours of Hartmann, who put forward his leading and systematising principle in the earliest of his larger works, and whose subsequent literary career consisted mainly in treating a great variety of special problems or special subjects in the light of that principle,
defining it more clearly and defending it against attacks and misconceptions.

On the other side the latest important philosophical system in Germany, that of Wilhelm Wundt, came like that of Lotze after its author had published elaborate treatises on special scientific and philosophical subjects. If the idea of the unification of knowledge as the task of philosophy was, in its modern form, for the first time clearly defined for English readers by Herbert Spencer, a similar but larger task, that of the unification of thought, was defined quite twenty years earlier for German students by Lotze; and, though in general unacknowledged, the view which he takes of the task of philosophy is still that which seems to commend itself to thinkers of all shades of opinion alike.

It will therefore be of use to us if in a review of the different attempts towards unification of thought which the century presents we take our position on the ground prepared by Lotze in the middle of the period, and, looking backward and forward from this position, realise how it differed from the earlier and the later endeavours to perform this highest of philosophical tasks: the unification of thought. And in order to give my readers a clue to the changes and developments which have taken place in the treatment of this central philosophical problem, I may at once state that during the earlier part of the century philosophical speculation was

1 Wundt published his 'System' in the year 1889 at the age of fifty-seven. It had been preceded by physiological, psychological, logical, and ethical treatises beginning with the year 1858. All the more important philosophical works of Wundt have been translated into English.
primarily occupied in seeking and establishing the right Principle of unification, that in the middle of the century it was more definitely occupied with the Method of unification, and that towards the end of the period, when both the principle and the method of unification had become doubtful or uncertain, the need and Purpose of a unification of thought made itself more and more felt. The necessity of arriving at some firm and consistent view of the world and life,—what we may term a reasoned creed,—seems to have impressed itself in proportion as the leading idea of such a creed and the method of arriving at it have become uncertain and unsettled. These remarks apply more fully to German philosophical thought than to that of other countries,

1 A very practical proof of this condition of thought will be found in the publication of a volume entitled 'Weltanschauung' (1911). It has the sub-title 'Philosophy and Religion,' and contains ten quite independent Discourses on the former and nine on the latter subject, testifying to the interest which both subjects command at the present day, but also to the want of agreement in what is offered to satisfy it. Although only one of the contributors, Prof. Carl Gättler, mentions the name of Lotze, we are told in the Preface (p. xi) by Dr Frischeisen-Köhler that the object even of specialists in the mental sciences is not confined to description and calculation, but must lead on to an understanding of the facts and events they have to deal with, and these are exactly the words with which Lotze concludes the first volume of his 'System' (1874, p. 597). To what extent the volume in question represents, or is under the influence of, the teaching of Dilthey, who contributes the first lengthy Discourse with the title 'Die Typen der Weltanschauung,' is not easy to determine. The preface certainly breathes the spirit which permeates all Dilthey's later writings, notably the discourse on the 'Foundation of the Mental Sciences' quoted in the last chapter (Trans. Berl. Acad., 1910), and the full explanation and illustrations given there on the difference between description and understanding of facts and events. The latter is occupied with the reference of all creations in the mental world, termed cultural systems, to the mind of the individual man and of mankind. Whereas the natural sciences detach as much as possible the objects of their research from their connection with their subjective origin, the mental or philosophical sciences are mainly intent upon bringing out this subjective factor. Lotze in the passage referred to considers
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

but I shall have an opportunity of showing later on to what extent they characterise likewise the development of philosophical thought in France and in this country.

So far as Lotze's own position is concerned, we may see it defined in many passages of his writings and lectures: most concisely in the published Notes of his lectures on "Encyclopædia of Philosophy." It is as follows: "General culture as well as the separate sciences contain a number of assumptions, the origin of which is obscure, because they have been gradually formed by the comparison of many experiences, or have at least become conscious to us only through such experience. Since they

that this conception of an interpretation of reality as distinguished from a mere description was probably in the mind of Plato, and constituted also the real intention of Hegel's dialectic. Readers of the 'Microcosmus' will be inclined to see in it the first attempt to solve this problem on lines more in harmony with modern thought, discarding the metaphysical formalism of Hegel, of which Dilthey approves as little as Lotze did in his time. In fact, the words of Lotze are prophetic of the philosophical movement forty years after his time, as represented in the writings and the school of Dilthey. To what extent Dilthey seems to go beyond the position of Lotze I shall have a future opportunity of pointing out (see infra, p. 772). On Lotze's connection with modern thought in Germany see the very interesting Address by Prof. R. Falckenberg (April 1913), published in the 'Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik' (vol. 150, pp. 37-56).

1 This Course of Lectures was, according to the historical data given by Rhenisch (see the Appendix to the 'Grundzüge der Esthetik,' 1884, p. 108), delivered for the first time under the title "Logic and encyclopædic Introduction to other parts of Philosophy," in the year 1845, the number of hearers being given as sixty. Considering that the number of students at that time at the University of Göttingen was probably not more than seven hundred, the proportion attending these lectures does not seem to have been much less than the proportion of those who attend the much more frequented philosophical lectures in German universities at the present day. A decline in numbers took place shortly after that time, but they rose again considerably after the war of 1870, the Lectures on Psychology and Philosophy of Religion increasing in popularity. It is also worth noting that in the earlier years of Lotze's Göttingen career the term Encyclopædia of Philosophy alternates with that of Theory of Knowledge, and that in the later period the term Encyclopedia disappears altogether, the lectures being advertised merely as "Logic."
have received definite expression in the words of language, we have become accustomed to use them without first investigating their foundation, their meaning, or the limits of their validity. In this way both common life and science make use of the conceptions of 'cause and effect,' 'matter and force,' 'end and means,' 'freedom and necessity,' 'body and soul,' &c.; and in consequence of the absence of that investigation they entangle themselves very frequently in contradictions, inasmuch as they are unable to define the region of validity of these frequently opposite assumptions. We may then formally define the task of philosophy as the endeavour to impart unity and consistency to the scattered thoughts of general culture: to follow them into their first presuppositions as well as into their ultimate consequences, to connect them all together, to remove their contradictions and to combine them to a comprehensive view of the world and of life; mainly, however, to make those conceptions which in science and practice serve as principles the subject of a special examination with the object of determining the limits of their validity. Philosophy is partly the name for an investigation which is carried on to this purpose, partly the systematic exposition of the results arrived at."

After his definition, of which the foregoing is a somewhat free rendering, Lotze proceeds to discuss the questions of the unity, the method, and the principle of philosophical reasoning. He maintains that the desire for unity and the search after one unifying principle has been frequently exaggerated; for the unity of principle is in itself a mere assumption. But
should we, in the course of our speculation, be led to assume two or more principles, the task would still remain to show how these different principles interact so as to lead to that connection which we must assume to exist in every world which is One world. And Lotze is still more opposed to postulating a unity of method. For this latter assumption there is neither need nor justification. Rather we must claim for our investigation "complete freedom to make use of any possible device which, in the position that we human beings occupy in the midst of all reality, may lead us by straight or circuitous paths to an accurate comprehension of that reality." Every investigation, however, assumes not only the existence of a Truth in the world, but further also that we are in possession of formal rules of thought which permit us to deduce from any assumed truth by a necessary process other truths possessing a definite meaning.

We may now compare the position which Lotze takes up with that which has influenced all recent, but notably all German, philosophy, viz., the earlier position of Kant. And here we find an agreement as well as a marked difference. Both Kant and Lotze begin their speculation by a reflection on the possibility and the means of philosophising, but Kant exaggerates this preliminary or critical undertaking to such an extent that he apparently loses sight of the ultimate object—the unification and systematisation of thought. This he promised to give in a future system,—a promise which was never fulfilled. Lotze, however, admits that all important philosophical questions are dealt with in Kant's critical writings, and
that the promised system would only have been a differently arranged exposition of the results arrived at in the 'Critiques.' But Lotze admits also, what is not clear in Kant's own undertaking, that his own as well as the Kantian way of approaching the philosophical problem involves an inevitable circle. Human reason is required to pass judgment as to the truthfulness of its own enunciations, and this by appealing to some of these as the ground for such judgment. With this in view Lotze limits, to begin with, the task of philosophy to an endeavour to bring connection and consistency into the whole of our ideas and observations, and he postpones an answer to the question whether this consistent whole, when attained, possesses any objective truth corresponding to the real nature of things. Kant had in an early part of his first 'Critique' arrived at the conclusion that the real nature of things, or what he termed the "Thing in itself," cannot be reached by our reasoning powers, inasmuch as our knowledge is based only on a varied and frequently unconnected subjective experience, and is, as such, occupied only with what appears: it is purely phenomenal and not real.

This result of Kant's early 'Critique' was that which attracted at the time undue attention, and provoked not only serious opposition but also a strenuous and long-sustained effort to find a way towards that knowledge of the nature of things, or of the "thing in itself," which Kant had pronounced to be unattainable. This involved a neglect of the other and more fruitful side of Kant's speculations, to which Lotze, following to some extent
on the road indicated by Herbart, desired to return. This return was more pointedly proclaimed by a school of thinkers who were little influenced by Lotze’s speculations and did much to divert philosophical interest into other channels, postponing for a time the treatment of the central philosophical problem—the unification of Thought.

As the latter was clearly before the mind of Lotze as the last and highest problem of philosophy, he felt—as he has told us himself—more sympathy with the idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, than with the exact treatment of isolated philosophical problems which had been started by the followers of Herbart and of Fries, and by the Neo-Kantians. In his various writings through which he gained a wider reputation, notably in the 'Microcosmus,' the systematic interest is indeed, to a large extent, pushed into the background, coming forward only in a tentative manner in the third section of the last volume, where he treats of the "connection of things." His scientific and medical studies had convinced him that a unification of thought could only be arrived at on a much broader basis of facts, that these had to be collected from the wide regions of science and history, of artistic and poetical literature alike. When he, after giving this general survey, attempted to put his conclusions into a systematic form, he had to admit that such did not profess to be a systematisation similar to that which the great thinkers of the first half of the century had attempted, but that it could consist only in a general indication how the different lines of reasoning which he had made use
of in his scientific and popular writings might be brought together into a comprehensive view, and that this would necessarily bear a personal and subjective character. And as such, *i.e.*, in the fragmentary form of indications and suggestions, this, the last important systematic attempt in Germany, has indeed remained, and the more so because its author was called away before he had time to write the third and concluding volume of his system. But, as he himself said about Kant, the promised system would probably not have contained any fundamental contributions which we may not be able to trace, at least in outline, from his earlier writings.

So far then as the unification of thought is concerned, the writings of Kant provoked two distinct departures, the one earlier, the other later. The earlier fastened upon the so-called dualism of his system, proclaimed this to be intolerable, and attempted to remove it by looking out for some principle which lay deeper than the position from which Kant had started. This dualism appeared prominently in Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, and a solution was supposed to be contained in a suggestion which Kant himself threw out in his third 'Critique,' in which he deals with the aesthetical problem and puts forward the idea of Purpose in the world as a regulative principle which the thinking mind could make use of in its search for purely causal or mechanical connections. Both Fichte and Schelling started from these later indications of Kant, whereas Reinhold had confined
his attempts to unify Kant's thought more exclusively to the purely theoretical expositions contained in the first 'Critique.' And this purely theoretical or, as we may term it, essentially scientific and logical interest supervened again in a much more comprehensive spirit in Hegel's system, which was elaborated after its author had fully assimilated the valuable suggestions contained in Fichte's and Schelling's less systematic writings. The valuable suggestions may be summed up in two distinct notions. These have, in the course of the nineteenth century, asserted themselves again and again in various forms, and in speculative treatises which have, in some cases, had little or no connection with Kant's philosophy. They are the practical or active principle in the human mind and the artistic or poetical conception of the world and life. The former was, more emphatically than by Kant himself, urged by Fichte in his doctrine of the primacy of the human will; the second forms the main characteristic of Schelling's earlier writings.

It was not until the first brilliant attempts to utilise these suggestions for the purpose of building up connected systems of thought had been confidently made and received by the philosophical public, and subsequently found wanting and repudiated, that the second departure referred to above, which we may term the Neo-Kantian, came gradually into favour. This change of philosophical interest took place about the middle of the century, and was assisted by a variety of causes, to which I have had frequent occasion to refer. The result
of this development has been the breaking up of the philosophical problem into a variety of distinct problems, such as I have dealt with in the foregoing chapters. We may say that the main cause of this new departure was the growth and diffusion of the scientific spirit on the one side, of the historical and critical spirit on the other. This new spirit, which is characteristic of nineteenth century thought, dispelled, for a time at least, what we may term the genuinely philosophical interest which is directed towards a unification of thought.

So far as the Kantian philosophy is concerned it was very early recognised that not only did it harbour an inherent dualism, but that, moreover, it was based upon certain facts and assumptions which were insufficiently proved or not even clearly set out. Notably the first 'Critique' started with definitions and distinctions adopted without sufficient justification from the Aristotelian logic and from the traditional psychology of the schools. With notions mainly drawn from these sources Kant attempted to criticise the notions of the traditional metaphysic of the schools and, at the same time, to reply to the doubts which had gradually sprung up through Locke's, Berkeley's, and Hume's original investigations. To many thinkers Kant's critical work did not appear to be thorough enough. It had, moreover, taken over from those various sources an amount of dry and unnecessary formalism which obscured the main points, made the study of his works unnecessarily laborious, and might possibly carry into the ultimate conclusions hidden errors which a more careful scrutiny would be able to correct. What was indeed wanted was a new and
correcter psychology ¹ and a new and less formal system of logic.

Both these desiderata were to some extent supplied by the labours of the English school. In it the first important work that was, after the lapse of nearly a century, again to affect German thought, was the treatise on 'Logic' by John Stuart Mill. That side of Mill's treatise which attracted attention in Germany was his

¹ In Germany this revision of the Kantian position was started, after the general ideas contained in the idealistic systems had lost their absorbing interest, mainly by two thinkers, Lotze and Trendelenburg, whose merits are being more and more acknowledged in the present day. One of the principal results of this revising process has been to bring out a marked difference in the conception as to the foundation of philosophical reasoning: Is it to be psychological or logical? Two schools have sprung up in Germany, termed psychological and anti-psychological. Of the former Prof. Franz Brentano (born 1838) may be considered the earliest and most pronounced representative; of the latter Prof. Edm. Husserl is the great protagonist, and this in conscious opposition to Brentano, under whose influence his earlier writings were composed. Both schools are much influenced by Lotze, who, probably first among modern thinkers, tried to bring some clearness into the subject, which was quite insufficiently treated by Kant. It belongs, however, so much to what Lotze would have termed the domestic affairs of the philosophical schools, that it hardly enters into a history of philosophical thought. To give the general reader some indication of the import of the controversy, I may refer to Lotze's distinction of the three regions into which the experience of the contemplating mind may be divided—the region of definite things, the region of relations, and the region of judgments of value. Things exist or do not exist, relations obtain (are valid) or do not obtain, and judgments of value are either approval or disapproval. This distinction no doubt is ultimately a psychological one, i.e., gained by reflection; but the question arises whether each of these regions of thought contains a sufficiently definite and permanent foundation to form the separate sciences or bodies of methodical thought and knowledge. The modern theory of development has introduced the idea of a continuous change, to which the human mind must be as susceptible as everything else. It is quite evident that so far as logic and morals are concerned, no satisfactory theory of either is possible without the belief in the existence of some unalterable truths and some supreme law of conduct. It is difficult to see how a thorough-going philosophy of Evolution can furnish these. To those who desire to be introduced into the details of the controversy as it exists in German literature, I recommend the first part of a tract by Dr Karl Heim, with the title: 'Psychologismus oder Anti-Psychologismus' (1902).
analysis of the methods of thought which had become current and useful in the mathematical and physical sciences. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences' was likewise translated into German. The translation of both these standard works was undertaken, not in the interest of pure philosophy, but by men of science in a scientific interest.

In addition to this influence of English philosophy of science must be mentioned Beneke's study of English psychology. But though Beneke was a philosopher, his writings did not during his lifetime receive due appreciation by contemporary thinkers in Germany, but had to wait till the Neo-Kantian movement of thought had gained strength from other sources. The most important other influence which worked in the same direction was the fresh life infused into psychological studies by the new science of physiology, notably of the physiology of the senses. This had its centre in the labours of Johannes Müller, which had an international influence, giving rise to important researches in all the three countries.

In Germany it was notably through Müller's great disciple Helmholtz, through E. H. Weber, through Lotze, Fechner, and Wundt, that these physiological researches gained their revolutionising influence upon philosophical thought. But in the hands of by far the larger number of philosophical students and scholars these fruitful and promising researches led away from the main philosophical problem, with the result that instead of a unification a disintegration of thought set in, with apparently little prospect of the discovery of any unifying principle which should bring together
again the scattered fragments into an orderly and comprehensive system or a reasoned creed.

And yet we must recognise, as I stated above, that such a creed, a monistic view of life, a connected and reasoned body of fundamental convictions to serve as a foundation of belief and a guide to conduct, is at the moment more than ever demanded.

Now wherever we meet with such a demand we may say that this denotes, and springs from, a deep religious interest: using the word “religion” in the wider sense which it acquired in the Latin language before the Christian era, and which would cover not only the religion of Israel and Christ but also the reasoned and systematic creeds of the more prominent philosophical schools which existed at the dawn of the Christian era. And thus we may say that at the present moment the supreme interest which leads men to philosophise is the same as that which governed philosophical thought at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century: it is the religious interest. But though the same, it is yet on a totally different level that this interest manifests itself after the lapse of more than a hundred years. In order to fix this difference and bring it clearly before the minds of my readers, I will define it by saying that at the end of the eighteenth century in Germany the philosophical problem suggested by the religious interest was that of the relation of Faith and Knowledge, whereas at the end of our period the problem had assumed a different aspect: we may define it as the problem of Belief or Unbelief.

This modern phase in which the religious interest
presents its problem to the philosophic mind, had not been reached at the end of the eighteenth century. Philosophical language shows this. There are three words very familiar in the philosophical vocabulary of to-day which we do not meet with in philosophic writings at the end of the eighteenth century— they are Pessimism, Agnosticism, Indifferentism. The modern spirit characterised by these terms was at the beginning of the nineteenth century unknown in all the three countries with which I am dealing. In Germany the optimism of Leibniz' philosophy survived all the misfortunes which befell the nation, and though the frightful catastrophe of the earthquake of Lisbon had shaken a shallow and superficial belief which pervaded a large portion of popular literature and was ridiculed by Voltaire, it had on more serious thinkers and writers the effect of prompting them to search for the foundations of their faith and the ground of their hopefulness in deeper and higher regions of thought, not in a reliance on mere external prosperity and success.

Both in Germany and France confidence abounded in the resources of the human mind, though this was characteristically bestowed in Germany upon philosophical speculation, resulting in idealism and transcendentalism; whereas in France it was bestowed upon the resources of scientific thought, which was held to have kindled the torchlight of Reason, dispelled the darkness of superstition, and swept away political and clerical tyranny and oppression. In this country an era of remarkable industrial progress had begun; political and social philosophy had got a fresh start, and were
hopeful of bringing about, by patient and enlightened reforms, that liberty which the French Revolution had attempted to gain by more violent methods, but had to a large extent lost again. This confidence of the human mind in its own resources, be they speculative, scientific, or practical, was confirmed and heightened by new creations and discoveries in literature, poetry, art, and science, by a revival of the religious spirit in England which for a long time obscured the hidden influences of Hume's scepticism, and by the educational interest in Germany and Switzerland. The latter combined with religious inwardness Rousseau's belief in the inherent goodness of human nature.

This hopefulness which characterised European thought till far on into the nineteenth century received its first great blow through the reactionary movement in French thought. It was aggravated by the disillusionment of the speculative mind in Germany towards the middle of the century, when the resources of idealism failed, and the belief in them was replaced by a belief in the methods and principles of science on the one side, of historical research and criticism on the other. An arrogant materialism set in, which lacked the originality as well as the literary graces so characteristic of the writings of the French encyclopædists two generations earlier. This, as also the slow and changing processes through which the historical schools matured their results, tended to weaken the belief in the powers of human reason to arrive at any certainty at all, and prepared younger minds in Germany for the reception of that pessimistic view which was brilliantly developed in the writings of
Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and Nietzsche. This direction of thought was likewise assisted by the disappointment which, in Germany, succeeded the failure of the political movement of the year 1848. The latter had been largely led by theorists and supported by scholars and students from the German universities. Political as well as philosophical aspirations had failed. To this must be added the renewed influence of the critical writings of Kant and the sceptical writings of Hume, to which Neo-Kantians in Germany and Neo-Hegelians in England drew marked attention. The word Agnosticism was coined to denote the hopeless attitude in which the human mind found itself with regard to what Carlyle termed the "Eternal Verities." This term was destined to acquire a much larger meaning than either Huxley or Spencer probably realised, when the criticism of the principles of scientific thought revealed not only their formal precision and practical usefulness but quite as much their essential instability and uncertainty, their purely provisional nature.

To the brilliantly expressed pessimism of Schopenhauer in Germany and the widespread agnosticism proceeding from Spencer in England, France added the probabilism of Renan. Thus, all three countries contributed, in their own way, to expose the general inconclusiveness of modern lines of reasoning: Germany of speculative, England of scientific, France of historical and critical research. An attempt has been made to admit in general this inconclusiveness of modern European thought, and at the same time to answer and counteract it. And it is significant.
that this answer has been most impressively given from the other side of the Atlantic, where a new and vigorous civilisation finds itself confronted afresh with the fundamental questions of conduct and belief. It is, we are told, from the side of practice that these eternal problems have to be attacked. The pessimistic solution of Schopenhauer, that the human Will is the source of evil, has been reversed, and the mainsprings of action have been proclaimed as containing the only revelation that Reality has vouchsafed to human beings.

It has been pointed out that this Pragmatism is only a new and telling name for a tendency which is not only revealing itself among original and leading thinkers in the New World, but is to be found also among foremost representatives of European thought, such as Wundt in Germany and Bergson in France. The prominent questions then which philosophy is called upon to answer at the end of the nineteenth century are, where to find certitude in matters of belief and conviction, where to find sanction and authority for the rules of conduct? As speculative knowledge has been discarded, and scientific knowledge is more and more absorbed in the successful investigation of the purely mechanical order of things and the conquest of nature, the question becomes increasingly urgent as to the independent reality of the moral and spiritual factors of life. Are they identical, as one school of modern thinkers maintains? Can morality be placed upon an independent foundation, and if so, is this scientific and relative or original and absolute? If, on the other side, morality cannot permanently live and grow except on a spiritual foundation,
as another school of thinkers maintains, then the philosophical problem presents itself as to the source of certitude in matters of faith. The mediating task of philosophical thought cannot be undertaken till the questions have been answered: knowledge or no knowledge? certainty or no certainty? something that is intrinsically good and valuable or a mere semblance and passing illusion? Philosophically expressed, it is the problem of the Absolute. As to the existence of this the beginning of the century harboured no doubt, the end of the century, the present age, has no certainty.

In the third part of the general Introduction to this Work I indicated the position which I would assign to philosophy in the 'History of Nineteenth Century Thought.' It was to occupy an intermediate position between scientific and religious thought; its principal task being to effect a reconciliation between these two regions—the region of methodical knowledge on the one side, and the region of personal convictions on the other. Upon this, as it would seem to many, modest task of mediating between, or reconciling, two distinct aspects of thought, philosophy has only retired during the second half of the century. At the end of the eighteenth, and through the greater part of the first half of the nineteenth century, the pretensions of philosophy, at least in Germany, were of a much higher order. It was nothing less than the attempt to elevate subjects of Faith into subjects of Knowledge. This involved two distinct assumptions which the present age is not generally prepared to allow. The first assumption is: the existence of a distinct and tolerably
well-defined body of beliefs, of a religious faith expressed in a small number of well-defined Articles. The second assumption is: that the human mind is in possession—or at least in confident search—of a method by which these definite and generally accepted Articles of Faith can be rationalised and brought into reasoned connection with the large body of existing natural, scientific, and historical knowledge. These two assumptions, which formed as it were the background of all philosophical speculation in Germany for at least two-thirds of a century, beginning with the year 1770, cannot nowadays be safely taken for granted by any philosophical writer. Both require, to say the least, a preliminary justification based upon a searching analysis.

The task of mediating between two forms of knowledge, or between Knowledge and Faith, was first assigned to philosophy by Leibniz, whose whole literary career was characterised by the endeavour to do justice to different and frequently opposed schools of thought, of science, and of belief; throwing out manifold suggestions whereby a reconciliation might be brought about. In this respect the system of Leibniz, which was only adumbrated by its author but never carried out with any approach to consistency and completeness, stands in direct contrast to that of Spinoza, who put forward a compact body of doctrine which was at once his science, his philosophy, and his religion. For various reasons, which for our present purpose it is not necessary to enumerate, this compact and comprehensive philosophical creation of Spinoza was not at the time either appreciated or even understood. The many existing controversies,
religious, ecclesiastical, political, and scientific, were so prominent and absorbing that the time had not yet arrived for accepting a dogmatic system produced by a solitary thinker, who had retired from contact with the world and acquired that serenity of mind to which the loud assertions of opposed parties presented themselves merely as different modes of one and the same highest truth. Nor had the different existing beliefs in various regions lost that vitality the absence of which would have prepared the thinking and searching mind for the reception of a new truth. In one word, reconciliation of the many scattered views and theories was more wanted than the construction of a new doctrine and theory of life. Thus it came about that the spirit of conciliation, with an optimistic belief in its possibility, which characterised Leibniz' work, was more acceptable and became more popular.

The endeavour to carry out the system which its author had only adumbrated, and to convert it into a teachable doctrine, became the task of the followers of Leibniz, of whom Christian Wolff was the most industrious and successful. The result of Wolff's labours, however, soon proved to be unsatisfactory: the best ideas of Leibniz were on the point of being lost; the work of reconciliation, the higher synthesis, turned out to be merely a shallow compromise. A dry formalism, easy to teach but destructive of the spirit of Leibniz' philosophy, was introduced, which, in the sequel, tended to make philosophy trivial and ridiculous, or to reduce it merely to the dicta of common-sense. The deeper truths which lay hidden in the world of
nature as well as in, what Leibniz termed, the "world of Grace," seemed to be lost or hidden away in an esoteric philosophy which was not taught in the schools. Accordingly the time came when two distinct tasks presented themselves to thinkers—the one in the direction of renewing with more method and circumspection Leibniz' attempt to reconcile knowledge and faith, the other to deepen and enliven both through a more sympathetic study of things pertaining to the natural and external world on the one side, to the individual and spiritual world on the other.

The first of these great tasks rose clearly before the mind of Kant, whose earlier writings were occupied with various problems suggested in Leibniz' philosophy; whose academic teaching followed much in the lines of the Wolffian school; but who, largely through the study of English thinkers, notably of Hume, succeeded in finding a new point of departure.

The second great task was attacked from various sides by thinkers who had freed themselves from the philosophy of the schools, who were not tied down to systematic teaching, and who found in instinctive and intuitive knowledge, gained through an immediate contact with its object, a new source of inspiration.

The new life which was infused into general literature, into science and philosophy alike, came thus from two independent sources, of which the one was eminently, but not exclusively, critical, of which the other was constructive and, in the sequel, became dogmatic.

These two springs of new life, the critical and the creative, stand out in full contrast in the two greatest
representatives of German thought and literature during the latter part of the eighteenth century: in Kant and Goethe. Yet before their genius manifested its greatness and originality through independent critical and poetic creations, the two ways had been prepared, but not clearly separated, by Lessing and Herder, of whom the former was the more critical and accurate, the latter the more original and suggestive. In the persons of Lessing and Herder a theological education secured the religious interest which both maintained throughout their career without attaching themselves to any definite philosophical school or to any narrow denominational confession. Both were actuated by the love of freedom and the spirit of tolerance, in both also there lived the spirit of Leibniz as well as that of Spinoza. They inherited from the former the historical sense and the idea of development in nature and history; in the latter they admired the creative spirit as well as the organising and constructive effort. The special work of philosophy was taken up by Kant with the distinct desire to bring about a reconciliation between science and religion, but in a different manner from that which Leibniz had attempted or which had been adopted by the more enlightened among his followers. They had conceived of faith and religion as consisting in a special knowledge of things spiritual, notably of God and His revelation, of human freedom and immortality. These spiritual truths were contrasted and brought together with what were termed the truths of nature, such as Causality, Necessity, the physical pre-determined law and order of things.
In Kant this problem assumed a different aspect. He prepared the way from the metaphysical to the psychological treatment of the religious problem. Although, in the sequel of his investigations, he dealt with such conceptions as efficient and final causes, the Universal Order, the Divine Being, Freedom of the Will, Immortality of the Soul, and the existence of Evil and Sin, he did not set out with a metaphysical analysis of these, but with the object of defining wherein consisted the mental process of acquiring Knowledge and the mental process and function of Belief. He reduced both to immediate evidence, but to evidence of a different kind; the one being the evidence of the physical senses, the other the evidence of the moral sense, the law of conscience.

Before Kant published his critical examination into the processes of theoretical and practical reasoning and advanced to a suggestion how the two might be brought together and admit of a reasoned religious as well as scientific creed, another thinker had independently taken up the problem from a similar—i.e., from the psychological—point of view. This was F. H. Jacobi, who through his clear and finished style acquired a considerable influence in a wide circle of readers to whom Kant's severe and formal discussions would otherwise have remained inaccessible and repellent.

Jacobi's writings occupy an important place in the history of philosophical though not of systematic thought. It is mostly through his criticism of the Kantian doctrine that he succeeded in defining his own position and acquired considerable popularity. But, like Fichte after
him, he had approached independently the great problem of philosophy, the religious problem, before he experienced the influence of Kant's writings. Jacobi may be counted among the philosophers of common-sense. He never admitted that the dualism of reasoned and intuitive knowledge could be overcome. He was influenced by English thinkers, such as Shaftesbury, Locke, and Hume, but his conception of sense was not the narrow meaning of the word. Sense meant for him likewise sentiment. The earlier writings through which he became known would have classed him with the novelists. The influence of English writers, such as Richardson and Goldsmith, is quite apparent, but in addition to this he also came early under the influence of the writings of Rousseau through his acquaintance with the Genevese philosophers Le Sage and Bonnet.

Jacobi had not only common-sense, he had also sentiment and sensitiveness. A pure nature with a high moral tone, he nevertheless inclined towards an æsthetical view of morality, and thus it came that both the sentimental and æsthetical side of his nature combined to put him in opposition to Kant, to whom common-sense was intellectually insufficient and whose ethical system was based exclusively upon the ideas of duty and obligation. Jacobi was a divided nature, and he made no attempt to bring the two sides of his philosophy into reasoned agreement—in fact, he maintained that such dualism was unavoidable and inherent in the human mind. He had a considerable personal and literary influence on other thinkers such as Goethe, Fichte, and Schleiermacher, but they all
passed out of the phase which his thought represents and sought for that unity of thought and feeling which he himself considered to be unattainable by human reason.

In fact, the position which Jacobi occupied could not in the long-run be maintained. It marks a transitional phase, a compromise, and was as such indicative of a want of confidence in the powers of the human mind to solve its greatest and fundamental problem. Thus Goethe separated from him because he felt that in his own poetical conception of nature he had discovered that unity and harmony, that comprehensive aspect, which Jacobi himself never reached. Fichte went beyond him, or rather absorbed the truth of Jacobi's philosophy of Belief, in a higher conception of Faith and Religion, which he developed in his later philosophical writings. And, lastly, so far as Jacobi's actual religious position was concerned, he never arrived at a definition of the relation of natural (rational) and historical (revealed) religion. He looked upon both as a revelation.

Now, what was termed Natural Religion—whether such a body of doctrine can be reasonably established or not—has certainly never exerted a lasting moral or spiritual influence unless it has attached itself to some historical or traditional authority. Thus we find that Schleiermacher, in the course of his philosophical development, took up more and more the position of a teacher and interpreter of Christian dogmatics and ethics. And in the hands of some of Schleiermacher's successors, notably of Albrecht Ritschl, we find that the reliance on natural religion, on a philosophical as dis-
tungished from the positive Christian creed, has been finally abandoned.

Had Jacobi been an academic teacher and forced as such to systematise and define his ideas more exactly, these ideas could not have remained in that fragmentary and transitory condition in which they exercised considerable influence on other independent and original thinkers while never rising to a leading position in philosophical thought in general.

This leading position was, at the time, held by Kant, whose line of reasoning became so much more fruitful because it contained not one but several suggestions how a unification of thought and knowledge might be attained. In this respect it supplied notably three definite ideas. All three have been fixed by philosophical terms which Kant introduced, which were taken up by his followers, and which have been permanently incorporated in philosophical language.

The first directing thought is to be found in the first of Kant's 'Critiques.' It is there termed "the unity of apperception of the intellect." After having adopted that psychological or subjective view of the whole of our theoretical knowledge which maintains that it is made up of ideas, it finds the unity of this aggregate or sequence of ideas in the unity of the apperceiving mind, in which attention, memory, and imagination play the leading part. Yet in opposition to this subjective or psychological unity of thought and knowledge there remains impressed on the mind the apparent unity and order of an external world. This Kant could never explain or explain away. It remained as a limiting conception, as
"the Thing in itself." The very attempt to find the unity of knowledge in the subjective principle led to a dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal.

The second unifying principle in Kant's philosophy is to be found in the second 'Critique': it is the moral law, "the categorical imperative," commonly called Conscience. And inasmuch as this was something different from the purely intellectual unity of apperception, it presented itself as the principle of Reality in the life of the human mind in addition and frequently in opposition to the purely phenomenal world of impressions, desires, and feelings revealed by introspection. And the relation of this categorical imperative, of this point of reference, to the purely empirical, accidental, and contingent flow of ideas, desires, and feelings, suggested that the principle underlying it, the human Will, indicated likewise the nature of that reality in the outer world which the first 'Critique' had retained in the limiting conception of the "Thing in itself."

Lastly, the third of Kant's 'Critiques' dealt with the reconciliation of the "mechanical connection of things," indicated and governed by the law of Causation, with the teleological view which the human mind inevitably forms: the conception of an end and purpose. It is the governing principle in our æsthetical view of nature, and it occurs likewise as a regulative principle, as a sign-post indicating the direction by following which the mind may discover the causal or mechanical connection of things. It is the "intellectual Intuition" of the artist, the inventor, and the discoverer.

The first great thinker who appreciated these im-
important suggestions contained in Kant’s ‘Critiques’ and set himself to follow out the trains of reasoning which they indicated was Fichte. He did not propose merely to criticise Kant’s doctrine or to take up single points, as had been done by others; he proposed to think out the Kantian scheme to its completion and to bring together the different lines of reasoning. But in addition to the Kantian philosophy there was another and distinct philosophical influence which made itself felt in Fichte’s system. This influence came through the renewed study of Spinoza’s works, which had been cultivated outside and before the appearance of the Kantian philosophy by many prominent and original thinkers in Germany. It formed the subject of an interesting conversation which Jacobi had with Lessing shortly before the death of the latter and before the appearance, in the same year, of Kant’s first ‘Critique.’ Jacobi himself published later an account of this conversation, and also an exposition of Spinoza’s system as well as of that of Hume; and there is no doubt that through these writings, which interested a much larger circle than did the writings of Kant, the philosophical horizon was greatly widened.

Since that time three distinct philosophical aspects have exerted a changing and recurrent influence upon all the most important Continental thought. These three aspects are identified with the names of Kant, Spinoza, and Leibniz. It may be said that Kant and Spinoza dominate the earlier, Kant and Leibniz the later, philosophy of the century.

Still more than was the case with Kant and Jacobi
did the religious problem occupy and stimulate the early speculations of Fichte. Hesitating for a time whether he would be a religious or a philosophical teacher, he finally entered the academic career, in which he became a great moral, religious, and political power; and the religious interest asserted itself in a still greater degree in the later of his published works and in his later courses of lectures.

The first of his writings, which at once made him celebrated, was a Critique, written in the Kantian spirit, of the conception of historical Revelation—a problem which had been discussed already by Lessing in his Treatise on the ‘Education of Humanity,’ but which at that time had not yet been dealt with by Kant himself.

In opposition to the doctrine of the inherent goodness of the natural man, proclaimed by Rousseau, and also to the rationalistic conception of Christianity as a purely moral code, Fichte dealt in his Treatise with the much deeper problem of Sin, Evil, and Redemption. And thus he showed a greater understanding of the religious problem than was current in the existing rationalistic and sentimental literature of the day. Fichte was, however, forced into opposition with the orthodox section, as was Lessing before him, through attacks of the former, largely provoked by jealousy of his rising academic influence and of the novel spirit which he infused into university life. Inspired as Fichte was by a belief in the omnipotence and omnipresence of the Divine Spirit, which he conceived to be the Moral Order, he nevertheless could not reconcile
with his view the attributes of personality. These he conceived as being indissolubly connected with the limitations of human persons. Throughout the whole of his philosophy he never adopted that term as expressive of his deepest and highest religious conviction, however much he may have gradually found a philosophical expression for the moral Truths of the Christian religion.

If we now inquire how Fichte, in addition to the religious problem which directed all his thought, dealt with the more technical philosophical problem, the unification of thought or knowledge, we find that he takes up Kant's position. But instead of asking, how is experience possible? he puts the deeper question, how is consciousness or self-consciousness possible? And while Kant's first answer to his question was, "by the unity of apperception," Fichte put the question more pertinently, how is this unity of apperception or of consciousness possible, i.e., thinkable and intelligible? And the answer which he gave to this question was: "through an original act or activity." He thus at once seized upon the link between the unity of the theoretical and that of the practical reason, which in Kant's system was indeed suggested but not clearly and consistently established. At the same time he threw overboard, as unnecessary and misleading, the idea of an additional external unity of the "Thing in itself," which had remained as a limiting idea in Kant's system.1

1 The fundamental practical idea first clearly stated by Fichte, that a moral purpose must form the explanation of every satisfactory analysis of the stages and development, not only of practical, but also of theoretical reason, has survived and come forward again and
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 627

In addition to this Fichte also took up the question of the ultimate source of knowledge and certainty of any kind. This he found in immediate evidence, or what he terms "an intellectual intuition." By this he meant that the beginning of all thought is a self-evidence, an intuition, or, as others would say, a Belief. Kant had already made use of this term in his third 'Critique'; but it was there suggested rather as contradictory to the view developed in his two earlier

again in the philosophy of the nineteenth century, and in this respect thinkers of very different schools, such as Lotze, Jodl, Eucken, and even Bradley, remind us continually of Fichte's philosophical ideals. In the working out of this highest philosophical programme, brought home to us again in the Lecture Syl-labus of Prof. Sorley ('Gifford Lectures,' 1914, i. 1), the abstruse and forbidding terminology and analysis of Fichte's esoteric writings has been forgotten. Nevertheless it is impossible to read the exposition of such thinkers as the late Prof. Robert Adamson in this country, and still more of Prof. Windelband in Germany, and not to recognise that modern psychology is approaching the same problem in a less ambitious but possibly more promising manner. For a clear understanding I would recommend those who are deterred by Fichte's own expositions, which seem never to have given him full satisfaction, to read the chapter on Fichte in Adamson's 'Lectures on Modern Philosophy' (ed. by W. R. Sor-ley, 1903, vol. i. pp. 253-263), and the luminous chapters in Windelband's 'Die Blütezeit der Deutschen Philosophie' (2nd vol. of the 'History of Modern Philo-sophy,' 4th ed. 1907, §§ 63 and 67). Windelband says: "From the fundamental principle of Fichte's doctrine there follows a result which places it, with all its dialectic consequences, in irreconcilable contrast with the common-sense view of things. It is better to mark this contrast quite clearly than to hide it; it contains the ultimate reason for all that has appeared and still appears paradoxical in the idealistic philosophy. The naive consciousness can think of a function (process) only as the state or the activity of a functioning being. In whatever way this relation is represented, the ordinary way of reasoning thinks, first of things, and then of functions which they carry out. Fichte's doctrine turns this relation upside down: what we term 'things' it looks upon as products of activities. If we look upon activities as something which presupposes Being, for Fichte all Being is merely a product of an original doing. Function without a functioning something is for him the ultimate metaphysical principle." A direction of thought similar to this recurs again and again in modern philosophy—e.g., in Wundt's critical destruction of the conception of substance, in the Energetics of Ostwald and others, in M. Bergson's conception of motion, &c.
works. Fichte uses it in the sense that all thought, all knowledge, and all philosophy rest upon the unity of consciousness, which cannot be demonstrated, but which is felt. In the sequel Schelling adopted the term as denoting the identity of a thinking subject with the object of its thought. This use of the term Fichte repudiated, and based upon it his emphatic denunciation of Schelling's system as distinguished from his own.

If, as I stated above, Kant took the first step from the metaphysical and dogmatic to the psychological treatment of the philosophical problem, Fichte took a further step. To him, even more distinctly than to Kant, the unity of knowledge exists and is to be realised in the inner region of self-consciousness. In Kant this Self appears only as the inner point of reference, the unity of apperception; in Fichte it appears as an active principle, as the first and fundamental act of a thinking mind. Self-consciousness is not merely a point of reference, it is an act of affirmation, of self-assertion.

It may here be remarked that the terminology employed by Fichte is unfortunate and misleading, more so even than that of Kant. In the use of the term "ich" (I or ego), we seem to be left in uncertainty whether by this term is meant the Self as one among other selves, or some condition of thought or feeling common to every thinking human being. In the latter sense no doubt Kant used the different terms of his analysis, such as Reason, Understanding, Imagination, &c. There was no attempt to take note of individual differences — in fact, Kant's analysis was ultimately founded upon the abstract psychology and logic of the
schools and the text-books. Fichte distinctly explains that in speaking of the Self, which he unfortunately calls "ego," he neither deals with psychological and logical data nor with the individual. He refers only to that which has to take place in every thinking mind as the condition of thought and knowledge.

Now it is quite evident that such a position is difficult to realise and still more difficult to maintain, and that it suggests two departures: the first lies in the direction of conceiving of this "ego" or self as the deeper-lying ground of the individual self which appears actually in many examples, as the one universal spirit of which the individual spirits are merely different manifestations. And the fact that Fichte himself, in many instances, introduces the word "God" when speaking of the centre and root of self-consciousness, gave to subsequent thought that direction which has been termed Pantheistic, and brought it near to the view developed in Spinoza's system.

The other departure from the untenable position of the Fichtean "ego" or self lies in the direction of the conception of a number or society of many different selves or human beings.

These two departures suggested by the abstract formulary of Fichte's philosophy have their final expression, on the one side in the system of Hegel, on the other side in a reversion to the monadism of Leibniz. And the latter is again differentiated on the one hand into the atomistic conception on which all purely scientific or mechanical explanations are founded, and on the other hand into the essentially Leibnizian
spiritualism which admits into its scheme the idea of personality, an idea which Fichte himself never admitted into his system. An adequate analysis of this conception forms one of the principal features in Lotze’s speculation.

Both these later aspects, that of Hegel and that of Lotze, are suggested by many passages of Fichte’s writings. But before they were systematically developed respectively in the first and second third of the century, other influences came into play which produced special systems of thought. These stand somewhat outside of the main current of German speculation. They gave rise to no independent philosophical schools, though their special doctrines had important influence in philosophy, science, and literature. The more prominent among these are: the succeeding phases of Schelling’s philosophy, the compact and isolated system of Schopenhauer, and the religious philosophy of Schleiermacher.

The interest which prompted Schelling in his earliest philosophical speculations was not in the same degree a religious interest as was the case with Fichte before and Hegel after him. But he brought two other interests to bear upon philosophical thought, the poetical or artistic and the historical interest. In the course of his subsequent developments his receptive mind assimilated, in an original manner, much of earlier and contemporary thought, and led him ultimately into the depths of the religious problem at a time when historical research had opened out in many directions new and wider vistas of inquiry.

Schelling was thirteen years younger than Fichte, and
was for a time his follower and fellow-worker, but he soon separated from him when it became necessary to give a more exact definition to the unifying principle which, as it seemed to him, was vaguely and unsatisfactorily conceived by Fichte as self-consciousness or expressed by the repellent term "ego." Schelling, among others, was early led to see the humorous side of Fichte’s terminology, and he, as well as the literary society in which he moved, was hardly able to appreciate the moral force and strenuous character of Fichte’s personality and doctrine. It seemed to them too rigid, and as such deficient from a poetical and artistic point of view. This want of sympathy led to an early estrangement, which found expression in polemical outbursts from both sides. The poetical side of Schelling’s mind found satisfaction in Goethe’s love of nature, in what may be termed the naturalism of Goethe’s poetry. Schelling also came into contact with eminent naturalists, and was especially interested in the new discoveries by Galvani and Volta, as well as in Animal Magnetism, which seemed to promise unexpected insight into some of the mysterious phenomena of living matter. To Schelling’s nature the philosophy of Fichte therefore appeared too abstract and logical, too rigorous and forceful: precisely the qualities which recommended it to minds of a different stamp and really secured for it a great personal influence.

Looking now at the ultimate philosophical problem, which, as I said before, did not present itself to Schelling with the religious interest it had for Kant and Fichte, the problem of the unity of thought and knowledge, we find the point which marks Schelling’s
departure from the position of Fichte in a suggestion made by the latter himself.

In one of the earliest of his many introductions and expositions of his doctrine, published in the year 1794, Fichte had dealt with the problem, how can we represent to ourselves the fact of consciousness—i.e., of the knowledge of self? how is self-consciousness possible? and finding that this fact implies the conscious distinction of a self and a not-self, he infers that the first act of the mind or intellect, which he conceives as an active principle, is the differentiation of subject and object, of self and not-self. This distinction presupposes a condition in which these two opposites were still undifferentiated, merged into one. This undifferentiated condition is the state of unconsciousness. Consciousness emerges or rises out of unconsciousness by an act of the unconscious self. Fichte's whole interest lay in the development of the conscious self, which, after the process of differentiation, possessed, as it were, the greater share of reality, in as much as the fundamental active principle had now become a free and self-conscious will with an object to work upon. But this was not the only possible view. The centre of gravity might not necessarily lie on one side of the duality of subject and object, it might lie, as it were, between the two, it might be the point of identity or indifference; also it might lie on the other side, in the not-self, in that region of facts and experience which the intellect looks upon as the outer world or as Nature. And inasmuch as this outer world appears as a separate existence detached from the thinking self which retires into the position of a mere beholder,
the question may be asked, how does the thinking or conscious self, the intellect, develop out of the apparently unthinking and unconscious world that surrounds it and of which it knows itself to be a part? This is the position of common-sense and of all natural science, which is ultimately founded upon common-sense.

Schelling, in his philosophical development, goes half-way to meet this position occupied by the natural sciences. He cannot forget that the train of reasoning from Kant to Fichte emphasised the fact that the external world exists for us only in the subjective image which it occupies in our own contemplating (and active) mind, and he cannot lose sight of what Kant and Fichte demonstrated to be the characteristic feature of the intellect: the unity of apperception with the former, the fundamental act of the intellect produced by, and rising into, a conscious free will, with the latter. It was thus an easy step, but one which Fichte did not approve of, to consider this active principle, of which we become aware as Will, to exist likewise in the outer world—in fact, in the whole of the universe or creation. This idea was further supported by an argument suggested in Kant's third 'Critique.' Kant there deals with the apparent existence of End and Purpose or of Design in the things of nature: he also brings this into relation with the æsthetic judgment which recognises standards of Taste and Value. He stops there, however, considering the conception of design in nature as merely a regulative principle in human thought. Schelling went a step further: he considered it as the indication of a real and active
principle, of that universal agency which in the sphere of the individual mind appears as conscious free will.

As stated above, the discovery, during that age, of animal electricity and magnetism seemed to open out an entirely new region of research wherein to explore and explain the phenomena of life. Thus it became for Schelling a necessity to look upon nature from a philosophical or idealistic point of view, and this was to be a counterpart to the purely realistic, empirical, and mechanical study of nature. Further, he found encouragement towards this undertaking in the spiritual side of Leibniz' philosophy and in Leibniz' doctrine of development, as he significantly points out in one of his earliest Tracts referring to the Fichtean form of philosophy (1797).  

We now see how the position occupied by Kant and prepared by British philosophy before him is gradually, almost imperceptibly, being abandoned. I said above that Kant among Continental philosophers took the first step in the direction of the psychological view of the great philosophical problem. We may now define this more exactly by saying that it was not psychological in the sense which the term conveys at the present day, mainly as a result of the independent and original psychological labours in this country. But it was a step in that direction, inasmuch as it was introspective. More than that: it was essentially self-reliant. It was so, not only in relation to the solution of the intellectual problem, but still more so in

1 Schelling, 'Werke,' I., vol. i. p. 443.
relation to the moral problem. And this, taken in a religious and higher ethical meaning, was the main interest and the main outcome of Kant's and Fichte's teaching; of the latter even more so than of the former, owing to the great part which Fichte played in the higher intellectual and educational work of the nation and the age. With him speculation had led to a philosophy of action. The characteristics of his nature were a strong will and character carrying through its intellectual and practical schemes with relentless logic and a rigorous moral instinct and purpose.

Fichte was unable from his strictly logical point of view to admit of that break of continuity which is demanded by the position on to which the mind of Schelling was gradually moving: the admission that you must look at things from two entirely different points of view, both equally legitimate, the external and the internal or introspective. His own rigorous logic had led Fichte up to the point where the light of consciousness emerges out of the night and darkness of the unconscious. At this point you must either be prepared to accept another and fundamentally opposed aspect or abandon as unintelligible the great world of external nature of which the introspective self after all forms only a part, in which it is—in the form of human individuals or persons—merely a special, though perhaps the highest and most interesting, phenomenon.

In choosing the former of these two possible courses, Schelling did no more than pay a tribute to the dualism.
common-sense view; but in doing so he also introduced again that dualism, that twofold way of looking at every phenomenon, which had, as it seemed, been overcome by the Kantian and Fichtean introspective or transcendental method.

The highest formal problem of philosophy, the unification of thought and of knowledge, upon which depended, according to the conviction of many of the foremost minds of that age, the solution of the religious problem, the establishment of a reasoned creed, seemed for the moment lost in uncertainty. A second and even more important problem arose accordingly out of the recognition of this dualism. An effort, it was felt, must be made to show that it did not indicate merely a point of indifference confronting the thinking mind with the unknowable and forcing it into a confession of ignorance. For such more modern conclusions that age, with its undaunted belief in the powers of the human intellect, was not ripe nor prepared. The conviction forced itself upon the philosophical thought of the age that this point of indifference, the identity of subject and object, afforded a glimpse into an underlying Unity, into the truly Real, a revelation of the Absolute. Accordingly Schelling introduces this idea into his system and conceives of the two sides of existence, of the life of nature and of the life of mind, as the unfolding of the underlying ground which he terms the Absolute, and which he further on identifies with the Divine principle. At this point he approaches the position classically represented by Spinoza’s system; but at the same time
he advances a step beyond Spinoza inasmuch as he includes the idea of development, the historical becoming, in the physical as well as in the mental world. He introduces into philosophy the historical spirit. This had in his time made great progress both in France and Germany, and this in the study of natural as well as of mental phenomena. It signified a recognition of the Leibnizian point of view. Whereas in the system of Spinoza, the inner and the outer world, the order of ideas and the order of things, were placed parallel to each other and conceived as the two known aspects of the appearance of the Divine principle, with Schelling the two developments of nature and mind were placed in succession: the first being conceived as preparatory to the latter, the latter the consummation and explication of the former. And Schelling introduced into his scheme, which assimilated ideas taken from earlier thinkers, likewise the artistic or poetical view of which Plato was the great exponent in antiquity. Being the first among the great modern philosophers in Germany who came from the poetic South, with a poetic trait in his own nature and style, he appreciated above all that poetic comprehension of nature which found such a classical representative in Goethe. In the mind of the latter the intuitive intellect, at which Kant had merely hinted, had become a reality, and thus we find that Schelling, in quest of an expression for the unity, identity, and harmony which he conceived to be the essence of Reality, inclined at one period of his speculation to see this actually attained, or to be
attained, in Art and Poetry. With this conception he, with some of the foremost representatives of the Romantic school, abandoned the purely ethical conception of the world-order, which, under the influence of Kant, dominated the contemporary philosophy of Fichte; who, on his part, was not slow to warn his hearers and readers against the danger of this new departure of his former disciple.

If we now pause for a moment to consider the great change which had come over philosophical thought in Germany at the beginning of the century, we realise that this consisted as much in a widening of the philosophical horizon and a deepening of philosophical insight as in a dangerous unsettlement of the philosophical mind. The unity of doctrine and of purpose which characterised the philosophy of the schools for a short time after the appearance of Kant's first 'Critique,' had in the course of twenty years been gradually lost. There was now a great abundance of philosophies, each professing to have found or to be in the way of finding the true Foundation. They were all governed by the formal aim of philosophical speculation, that of the unification of thought. They were all more or less guided by a desire to solve the highest problem of the age, the reconciliation of the truths of science and the truths of faith; science being conceived in the larger sense of the word peculiar to the German mind, faith still meaning the essential truths of the Christian religion. The scientific did not then mean the opposite of the religious spirit, but desired rather to include and incorporate it.
Atheism and irreligion were indeed spoken of, and this in connection both with Fichte's and Schelling's deliverances, but this meant rather an opposition to the narrow and dry formalism of the existing orthodox section of the Protestant Church doctrine than any approach to the scoffing spirit represented in France by Voltaire, and in Germany, unfortunately, by Voltaire's friend and disciple, Frederick the Great. It was at a much later date that this spirit of indifference or of animosity entered into German thought and literature. The greatest poet and the greatest thinkers of the age were still bent upon seeking and finding the Divine principle which permeated all nature as well as all the spheres of human life.

The unsettlement of philosophic thought just referred to found nowhere a larger expression than in the many changing aspects under which new ideas presented themselves to the mind and in the writings of Schelling and in the general vagueness and inconclusiveness of his reasoning. Fruitful as he was in finding ever new moulds wherein to cast and express his deepest philosophic aspirations, his teaching was apt to lead his disciples into seemingly promising but actually barren by-paths. This brought upon him deserved and undeserved attacks, provoking from him sometimes unedifying and undignified rejoinders. Obscured by these the true merits of his thought were soon forgotten, and it is only within quite recent times that attention has again been drawn to the historical importance of his labours. His philosophy was essentially prospective and suggestive. It contained the
programme of the whole thought of the century, and it is not without significance that of all the philosophies which then ruled in Germany, his alone gained at that time European influence: through Coleridge in England, through Victor Cousin in France, through his 'Philosophy of Nature' in several European countries.

The controversy into which Fichte was drawn through the attacks of narrow-minded and jealous opponents had given prominence to the religious problem and to the position which contemporary philosophic thought had taken up with regard to it. This was still further accentuated by the appearance in the last year of the eighteenth century of Schleiermacher's Addresses. Their main object was to gain renewed attention, on the part of cultured readers, for the religious problem, through bringing it into intimate connection with recent speculation. It made manifest, among other things, the deep religious spirit which inspired Spinoza's system, a subject which, as already stated, had come under discussion largely through the influence of Jacobi's writings.

These Addresses discussed, not so much special religious or theological doctrines, as the psychological facts connected with and exhibited by the religious and believing mind. Schleiermacher there propounded his well-known psychological explanation of the religious attitude of the human mind as being rooted in a feeling of dependence. In the sequel of his expositions he gave to this view a distinctly pantheistic expression, something similar to what has in recent times been termed "cosmic emotion." It depended upon the attitude of the human
mind to the totality of things, to the Universe. The universe was not, however, at that time and in that school of thought, conceived in the naturalistic sense which has gradually supervened in the course of the nineteenth century in consequence of the great progress and popular influence of the natural sciences. The totality of things, or the Universe, was decidedly, though somewhat vaguely, considered to be spiritual, with an equally decided bias in the direction of identifying the spiritual with the intellectual. To this intellectual definition Schelling, indeed, influenced largely by Goethe, had added the poetical or artistic conception; Schleiermacher, on his part, urged more distinctly the emotional.

Schleiermacher's Addresses mark another important step towards the introspective or psychological treatment of philosophical problems. They represent, moreover, one among many efforts made at that time to maintain philosophical discussions at a higher level, to prevent them from falling back into that formalism and triviality into which they had sunk during the age of so-called enlightenment, and out of which Kant had raised them into a higher sphere.

We see then how many interests and influences, how many new ideas, how many theoretical and practical tendencies were then at work. To outside beholders, to the younger and ardent minds, especially at the German universities, the aspect must indeed have been bewildering.

What was wanted more than anything else was to concentrate the many rays of new light into a focus, to
bring together again into a system what was in danger of being lost—and what was in many individual instances actually lost—the intellectual achievements of the age, to gather up the many suggestions into a comprehensive whole, to find a uniting principle and a method by which it could be traced in its many-sided workings, by which it could also be communicated as a great truth to young and aspiring minds. To do this required a last and supreme effort. For such an effort, for its reception and appreciation, the age was fully prepared. This effort was made by Hegel; and the foregoing remarks are merely intended to explain how his work gained that enormous influence which to us, who have again descended to a lower and more prosaic level, might well-nigh seem inexplicable.

The writings through which Hegel made his mark and defined his position in philosophical literature belong to the first decade of the nineteenth century. He was then over thirty, having been born in 1770, five years before Schelling. He had spent fully ten years in maturing his ideas. The greater part of what he wrote during those years, but did not publish, has since come to light, partly in the 'Life' by Rosenkranz, published in 1844; more fully in quite recent times.

A most instructive analysis of these preparatory studies has been given to us by Dilthey, with that fulness of knowledge and deep insight into the history of thought so characteristic of all his works. Hegel did not wait as long as Kant had done before he published his greatest work. The 'Phenomenology of the Human Mind' thus exhibits more of youthful inspiration and
ardour than Kant's first 'Critique'; but it, as well as the articles which he contributed to several philosophical periodicals in the first years of the century, contains also much more than Kant's writings did of the polemical spirit. Hegel's early writings abound in personal attacks, sometimes without mentioning the name of his opponent. Some of these virulent criticisms were toned down in later writings. This is notably the case as regards Jacobi, who at first came in for much criticism, but whose position Hegel fully appreciated after Jacobi had been subjected to the exaggerated denunciations of Schelling. With the latter Hegel had corresponded and co-operated up to the appearance of the 'Phenomenology,' but in the preface to that work he clearly explains his altered point of view, and in a passage which has become celebrated denounces Schelling's philosophy as vague and unscientific.

Hegel's preparation for his great philosophical performance consisted as much in a study of ancient Greek philosophy as in that of the sacred writings. Before he was thirty he wrote for himself, but did not publish, a 'Life of Jesus,' the earliest and by no means the least remarkable of those many attempts in modern literature to grasp, in a philosophical spirit, the essence of Christianity and comprehend the personality of its Founder. So far as Hegel's purely philosophical writings are concerned, the two tasks, the formal and the material, which I have defined above, are clearly and prominently before his mind: the unification of knowledge and the relation of philosophy and religion. But with Hegel both these problems have assumed their more modern
aspect as the unification of thought and the relation between religious faith and speculative reason. Both, also, have received a psychological formulation, though Hegel's psychology was not that of the individual mind but that of the mind conceived in a much wider, more objective meaning of the term, a meaning which he himself has done more than any other thinker to impress indelibly upon a large section of subsequent historical literature.

But another change had come over philosophical thought since the time of Kant, and this comes out most clearly in Hegel's own writings. In spite of all protests philosophy had again become dogmatic. What had happened to Descartes and his followers happened to the followers of Kant. From the sceptical and critical attitude introduced by Kant, philosophy had again reverted to the dogmatic assertion of a definite principle or underlying conviction. In this was to be found the solution of the philosophical problem. Jacobi and Fichte had already pointed to immediate evidence as the beginning of all knowledge. Schelling had adopted Kant's and Fichte's idea of intellectual intuition. In spite of his unsparing attacks on the indefiniteness of these positions, Hegel himself starts in his first great work with the assertion of a definite thesis, the truth of which he tries to establish in the body of his work by a process of reasoning which is at once psychological, in the wider meaning of the word, and historical.

The principle upon which Hegel's philosophy is founded, the ever-recurring thought of his speculation, is this: the Absolute is Spirit. To this we must add
the further thesis: the Absolute is not a transcendent, it is an immanent principle, it manifests itself in the existing world, it is realised in nature and especially in human history. It is not a substance, in the sense of Spinoza, but an activity, a process; it is not stationary, an unchangeable reality, but development. In the two theses, that the Absolute is Spirit and that it is development, is to be found, as Kuno Fischer has said, the whole of Hegel's philosophy.

I have on a former occasion pointed out that the word which Hegel uses to denote this fundamental principle, the German word Geist, has for an English reader a double meaning—for it means "mind" as well as "spirit." This is unfortunate for the real comprehension of Hegel's philosophy, and much ambiguity, a whole host of controversies and misunderstandings, would have been avoided had the different meanings of the word been kept separate or sufficiently explained. The fact that Hegel, following Fichte and Schelling in this respect, frequently identifies the Absolute with the Divine principle, with the God of Religion, suggests to his readers that he conceives it to be a personal mind or spirit, a personality. On the other side, the fact that he also calls it the Subject, leads one to think that he is speaking of the human mind, of the Self of Fichte and Schelling, as differentiated from the not-self. And again, his use of the term "objective mind" leads one to infer that the principle of philosophy may be conceived as a thought, as an idea, intelligible to the human mind, and which is at work in the world of nature, and especially in the world of history and
of conscious individual human life. In fact, Hegel's 
\textit{Geist} means alternately one or more of three definite 
things expressed in the English language by Spirit, 
Mind, and Thought or Idea.

To the principle, to the main conception of his 
philosophy, to the underlying conviction which had in 
Hegel's mind, through prolonged and deep studies, 
acquired a propelling and assertive force, we are in-
troduced in the Preface and the Introduction to the 
'Phenomenology'; he there promises to lead us up 
to a comprehension of the result as well as the be-
ginning of the new philosophy by an analysis which is 
at once introspective and historical. Having attained 
that position, having as it were closed the circle, having 
learnt how the result coincides with the starting-point, 
we are promised that in the actual system the unfolding 
of the Absolute in the different regions of nature, life, 
mind, and history, of art, religion, and philosophy, shall 
be deductively exhibited. In performing these two 
great tasks: the lifting up of the thinking mind to a 
level from which it can clearly conceive of the Absolute 
as Spirit or Mind, and the following of this principle 
into its many manifestations, Hegel employs two definite 
schemes or formulæ of thought which he has adopted 
from his predecessors Schelling and Fichte. They form 
the celebrated dialectical method of his philosophy, 
which he distinctly states to be teachable and com-
municable, unlike that of Schelling and others, which 
was a sort of intuition or feeling, and which Hegel 
treats with contempt.
The two conceptions which govern this method may be defined as follows:

In the first place, every thought can be expressed in a definite sentence, or thesis. The further analysis, explanation, or illustration of this thesis leads to an assertion of something else, to a distinguishing of the content of the thesis from something else outside of it. It is a process of distinguishing or differentiation. This may be termed the antithesis. And a third step may be taken, and in many cases is inevitably taken, a position is gained from which both the thesis and the antithesis, both the affirmation in the former and the negation in the latter, are brought together in a synthesis.

This represents a very common way of explaining any subject, be this a definite thing in the outer world or some abstract notion in the thinking mind. You first try in some way or other to bring yourself, your readers or hearers, face to face with the subject you are dealing with. You then direct attention to the difference of your subject from other things, and then you try to show how this single subject is comprised with other things, which it is not, in some larger complex. This process can be repeated: taking the complex subject which you have arrived at, and which exhibits many differences, you can again differentiate it from other complexes, with which it forms still larger complexes; and this process can be repeated till you have arrived at an exhaustive view of the whole, the totality of things, the universe, the world, or by whatever term you wish to define it.
This method of proceeding had already been resorted to by Fichte. As I have stated it, it appears to be simply a process of applied logic, a merely formal procedure of thought. But this merely formal character is, as it were, relieved and made more significant by bringing in that idea which, as I stated above, is at the root of all idealistic philosophy, forming as it were its deep-seated belief or dogma. This is the conception that everything, the world of nature as well as the world of mind, things as they are and things as they have developed in time, are the manifestations of some underlying reality, of the truly real, which is the ground and root of everything.

If this conviction be added to the foregoing scheme the latter at once becomes fraught with some deeper meaning. Anything that is now the subject of thought is only a point, as it were, in the great universe, in the totality of things; it is that upon which, for the moment, the light of thought is thrown, the limited, local, and maybe casual manifestation of the underlying reality.

In the second process, in the antithesis, light is thrown on that which surrounds the point on which our attention has been concentrated; our view and comprehension is as it were enlarged and enriched by looking round at other subjects. The process of differentiation is one of enlargement and enrichment of thought. And lastly, the bringing together of the scattered elements and fragments by a synthesis signifies that we reassert that essential unity of everything which had, for the moment, escaped our attention in
the distracting diversity of many things or many thoughts. Now this synthesis, as it does not really destroy the manifoldness of things as they present themselves to our contemplating mind, is possible only by an abstraction, i.e., in the region of the Idea. Thus the first step we take is to form some idea which, more than a single thing or observation, experience or thought, represents the *ensemble* or "together" of things, the unity of the underlying ground; it is a first, maybe a very elementary and primitive conception of what this underlying reality is. As we repeat this process, however, we gain more and more elevated expressions or ideas of the Absolute; or, to express it in other words, the idea which we form of the Absolute becomes fuller and more comprehensive, approaching nearer and nearer to its actual nature or essence.

If we now combine this whole scheme in its formal, as well as in its more substantial meaning, with the conviction expressed in an extreme form by Fichte, that the Absolute reveals itself in the first conscious activity of a thinking subject, we arrive at the view that the actual unfolding of the truly Real or the Absolute is of the nature of the thinking process which the human mind is carrying on in itself: further, that the several stages of logical thought are essentially of the same nature as the several stages of the actual development of reality—in fact, we look upon logic, i.e., the canons and categories of human thought, as indicating the succeeding stages of the development of the world-ground or the Divine Logos; a conception which, since the appearance of Neoplatonism in antiquity, has reasserted
itself again and again in modern philosophy. Schelling had, notably in his philosophy of nature as well as in that of mind, coined a new and suggestive term; he speaks of the ascending "powers" or "potencies" in which the Absolute is manifested. It was a combination of Fichte's subjective analysis of consciousness with this idea of Schelling, out of which there arose the more definite scheme of Hegel, according to which the development of the world-ground, of the truly Real or the Absolute, is comprehended by us human beings in the different stages of thought: the Logos, the world-mind, becomes intelligible to the human mind through its own thinking process, and the necessities of thought are merely a manifestation of the actual connection of things in their process of development.

"The dialectical method was developed by Hegel with great virtuosity. He lets every notion fall into its opposite and shows how out of this contradiction a higher notion results: and this again experiences the same fate, it finds its antithesis which requires a still higher synthesis. The master has shown in the application of this method—notably in the 'Phenomenology' and in the 'Logic'—an astounding wealth of knowledge, a unique and delicate sense for logical connections and a victorious power of synthetic reasoning, though, it must be said, the depth of thought leads occasionally to obscurity or to merely verbal distinctions." ¹

This wealth of knowledge, this faculty of finding out hidden connections, logical, psychological, and historical,

¹ Windelband, 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' 4th ed., 1907, p. 496.
thus offering manifold suggestions for the comprehension and interpretation of things and events in their actual and historical "together," is the real secret of Hegel's genius; through it he stimulated many thinking minds who, in the manifold and broad regions notably of historical research, approached their subject with the conviction of its unity, of its deeper sense and meaning, and of the existence of governing ideas. This influence ruled for a time supreme and produced remarkable results.

In most cases the logical scheme which Hegel exalted was gradually dropped in its application. On the other side, those who called themselves disciples of Hegel and formed the Hegelian school, in the narrower sense of the word, emphasised unduly this dialectical process, and contributed, through their dry and monotonous rhythm of thought, to bring philosophical speculation into disrepute.

For the present, as we are concerned mainly with the two supreme philosophical problems, the unification of thought and the relation of knowledge and belief, it is important to point to two striking consequences which result from the whole of the idealistic movement of thought as finally conceived by Hegel. The fact that the necessities of the logical process were conceived as manifestations, in the human mind, of the stages of the development or life of the Absolute, led to a solution of the antinomy of freedom and necessity. The autonomy of practical reason with Kant, the fundamental act of consciousness with Fichte, led in Hegel's conception to the conviction that what appeared as necessary to us was merely the expression of the
fundamental free and self-chosen manifestation of the Absolute, of the Divine Spirit. Thus it becomes intelligible how Hegel, in a sense, could represent his philosophy as exhibiting, and being founded on, the idea of Freedom. And it is further evident how this identification of the Real with the reasoning process must result in the assertion that "everything real is rational" and that "everything rational is real." Such statements have again led to much misunderstanding and to senseless distortions and misrepresentations of the truth which is contained in Hegel's doctrine.

This doctrine formed, as it were, the last outcome of the idealistic movement. It afforded a supreme unification of thought and knowledge on the one side, and on the other side it led to that point of view from which the religious conception of a Divine Order of things could be philosophically comprehended, from which the spiritual unity could be understood and incorporated in a scientific interpretation of things, in a reasoned Creed.

In the system of Hegel we not only meet with the final and greatest effort to solve the philosophical problem on the basis of an idealistic or spiritual conception, we also arrive at the true centre of modern thought in which many new departures have their origin. If we consider it in this light we are compelled to regard Hegel's philosophy as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, intellectual performance of the century, and this in its immense suggestiveness as well as in its gigantic failure.
II.

After the immediate influence of Hegel's work and personality had disappeared, when, as it were, the first phase of Hegelianism had ended, there are to be found only three systems of thought which exhibit similar consistency and have attained, or at least approached, similar importance: they are the systems of Schopenhauer in Germany, of Comte in France, and of Herbert Spencer in England. All three are independent of Hegel, all three attempted a unification of thought and knowledge, but the position which they took up to the religious problem was characteristically different.

Schopenhauer's philosophy was indeed a philosophy of redemption, but it stands so little in connection with the religious problem, as this practically presents itself to-day, it is so full of elements derived from regions of thought which are foreign to modern or European interests, that it resembles rather an exotic plant grown in a modern conservatory, where it is preserved from too intimate contact with the outside world.

The philosophy of Comte, on the other side, as well as that of Spencer, stands in immediate contact with the thought and the interests of the age, but neither of them recognises the religious problem in its real importance, though both deal with it in a certain sense. They are at one in absorbing into their systems the ethical elements which before their time were essentially bound up with some religious or spiritual creed.

This spiritual element Comte indeed tried to restore
in his later speculation, but without any conspicuous success: whereas Spencer leaves it altogether outside of his system, though he does not denounce it in the categorical manner so prevalent and so repellent with some extreme schools of thought on the Continent.

What is characteristic both of Comte's and of Spencer's system is the entry of the scientific spirit as opposed to the metaphysical, and the recognition of the growing importance of the social problem. Neither of these two sides of modern thought—neither the scientific nor the social—had been distinctly recognised in the idealistic movement which culminated in Hegel, though we find in Fichte's later writings and addresses distinct beginnings of a philosophy of human society. The idealistic systems were essentially philosophies of religion in the sense which I have so frequently emphasised: they aimed at establishing a reasoned creed which should satisfy the highest demands of the modern educated European mind, and they were religious in the further sense that they desired to absorb, to incorporate, and to interpret not only the moral, but essentially also the spiritual truths of Christian faith.

They were, however, primarily neither philosophies of science nor philosophies of society. Beginnings of the former are, indeed, contained in Kant's earlier writings, but they date from a time when what we now term science or exact reasoning was limited almost entirely to the Newtonian philosophy. Nevertheless, as Fichte's later writings exhibit the first signs of an appreciation of the social problem in Germany, so Kant's earlier writings mark the first beginning in Germany of a
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

philosophy of science. We have then, if we confine ourselves to Germany, three supreme interests, each demanding philosophical recognition and treatment—i.e., systematic or unifying thought. These problems are the problem of religion, the problem of science, and the problem of society.

Although none of these problems, as stated in these terms, is identical with the main philosophical problem, each of them has alternately been made the central problem; other problems, such as I have treated of in the body of this work, having filled circumjacent positions. This corresponds to the various prevailing interests of recent times, as expressed by the general development of philosophical thought. Among those thinkers who experience the necessity of arriving at some comprehensive view, at some theory of life, there will always be in the first line those who take a distinctly religious view, believing that only in this way can the supreme philosophical problem, as well as all collateral problems, be brought nearer to a solution. There are, secondly, those who have received their training and spent their lives in scientific or exact research, and are impressed with the general mechanical order which pervades the universe. To them the unifying idea of thought is what they term the "Laws of nature." And there are, lastly, those who find the chief object of interest nearer at hand, in human society. This leads them on to the idea of Humanity as the highest conception that human beings are capable of. For the first class of thinkers the problem of philosophy is essentially theocentric or religious; for the second, it is essentially scientific; for
the third, it is essentially anthropocentric or humanistic. In the course of the nineteenth century thought has moved from the first to the second, and is at the end of the century everywhere inclined in the direction of the third of these three positions.

We have seen how the first of these was the central problem in the idealistic systems; we have now to follow up the scientific movement in philosophy, which, as I said, had its origin likewise in Kant.

The two thinkers who, for a time, represented almost alone in Germany scientific, as distinguished from religious philosophy, were Fries and Herbart. Both start directly and professedly from Kant. Fries had, at the same time, a distinct religious interest: he had been brought up in religious surroundings. Herbart, on the other side, never dealt exhaustively with the religious problem. He, even more than Fries, represents the realistic current of thought, and was for a time considered to be the strongest opponent of the idealistic movement. Beginning with Kant, he in the sequel assimilates ideas taken from the Leibniz-Wolffian school. Together with Fries he also introduced psychological analysis into the foundations of his philosophy.

But neither Fries nor Herbart succeeded in developing a system of philosophy in the sense of bringing the whole of their speculation under a governing idea, to a point of view from which the different philosophical problems could be methodically attacked. They were, even more than Kant, convinced that all knowledge is purely empirical, and that the philosophical treatment must either be confined to bringing out the different prin-
ciples which underlie the methodical treatment of the various departments of knowledge, or must have for its special object the task of removing the contradictions which these fundamental principles exhibit. The latter is especially the object of Herbart's metaphysic and of the metaphysical part of his psychology.

In the empirical conceptions which we use in science and in common life he sees manifold contradictions, and he defines the object of metaphysic as being to elaborate, to remodel, to "work up" the whole body of these ideas in such a way that the contradictions disappear. In doing so he is led to a pluralistic as opposed to a monistic view of the ultimate Reality. Without being able to define the latter, he conceives it accordingly as a plurality of "Reals" which are simple in their nature and cannot be further defined. Our thought and knowledge turns entirely upon the relations in which these ultimate "Reals" or atoms of existence stand to each other.

As I have had occasion to show in an earlier chapter, Herbart's realistic philosophy had considerable influence in correcting the abstractions of idealism and bringing back philosophical thought to the level of detailed practical research. So far as systematic philosophy is concerned, his influence combined with that of the opposite school to produce an entirely altered conception of the object and task of philosophy. Of this altered conception the greatest, and by far the clearest, exponent is Hermann Lotze.

Although Lotze does not profess—and thinks it impossible for the human mind—to solve the philosophical problem, the complete unification of thought and
knowledge, as the idealistic school had attempted to do, he nevertheless brought his many-sided contributions to philosophy into a systematic whole, and this in a manner which has to a large extent been adopted by other thinkers after him. At the same time he is not so exclusively dominated by the scientific spirit as some more recent thinkers; in fact, he stands in the middle between those opposed schools of thought which existed during his lifetime, and forms a transition from the religious and exclusively metaphysical philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century to the scientific and sociological philosophy of the latter half, although he does not really advance as far as the last.

It will now be useful to explain more exactly the characteristics of this intermediate and transitory phase of philosophical thought. This task is made easier by looking at the historical connections, at the antecedents and surroundings of Lotze's thought. It seems that his studies were equally directed towards classical and philosophical subjects on the one side and scientific and natural subjects on the other. It is also well at once to point to what I may perhaps be allowed to call the shortcomings of this, in itself, very comprehensive scheme of studies.

Lotze never really appreciated or entered into that spirit of historical criticism which became, during his lifetime, the ruling tendency of German thought, notably at the universities; nor did he really appreciate the facts and theories of historical development, either in the earlier Hegelian or in the later Darwinian
sense. And lastly, he did not grasp the sociological problem or appreciate the importance which the social question would acquire both in theory and practice in modern life. He, by predilection, moved in the traditions of the classical and romantic phases of German culture, and he found nothing to attract him either in French or English contemporary thought.

Looking at the special problem of philosophy, he did not limit it to the unification of thought and knowledge; he inherited from the great idealistic systems the conviction, from which he never departed, that the facts of nature and life must not only be scientifically described and calculated, but must also be understood and interpreted. They must (to use a term which is not, however, common with him) be viewed "sub specie aeternitatis," i.e., in the light of a ruling idea, of a spiritual principle, which is the abode of supreme truth, beauty, and goodness, and which he terms Holiness. This ruling idea is, as it were, in the background of all his scientific as well as of his specially philosophical reasoning. It is an all-pervading, ever present tendency and direction of his thought, but he refuses to recognise any logical scheme by which, as in the philosophy of Hegel, this conception can be brought into full daylight. In this respect he adopts much of the Leibnizian attitude of thought; more in fact than Herbart before him, into whose metaphysical scheme of a "World of Reals" the conception of a universal Harmony—which formed an essential feature of the "Monadology"—did not enter.

Lotze's philosophy is monistic in a sense, and it is at
the same time dualistic. His criticism of the conceptions which underlie the scientific or mechanical view of things leads him to the conviction that a pluralism such as that of Herbart does not furnish a satisfactory conclusion. A world of many things, be they conceived as atoms of the same or of varying nature, cannot possibly exhibit that order and regularity which science postulates and which its progress continually confirms. Such a plurality must be held together by some uniting principle. This Lotze terms the "universal substance." Only through such a uniting bond are definite relations, the laws of nature, and mutual interaction, intelligible to the human mind. With this conception of the universal underlying substance, of which special things are merely manifestations, Lotze comes near to the conception of Spinoza. But Lotze does not maintain that he can inductively arrive at any definition of the nature of this underlying and all-comprising substance. Such can only be got by starting from a different point of view and by an argument based on analogy.

The self-conscious human mind is, like everything else, a manifestation of the underlying reality, and as such to a certain extent at one with it: our own self-conscious experience thus gives us a true, though limited, insight into the nature of reality. Now the distinctive feature of the self-consciousness of an individual mind is what we term Personality. It is accordingly this conception which receives further attention in Lotze's analysis; it results in a statement which is opposed to the dictum of Spinoza, subsequently adopted by Fichte, that personality and, more generally, all determination is a limita-
tion. Such limitation, according to Lotze, exists in the case of personalities that are finite; but personality is not necessarily finite; the all-pervading universal and spiritual substance, the Infinite, must be conceived as Personality in the full sense of the term. Full personality, in fact, belongs only to the Infinite. Finite beings are only endowed with imperfect or partial personality, with so much of it as has been bestowed upon them through the Infinite Source of their separate finite existence.

"The usual doubts," Lotze says, "as to a personal reality of the Infinite have not shaken our conviction. Whilst we have been trying to refute them we have had the sensation of taking up a position which only the most extraordinary contortion of all natural circumstances could have brought about. The course of philosophical reasoning has forced us into the attitude of showing that the Infinite is not awanting in those attributes of personality which we meet with in the finite; the real state of things should rather have led us to show that of the full personality which is only possessed by the Infinite a faint reflection is vouchsafed likewise to the finite; for not the conditions but the hindrances in the way of the development of self-sufficiency are the peculiarities of the finite. To these we wrongly attach its claim to personal existence. The finite person acts everywhere by means of forces which he has not given to himself, according to laws which he has not made—that is to say, through the means of a mental organisation which exists not only in himself but likewise in innumerable of his equals. It may, therefore, easily seem
in his self-contemplation as if in him were a dark unknown substance, on which rested, as on a support, all personal life. Hence those ever recurring questions, what then we ourselves are, what our souls, what that dark, unintelligible, never thoroughly conscious self which works in our emotions and passions. That these questions can arise is a proof how little personality is developed in us to the extent which the idea permits and requires. It can only exist perfectly in the Infinite Being who, reviewing all His phases and actions, nowhere meets with a moment of passive or active life the meaning and origin of which were not quite transparent to Him. The position of the finite mind, tied as it is to a special place in the general order of things, is the cause why its inner life is gradually wakened by external stimulations, why it flows on according to the laws of a psychical mechanism which bids single impressions, feelings, and desires, chase and expel each other. Hence there is never a concentration of the whole self in one moment, our consciousness never presents to us a picture of our whole self; not of its coexistent states, much less of the unity in its development in time. Even to ourselves we ever appear from a partial point of view, which discloses only a portion of our being; roused by external touches we react with this partial consciousness; only in a limited sense may we say that we act; rather in most cases something happens in us through those impressions and feelings to which the psychical mechanism has given the preponderating influence. Much less are we ever really for ourselves. Memory loses much, but most of all the record of our own individual moods.
Many trains of thought familiar to our youth appear to our advanced years as foreign events: powerless to find a road back to sentiments in which we once revelled we hardly behold a faint afterglow indicating the power which they once possessed over us; aspirations which once seemed to constitute the very essence and kernel of ourself, appear to us on the other paths which life has led us as inexplicable mistakes of which we have long since forgotten the motives. Indeed we have little reason to speak of the personality of finite beings. It is an ideal which, like all ideals, is possessed in its integrity only by the Infinite, but bestowed upon us like all good things conditionally and imperfectly."

The idea of personality as the only adequate conception which we can form of the truly Real or the Absolute is the central idea of Lotze's system. It is however not a leading or unifying idea like the idea of mind — as expressed in the dubious term Geist — in Hegel's system. The conclusions of the purely metaphysical and logical train of reasoning require an interpretation, and this interpretation is derived from an independent source; from the idea of the highest Good which is allied to the ideas of Truth and Beauty, and has its reality for us in the Ideal of personal Holiness. The fact that we form our judgments under the guidance of such ideals demonstrates the existence of a region different from that of the phenomena which surround us: it is the world of Values or "Worths." The former, the world of things, must indeed be considered as in some way connected: not only logically through a system of regularities which we term the laws of nature
but also in its contingent manifoldness and diversity. This contingent character, which in the idealistic systems appeared accidental and inexplicable, must have a uniting plan or meaning. It must be significant of some underlying purpose. But for us human beings such a plan or meaning finds its fullest expression in that which to us is of interest or value, in that which deserves to exist for its own sake and the realisation of which is the beginning, the purport, and the end of its existence. It has its psychological abode not so much in the intellectual as in the moral and emotional side of our nature.

In this way Lotze considers it to be the task of philosophy to reconcile the results of experience and science with the demands of our emotional nature, or, in more philosophical terms, to show how the world of values or worths finds its realisation in the world of things. That such a reconciliation is possible is ultimately entirely a matter of belief. To uphold and cling to such belief in the face of the manifold contradictions and difficulties which life and experience present to us, and which philosophical reasoning can only very partially remove, is the real function of religious faith, and as such a resolution of the character.

In placing the idea of Personality in the centre, or rather in making it the sustaining foundation of his thought, Lotze really begins where the system of Hegel should have ended. That Hegel never arrived at a clear conception regarding this important point was a defect in his system which was pointed out by many of his followers and critics. From the side of the religious interest
which had followed Hegel's speculation with increasing attention, attempts were made to remodel and amplify the argument. Among these attempts, that of Weisse was the most elaborate; it was that also which influenced Lotze himself in his early studies.

On the other side an equal defect in Hegel's speculation was the unsatisfactory treatment of the whole region of actual phenomena. This showed itself nowhere more than in his inability to understand the contingent in nature, the endless variety and manifoldness of her creations. This defect had been pointed out during Hegel's lifetime already by Schelling, who maintained a lifelong protest against what he termed the negative side of his own earlier speculations and of the whole of Hegel's completed system. But though Schelling on the one side, and, influenced by him, Weisse on the other, tried to remedy these defects, it was not through their efforts but rather from quite independent quarters that this was successfully attempted. Without any reference to the unification of thought as contained in Hegel's scheme, the two sides in which it was most wanting were cultivated in the exact philosophy of nature on the one side, in the positive religious philosophy of Schleiermacher on the other.

This marks the entry of the positive spirit as opposed to the metaphysical: positive not only so far as natural but also so far as religious phenomena are concerned. It marks at the same time the splitting up of the programme of the earlier metaphysical philosophy into two entirely different aspects: the scientific, which is based upon the observation of nature.
in the largest sense of the word, and the spiritual, which is based upon religious experience. As stated in a previous chapter, the latter finds its most pronounced expression in the theological system of Albrecht Ritschl.

The great influence which both these quite independent speculations had upon natural knowledge on the one side, upon positive theology on the other, exceeded that of the philosophical scheme of Lotze which really does justice to both. It is only now when we are able to look at the course of philosophical thought in the distance of time that we can recognise in Lotze's system the only adequate attempt to give the rationale of scientific thought on the one side, of religious thought on the other, and to bring the two aspects together into some intelligible scheme or formula. This formula, expressed in a few words, is this. The world of things finds its most adequate description or logical expression in an all-pervading mechanical Order, but it finds its interpretation through the world of values: the latter has its true reality only in the idea of a personal Spirit, a Deity, and of a world of Spirits which He has created.

There is, however, a deeper reason why Lotze's scheme did not receive at the time the recognition which it deserves. Though present to the mind of its author in his earliest works it was only slowly matured, and still more slowly published. This did not suit the impatient spirit of the age, which, turning away from the barren speculations of the Hegelian school, hailed with delight the more promising methods that had been so successfully introduced into natural science. These had, notably in Germany, been applied to the phenomena
on the borderland of matter and mind and seemed to promise an entry into the phenomena of consciousness.

As I stated in an earlier chapter of this work, physiology, and especially the physiology of the sense organs and of sensation, was essentially a German science. It was natural that the hopeful spirit which animated thinkers of that age should hasten to attack the philosophical problem by resorting to the methods and the supposed new principles of biological science. Indeed, Lotze's earlier writings themselves preached the doctrine of the all-pervading mechanism of nature, physical and psychical alike, and led the campaign against the fictions of vitalism. His warning that these important writings represented only one side of his philosophy were disregarded. Moreover, so far as the other and philosophically more important side was concerned, he did not speak with that hopefulness which had characterised the idealistic systems. In fact, we find in his more esoteric deliverances the first signs in German speculation of that spirit which later on in this country received the title of Agnosticism. He warned his readers not to expect too much, and spoke in accents very different from the aspiring note which resounded in Fichte and Hegel, who ever led their readers and hearers onward to greater expectations. Those who, in diminishing numbers, still took a hopeful view of the powers of the human intellect, turned on the other side to such later achievements of the idealistic and romantic spirit as had ripened in the minds of a few solitary thinkers. During the third quarter of the century these acquired sudden celebrity and an influence
on the popular thinking mind outside of the schools, which in some instances was quite phenomenal.

With the philosophies of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann we enter upon a different phase of philosophic thought. Both thinkers consider the first task of philosophy to be a unification of thought; the discovery of some principle through which what in science and life remains fragmentary and disconnected can be brought together into a coherent and consistent system. But the interest which led Schopenhauer to his speculations was not so much a personal concern, a religious demand, the reconciliation of knowledge and belief, or of faith and reason, as it was with Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Lotze. Although eminently subjective, his writings contain less of the personal element. His personality stands as it were outside of the framework of his system. He did not live his philosophy, though he lived exclusively for it. His philosophy was essentially for others, not for himself. We do not find with him the long years of labour which preceded the publication of Kant’s ‘Critiques,’ nor the unrest and spiritual striving of Fichte’s youthful years, nor the profound and many-sided studies in and through which the central idea of Hegel’s system gradually crystallised, nor the religious background of Schleiermacher’s thought, nor even that underlying conviction upon which Lotze’s speculation rested from the beginning. We feel by contrast how all these thinkers aimed at expressing in their philosophical writings the most serious convictions which guided not only their thought but also their conduct, and that they conceived themselves eminently responsible
to their readers, and especially to their youthful hearers, for giving to them the deepest truth, a message which was sacred to them.

This is not the only position from which the highest philosophical problem, the formation of a reasoned creed, can be approached. The problem of philosophy, the unification of thought and knowledge, may be regarded like any other scientific problem or like an artistic performance. The interest in it may not be the highest, the religious interest, it may be purely metaphysical or artistic or scientific. This is notably the case where philosophical speculation is carried on as an interesting pursuit, but without that responsibility which, in the mind of every serious thinker, the teaching profession inevitably adds to the purely intellectual interest. Schopenhauer did not experience this personal responsibility of the teacher who has daily to meet and address a youthful audience. Thus, whilst Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schleiermacher took part, and were leaders in the great educational work of the nation, this consideration entirely disappears in Schopenhauer's writings. He however conceived the contrast differently, regarding himself as the devotee of pure truth and the professorial class as practising an immoral system of accommodation.

In the same degree as the personal element disappears, the literary and artistic element takes its place. The writings of Schopenhauer appeal primarily to an audience not under academical authority, whom they attract not by the moral force of their deliverance but by the excellence of their literary style. From this point of view Lotze is the only writer of the other class who can be compared
with him, if we except certain smaller productions of Schelling and Schleiermacher and the later popular writings and addresses of Fichte. He has, moreover, one point in common with Lotze: both had a large body of reasoned speculation immediately before them in which they could find suggestions varied and numerous. But the study and contemplation of this great material did not produce with Schopenhauer the same result as it did in the mind of Lotze, who, in the Leibnizian spirit, declared that "after such a long development of philosophical thought, in which every possible point of view had been discovered, forgotten, and discovered again, there was no longer any merit of originality but only that of accuracy." Schopenhauer was in this respect not so modern and so modest. He started in a romantic spirit and continued the idealistic tradition, believing that through some intuition, similar to that of the artist, an idea could be discovered which should unify thought and solve the highest philosophical problem. Unlike Lotze also he coined for his fundamental ideas definite terms through which they have become popular in subsequent literature. These terms are given in the title of Schopenhauer's first and greatest work: 'The World as Will and Idea.'

By putting the Will, the active principle, in the foreground, Schopenhauer gave expression to an idea which was not foreign to his forerunners — Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. In various important passages of their writings they led up to a conception for which Schopenhauer found the right word. Unconsciously he also anticipated a movement of thought which has since
grown stronger, and which in the present age has found a characteristic title.

Most of the philosophies of the latter part of the century may be termed voluntaristic, in opposition to the essentially intellectualistic philosophies of the earlier part of the century. In fixing upon the Will, or the active principle in human nature, as indicative of the true nature of all Reality, so far as it is accessible and intelligible to us, Schopenhauer took up the philosophical problem in the form in which he conceived that Kant had left it in his first 'Critique.' The problem defined there, which had received clearer and clearer expression since the time of Descartes, is the problem of "the Thing in itself," — the X which represents the Real in opposition to the merely apparent or phenomenal nature of things. Whereas all the other followers of Kant tried to get over the dualism left in his system by getting rid of this unknowable Something, Schopenhauer sees the only possible step in advance in giving a direct answer to the question, What is it? And the answer is found by resorting to a method which is common to him with other and opposite thinkers; it is through introspection and by analogy that we arrive at this answer. Not the world of the senses nor that of the intellect, but our consciousness of an active principle in us, which we call the Will, gives us an indication of the source and essence of all Reality. In pointing to this he expresses with more emphasis and in a one-sided manner what others had urged before him. He at the same time reintroduces into philosophical thought
that dualism which the idealistic philosophy had tried to remove.

To Schopenhauer, the world as we know it rests on or contains two independent principles, the Will and the Intellect; and the title of his great work which appeared in the year 1819 is 'The World as Will and Idea.' The substance of this work consists mainly in an exposition of the relation in which these two principles stand to each other, and in manifold and very interesting illustrations drawn from a large field of observation.

Schopenhauer's main work was contemporary with the writings of Hegel and with the latest important publication of Schelling, but it remained unknown and neglected for nearly thirty years, though it impressed a few minds of the first order as a unique and extraordinary production. In one other important direction Schopenhauer's dualistic system coincided with, and assisted, the reaction which set in in the middle of the century, emphasising those points which the purely intellectual and logical systems had pushed into the background. In all these systems the transition from the abstract and unifying principle to the world of many things and of individual beings remained the great difficulty. Schopenhauer saw that this pointed necessarily to the existence of more than one principle.

The Will is indeed, in a general conception of the term, a uniting principle in the world, but there is on the other side a principle which works in the opposite direction—the principle of individuation,—and
this he conceives to be the Intellect. In this way the contingent and the many, as opposed to the necessary and the One, receives due attention in Schopenhauer's system. The entry of the Intellect into the activity and service of the Will as a means to its higher objectivation works an apparent disruption, and is the cause of the differentiation and diversity of things in the phenomenal world.

To the process of objectivation of the Will Schopenhauer thus adds in the higher forms of existence the principle of individuation. The original and underlying One, when and where it becomes self-conscious, sees and comprehends itself in the forms of space, time, and causality, as a world of many things and many individuals: and this process of individuation or differentiation ascends in the higher forms of existence through sensation, perception, the processes of abstraction, intuition, and reasoning, to an ultimate possible position in which the apparent or phenomenal diversity is gradually annulled or reunified, the One returning again into itself.

This whole process, which, however, is considered to be out of time, receives an ethical interpretation which is not a necessary consequence of the metaphysical premises of Schopenhauer's philosophy, but which marks in the history of philosophical thought the beginnings of that reaction which attained full force when the idealistic movement had exhausted itself. We have seen that the latter was essentially optimistic; it was sustained by an exalted belief and confidence in the powers of the human intellect to solve, in theory and practice, the ultimate problem of existence.
In opposition to this optimistic spirit Schopenhauer introduces into philosophical thought the pessimistic view. The existence of Evil and Sin in the world impresses him more than the hopeful outlook, the promises and aspirations, so characteristic of Fichte's and Hegel's work. In this work he takes no part: he turns away to the opposite or pessimistic interpretation, he introduces a foreign element, that which had found expression in the philosophy and poetry of India. A knowledge of these had at that time been recently introduced through the study and translation of the great productions of Oriental literature to which the Romantic school, headed by Schlegel, had given much attention. Imbibing this spirit Schopenhauer looks upon the world-process as a process of evil, upon the assertion of the Will as the source of evil; and finds the redeeming process to consist in self-negation, in annihilation of the Will, in quietism, in asceticism, and in the passive virtues of sympathy, compassion, and renunciation. We may note here that it was likewise the problem of Sin and Evil in the world which Schelling approached in the last phase of his philosophy, and which prevented him from arriving at any satisfactory conclusion of his speculations. To the two questions which remained unanswered in Schelling's mind, the problem of the contingent and the problem of evil, Schopenhauer's philosophy professed to give an answer; but it was one that stood in opposition to the progressive spirit of the age.

The philosophy of Eduard von Hartmann has generally
been brought into connection with that of Schopenhauer. In the opinion of German, and still more of foreign, historians of philosophy, he is to be classed amongst the great exponents of pessimism in modern thought. But though his earliest work, through which he attained a sudden celebrity hardly sustained in his later writings, gives a certain colour to this classification, the classification is more misleading than helpful. Von Hartmann was indeed influenced by Schopenhauer, and he, even more than the latter, upheld the opinion that an unbiased examination of human life showed that the world contained more evil than good, more unhappiness and suffering than happiness and enjoyment. But as he, especially in his later writings, entirely opposes the eudaimonistic theory of morality, the inference he draws from this pessimistic view of the world and life does not lead him on to preach inaction, renunciation, and quietism, but rather the opposite—a energetic striving, a hopeful combat with evil. In this respect the doctrine of von Hartmann has only gradually become better understood. And in other respects he differs still more from Schopenhauer. He was well acquainted with modern German speculation, and his points of contact with Schelling, Hegel, and other prominent thinkers are quite as important as those with Schopenhauer; in fact, his philosophy may be regarded as a reconciliation of the truth contained in Hegel's with that contained in Schopenhauer's system. He fully understood the task which was implied in Schelling's later writings—the demand for a positive as complementary to a purely negative or formal
philosophy. He also clearly recognised and explained the dualism which, in spite of assertions to the contrary, lurked in the background of Hegel's as well as of Schopenhauer's system: the logical formalism which did not descend to reality and could not comprehend the contingent in the former system, the duality of the Will and the Intellect in the latter. According to von Hartmann, there must be an underlying spiritual unity of which the Will and the Intellect are merely attributes or manifestations. In defining this as the "Unconscious," he reminds us of the position taken up already by Fichte, which formed the starting-point of Schelling's speculation, that the first reality is the unity of subject and object prior to the appearance of Consciousness. Having arrived at this negative definition of the underlying ground or essence of reality, he proceeds to demonstrate its existence by resorting to an elaborate interpretation of physical as well as mental facts, of cosmical phenomena as well as individual experience. In all these regions, observation, the inductive study of nature and mind, show that there remains a hidden factor, an unknown principle which, as it does not present itself and rise into the clear light of consciousness and is accordingly undefinable, he characterises by the name of the "Unconscious." Still more than Schopenhauer, who in his later writings gathered much material from the accumulated knowledge of the natural sciences, does von Hartmann stand on the foundation of the latter, and, being later in time, he is able to make larger use of recent discoveries than either Schopenhauer or even Lotze was able or willing to do. There is
also no doubt that he anticipated many lines of thought which have been developed in the recent psychological literature of France and England, where the term "Subconscious" has served in many instances to denote what von Hartmann terms the "Unconscious."

From all this we gather that Hartmann aimed at a unification of thought and knowledge as a formal desideratum of the philosophic mind; but he does not confine the aim of philosophy to this purely formal or logical task. He has likewise a religious interest, and in this respect he is much more nearly related to the idealistic movement of thought in Germany than to the realistic or scientific. With the former he believes that it is the object of speculation to arrive at a reasoned creed, but he characteristically declines to admit that such a creed can rise to apodictic certainty. It is only a question of greater or less probability, such as is gained and increased by the processes of observation and inductive reasoning. But though he denies the existence of any absolute or final authority in matters of belief he does not accept a purely ethical creed. He does not think that a system of ethics can be built up without a religious foundation; with him this religious foundation is not that of an historical religion or revelation: it is metaphysical, and the distinct object of much of his later writings consisted in the construction of a metaphysical creed in which the valuable elements of existing historical religions, including Christianity, shall be brought together and metaphysically supported.

In a history of Philosophical Thought as distinguished from a History of Philosophy, it is hardly possible to
assign an important position to von Hartmann's speculation. The phenomenal success of his first great work was largely owing to expectations raised through the title. The educated mind of the time looked forward to the exposition of a philosophy built upon the inductive and especially the biological sciences, but which, at the same time, should admit the existence of an underlying spiritual, even a mystical, principle. As such it seemed destined to combat the materialistic doctrine which was not only unpoetical but was also felt to be growing stale. These expectations were hardly fulfilled, and the reading public did not pay the same, or even due, attention to the later works in which von Hartmann has gained an important place in the history of philosophical criticism. In fact, only after a lapse of many years was deserved appreciation bestowed upon these critical writings, in which a vast amount of historical knowledge is combined with great critical acumen and lucid exposition.

Von Hartmann was a solitary and secluded thinker, but the fundamental principle which he proclaimed was too negative, being neither original nor comprehensive enough to permit of expansion into a self-consistent edifice of thought; he stands outside of the general course of philosophical speculation, in opposition to nearly every other great thinker, an interesting curiosity rather than an incisive and propelling force in the progress of thought. He stands there as the last firm believer in the mission of metaphysics, in the older idealistic and romantic sense of the word. As such I have dealt with him here somewhat in advance of his chronological
position, for his own age, notably in France and in this country, had already given an entirely different direction to philosophy. For though von Hartmann stood himself under the influence of scientific research, his was not really a scientific philosophy, the scientific problem did not stand in the centre of his thought. The placing of it in that position was for the first time undertaken, not in Germany, but in this country and in France. The work was later on done likewise in Germany, as we shall have occasion to learn in the sequel of this chapter.

The thinker in whose system the scientific spirit gained for the first time the upper hand was Auguste Comte. But it would be a mistake to consider him as merely a representative of what in France is nowadays termed Positivism. With Comte Positivism meant essentially the reconstruction of society upon a new foundation, upon a foundation prepared and attained by the study of history as well as of science. Positivism, as at present understood by most of those who use the term in France, means simply the methods of the exact and natural sciences. The fact that the most important of Comte's writings, the 'Philosophie Positive,' was published as an independent work and separated from the 'Politique Positive,' has made it possible to eliminate, in the popular conception of Comtism, the most characteristic feature in the earliest and latest of his speculations. These deal with the practical application of his doctrine. With him the term Positivism is not confined, as it is in more recent times, to a
Philosophy of the Sciences and "The Philosophy of History." Though some chapters of the 'Philosophie Positive' will probably retain an important place in philosophical literature as being of lasting value, Comte was primarily, as little as Francis Bacon, a scientific thinker; his was not exclusively a philosophy of science. Scientific thought was for him merely a method, not an object in itself; it was a method by which the great social problems created by the French Revolution were to be brought nearer to solution.

I stated above that Comte was not led to philosophical speculation by a religious interest. This is correct only if we limit the religious interest to that problem which, as we have seen, interested the leaders of philosophical thought in Germany during the classical age of German poetry and speculation: the seventy years from 1770 to 1840. I defined it there as the problem of the relation of knowledge to faith, which was gradually transformed into the question of belief and unbelief. This problem did not trouble the mind of Comte, but if we take a different view of the religious problem and identify it with the question of the moral order and spiritual government of human society, then we must admit that this was exactly the problem which presented itself to Comte's mind at a very early period of his life; and this in consequence of the anarchy which prevailed in his country as a consequence of the great Revolution. In fact, it was the problem which the Revolution had set before the age as its most important task.

We may at once contrast this with the historical
origin of the religious problem as it existed in Germany. The religious problem, so far as philosophical thought is concerned, was there, not the immediate, but the eventually inevitable outcome of the Protestant Reformation. The latter had made religious belief a concern, a duty, of the individual soul; and, in doing so, it had brought it into contact with Free Thought. After two hundred years this problem became more clearly defined. The question was, how to harmonise the essential truths of the Christian religion, which the Reformation had upheld and put in a new light, with the unfettered progress of free inquiry. The philosophical problem at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany was thus one that had been recognised long before, and was not created by, the great Revolution; it was the inevitable result of the Protestant spirit of free inquiry. Thus we may say that the central philosophical problem in Germany was a remoter result of the Reformation, that the philosophical problem in France was the proximate result of the Revolution.

Taking this for granted, we also see how little either of the two positions coincides with that which obtained in this country. The history of this country tells us neither of an abrupt spiritual, nor of an abrupt political revolution, such as respectively characterise fundamentally the progress of life and thought in Germany and France. Both the spiritual and the political changes took place here more gradually, nor did they, to the same extent, stir the whole nation as did the reforming movement in Northern Europe and the revolutionary in France. This explains also why
Comte disliked the Protestant spirit, which he identified in Germany with the metaphysical and critical, in England with the aristocratic as opposed to the monarchical as well as to the democratic tendency. Believing in a general and fixed Order of Nature, the highest product of which was Mankind and its History, he never lost sight of, and latterly reasserted the necessity of, a definite social order and a supreme authority approaching almost to absolutism. He had great admiration for the theocratic system of the Middle Ages, and his reconstructed Order of Society contained an intellectual or scientific in the place of a religious priesthood. He had not the large Protestant view of individual liberty as it lived in the minds of the leading thinkers in Germany. The masses, he considered, could never take part in working out the principles of the highest and ruling order of things; such intellectual activity must be confined to a selected class. The work of the masses would be to apply, for the benefit of society, the truths understood and represented by a small number of thinkers. Thus he had even less appreciation for the metaphysical and critical school of thought than he had for the earlier theological, and in him we find that remarkable combination of the hierarchical (or Catholic) with the Positivist (or scientific) spirit which is still to be found among French thinkers of the day.

We see then how fundamentally different were the intellectual predispositions and surroundings in which Comte's philosophy grew up. The total absence of a critical foundation, such as German philosophy, since Kant's time, has considered to be indispensable, the
absence also of any unifying cosmic idea, have induced German historians either to disregard Comte's philosophy altogether or to deny it the title of a philosophical system. By many Comte's unifying principle is considered to be merely a method. This is correct to a large extent. Nevertheless this method is not merely that of the sciences or that of common-sense, although we find him reaffirming again and again the intimate connection of Positivism with both. The unifying tendency of his thought, which he never tires of extolling, is architectonic, an attempt to bring order and arrangement into human thought and knowledge; and the larger part of his first great work is occupied with establishing the hierarchy of the sciences, according to which one follows out of the other and the whole series ends in the new science of Sociology. As this deals with the highest product of nature, the society of human beings, it is also the highest among all the sciences, of which it is the consummation. Next to this order of the sciences there stands the well-known order in which he conceives of the development or evolution of human society in the course of history. In fact, Order or logical arrangement and Development make up the central and unifying thought in Comte's system. With this idea he desired to lift society out of the state of anarchy into which it had been plunged through an extreme application of the mistaken metaphysical or abstract spirit, which had resulted only in experimenting and floundering.

Keeping always in view the rearrangement of society, the new social Order, Comte is well aware of the im-
possibility either of resorting to one rigid method of thought or of appealing to any absolute Truth. His belief in harmony and order does not preclude a great diversity of methods and the recognition of the relativity of all knowledge. Thus a large portion of his principal work is devoted to an analysis of the different methods which should govern the different sciences. He is more liberal than many contemporary and later thinkers in allowing for the different departments different methods of research.

Thus he assigns to the calculating methods the sciences of astronomy and mechanics; to the experimental methods the science of physics; to the formal methods the science of chemistry; and he especially opposes the one-sided employment of these abstract methods in the biological sciences: the latter have to recognise the appearance of a new principle, the principle of Life. He regards this as consisting in what in more modern terms would be called "adaptation to surrounding conditions," and he adopts de Blainville's definition of life as an uninterrupted process of composition and decomposition. He also emphasises the comparative method and the necessity of a rational classification. As regards the real value of mathematics, Comte's estimate seems to have been subject to uncertainty and change, for in the third volume he extols the mathematical as the type of the positive rational method; whereas by the time he had reached the last volume, having experienced the exclusiveness of contemporary mathematicians, he opposes the extreme control which the latter had usurped to themselves in France, and
ridicules some of their favourite methods of dealing with social problems, such as the calculus of probabilities. In sociology he recognises the historical method as that most adapted to its subject, and, from the study of the history of Mankind, he abstracts the general laws which he thinks govern human development.

In addition to the law of the three phases he recognises, both in the ascending scale of animated nature and in the progress of civilisation, the appearance and growth of the social as opposed to the egoistic instinct. He finds the first germs of this in the differentiation of sex, in the care for offspring, and conceives that the further progress of humanity towards the positive order of society will be brought about by the encouragement, through rational methods and intellectual supremacy, of what he later termed the "altruistic" or social virtues. Incidentally we may note a certain resemblance between Schopenhauer's and Comte's ideas of development, bearing always in mind that with the former such development is looked upon as being out of time, or purely logical; whereas with Comte it is the actual development or evolution of humanity in the course of history.

With Schopenhauer the intellect comes in as a later attribute of the unthinking Will and acts as a differentiating, but ultimately as a reunifying, principle, inasmuch as it leads to the recognition of sympathy as the highest virtue. And Schopenhauer's system explains, as Comte's does not, how this sympathy or altruism originates. It has its origin in the fact that the different individual Wills are only objectivations,
apparent differentiations, of the one underlying Will, the active principle of all Reality. Schopenhauer arbitrarily conceived of the whole process in a pessimistic sense. Comte, following the optimism of some of his predecessors, takes a hopeful view of the future progress of humanity, although he ridicules Condorcet's doctrine of the unlimited Perfectibility of the human race and foreshadows an ultimate decline, inevitable for all, even the highest, creations of nature.¹

Though the title of a system has been denied to Comte's philosophy, we must admit that he had before his mind the two supreme aims of all philosophical thinking: the unification of knowledge, and the formation of a reasoned creed. His conceptions of the unification are indeed peculiar. Unification means with him essentially order or arrangement. His unity is essentially that of harmony; it is not a unity of thought or method, it is one of tactics or organisation. And so far as the reasoned creed is concerned he, especially in his later writings, mitigates his opposition to theology by directing it against a religious doctrine which centres in a superhuman reality. He reintroduces the term "religion" into his scheme, but it is a religion of this

¹ "Il serait d'ailleurs évidemment oiseux de s'arrêter maintenant, en aucune manière, à la détermination prématurée du caractère extrême que devra prendre, dans un avenir très-lointain, le véritable esprit philosophique, toujours disposé à reconnaître, sans aucun vain désespoir, toute destinée clairement inévitable, quand l'âge du déclin deviendra prochain, afin d'en adoucir convenablement l'amertume naturelle, en y soutenant noblement la dignité humaine. Ce n'est point à ceux qui sortent à peine de l'enfance qu'il appartient déjà de préparer leur vieillesse; cette prétendue sagesse conviendrait certainement encore moins pour la vie collective que pour la vie individuelle." ("Cours de Philosophie Positive," vol. vi. p. 850.)
world, of Humanity. Thus he finds a highest constructive principle, and, with this in mind, he undertakes to rewrite the whole of his philosophy, beginning with the social idea.

This again reminds us of a similar twofold development in Hegel's writings. The 'Philosophie Positive' corresponds to Hegel's 'Phenomenology.' Both lead up to a highest idea, which is already foreshadowed in the beginning of the respective Works. The 'Politique Positive' corresponds to Hegel's system as given in the 'Logic' and the 'Encyclopædia.' We are also reminded that Kant intended in a similar way to duplicate the exposition of his doctrine.

In the later work Comte further recognises the necessity of dealing not only with the social principle, but also with its bearing on the life and conduct of the individual. Upon the foundation of sociology there must be built up a scheme of morality. In that work also Comte recognises, though he does not use the conventional language, the two main ethical problems: the question as to the essence of morality, and the question of obligation. The former is emphatically the altruistic principle, the living for others. As to the second, on the question how obligation is to be harmonised with the freedom of the individual, we are left in uncertainty. It seems that Comte was so impressed with the priority of the social order over individual interests, that he trusted to the existence of this order, to the influence of the emotions, and the effect of education, to insure its general recognition.

The later or systematic part of Comte's philosophy is
now little studied. Like other schemes of social reorganisation, in which French literature of the nineteenth century is especially rich, it has been laid aside. Only the positive spirit has spread and lives still in the literature of his country. Nevertheless the mind of Comte was prophetic, inasmuch as it marked in advance the direction which French thought would take and the problems which it would have to solve. It pushed the social problem into the centre of thought, a position which it still holds, and it raised if it left unsolved the problem, which is even more pressing to-day, how to found a purely ethical religion and how to guarantee and enforce the acceptance of its precepts.

Comte foresaw clearly that the final question would be as to the seat of authority in matters of belief—i.e., as to the persuasive or compelling force of the ultimate convictions which should govern conduct. In fact he, in his later writings, laid great stress upon the establishment of a system through which what was considered the final truth and the highest moral principle could be enforced in the organisation of society. He devised a régime similar to that of the Roman Catholic Church, without the dogmatic substance of the Roman Catholic religion. It is perhaps not too much to say that this is exactly the problem which the educational government in modern France is trying to solve.

Comte was a solitary thinker, like Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. He had few disciples, and his connection with earlier or contemporary thought was very slender. The first to introduce the historical spirit into sociology, he is, as he claims to be, quite original in
his philosophy of history. He expressly remarks that when elaborating his own scheme he purposely abstained from reading other philosophies of history such as those of Vico, Kant, Herder, and Hegel. Unlike von Hartmann, who spent the latter part of his life in studying and explaining the relation in which his own philosophy stood to other systems, Comte does not seem to have carefully studied any other philosophy. His historical sense did not prompt him to exhibit in detail his own speculation as the latest result of other and earlier courses of thought. In this way he is different from Schopenhauer, who distinctly attaches the fundamental conception in his speculations to the history of a definite philosophical problem which was brought out, but not solved, by Kant. Comte anticipates a complete reorganisation of thought and society as a result of his doctrine. In this respect he resembles both Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, especially the latter, who, however, differs from him inasmuch as he does not look for any sudden effect and acceptance of his teaching: whereas Comte, during the later years of his life, lived in this respect under a great illusion.

The philosophy of Comte leads us by an easy step to that of Herbert Spencer. The two thinkers are in popular literature frequently classed together: Spencer is sometimes considered to be a Positivist, and Comte an Evolutionist. Spencer himself objects to being placed in the same category with Comte, and Comte, though making free use of the term "evolution," did not really enter into the spirit of the doctrine in its modern form. The two doctrines however can be, to a large extent,
brought together; either affords support and enlargement to views contained in the other.

Spencer was a solitary and independent thinker, like the other three we have just been dealing with. He resembled Comte in having only a slender connection with contemporary philosophy. Only a few thinkers, such as Sir Wm. Hamilton, Mansel, and John Stuart Mill, seem to have influenced him. He took little or no interest in the opinions of other thinkers, nor any pains to understand them; in fact, he admitted himself that he never cared to read any book with the opening arguments of which he could not agree. Spencer, more clearly than Comte, defines the highest task of philosophy much in the way that I have adopted in this chapter. In fact, he has helped very materially to formulate and introduce the modern definition of philosophy. He considers its formal task to be unification of knowledge, and, in the introduction to his 'First Principles'—which forms the first part of his system of synthetic philosophy—he defines its main practical outcome as the reconciliation of religion and science.

As little as to Comte does it occur to Spencer that the exposition of any philosophical system should be preceded by a critical investigation of the means which are at the disposal of the human mind to solve its highest problems. The Kantian or critical spirit is foreign to both these thinkers: they are both dogmatic, inasmuch as they, without many preliminaries, state the position which they take up; in both cases the position is gained by a grand generalisation of an incomplete induction, and it is proved by examples and illustrations
drawn from a wide range of experience. Neither does a psychological analysis form an introduction to these philosophies, though psychology forms an important part in the large body of Spencer's speculation. As psychology and the theory of knowledge form the groundwork of all recent German philosophy, it is not to be wondered at that neither Comte nor Spencer has had much influence upon it.

In the first part of 'First Principles,' Spencer takes up the problem of science and religion, dealing with the ultimate conception to which, as it seems to him, both are inevitably driven. This he terms the Absolute, and he shows how neither religion nor science can find an adequate expression or definition of this limiting idea, for both are essentially occupied with the relative. The Absolute exists for the religious as well as for the scientific mind, but it exists only as the opposite of the Relative, the Infinite only as the opposite of the Finite, the Unconditioned only as the opposite of the Conditioned. Nevertheless, this conception exists and cannot be dispelled; Spencer terms it the Unknowable. But he is not a thorough-going Agnostic, for he defines it also as the underlying Power of which the whole phenomenal world, including our own intellectual and emotional experiences, is merely the manifestation. Inasmuch as the latter are to us as real and important as the former, Spencer considers as equally admissible the religious or emotional and the scientific or intellectual view of the world and life. In this way he desires to reconcile them, but he denies that philosophy can do more than admit this twofold aspect, and he at
once proceeds to an exclusive discussion of the principles of scientific knowledge, of which he proposes to give the Rationale or ultimate unifying formula. Spencer has accordingly no room for a philosophy of religion. Philosophy is ultimately coincident with scientific knowledge, of which it is the complete unification.

This introduction to the system of synthetic philosophy reminds us of the Preface to the 'Microcosmus,' where Lotze also deals with the problem, how to reconcile the scientific with the emotional aspect. But there is a marked difference from the outset. Though not expressly stated by Spencer, the religious or emotional view of things does not include the ethical; whereas in Lotze's mind the latter, the idea of the Good, forms an essential, in fact the supreme, conception of the believing soul. With Spencer the ethical interest falls entirely into the region of science and philosophy, and forms an important branch of scientific and philosophical knowledge. With Lotze ethics is not a portion but the transcendent foundation of metaphysics.

Both Lotze's and Spencer's attempts to reconcile the religious with the scientific view were put forward at a time when the thinking public in their respective countries was violently agitated by raging controversies: Germany by the Materialistic, England by the Darwinian controversy. It is, however, well to note that the virulence of attack came, in Germany, from the side of a popular philosophy which professed to be founded on the latest results of the mechanical and biological sciences, and was directed against traditional beliefs and the ruling philosophy which, on its part, professed to
support them. The leaders of this attack were Feuerbach, Moleschott, Büchner, and Carl Vogt. In this country, on the other side, the violent spirit came from the side of prominent exponents of the established beliefs; the discussion originating in the publication, about the same time, of two works of very different character but equally impressive by the definiteness of their respective doctrines. They were Mansel's "Bampton Lectures" on 'The Limits of Religious Thought,' and Darwin's 'Origin of Species.' We know that Lotze on his side took a leading part in the criticism of materialism; we also know that Spencer was greatly influenced by the ultimate conclusions drawn by Mansel from the philosophy of Sir Wm. Hamilton; further, that Darwin's startling hypothesis of natural selection furnished one of the most telling illustrations of the larger but vaguer theory of evolution which Spencer had then already clearly formulated for himself.

The principal ideas which contributed to the formation of Spencer's highest scientific generalisation, and which were at work in his mind before Darwin's classical treatise appeared, were partly suggested in the biological writings of von Baer; these had become known in this country through Huxley's translations. To these must be added the theory of environment and adaptation, and the conviction that psychical and social phenomena cannot be understood by the study of individuals alone, but point to the history of the race. When studying the phenomena of development Spencer recognised the importance of the nebular hypothesis of Kant and Laplace as an explanation of the genesis of the solar system.
The centre of Herbert Spencer's interest lies, nevertheless, in biology and sociology, and he brings in that solitary speculation taken from the inorganic world as an example of historical development on the cosmical scale. This bringing together of the largest cosmical phenomena with those in the restricted region of living things is peculiar to Spencer before Darwin's hypothesis brought greater precision into this latter region. The eye for far-reaching analogies, and the habit of regarding individual phenomena in their surroundings in space and their succession in time, form the two characteristic conceptions of Spencer's early speculations. On these he builds up his special scheme of evolution, the main points of which he developed in a series of separate essays to which he refers in his first systematic work. His philosophical development is thus quite different from that of Comte or from that of Mill, with whom he has not infrequently been classed owing to the leading interest in social questions common to both.

Comte's scientific knowledge was really limited to mechanics and astronomy, and he saw clearly, what only those familiar with mathematical reasoning sufficiently appreciate—viz., that the phenomena and processes of life and consciousness require an entirely different treatment from that which is applicable and sufficient when dealing with the purely mechanical processes of the cosmos and the lifeless world. The transition of scientific thought from lifeless things to living and conscious beings was never clearly defined in Spencer's philosophy, and forms one of the unsolved difficulties in any scheme of general evolution.
On the other side Spencer recognised, what Comte did not, the importance of the ideas of environment and adaptation put forward by some of Comte's contemporaries. Reference to these was to be found likewise in von Baer's writings.

In trying to solve the philosophical problem as he defined it, viz., the unification of knowledge, Spencer describes his special scheme of evolution in the following words: "The processes everywhere in antagonism, and everywhere gaining now a temporary and now a more or less permanent triumph the one over the other, we call Evolution and Dissolution. Evolution under its simplest and most general aspect is the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; while Dissolution is the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter."

He had before established two principles which he termed respectively the "indestructibility of matter" and the "continuity of motion." To these he added two other principles: the "persistence of force" and the "rhythm of motion." He then goes on to explain that his use of the term Evolution is not identical with other accepted meanings of the term. "While," he says, "we shall by Dissolution everywhere mean the process tacitly implied by its ordinary meaning — the absorption of motion and disintegration of matter — we shall everywhere mean by Evolution the process which is always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, but which . . . is in most cases much more than this."

From this definition of his highest principle we see that the biologist Spencer, in trying to find the ultimate
unifying conception of scientific knowledge, resorts to a purely mechanical and geometrical conception. On the other side we have seen that the mathematician Comte, in trying to define the aspect from which biological and social phenomena are to be understood, distinctly discards the purely geometrical view as insufficient, and emphasises the necessity of starting with a consideration of the *ensemble* or "Together" of things. In this respect Comte had really a correcter view of the philosophical difficulty. For it is easy to trace in every and all, even the most complicated, phenomena purely geometrical relations and mechanical processes, whilst it has always been impossible to grasp through them the real essence of these phenomena; the consequence being that latterly even naturalistic thinkers have very generally found it necessary to attribute the unknown but peculiar principle of living and conscious things likewise to those of the lifeless world.

It would be a mistake to consider Spencer's evolutionary system in the same light as the apparently similar schemes of Schelling and Hegel. Spencer's philosophy does not deal with the origin, history, and end of things as a whole. It is neither a history of creation nor a history of the human mind. It does not deal with the entirety of things or the Absolute, in fact Spencer distinctly declares that such a general comprehension is impossible. It only deals with definite restricted and related regions of phenomena, and endeavours to show how the same succession and alternation of different and opposite processes exist everywhere, and are, as it were, the underlying mould into which all
change or evolution is cast. In this respect Spencer's formula, the alternation of Evolution and Dissolution, of condensation and separation, of integration and differentiation (segregation), of orderly arrangement and chaotic diffusion—or in whatever other terms the rhythmical process may be described—compares rather with the least successful of Hegel's efforts, viz., to show how the vaguer process of development as conceived by Schelling and himself might be understood as the successive application of a logical formula. Whereas both Schelling and Hegel believed in the gradual and persistent manifestation and realisation of an underlying spirit, of a something which possessed the highest intellectual and spiritual value and interest, Spencer declines altogether to form any conception of the Absolute, or of the significance of the world-process. He does not even decide which of the two alternating processes is the more important and lasting one. He is driven, through the contemplation of very varied but essentially limited regions of phenomena, to the conception of rhythmical and cyclical changes, of states which repeat and return into themselves. The idea of progress, therefore, in the higher sense of the word, as it vivified the writings of the idealistic philosophers, is absent in Spencer's philosophy. Nevertheless, he is able to gain upon the foundation of his 'First Principles' a position from which the trend of social evolution and the significance of morality can be understood. Society is moving in the direction of more and more perfect adjustment of its various parts and members through adaptation to external and internal circumstances; it is
moving in the direction of an equilibrium. This conception suffices for the useful discussion of a great variety of social phenomena as they present themselves in the present phase of civilisation. The idea also of a distant but final state of adjustment or equilibrium furnishes an ideal according to which our present conduct, both individually and socially, must be regulated. What other philosophies, notably that of Kant, look upon as an inherent law or revelation of the Absolute, the moral law, Spencer considers as the intellectual anticipation of that state of things which society is inevitably, though slowly, approaching, and the advent of which is to be accelerated (as in Comte's scheme) by the anticipated statement of this final result.

Just as the aim of scientific knowledge consists in prediction of phenomena, in anticipation and consequent control of events, so also the object and rule of moral conduct can only consist in consciously furthering that process of development which is clearly indicated by the study of social phenomena from the point of view of evolution and adaptation. The rule of what ought to be is to be found by scientifically comprehending that which is and has been.

Looking now at Spencer's system from the point of view of the highest philosophical problem, the unification of thought and the reconciliation of science and religion, we may say that both problems came before his mind and that, in a certain sense, both were solved. The unification has been attained by introducing a definite formula, through the application of which to phenomena of very different regions a certain uniformity
of method or of philosophical treatment can be preserved. It is, accordingly, rather a unity of method than a unity of knowledge which we have gained, and it would be more correct to call the formal task of philosophy a unification of thought than a unification of knowledge.

Knowledge itself, i.e., the ever extending mass of facts, phenomena, and processes which present themselves to the human mind, retain their multiplicity, their difference of aspects, and it is only a way of contemplating and arranging them according to some general scheme suggested by mechanical and geometrical relations that has been given to us. By it we arrive at a definite order of ideas, a unifying Thought.

Spencer thus deals only with abstractions and regularities, what we call the laws of things and events, but not with the endless variety in which these regularities present themselves in the actual world. The contingent and the individual are notions with which Spencer does not deal. As Lotze would express it, Spencer only studies the world of fixed relations, the endless repetition of definite connections in space and time. The world of things, in its endless variety, in its numberless instances and examples, that which is of practical interest to us, receives little recognition, nor does the higher philosophical question as to the significance, the meaning and value, of this world receive more. In this respect Spencer is an Agnostic, a true man of science. He is a scientific philosopher; yet his philosophy is not at the same time a philosophy of the sciences, it is not a theory of knowledge such as, from different points of view, was contemplated by Kant in Germany and by
John Stuart Mill in this country or such as has been further developed by more recent thinkers, especially on the Continent.

If we may thus define the unification arrived at by Spencer as a unification of method or thought rather than as a unification of knowledge, we must further define it as a unification of scientific thought in which religious thought is left out of consideration. And this limitation of the range of Spencer's speculation becomes still more evident if we note how far Spencer has succeeded in solving the further problem, the reconciliation of science and religion. This is accomplished by eliminating religion, both as a psychological phenomenon and as a definite doctrine, altogether from the region of philosophical discussion. Both remain things lying outside the realm of the philosopher. Their existence is not denied, nor does Spencer assume towards them any polemical or aggressive attitude such as has been so characteristic of Continental materialism. His doctrine of slow change in the world of ideas, as well as in that of nature, prevents him from expecting any immediate effect or change in matters of opinion and belief. Having accordingly passed over the religious problem in the form in which it appeared as the central question in the idealistic philosophy of Germany, Spencer instead places at the centre of his speculation, as Comte did before him, the social problem. The greater part of his writings, the early as well as the latest, are occupied with this. His unifying principle of thought is finally put to the test in the construction of a social philosophy, such as I have dealt with in an earlier chapter.
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 701

Through the wide grasp of natural and social phenomena which characterises Spencer's writings, as well as through the limitation of his speculation to what he terms the Knowable, the spirit of Spencer's philosophy has entered into wide regions of modern thought and given rise to important criticisms and developments.¹ Though we may say that the greater

¹ In this country the most important critical work is that of Prof. James Ward. It is entitled 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' forming the Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-98. It was published in 1899, and may be considered as forming a landmark in recent thought, marking the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. There is only one other philosophical work which can claim to have assisted to the same degree in revolutionising philosophical thought in this country during the last years of the period I am dealing with. This is Mr F. H. Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality' (referred to extensively, supra, vol. iii. pp. 27, 186, 431, 434, 533 sqq.) The first edition appeared in 1893, and two more editions were called for before the end of the century. Both works are largely influenced by Continental thought. That of Ward contains much which reminds one of Lotze, whereas Bradley, though certainly influenced by Lotze, refers with more sympathy to Hegel. But these two works, so different, have nevertheless jointly produced, what we may term, the modern British School of Philosophy, the originality and independence of which has not yet been duly recognised abroad. If the Lotzean position in philosophy may be considered as an important stepping-stone in modern thought, we may also say that it has been superseded by recent thought in this country, and this advance is due mainly to the growing influence of the two thinkers just mentioned. I shall have to refer again to both of them later on in this chapter. So far as Ward is concerned he had already gained the reputation of an original thinker, mainly through his Article on 'Psychology' in the Encyclop. Brit. (9th ed., 1886), followed by two further Treatises in the 10th and 11th ed. (referred to supra, vol. iii. p. 277). In the critical work the philosophies of Naturalism and Agnosticism, mainly identified with the names of Spencer and Huxley, are minutely analysed and found to be defective and unsatisfactory; a circumstance which does not seem to have escaped Huxley nor altogether even Spencer himself. (See the latter's Autobiography, vol. ii. p. 166 to end.) We are then led on to the beginnings of a constructive effort, the foundations of which are to be found in Ward's Psychology, with its insistence on the experience of the individual mind developed and augmented by intersubjective intercourse with other minds, forming, as it were, the whole continuous field of thought, knowledge, volition, and moral judgments, the unity of which is to be found ultimately in the continuity of mental life and in the duality with unity of the primordial experience of subject and object. The following passage

69. Criticisms and developments of Spencer.
part of the philosophical interest of France and England has been till quite recently absorbed in this labour, it cannot be maintained that it has so far resulted in any systematisation comparable to that which is offered in the succeeding volumes of the 'Synthetic Philosophy.'

Spencer shares with Hegel the merit of having brought, in a definite form, the idea of development before the mind of recent thinkers. It is also interesting to note that both were, directly or indirectly, influenced by that complex of ideas which had found in Schelling and his immediate disciples an original but vague and fluctuating expression. These ideas Hegel deepened and reformed through his earlier theological, historical, and logical studies. Spencer approached them in the more definite form which they had acquired in the writings of eminent physiologists of his day, notably

states very clearly the fundamental conception of Ward's philosophy: "First, we found experience used in a double sense: there is the experience, the living experience, of a given individual, filled with concrete events and shaped from first to last by the paramount end of self-conservation and self-realisation. There is also experience generally — Experience with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the race, the result entirely of intersubjective intercourse, systematised and formulated by means of abstract conceptions. Next, we found grounds for suspecting that dualism has arisen from misconception and ignorance as to the relation of these two senses of experience. Experience in the first sense being relegated to psychology, experience in the second remained as the sole business of natural science; and the one experience coming then to be regarded as exclusively subjective and the other as altogether objective, a clear line emerges between the two, and the dualism of Mind and Nature is the result. But now, in the third place, we have found that our primary, concrete experience invariably implies both subjective and objective factors, and seems to involve these, not as separable and independent elements, but as organically coöperant members of one whole. If they bear this character throughout, then logical distinction of these factors is possible but not their actual dismemberment; there is duality but no dualism." (Vol. ii. p. 152.)

Certainly not within the period of this History.
of von Baer:¹ and he approached them with a mind trained in the mechanical principles of applied mathematics. Hegel's conception of development was thus that of the historical evolution of a spiritual content. Spencer's conception of development was that of the changes of an organism under the influence of internal and external mechanical forces. Hegel's disciples and readers gave him credit for having achieved more than he actually did; similarly Spencer's philosophy benefited by favourable external and internal circumstances which secured for it recognition from many different sides. Of these circumstances one was no doubt that the term Evolution formed a fortunate and more than adequate watchword for a new philosophy. Simultaneously also with the scheme of mechanical development indicated by this term there became known in this country Hegel's scheme of mental development. In many instances the two schemes were brought together, and the term Evolution was employed in a wider sense by writers and thinkers who were not prepared to accept the Darwinian theory of descent, and still less the lifeless mechanical formulæ of Spencer.² But more than by anything else did the philosophy of Evolution benefit by the recog-

² "Darwinism often recommends itself because confused with a doctrine of evolution which is different radically. Humanity is taken in that doctrine as a real being, or even as the one real being, and Humanity advances continuously. Its history is development and progress to a goal, because the type and character in which its reality consists is gradually brought more and more into fact. That which is strongest on the whole must therefore be good, and the ideas which come to prevail must therefore be true. This doctrine ... has, I suppose, now for a century taken its place in the thought of Europe." (F. H. Bradley in 'Mind,' July 1911, reprinted in 'Essays on Truth and Reality,' 1914, p. 321.)
nition that Darwin's theory of natural selection could be fitted into the Spencerian scheme in which, together with Lamarckian adaptation, it formed such an important illustration of organic change. And at least in one large department, in that of biology, Darwinism supplied exactly that principle which Spencer's scheme was essentially in need of; it supplied, or was at least very largely credited with supplying, a principle of progress. Through it the term Evolution acquired the meaning of an advance from the lower to the higher, and partook of that peculiarity so characteristic of Hegel's principle, that it set no definable limit to the process of mental development.

But it soon became evident that the Spencerian scheme of evolution is incomplete. This incompleteness, though obvious from the beginning to a few penetrating critics, escaped general notice through the enormous array of actual facts marshalled before the minds of Spencer's readers. The want of transition from the general principles to their application in separate regions of knowledge, the fact that in each of these regions this application had to begin with the introduction of special factors or data which were, between the different regions, connected merely by vague analogies, was a defect which was early recognised. Beyond the reference to the nebular hypothesis of Laplace in cosmical physics and to the transformist view in geology introduced by Lyell, we find in Spencer's writings no attempt to deal with evolution in inorganic nature. This omission, though explained by Spencer as inevitable considering the magnitude of the task he set himself, is nevertheless unfortunate, for
it prevented him from clearly defining and accurately gauging the validity of the purely mechanical conceptions which he had expounded in his 'First Principles.' This task has since been performed by a large amount of penetrating criticism, and not least by the change which has come over scientific thought itself.

The main result of this may be stated in the thesis that all purely mechanical processes are reversible and, as Spencer himself stated, rhythmical, and in the long-run self-repeating. In consequence of this property—the property of all so-called conservative systems—mechanism, however complicated, is incapable of explaining that peculiarity of organic and mental life which is the main characteristic of progress, and which consists in something more than mere change or rearrangement. Now it was just this something more in which the mechanical scheme of Spencer was deficient, but which seemed to be supplied by the principles of natural selection and adaptation introduced into biology by Darwin and Lamarck. What thinkers of the older and idealistic schools had tried to define by various terms such as "vital force" (Stahl and Bichat), "purpose and finality" (Kant), "nisus formativus" (Blumenbach), "the Idea" (Hegel, Lotze, Claude Bernard), "inherent tendency" ('Zielstrebigkeit,' von Baer), seemed to be supplied by the conception of an inherent teleology of nature which found expression in an entirely novel vocabulary such as "natural selection," "adaptation," "survival of the fittest," "struggle for existence," &c., terms which received a purely causal or mechanical explanation on the foundation of two empirical facts.
peculiar to all living things, viz., automatic growth and multiplication beyond the means of subsistence (Malthus' principle), and variation (Darwin).

It was, however, gradually realised that all these terms involve a principle which cannot be mechanically defined, and that, moreover, the question of origins or genesis, of the beginning of things, had really been forgotten in the more fruitful and absorbing quest of genealogies. In this respect the French term "transformation" and the English term "descent" are more adequate than such terms as "origin" and "genesis."

If, on the one side, the Spencerian scheme of evolution was never adequately and fully applied to cosmical and lifeless phenomena, it was found on the other side that it could no more be applied to the higher stages of organic, mental, and social life without in each case introducing new factors and data, empirically collected. Whilst Spencer showed much ingenuity in preparing for every higher phase the necessary empirical foundation, and in collecting such elementary factors and data as lent themselves to the application of his general scheme, it also became evident that the whole of this process consisted in an atomism of thought, in an analytical process analogous to the atomic view of mechanical physics, and that the final consummation, as already indicated at the conclusion of 'First Principles,' was the conception of an ultimate equilibrium difficult to distinguish from the dead level of monotony and stagnation. In fact, the Spencerian idea of evolution proved to be only applicable to finite regions in which the ultimate equilibrium could again be disturbed
through the influence of other surrounding but equally finite spheres of existence. The question of the significance, the life and meaning of the whole, remained unanswered and unanswerable; coinciding, according to Spencer's own admission, with the unknowable ground of everything, the Absolute.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century this defect of any and every purely mechanical scheme of evolution became more and more evident, and this through the independent labour of thinkers in all three countries, and as much through the movement of scientific as through that of philosophical thought. It is not too much to say that it has been a distinct aim of the latter to enlarge the conception of evolution so as to admit of a principle of progress. To express it in scientific language, the conception of a conservative system is not applicable either to the universe as a whole or to such finite portions of it as contain the phenomena of life and mind. Nevertheless, the naturalism and agnosticism in Spencer's thought have acted as a great stimulus to philosophical reasoning both in France and in this country, not to speak of America, in the intellectual development of which we are, in this Work, only indirectly interested.

The most original attempts to modify the evolutionary theories of Spencer and Darwin so as to make them more applicable to mental and especially moral and social phenomena, are to be found in the recent philosophical literature of France. In this country that school of thought which undertook to explain and, as T. H. Green put it, do over again the work which Hegel

72. Defects of mechanical scheme of evolution recognised in all three countries.

73. T. H. Green.
had set himself to do in Germany, adopted many of the watchwords and canons which Spencer and Darwin had introduced into philosophical literature; but it has not so far succeeded in fixing upon any well-defined novel principle by which to characterise its speculations and make them generally intelligible to the thinking public. It is still only the watchwords of Spencer and Darwin on the one side, or of Hegel on the other, which are proclaimed in endless variations. French thought has in this respect been more original. But, before I deal with the important contributions of recent French philosophy to European thought, it is necessary to become acquainted with the latest and only comprehensive systematic attempt that, since the age of Lotze and von Hartmann, has been made in Germany: this is the system of Professor Wilhelm Wundt of Leipsic.

In time the important volumes in which Professor Wundt has gradually matured and unfolded his systematic view are almost contemporary with those of Spencer in England, but their respective systems were independently built up without, at least for a considerable time, any mutual influence. Although both thinkers may with some propriety be termed scientific philosophers, the part which science, in the narrower sense of the word, plays in the two philosophies is very different. As I stated above, Spencer gives us no philosophy of science. The work begun in England by Whewell and Mill, and continued by Stanley Jevons and others, was not taken up by Spencer at all. On the other side Wundt's earliest studies led him to attack those very problems involved in scientific thought which had
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

occupied Mill in England, and which in Germany had at
the time been taken up by the Neo-Kantians. The
result has been that the earlier volumes of Wundt's
publications contain the most complete analysis of
scientific method yet produced. They cannot be dis-
regarded by any one who at the present day desires to
deal with the subject. Wundt is in this respect a
much more important successor of Mill than Mill's
countryman, Spencer.

Further, though both Spencer and Wundt came from
scientific to philosophical studies, the order in which
they assimilated scientific ideas was not the same.
Spencer was originally a practical engineer, with a
knowledge of mathematics and dynamics going little
beyond the practical formulae then habitually used in
dealing with problems of engineering and construction.
The great change which, about that time, was being
introduced into abstract dynamics through the labours of
Stokes, Thomson and Tait, and Clerk Maxwell, had not
yet made itself felt in practical engineering. Spencer's
dynamical notions were thus the traditional ones
belonging to the older school, and it does not appear
that he ever realised that to a scientific thinker at the
end of the century they would appear hopelessly vague,
inadequate, and incomplete. Unconnected with his
occupation as an engineer, which he presently relin-
quished, was his interest in social questions, and it was
from this side rather than from the purely scientific
side that he approached the great philosophical, which
became for him a social, problem. He approached it
through the study of biology, and of organic forms by
means of purely mechanical, but essentially inadequate, conceptions.

On the other side Wundt's scientific studies began with that branch of physiology which had received special attention in the school of Johannes Müller: the physiology of the sense-organs and of the processes of sensation and perception.

His earliest contribution to this branch of physiology belongs to a period which witnessed the publication of two standard works of a very different character: Helmholtz's 'Physiological Optics,' followed by his 'Physiological Acoustics,' and Fechner's 'Elements of Psycho-physics.' For a considerable time Wundt's labours moved in the new region of research opened out by these two epoch-making publications, but he soon felt the necessity of studying the principles of exact reasoning contained in the application of mathematics to physical phenomena. In his treatise on the 'Axioms of Exact Science,' he dealt with a subject prepared by Kant, cultivated by the Neo-Kantians, and to which attention was attracted by the growing interest taken in Schopenhauer's writings. It was, however, essentially through his development of psycho-physical methods that he defined his attitude towards philosophical problems.

If Fechner may be termed the father of psycho-physics, it is really Wundt to whom the great enlargement and firm establishment of this branch of research is mainly due. But here we may notice a great difference between the scientific spirit which animated Spencer and that which permeates all Wundt's writings. The former soon fastened upon a definite mechanical
formula which was for him the unifying principle of thought, under the guidance of which he collected and marshalled an enormous mass of empirical knowledge. In doing this he took little notice of what others had done before him. His knowledge of the history of Philosophy was extremely superficial.

On the other side Wundt is a true representative of the German ideal of ‘Wissenschaft,’ which denotes science and erudition combined. Wundt is untiring in the study, appreciation, and criticism of earlier and contemporary thinkers; and one of his earliest and chief achievements is his great Treatise on ‘Logic,’ in which the nature, the limits, and the different forms of scientific reasoning are exhaustively analysed. This and his early researches in the borderland of physiology and psychology impressed upon him the inadequacy of the abstract principles of the exact sciences for dealing with mental phenomena. It was especially the criticism of the conceptions of substance and causality which prevented him from falling into and maintaining that one-sided confidence in purely mechanical reasoning which characterises the whole of Spencer’s philosophy. He himself has given us an account of the enlargement of his views which drew after it a correcter and fuller appreciation of philosophical and psychological problems, as distinguished from those of exact science.

“If I were asked,” Wundt says, “wherein the psychological value of experimental observation consisted, and still consists, for me, I should say that it has produced and more and more confirmed an entirely new view of the nature and connection of psychical
processes. When I first approached psychological problems I shared the general prejudice natural to physiologists, that the formation of sense-perceptions is merely the work of the physiological properties of our sense-organs. I learnt for the first time when studying the performance of the visual sense (especially as regards space-perception) to understand that act of 'creative synthesis' which gradually became for me a guide at the hand of which I could also gain a psychological comprehension of the development of the higher functions of imagination and intellect; for this the older psychology gave us no assistance. When I then approached the investigation of the time-relations in the sequence of our ideas a new insight was afforded me into the development of the functions of the will (viz., through the influence of preparation and tension upon the shortening of physiological time) . . . an insight likewise into the close connection of all such psychical functions as were separated through artificial abstractions and terms such as 'representing,' 'feeling,' and 'willing'; in one word, an insight into the indivisibility and the inner similarity of mental life in all its stages."

This passage is characteristic of Wundt's philosophy and differentiates it from that of Kant on one side, from that of Spencer on the other. Kant had recognised the synthetic function of the intellect, and had fixed upon the process of apperception as the centre of this mental synthesis. Wundt goes a step further, and defines it as a creative act which produces something more than a

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1 See 'Philosophische Studien,' section in the second volume of 1894, pp. 122-124; also the first Wundt's 'Kleine Schriften,' 1911.
mere summation of separate elements or factors, and in this way he introduces into the mental process a feature unknown to Spencer and, as we saw above, wanting in his scheme of evolution. Wundt adopts Kant's term 'apperception,' but for him apperception is the first conscious exhibition of an active principle, which he identifies with the Will, and ultimately defines as the special characteristic of mental life. Something analogous to this principle he traces, though less and less perceptibly existing, even when we descend into the lower regions of animal life. The first main characteristic of this special factor is that it produces not only something new, but something which is continually on the increase; that it is a true principle of growth and development, not of mere rearrangement, of concentration and dissolution. There is, however, so far as I know, no evidence that the insufficiency of Spencer's special conception of development assisted Wundt in introducing into his scheme this enlarging feature.

The conception of this "creative synthesis," of Activity as the central characteristic of mental life and development, goes, with Wundt, hand in hand with the second doctrine peculiar to his philosophy. This doctrine is developed in his criticism of the ideas of substance and causality. It distinguishes his philosophy from the older ontology and metaphysics which, in modern times, have found their classical expression in the system of Spinoza. The conception of substance is not applicable, according to Wundt, to mental phenomena, i.e., to the phenomena which we know through introspection. These are purely processes following each other in the sequence of time,
and connected by the idea of causality or its reverse, finality, accordingly as we connect the sequent with its antecedent, or the latter with the former. As distinguished from this, causality in the outer physical world is merely the rearrangement in space of something which in quantity is supposed to be unalterable; which we call Substance, and picture to ourselves in some form or other such as matter, its ultimate particles, or in more recent times Energy. This rearrangement we assume to be continuous, and it is subject to the principle of conservation or equivalence.

These modern theories of conservation of matter or energy, or, in general, of Substance, are not applicable to mental processes, which are, on the other side, subject to the principle of the growth or increase of mental energy. From this point of view Wundt denies the usefulness and validity of the conception of Substance as applied to mental phenomena. The traditional notion of a soul as a spiritual thing has thus no place in his philosophy, which, as such, stands in marked opposition to the philosophy of Lotze, for whom the conception of the universal substance is identical with that of the underlying reality, of the spiritual ground of everything.

Wundt is, next to Spencer, the most recent thinker who has ventured upon a systematic comprehension of his philosophical ideas. His definition of philosophy as expressive of the inherent tendency of thought towards unity falls in with the general drift of modern speculation, but nevertheless it differs both from the definition of Herbart and Lotze on one side and from that of Spencer on the other. Further, he recognises, as did
both Lotze and Spencer, the necessity of a reconciliation of the two great regions of thought which in modern times have so frequently come into conflict, the scientific and the religious. But here also his line of reasoning differs both from that of Lotze and from that of Spencer. His position is an independent one, and was probably arrived at, not in the beginning but gradually, in the course of the development of his philosophical ideas.

In contrast with Spencer's formula the unifying tendency of thought is not expressed as the unification of knowledge. Wundt does not consider it sufficient to trace an ever-recurring scheme or method of thought through the different regions of actual existence. True to the central conception of his psychology, which looks upon the mind as an active propelling principle, he notifies in his 'Theory of Knowledge' the inherent tendency of thought to go beyond the facts and data supplied by experience. The formation of ideas by which experience is transcended, reminds us of similar views contained in the philosophy of Kant. Both the suggestiveness of experience and its incompleteness stimulate the activity of the intellect to complete and supplement the lines of reasoning which start and must always start from given facts and data. Wundt shows how in its simplest and most abstract nature this tendency of thought is exemplified by mathematical reasoning which, starting from number and measure, forms transcendent conceptions, such as the Infinite, and ventures further into the region of the imaginary. In this way Wundt defines this transcendency of thought as of a twofold nature: he distinguishes between a real
and an imaginary transcendency of thought. In the former, existing and useful trains of reasoning are simply carried further, but essentially on the same lines; in the latter they are supplemented by new conceptions, which cannot be adequately represented in reality, but are, nevertheless, useful as ministering to the unifying activity of the intellect.

The two main transcendent ideas are, according to Wundt, the cosmological idea and the psychological idea: the idea of the World and the idea of the Soul. To avoid the one-sidedness inherent in both, in materialism on the one hand and in spiritualism on the other—systems of thought which are based upon an exclusive application of one or the other of these two ideas—the mind is forced to combine both in a third idea which Wundt terms the ontological. His previous enunciation of material substance and of mental activity permits him to bring both ideas together in the ontological conception of a totality of willing or active beings. The world must be conceived either as a material unity or as a mental unity. Which of the two we elect is to some extent a matter of subjective choice: for Wundt it is the idea of a universal collective Will of which the separate wills are only manifestations. This idea of an Infinite Collective Will Wundt identifies with the Divine principle, and in this way he approaches a conception of a Divine Order not unlike that of Fichte's earlier speculation, but distinguished from it as being a process of development. The imaginary transcendency of this conception renders further definition impossible.

Thus the idea of Personality, so important in Lotze's
philosophy, does not enter into the highest conception of Wundt's speculation, but he is led on to an investigation of the historical manifestations of the collective Will in the history of human culture and civilisation. Its first and earliest conscious manifestation is to be found in language. The latter is the source of myths, and these the beginning of religion on the one side, of custom and morality on the other. The gradual evolution of individual minds, with their individual interests and conflicts, is thus a manifestation or outcome of the life and development of the collective mind. In this way Wundt gives special expression to the idea of Humanity, which plays such an important part in the classical literature and philosophy of Germany and in a different manner in the Positivism of Comte in France.

There is no doubt that Wundt's peculiar conception of an actuality, of a willing process, as a special principle distinguished from the conception of substance, is extremely fruitful in dealing with historical and ethical questions. Not less fruitful is his conception of growth and expansion as characteristic of mental as distinguished from purely physical energy. By a combination of these two fundamental conceptions he views the collective Will neither as a mere sum of individual Wills, nor as a finished and perfected existence. It is something more than the sum of its parts: the principle of "creative synthesis" comes here into evidence. Also, it is an ideal which is being gradually realised by the combined effort of the individual Wills. This ideal affords a foundation for ethical development and for a definite though changing expression of moral precepts. This view confirms
Wundt in his tendency—manifested already in his earlier writings—to consider individual mental life in its social and living environment and also in its historical development. Although psychology forms the entrance to his philosophy, his psychology is not limited to that of the individual mind, but is enlarged by the psychology of the collective mind. To this subject Wundt has devoted the latter years of his laborious researches and ever extending studies. He thus shares, though in an independent spirit and with a special object in view, the tendency of modern speculation: to look for the explanation and definition of existing forms of knowledge and belief in their genesis or historical becoming. His philosophy is therefore distinctly evolutionary, and, as such, marks an advance upon the pre-evolutionary philosophy of Lotze. From this point of view we have also to understand the position which Wundt takes up to the religious question.

He has neither put forth a philosophy of religion, such as Schleiermacher and Lotze have given us from different points of view, nor a religious philosophy such as was developed in the later writings of Fichte and in those of the right wing of the Hegelian school. His interest in the subject was not that which originally led him to philosophise, as it led most of the great Continental thinkers in modern times; neither was the philosophic impulse in his case connected with the social problem as it was in the case of Comte in France and of most philosophers in this country. His original interest was purely scientific; but as he was early led beyond a mere intellectualism to a study of the active and emotional side of
human nature, so his scientific interest led him to a study, and necessitated a comprehension, of the mental creations belonging to those regions. But we do not find that equal appreciation for the religious and emotional and for the scientific and rational aspect of things which is from the beginning characteristic of Lotze's position. We are thus left in some uncertainty as to the value and importance which Wundt attaches to any system of religious beliefs or to a theological treatment of them.

With Lotze some fundamental conviction of a religious nature formed the beginning and governing idea of the whole of his speculation. With Wundt certain religious conceptions, which are, as always, imported into his speculation from the region of existing beliefs, make their appearance at the end of his more systematic works. They are there treated sympathetically; but, coming, as it were, from outside and at the end of elaborate trains of reasoning, they appear more as an impartial tribute to historically important phenomena of mental life than as a fundamental conviction for which the whole of the speculation was undertaken.

The spiritual content which actuated the idealistic and romantic development of German thought as a propelling force does not appear in the beginnings and in the groundwork of Wundt's philosophy. As a purely scientific thinker he was, however, in the course of his mental development, bound to recognise and appreciate it. He thus stands, so far as the religious problem is concerned, half-way between what has been termed the dualism of Lotze and the agnosticism of Spencer, at once
an opponent, with the former, of the shallow materialism and, with the latter, of the socialism of the age.

With an appreciation of Professor Wundt's important labours in the direction of systematisation of thought we might properly close this chapter. During the last twenty years of the century no comprehensive and original system of philosophy has made its appearance. Wundt's work has in this respect been compared by German writers to the work of Aristotle in antiquity: concluding for a period the systematic effort of thought and giving at the same time such a comprehensive critical view of contemporary speculation and contemporary problems that great originality as well as much erudition will be required from any one who would succeed in finding and establishing a new departure in systematic philosophy. The foundation of any new system will have to be laid both much deeper and much broader than in the past. Accordingly, the work which has been done since, in all the three countries, is, if not devoid of originality, yet on the whole fragmentary and preparatory. No one has ventured upon a new and comprehensive summation of these labours. Nevertheless, some progress has been made towards systematisation; but this progress stands still under the culminating sign of one dominant idea which led Spencer as well as Wundt, the idea of Evolution.

The peculiar aspect given to this idea through Spencer has been more stimulating to French than to German thought. The latter took it more directly from Darwin, or from the earlier and more comprehensive conception of development which, since the time of
Leibniz, had leavened most of the important systems of philosophy as well as the historical studies and general literature of the country.

To French thinkers neither the German nor the Spencerian notion of Evolution or development appeared generally satisfactory and conclusive. The logic of the former was too metaphysical and abstract to satisfy the demand for lucid expression so characteristic of the French mind. On the other side the great defect of Spencer's system, that it really contained no principle of progress, was early recognised by several prominent thinkers, and various corrective and enlarging attempts have been put forward: independently, as it seems, though not very far removed from ideas which are, in a more systematic form, contained in Wundt's writings. Even so far as the mere philosophical vocabulary is concerned, we find in the latter anticipations of titles and watchwords which have since attained a certain popularity and have become directive of philosophical thought.

In addition to this independent evolutionism, we find in French thought two other characteristics. Positivism, though not in the special sense in which it was understood by Comte, is, as it were, an abiding feature. Alongside of it we find prominently developed a tendency of thought which in the popular philosophic mind will always be identified with the name of Schopenhauer, who, in the title of his earliest great work, put the active principle or the Will into the foreground of his metaphysics. Though not in this abstract manner, this principle, which is known to us through introspection as an
independent attribute of reality to which all growth, progress, life, thought, and action are ultimately due, has become a leading idea both in German and in French philosophy, and has latterly found original expression likewise in English philosophical literature. This prominent line of reasoning in recent European thought has coined for itself a whole array of new terms, such as "Voluntarism" (Paulsen), "Actualism" with its principle of the Idées - forces (Fouillé), "Creative Synthesis" with its principle of the growth of mental energy (Wundt), "Creative Evolution" with the principle of Élan vital (Henri Bergson), "Pragmatism" (William James), and "Activism" (Rudolf Eucken).

As I stated just now, this philosophy of the Will must always remind us of Schopenhauer. Its germs may, however, be traced to the independent speculations of Fichte in Germany and of Maine de Biran in France, from which thinkers it has directly descended respectively to Rudolf Eucken and to Alfred Fouillé and Secretan, as later representatives of German and French thought.

It is notably to M. Fouillé that we are indebted for a comprehensive exposition of this actualism, and for an attempt not only to show its application to the great problems of psychology, metaphysics, ethics, and sociology, but also to effect through it a reconciliation of the two main currents in modern French thought, the Idealist (intellectualistic) on the one side and the Positivist (scientific) on the other. He has thus laboured in the direction of a unification of thought. M. Fouillé combines in his philosophical reasoning all the best
traits of modern French thought: an appreciation of the ideology of Plato, the study of which—as of the whole of ancient philosophy—was stimulated and cultivated in the eclectic school of Victor Cousin; an equal appreciation for the genuine teaching of Positivism, enlarged by the evolutionary conceptions of Darwin, Lamarck, and Spencer. To these, the main subjects of his earlier studies, he has added a thorough knowledge of the original works of Kant as also of the Neo-Kantian movement and of the writings of Lotze. With such a large material to work on, his endeavour lies in the direction of conciliating opposed tendencies of thought, leaving aside the more extreme developments which these several tendencies have led to. Though he opposes what he terms the Idealist movement with its modern doctrines, such as those of discontinuity and contingency, the heaven of ideas of Plato still illuminates the whole of his thinking, which aims at bringing these ideas down to the surface of this earth. Though he disputes the one-sided mechanism, automatism, and agnosticism of Spencer, Huxley, and others, he stands firmly on an enlarged positivist basis and shares with Comte and Spencer the interest which they took in the great social question. For the central and leading principle he has coined the term Idées-forces, a term which conveys a more definite notion in the French language than it does in its German and English renderings. To him Ideas—which term he uses in the Cartesian sense, as meaning any mental presentation—are active forces, and as such the counterpart in the inner world of mechanical motion in the outer world; for
he seems to adhere to a complete correspondence of the psychical and physical, unlike Wundt, who does not consider that a complete parallelism is either a tenable or a useful conception. His main idea rests thus upon an attempt to bring what he considers the characteristic features of the physical and mental—motion on the one side, ideas on the other—together under the unifying conception of force; whereas in Wundt's system the distinction of substance and process, of physical and psychical causality, forms a leading conception.

Influenced by Fouillé, the suggestive writings of Jean Marie Guyau contain an attempt to employ an enlarged conception of Life as a definition of the progressive principle in history and society, and to supersede with it the traditional views both in ethics and religion. In this respect he goes further than Fouillé, who does not take up to these traditional mental agencies the same radical position. But Guyau, whose career was prematurely ended, has, less than other prominent recent thinkers in France, given a systematic development to his central idea. His writings are, nevertheless, as we have had occasion to see in earlier chapters, original and important in the history of modern thought.

The most important of modern thinkers in France is M. Henri Bergson. His earlier works, much appreciated in his own country, remained little known outside of it. Lately, however, his recent volume, with the suggestive title 'Évolution Créatrice,' has made him everywhere known as a thinker whose original views require and deserve patient study to be fully grasped and appreciated. His earlier smaller works, as well as his contributions to
several Reviews, contain interesting speculations on the notion of Time and Memory, which he opposes as the characteristic feature of mental life in its continual change to the spatial expansion and rigidity of the phenomena of the outer world. It seems that his real position in philosophical thought was not clearly understood through his earlier writings. Against the Positivists he maintained strenuously a belief in the possibility and necessity of metaphysics; in his later work he has clearly shown that he belongs to the Evolutionist movement of thought, cherishing the desire of introducing into the mechanical view of development a principle of progress. It is, however, not easy to arrive at any clear conception of his central idea and its workings. The attention which it has aroused not only in French but also in German and English philosophical literature will lead, through criticism and discussion, to a better understanding.

It is equally difficult to bring into a focus the teaching of Rudolf Eucken, whose writings, as well as his academic teaching, have apparently gained a very marked influence in German thought and literature. That he defines his philosophy as "Activism" shows that he belongs to that tendency of modern thought which I am at present dealing with. The fact that he refers back to Fichte proves that he inherits with him that spiritual content which, as I have shown, both the idealistic and the romantic schools of German philosophy tried to rationalise.

In a much more definite form, making it acceptable to a much larger circle of thinking persons in many countries, does this recent tendency of thought appear in
the writings of the American philosopher, William James. He has brought together under the name of Pragmatism certain trains of reasoning peculiar to himself, but suggested likewise by contemporary writers in America and, to a lesser degree, in this country. For the understanding, diffusion, and acceptance of the teachings of this most recent school of philosophical thought, it has been of great value that it has concentrated its efforts upon the solution of a purely logical question, and that it gives this solution in a few simple words. The problem is the old question: What is truth? The answer: Truth is that which works. William James himself frankly admits that the new term Pragmatism, which was evolved in a conversation of his with a friend, is to a large extent a new name for Ideas which are not new. And similarly, in addition to a few striking and original logical dissertations, a great deal of the propaganda of the Pragmatists lies in the pains they are taking to show how in modern, but still more in ancient, philosophy the fundamental conception of their creed is variously anticipated: an argument which tells as much against the originality as it does for the universality of their central doctrine.

These latest developments of philosophic thought, which reach into the first decade of the twentieth century, and so do not come into the scheme of this History, do not advance to a complete systematic treatment such as we meet with in the works of Herbert Spencer and of Professor Wundt. Among the more recent thinkers it is only M. Fouillée who has demonstrated the value of his central idea by dealing with some of the standard
OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT.

problems of philosophy and of the burning questions of the day. Among these he has specially dealt with the psychological, the ethical, and the sociological problems. The other recent doctrines may contain valuable principles capable of systematic treatment, and affording help in solving the two supreme philosophical problems: the formal one of a unification of knowledge or thought, and the more substantial one of furnishing a reasoned creed which should afford a reconciliation of the scientific and the religious aspects. It is quite evident that they all move under the sign of Evolution: also that they feel the necessity of enlarging and deepening the Spencerian conception of Evolution by the importation of some principle of progress. But, though the system of Wundt does clearly supply the latter, it does not seem as if his special conception of development has proved to be generally acceptable.

The end of the nineteenth century thus found itself confronted with the problem which existed in the beginning: the problem of reason and faith or of science and religion. Though this supreme and unsolved problem does not appear in the same light as it did to thinkers in the beginning of the century, the need of a solution is now more generally felt. The easy solutions given by French thinkers during the revolutionary period are now nowhere acceptable. The problem has been fully realised in this country also, where it had hardly presented itself at all a hundred years ago. It is to a large extent through having recognised the deep importance of this problem that German philosophy has received so much attention and gained so much influence outside
of its native country. On the other side, it is precisely where it had met with such an easy solution, in France itself, that this supreme problem is now most seriously pondered over by leading thinkers. Of this we need not take further notice in this connection, as it was fully dealt with at the end of the foregoing chapter.

I have had so frequently to notice the fragmentary and inconclusive character of philosophic thought at the end of our period that I cannot conclude without briefly noticing the indications—particularly in British thought—of the advent of a new spirit. The indications I refer to point to a decided change in the position which the philosophic mind is likely to take up in the near future, with the object of again attaining to a greater unity and harmony of thought, liberating itself from the fetters of too much criticism and acquiring that self-confidence which is indispensable to any constructive effort. This was only faintly traceable or perhaps completely hidden to the external view at the end of our period. Since that time, however, the tendencies inherent in recent thought have become clearer, and in so far as they bear upon the subject of this chapter—the unification of Knowledge and the unity of Thought—I will attempt briefly to point them out. In doing so, I shall confine myself to a few leading thinkers, dispensing with a survey of the extensive literature in which similar tendencies are manifest, and this for two reasons.

First, because this literature is mainly interested in special problems, employing highly technical terms, and has in consequence not yet entered into the general body of thought. Secondly, because my knowledge of this
important and extensive literature is even more fragmentary than the literature itself. In order not to part from my readers without giving them some idea of the tendencies of recent thought, I must briefly recapitulate what has been shown more in detail in preceding chapters.

The highest aim of philosophy has always been to search for unity of thought. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Kant had firmly established in the minds of his followers the conviction that this unity can only be found in the unity of consciousness—i.e., of the inner life; but he had still left the possibility of another unity in the "Thing in Itself," the caput mortuum of external reality. The immediate followers of Kant, in what they considered the true spirit of his teaching, consistently destroyed this phantom, and sought for unity and harmony in the inner world, confining themselves finally to the world of thought—i.e., of logical thought. This movement culminated in Hegel.

Quite independent of this, which is usually termed the Idealistic movement, the natural sciences approached unity of thought from the other side—i.e., from the side of the external or material world, concerning the ultimate reality of which they entertained no doubt. Their researches, which were not conducted with the object of establishing a reasoned creed, but simply in order to gain natural knowledge, led, nevertheless, to a surprising though partial unification of such knowledge, and when the endeavours of the Idealistic school failed, some thinkers, trained in the methods of the natural sciences, and impressed with the increasing simplification of their
principles, quite spontaneously conceived the idea that by following out their line of reasoning a solution of the philosophical problem could be attained where and when Idealism had failed. In fact, they thought that circumspection—*i.e.*, looking outside and around—would be more helpful than introspection. There is also no doubt that idealistic thinkers had, in an unwarranted manner, made tacit and surreptitious use of notions which belong exclusively to the material sciences. The naturalistic school of thought worked in the commencement mainly with the conception of Life as the highest unifying principle in nature, and when the older formula of a "vital force" could not be logically defined it was driven to a purely mechanical construction of reality. This line of reasoning found its consummation in the system of Herbert Spencer. In this system the naturalistic train of thought came to a limit as the idealistic had apparently come to a limit a generation earlier in the system of Hegel.

In parenthesis it may be noted that on the idealistic side Schopenhauer alone had not discarded the "Thing in Itself," but had incorporated it in his dualistic system by defining it as the Will in analogy with the active principle of the human mind; on the other side, Comte had not reduced biology to mechanism, but had maintained that the living creation could only be understood by the *vue d'ensemble*—*i.e.*, by resorting to a mental principle.

This inroad of naturalism into what we may term the philosophy of mind did not contaminate British thought to the same extent. Though by Hartley a mechanical
process of 'vibration' was assumed as the elementary motion in brain and nerves, this hypothetical physiology did not exclude the reference to a psychical association of mental processes. All philosophy of mind in this country, including that of James and J. S. Mill, may be termed introspective; the term "mental chemistry" was indeed used, but the elements in this chemistry were not material things but ideas. The assistance of biology proper, i.e., of the physiology of the senses and the brain, came to be imported from the Continent into English psychology, notably by Bain and Maudsley, and has, since their time, been further developed through Spencer and Lewes, and to some extent also under the foreign influence of Wundt. In opposition to the latter, however, Bain himself raised his voice in one of his latest deliverances.¹

Now it is one of the principal features of recent philosophy in this country that it has re-established again in its supreme place the introspective method. This was very marked in Prof. James Ward's first article on "Psychology" (1886) mentioned in an earlier chapter.² In this new departure the traditional bent of the British mind has again asserted itself. A continuity is established with the introspective line of thought which started with Locke and was carried on through Berkeley, Hume, and the Scottish School, down to J. S. Mill. But in distinction from them the new departure urged the necessity of looking at mental life as a whole, of breaking with the atomising processes of the "faculty" and "association"-psychology, of studying the continuum of

sensory and motor presentations, and of considering the emotional and volitional incidents as having the same reality as those of the senses and the intellect. The result was that the psychology of the latter had to go hand in hand with that of the former. The continuity, as well as the greater complexity of the field of consciousness, was brought out still more prominently and convincingly by the same thinker in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures referred to already.¹ We learn there that unity of thought and knowledge depends ultimately upon the continuity and unity of consciousness. The apparent dualism of an inner and outer world, to destroy which Kant led the way in his "unity of apperception," but restored again in his "Thing in Itself," is superseded in Ward's fundamental thesis that conscious mental life begins with the felt unity in duality of subject and object. Through it there arises within the individual consciousness by the active and selective process of attention, and by intercourse with other minds, the image of an outer world. This is not opposed to, but forms a portion of, the entire world of consciousness, but it acquires for practical purposes a seemingly independent existence, a reality of its own, supplying the material for orderly logical and scientific thought. All that we know, or can know, is comprised in the circumference of our individual consciousness enlarged through intersubjective intercourse into the greater sphere of general experience common to many minds. But if we, according to this view, do away with the common-sense aspect of things, according to which

¹ See ante, p. 156.
there are two realities, the outer world and the inner world; if we absorb, as it were, the outer world in the inner world, and make it a portion of our inner experience; we do not, in doing so, destroy the irremovable conviction that these two worlds present to us a different sort of reality. For things in the outer world are more obtrusive, those of the inner world perhaps more important. The former are better defined, the latter more identified with our individual interests; the former seem to have more tangible reality, the latter more value. Thus, whilst getting rid of the opposition of internal and external, we do not explain the difference of greater and less reality or of appearance and reality.

Almost simultaneously with the new psychology, of which James Ward is the leading exponent in this country, another thinker, starting from quite different beginnings, took up the problem just referred to. This is Mr F. H. Bradley, who, in his 'Appearance and Reality' (1893), fixed the attention of British thought upon a metaphysical question in a way which no other thinker has done before or since. His object was "to stimulate enquiry and doubt." This work may be looked upon as a treatise of "First principles," and is, as such, an introduction to the idealistic school of thought in the same way as Herbert Spencer's 'First Principles' aimed at laying the foundations of a consistent naturalistic system. The method adopted by Mr Bradley, a peculiar kind of reflection, was original in the history of British philosophy, but is more or less familiar to students of Lotze in Germany, who himself had adopted it under the influence
both of Hegel and Herbart. It may be defined in general as an attempt to answer the many questions which arise as to the meaning of those abstract terms, such as "reality," "appearance," "experience," &c., which we continually use in ordinary as well as in scientific and philosophical reasoning. It is akin to the dialectic of Hegel’s Logic as well as to the Bearbeitung der Erfahrungsbe griffe of Herbart. It introduces, inter alia, the idea of "degrees" of reality in order to solve the problem mentioned above, and aims at fixing our thoughts upon the problem of the ultimate or highest reality, which is termed the Absolute. There is no attempt to solve logical and metaphysical questions by recourse to mechanical analogies, and it is accordingly purely introspective. In approaching the problem of the unity or harmony of thought and knowledge, it urges not so much the internal unity of consciousness as the necessity for the human mind of orderly or systematic unity. The totality of things is conceived as a system, special points and features being ultimately intelligible only by looking at the whole. Without using the exact term, the work is really a treatise on the "synoptic" aspect of reality.

Although we find in recent philosophical literature in this country the two schools of thought of which Ward and Bradley may be considered the leaders frequently treated as separate or opposed, they are at one in urging an idealistic view of the world and Life, and in employing the introspective method, though in the one case this is more distinctly psychological, in the other more distinctly logical. But in their latest respective de-
liverances, as also in the discussions carried on mainly in the Aristotelian Society, the representatives of the two schools seem to be coming nearer together, each having learned something from the other. It is significant that the relation of psychology and logic forms also one of the burning questions of philosophical thought in Germany.
CHAPTER XII.
THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

I.

To the popular mind the science of Mathematics on the one side and that of Metaphysics on the other stand in marked contrast. The former represents, as it were, the most certain, the latter the most uncertain, form of Knowledge which the human mind is possessed of. It is, however, worth noting that nevertheless these two forms of Knowledge have, according to the popular opinion, one quality in common, neither of them seems capable of any real progress. The absolute fixity of the fundamental principles of the one makes a real advance seemingly as impossible as the absolute uncertainty of the principles of the other.

In the concluding chapter of the first section of this History I tried to show how, so far as Mathematics are concerned, the popular view is erroneous; no science has advanced and changed during the nineteenth century more than that of mathematics. In the present chapter, which will conclude the second section of this History, I shall endeavour similarly to refute the second opinion,
and to show how, in spite of the varying aspects which the philosophical problem has presented to us in the foregoing chapters, there has nevertheless gone on a very definite underlying advance in the philosophical Thought of the period. This chapter will accordingly aim at expounding the rationale of philosophical thought. For this purpose I shall have to answer two definite questions. The first will refer to the main influence through which this change and this advance have been brought about; the second will refer to a general tendency of thought which the detailed expositions in the earlier chapters have enabled us to discover in recent philosophical discussions.

I will at once answer the first question by saying that the main influence through which philosophical thought has undergone what we may term a fundamental change must be traced back to the progress of science itself and its manifold applications in practical life: it is, in fact, the working of the scientific spirit, extending beyond the limits of its special subject. This special subject itself we may define as the advancement of natural Knowledge in theory and practice.

It may also be convenient, whilst postponing an answer to the second question, to state provisionally that the advance of philosophical thought has been prepared under the influence of the critical spirit through a process which may be divided into two distinct stages. Criticism in philosophy first destroyed the older metaphysical notions by applying, wherever possible, the methods and principles which had proved so efficient in the region of scientific research, and it then turned
its attention to these methods themselves and showed their essential inadequacy for philosophical purposes, thus preparing the way for a different treatment. A conviction that this is necessary constitutes perhaps the only feature common to all the more important philosophical writings of the present age, and will, if it succeeds in finding clear and definite expression, constitute a real advance in philosophical thought. That such a new position must be gained was already clearly before the mind of some of the great thinkers in the beginning of the century, but their attempts though eminently suggestive were premature, and could not stand against the rising tide of naturalistic thought which flooded the whole of philosophical literature in the middle of the century.

Dealing now somewhat more closely with the first phase in the change of modern thought, I must remind my readers that most of the pioneers of modern philosophy were thinkers impressed by the new scientific methods. Some of them occupy even a foremost place in the history of science itself. Among the latter Descartes and Leibniz stand out prominently as representatives and inventors in the most advanced regions of mathematical thought. Others, such as Bacon and Spinoza, recommended scientific methods—the former the experimental, the latter the mathematical—for the purposes of philosophical inquiry.

Locke proposed to analyse the processes of "human understanding" by following the lead of the natural sciences and investigating origins, dealing with ideas as the elements of thought and knowledge. This led to
a genuine new departure, while the mathematical method of Descartes and Leibniz degenerated with Christian Wolff into mere external form.

The only constructive thinker of first importance who was not overawed by the mathematical method, for which he had indeed no real appreciation, was Bishop Berkeley, and it is worth noting that his contribution to philosophical thought was not truly appreciated in its originality till late in the nineteenth century.

Special scientific formulæ, such as the Newtonian law of gravitation or the atomistic theory of chemistry, were, in many cases, taken as models—the former by Hume in putting forward the laws of association; the latter by the British School of Psychology in succession to Hartley. Hartley himself had sought to connect these laws with physiological processes in the brain. Kant’s earlier works are full of quasi-mathematical reasoning; but, unlike Newton, he exaggerated the importance of gravitation as a fundamental principle, as did Laplace; and he did not understand the Newtonian laws of Motion which were clearly set out by his contemporary d’Alembert in France.

In the beginning of the century there existed only a very small number of strictly-defined scientific principles. The laws of attraction and repulsion and those of atomic grouping and combination stand out prominently; to these were added, about that time, the principle of polarity and that of vital forces—the former through the sciences of magnetism and electricity, the latter through the biological sciences.

These two conceptions, familiar in earlier times, ac-
quired special importance through French mathematicians and naturalists. They were eagerly seized by the school of philosophers which centred in Schelling and termed its doctrine the philosophy of Nature. As we have seen, this school reacted harmfully upon the progress of science itself, though some of its members, like Lamarek, Oken, and Treviranus, anticipated later important developments; and von Baer, unlike Liebig, appreciated its deeper-lying truth.

When the convertibility of heat and mechanical motion was established, and mechanical forces took the place of vital forces in biology, when the vaguely expressed principle of the conservation of force was added to the equally vaguely expressed principle of the conservation of matter, physiologists trained in the school of Liebig attempted to build up a system of philosophy upon the basis of these conceptions. This was the well-known and popular philosophy of Kraft und Stoff. It contained really nothing new, but spread ideas which had been expressed in a better style and in choicer language by the French Encyclopædists into circles in Germany to which both French philosophy and that of their own country was either foreign or unintelligible.

If we read the current histories of philosophy of the nineteenth century, nearly all written by German scholars, we are unduly impressed by another contemporary movement of thought, the one just referred to being mostly neglected and not counted a philosophy at all. So different is the history of philosophy from that of philosophical thought which I have attempted to write.
In those histories, the naturalistic tendency is usually disregarded, and in many instances it is made to appear as if the idealistic systems alone deserved the name of philosophy. A prominent example of the attitude is the well-known work of Kuno Fischer, for whom modern philosophy is wellnigh identical with Idealism of the Hegelian type. This monumental History, though a work of genius, is nevertheless misleading, for it puts into the foreground or fills almost the entire picture with a movement of thought which was not international, and has become so only to a moderate extent at a later period.

The international movement of European Thought during the nineteenth century was dominated by the development of scientific ideas in all the three countries alike. Idealism, as a philosophical doctrine, was in the general movement only an episode, though an important and suggestive one. Its real meaning and value is only now beginning to be justly appreciated. One of the reasons why for a time the Idealistic Systems were discarded may be found in the fact that they did not rest on a sufficiently broad basis of experience, such as the natural sciences had prepared for themselves. That this was necessary was recognised by some of the most abstract thinkers, such as Fichte and Hegel: they handed over the performance of this important task to their disciples and followers; in their latest works these two thinkers sought for the necessary proofs of their abstract generalisations respectively in the data of the individual and in those of the collective human consciousness—\(i.e.,\) in psychological and historical facts. Hence the immediate outcome of Idealistic Thought was not a
general acceptance of the higher metaphysical principles, but a reversion to psychological, historical, and anthropological studies. In this direction the second half of the nineteenth century accumulated an enormous mass of material which foremost thinkers of the present day aim at utilising for the purpose of working out the programme of earlier Idealism. It is now being gradually admitted that no one indicated this programme more clearly and comprehensively than Hegel himself. That he failed to impress lastingly the philosophical mind may be traced, among other causes, to two main defects in the process by which he tried to carry out his main principle and to substantiate the inherent truth of his fundamental conception. This fundamental conception is that of the ultimate Reality as Mind or Spirit.

As I have pointed out on former occasions, the German word Geist has several meanings. The very attempt to translate it into the English language reveals the uncertainty of the conception, the context of Hegel's own exposition requiring us sometimes to use the word Mind, sometimes Spirit, sometimes Consciousness. Had Hegel entered upon a more careful psychological account of what is meant by this term he would have been able to guard his followers from putting too narrow a definition upon his fundamental principle; had he, e.g., continually kept before his readers his earlier expression that the Absolute is Subject, no doubt could have arisen as to his position regarding the question of the Personality of the Absolute or the Divine Spirit, and his phil-
osophy could not have been identified with Pantheism. Had he, on the other side, sufficiently guarded his readers against identifying the term Mind or Spirit with that very small portion of Reality which each of us terms his individual self; had he emphasised that he meant the larger consciousness which embraces everything; he would have made it impossible for Feuerbach to put a purely anthropological or materialistic interpretation on his philosophy. There is no doubt that in speaking of the Mind or Spirit, Hegel had every one of the different meanings of the term Geist before him; the narrower meaning of the individual human self-consciousness, as well as the objective mind and the larger meaning implied by the Leibnizian Monad as an individual mirror of the whole universe.

But these meanings are not kept sufficiently distinct and their mutual relations explained and defined, and indeed, if such definition is at all possible, it was not at the time so urgently needed as it has become since, for Hegel's hearers and readers possessed, to a large extent, an unconscious knowledge of what was meant. They lived on the reminiscences of the Classical and Romantic age, with its high aspirations, its brilliant creations, and its great achievements. It was a generation full of hope, aspiration, and confidence which Hegel addressed, and the term Geist when uttered called forth an immediate response from any attentive hearer or sympathetic reader. What Hegel professed to give, many young minds were in search of, and eager to receive without much critical questioning. This questioning
belonged to a later period, to a generation out of touch with the aspirations of an earlier age, and in whom the reminiscences had faded away.

It will not be without help to my readers if I remind them how, in our day, certain terms equally undefinable have come to govern a large part of our thinking: how, e.g., the term "evolution" is now indiscriminately used and supposed to convey a distinct meaning—how it is looked upon by many as a master-key which opens the door of every secret chamber; as a watchword which will allow us to pass every difficulty and emerge safely from the labyrinth of perplexity and doubt. Yet if we look into the matter somewhat more closely, the term "evolution" has been defined by its greatest champion only in the narrowest, purely mechanical sense. Students of Hegel's philosophy may here interpose, and remind us that Hegel himself felt the necessity of defining more exactly what he meant by the term Absolute, that he, in fact adopted a special method, suggested by Fichte—the dialectic method. Unfortunately, however, this method did little more than emphasise a purely logical formula, which was even more empty than the later mechanical formula adopted by Spencer. The whole of Hegel's philosophy seemed then to many to be merely an arrangement of an enormous mass of historical and psychological facts according to some dry formula, setting them in a soulless and ever-repeated rhythmical movement. This it is that Mr Bradley has so well stigmatised as a "ballet of bloodless categories."

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that both formulas of
development,—the logical of Hegel and the mechanical of Spencer,—have given to their followers abundant occupation. Starting in both cases with the object of illustrating and verifying an abstract canon of thought, their eyes have been arrested by the incomparably greater interest which the region of facts presented to them, and, held by this interest, they have gradually forgotten the dry formula which started them on their journey. Hence the great accession to actual knowledge of historical and physical facts which resulted in both cases. Yet, with this accumulation of new knowledge, the philosophical problem was not solved. There still remained the question: What do we mean when we speak of Mind or of the Absolute? Similarly, the modern doctrine of Evolution leaves unanswered the question: What is it that evolves? What, e.g., is the real essence of life and progress?

So far as Hegel is concerned, the principal merit of his philosophy in the history of modern Thought seems to be that he formulated two definite problems,—the problem of defining the Absolute or Ultimate Reality, and the further problem of finding an intellectual pathway by which to reach it. The first he provisionally solved by describing the Reality as Spirit or Mind; the second by his dialectical method. And the modern idealistic movement of Thought started in this country by taking up these problems as defined by Hegel, trying to do his work over again with the help of the deeper insight that had been gained through science and history on the one side, through logical and psychological studies on the other.
This movement, however, belongs to a later period. A whole generation intervened between the death of Hegel and the beginning of Hegelian studies in this country. During that period Hegel was forgotten and neglected in his own country: it was the period during which the scientific spirit gained the upper hand and usurped the name of philosophy—moving about in the new region of thought in the same uncritical manner in which Metaphysics had deported themselves before the time of Kant. The Critical Spirit was only then beginning to examine the principles and methods of Science in the same way as Kant had, two generations earlier, examined the principles and methods of Metaphysics. We may term this period that intervened between the earlier and the later idealistic school of thought, the "period of transition."

The labours of this period, so far as scientific thought is concerned, are marked by their growing international character; at the end of the period science had become cosmopolitan. Not so philosophy. Each of the three countries in which we are mainly interested prepared in its own way that change of ideas which marks the essential intellectual difference between the beginning and the end of the century. We may identify the work of each country respectively with the names of Lotze in Germany, Comte in France, Mill and the Utilitarians in England.

Popularly, the best-known types of philosophical thought in the three countries are Materialism and Pessimism in Germany, Positivism and social philosophy in France, Naturalism and Agnosticism in England.
All these terms, if they were not invented, at least became current during this period. But they convey only a superficial idea of the underlying motives which directed the thought of the period. The most characteristic feature is probably to be found in a general disruption of thought, in the rise everywhere of antagonistic schools with sharply marked contrasts leading to violent controversies. The thought of this period is accordingly dualistic; the older faith in the existence of some supreme governing principle in the world of Thought or Reality is gradually disappearing, or is supported only by an undue emphasis laid upon one side of truth, with a complete disregard for the other. And the systems of philosophy which became current during that period may likewise be characterised as dualistic in opposition to the monism of Hegel. Thus we have in Schopenhauer's philosophy the two unreconciled principles of Will and Intellect; in Comte those of Egoism and Altruism; and in Spencer those of the Knowable and the Unknowable. But behind and below these more prominent popular and aggressive systems we have the deeper-going currents of thought which are slowly preparing a new era. The writings of the thinkers who performed this silent and unobtrusive work are popularly less known, but it is to them that students of history must revert in order to understand the present endeavour towards a more reassuring and hopeful position. This underlying current of preparatory work is represented in Germany mainly by Lotze and some of the Neo-Kantians; in France by Renouvier; in this country by T. H. Green and Henry
Sidgwick. None of these thinkers, with perhaps the exception of Lotze, have received much attention outside of their own country, and Lotze himself, though he for a time kept the philosophical interest from completely dying out at the Universities, has, even at the present moment, hardly received that attention in his own country which his writings deserve. The reason is to be found mainly in this, that he is, since Leibniz, the only thinker who had an equal knowledge of the sciences of Nature and of those of Mind; that he kept the principles of both distinctly apart; and that accordingly, in the popular estimation, the dualistic character of his writings and his extreme cautiousness made him appear inconclusive. To this must be added the further characteristic that he had no genuine historical interest, and little appreciation for formal logic,—two provinces of research which had received special attention among Hegel's followers as well as among his opponents; and these at the time made up almost the entire philosophical public. His sudden death in the year 1881 prevented him from putting the final touches to the systematic statement of his views, though it is doubtful whether the third volume of the 'System' would have given us more than what we find less systematically stated in the 'Microcosmus.'

Nevertheless, Lotze has introduced, or at least prepared, a new view of the position of Philosophy and of philosophical thought; that which is becoming more and more acceptable to the modern mind, that also which has been adopted in this History and explained in the
THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 749

general Introduction. According to this view, Philosophy proper or Metaphysics gives no new knowledge, but is merely an attempt to reconcile opinions gained by very different processes of thought and observation; by the rigid methods of science on the one side and the demands of practical life on the other.

This critical or judicial attitude of philosophy was prepared by Locke and Hume in this country and clearly stated by Kant; but the great change which the latter introduced, together with the new world of creative mental activity in the region of poetry and art, gave, in Germany, a renewed impetus to constructive thought, and pushed aside for a generation the continuance of the critical work and judicial sifting which Kant had initiated. From this point of view Lotze is the true heir of the Kantian bequest; but in several directions he extended the foundation of the Kantian argument and gave it a freer movement.

Replying to Hume's doubts, Kant had taken up the position that, whatever force these may have, the human mind is undoubtedly in possession of experience and scientific knowledge, and that our philosophy of the mind must contain an explanation of this phenomenon; further, the human mind is also in possession of a definite moral law, and this fact must also throw light on its constitution. Lotze defines the same position somewhat more fully; on the one side, he says, we have the region of facts and scientific conception, on the other we have an equally real world of moral, aesthetical, and religious demand and belief. The two regions play an equal part in human
life, human history, and human culture, and require to be equally recognised. He terms these, the World of Things and the World of Values.

A conviction, he holds, must be arrived at which permits us to harmonise these two realms of thought, to remove the many apparent contradictions and difficulties. It is also clear that he considered that the modern mind possesses already, in a theistic view of the world and life, such a conviction; he is, as he says, old-fashioned enough to believe in the existence of Religion, and he does not disguise his belief that the ultimate unifying thought is a concern of the personal character, and that philosophy can do no more than defend the position most clearly expressed in Christian doctrine against the many objections and doubts which inevitably spring up through the progress of scientific thought and the practical experience of life.

The unique situation of Lotze with regard to the natural and the mental sciences is not limited to an acquaintance with the results of these two great departments of Knowledge as they existed in his time. Such a knowledge has been the property of other thinkers before and after him; but, since the time of Leibniz, not one of them had gone through an equally severe training on both sides, a training which we may, following the popular usage, call a mathematical and classical training; no one has, since the time of Leibniz, been able to reason with the same assurance on the lines of the exact as well as on those of the historical sciences. This means that Lotze grasped the principles and methods of the mathematical and natural sciences just
as firmly as those of philosophical and historical criticism.

Perhaps the only other thinker, in recent times, who was equally qualified by his training, knowledge, and sympathies to hold the balance evenly between the scientific and religious interests of the age, was Fechner; but his general philosophical views were too little systematic to impress his contemporaries. Behind both him and Lotze there stood, however, an influence greater and more powerful than that of either: this was the influence of Goethe, which in philosophy made itself felt mainly through Schelling. From this source Fechner inherited the poetical and mystical features of his scientific as well as of his religious and his humorous writings, but he was also much impressed by the promising methods of exact research, which led him safely out of the labyrinth of the *Natur-Philosophie*. Lotze, on his part, had none of the mysticism and poetry of Fechner, but he had also less reverence for the mathematical formula, the power as well as the limitations of which he estimated correctly. He was also quite averse from those shallow compromises between the scientific and the religious aspects so common and popular in this country, such as found a well-meant expression, *e.g.*, in the Bridgewater Treatises and in some more recent apologies of Theistic Thought, which, though seemingly helpful for the moment, lose their meaning with every new aspect revealed by the progress of natural research and historical criticism.

Some of his earlier writings were devoted to the extension of what he termed the mechanical sciences,
and to the expulsion of the current conception of a vital force; but he did not adopt the shallow views of the materialists, nor those of later pessimists, nor was he overawed by Darwinism. His position is defined by his version of a truth stated already by Leibniz—that mechanism is an all-pervading but a subordinate principle of Reality: thus, neither the 'Force and Matter' of Büchner, nor the 'Will' of Schopenhauer, nor the 'Unconscious' of Hartmann, nor 'Natural Selection,' led him astray.

It may appear strange to my readers that I give such a prominent place to a thinker who is so little popularly known; indeed, the philosophy which he represents refrains on principle from indulging in easy watchwords or marketable phrases; it is more an attitude of mind and a habit of thought which he cultivates; the study of his writings may appropriately serve as an introduction to philosophy preparatory to the formation of a comprehensive reasoned creed. And apart from the episode of the idealistic systems which intervened between Kant and Lotze, this is really the position of philosophical thought initiated by Locke and Hume in this country and by Leibniz abroad, and clearly defined by Kant.

Instead of starting with some self-evident principle, some definition of method or some highest conception of the essence of Reality, of the truly Real, as Descartes and Spinoza did, and as the idealists in Germany attempted to do, the philosophy I am now referring to is contemplative and critical rather than constructive. It tries to understand the great bodies of Thought and Knowledge which are already in existence, aims at grasping them as
a whole, finding their rationale, and penetrating to the frequently hidden principles which they unconsciously employ. Such an attitude of thought implies, however, a mode of procedure which was not congenial to Lotze's mind, and which was just what was supplied by that school of thought for which he had but scant appreciation. This school of thought was represented most prominently in this country, though its antecedents may be traced to various Continental thinkers of the very first order. It may be defined as the study of origins, and this in two directions—viz., historically and psychologically. Its watchword is Development or Evolution. It traces the genesis of things in Nature and the growth of ideas in the human mind. It does so not without a tacit assumption that the truth and value of any fact or idea depends on its history. Lotze opposes this view by saying that validity is not dependent upon historical but on logical evidence; it must be substantial, carrying its own credentials. Thus we may say that Lotze's philosophy is pre-evolutionary.

With the fuller recognition of this idea of development we enter a new phase of nineteenth century thought; and it is significant that this era was heralded by a scientific version of this principle, and that it gave to philosophy in this country a distinctly naturalistic bias. This naturalistic bias had been prepared already by the Association-psychology of Mill and Bain; Bain, as well as Spencer and Huxley, was much influenced by the independent physiological researches of the Continental school, headed by von Baer and Johannes Müller. The exponents of Naturalism in England never
indulged in the extreme version of Feuerbach and the popular materialists in Germany; nevertheless they provoked a desire on the part of an opposite school of thought to give a more idealistic expression to the current idea of development, now become popular under the term Evolution.

This idealistic interpretation of the principle of development, the search for origins and the genesis of things, they found fully alive in the historical studies of German and French scholars, and much of this was seen to have been stimulated by the idealistic school of thought of which Hegel stood out as the last and greatest representative.

The central philosophy of Hegel thus became a subject in the studies of this school. It gave an answer to a question which, on closer scrutiny, was found to be ignored in the naturalistic conception, for it became evident that in that conception neither the subject nor the object of the process was defined or at all intelligible. For the purposes of natural science, of the scientific connection of things and events in time and space, the statement of a process was sufficient, but the philosophical mind desires to go a step further: What is the beginning and the end of this process? What is the power that started it, and what is its end and aim? To these questions the Evolutional system of Hegel gave a definite answer. The power underlying all, or the Absolute, is, according to Hegel, Spirit or Mind, and the purpose of the process which can be traced in the ascending stages of thought is self-realisation.

Thinkers in this country set themselves accordingly to
find out in what manner and to what extent Hegel had been able to substantiate this, his leading conception. It is clear that this task involved a great many separate problems, and that these problems were not altogether identical with those formulated by Hegel's disciples and followers in Germany. There, if we disregard the negative side of the movement, the influence of Hegel showed itself in two very different directions.

They were represented by the school of historical research in which the history of philosophy and, in general, the history of ideas, played a prominent part; and, distinct from this, by a revival of the study of logic, by a criticism of Hegel's dialectic from within and a return to the Kantian position. In this country the studies of Hegel's doctrine took a different direction: they were mainly prompted by an ethical interest, a conviction that the growing influence of Utilitarianism tended to destroy the spiritual side of morality, reducing ethics to a sort of Calculus which took little or no notice of the emotional element in human nature. This was indeed felt by some of the Utilitarians themselves: in different ways by Mill and the followers of Comte in this country.

But the leaders of what has been termed Transcendentalism felt the necessity of meeting the rising tide of the naturalistic and negative thought, and of utilising the results gained by scientific thought, in some better way than the older apologetic literature had done. A new intellectual basis had to be found. James Martineau and T. H. Green both worked with this object in view, but only the latter succeeded in arousing sufficient
interest among the younger generation, mainly at the Universities of Oxford and Glasgow, where Wallace, the Cairds, and later, F. H. Bradley, produced standard works, all of which professed to be expressions of the spirit, not the letter, of Hegel's philosophy.

Quite independently of this movement, a new era of thought was prepared by Henry Sidgwick's epoch-making criticism of ethical theories. The revival of the study of Berkeley's writings through Campbell Fraser in Edinburgh tended likewise in the direction of a spiritual philosophy, at present represented by some of the leading thinkers in this country. At this period philosophical thought in all the three countries was much occupied in destroying the older metaphysic, the place of which was in general taken by what is called Theory of Knowledge, a critical investigation of the fundamental principles or categories of thought in the sense of Kant. At this problem the Neo-Kantians in Germany, Edward Caird in this country, and Renouvier in France, worked independently, not without the hope on the part of some of them that a new metaphysic might arise out of their investigations: such was indeed, according to some of his interpreters, the implied aim of Kant himself. Lotze alone put Metaphysics at the entrance of his systematic work, his aim being not to decide as to the limits of human reason, but rather to fix the meaning of the abstract terms or categories of thought in and through which language expresses the ideal content of the human mind; a deep-lying conviction of an essentially ethical character.

An independent line of research was struck out by
Wundt in Germany and consistently followed up. What had been recommended since the time of Francis Bacon in England, and attempted in a fragmentary manner by various thinkers, was here done with perfection and completeness. Without, as it appears, any preconceived notion as to the final result, Wundt approached the phenomena of Mind from the outside, and with the approved methods of the experimental and exact sciences, taking up what Fechner had termed the psycho-physical problem: this led him on to a critical examination of the principles of exact reasoning, and, in the sequel, to that remarkable discovery of the essential difference between psychical and physical phenomena of which he has given such a penetrating account.

The outcome may be shortly expressed as the growth of mental as compared with the mere preservation of physical energy. This produced a change and widening in Wundt’s philosophical horizon, and his speculation assumed a distinctly idealistic character: his studies moved more and more away from the psycho-physical field of research, in which he will always stand out as the most prominent and leading figure. The conception of the growth and expansion of mental energy would necessarily lead to historical studies, to the wide region of objective mental life, of which language, custom, religious rites and systems form the documentary evidence, what is termed in Germany *Völker-Psychologie*. Yet, what had happened to Lotze repeated itself to some extent in Wundt’s philosophical reputation. One-sided Materialists had hailed in the young Lotze, as they did later in the younger Wundt, the champion of their own
cause, and had ridiculed his Metaphysics. The idealistic turn in Wundt's mind, when revealed, found as little favour in that quarter; but there is no doubt that his development is strikingly representative of the change of thought which took place, not only in Germany but in other countries, during the nineteenth century, preparatory to the new Idealism of the future.

Another line of thought which helped in the same direction was just that which to many unthinking persons would seem to point in the opposite direction. This is what Huxley termed the "Agnosticism of the age."

Though the term is novel, the truth it implies is old, being represented in earlier nineteenth century thought by the Kantian limitation imposed on human reasoning, and in this country by the position taken up by James Mill.

Mansel's 'Bampton Lectures' and Herbert Spencer's 'First Principles' (Part I.) drove it home to the popular mind. But probably the most impressive line of reasoning is to be found in the strictly logical analysis of the scientific terms "Matter" and "Force." This was effected in the domain of mathematical physics; independently by Thomson and Tait in England, Lotze and Wundt in Germany, and Renouvier in France.

For philosophical purposes a simple definition at the opening of Kirchhoff's Lectures on "Mechanics" marks an epoch, and was largely quoted by philosophical naturalists in Germany, though Kirchhoff, as little as Thomson and Tait, was aware that his definition marked a turning-point not only in scientific but also in philo-
sophic reasoning. This became more evident and more popularly known through the writings of Mach in Germany, of Clerk Maxwell, Clifford, and Karl Pearson in England. The manner also in which Tait in his popular Lectures and his polemics treated the notions of "Matter" and "Force," showing that both could be dispensed with in mechanical science, which could be built up with the measurable quantities of time, space, velocity, and inertia (capacity of motion), demonstrated the futility of building up a satisfactory philosophy upon the materialistic basis of Kraft und Stoff. However, the process of gradually eliminating the notions of "Vital Force," of "Force" and of "Matter" and "Substance" in the popular sense from the strict notation of science, had not only a negative, it had also a positive result: it led to various attempts to say what the mind really means by the discarded terms "Force" and "Substance," a process of criticism after the manner of Lotze. It gradually became clear that these terms, as well as the term "Life," imply something non-mechanical, denoting some psychical experience.

The fact that none of the expounders of the mechanical or naturalistic philosophy could dispense with one or more of these terms was a proof that some other than mechanical notions had to be covertly or surreptitiously introduced in order to build up a reasoned creed. Thus Herbert Spencer termed the underlying reality the Unknowable Power, and the mechanical principle which pervades the region of knowable things, Force; and Haeckel introduces the term "Substance." These three terms are intelligible to the human mind only through
an inner experience: "Power" and "Force" have a sense only through experiences of conscious mental effort; and "Substance" is merely an objective term for what we, in our conscious subjective life, are aware of as the "continuum of presentations," Kant's unity of apperception, or the "Together" of sensations and ideas.

In the latter sense Lotze made use of the conception of a Universal Substance as the underlying spiritual bond which maintains order and intercourse between the mechanically separated elements of the physical world.

To express it quite generally, the logical consequence of the growing conviction that in the outer mechanical or physical world nothing could be found which corresponded to such terms as "Force," "Substance," or "Life," was to give to philosophic thought a movement towards the region of our inward experience. This movement was, to begin with, logical, but necessarily became ultimately psychological. And this is exactly the turn which marks two of the most prominent schools of philosophy at the present day.

Another school of thought, moving to some extent on similar lines, originated in France, and, following Comte, termed itself Positivism. This worked in the same direction, though to a large extent unconsciously, for neither psychology nor ethics nor the theory of Knowledge was, to begin with, contained in its programme. It strengthened, however, if it did not actually introduce, a new interest in philosophical literature,—an interest which, for various reasons, dominates philosophical thought at the present day. This is the sociological
interest. If, in the Middle Ages, philosophy could be termed the "handmaid of Theology," one might almost be tempted to say that at the present moment it is the "handmaid of social science." For the present argument, however, it is important to point out how Positivism, in the hands of Comte and his disciples, involved two psychological problems. First, it pointed to Altruism as the essentially human as opposed to Egoism as the essentially animal element in human nature. Secondly, it insisted upon some form of social "Together" as the primary fact of social life, in opposition to the view that individuals form the constituting elements of society. And Comte himself gave expression to the deeper psychological truth that the study of concrete nature, as distinguished from the study of abstract notions, must be imbued with the esprit d'ensemble, the synoptic view of things, a truth which has found expression in modern psychological doctrine which starts, not with isolated sensations and their aggregates, but with the continuum in time and space of mental states.

II.

At the beginning of this chapter I stated that, in the history of Thought, the most prominent feature of the change which took place during the nineteenth century was probably the ascendancy attained by the scientific interest which, for a time, seemed almost to vanquish the philosophical interest, escaping also the destructive influence of criticism. In the popular estimation, this
feature is expressed as the rise of Naturalism, followed by Materialism and Industrialism. We have now seen how this spreading tide of naturalistic thought showed, towards the end of the century, signs of going down, giving way to a counter current which promises to be idealistic and spiritual. Should this promise be fulfilled, as seems to be an increasing hope in all the three countries, the historian of Thought will be entitled to take an opposite view, and to look upon the whole process as a development of Idealism, in the course of which Naturalism, with its concomitant features, formed only an episode.

This view can, at present, only be maintained by showing not merely how the principles of Naturalism, Positivism, and Materialism have failed to justify themselves before the scrutiny which the critical spirit has applied to them, but emphatically also by showing where the positive beginnings of a new phase of Idealism are to be found.

Before tracing more clearly the renewal of this hopeful and promising spirit which seems to be gaining ground in the region of philosophy, we must point to another episode which occupies a prominent place in the development of philosophical speculation, and which has had, next to Naturalism, the most marked influence on general literature and on the popular mind, especially in Germany. This is the appearance of Pessimism. The pessimistic phase of thought showed itself in poetry and literature before it was recognised that it had received a philosophical setting in the now celebrated system of Schopenhauer. This phase of thought is by no means
equally represented in the three countries, though the
wave of Pessimism which spread through the Continental
literature of Europe in the second quarter of the century
found, or imagined it found, a living voice in one side of
Byron's poetry; so much so that a prominent historian
of the earlier part of the nineteenth century, namely
Gervinus, has devoted a lengthy chapter to the subject.

As we are at present occupied with the real advance
which philosophic thought can register during the
century, and neither with its aberrations in the form
of pessimism nor with its practical decline through the
mood of sceptical indifference, it would hardly be
necessary to refer to Schopenhauer or his follower von
Hartmann, were it not for the fact that the respective
fundamental principles of their systems, quite apart
from their practical applications, mark a distinct en-
richment both of philosophical thought and of philosophi-
cal language. This showed itself when once the ethical
side-issues of their speculations were pushed into the
background, and trained thinkers were induced to
penetrate to the deeper foundations of their thought.

The very titles of Schopenhauer's and von Hartmann's
principal works, 'The World as Will and Intellect' of
the former, 'The Philosophy of the Unconscious' of
the latter, not only attracted popular attention, but
indicated problems which had received insufficient atten-
tion in the ruling schools. If the spirit of dismay
which filled many younger minds in Germany after
the failure of the revolutionary movement in politics
and of the idealistic in speculation, found its philoso-
phical justification in the pessimism of Schopenhauer,
another and opposite tendency in philosophy which emphasised the importance of the active principle in the human mind had to recognise—sometimes unwillingly—that Schopenhauer had, thirty years earlier, come forward with a bold solution of Kant's unsolved enigma by stating that the "Thing in Itself" is Will. Critics were not slow, however, to point out that both the "active principle" of Schopenhauer and the Unconscious of v. Hartmann could be traced back to the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling.

The names of Schopenhauer and v. Hartmann are both identified with distinct philosophical problems. The same cannot be said of another brilliant writer who was much influenced by Schopenhauer, whose writings have had a still greater popular success, but whose philosophical importance seems limited to his being the champion not of quietism and the negation of the Will, but of its forceful self-assertion. This is Friedrich Nietzsche, who has in his own personality placed before thoughtful minds an interesting psychological problem.

One can hardly avoid contrasting with this philosophy which moves in brilliant aphorisms and concentrates itself in an enigmatic personality, equally devoid of consistency and logic, the dignified flow of thought, the uneventful lives and unobtrusive personalities of some of the foremost leaders of the thought of the period. To one of these we must now return if we wish to understand a very large part of the philosophical labours of the latter part of the century. It was Lotze who, during the period of apparently the smallest philosophical productivity, did much to introduce two habits of
reasoning which have since his time imperceptibly influenced speculative minds both in Germany and in this country: the two works in which he has done this are his 'Microcosmus' (completed in 1864) and his 'Logik' (1874).

Few German or English contemporary thinkers of the first order could be named in whom we cannot trace the influence of the painstaking analysis contained in Lotze's 'Logik': it has helped them to clarify their own ideas and to fix their own positions, not infrequently in marked antagonism. Notably he has, as one of the first, brought out the main points which have to be settled before philosophical speculation can really begin. In this way he has taken up in a broader spirit and with ampler means what Kant attempted a century earlier. Thus he has assisted in reviving the study of Kant's 'Critique,' which had already served as a guide to those who, for various reasons, took little or no notice of Lotze's own writings. Such are, e.g., Renouvier in France, Green, Caird, and Martineau in England.

To put only a few of the cardinal initial questions before my readers, it will suffice to ask: Is philosophical thought to be based on psychology or on logic? What is the relation of metaphysics and ethics? Such questions are discussed in Lotze's works, and, as it may seem to many, imperfectly or insufficiently answered. The very fact that he seems himself to hesitate in giving decided answers, in fixing and still more in carrying out his programme, constitutes that peculiar trait in his writings which has become so suggestive and helpful to some, so puzzling and even repellent to others. To
some he has afforded a clue, whilst he has driven away others to seek their salvation elsewhere.

What Lotze has done for Logic and Metaphysics but has left undone for Ethics was to a large extent supplied by Henry Sidgwick in his 'Methods of Ethics'; and the importance of this work, the study of which is indispensable as an introduction to the moral philosophy of the age, stands out, at the moment, even more prominently than that of the 'System' of Lotze. The latter has been followed by the elaborate and original treatises of Brentano and Husserl (to mention only two foremost representatives) in Germany, of Bradley and Bosanquet in this country. French thinkers will more readily go back to Renouvier's 'Essais de Critique Générale,' now again republished. On the other side the lesson contained in the 'Microcosmus' has not yet been fully recognised in recent philosophic thought. To this I must now direct the attention of my readers.

It is the first attempt to take a comprehensive and synoptic view of the world and life from an introspective and anthropological standpoint. Whereas nearly all philosophies before Lotze started from some definite metaphysical or methodical principle, and aimed at constructing systems and gaining a unity of thought by applying such principles in many directions, Lotze spreads out before his readers in orderly arrangement the great world of facts with the reflections suggested by them, and finally attempts to bring them together and connect them in a few finishing strokes which constitute the main features of his philosophical creed.

The task of philosophy becomes, from this point of
THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

view, not the construction of a system by starting from some highest truth and following this down in its various manifestations, using it as a master-key by which to gain access to the many regions of science, life, and history; it rests rather upon the conviction, enormously strengthened by the later doctrine of evolution, that the different regions of human thought and activity, such as the body of scientific knowledge, the practical systems of morality, law, and society, and, above all, the religious faiths of the world, are existing facts, systems in which certain hidden truths have been established slowly and gradually and through the combined labour of many minds during long ages.

The construction of a system of philosophy on such a broad inductive basis, the attempt to lay bare the hidden truths contained in those manifold cultural systems elaborated consciously or unconsciously by the efforts of the human mind; to show their harmonies as well as their discords, and if possible to dissolve the latter; will seem to many an impossible and premature attempt. And so it has actually appeared to the generation which followed Lotze in philosophy; as, a generation earlier, a similar endeavour had appeared premature to those naturalists who read and laid aside Humboldt's 'Kosmos.'

This comparative failure of two world-pictures which, in the course of the nineteenth century, were drawn by two intellectual artists neither of whom would profess to have discovered any fundamentally new scientific or philosophical principle has, in both cases, led to a dissipation and disintegration in the thought.
of the age: in science to extreme specialisation, in philosophy, to a discussion of separate logical, metaphysical, and ethical problems, such as have occupied us in the preceding volumes. Nobody nowadays would venture to rewrite either the ‘Kosmos’ or the ‘Microcosmus’; the field in either case seems too large, the material too overwhelming. And yet the process of unification of thought has in neither case been arrested. Let us for a moment try to understand by what means this process has been or can be successfully carried on.

And first, let us look at scientific thought. Whilst the range of facts and phenomena has enormously increased, a few highest principles or generalisations, such as have occupied our attention during the first section of this work, representing the uniformities termed natural laws, have suggested themselves to the human intellect—they have enabled naturalists to put into order and describe in more or less simple terms the otherwise bewildering variety of facts and events which surrounds us. The comparative unity or system of nature arrived at in this way is a purely logical one, which through application and actual verification, through calculation and prediction of unknown facts and future events, has received the impress of reality, leading our thoughts and regulating our conduct in the outer world. The success attained in this region of thought and knowledge has been so great that natural philosophers have attempted to construct systems of philosophy by elevating one or two among the accepted leading principles to the supreme position as expressions of the innermost essence of things. Such principles are, notably, the
Newtonian law of attraction, or action at a distance, which governed much scientific thought in the earlier part of the century, and appears again in a modified form in Herbert Spencer's system; Büchner's principles of *Kraft und Staff*; the principle of Energy in the writings of Ostwald and others; the principle of descent and evolution, and Haeckel's Law of Substance.

A feature common to all these principles and their elaboration is that they deal with things and events which exist or have existed somewhere in space, and, as such, must somehow partake of the nature of space, being subject to geometrical rule and order. Two difficulties, however, arise which stand in the way of the completion of this world-picture, which we may term, with Humboldt, the physical description of the Universe.

The first difficulty is that in stating ever so completely the uniformities and regularities of natural facts and events we are dealing only with an abstraction, a lifeless mechanism. In the actual world itself this ever-repeated order exists only in innumerable living examples, in occurrences which might, so far as we know, also be quite different. For the actual order—what we may term the collocation—of things the laws of nature give us no explanation. Now, if this scientific or mechanical order of things in space and time is only an abstraction, the question arises: Where does this abstraction, as a matter of fact, exist?

An attempt to answer this question raises a second difficulty, for it introduces us to another world, which we may term the inner as contrasted with the outer
world—the world of thought as distinguished from the world of things, or generally, the mental as opposed to the material world. In a physical picture of the universe this other world must have a definite location. In trying to fix this we are driven to the conclusion that this inner world occupies, though existing in numerous specimens, only an infinitesimally small extent, so small that from the cosmic point of view it seems a negligible quantity.

Limiting ourselves, however, to our terrestrial world, what we term Mind seems to exist in no geometrical place, and nevertheless it seems to exist, in some form or other, over a very extended area—in other words, what we term the Mind or the Soul exists individually at no points which can be geometrically fixed; and yet, as the social mind, it exists somehow over the whole civilised portion of our globe. Such an existence, which is, as it were, nowhere and yet everywhere, escapes the first condition of exact scientific treatment. What has been termed scientific or exact psychology is occupied with purely external physical phenomena, which are in some vaguely apprehended manner connected with what we term mental phenomena; or it attempts to describe the latter by vague analogies of spatial occurrences, which in no other department of exact science would be considered satisfactory or permissible.

The naturalist imports into his world-picture, through language and thought, features which do not really belong to it. He, in fact, transcends the limits of possible observation and presentation by the physical senses, and this foreign element breaks up hopelessly the continuity
THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

and destroys the unity of his picture. He commits what Aristotle termed a \( \mu \eta \gamma \alpha \beta \alpha \alpha \gamma \iota \varsigma \varepsilon i \varsigma \mu \lambda \lambda \gamma \iota \varsigma \). This is being more and more recognised at the present day by natural philosophers of the first order.

This growing conviction constitutes one of the real advances in philosophical thought in the course of the nineteenth century. But though not so clearly understood as it is at the present time, it has, in a less definite form, been present to the minds of thinkers ever since the time of Plato in antiquity, and many efforts have been made to get out of this impasse. A successful beginning to find a way out of it was made in this country by Locke, and has been continued ever since, latterly also by prominent thinkers abroad; it may be termed the introspective method.

Without entering into details it will suffice to point out that this method depends upon the recognition of the fact that whatever the phenomena of the outer world may be, they have, for us human beings, existence only in so far as they, in some way or other, enter into our consciousness in the form of what Locke and his followers termed Ideas, more recent thinkers, Presentations, or, perhaps even more correctly, Experience. For this school of thought the universe is known only to the extent that it is, as it were, mirrored in human consciousness. A unification of thought and knowledge would thus depend upon an exploration and description of the whole field of consciousness.

Now the fact that at the time of life at which any thinker starts upon this search or exploration he is aware and fully convinced that the field he is exploring
by his inner sense exists in numerous other instances in the minds of his fellow-men, has long before forced upon him the conviction that he is not dealing with a purely individual and personal phenomenon, but with one which, being common to so many, is practically to be regarded as external and common to them all. And yet there is no doubt that the field of his consciousness was at one time in his life a purely subjective experience, and that it developed out of this during infancy, and acquired a dual aspect: first, the external aspect, in which he, the thinker himself, shrinks into a small area (his physical body or external self); and secondly, the internal or introspective aspect to which everything, including actual things and persons surrounding us, are only experiences of individual consciousness.

Earlier thinkers who started upon the line indicated by Locke did not trouble themselves to investigate, or did so very imperfectly, how the individual mind or consciousness develops out of the chaotic state into the daylight of clear sight and reason with its distinctions of subject and object, of consciousness and self-consciousness, of the self and other selves. In the nineteenth century, however, the facts of consciousness and their psychical history formed a recurring subject of discussion, beginning with Fichte's 'Thatsachen des Bewussteins' and Schleiermacher's 'Psychologie,' down to Ward's 'Psychology,' Bergson's 'Données Immédiates de la Conscience,' and Dilthey's 'Beschreibende Psychologie.'

1 In addition to the writings mentioned in the text of this and the foregoing chapter I refer my readers to the following:—

Croom Robertson, "How we come by our Knowledge" (1877), reprinted
Now although this line of thought indicates a real advance in psychological and logical research, it is not this alone or principally that interests us in this connection; it is that this introspective view affords a more hopeful prospect of carrying out that unification of thought which is the main object of philosophy, that mediating and harmonising task which was indicated in the Preface to Lotze's 'Microcosmus' and forms the fundamental conception upon which the whole of this History has been written. This conception was clearly indicated in the general Introduction (vol. i. p. 71 sqq.) According to this, philosophy occupies an intermediate position between the scientific and the religious view of the world, or, to express it in other words, between that world which we term external, physical, and objective, and that other world which we popularly oppose to it as the internal, mental, or subjective world.

The difficulty of effecting this mediation or unification of the two regions of thought, if we adopt the naturalistic position, we found to lie in the circumstance that we could not define the second or subjective world in objective terms, that we could not, roughly speaking, find a geometrical location for it in the circumference of spatial existence; and the very fact that we are unable to do so has led to the seeming contrast or opposition in which the two worlds stand to each other,

W. Dilthey, 'Vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Außenwelt, Sitzungsberichte, Berlin Academy,' 1890, pp. 977-1022.

37. Possible reconciliation of the scientific and religious views.

to the use of such terms as subjective and objective, inner and outer, mental and physical. It has been found impossible to throw a bridge across the apparent chasm which divides these two worlds. But from the introspective point of view this opposition disappears, the outer world is for us comprised in the whole circumference of consciousness, and so is likewise the inner world. Both exist, not on different planes, but on the same plane; and, in fact, the experiences belonging to the two different orders which we distinguish in actual life and emphasise in science are continually intermingled. It is only by a lengthy process of education in our infancy and early childhood that we learn to separate the totality of our experience into two more or less distinct regions, that the continuum of presentations or consciousness is divided into two continua, the stream of thought into two streams which we with difficulty keep apart. In scientific research this differentiation is carried to an extreme, and is known as the elimination from our observations of the subjective factor. Only in mathematical reasoning, and then probably only through the help of geometrical location, is this separation carried out to perfection. Some minds, even of a high order, are quite incapable of carrying out this mental operation so indispensable in scientific research.

In the foregoing chapters of this section we have had repeated and, as we progressed, more frequent opportunities of showing how recent philosophical thought is revealing a distinct tendency to take what I have termed the "Synoptic view," to look at things as a
whole and not in their isolation or in their parts. This
tendency is clearly marked not only in philosophical
but also in scientific thought. It underlies quite as
much the world-picture drawn by Humboldt as it does
the views of Lamarck and Darwin as to environment in
space and succession in time, and the attempt of Lotze
to look at the universe from the microcosmic or anthropo-
logical point of view. It showed itself in the most
abstract of all sciences, in modern mathematics, which
opposed line and plane geometry to the point
geometry of Descartes; the theory of groups and
arrangements to that of mere quantity.

In psychology, the older theory of sensations, the
doctrine of separate faculties or of the association of
ideas, has been superseded by the conception of the con-
tinuum of presentations or experience and the stream of
thought. In biology and still more in sociology the
vue d'ensemble of Comte has come to the front, and even
where the search for biological or sociological units has
been prominent, these units have been found to possess
a complexity of structure without which neither the
phenomena of physical nor those of social life could be
explained. The older processes of dissecting and atom-
ising with the aim of putting together again the com-
bined processes of analysis and subsequent synthesis, have
been found eminently useful for practical purposes, but
essentially deficient in explaining things real. Naturalists as well as artists have emphasised the necessity of
sight as opposed to thought. And even in practical life
the synoptic view has become more and more indispens-
able through the enormous changes in the commercial
and industrial world, where the comprehensive grasp of
details in a single mind has in many cases been quite as
important as the highest professional knowledge of the
expert or the inventor. Huge industrial enterprises
grow up like organisms under the combining genius of
great organisers, who themselves boast of no actual
originality in discovery or invention, and they not infre-
quently collapse as suddenly with the departure of the
leading mind, just as a living organism collapses when
the indescribable spirit of life has left it.

The reason why the atomising process is inadequate
seems to be twofold. First, the actual arrangement of
separate things, be they physical particles or mental ideas,
if once broken up cannot be again restored as it was found
and seen in its actual existence; something is lost which
cannot be regained. And further, the process of analysis,
of finding the ultimate constituent elements, is endless:
as space is infinitely divisible, so also the elements out of
which things natural are compounded seem to be out of
reach. The lane through which we walk in the attempt to
reach the last constituent elements of things natural has
—contrary to a popular saying—no end, it never turns,
and the point which we choose for retracing our steps is
purely arbitrary, fixed by the knowledge of the moment.
The analytic process is irreversible. The point at which
we start to synthesise or put together is purely arbitrary,
fixed by our knowledge or rather our ignorance, and the
product of such synthesis is accordingly artificial, not
natural: the world of things, images of thought or
practical constructions, is accordingly artificial; these
are neither natural nor artistic.
THE RATIONALE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 777

Now if this process of looking at things as a whole and not in their isolation has become the order of the day even in special researches, as can be proved not only by the references to foregoing chapters but also, still more convincingly, by glancing, if only cursorily, at recent philosophical writings, it surely must recommend itself also in dealing with the totality of things as revealed to us through consciousness. And this looking at wholes is our mental attitude when we take the introspective view.¹ For introspection includes likewise the circumspection to which in the Introduction to this section we found it convenient to oppose it. For whilst the circumspective process or the external view could find no place in its field of vision for the inner or mental world, the introspective view on the other side comprises the whole of the outer world as a large and prominent portion within the field of its vision, in the form of definite sensations and the whole train of ideas connected with them. The unity which we are in search of in philosophical thought certainly

¹ "At any moment my actual experience, however relational its contents, is in the end non-relational. No analysis into relations and terms can ever exhaust its nature or fail in the end to belie its essence. What analysis leaves for ever outstanding is no mere residue, but is a vital condition of the analysis itself. Everything which is got out into the form of an object implies still the felt background against which the object comes, and, further, the whole experience of both feeling and object is a non-relational immediately felt unity. The entire relational consciousness, in short, is experienced as falling within a direct awareness. This direct awareness is itself non-relational. It escapes from all attempts to exhibit it by analysis as one or more elements in a relational scheme, or as that scheme itself. ... And immediate experience not only escapes, but it serves as the basis on which the analysis is made. ... Everything, therefore, no matter how objective and how relational, is experienced only in feeling, and, so far as it is experienced, still depends upon feeling."—(F. H. Bradley, 'Essays on Truth and Reality,' 1914, p. 176.)
exists as the felt continuity of consciousness, of what Kant termed the "unity of apperception." We are thus led back again to that revolution of thought which Kant, more than a century ago, compared to the Copernican revolution in astronomy. The comparison implied in Kant's words suggests a picture by which I may hope to make the position more comprehensible to my readers.

Suppose that on a clear but perfectly dark night we glance at the starry firmament with that wonder which Kant expressed in one of the most majestic passages of his writings: suppose that we are so lost in admiration that we forget entirely our own existence and presence. We may assume that this was the state of mind which, thousands of years ago, led the first astronomers to their observations. What probably arrested their attention in this firmament of the Heavens was the fixed stars, their constellations and their regular movement. Next to them the moon, the planets, and the sun, in their changing positions among the unchangeable and ever-recurring constellations of the fixed stars. In course of time these prominent objects in the firmament were found to present certain constant features which were described by what are termed Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion, and brought together by Galileo and Newton in the science of physical or gravitational astronomy. At a much later and comparatively recent stage of astronomical research other phenomena of the Heavens, such as the Nebulae, the Meteorites, or the more proximate meteorological phenomena in cloudland, were added to physical astronomy. Still more recently the invention of the spectroscope created a new science of
Astro-physics; and the mechanical theory of heat, the electro-magnetic theory of light, and the discovery of radium added many new chapters to the science of the Heavens. And we may confidently look forward to a continual extension of the science of the physical firmament, to new and quite unexpected discoveries, be it through direct observation or, what is perhaps more likely, through theory and calculation verified by subsequent observation. What still may appear as the limitless void of the dark blue Heavens will, we are sure, reveal to the searching eye and the thinking mind of star-gazers new worlds and new phenomena, and to this progress of science it appears impossible to assign any limit.

Let us now, for a moment, look upon the field of consciousness of any individual mind as, in the years of infancy and childhood, it rises out of the chaotic state of what we may term mere feeling or awareness and acquires the marks of order and arrangement through definite sensations, through emotions and desires. Let us, in fact, picture to ourselves the first stages in the development of the adult mind in possession of a clear view which may be compared to that which characterised the glance of the first observant and thinking star-gazers. Like them, the young mind will fasten upon the recurrent complex of sensations which it is taught to consider as the outer world, as distinguished from the background of consciousness in which this is embedded or has its seat, as the constellations of the stars have their seat in the firmament of the Heavens. We may now, in fact, speak of the firmament of the soul. How the
definite picture of external persons and things rises with ever greater clearness out of the totality and continuum of inner experience is a problem for genetic psychology.

Various beginnings of a solution of this problem are to be found in philosophical writings, ever since the time of Locke and Berkeley. By many psychological inquirers different stages of this prehistoric development of the individual consciousness have been traced. Such accounts, it must be admitted, can never be anything more than conjectural; yet they are not more so than the genealogical trees in recent biology, or the attempts to discover and fix the stages of civilisation, the growth of language and ideas, in prehistoric times and among primitive peoples. Such a genetic psychology would have to fix what may be termed the primordial data of consciousness, such as change and unrest, impulse and desire, attention, memory, and oblivion, intersubjective intercourse, words, signs, and language, &c. It would have to work in a manner analogous to that of gravitational astronomy, dealing with mental (as the other does with physical) agencies or forces which, in the fully developed adult mind, are still at play.

But as little as the modern astronomer can content himself with physical astronomy,—having now to resort to other means in order to explore what to earlier ages was the supposed void of space, the background of the firmament,—as little can the psychologist content himself with an exploration and analysis of that cluster of sensations which is distinctly traceable, which we have
learnt to consider as the outer world. This we have in common with other persons whose existence we had, as it were, to discover in our infancy, and who have taught us through signs and language to assign to our own self a modest and retiring position among men and things. The explorer of the firmament of the soul will have to recognise as equally real those regions in the field of consciousness which are less fixed, more changing, containing experiences which do not recur with similar regularity, and which, in consequence, we do not externalise; which we share with other minds in vague forms not lending themselves to exact definition. Such exact definition—this term being employed as it is when we speak of the definition of an object under the microscope or the telescope—is dependent on location in space. We may indeed perhaps be right in maintaining that all definite and clear knowledge depends ultimately upon the spatial nature of the constellations or complexes of our sensations; that even logic, with its laws of identity and contradiction, rests upon spatial distinction; and that through this qualification, what in the field of consciousness partakes, and only so far as it partakes, of the spatial property, is capable of rising into the clear daylight of exact thought. Such a view seems implied, if not emphatically stated, by Kant when he maintained that any knowledge was only so far scientific as it partook of mathematics. The whole edifice of this exact knowledge, as it has been built up through generations of thinking minds and as it is largely imparted to each of us individually through intersubjective communion with others, includes and rests upon a conception of

The definite contrasted with the vague.
reality quite different from that of the primordial reality which I have termed the field of consciousness or the firmament of the soul. It forms the external universe to which we belong as very small occupants in the form of our physical bodies; and the latter appear, if viewed from this new vantage-ground of reality, as the envelopes into which the whole of our primordial mental firmament has shrunk and, as it were, fled out of vision.

Continuing now on the lines indicated by the analogy with physical astronomy, we may be tempted to look upon the universe contained in space as an interpretation or construction of a certain portion of our primordial self, of our original field of consciousness, of, as it were, the fixed and wandering luminaries in the firmament of our soul. And this interpretation or construction has introduced into our minds a notion of reality and of knowledge quite different from, more precise and useful than, the original spectacle, the continuum of sensations, emotions, and desires, and our simple awareness of their fleeting nature.

Now, in the same way as gravitational astronomy, of which the science of Kinematics is, as it were, the logical framework, forms the model of all other exact knowledge, occupying the top place in the hierarchy of the sciences, so we may say that the construction of the geometrical world of physical reality, together with logical thought, forms the pattern upon which we are always tempted to model an exploration of the larger field of consciousness, of the background of the firmament of the soul, in which the original data of our physical universe are embedded. This larger back-
ground contains, in addition to our sensations, the world of emotions, desires, and impulses. We long for a construction or interpretation of this world which shall give a satisfaction similar, but superior, to that afforded by the picture of the physical universe. At such an interpretation the human mind has been, consciously or unconsciously, labouring ever since the dawn of civilisation, and the result is embodied in the poetical and religious view of the world and life.

In taking the outer world which, from this point of view, is a construction carried out with the help of others in the early years of our childhood, as the model according to which to construct an interpretation of the larger—in fact of the whole—field of consciousness, we follow the actual lines of development which our mind has undergone in preparing us for the work of this life. For it is only through and after that earlier unconscious and inevitable construction that the notions of self and not-self, of subject and object, of our own person as differentiated from but co-ordinated with other persons, have entered our mind and enormously extended our original mental horizon or firmament. Looking around us, beholding definite things in the outer world, and being impressed, through language, with the conviction that other persons have what we, rightly or wrongly, learn to consider as pictures of these things within their own minds, we are led to consider these outer things to be the cause of the sensations which we experience ourselves, and only in so far as we can correlate our inner experiences with external things do we consider them to be real and not mere fancies; for, inter alia, we can then
point them out to our fellow-men and make them the objects of a common knowledge and understanding. In fact, externality has become the criterion of reality, of that most impressive reality which we have learnt to superimpose upon the original reality of sensations or experiences contained in the field of our primordial consciousness.

The firmament of our soul, out of which the complex of definite physical sensations has been selected or abstracted and externalised, contains many other experiences which are to us quite as important as the former, and we are continually haunted by the desire to gain for them the same, or even a higher, degree of reality than that which attaches to the external world or visible universe. Out of this desire arises, in some minds, the conviction that this less definite region of our mental firmament has no lesser but rather a greater reality than the other; and this conviction, when forced to find expression, constructs what we may term the larger or spiritual universe of which the physical universe is merely, as it were, one portion or aspect.

To use the terminology of Lotze, we may say that the human mind in the course of its mental development constructs in every individual person, with the assistance of others, in the beginning of life, the outer World of Things, and that subsequently, through the co-operation and successive labours of the more highly gifted minds, the World of Values, of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, is constructed, giving support not only to the data of this work-a-day world but likewise to the conceptions of what we term the Ideal World. How either of these
constructions is carried out: the genesis of the sensuous world within the consciousness of the child on the one side, and on the other side the genesis of the spiritual world within the consciousness of the adult mind,—all this is a subject for psychological and historical studies. These studies form the occupation of some of the foremost minds of the present time.

But it cannot be my object to enter more fully into this region of philosophic thought, which is now being explored by prominent thinkers on the Continent and with eminent originality by thinkers in this country; for to do so would be to step beyond the limits which I have assigned to the present section of this History as well as of the period which it comprises. It cannot be denied that the last years of that period, and still more the beginning of the present century, exhibit to the historian of thought as one of its most striking features a revival of philosophical interest, and that this is nowhere more living and promising than in the provinces of introspective psychology and of ethical, including religious, philosophy. But we are living in what Niebuhr termed a "preparing" age, in which the abundance of original and suggestive work is quite as striking as its controversial character and its inconclusiveness. Great questions, such as that of "Psychologism" in Germany, of "Intellectualism" in this country, and of the foundation of morality in France, are being approached by independent thinkers from various sides; but all these problems with their numerous subdivisions are still sub judice, and we look in vain for a final and generally acceptable summing-up and
verdict. It is, therefore, only of tendencies of thought that I can here report, and I must refrain from quoting from the overwhelming abundance of writings— with which I am only partially acquainted— any authoritative statements; nor could I be sure if I did so that I should express faithfully the meaning and purport of passages which I might select from all sides.

Allowing, however, that there are to be found a few general tendencies in recent thought which distinguish it from that of the preceding age, I will now apply them with the intention of showing how the present section of our History requires to be followed and demands its completion by a study of that large body of thought which is buried in the poetical, artistic, and religious literature of the whole period, of that literature which does not profess to be either scientific or philosophical, which does not follow any definite method, but which is the spontaneous deliverance of individual minds. And before doing so let us define again in a few words what these tendencies are.

First we have what I have termed the "synoptic" tendency of thought, the endeavour to reach a vue d'ensemble, a Gesammtanschauung; and this quite as much when we have to deal with the totality of things as when we confine ourselves to specially selected regions of research. This synoptic view is complementary to, and has succeeded, the combined methods of analysis and synthesis which were introduced into philosophic thought under the influence of the natural and exact sciences in the earlier part of the nineteenth century; and here it is well to note that the latter themselves
have, mainly under the influence of Darwinism, gathered renewed strength and vastly extended outlook by similar comprehensive methods.

Secondly, this synoptic view has been nowhere more fruitful than when applied to psychological research. The view introduced by Locke and gradually developed by Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, that all our knowledge of the external world is made up of "ideas," now more correctly termed "presentations," found a forcible but extreme expression in an "Analysis of Sensations," and led through criticism to the recognition that such an analysis (including a subsequent synthesis) neglected to search for the original connection, the "Together" of these elements of cognition in consciousness. The synoptic view is not content with an analysis and synthesis of Sensations, but emphasises the continuum of these sensations or presentations within consciousness, and advances a step further by including in this continuum not only the sensational but also the emotional and volitional elements. Together with the former they cover the field of consciousness, forming the more or less continuous background or firmament of the soul.

This led, thirdly, to a comprehensive introspective view of the totality of our world of cognition within the all-embracing field of consciousness. The human mind in its early years constructs, with the aid of other minds, the well-ordered and sufficiently stable image of the outer world, gaining through and in this a definite location for its own self as well as an instrument for the specifically intellectual and practical work of this life.

And, lastly, the complex of original sensations or
experiences which forms the material for this construction or interpretation of finite reality forms only a portion of the comprehensive field of consciousness, provoking the desire to arrive at a larger construction or interpretation which would give to the emotional and volitional background in which the finite world is, as it were, embedded, an impress of reality equal or superior to that of the external world.

For poetical, artistic, and religious minds this larger circumference, this background or firmament of the soul, forms the greater reality, in which the narrower but more definite reality of external things and persons has its setting; and it demands a higher and wider interpretation. Such minds have always existed; they have not only for themselves, but also for others, through the creations of art and the symbolic use of language in poetry, succeeded in communicating the result of their discoveries in the unexplored regions of our mental firmament. The main advance in philosophical thought in the course of the nineteenth century and beyond has lain in the direction of psychologically understanding that this region of artistic creation and religious thought has an independent existence, that it can draw upon a fund of mental experience quite as real and inexhaustible as that which is being successfully explored by scientific thought.

A History of Thought will accordingly not be complete without tracing with equal diligence and with equal sympathy, in the spontaneous literature and the artistic creations of the period, the inventions of the poetical and the manifestations of the religious thought
of the age. In this wide region of thought we shall not only find the beginnings of many trains of reasoning which have proved fruitful and useful in the narrower but more definite provinces of scientific thought, but we shall also find that higher interpretation of reality—i.e., of the field of human consciousness, which, looking upon scientific thought and natural knowledge as the means of understanding better and establishing more firmly the realities of this life and this world, leads on to a higher view. To this view the elaboration and construction of a small portion of the field of human consciousness, for the purposes of this life, is symbolical of the larger and higher interpretation of the totality of things which we find in religious faith and life. Further, the ultimate reality is not to be reached by thought, but must be felt, lived, and experienced; and where human language and human ideas fail, creation in Art and living Events must come to our aid. The entrance into this life, the thought and work in this world, have only become possible to us individually through the aid of others. This indicates that a personal influence is required wherever an entrance into reality is to be attained.

The most comprehensive and expressive word which human language has coined to denote the fulness of personal life and activity is Love. Not only in the far away consummation of things, but in human Life as it is—

"Love alone leads us
Upward and on."
INDEX

Absolute, the, iii. 207, 208, 255, 372, 381, 408, 410, 442, 446, 447, 448; a process, 450; 457, 458, 459, 461, 462, 463; philosophy of, 464; 465; Spirit, 466; essence of, 469; and the Divine principle, 473; or Divine Being, 489; 498, 499, 502; of Schelling and Hegel, 507; "Unknowable," 514; 515, 522, 533, 534, 535, 536, 538, 540, 541, 543, 549, 556, 557, 571; Schelling's, 584; Hartmann's, 591; 592; iv. 41, 43; or supreme idea, 51; 52; mind, 53; 55; or world-spirit, 63, 184, 190, 193, 290, 300, 329, 333, 338, 340, 367, 636, 646 sqq.

Absolute mind (see Hegel).

Absolute substance (see Spinoza).

Absolutism, in Hegel, iii. 390; and Monism of Bradley, 540.

Academic teaching, interests of, iii. 424.

Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, iii. 304; restoration of, 382.

Académie Française, iii. 97.

Academy of Munich, iv. 39.

"Active" principle of Fichte, iii. 507; iv. 722.

Activity and feeling, stress laid on, iii. 290.


"Actualism," iv. 723.

"Actuality" theory of Wundt, iii. 238; 595.

Adamson, R., iii. 202, 413, 414; 'Fichte,' "Blackwood's Philosophical Classics," iv. 163; 267.

Addison, British essayist, iii. 92.

Ænesidemus (G. E. Schulze), iii. 347.

Æsthetic and ethical aspects of nature, iii. 625.

Æsthetical and ethical approval and disapproval, iii. 482.

Æsthetics, Croce on, iii. 16; 311, 450, 626; Beautiful or, iv. 64.

Æsthetics in Germany, Lotze's History of, iii. 130; iv. 4; the term, 5; in eighteenth century, 6; German, 8; 9, 10; history of, 14; Formwissenschaft, ib.; treatment of philosophy and, 26; in Hegel's system, 51; 53, 54; Hegel's, 58; science of, 62; un-systematic æsthetics in England, 95; psychology of Ethics and, 101; 107; new epoch in, 113, 150, 199, 235.

Agnosticism, Huxley's, iii. 297, 416, 511, 530, 599; and Pragmatism, 297, 313, 315; iv. 185; 758.

Ahrens, H., Joll on quoted, iv. 190 sqq.

'Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,' Dilthey in, iv. 312.

Allihn, F. H. T., Scientific philosophy, iii. 69.

Altenstein, Prussian ministry under, iii. 141; 208.

Altruism, opposed to Egoism, iv. 154; 189, 193.

Ambrosian codex, iii. 140.

American Constitution, iv. 421.

American 'Philosophical Review,' iv. 412.

Amiel, H. F., 'Journal Intime,' iv. 15.

Ampère, André-Marie, de Biran and, iii. 235; and Sophie Germain, 235; 384, 385.

'Analytic Psychology,' Stout, iii. 11; 278; "anæotic" in, 289.

'Analytical Dynamics,' Duhamel, iii. 384.

Ancient and modern conceptions, iii. 194.
INDEX.

Andler, C. H., iv. 571.
Anna Amalia of Weimar, niece of Frederick the Great, iii. 558.
'Annalen der Naturphilosophie,' Ostwald, iii. 546.
Anschauung, iii. 205; Kant's, 245; Intellecutuelle, 445; 465; 612; iv. 163, 314.
'Anthropologie' (Völkerpsychologie), Wundt, iii. 163.
Anthropology, iii. 291; iv. 210; opposed to psychology, 212; Sociology and, 258; 513 sqq.
Anti-Napoleonic Revolution, iii. 257.
'Antinomies,' iii. 623.
'Appearance and Reality,' Bradley, iii. 27; 186, 431, 434, 533, 534; quoted, 535; 539.
'Apperception' distinguished from 'Perception,' Leibniz, iii. 327.
' Appropriation' Clasue, iv. 141.
Aquinas, Thomas, iv. 135, 277.
Archaeology, Old Testament, iii. 165.
'Archaic Latin and text of Plautus,' Ritschl, iii. 143.
'Archiv für Gesch. der Philosophie,' Articles by Höfeling, iii. 340.
'Archiv für Systematische Philosophie,' iii. 152; 592.
Aristotelian studies led by Trendelenburg, iii. 125; logic, 349.
Aristotle, iii. 26, 27, 51, 104; 'De Anima,' 196; 201, 320, 331, 332; 'Organon,' 350, 414, 421; 337, 411; 'Logic' of, 413; 441, 454, 467, 521, 528; iv. 6, 25, 50, 188; Plato and, 181; 202; 'Nicomachean Ethics,' 252; 392, 420, 720.
Armstrong, Lord, 'Electrical Discharge in Air and Water,' iii. 128.
Arnold, Matthew, 'Essays in Criticism,' iii. 98; 'Function of Criticism at Present Time,' ib.; 111; 118, 122; 'Memorial Verses' quoted, iv. 33.
Arnold, Thomas, of Rugby, iii. 98.
Art Seminaries, Archeological, Philosophical, and, iii. 148.
Art in France, iv. 14; mission of, 15; and Beauty, 33; Nature and, 34; 40; wonder of, 44; 52, 55, 72, 112; a larger language, 123.
Assimilation and Association, iii. 277.
'Association,' Hartley, iii. 217.
Association-Psychology, iv. 119, 154.
Association of Sciences, German, iii. 261.
Associational School, iii. 209.
Aster, E. von, ed. 'Grosse Denker,' iii. 408, 409, 423, 425; iv. 247.
Astruc, Jean, 'Conjectures sur les mémoires originaux,' &c., iii. 164, 165.
Atheismus-Streit (Fichte), iv. 165, 310.
'Atomenlehre,' Fechner, iii. 549.
Atmischen of Thought, iv. 431, 434.
Atomising process, iv. 776.
Aufklärung, iii. 116, 250, 251, 256, 330, 334, 354; iv. 10, 27, 135, 277, 301.
August, Karl, iv. 171.
Augustenburg, Duke of, and Schiller, iv. 29.
Austin, John, Professor of Jurisprudence in London, iv. 140.
Avenarius, Richard, 'Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie,' iii. 69; 282, 283, 284; and Mach, 579; economy of Thought, ib.; 'Philosophy as thinking of the World,' &c., 589.
'Averroism,' iii. 256.
Baader, Franz von, iv. 454; 'Fermenta Cognitionis,' 591; speculations of, iv. 296; relations with Schelling, 328.
Babeuf, iv. 472.
Baconian process, iv. 17, 53.
Bacon, Francis, 'Idols of the Market,' iii. 8; 26, 27, 28, 40, 63, 217, 219; 221, 224, 226, 295, 301, 303, 305, 309, 312; 317, 320; 'Advancement of Learning,' 322, 339; 'Novum Organum,' 376; 414, 421, 422; compared with Hegel, 476; iv. 128; predecessor of Hobbes, 130; 199, 361; separation of Reason and Religion, 397 sqq.; 'New Atlantis,' 428.
Baconian philosophy, iii. 219, 375, 379.
Baer, Karl Ernst von, iii. 155, 370; appreciation and criticism of Schelling, 455; 'Embryology,' 461; 554; and Darwin, iv. 529; 693, 705, 740, 753.
Bagehot, iv. 559.
Baillie, J. B., transl. Hegel's 'Phenomenology,' iii. 249; 466; iv. 216.
Bain, Alex., iii. 66, 79; Mill and, 179, 209; 'The Senses and the Intellect,' 'The Emotions and the Will,' 214; 218, 247; J. S. Mill and, 270; 271, 273, 275; Ward compared with, 280; 'Life of James Mill,' 313; Psychology of, 426, 537, 594; analytic method in thought, iv. 186; 506 sqq.; 731, 773.
INDEX.

Biblical Criticism, influence on religious, theological, and philosophical thought, iii. 165.

Bichat, influence on Comte, iv. 188; 507, 518, 705.

Biedermann, iv. 473, 474.

Bielchowsky, A., 'Life of Goethe,' quoted, iii. 354; and Goethe, iv. 39; 300.

Bigot, H., iii. 16; transl. 'Esthétique comme science de l'expression' quoted, iv. 15; 16; transl. Croce's 'Esthetics,' 116.

Biology and History of Origins, iii. 22.

"Biological," Article by Huxley in 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' iii. 199; Science of, 586, 606.

Biot, iii. 370; Fechner's transl. of Physics, 519.

Biran, Maine de, only genuine representative of psychology of his time in France, iv. 132, 133; 722.

Black, A. & C., publishers, iii. 185.

Blackwood, iii. 96.

"Blackwoods' Philosophical Classics;" 'Berkeley,' iii. 254; 'Locke' quoted, 304; 'Hamilton,' 579; 'Hegel,' 466; iv. 51, 163.

Blainville, de, influence on Comte, iv. 188; 684.

Blumauer, iii. 352.

Bloombach, iv. 513, 705.

Blunt, H. W., "Logic" in 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' iii. 414.

Bluntschli, iii. 130; iv. 524.

Böckh, iii. 139, 152.

Bürgkamp, 'Karl Ritter,' iii. 155.

Böhme, Jacob, iii. 171; 387; 591; influence on Schelling, iv. 328.

Boë, founder of 'Hainbund,' iii. 129.

Boileau, iii. 96.

Boirac, Article "Psychologie" in 'Grande Encyclopédie,' iii. 199.

Bolingbroke, Lord, iii. 86, 223.

Bonald, de, reactionary writings of, iv. 133; 397, 398, 463.

Bonaparte, iii. 382.

Bonnet, Charles, iii. 30; iv. 620.

Bopp, F., 'System of conjugation of Sanskrit compared with other languages,' iii. 117; and Grimm, ib.

Börne, iv. 200.

Bosanquet, B., Treatise on 'Logic,' iii. 390; 413; Works on 'Logic,' 414, 521; 'History of Esthetics,' iv. 15; quoted, 33; 47, 97 sqq.; quoted, 99, 124; 102; Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, 216.

Bossuet, iii. 98; iv. 398.

Bouglé, C., quoted, iv. 557.

Bourdeau, iv. 578.

Bouterwek, Fr., iii. 438.

Boutroux, Émile, French Philosophy, iii. 66; quoted, 'Revue de Métaphysique et de morale,' 94; 208; 'De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature,' 622; Fouillée quoted on, 625; quoted, iv. 235.

Boyle and Newton, iii. 197.

Bradley, F. H., 'Appearance and Reality,' iii. 27, 186, 431, 434, 533, 534, 555, 539, 540, 541; iv. 701; 'Ethical Studies,' 186; 'Principles of Logic,' ib.; 'Logic, 390; 413, 414; quoted, 434, 435; 521; and Lotze, 534; Reality, 536, 538; a Monist, 540; iv. 168; Ethical Studies, 221, 250; 228, 627; on Darwinism quoted, 703; 733 sqq.; 744, 773; quoted, 777.

Brahms, iv. 53.

Brandes, Geo., iii. 38.

Brandis, Chr. Ang., 'Gesch. der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie,' iii. 37; 167; iv. 181, 319.

Brandis, J. D., iii. 585.

Brandl, 'English Philosophy at German Universities,' iii. 146.

Breton, Franz, iv. 607.

Bridgman, Laura, History of, iii. 273.

British ideas carried over to France, iii. 227.

British Psychology, want of system in, iii. 219.

'British Quarterly Review,' iii. 579.

Broca, iv. 513, 514.

Broussais, Cabanis and, iii. 197; 202; iv. 507.


Article by Picavet, ib.; and Lotze's 'Physiology of the Human Mind,' 202, 203; 217, 226.

Brunetière, iii. 96; 97; on Positivism, 531.

Bruno, Giordano, iii. 119; 120.

Bruyère, La, iii. 201.

Buchner, Lud., 'Kraft und Stoff,' iii. 177, 198; 561, 564, 565, 570, 584, 601; and Vogt, school of, iv. 341; 399, 413, 484, 693, 752.

Bucke, H. T., 'History of Civilisation,' iii. 33; iv. 494 sqq., 510; Flint on, 511; Gooch on, 511.

Buffon, iii. 302, 612.

Bureau, Paul, iv. 587.

Bürger, 'Lyrics,' iii. 355.

Burke, Ed., 'Enquiry into our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful,' iii. 11;
INDEX.

15; iv. 6; Essay, 28; denunciation of French Revolution, 130; 421.
Burns, Robert, iii. 452.
Burton, J. H., 'Life of Hume' quoted, iv. 335.
Butler, Jos., British Moral Philosophy, iv. 150; and Moral Order, 167; 228; Reid and, 226; 265, 424.
Byron, iii. 314, 609; iv. 200, 201, 763.

Cabanis, and Broussais, iii. 197; 202; a follower of Condillac, 230; iv. 489, 507.
Caird, iii. 158.
Caird, Ed., Hegelian Thought, iii. 122; 'Philosophy of Kant,' 186; T. II. Green and, 224; 'Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant,' 297; Hegelianism, 412; Works on Kant, 412; 532; 'Metaphysics' in Ency. Brit., 429; 'Essays on Literature and Philosophy,' 429; influenced by Kant, 430, 435; 'Hegel in Blackwoods' 'Philos. Classics,' 466; quoted, Hotho's Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst, iv. 51; 'Philosophy of Kant,' 61; and Hegel's Philosophy, 371; 392, 756, 765.
Caird, John, 'Spinoza,' iii. 122.
Caldecott, Alfred, 'Philosophy of Religion in England and America' quoted, iv. 270; 362 sqq.; 376; quoted, 377; 396.
Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature, iv. 417.
Cambridge 'Modern History,' iv. 421.
Cambridge Platonists, iv. 257.
'Cameralia,' iii. 133.
Carlyle, Thos., Essay, 'State of German Literature,' iii. 97, 121; 'Collected Works,' 97; 98, 118; influence on Mill, 373; 379; 423; 'Everlasting No' and 'Everlasting Yes' of 'Sartor Resartus,' 527; iv. 357; iii. 528; 'Essays,' iv. 33; 100, 101, 125, 246; 'Past and Present,' 353; 'Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre' quoted, 355, 356; and Goethe, 356; appreciation of Goethe, 357 sqq.; 'German Romance,' 358; 363, 421, 425, 442, 474, 495, 543, 581, 612.
Carnot, Sadi, iii. 404.
Carpenter, Estlin, 'Life of Martineau,' iv. 375.
Casaubon, iii. 48.
Case, T., Article on "Logic" in 'Ency. Brit.,' iii. 414; quoted, 430.
"Categorical imperative," Kant, iii. 125, 437; 441, 448; iv. (see also Kant).
'Categoricals of Aristotle,' Maimon, iii. 347.
Catholicism, Roman, iii. 426.
Cauchy, iii. 584.
Cause and effect defined, iii. 397 sqq.; iv. law of, 73, 76.
Chalmers, Thos., iii. 224, "collocation," 617.
Charron, Pierre, 'De la Sagesse,' iii. 320.
Chateaubriand, iv. 400, 464.
Chaumette, iv. 473.
Church, Dean, iv. 379.
Church, State, and Society, changes in, iv. 151; 182 sqq.; 193 sqq.
'Circulation of the Blood,' Harvey, iii. 322.
Civil Code, German, iii. 132.
'Civilisation in Europe,' Guizot's History, iii. 33.
'Civilisation in France,' Guizot's History, iii. 33.
Clarke, iii. 220, 327; iv. 268.
Classical Antiquity, culture of, iii. 143.
Classical period, connection of modern with the, iii. 265.
Classical School in Germany, iv. 288.
Classical studies, Thuringia and Saxony the traditional home of, iii. 128.
Classicism and Romanticism, iii. 257.
Classics and Holy Scriptures, iii. 127.
Claudius, M., iv. 292.
Clement XIV., Pope of Rome, iii. 351; iv. 398.
Clifford, W. K., iii. 404; and K. Pearson, 579; "Mind-Stuff"; iv. 412; 759.
Cockburn, 'Life of Lord Jeffrey,' iii. 92.
Code Civil of Napoleon, iii. 133.
Coleridge, iii. 118; 122; 200; 304; influence on Mill, 378; 379, 428, 456; 527, 528, 609, 614; iv. 14, 125; J. S. Mill on, 141; influence of, 287; 428; 458.
'Collectivism,' iv. 571.
Collège de France, iii. 354.
Collins, Anthony, iii. 228.
Columbus, iii. 154.
Commission for Universities, Parliamentary, iii. 222.
Common-sense and Speculation, iii. 3.
Common-sense, Language and, iii. 3; iv. 10.
INDEX.

Common-sense philosophy, Sidgwick on, iii. 4.
Common-sense, reversion to, iii. 68.
Comte, Auguste, iii. 5; and French philosophical thought, 43; "Philosophie Positive," 33; opposed to speculative thought, 39; Philosophy, 58, 79; Sociology, 80, 86; historical development of human thought, 88; "Formula," 89, 94; Positivism of, iii. 97, 303, 528; iv. 182, 187; as mathematician and analyst, iii. 104; "Religion of Humanity," 117; System, 183; 188, 190; 'Considérations sur les Sciences et les Savants,' 193; "esprit d'ensemble," 193, 397, 515; 234, 236, 262, 269; 270; J. S. Mill and, 292, 296, 304, 315, 347, 377, 381; "esprit de détail," 382, 515; 'Cours de Philos.,' &c., quoted, 382, 383, 384; and Duhamel, 384; Cournot, 385; 423; "positive," 487; influence on philosophy, 485; 521, 594, 614; and positive philosophy, iv. 182, 187; influence on Mill, 154; 'Traité de Politique Positive,' ib.; Positivist Ethics, 163; positive view distinguished from German metaphysics and English philosophy, 185; philosophy, 186; Sociology, 187, 213; influenced by Turgot and Condorcet, 188; and Ethics, 189; and definite order of Society, 190 sqq.; 'Cours de Philosophie Positive,' 191; study of history, 192; study of mankind, 193; comparison with Feuerbach, 201; 222; philosophy of, 233; 'Politique Positive,' 234, 356; 'Philosophie Positive,' 234, 235; narrowly positive, 236; 237, 247, 256; Altruism, 411; 430, 441, 444, 445; 456, 465; and Saint Simon, 470; his philosophy of history, 481 sqq.; and Hegel compared, 481 sqq.; his "Law of the Three States," 483 sqq.; 534; his hierarchy of the sciences, 486 sqq.; his early 'Tract,' 486 sqq.; and Hegel, reception of their doctrines, 492; J. S. Mill on, 483; and J. S. Mill, 494, quoted, 495; 496 sqq.; 498, 499; and Hegel, 500; 502, 506, 509, 516 sqq.; Huxley on, 517; 524, 527, 531, 535, 536; dualism of, 539; on "Division of Labour," 558; 560, 653; religious interest of, 680; unity of his system, 683; and Schopenhauer, 685; quoted, 686; and Hegel, parallel between, 687; 688, 689, 694; and Spencer compared, 696; and Hegel compared, 696 sqq.; social problem, 700 sqq.; 718, 721, 746, 747, 753, 773.
Condillac, Philosophy, iii. 156, 200; Helvetius and, 220, 229; 'Treatise on Sensations,' 230; Cabanis a follower of, 230, 231; Maine de Biran a disciple of, 232; 234, 270, 271, 313; iv. 119, 427.
Conditioned, The, iii. 381; iv. 298.
Condorcet, and Laplace, iii. 100; iv. 111, 132, 137; and Comte, 188; 449, 455, 460, 491, 499, 686.
Conic sections, iii. 102.
Consciousness, data of, iv. 772.
Conservation of Force," Helmholtz' Tract, quoted, iii. 399; 564.
'Contemporary English Psychology,' Ribot's Treatise, iii. 269; 270.
'C Contemporary German Psychology,' Ribot, iii. 273.
Contemporaneous Review,' iii. 126, 531.
'Contingent' and "Discontinuous" involved in problem of nature, iii. 618; 619, 620, 625.
Conviction, fundamental necessity of, Lotze and Wundt, iv. 719 sqq.
Copernican Revolution, iv. 778.
Copernicus, iii. 340.
Cosmological problem or "problem of nature as a whole," iii. 546.
Cosmology and Rational Theology, iii. 201; Universe or the Outer World, 431; 460, 544; or Theory of Nature, 545.
Copland, W. C., transl. Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' iv. 394.
Cournot, A. A., 'Theory of Probabilities,' iii. 385; iv. 555.
Courtney, W. L., 'Life of John Stuart Mill,' quoted, iv. 366.
Cousin, Victor, transl. Plato's 'Dialogues,' iii. 26; 27; French eclecticism, 79; 97, 185; "Philosophy of Common-sense," 186, 190, 200, 229, 234; Royer Collard and, 235, 236, 236, 236, 270; Hamilton's Essay on, 380; 381; School of Philosophy in France, 384; Saint Hilaire's Life of, 426; 456; 'Fragmenth Philosophiques,' 490; iv. 182; eclectic school, 236; 493, 506 sqq.
Cowper, iii. 452.
Creative and critical eras, iii. 6.
Creative Substance, Lotze on, iv. 714.
Creative Synthesis, Wundt on, iv. 712.
Critical eras, creative and, iii. 6.
INDEX.

Delboeuf, 'Revue Philosophique,' iv. 411
De Maistre, Jos., iii. 228, 230; reaction-
ary writings of, iv. 133; 397, 405,
402, 463, 364, 465, 493.
'Demon,' Maxwell's, iii. 577.
De Montaigne, Michel (see Montaigne).
De Morgan, Augustus, iii. 105, 107;
'Study and Difficulties of Mathema-
tics,' 576; 'On Probabilities,' ib.;
'Logic,' ib.; iv. 375.
Descartes, René, iii. 26, 27, 28; Modern
Idealism and, 39; 74, 110; philo-
sophies of Leibniz and, 190, 210;
System, 219; 232, 234, 212, 243, 246,
253, 302, 311; 'Discourse on Method,'
313, 421; 316, 317, 320; constructive
efforts of, 321; 322, 323; theory of
vortices, 324; 325, 327, 329, 331, 334,
336, 337, 366, 389; 422, 451, 531,
592, 623; metaphysical system of;
iv. 6; relation to Lotze, 128; 138,
199; Fouillée and, 240; and Kant,
360; 361, 393, 398, 399, 644, 752,
775.
De Stael, Mme., 'De l'Allemagne,' iii.
294.
De Tracy, Destutt, iii. 202; 'Éloge de
Cabaniès,' 203, 230; idea of activity,
263; iv. 301.
Development, idea of, iv. 137; Hegelian
and Darwinian theories of, 658.
Diderot, iii. 124; Rousseau and, 201;
'Letter on the Blind,' 273; 'Système
de la Nature,' iv. 136.
Dilthey, W., iii. 250, 251, 372; 'Jug-
endgeschichte Hegel's,' 468, 469; iv.
124; 'Leben Schleiermachers,' 172,
305, 314; quoted, 173; on Fichte,
quoted, 176; quoted, 306; 'Schleier-
macher's Correspondence' quoted,
309; 'Schleiermacher' in 'Allge-
meine Deutsche Biographie' quoted,
312, 314; 'Erlebniss,' 344; 424,
459; 580 sqq.; Barth on, 581; 584;
and Lamprecht, 585; 598, 599, 772,
773.
'Discontinuity,' rise of the problem
of, iii. 597, 625; Renouvier, 291;
iv. 435; 408.
'Discontinuous' and "Contingent"
problems of the, iii. 618, 619.
Divine Personality, Absolute and, iii.
176; Being, 223; Order, 263.
Division of Labour, Comte on, iv. 558.
'Dorians, The,' iii. 153.
Dorner, 'History of Protestant Theo-
logy,' iii. 130; 161, 175.
Drako, iv. 36.

Drews, A., 'History of German Specu-
lation since Kant,' iii. 33, 176; ed.
'Schelling's Selected Works,' 487;
592.
Droebisch, iii. 282.
Dualism, iv. 635 sqq.
Du Bois Reymond, E., physiologist,
iii. 222; Address to German Assoc.
Naturalists at Leipsic, 552, 594; 'Re-
searches in Animal Electricity,' 597,
599, 600, 601, 603; iv. 343, 396, 412.
Duhamel, J., 'Calculus,' iii. 384; 'Ana-
lytical Dynamics,' ib.; 'Les Méthodes
dans les Sciences,' &c., 384; 385.
Duhem, iii. 385.
Dühring, E., 'Kritische Gesch. der All-
gemeinen Principien der Mechanik,'
iii. 338.
Dujardin, Ed., iii. 185.
Dupanloup, Mgr., quoted, iv. 454.
Dureckheim, on Division of Labour, iv.
538 sqq.; his 'Philosophy of His-
tory,' 560 sqq.; quoted, 561; 563,
567.
Dyde, transl. Hegel's 'Philosophy of
Right,' iv. 216.
Dynamical theory of gases, iii. 137.
Ebbinghaus, iv. 570.
Eberhard, Goethe to, iii. 334; conver-
sation with, quoted, 608; iv. 299.
Eclecticism, French, iii. 79; iv. 197;
Consius's, iii. 186; iv. 256; iii. 187, 190.
École normale, iii. 234, 304; Cournot
pupil at, 385, 425; Lachelle's teach-
ing at, 620.
École polytechnique, iii. 234, 381, 385,
425.
Economic questions in England, iii. 92.
Economics, politics and, iii. 91; 100,
130, 133, 309, 311.
Economy, Political, in France, iv. 127.
Edgill, E. A., 'Faith and Hope,' iv.
322, 349.
'Edinburgh Review,' ed. by Jeffrey, iii.
92; 105; 124; articles by Hamilton,
379; essay on Consis, 380, 588.
Edinburgh University, iii. 379.
Education, uplifting of popular, iv.
291; Bar on, 578.
Educational movement, iii. 256.
'Ego,' Self, Mind, iii. 207, 589;
Schleiermacher's conception of, iv.
175; 314; ambiguity of the term,
628.
Egoism (see Altruism).
Eichhorn, J. G., iii. 127; as successor
of Astruc, 164; 'Introduction to Old
Testament,' 164, 165.
"Elan vital" (Bergson), iv. 722.
Elizabethan period of English literature, iii. 114.
Ellipsoid in motion, fluid, iii. 102.
Elohim, Jehovah and, iii. 164.
Embryology, von Baer, iii. 461.
Emerson, Schelling's influence on, iii. 456.
Empirical psychology, mainly British, iii. 202; return to, 258, 545; and rational, 200, 201.
Empiricism, English, iii. 43.
'Encyclopædia Britannica,' iii. 152; Huxley's "Biology," 199; Ward's Treatises, 266, 268; "Psychology," 277; "Lotze," 408; "Logic," 413; new volumes, 414; Mansel and Hamilton on "Metaphysics," 429; Case quoted, 430.
'Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences,' Hegel, iii. 475.
Encyclopédie de d'Alembert, iii. 332.
Encyclopædists, French, iii. 122, 123, 273, 373.
'Energy,' iii. 100; and Force, conception of, 392, 397, 574; growth of mental, iv. 722.
English Deism, German Rationalism and, iii. 169.
'English Hist. Review,' Lord Acton, iii. 160.
Ensemble, the, iv. 502 sqq.; 519, 525; esprit d', 541; vue d', 343, 417, 730, 775 (see also Esprit d'ensemble).
Epistemological and logical problem, iii. 121, 521.
Epistemological development in Germany, iii. 243; logic and, 467.
Epistemology, iii. 112; 125; Erkenntnisstheorie or, 150; 297, 337; 381, 375; and exact sciences, 390; and systems of philosophy, 421, 498; iv. 292.
Epoch, Taine on the, iv. 507.
Erasmus, iii. 48, 116.
Erdmann, J. E., 'Darstellung der neueren Philos.,' iii. 57; 39; 'Gesch. der neueren Philos.,' 74; iv. 68; iii. 317, 337, 408; emancipation from Hegelian formalism, iv. 68.
"Erhaltung" or "Entfaltung," iii. 397.
'Erkenntnisstheorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart,' Kleinpeter, iii. 580, 581.
'Erkenntnisstheorie,' E. Zeller, iii. 125; or Epistemology, 180; 295, 296, 297, 375, 505.
"Erlebniss" (living experience), iv. 344.
Eschennayer, iii. 436.
Esenbeck, Nees von, iii. 455.
Espinas, A., iv. 523.
"Esprit d'analyse," iii. 105.
"Esprit de détail," Comte, iii. 382, 515, 538.
"Esprit d'ensemble," iii. 105; Comte, 193, 382, 397, 515, 538 (see also Ensemble).
Ethical approval or disapproval, iii. 482.
Ethical culture, Society for, iii. 315.
Ethical problems, iii. 509, 559; iv. 125, 126.
Ethical spirit of British philosophy, iii. 510.
'Ethical Studies,' Bradley, iii. 186.
Ethics, iii. 309, 311, 314, 431, 450; the root of metaphysics, 498; foundation of, 515, 552; psychology of aesthetics and, iv. 101; 107; and British Science, 127; in Germany and France, 128; English, 131; in England, 133; science of, 187; Comte and, 189; Practical, 194; revival of, 202; Metaphysics based on, 207; 220; precedes Metaphysics, 209; 210; Metaphysics and, 215, 262, 381; of Naturalism, 230, 246; 256 sqq.; 244; critical school of, 253; limits of, 257; problem of, 373; and Theology separated in France, 439; International Journal of, 587.
Etymological researches, Pott's, iii. 147.
Eucken, R., 'Gesch. der Philosophischen Terminologie,' iii. 238, 239; 436; iv. 627; 722, 725.
Euclid, iii. 305.
Eugene of Savoy, Prince, iii. 328.
Euler, and Gauss, iii. 302, 303; Bernoullis and, 303.
Evangelicism of Francke, iii. 128.
Evil, problem of, iv. 625.
Evolution, iii. 315, 494; doctrine of, iv. 137; 506; philosophy of, 534; Spencer's theory of, 695 sqq.; idea of, 720 sqq.; creative, 722; ambiguity of the term, 744.
Evolutionism, Spencer, iii. 461.
"Exegesis," iii. 127.
External and Internal Objects, difference of, iii. 13.
Falckenberg, R., 'Gesch. der neueren Philosophie,' iii. 38; quoted, 320, 408, 451; iv. 599.
Faraday, phenomena of radiation, iii. 400, 401; and Poisson, "lines of force," 577.
INDEX.

"Faust," Goethe, iii. 355, 364, 366; quoted, 559 (see also Goethe).  
Fechner, Gust. Th. (Dr. Mises). "Psychology," iii. 58, 68; Elements of Psychophysics, 72, 73, 519, 520; Philosophy, 74; formula, 76, 101, 128; psycho-physics, 179, 271, 287; quoted by Kantze, 370; appreciation and criticism of Schelling, 455; 513; and Hartmann, in 515; "Physica" and Thénard's "Chemistry," 519; "Das Buchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode," 519; "Ueber das Höchste Gut," 519; "Nanna oder über das Seelenleben der Pflanzen," ib.; "Zend-avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits" quoted, 519; "Atomenlehre," 549; quoted, 550; and Lotze, 615; iv. 267; 343; "Vorschule der Ethik," 104; physiological studies of, 275; "Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht," 344; 556, 608, 710, 751.  
Fellowes, Sir Chas., iii. 154.  
Fénelon, iv. 393.  
Ferguson, Adam, iv. 16; 457, 558.  
Ferrier, iii. 473.  
Feuerbach, Lud., philosophical criticism, iii. 174; "Essence of Christianity" and "Essence of Religion," ib.; Treatise, 176; writings of Strauss and, ib.; and Hegel, 260, 272, 454; Positivist Ethics, iv. 165; 186, 198; "Essence of Christianity," 199; "Collected Works" quoted, 199; pamphleteering, 200; and Comte compared, 201; 204, 217, 318, 368, 427, 443, 537, 542.  
Fichte, I. H., iii. 365, 492; "Anthropology," 549; idea of Personality, iv, 168; "Zeitschrift für Philosophie," &c., 165; "System der Ethik," 165; and Anthropology, 212.  
Fichte, J. G., iii. 39, 74, 119; "Application of Criticism to Religion," 161; "Criticism of Revelation," 161, 357, 385; quoted, 359; 175, 206, 249, 250, 251; philosophy, 253, 254, 257, 258; "and his Predecessors," Fischer, 162; "Wissenschaftslehre," 295, 361, 363; iv. 161, 317; Conception of "Wissenschaftslehre" or the so-called philosophy, iii. 295; "Werke" quoted, 265, 357; 299, 300, 347, 348, 359; quoted, iv. 161; 160, 169; Reinhold's successor, iii. 357; 360, 361, 362; representative of a new generation, 363; French Revolution, ib.; "Freedom of Thought," ib.; "Revelation," ib.; "Vocation of the Scholar," ib.; Pragmatism, 364; Pragmatic philosophy, iii. 513; "Nachgelassene Werke" quoted, iii. 365, 366; and Schelling, 372; 373, 377, 380, 387, 445; influence on Schopenhauer, 393; 410; 483; quoted, 442; and Kant quoted, 445; "Ego," 445; "Second Introduction," 446; practical aims, 447, 448, 419; Absolute as activity, 450; definite purpose of, 451, 453, 457; view of nature, 458; 459; 460, 462, 463, 464, 465; influenced by Jacobi and Schleiermacher, 469; 470, 472, 473, 479, 483; "Sittenlehre," iii. 485; iv. 161, quoted, 176; iii. 486; systematic writings of, 492, 493, 499, 504, 506; "Active" principle of, 507, 526, 529, 552; internal impulse, 553; 557, 558, 559; subjectivism of Kant and, 591; and Schiller, iv. 20; exponent of Kant's moral system, 21; and, iv. 161; "Nachgelassene Werke" quoted, 396; interest in ethical problem, 41; philosophy of Kant and Fichte, 49; 53, 57, 59, 61; 62, 69, 73, 91, 104; ethical problem, 126; 129; and Kant's ethical doctrine, 160; Ego, Self and Not-self, 162; 193; Bewusstseyn überhaupt, 163; 164; influence at Jena, 165; philosophy of, 167, 186; ethical views, 168; dismissal from Jena, 171, 172; and Schleiermacher, 173, 314; 174 sqq.; 180; idealistic system, 208; practical reason of the Will, 209; 216, 220, 222; Schiller and, 279; and Schopenhauer's solution of problem of reality, 285; intellectual intuitions of Schelling and, 286; 289, 290; popular writings, 292; 293, 295; and Jacobi, 301 sqq.; and Dilthey, 309; "Atheismusstreit," 310; "Data of Consciousness," 314; and Lotze, 330; intellectual intuition, 406; 443, 476, 477 sqq., 497; his Social Tract, 536, 547 sqq.; 546; "Proposition character of," 551; 556, 573, 595, 596, 603, 604, 619, 620, 624 sqq., 627, 628 sqq., 644, 669, 670, 718, 725, 741, 772.  
Firmament of the Soul, iv. 779 sqq.  
Fischer, Kuno, "Exposition of Kant's System," iii. 28; "Gesch. der neueren
INDEX.


Flint, Robert, ‘Philosophy of History in France and England’ quoted Ripley, iii. 307; iv. 423; 424; on Buckle’s inconsistencies, 511, 581.

Florentine Chronicles,’ iii. 152.

Flourens, iii. 197.

Flügel, O., iii. 69.

‘Force,’ inexactness of the term, iii. 100, 565, 572; and Energy, 397; iv. 415, and Matter, 740, 753.

Forster, George, iii. 453.


‘Fortnightly Review,’ iii. 270, 530.


‘Foundations of a Creed’ (‘Problems of Life and Mind’), Lewes, iii. 268, 314.

‘Foundations of Belief,’ Balfour, iii. 531.

Fourier, Chas., iii. 304; socialistic theories of, iv. 133; 472 sqq.; 493.

France and England, social point of view in, iii. 43 (see also social problem).

VOL. IV.

Francke, Evangelicism, iii. 128; and Spener, iv. 291.

Frank, H. R. von, ‘Gesch. und Kritik der neueren Theologie,’ ed. Scharnhorst, revised by Grützmacher, iii. 175; ‘History of Recent Theology in Germany,’ iv. 351.

Fraser, A. C., iii. 253; ‘Berkeley,’ in Blackwoods’ ‘Philos. Classics,’ 254.

Locke quoted, 301; 308; ed. Berkeley’s Works, 532.

‘Fraser’s Magazine,’ Mill quoted, iv. 152.

Frahnenstädts, Jul., ‘Letters on Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,’ iv. 74.

Frederick William III. of Prussia, iii. 463.

Frederick the Great, iii. 353; wars of, iv. 19; 474, 639.

Freedom of Thought, Fichte, iii. 363; idea of, iv. 652.

‘Free enquiry,’ iii. 128, 178, 306; iv. 134.

Freitag, Gus., ‘Bilder aus der Deutschen Vergangenheit,’ iii. 32; iv. 473.

French Constitution, iv. 421.

French Encyclopedists, iii. 113: Eclecticism, 79; Philosophy, 66; Philosophical Thought, Comte, 43; Revolution, Fichte, 363; University System of Middle Ages, 138.

Fresnel, discoveries of, iii. 400.

Freytag, W., on Ranke’s Conception of History, iii. 152.

Fries, J. F., iii. 125; ‘Mathematische Naturphilosophie,’ 258; ‘Handbuch der Psychischen Anthropologie,’ 258, 274; 368; and problems of moral philosophy, iv. 205; 271, 300, 303 sqq., 316; psychological question, 323, 396; religious faith, 406; 595, 596, 608, 656.

Frischeisen-Kökler, iv. 598.

Fröbel, iv. 512.

Froude, J. A., quoted, iii. 122.

Fuchs, E., ‘Vom Werden dreier Denker,’ iv. 310; 314, 315.

Galileo, and Newton, iii. 202; ‘Law of Falling Bodies,’ 322; experiments, 339, 414, 567; iv. 775.


Galt, Francis, iii. 554.


Garrick, Richard, iv. 152.

Garrick, iii. 128.

Gassendi, iii. 397, 329.

Gass, C. F., ‘Fundamental Axioms of Geometry,’ iii. 107; 258; and Euler,
INDEX.

rologie des Sittlichen Bewusstseins,' 521; 'Kategorienlehre,' 521; 522, 530, 591; philosophy of, 593, 594, 596; 'Critical account of German aesthetics from the point of view of philosophy of the Unconscious,' iv. 15, 32, 63, 83, 92; Schopenhauer and, 63; the Unconscious, ib., 83 sqq.; 76, 442; philosophy of the Beautiful, 83; 84; philosophy of philosophy, 85; agreement with aesthetic view, 86; 'Deutsche Aesthetik' quoted, ib.; 87; 'Treatise on the Categories, ib.; 'Phenomenology of the Consciousness,' ib.; 'Philosophie des Schönen,' ib.; on philosophy quoted, 88; the Mystical, 89; 92, 106, 108, 110, 124, 200; system of, 201; 208; and Nietzsche, 216; 537, 596, 668 sqq.; 674 sqq.; 688, 752, 763 sqq.

Harvey, iii. 30; Circulation of the Blood, 322.

Haupt, Berlin Programmes, iii. 136.

Havet, Ernest, iii. 185.

Haydn, iv. 53.

Haym, R., in 'Herder,' iii. 165; 255; 256; quoted, 393; 469; quoted, iv. 185, 424; 425, 426, 480, 607.

Hayward, 'History and Theory of Philosophy,' 4. 224.

Hebel, iv. 292.

Hegel, Geo. Wilh. Fr., iii. 3; Lectures: 'History of Philosophy,' 4. 373, 475, 386; 'Werke,' 4. 252; 20; 30; 'Philosophy of History,' 33; 37, 39, 51, 58, 67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 88, 94, 121, 141; influence of, 166; 'Phenomenology of Mind,' 166, 243, 219, 371, 539, 541, 167; iv. 193, 216, 290; 'Metaphysics,' 168; philosophy of, iii. 165; 411, 465, 529; 169; Schelling and, 169, 176, 179, 197; 170, 171; Christian dogmatics and, 172; humanistic interpretation of, 174; and Strauss, ib.; 175; systems of Leibniz and, 187; Spinoza and, 188, 214; 'Leben,' 208; Kant and, 219, 228, 242; 'Jugendgeschichte,' 250; Feuerbach on, 260; 270, 296, 304, 311, 316, 317, 350, 362, 364; philosophy of reflection, 372; 380, 381, 356, 357, 388, 389; Idealism and Absolutism, 390; 395; new conception of Logic, 410; 412, 415, 507; 452, 434, 445, 450, 454, 455, 459, 464; Absolute Spirit, 466, 467, 468; 'Life of Jesus,' 469, 470; reason of success, 471, 472, 474; 'Science of Logic,' 475; 'Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences,' ib.; compared with Bacon, 476, 477; speculation, 478; 480; logical system, 487, 587, 615; 489; doctrine, 490; 492; 'Critical Journal,' 493; 495, 504; 'Triads,' 514; 517, 518, 520, 521, 526, 528; Wallace on, 532; 540, 545, 556, 561; idealistic system, 590, 591, 598; iv. 13; treatment of Schleiermacher and philosophy, 32; 'Phenomenology of Mind,' 48, 52; Lectures on 'Philosophy of Religion, of Society, of Art, Aesthetics,' 50, 51; formula of Logic, ib.; philosophy of nature, of mind, ib.; philosophy of, 52, 59; 'Vorstellungen,' ib.; 'Darstellung,' ib.; 'Begriff.' ib; Theodicy, 53; Divine Worship, ib.; Lectures, 54; on Art quoted, 55; inappreciative of natural beauty, 56; 'Werke,' 56, 57 quoted, 58; Aesthetics, ib.; ideas on aesthetics, 60; 'Logic' and 'Encyclopædia,' 61; panlogism, ib.; formalism, ib.; dialectic, 62; systematic speculation, 63; 69, 83; Absolute Mind, 84; 87, 89, 98, 99, 105, 107, 126; metaphysical system of, 129, 137, 192; and Fichte, 133; 168, 171; and Schleiermacher, 173; Fichte, 213; contrast with Schleiermacher, 180; Monism of, ib.; similarity to Aristotle and Plato, 181; Schelling and, 182; 185; speculations of, 186; study of history, 192; and historical problem, 193; 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, &c.,' 194; divergent application of thought, ib. sqq.; ideas of Development and Freedom, 198; idealistic system, 208; panlogism of, 210; 211; philosophy of, 212; Real is the Rational, 213; abstractions of, 214; philosophy of, 216; 'Logic,' ib.; 'Philosophy of Mind,' ib.; 'Philosophy and Religion,' ib., 293; 'Philosophy of Right,' ib.; and Green, 219; 222, 234; 236; 'Geist,' 263; 266; formula of religion, 293; 'Hist. of Philosophy' quoted, ib.; and Jacobi, 300; 'Werke,' ib.; and Hamann, ib. sqq.; and Dillthey, 305, 309, 317, 320, 321; Kant and Schleiermacher, treatment of religious conceptions, 324 sqq.; "classics," 326; opposition of Schelling, 327; and Weisse, 328; pantheism of, 329; Lotze and Schleiermacher, 333; 335; and Schleiermacher, 339; and Schopenhauer, 360 sqq.; philosophy, 365, 370; 376, 385, 405 sqq.; 413, 418, 424, 443, 477, 478, 479 sqq.;
and Comte, 181 sqq.; Comte and, reception of their doctrines, 492; 498, 499; and Comte, 500, 502, 503, 512, 524, 556 sqq., 528: Spencer and, contrasted, 529 sqq.; 561, 534, 535, 538, 555, 583, 595, 596, 603, 604, 629, 630, 642 sqq.; main principle of, 644 sqq.; method of, 647 sqq.; the 'Secret of,' 650 sqq., 653; theory of development, 658, 664, 669; parallel between Comte and, 687, 689; compared with Comte, 696 sqq.; 705, 729, 741 sqq.; 747, 754.

Hegelian system, iv. 214; influence of, 257; school of, 537, 540, 666 sqq.

Hegelianism in Prussia, iv. 197; collapse of, 283; reaction of, 234, 255.

Heine, Heinrich, perfected pamphleteering style, iv. 200, 204.

Heinze, Max, 'Ueberweg' ed., iii. 38; 'History of Philosophy,' 349; quoted, 350; re-edited 'Grundriss der Geschichteder Philosophie,' iv. 206; 'History of Philosophy since beginning of the 19th Century,' 286.

Helferich, H. von., iv. 552.

Hel lenic and Romantic, iv., 36.

Helmholtz, H., 'Physiological Acoustics,' ii. 73; 'Physiological Optics,' ib.; 'Data which lie at the Foundation of Geometry,' 180; physiological investigations, 181; and Darwin, 182; 253, 289, 375; 'Conservation of Force' quoted, 399; 564; 'Ueber die Wechselwirkung der Naturkräfte,' 551, 552, 598; iv. 343, 396, 608, 710.

Helmholtz and Coudillac, iii. 220; and Holbach, heidoom of, iv. 132; Puffendorf and, 138; Bentham and, 138, 144, 427.

Henke, 'Jacob Fr. Fries,' iii. 258.

Heracleitus, iii. 494.

Herbart, i. 6, 39, 58, 67, 69, 71; 'Works,' 74; 482; 'Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie,' 125; return from Metaphysics to Psychology, 179; and Beneke, 179, 213, 214, 198; Stout on, 202, 204, 205, 206; System, 206; 'Ideas,' 207; conceptions introduced by, ib.; School of, 208; psychology, ib.; 209, 211, 215; influenced by Leibniz, 217; 243, 248, 258, 259, 265, 267, 279, 347, 368, 406, 410, 450; 'Together' in space, 482; ethical interest, 483; Review of Schopenhauer's Work, 185; 492, 499, 500, 504, 506, 529, 536; iv. 14; realism, 62; 'Intro. to Philosophy,' 102; Encyclopædia, ib.; 'Works,' 102, 104, 105; 'Value,' 106; metaphysical system of, 129; reform of ethical philosophy in Germany, 205 sqq.; 244; and modern psychology, 274; 317, 322, 396, 512, 555, 604, 656, 734.

Hercules, iv. 36.

Herder, iii. 30; 98, 114, 117, 119, 120, 151, 161; poetical views elaborated by, 165; relations to Göttingen, ib.; Haym, ib.; 'Spirit of Hebrew Poetry,' ib.; 255, 256, 257, 265, 329; 'Ideen,' 332; Haym quoted, 353; 354; List of Important Writings, 555; 356, 364, 371, 387, 395, 444, 452, 458, 472, 494, 557; iv. 6, 10; naturalism of, 11 sqq.; 16, 17, 91, 105; 135 sqq.; 211; 'Ideas towards a History of Mankind,' 212; 246, 271, 282, 292, 296; Hamann and, 300; and Rousseau, 423; 424 sqq.; 464, 479; 501, 506, 514, 554, 536, 574, 618, 689.

Hermann, Gottfr., iii. 134; 'criticism' as practised by Ritschl and, 137; 139, 140; 141, 145, 146; School of, 156; classical tutor of Weisse, iv. 61.

Hermes, iii. 39.

Herodotus, iii. 310.

Herschel, Sir John, 'Study of Natural Philosophy,' iii. 376; 381, 556.

Hertling, 'Beneke' in 'Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie,' iii. 280.

Hertz, iii. 580; posthumously published 'Principles of Mechanics' quoted, 584.

Hesiodi, iii. 99.

Hettner, 'Litteratur - Geschichte,' iii. 117; 129.

Heyne, C. G., iii. 127, 129; 'Seminary,' 137; 145, 146; and Wolf, 164, 165.

'Hibbert Journal,' iii. 22, 199; iv. 376.

Hill, G. W., iii. 102.

Hinneburg, Paul, 'Die Kultur der Gegenwart,' iii. 94.

Hirt, introduced the term 'characteristic,' iv. 39.

Historical development of human thought, iii. 88.

History since Niebuhr, broader views of, iii. 150.

Hobbes, iii. 197, 215, 309, 329; philosophy of, iv. 130; new doctrine of, 138; and Mackintosh, 150; 420, 421.

Hodgson, S. H., in 'Mind,' quoted, iii. 389, 390.

Hoffding, Harald, 'History of Modern
Philosophy,' iii. 38, 519, 523, 594; iv. 103; 'Philosophische Probleme,' iii. 57; quoted, 292; 'Moderne Philosophen,' 57; 233, 234, 283; 'Modern Philosophers and Philosophical Problems,' 284; 291, 317; 'Archiv für Gesch. der Philosophie,' 340; 349; iv. 145, 146; 'Das Wertungszprobleme,' iii. 409, 466; iv. 107, 124.


Hogarth, iii. 128; iv. 14.

Holbach, La Mettrie and, iii. 197; Helvetius and, hedonism of, iv. 132.

Hölderlin, iii. 250, 526; iv. 52, 583.

Holtzmann, Prof., 'R. Rothe's Speculative System,' iv. 325.

Home, Henry (Lord Kames), 'Elements of Criticism,' iii. 48; 96.

Homer, iii. 99, 129; and Virgil interpreted by Voss, 145; Ajax and Ulysses, 167; iv. Epics of, 34; immediateness of, 35; 426.

Homme Moyen, iv. 510.

Horace and the Ancients, iii. 96; 'Epistle to the Pisos,' iv. 14.

Horn, Franz, iii. 124.

Hotho, H. G., ed. 'Hegel's Works,' iv. 51; 'Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst,' quoted by E. Caïrd, 51.

Hufeland, iii. 354.

Hugo, Gustav, Lectures on 'Roman Law,' iv. 140.

Hugo, Victor, Ronsard to, iii. 96; iv. 112, 246, 400.

Huguenots, the, iv. 474.

Humanism, iii. 117.

Humanismus, 'das Ideal der Humanität,' iii. 116.

Humanistic, interpretation of Hegel, iii. 174; movement split, iv. 21.

Humanity, idea of, iv. 425, 533.

Humboldt, A. von, and Liebig, iii. 92; 138, 153, 154, 370, 551; 'Kosmos,' 552, 555; influenced by Cuvier, 553, 612; iv. 318, 514; 'Kosmos,' 767, 775.

Humboldt, W. von, and Schiller, iv. 32; 122; 'Über die Verschiedenheit der Menschen' quoted, 123; 498, 512, 596.

Hume, David, iii. 4, 21, 31, 48; and Locke, 112; 'Treatise of Human Nature,' 123; 189; Lessing and, 124; 162, 181, 182, 184; philosophy, 186; 215, 217, 218; and Berkeley, 220, 221; Candidate for Chair of Moral Philosophy, 223; 225, 228, 229, 231, 239, 241, 242, 273, 256, 278, 279, 294, 309, 317; Locke and, 317; 337, 339, 340, 342, 346, 363, 367, 375, 380, 402, 418, 439, 493, 510, 524, 525, 527; 'Treatise,' Green and Grose, 532; 536; and Smith, iv. 6, 11, 127; influence on Kant, 145; 160, 218, 220; analysis and synthesis of ideas, 281; scepticism of, 282, 320; 'Essay on Miracles,' 335, 339, 364; 'An enquiry concerning Human Understanding' quoted, ib.; 336 sqq.; 361; 'Inquiry,' 564; 'Natural History of Religion,' ib.; 'Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,' ib., 366; 365; and Mill, 367; 370; 380, 402, 439, 456, 606, 612, 617, 731, 739, 740, 752, 787.


Hutcheson, Francis, iii. 224; iv. 6; Shaftesbury and, 27; Leslie Stephen on, 142; 'Concerning Moral Good and Evil' quoted, ib.; and Adam Smith, ib.

Hutton, R. H., on Martineau quoted, iv. 376.

Huxley, T. H., 'Science and Culture,' iii. 30; 'Biology' in 'Ency. Britannica,' 199; 253; Agnosticism, 297, 511, 530, 599; 315, 416; in 'Nineteenth Century' quoted, iv. 229; and Mill on the Cosmic process, 232; 'Romanes Lecture' quoted, ib.; 'Evolution and Ethics,' ib.; 'Collected Essays,' ib.; 233; 'Hume' quoted, 364; Agnosticism, 369; on Morality quoted, 379; 402; on Comte, 517, 612, 693, 723, 758, 758.

Ideal, the, of Humanity, iv. 71, 114; 90, 92, 94, 105, 113, 244.

Ideas or Ideals (Weisse), iv. 64.

Idealism, modern, iii. 39; 146; 292, 301; German, 312, 426, 453, 528; iv. 185; Berkeley's, iii. 311, 348; Continental, 315; pure, 433; Kant's objection to, 439; classical era of, iv. 185; hypothetical, 232; synthesis of naturalism and, 233; new phase of, 762 sqq.

Idealistic school, iv. 61; movement, 125.

Idealists, iii. 207; German, iv. 97, 299.

"Idées - Forces," iv. 237 sqq. (see Fouillée).

"Ignorabimus," Spencer and Du Bois Reymond, iii. 569.

Imitation, the laws of, iv. 567 (see also Tarde).

"Incoqubescible," iv. 341.

Individualism, Way out of, iii. 248.

Individualistic Theory, iv. 563 (see also Tarde).
215; and Hegel, 219; doctrines of, 224; influence on German Idealism, 236; and psychology, 237; to Schopenhauer, 238; Kantian, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244; 'Anschauung,' 245; psychological programme of, 248; 249, 251, 252, 255; 'Kritik' and 'Kritik der Sitten,' 256, 260, 262; 'Criticism,' 274, 282, 422, 430, 620; critical labours, 285; 286, 287, 298, 299, 300, 303, 304, 313, 317, 334; way opened by, 336; influenced by Locke and Hume, 337; 'Natural History of the Heavens,' 338; psychology, 339; Locke and, 340; Critical Philosophy, 341; 'All-Destructive,' 342; 'History of Pure Reason,' 342, 343; central point of philosophy, 341; Noumenon or 'Thing in itself,' 345; 346, 347, 348; iv. 69, 147 sqq.; 217, 283, 285, 304, 314; acceptance of traditional psychology, iii. 349; criticism predominant, 350; 351, 352, 354, 355, 356; 'Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics,' 357; 'Critique of Practical Reason,' 357, 443, 445; 'Critique of Judgment,' 357; iv. 12, 42; 'Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason,' iii. 557; philosophy, 358, 361, 381, 481; problem of reason and faith, 363; 364, 365, 367, 372, 374, 377, 378; 387, 389, 390, 393, 395; exact knowledge, 396; 396, 402; return to, 404; transcendental logic, 410; 412, 418; leader in metaphysics, 436; 'Thing in itself,' 437, 481, 483; objection to Idealism, 439, 440; Categorical imperative, 437, 507; 441, 442, 445; iv. 20, 104, 108, 110, 149, 213, 278, 313, 378, 410; Third Critique, iii. 446, 447, 448; analysis, 449, 450, 451, 453, 456, 459, 460, 467, 468, 469, 470, 472; ethical tone peculiar to, 473; 478, 480, 483; agnostic position, 484, 486, 492, 493, 499; critical spirit, 504, 505, 506, 521, 529; Schelling's works on, 532; 533, 538, 547, 552; external impulse, 553; 589; return to critical position, 555; 586; practical philosophy, 557; 588, 589; 'subjectivism,' 591; Aesthetic and Logic, iv. 5: 9, 11, 13; Theory of the Beautiful, 15; and Schiller, 15, 18 sqq.; 'Aesthetics,' 16, 17; 'problem of origin and historical development of human race,' 18; Critique of Pure Reason, ib.; 'Critique of Practical Reason, ib.; Faculty of Judgment, ib.; Three Critiques, ib.; intellectualism, 21; 26, 27; theory of disinterested pleasure, 28, 29; and Fichte's philosophy, 32; controversy with Schiller, 35; 'Religion within the limits of Mere Reason, ib.; similar quoted, 36; 38; problems formulated by, 41, 42; Practical Philosophy, 43; intellectual intuition of, 44; philosophy of, 49, 61; 50, 67, 68; foreshadows Herbart's views, 106; definition of the Beautiful, 77, 92, 93; ethical rigorism of, 109; aesthetics of perception, 113; ethics, 114; 126; and ethics, 129, 138; Critique contrasted, 144; 'Metaphysik der Sitten' quoted, ib.; second 'Critique,' ib.; Religious Philosophy, ib.; 'Critique of Pure Reason,' ib.; and Bentham, 145; 'Observations on the Beautiful and Sublime,' ib.; formalism in ethics, 146; principle of the 'Good Will,' ib.; Metaphysics, ib.; 'Highest Good,' 150, 313, 152; development from, 155; greater reformer than Bentham, 156; and Schiller, ib.; Autonomy or Freedom of the Will, 157; 'Critiques,' ib.; 'Religion within the limits of Mere Reason,' ib., 159, 297; theory of the Sublime, 158; influence on Fichte, 160; 'transcendental' of, 162; and Fichte, 163, 170; ethical system, 165 sqq.; 171; influence on Schleiermacher, 172; ethics, 177; and Hegel, 179, 180, 185; and Comte, 186; watchwords of philosophy since, 195; First philosophy of, 202; 216, 307; and Herbert, 205; practical reason of the Will, 209, 211; influence in England, 215; and Green, 219, 220; Critique, 222; and modern ethical thought, 253; ethics of, 254 sqq.; 313; rigorism of, 257, 312; 271, 272; philosophy of, 274, 295, 322; Ethics and Schleiermacher's psychology, ib., 309, 314; religious philosophy, 276; Welträtself, ib.; 'three visions of, 277; 'Critiques,' 278, 371, 279, 282; Things in Themselves, 284, 286, 291; ethical writings, 292; transcendentalism, ib.; 295; 296; 'Conflict of the Faculties,' ib.; 298, 299, 300, 302; 324; exact science, 325; Hegel and Schleiermacher, treatment of religious conception, 324 sqq.; 333; unity of apperception, 342; mechanical and spiritual in Kant, ib.; and Descartes, 360, 393; 361, 366 sqq.; 369, 379, 384; transcendental, 406;
INDEX.


Karl August of Weimar, Duke, iii. 334.

Kelvin, Lord (William Thomson), and Tait, 'Natural Philosophy,' iii. 576; experimental and theoretical labours of, 392; on 'vortex-atom theory' quoted, 574; 576, 582, 584, 612; iv. 412.

Kemp, J., transl. Schopenhauer's 'World as Will and Idea,' iv. 394.

Kepler, iii. 256; Laws, 322, 339, 519; iv. 778.

Kielmeyer, K. F., 'Relation of Organic Forces,' iii. 553; influence on Cuvier, Humboldt, and Schelling, ib.; preface to Cuvier's 'Leçons d'anatomie comparée,' 553; 554.

Kieser, iii. 454.

Kinetik theory of Gases, iii. 102.

Kirchhoff, iii. 107; and Mach, 252; Lectures on "Mechanics," 403, 404; quoted, 578; 580; iv. 343, 396, 758.

Kleinpeter, Dr., 'Die Erkenntnistheorie der Naturforschung der Gegenwart' quoted, iii. 580, 581.

Klopiock, iii. 116, 129.

Knebel, military tutor to Duke Karl August of Weimar, iii. 354.

Knight, W., 'Philosophy of the Beautiful,' iv. 97; 'Outlines of Aesthetics,' 98, 424.

Knowledge, iii. 294; problem of, ib., 325, 456, 480, 488, 510, 524, 529, 592; iv. 28; theory of, iii. 337, 339, 540; iv. 128, 202, 210, 262; and faith, iii. 341; relativity of, 341; 346, 362, 367, 414, 416, 418, 420; validity of, 431, 442, 477; and belief, 531; 534; 'sight' replaced by, iv. 48; 115; two forms of, 736 sqq.

Knowledge and Belief, reconciliation of, iii. 54.

Koëchly, H., iii. 136, 140.

Külliker, iv. 518.

König, E., Monograph on Wundt in 'Frommann's Klassiker der Philosophie,' iii. 594.

Körner, iv. 16; and Schiller, 18; 32.

Kosmos, Humboldt's, iv. 767.

Krause, Chr. Fr., iii. 591; System of Panentheism, iv. 190, 329; Ahrens on, 190 sqq.

KrausSch, E., in 'Lexis,' iii. 165.

Krug, ii. 251; iv. 900, 908 sqq.; 595.

Külpe, O., iii. 67 quoted; iv. 102.

Kunstidee (art idea), Schiller's, iv. 16.

Kuntze, J. E., 'G. F. Fechner' quoted, iii. 370.

"Laboremus," watchword of Septimius Severus, iii. 599.

Lachelier, Jules, iii. 430, 620; on "Nature," quoted, 621, 622, 623; iv. 217.

Lachmann, iii. 146.

Lacroix, iv. 493.

Lagrange, iii. 404, 568.

Lamarck, iii. 461, 554; and Comte, iv. 188; 505, 528, 531, 723, 749, 775.

Lamartine, iv. 400.

La Mettrie and Holbach, iii. 197.

Lamprécht, Karl, 'Deutsche Geschichte,' iii. 92; iv. 569 sqq.; 574; and Dilthey, 655.

Lang, K., N. von, iv. 478.

Lange, F. A., 'History of Materialism,' iii. 28, 33, 117, 179, 197; quoted, 562, 563; "Psychology without a Soul," 199, 296; 'Geschichte des Materialismus,' 297, 563; iv. 53; 'History of Materialism,' 90, 93; main representative of Neo-Kantianism, ib.; quoted, 91; reaction against Materialism in Germany, &c., ib.; 92, 94, 97, 105, 244, 343; Ideals, 411; 522.

Lange, W., ed., 'Gesch. der Pädagogik,' iv. 135.

Language, and Common-sense, iii. 3, 10; of classical antiquity, 135; of Greeks, 136; modern, 141.

Language and bodily sensation furnish point of union, iii. 15.

Laplace, Condorcet and, iii. 100, 302, 304; school of, 310, 395, 399, 400, 547; 'Exposition du Système du Monde,' 550; 'Essai philosophique sur les probabilités,' 550; 551, 552; iv. 132, 491, 693, 739, 772.

Laplacian world-formula, iii. 551; purely mechanical view of nature, 552.

La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyère, iii. 201.

Laromiguère, iii. 270.

Lask, iv. 409.

Lassalle, Ferd., iv. 537.

Lasswitz, Kurd, 'Geschichte der Atomistik,' iii. 33; 'Gustav Theodor Fechner,' 519; iv. 267.

Lavater, iii. 120, 295.

Lavoisier, iii. 212.

Layard, iii. 154.
Lazarus, and Anthropology, iv. 212; and Steinthal, 511; 513, 515.
Leake, W. M., Works on Athens, Asia Minor, the Morea, Northern Greece, iii. 153; travels in Greece, 154; re-discovery of Old World, 1b.
Lec, Vernon, "Recent Ästhetics" in 'Quarterly Review,' iv. 102; 'L'Esthetique du Mouvement' quoted, 124.
Lehmann, Rud., in 'Grosse Denker,' iii. 485; Schopenhauer's Doctrine, quoted, 583; 589; iv. 569.
Leibniz, iii. 7, 18, 28, 39, 48, 49, 74, 114, 123, 124; systems of Hegel and, 187; philosophies of Descartes and, 190; 197; "Psychologica Empirica," 201; "Psychologica Rationalis," 1b.; 207; Wolffian school, 1b.; 'Monodology,' 1b.; 502; 210, 212; iv. 308; influence on Herbart, iii. 217; systems of Descartes and, 219; 220, 223, 241, 246, 256, 264, 267; "petites perceptions," 288; iv. 17; and Newton, iii. 302; analytical method of, 303; 304, 308, 313; 'Nouveaux Essais,' 317; and Spinoza, 324; 325, 326; 'Calculus,' 327, 328; 'Théodicée,' 329; Knowing and Feeling of the Human Soul, 329; 330; and Spinoza contrasted, 331; and Bayle, 332, 333; "sub specie universi," 334; systematisation of ideas, 335; 337; 339, 340, 343, 347, 348, 354, 361, 387, 395, 406; conception of Knowledge, 407; 417, 451, 454, 459, 466, 469; Monads, 481; philosophy, 491; 494, 504; Monads and Harmony, 507; 529; 547; 558, 562; Metaphysical System of, iv. 6; 14, 16; Pre-established Harmony, 25; philosophy, 71; 135; development, 137; Schleiermacher and, 172, 173, 176, 183, 204; Herbart and, 206; 211, 217; metaphysical view of, 282; 283, 290, 296; 'mirror of the Universe,' 315, 361; 501, 528, 576, 615 sqq.; 624, 629; 634, 636, 659, 670, 739, 743, 750, 752.
Leibniz-Wolffian School and Kantian philosophy, iv. 279.
Léon, Xavier, iv. 588.
Leopoldi, iv. 204.
Le Sage, iv. 620.
Lequier, Jules, iii. 624.
Lessing, iii. 111, 113, 114, 115, 116; and Kant, 118; his revival of Spinoza, 1b.; a Spinozist, 118; 120, 123, 124, 126; 'Antiquarian Letters,' 137; 144; 'Works,' 146; 151, 160, 161, 237, 239, 329, 342; "Nathan der Weise," 355; 371, 387, 445, 453, 472, 492; iv. 7, 8, 10; criticism of, 11; 12, 17, 90, 91, 92, 105, 125, 136, 137, 211, 288, 292, 479, 501, 574, 618, 625.
Lévy-Briihl, in 'Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale,' iii. 385.
Lewes, G. H., 'Life of Goethe,' iii. 122; iv. 358; 'Problems of Life and Mind,' iii. 263; 314; 'Foundations of a Creed,' 263, 314; 'Study of Psychology: its Object, Scope, and Method,' 263; 271; 'History of Philosophy,' 317; 530; on Goethe, iv. 33; 219; 527, 731.
Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, 'Enquiry into the Credibility of Early Roman History,' iii. 151; E. Krautsch on, 165.
Lexis, 'Die Deutschen Universitatcn,' iii. 66; 133, 137; Wilamowitz in, 148; 146; Lindner in, 159; 165.
Lichtenberg, G. Chr., Prof. Natural Philosophy, iii. 128; place in History of Science, 1b.; Figures of Electric Discharge, 1b.; 'Collected Works,' ed. Griesebach, 1b.; 'Letters and Explanations,' 1b.
Liebig, J. von, Humboldt and, iii. 92; Ritschl and, 145; at Giessen, 1b.; educational work of, 146; 'Chemical Letters,' 198; J. Müller and, 211; 370, 374, 375; 414; Memoir, 455; iv. 740.
Lindner, Theodor, 'Medieval and Modern Historiography' in 'Lexis,' iii. 159.
Lindsay, J. M., transl. Ueberweg's 'System of Logic,' iii. 209.
Lipsius, iii. 274; 'Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychologie,' 289; 'Grundlegung der Ästhetik,' iv. 102; 570.
List, Fr., iv. 537, 543.
Literature, historical, of Germany, compared with that of France and Great Britain, iii. 150.
Littre, disciple of Comte, iv. 235; Fouillé on, 239; 524.
llano, Antonio, 'Morality the last of Dogmas,' iv. 412.
Lobatchevsky, iii. 107.
Locke, iii. 11, 18, 106; and Hume, 112, 317; 205, 215, 217, 220; 'Essay,' 322,
INDEX.

811

243; and Berkeley, 224; 227, 228; ideas of his philosophy, 229; 239, 241, 242; 245, 246, 253; "tabula rasa," 281, 295, 298; Fraser on, 304, 309, 308, 310; 312; 327; 329; 332, 338; plain historical method, 337; 339; and Kant, 340; 341, 342, 344, 347, 375, 422, 437, 449, 563; iv. 11, 12, 13, 131, 142, 142, 428, 450 sqq., 519, 522, 526, 606, 619, 620, 731, 719, 752, 780, 787.

Logic and Psychology, iii. 298, 301, 309, 311, 414, 430, 449, 532.

Logos, iii. 356, 469; evolution of the, 470; life of the, 459.

Loudon, University College, iii. 199.

Longet, i. 197.

Lorenz, O., 'Geschichtswissenschaft,' iii. 152, 159.

Lotze, Hermann, list of Works, iii. 6, 7; 39, 40, 52; 'Schriften,' 47, 482, 499; 467, 471, 475, 478, 488, 493; 'Philosophy in the Last Forty Years,' 126; 'History of ästhetik in Germany,' 130; 178; 179, 184, 191, 193; 'Mathematics,' 201, 266; and Brown's 'Physiology of the Human Mind,' 202; 214, 216, 259; 'Physiology of the Soul,' 260; 264; approaches philosophy from the side of medicine, 265; 'Seele und Seelenleben,' ib.; 'Psychology,' 266; 'System of Philosophy,' ib.; 'Medical Psychology,' ib.; 'Microcosmus,' 266, 407, 615 sqq.; 102, 212, 320, quoted 330 sqq.; 343, 346, 766 sqq.; 'Theory of Local Signs,' iii. 206; his circumference, 267; 'Syllabus of Lectures,' 289; 276, 278; 285, 287, 288, 317; 'German Philosophy since Kant quoted, 334; 335, 361, 362; Cournot compared with, 355; 'Logic and Metaphysics,' 390; 'Leben, Lebenskraft quoted in 'Kleine Schriften,' 396; 'Logik,' quoted, 403; 406, 407; doctrine of Values or Worths, 405; 499, 410; and English Hegelianism, 412; 413; 414; and Spencer, 415; 416; 'eine Gemütss-sache," 420; 425, 430; 'Diktate,' &c., 413; 'Logik,' ib.; 'Metaphysik,' 397, 431, 432; quoted, iv. 207 sqq.; quoted, iii. 495, 496, 497, 514, 515; 'System of Philosophy,' 431, 432; identifies truly Real with Value or Worth, 434; 435, 444, 446, 454, 461, 467, 474, 480; 'Gesch. der neueren Philosophie quoted, 482; 490, 491, 493; defect in philosophical attitude, 494; 498, 500; philosophy, 501; detailed interest in phenomena, 501; 502; religious conceptions of, 503; 504, 505; problem of reality since, 506, 508, 513; 'Treatise on Metaphysics,' 516; 519, 520, 521, 529; 'System,' transl., 532; and Bradley, 534; 536, 539; Courses of Lectures, 546; on Schelling's 'Philosophy of Nature,' 548; Vital Force, 562; The Soul, 563; Works on Pathology and Physiology, ib.; formula regarding Mechanism, 570; 573; Inaugural Dissertation, 'De future Biologie principis philosophicis,' 575; Syllabus on 'Naturphilosophie' quoted, 576; 594, 596, 598, 614; and Fechner, 615; philosophy, 619, 624; Fouillé on, quoted, 625; 'History of German ästhetik,' iv. 5, 14, 17; quoted 25, 60, 91, 126, 128, 102; treatment of 'ästhetik' and Philosophy, 26; 28, 32, 57; on Weisse quoted, 60 sqq.; transl. from Weisse, 64; Values or Worths, 64, 103, 107, 114; 'ästhetik,' quoted, 65; version of Weisse's doctrine, ib.; 'Ueber den Begriff der Schönheit,' ib.; 'Ueber Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit,' ib.; Peipers' ed. of 'Kleine Schriften' quoted, 67; 103; 'Grundzüge der Ästhetik,' 66; 68, 87, 101; 'Mathematische Welt,' 103; 110; and Guyau, 114; 121, 126; Descartes to, 125; 128; ethical position of, 157; influenced by Herbart, 206; doctrine of "values," 206; Green and, 217; 'Schriften,' ib.; quoted, 225; and Green quoted, 215; 'System of Things,' 220, 256; 222, 226 sqq.; 245, 247; realm of values, 249; speculations of, 256; and Fechner, 267, 343; ideal or spiritual view, 275; 278; resolution of the character, 285; religious thought of, 321 sqq.; philosophical problem, 324 sqq.; "Personalität," 327; 'Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Kant' quoted, 329; 'Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie,' 331; 332; relation to Hegel and Schleiermacher, 333; 'Kleine Schriften,' 344; 345; Lecture course on 'Philosophy of Religion' quoted, 346, 348; and Revelation, 347; 366; 373; and Martinet, 376 sqq.; 382; and Bal- four, 336, 395, 398, 418, 422, 425, 596; his intermediate position, 597 sqq.; 598, 599; his definition of Phil-
INDEX.

osophy, 600 sqq.; 607, 608, 627, 630; his conception of the task of philosophy, 657 sqq.; Monism and dualism of, 660; on Personality quoted, 664; 670, 676; and Spencer compared, 695; 698, 705; on Creative Substance, 714; 718; fundamental necessity of a religious nature, 719 sqq.; 733, 746, 747, 748 sqq., 756, 758, 759, 764 sqq.

Louis Philippe, iv. 197.

Lowth, Robert, Bishop of London and Educator, Oxford, iii. 165; influence on German literature, 166.

Lucock, Taylor and, iv. 213.

Lucretius, iii. 146; 'Nature of Things,' 197; 202.

Ludwig, iii. 282.

Luther, Martin, iii. 124, 305, 354; iv. 326; 573.

Mach, Ernst, iii. 58, 107; Kirchhoff and, 282; 'Critical Exposition of the Development of Mechanics,' 403; 404, 430; and Wundt, 575; 'History and Origin of the Principle of Conservation of Energy,' 578; and Avemaries, 579; 580, 582; 'Mechanical Physics,' 604, 610, 617; Analysis of Sensations, iv. 316; 396, 404, 759, 773.

M'Cormack, Eng. transl. Mach's 'Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung,' iii. 338.

M'Cosh, Jas., 'Scottish Philosophy,' iii. 222; 223, 224, 236; 338.

Mackenzie, Article in 'Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale,' iii. 413.

Mackintosh, Sir Jas., in 'Ency. Britannica,' iv. 150; 431.

'Macmillan's Magazine,' J. T. Merz' 'Appreciation of Ed. Caird's Philosophy of Kant,' iv. 61.

Macpherson, 'Ossian,' iii. 160.

Magenide, iii. 197.

Mai, Cardinal, discovers Plautine Palimpsest in Ambrosian Library at Milan, iii. 140.

Maimon, Salomon, 'Categories of Aristotle,' iii. 347; comparison of Renouvier and, 390.

Maine, H. S., iv. 422, 524.

Mainländer, Philipp (Philipp Batz), 'Philosophy of Redemption,' iii. 78; 526.

Malebranche and Bayle, iii. 122, 302, 324.

Mallock, 'Is Life Worth Living?' iii. 531; iv. 394, 395, 396.

Malthus, iii. 396; 'Essay on Popula-

Mandleville, iii. 228.

Manuel, H. L., iii. 59, 226; and Ferrier, 271; 312; 'Metaphysics' in 'Ency. Brit. Univ.,' 429; Hampton Lectures, 429; 528; 530; 'The Limits of Religious Thought,' iv. 215; 268, 367 sqq.; 'Inaugural Lecture,' 369; 'Metaphysics or the Philosophy of Consciousness,' ib.; 370, 606, 693, 758.

Marheinecke, iv. 312.

Marshall, Prof., iv. 559.

Martineau, Jas., 'Study of Spinoza,' iii. 122; 315; 412; iv. 268, 318; in 'Nineteenth Century,' 374; 'Types of Ethical Theory,' ib.; quoted, 376; 'A Study of Religion,' ib.; quoted, 378; 'The Seat of Authority in Religion,' ib.; and Mill, 575 sqq.; 381, 395, 401, 755, 765.

Marx, Karl, iv. 536 sqq.; 543, 544, 570.

Maspero, iii. 155.

Massuet, René, ed. Works of St Irenæus and St Bernard, i. 170.

Materialistic controversy, iii. 176.

Mathematics and Metaphysics compared, iv. 736 sqq.

Matter and Force, iv. 341 (see also Force).

Maudsley, H., iv. 731.

Maurice, F. D., iii. 122; iv. 368; 'Life of' quoted, ib.

Maxwell, Clerk, iii. 404, 576; 'Matter and Motion,' 577; 'Demon,' ib.; iv. 709, 759.

Meissner, iii. 141.

Melanchthon, iii. 116.

Mellin, 'Dictionary,' iii. 436.

Mendel, theories of, iii. 534; 574.

Mendeleef, 'periods' of, iii. 607.

Menleissohn, M., iii. 119; iv. 16, 136, 296.

Merz, J. T., 'Appreciation of Ed. Caird's Philosophy of Kant,' iv. 61; on 'Synoptic Aspect of Reality,' 431; on 'Education and Instruction,' 456.

Metabolism (Stoffwechsel), iii. 396.

Metaphysical problem, Nature a, iii. 544; iv. 271.

Metaphysics and philosophical systems, iv. 128; and Ethics, 262; mathematics and, 736 sqq.

Meyer, Heinrich, Correspondence with Goethe, iv. 39.

INDEX.

Michelot, J., iv. 423; quoted, 472.
Michelet, K. L., ed. Hegel's Lectures on 'History of Philosophy,' iii. 373. 'Microcosmus' (see Lotze).
Milien, the, H. Taine on, iv. 505 sqq.: 507.
Mill, James, Hartley and, iii. 202; and Alex. Bain, 209; 214, 216; Hartley's theory, 218; mental chemistry, 218; 224, 225, 228; Associationism, 278; 309, 312; Agnosticism, 313; Bain's Life of, ib. 314, 315; Association Psychology, 376; 527, 594; 'Fragment on Macintosh,' iv. 150; 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' 153; Analytic method in thought, 186; 318, 429, 444, 496.
Mill, John Stuart, iii. 58, 72, 79, 100, 106, 125; and Bain, 179, 270; 'Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,' 186, 413; 215, 216, 217, 225, 226; 'Logic,' 247, 262, 263, 271, 275, 278; iv. 96, 97, 153; Comte and, iii. 292; 296; 301; 302, 303; 'Autobiography' quoted, 309, 315; 'Essays on Religion,' 314; 318, 337, 343, 347; 'System of Logic,' 374, 376; Wundt on, 375, 377; influence of Coleridge, Carlyle and Wordsworth on, 378; 379, 381, 382, 383, 389; and Kant, 399, 401, 416, 420, 510, 511, 521, 527, 528, 539, 537, 572, 594; on Bentham, quoted, iv. 141 sqq.; 'Dissertations and Discussions,' ib.; on Coleridge, ib.; democratic principles, 143; Goethean and Fichtean period, 149; 'Utilitarianism,' 152; quoted, 155; 'Political Economy,' ib.; 'Dissertations and Discussions,' ib.; Ethical Treatise, ib.; Autobiography, ib.; 'On Liberty,' 154; Positivist Ethics, 168; Comte and, 185; analytic method in thought, 186; and Herbert Spencer, 215; 219, 229; and Huxley on the cosmic process, quoted, 232, 247; 'Three Essays on Religion,' quoted, 305; and Hume, 366 sqq.; 369; 'Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy,' 370; and Martineau, 375; 404, 429, 443, 444, 454, 456; on Comte, 488; quoted, 495; and Comte, 494 sqq.; quoted, 496; and German philosophy, 498: 504, 506 sqq.; 517, 524, 527, 542, 607, 690, 694; and Spencer, 709; 731, 746, 753, 755.
Milton, iii. 609. 'Mind,' H. Sidgwick's 'Criticism of Critical Philosophy,' iii. 186; Stout on Herbert, 202; Stout on 'Herbert compared with English Psychologists,' 206; W. L. Davidson in, 214; 216; Ward's Treatises, 266; 'Philosophy in France,' 274; G. Croom Robertson and, 275; Ward's 'Psychological Principles,' 277; 'Modern Psychology,' 280; 282; Hodgson's Articles quoted, 390; Ribot quoted, 426; Benn's review of Schelling's 'Selected Works,' 487; iv. 124, 224, 228, 375, 395. 'Miraculous,' idea of (Schleiermacher), iv. 334.
Mises, Dr. (Fechner). See under Fechner. Mitchell, Jas., Dugald Stewart on, iii. 273. 'Modernism,' iv. 349.
Moleschott, Jacob, 'Der Kreislauf des Lebens,' iii. 198; 562; iv. 693.
Moll, Dr, 'Alleged Decline of Science in England,' iii. 304.
Mommsen, Theodor, 'Roman History,' iii. 152; 156; political position of, 157.
Monad, the Leibnizian, iv. 743.
Monahan, Ada, transl. of Janet's and Seailles' 'History of the Problems of Philosophy,' iii. 57.
Monboddo, Lord, iv. 424.
Monge, iii. 323.
Montiam, iv. 594; and dualism, 660.
Montaigne, Michel de, and Pascal, iii. 201; 'Essais,' 320; 'Apologie de Raymond Sebond,' 320; 332.
Montesquieu, iii. 122; iv. 421, 456, 466, 491.
'Monthly Review,' iii. 92.
Moral Order, iv. 167; principle at the root of all philosophy, 626 sqq.
Morality, its theoretical and applied aspects, iv. 127; metaphysical foundations of, 135; and Religion, 166.
More, Sir Thos., 'Utopia,' iv. 425.
Moritz, iv. 16.
Morley, Lord, second editor of 'Fortnightly Review,' iii. 530; 'English Men of Letters,' iv. 304; Mr Mill on 'Religion,' 366; quoted, 449 quoted, 466; 462; 'Joseph de Maistre,' 465; 509.
Morphology, iii. 606.
INDEX.

Mosaic Decalogue, iv. 253.
Mozart, iii. 314.
Muir, J. K., 'Ritschlianism,' iv. 322, 349.
Muirhead, J. H., ed. 'Library of Philosophy,' iii. 466.
Muller, Johannes, iii. 73; and Liebig, 211; 214, 215, 258, 259, 598; iv. 608, 710, 753.
Müller, Max, iv. 273, 398.
Müller, Ottfried, iii. 139, 152; 'History of Greece,' 153; 'History of Hellenic Tribes and Places,' 153; 154, 370.
Munich Collection of History of Sciences in Germany, iv. 15.
Musset, de, iv. 204.
Mythology or Symbolism, iv. 45.
Napier, 'Logarithmic Tables,' iii. 322.
Napoleon, iii. 284, 285; Code Civil of, 133; iv. 140, 478.
Napoleonic occupation, iii. 138; wars, 363.
Nationality, idea of, iv. 574 sqq.
Natural philosophy, iii. 549, 553; Thomson and Tait. 576.
Naturalism, of English poetry and art, iii. 547; iv. 185.
Nature, psycho-physical view of, iii. 17, 266, 518; Lucretius's poem, 197; rehabilitation of, 458; philosophy of, 460; 547, 558, 561, 582, 583; conception of, 515; 544; problem of, ibid., 545, 546, 548, 592, 593, 616, 618, 619, 625; exact study of, 547; soul and, 571; laws of, 572, 615; effects of modern analysis on conceptions of, 606; artistic view of, 610; interpretation of, 611; synoptic view of, 613; Lachelier quoted, 621, 622, 626; and Art, iv. 34, 229, 230; return to, 449.
Neander, J., iii. 170.
Nebular hypothesis, iv. 693.
Neo-criticism in France, iii. 297.
Neo-idealist movement of thought, iii. 94.
Neo-Kantism in Germany, iii. 297; iv. 603, 612, 723, 747, 756.
Neo-platonism, iv. 649.
Nettleship, Lewis, iii. 95; 'Memoir of Green,' iv. 217.
Newman, F. W., Letter from Martineau quoted, iv. 375 sqq.
Newman, J. H., 'Grammar of Assent,' iii. 531; iv. 381, 382; 395.
Newton, Law of Attraction, iii. 112; Boyle and, 197; Galileo and, 202; 'Principia,' 212; Newtonianism in France, 220, 227; 256; and Leibniz, 302; 309; Law of Gravitation, 310; 323, 377; natural philosophy, 338; laws of motion, 339; 368, 399, 558, 567; mathematical view of, iv. 282 sqq.; 467, 778.
Newton-Clarke, mathematical view, and Kant, iv. 283.
Nietzelr, B. G., iii. 98; 139; reconstruction of Roman History, 143, 144; broader views of History since, 150; 151; conception regarding sources of History of Republican Rome, 152; Lectures on Ancient History at Bonn, 152; 153, 156, 160; the elder, 163; Vorbereitende Zeit,' iv. 217, 501.
Nietzsche, E. Förster, 'Biography of Nietzsche,' iii. 142.
Nietzsche, Fr., iii. 78; Biography of, 142; 423, 454, 526; iv. 93, 126, 200 sqq.; 208, 228, 246 sqq.; Immoralism, 254; Carlyle and, 357; Schopenhauer and, 390 sqq.; Superman, 393; 394, 395; and Gu Yan, 408; 537, 764.
'Nineteenth Century Review,' Tennyson's Prefatory Poem quoted, iii. 530; 'Symposium,' 531; iv. 374; 377, 394.
"Nirvana" of the Buddhist, iv. 392.
"Noetic" School of Oxford, iv. 287.
Norrissian Prize Essay on Ritschel's 'Theology, iv. 322; 349.
North Carolina, Colony of, iv. 428.
Nosologie, iii. 272.
Noumena, opposed to Phenomena, iii. 125.
Noumenon (see 'Thing in itself').
Novalis, Theory of Artistic Irony, iv. 59; 175, 583.
Oerstadt, iii. 92; 'Der Geist in der Natur,' 591.
Oesterreich O., 'Deutsche Literaturzeitung,' iv. 93.
Oken, iii. 92; 'Naturphilosophie,' 370; 591; 454, 550, 554; iv. 518, 740.
Old Testament, Eichhorn's Introduction to the, iii. 164; Archeology, 165; 166, 170.
Ontologists, Phenomenists and, iii. 542.
Ontology, Being or Reality, iii. 451, 456,
INDEX.

451; in England and France, 523; 544.

Order, Basis of, iv. 130; Moral, 167; Natural, Moral and Divine, 183.

Orthodoxy, or Rationalism, iii. 161; traditional, 169.

Ossian, iv. 426.

Oswald, Wilhelm, iii. 100; 315; energetic philosophy, 391; 430; 'Naturalphilosophie,' 546; 'Annalen der Naturphilosophie,' ib.; 'Philosophy of Nature,' 546; 580, 582; iv. 396, 627.

Oswald, iii. 4.

Panentheism, Krause's system of, iii. 591; system of, iv. 190.

Panlogism and Pantheism of Hegel's philosophy, iii. 244, 508; iv. (see Hegel).

Pascal, Montaigne and, iii. 201, 302.

Pasteur on 'Stereo - Chemistry and Vitalism' in 'Nature,' iv. 229.

Pattison, Mark, iii. 66.

Paul, Jean, iv. 292, 425.


Paulsen, Fr., iii. 67; 'Voluntarism,' 83; 'Immanuel Kant,' 28; 340; quoted, iv. 252, 283, 297; 'Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den Deutschen Schulen und Universitäten,' &c., iii. 116, 117; 130, 141, 341; 'Einleitung in die Philosophie,' 431; 513; 519, 520; higher education, iv. 135; 250; Ethics of, 251, 254; Systematic philosophy, 251; Culture of the Present Age, 251; 'Ethik' transl. Thilly, 251; 'Güterlehre,' 252, 253; 267; Studies of Kantian Philosophy, 276; 'Philosophia Militans,' 277; 450, 722.

Peacock, Geo., logical premises of general arithmetic, iii. 376.

Pearson, Karl, iii. 107; 'Grammar of Science,' 403, 404; 579; and Spencer, 580; 604, 605.

Peipers, ed. Lotze's 'Kleine Schriften,' iii. 126; 266; iv. 65.

Peloponnesus, E. Curtius, description of the, iii. 153, 155.

Penn, William, iv. 307, 428.

Percy Ballads, iii. 166; iv. 426.

Personality, Lotze on, iv. 327; 330 sqq.; and Highest Good, 345; discussion of, 373; Lotzean, quoted, 661 sqq.; Wundt on, 716.

Peschel, O., 'Geschichte der Erdkunde,' iii. 155.

Pessimism, iv. 674, 762 sqq.

Pestalozzi, iii. 204; 257; problem of education in France, 363; appeal to Goethe, 363; 448; and education in Switzerland, iv. 203, 291; school of, 292; 453, 454, 498, 512.

Petersen, iv. 478.

"Petites perceptions," Leibniz, iii. 288; 327, 328; 347; iv. (see Leibniz).

Pfänder, A., iv. 247.

Pfeiderer, O., 'Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie' quoted, iv. 304; 363, 385.

Piorta, iii. 141.

Phenomenalism of Lotze, Spencer, and Wundt contrasted, iii. 516.

Philology, iii. 127; classical, 130; comparative, ib.; modes of treatment in classical, 134; German classical, ib.; classical and other branches of, 146; Brandl's Report on English, ib.; science of, 472.

Philosophy, anarchy in recent, iii. 93; systematic, 94; Hume's, 186; of Common-sense in Britain, 186; Baconian, 219; Locke's ideas in, 229; of Kant, 250; in France, 274; of Life, iv. 11; moral, in England and France, 129; 193; and Theology, 263; the task of, according to Lotze, 657 sqq.

Philosophical Thought, the rationale of, iv. 756 sqq.

Physics (not metaphysics) of morality, iii. 208.

"Physiocratie," iv. 452.

Physiology, iii. 211; influence of, 259.


Pietists (Lutheran), iv. 291.

Platen, 'Diary' quoted, iii. 455.

Plato, iii. 25; 'Dialogues,' 26; 27; and Kant, 28; 51, 77, 104; "Ideology," 169; and Spinoza, 179; and Neoplatonists, 244; 286, 331, 346, 387; and geometry, 428; 432; philosophy, 434, 454, 479, 486, 491, 512, 528, 529, 588; iv. 6, 14; world of ideas, 21; 25, 26, 57; and Schopenhauer, 75 sqq.; 101, 112; aesthetics of the Ideal, 113; 138; philosophy of, 148; 172; Aristotle and, 181; 202, 240, 275; to St Thomas, 277; 307; 335; Dialogues, 370; 420, 524, 599, 637, 725.

Plotinus, iv. 6, 25.

Poincaré, Henri, iii. 385; 'La Science et l'Hypothèse,' 404; iv. 404.
INDEX.

Poisson and Faraday's 'Lines of Force,' ii. 577.
Pollock, Sir Fr., 'Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy,' ii. 121; 'Spinoza and Modern Thought,' 122; in "Mind," iv. 395.
Poncelet, iii. 323, 404.
Pont de Nemours, Du, iv. 452, 453.
Poeppe, the, and 'Les Paroles d'un Croyant,' iv. 405.
Positivism, iv. 169; of Comte, 182; 489; 185, 234 sqq.; 275; of Spencer, 371; 679 sqq.; 760 sqq.
Positivists, iv. 61.
Pott, A. F., etymological researches, iii. 147.
Pragmatism (Wm. James), iv. 253, 349, 414, 613, 722.
Pragmatists, iv. 93.
"Presentation - continuum," iii. 291; sensory and motor (see Jas. Ward).
"Presentations," iii. 205.
"Presentative Activity and "Presented" Content," iii. 206.
Prichard, J. C., iv. 511.
Priestley, iii. 4; Hartley and, 197.
Pringle-Pattison (Andrew Seth), 'Scottish Philosophy,' iii. 3, 225, 241, 242; iv. 143; 'Hegelianism and Personality,' 373; in 'Hibbert Journal,' 376.
Projection, Principle of, iii. 323.
Proudhon, iv. 493, 539.
Psychological problem, religion a, iii. 163, 172; point of view, iv. 271.
Psychologism, iv. 607; and Intellectualism, 785.
Psychology, British introspective, iii. 209; in Germany at beginning of century, 292; British empirical, ib.; Kant and, 237; 339; and Logic, 449; 531, 557; iv. 128; science of, 187, 262; 210; anthropology opposed to, 212; 213, 235 sqq.; 245; and Logic, relation of, 735.
Puchta, G. F., iii. 455.
Puffendorf, Samuel, "Naturrecht" or Natural Law, iii. 132; and Helvetius, iv. 138; 'Law of Nature,' 138.
Quakerism, rise of, iv. 287.
'Quarterly Review,' iii. 92, 579; iv. 102.
Quesnay, F., iv. 452, 453, 454, 456.
Quetelet, iv. 511.
Ranke and his school, iii. 150; 'History of the Popes,' 151; "Ideas" of, 151; 152; Conception of History, ib.; 157, 160; iv. 501, 569 sqq.; his Ideenlehre, 570.
Raphael, iv. 47.
Rationalism, iii. 544, 545.
Rational Theology, iii. 544, 545; and sensual, relationship of, iv. 160.
Rationalism, Orthodoxy or, iii. 161; German, 169; iv. 135.
Ravaission, iii. 66; 'Rapport,' 91; quoted, 426, 427; 239; 'La Philosophie en France,' 231; 234; iv. 398; quoted, 484.
Rawlinson, iii. 154.
Reactionaries, the, iv. 465.
Reality, Appearance and, iii. 27; and Knowledge, 293; 442; ultimate, 450, 473, 557; 457; iv. 789; pathway to, iii. 466; or spiritual ground of things, 469; 477, 479, 486, 481; problem of, 482, 484, 488, 490, 505; since Lotze, 506; 508, 509, 510, 511, 516, 518, 521, 522, 526, 528, 527, 529, 533, 542, 544, 592; 483, 485, 542; essence of, 498, 517; 499, 501, 503; moral side of, 507; 512, 514, 534, 536; Bradley's Degrees of, 540; 541; twofold aspect of, 615; problem of, iv. 77, 83, 115, 125; interpretation of, 783.
Reformation, the, iii. 116, 210, 305, 524; iv. 149, 219, 258, 277, 283, 312, 358.
Reform Bill, iv. 141.
Rehmu, J., 'Die Seele des Menschen'—"Essence" and "Life of the Soul," iii. 199; 289.
Rehmsch, iii. 266; iv. 599.
Reid, Thos., iii. 3, 4, 8, 188; and Stewart, 202, 232; and Scottish school, 219; iv. 402; iii. 225, 226, 228, 229, 235; psychological insight of, 241; 242, 253; influence on Hamilton, 380; 525; iv. 11; and Butler, 226; 265.
Reinach, Salomon, iii. 185.
Reinhold, iii. 125; 'Letters on Kantian Philosophy,' 162, 352; Fichte's correspondence with, 295; 345, 351; at Weimar, 355; 357, 415, 464, 479; 10, 13; chief exponent of Kant's Intellectualism, 21; 57, 172, 595.
Religion, iii. 158, 159; from psychological point of view, 163; as a credible doctrine, iv. 394.
Religious ideas, conflict of, iv. 585 sqq.
INDEX.

Religious Philosophy, iv. 282 sqq.


Renan, Ernest, iii. 79; iv. 235, 402, 524, 612.

Rennouvier, Chas., 'Essais de Critique Générale,' iii. 72, 206, 274, 297, 404, 438, 575, 594; 'Néocriticisme,' 97, 118, 185; 296; Philosophy, 184, 624, 625; 208, 278; Discontinuity, 291; 417; Beurrier's Articles on, 297; science of morality, 314; 337; 389, 390, 416; 'une affaire passionelle,' 420; 430; 'Personnalisme,' 408; 521, 620, 622; an empiricist or pheno menalist, 623; iv. 97, 163; 'Science de la Morale,' 256, 257, 306; Category of Personality, 368; 434, 747, 756, 758, 765.

Restoration, the, iii. 204; 223; 226; 233, 525; iv. 129, 303, 397, 400.

Revolution, the, iii. 154, 157, 185, 210, 230, 232, 235, 250, 299, 300, 341; problem of liberty, 363; 524, 526; 555; influence of, iv. 19, 92, 93, 111; century of the English, 130; contrast of and Civil War, 130; 134; Order of State and Society during, 183; German, 201; 204, 258, 277, 359.

'Revue de l'Instruction Publique,' iii. 270.

'Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,' Bontroux, iii. 94; Cournot, 385; Lévy-Bruhl, 385; Mackenzie, 413; 420; iv. 295, 257, 272, 588.

'Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger,' iii. 274, 297; iv. 411.

Ribbeck, Otto, 'Life of Ritschl,' iii. 142.

Ribot, Th., iii. 66; in 'Mind,' 94; 214; 'La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine,' 215, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273; on Renouvier, quoted in 'Mind,' 296; 426.

Ricardo, David, iv. 459 sqq., 496, 539, 542, 543, 544.

Richardson, Samuel, iv. 620.

Rickert, iii. 409.

Richl, A., iii. 414.

Richl, W., 'Naturgeschichte des Volkes,' iii. 32; 'Die Deutsche Arbeit,' ib.; 'Land und Leute,' ib.

Riemann, influence of Darwin and, iii. 180; dissertation on 'Hypotheses of Geometry,' ib.; mathematical investigations of, 181.

VOL. IV.

Rights of Man, iv. 421.

Ripley, 'Introductory Notice to Jouve froy's Essays' quoted, iii. 307.

Ritschl, A., 'Geschichte des Pietismus,' iii. 33; iv. 266, 275; science of theology, 306; 320, 322, 406; synoptic view, 321 sqq.; Justification and Reconciliation, 322; 'Theology and Metaphysics, 322, 323; appreciation of Lotze's Philosophy, 324 sqq., 326; and Zeller, 339 sqq.; 343; independence of religious beliefs, 348 sqq., 382 sqq., 395, 621.

Ritschl, Fr., 'Parerga,' iii. 136; Criticism as practised by Hermann and, 137; 138, 139; Hermann and, 140; Examination and collation of Plays of Plautus, 140; 141, 142; Ribbeck's Life of, 142; archaic Latin and text of Plautus, 143; and Liebig compared, 145; 146, 147; school of, 156; 160, 175; iv. 320.

Ritschl, O., 'Ueber Werth urelheile,' iv. 103; 'Leben' of A. Ritschl quoted, 321.

Ritschlianism, iv. 322, 548 sqq.

Ritter, H., 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' iii. 37; 410; iv. 181, 319.

Ritter, Karl, iii. 153; greatest geographer of nineteenth century, 154; 155; Bögekamp, 'Karl Ritter,' 155; 160; 167.

Robertson, G. Croom, ii. 8; in 'Mind,' 66; 275; 'Hobbes,' iv. 130; 375, 772.

Robin, Ch., quoted, iv. 517.

Robson and Taylor, transl. of Dorner's 'History of Protestant Theology in Germany,' iii. 161.

Rocheforcauld, La, iii. 201.

Rödbertus, iv. 537.

Roland, iv. 200.

Romanists, school of, iv. 140.

Romantic School, iv. 8, 24; Hellenic and, 36; 45, 48, 60, 126, 311; movement, 288.

Romanticism, Schelling and, iv. 24.

Romanticists, attitude in religion, iv. 301; 312.

Ronsard to Victor Hugo, iii. 98.

Rosas, Anton, iii. 588.

Roscher, W., iii. 130, 133; iv. 543, 552, 554.

Rosenkranz, Karl, 'History of the Kantian Philosophy,' iii. 74; 'Kant's Works,' 74; quoted, 341; 342; 469; iv. 15; ed. 'Metaphysic der Sitten' quoted, 144; 460.

Rothe, Richard, iv. 266; 'Theologische Ethik,' 325; 326.
INDEX.

Rousseau, iii. 115; and Diderot, 201; 256, 257; 299, 340; 'Confessions,' 355; problem of education in France, 363; 452, 453; iv. 11, 13; and the Revolution, 132; sentimentalism of, 134; influence on Kant, 145; 'Emile,' ib.; 146; and education in Switzerland, 203, 291; and Kant, 277; 288, 296; and Hamann, 301, 421; Herder and, 423; 427, 449, 450 sqq., 153, 524, 548, 611.

Royce, Josiah, 'Kant's Terminology' in Baldwin's 'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,' iii. 436; 'Hegel's Terminology,' 436; papers in 'Philosophical Review,' 438; iv. 437.

Royer-Collard, iii. 4; 231; and Cousin, 235, 270.

Ruge, Arnold, and Feuerbach, iv. 199.

Ruskin, iii. 423, 465; 'Modern Painters' quoted, 608; 612, 614, 626; iv. 14, 32; 47, 57, 95; 'Stones of Venice,' 53; Discussions on the Beautiful, 57 sqq.; Social importance of Art, 99; 100, 101, 124, 125, 248.

Rayssen, T., on Comte, quoted, iv. 490.

Sabatier, 'Modernism,' iv. 349.

Sage, Le, iv. 620.

Saint-Hilaire, Barthélemy, 'Life of Victor Cousin,' iii. 426.

Saint-Simon, Comte de, iii. 304, 377, 423; socialistic theories of, iv. 133; influence on Comte, 188; 462, 466 sqq.; Comte and, 470; 472, 478, 482, 483, 495, 497, 539.

Saint-Simon, Duc de, iv. 466.

Saintsbury, Prof., 'History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe,' iii. 96; iv. 4; 99, 127; 'Periods of European Literature,' 288; 426.

Sanchez, François, 'Tractatus de multum nobilibi, &c., iii. 320.

Sanskrit, study of, iii. 147; Bopp's conjunction of, 147.

Saunders, T. B., iii. 75; iv. 394.

Savigny, historical school founded in opposition to philosophical school of Thibaut, iii. 132; controversy with, ib.; 'Task of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence,' ib.

Say, J. B., iv. 543.

Scaliger, Jos. J., iii. 147; iv. 320.

Science. Ethics and British, iv. 127; and Religion, problem of, 727; influence of, on philosophical thought, 737 sqq.

Schaarschmidt, iii. 175.

Schäffle, A., iv. 521 sqq.

Schasler, Max, 'History of Aesthetic as the Philos. of the Beautiful and of Art,' iv. 14; quoted, 18; treatment of Aesthetics and Philosophy, 26; 57, 62; criticism of Lotze's writings, 65; 'Die Dioskuren,' ib.; 102, 125.

Schelling, iii. 30, 39; "positive" philosophy, 55, 487, 488, 614; 66, 119; 'Relation of Plastic Arts to Nature,' 155; and Hegel, 169, 197, 176, 171, 175, 179; 'Philosophy of Nature,' 292, 486, 547, 548, 550, 553, 583; 249, 250, 252; to Schopenhauer, 253, 258, 350, 364; artist and poet, 366; 'Werke' quoted, 367; 490; 'Methods of Academic Study,' 368; quoted, 369; his influence on Fechner, 370; and Fichte, 372, 445; 373; Hegel, 'Werke' quoted, 374; 380, 381, 387, 388; influence on Schopenhauer, 383, 385; 446, 450, 451, 453, 454; Introductory Lecture at Munich quoted, 455; 456; enriched philosophical language, 457; love of nature, 458; conception of the Absolute, 459, 507, 584; 460, 461, 462; on Fichte's Lectures, 'Über das Wesen des Gelehrten,' 463, 464; quoted, 465, 467; Address at Munich: 'Relation of the Fine Arts to Nature,' 468; 469, 470, 472, 473, 477, 479; religious turn, 489; philosophy of Freedom, 489; 490, 492; 'Aus Schelling's Leben,' 493; 494, 499, 504, 508, 514, 517, 518, 520, 526, 529, 545, 548; quoted, 549, 550; biological appeal of, 553, 554, 555; view of Nature, 556; 557, 561, 586, 588; 'Essence of human freedom,' 589, 590; 'Absolutism,' 591; 593, 596, 613, 614, 615, 616; speculations of, 619; iv. 16; philosopher of Romanticism, 24, 29; influence of Goethe, 32; philosophy of, 37; on art and the problem of reality, 59; Address before Munich Academy quoted, ib.; 47, 57, quoted 99; 'Werke,' 39, 47; contemporary of Goethe, 40; Transcendental Idealism, 41, 44; 42, 43; 'Collected Works' quoted, 44; and Mythology, 45, 46; want of logical method, 47; on Dante, ib.; want of definite method, 48; 53; Art abandoned for Mysticism, 56, 57; 'intellectual intuition,' 58, 406; 59; ideas on Aesthetics, 60; polemics with Jacobi, 61; 'intellectual sight,' 62; 65, 68, 69, 75, 79, 83; "alogical" principle, 84;
INDEX.

87, 92, 98, 101, 105, 107; metaphysical system of, 129, 137, 162; Fichte's successor, 166, 168, 171; and Schleiermacher, 172; 173 sqq.; 'Werke,' 175; speculations of, 186, 266; nature and mind as opposites, 193; idealistic system, 205; 211, 216; intellectual intuition of Fichte and, 286; 289, 290, 293; Jacobi, 300; 'Philosophy of Nature,' 310; 311, 314, 316; Tract on 'Freedom,' 317; 'Ans Schelling's Leben in Briefen,' ib.; 'Inaugural Address,' 318; 'classics,' 325; opposition to Hegel, 327; influenced by Boehme, 328; monistic speculations of, 342; 347, 361; 389; existence of evil, 373; 405; 477, 479; 500, 538, 565, 595, 596, 603, 604, 630 sqq.; 643, 646, 650, 670, 672, 674, 675, 740.

Schiller, J., transl. Mill's 'System of Logic,' iii. 374.

Schiller, Fr. iii. 98, 120, 138; and Goethe, 257, 355; appointed to Chair of History, Jena, 363; 444, 453, 462, 471, 473; 'Güter Griechenlands,' 626; "aesthetical education of man," iv. 7; 'The Vulgar,' ib.; 'Song of the Bell,' 11, 12; appreciation and assimilation of Kant's views, 13; philosophy of the Beautiful, 14; 15, 17; 'Die Künstler,' 16, 19; "Kunst-

Kunstidee," 16; and Körner, 18; 'The Artists,' 19; and Fichte, 20; speculations on the Beautiful, 21; assimilation of Kantian ethics, ib.; 'Ideal and Life,' ib.; 22, 24, 26, 28; letters to Duke of Augustenburg in 'The Hours,' 28, 35, 36; "play-theory," 30, 39, 108; "aesthetical education of mankind," 31; 'Naive and Sentimentalische Dichtung,' ib., 42; correspondence with Körner, Goethe, and Humboldt, 32; philosophical Essays, 34; 'Thalia,' 35; influence of Kant's philosophy on, 'Grace and Dignity,' ib., 160; quoted, 36; 'Das Ideal und das Leben,' ib.; contrast of Realism and Idealism in poetry, 36; aethetical intuition of, 44; 46, 90, 91, 92, 93, 105, 110; Letters on Aesthetical Education of Humanity, 114; and Goethe, 149; Kant and, 156; Aesthetical theories, 156; influenced by Hellenic ideal, ib.; assimilated doctrine of Kant, 157; 'Don Carlos,' 158; opposition to rigorism of Kant, 159; 166; and Fichte, 270; philosophical writings of, 292; Goethe and, 299; 316, 425, 474, 479.

Schlegel, A. W., iv. 514.

Schlegel, Fr., iii. 473; 'Lucinde,' iv. 46; theory of artistic Irony, 59, 172; 'Philosophy of History,' 423.

Schlegel's, the, iv. 173, 311, 426 (see also Romantic School).

Schleiden, iii. 258; iv. 304, 518.

Schleiermacher, transl. of 'Plato,' iii. 26; 37, 40, 58; Lectures, 141; 168; religious Discourses, 162, 163; on 1st Epistle to Timothy, 166; posthumously published Lectures, 167; comparison of Daub and, 167; 170, 171, 172, 175, 258, 272, 372, 357, 394; influence on Ueberweg, 411; 454, 469, 472, 480, 493, 505, 508, 526, 529, 591; and Croce, iv. 122 sqq.; and Ethics, 129; 182, 185; influenced by Kant, 171; 'Addresses on Religion,' 172, 308, 313, 316, 640 sqq.; 'Monologues,' 172, 180, 308, 313, 316; 'Letters on Schlegel's Lucinde,' ib.; 173, 174; quoted, 175; 'Diary' quoted, 176; conception of Christian Church and life, 177 sqq.; contrast with Hegel, 180; Highest Good, ib.; philosophy similar to that of Socrates, 181; 205, 222, 247, 266; religion and philosophy, 268; teaching of, 271, 272; psychology, 274; 'Reden über die Religion,' ib., 305, 382; centre of religious speculation in Germany, 287, 289; 'Addresses,' 296; and Jacobi, 300; grasp of historical religion, 305; and Dilthey, ib. sqq.; and Moravian Brotherhood, 307; akin to Leibniz, 308; 309 sqq.; pantheistic side of, 311; 312; solution of religious problem, 313 sqq.; 'Lectures,' 315, 317; his psychology neglected, 316; 318 sqq.; 320, 321; and Ritschl, 322, 340; psychological question, 323; Kant and Hegel, treatment of religious conception, 324 sqq.; "classics," 326; 327; Lotze and Hegel, 333; "the Miraculous," 334; and Hegel, 339, 343; and religious beliefs, 348 sqq.; 368 sqq.; and Martineau, 377, 381; 'Der Christliche Glaube,' 382; 383, 395, 398, 406, 477; 580, 584, 596, 620, 621, 630; 665, 669, 718, 772.

Schlosser, Fr. Chr., 'History, written from a philosophical Point of View,' iii. 150.

Schmidt, Carl, 'Geschichte der Päda-
gogik, iii. 117.

VOL. IV.
Schmidt, Leopold, iv. 172.
Schneller, Gustav, quoted, iv. 478; on Socialism, 536; quoted, 551.
Schenk, E., ‘World as Will and Intelligences,’ 55; 56, 57, 75; “Pessimism,” 77; 78, 79, 84; Frauenstätt’s ‘Letters on Philosophy’ of, 74; Gwinner’s Biography of, 74; 94, 104, 125; philosophy of, 177, 417; Kant to, 238; 243; Schelling to, 253; 272; ‘Parerga and Paralipomena,’ 316; 347; Will, 393, 418, 507; “Voluntarism,” 418, 423, 520; 419, 438, 439, 469, 480, 481, 482; and Wieland quoted, 483; 484, 455, 486, 492, 493, 508, 521; philosophical view of Nature, 586; ‘Will in Nature’ quoted, 586, 589; ‘Werke’ quoted, 587; influenced by Fichte, 588; an idealist and romanticist, 589; idealistic system, 590, 594, 596; iv. 50; von Hartmann and, 69; “the Will,” 69, 75 sqq.; peculiarity of his philosophy, 70 sqq.; interpretation of Beautiful in nature as in art, 75; assimilates Plato’s doctrine of ideas, 76 sqq.; grouping of the arts, 79; theory of music, 126 sqq.; and Guyau, 102, 110, 126; Wagner and, 81; 83; and v. Hartmann, 55 sqq.; 102, 110, 126; 199; and pamphleteering style, 200, 201; pessimism of, 203; 204, 208; primacy of the Will, 209 sqq.; “Will-philosophy,” 210; 216; 246; and Nietzsche, 247; and Fichte’s solution of the problem of reality, 285; 286; and Schleiermacher, 317; Hegel and, 360 sqq.; and Nietzsche, 390 sqq.; 394; ‘The World as Will and Idea,’ 394; 511, 537, 596, 612, 630, 635 sqq.; 666, 670, 672; and Comte, 685; 688, 721, 722, 730, 747, 752, 763 sqq.
Schubert, ‘Geschichte der Seele,’ iii. 591; on Kant, iv. 146.
Schulze, Johannes, iii. 141; 208, 251, 589.
Schumacher, iv. 552.
Schurz, Carl, Reminiscences of, iv. 53.
Schmitt, iii. 354.
Schwann, iv. 518.
Schwarz, Carl, ‘Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie,’ iii. 165; 172, 175.
Scott, Sir Walter, iv. 246, 329.
Scottish School, Thomas Reid and, iii. 219; of Philosophy, 224; 239, 312, 315; of Common-sense, 510, 611, 625.
Séailles, Gab., ‘History of the Problems of Philosophy,’ iii. 57.
Seelenfrage, Die, iii. 197, 198, 261; iv. 102.
Seelenlehre, Psychology, iii. 198.
Seeleussubstanz, Göttingen, ii. 261.
Selves, the two, Josiah Royce on, iv. 437.
Seth, Andrew (see Pringle-Patton), iv. 224; quoted, 226.
Shakespeare, iii. 114; iv. 8; 136; immediateness of, 35; 60, 98; Lyrics of, 426; quoted, 520.
Shaftesbury, iii. 224, 225, 324; iv. 6, 16; and Hutcheson, 27, 104; ‘Hymn,’ 135; Moral Order, 167.
Shelley, iii. 609; iv. 173.
Sidgwick, Henry, ‘Philosophy of Common-sense,’ iii. 4, 66; ‘Methods of Ethics,’ 186; 189, 314; ‘Outlines of the History of Ethics,’ iv. 138; ‘Methods of Ethics,’ 150, 187, 221, 223, 224, 250, 380; ethical treatises of, 168; and Letze, 224 sqq.; 381, 402, 748, 756.
Simmel, Geo., ‘Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft,’ iv. 250.
Smith, Adam, iii. 5; influence of, 133; and Political Economy, iv. 127; successor to Hutcheson in Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, 142; Industrial problem, 143; ‘Wealth of Nations,’ 114; theory of moral sentiments, 189; 429; 452, 453, 456 sqq.; 460, 463; 496, 539, 540, 543, 558.
Social problem, the, in history, iii. 51 sqq.; iv. 162, 420 sqq.; contract, 421; its three main questions, 446; science, 530; central position of, with Comte and Spencer, 700 sqq.
Socialism, iv. 470, 478, 535 sqq.
Socialists, the, iv. 465.
Society, biological view of, iv. 516 sqq.
Sociology, Comte and doctrine of, iv.
INDEX.

individualism, 149; in 'Mind' quoted, 224; on de Morgan quoted, 375; 'Dictionary of National Biography,' ib.; quoted, 424.
Stern, ii. 128.
Stewart, Dugald, Thos. Reid and, iii. 202; 232; Jas. Mitchell, 273; 375.
Stokes, iv. 709.
Stout, G. F., 'Articles in Mind' on Beneke and Herbert, ii. 202; 205; 'Herbert compared with English Psychologists,' 206; 208, 209; 'Analytic Psychology,' 11, 278; 289; iv. 778.
Strabo, iii. 154.
Strass, David Fr., iii. 37, 99; 'Life of Jesus,' 156; iv. 198, 338; iii. 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173; Hegel and, 174; writings of Feuerbach and, 176; iv. 110, 172; 318 sqq.; 343; 'Der alte und der neue Glaube,' 344; 368, 427, 504, 524.
Strohle, E., in 'Lexis,' iii. 133.
Stubbs, iii. 32.
Sturm, Jos., 'Litterata pietas,' iii. 116.
Sturt, Henry, iii. 94.
St Augustine, iv. 138, 392, 398, 420.
St Irenæus and St Bernard's 'Works,' ed. by Massuet, iii. 170.
St Thomas, Plato to, iv. 277.
"Sub specie æterni," Spinoza, iii. 334.
"Sub specie æternitatis," ii. 282, 549; iv. 338.
"Sub specie uniformitatis," iv. 338.
"Sub specie universi," Leibniz, iii. 334.
Substance, iv. 760.
Sully, J., 'History of Pessimism,' iii. 75, 78; iv. 394.
 Supernatural, nature of the, iv. 341.
Swift, iii. 128.
Sydenham, iii. 342.
Sylvester, Prof., iii. 105.
Symposium, iv. 374, 380, 394 (see also 'Nineteenth Century').
Synopsis and synoptical view, iii. 192 sqq. (see also 'Together' of things); aspect or view, iv. 180, 199; aspect of reality, 235; 314, 315; A. Ritschl and, 321; 343, 344, 382, 417, 422, 451, 454 sqq.; 561, 583, 774 sqq.; 786 sqq.
Synthesis, creative, Wundt on, iii. 396, 397; iv. 722.
System, absence of, since Spencer and Wundt, iv. 726 sqq.

Tabula rasa, iii. 228, 229, 281.
Taine, H., 'Origines de la France Contemporaine,' iii. 32; 227, 228, 229, 270; 'De l'Intelligence,' 271; iv. 507 sqq., 235; Fouillée on, 239, 388; on Jacobin programme, quoted, 442; on the milien, 505 sqq.; 506 sqq.; on the Epoch, 507; his 'History of English Literature,' 508 sqq. Barth on, 509, 524.
Tait, P. G., 'Properties of Matter,' iii. 199; 'Natural Philosophy,' 576; controversy with Spencer, 577; 582.
Tait and Thomson, iv. 709; 758, 759.
Talbot, Dr (Ritschlianism), iv. 349.
Tannery, Jules, iii. 385.
Tarde, Gab., iv. 555; 562 sqq.; Ward on, 561; his Social Laws, 564; his Criticism of Spencer, 565 sqq.; Individualistic Theory, 563; quoted, 566, 567; 576, 579.
Taylor and Robson's transl. of Donner's 'History of Protestant Theology in Germany,' iii. 161.
Taylor, Sedley, iv. 553.
Tendencies of recent thought, iv. 786 sqq.
Tennyson, Prefatory Poem to 'Nineteenth Century Review' quoted, iii. 530; iv. 99, 374.
Testament, New and Old, iv. 166, 336, 339.
Tetens, iii. 201; Wolf and, 238; 339.
Théâtre, 'Chemistry,' iii. 519.
Theodicy, iv. 194, 198, 346.
Theognis, iii. 99.
Theology, School of Speculative, iv. 168; Philosophy and, 263.
Theological and philosophical literature, distinction in Germany between, iv. 265.

Tihant, founded philosophical school, iii. 132; controversy with Savigny, ib.; 'Necessity of a general Civil Code for Germany,' ib.
Thiersch, Fr., 'Reform of High School System in Bavaria,' iii. 141.
"Thing in itself," iii. 251, 345, 346, 347, 361, 393; Nonmenon or, 418; 437, 438; Unknowable, 439; 440, 441,
Wissenschaft,' 198; 261; 562; 563; and Büchner, iv. 341; 693.
Volney, 'Catechism of Natural Law' (Principles of Morals), iii. 394; iv. 468.
Volney, 'Einleitung Oberon,' 253, 722. Voss, J. H., 'Lause,' iii. 129; Homer and Virgil interpreted by, 145; Epics of Homer, iv. 34.

Wachsmuth, Curt., 'Einleitung in das Studium der Alten Geschichte,' iii. 145.
Wagner, Richard, iv. 14, 53; on Schopenhauer quoted, 81; 86. Wagner, Rudolph, 'Physiologische Briefe,' iii. 198; 259, 261; 'Dictionary,' 266; "vital Force" in 'Handwörterbuch,' 562.
Waltz, Georg, iii. 148.
Waltz, Theod., and Anthropology, iv. 212, 513.
Wallace, W., trans., and commentaries on Hegel, iii. 258; ii. 22, 216; Prolegomena to Study of Hegel, 216; Essays, 'Hegel's Philosophy of Mind,' 216.

Ward, J., 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' iii. 186, 618; 265, 240; Treatises in 'Mind' and 'Encyclopaedia Britannica,' 266; 269; 'Psychological Principles,' 277; 282; Gifford Lectures. 278, 397, 542; 625; 'General Analysis of Mind,' 278; 279; compared with Bain, 280; 'Psychology,' 281; 288, 289; 538; 'Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism,' 512; (sensory and motor presentation-continuum, iv. 163, 230; Gifford Lectures, 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' 229; 'Pluralism and Theism,' 16; 315; intersubjective communion, 338; 437; on intersubjective intercourse, 561; his Gifford Lectures, 701; quoted, 702; 731, 793 sqq.
Weber, C. M. von, iii. 314.
Wegele, F. von, iii. 150; 'Geschichte der deutschen Historiographie,' 159.
Weill, Georges, iv. 467.
Weisse, Chr. H., iii. 39, 175, 297, 508; iv. 15; philosophy of, 60; 'Kleine Schriften,' 61; Lecture Syllabus on Ästhetics, 61, 62; theosophical view, 62; Lotze's version of doctrine of, 65; 68, 87; speculations of, 266, 326 sqq.; and Hegel, 328 sqq.; 'Philosophische Dogmatik,' &c., 329.
Welcker, iii. 139, 152.
Weltanschauung, iv. 598.
Weltlasshler, iii. 598.
Wortbehrung, 'Conception of value or worth,' iii. 410. Wesley, John, iv. 287.
'Westminster Review,' Spencer's Essays in, iii. 551.
Whittaker, Thos., iii. 75, 99; 'Priests, Philosophers and Prophets,' 185; 200; 'Schopenhauer,' quoted, iv. 391 sqq.; 394; quoted, 421; quoted, 443; on Comte and Mill quoted, 489; 773. White of Selborne, iv. 99.
Wieland, Franco-classical style, iii. 129; 353; 'Der deutsche Merkur,' 352; 354; 'Oberon,' 355; 453; and Schopenhauer quoted, 483; iv. 16. Wilamowitz, U. von, iii. 128; 137; in 'Lexis,' 143, 146; 152.
Will to Believe, iv. 347.
Will, principle of the, iv. 671 sqq.; 717; Wundt on Collective, 716; the philosophy of the, 722.
Williams, H. H., 'Ethics' on Nietzsche quoted, iv. 249.
Willmann, O., iv. 276; 'Geschichte des Idealismus' quoted, 277. Willy, Rudolph, 'Die Krisis in der Psychologie,' iii. 283; 288.
Winckelmann, Reform of Art by Criticism, iii. 114; 'Reflections on Imitation of Grecian Works in Painting and Sculpture,' 114; German art criticism, iv. 8; 10; classicism of, 11; 17; study of Greek sculpture, 34; 92, 98, 99, 124.
Windelband, W., 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' iii. 38; quoted, 119; 326; 'Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,' 38; quoted, 327, 328, 468, 467; iv. 145; 'History of Philosophy,' iii. 57, 350, 437; 317, 329; on Bayle quoted, 333; 'Vierteljahresschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie,' 340; 346; quoted, 348; 350, 361; 'Die Philosophie im Beginn,' &c., quoted, 375; 408; 'Grosse Denker' quoted, 408; 409.
INDEX.

435; on Logic, 430; quoted, 458; Irrationalism, 454, 466, 463, 485; on Schelling, 487; 'History of Philosophy' quoted, 593; and Lotze, iv. 65; 627; quoted, 650.

Windischmann, iii. 493.

Wissenschaft, iii. 407, 425, 474, 485.


Wolff, F. A., iii. 49, 74; 121; 'Scientific Aims of,' 138; 139; Seminary at Halle, 141; School of, 143, 236; 145, 147, 152; Heyne and, 164; 256; 303; Erics of Homer, iv. 34; 307.

Wolff, Chr., iii. 201; 'Rationalism,' 128; faculty psychology, 339, 342, 472; 480; iv. 616, 656, 739.

Wordsworth, Prelude, iii. 255; 'Miscellaneous Poems,' 314; influence on Mill, 378; 528, 609, 614, 626; iv. 14, 47, 57, 97, 99, 246, 359.

Wundt, W., iii. 58, 66, 67; 'System of Philosophy,' 71; 72, 73, 74, 83; 'Wir sind alle Epigonen,' 95; 101; 'Anthropologie' ('Volkerpsychologie'), 163; 215, 253; 271, 280, 283; 'actuality' theory, 288; 289, 337; on Mill in 'Die Philosophie im Beginn,' &c., 575; analysis of mental life, 390; 397; on creative synthesis, ib.; iv. 712; iii. 430, 431, 513, 515, 516, 517; Centenary Address on Fechner, 520; quoted, 550; 542; 'Metaphysics,' 546; 554; 'Physical Axioms and their relation to the principle of Causality,' 578; 582; critical problem, 594; 'Actuality,' 595; 'Naive Realism,' 596; 614, 619; and anthropology, iv. 212; voluntarism in ethics, 254; 'Ethik,' transl. Titchener, ib., 255, 267; physiological studies, 275, 396, 422, 525, 570, 571, 579 sqq., 597, 608, 613, 627; relation to Mill and Spencer, 709; his philosophical development referred to, 711 sqq.; on Collective Will, 716; on Personality, 716 sqq.; 722; fundamental necessity of conviction, 719 sqq.; 724, 731; relative absence of system, 726 sqq.; 757 sqq.

Young, Thos., iii. 21, 92.

'Zeitschrift für Alterthumswissenschaft,' iii. 140.

Zeller, Eduard, 'Philosophie der Griechen,' iii. 37; 40, 41; 'Gesammelte Abhandlungen,' 72, 73, 74; on Strauss, 99; Erkenntnisstheorie, 126; 130; 296; 'Ueber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie,' 297; 468; iv. 172, 319; Polemics with Albrecht Ritschl, 339; 'Vorträge und Abhandlungen' quoted, 339; 343, 583.

Züller, iii. 69.

Zimmermann, Robt., 'History of Esthetic as a philosophical Science,' iv. 14; 'Herbartian Aesthetics,' 105.

Zuckschwerdt, O., iv. 296.
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